Asiatic Mode of Production

The Asiatic mode of production (AMP) has been a major point of contention among both the
Marxist and Non-Marxist scholars alike. Such debates pivot around the empirical validity of
the AMP that means the question of “whether or not it corresponds to the reality of certain
societies” (Hindess and Hirst 1975, 178). Instead of engaging with the empirical
controversies Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, in their book ‘Pre-Capitalist Modes of
Production’ (1975), consider the problem of theoretically constructing of the concept AMP.
With reference to the Marxist theory of mode of production, they intend to inquire whether
AMP qualifies as a specific mode of production distinct from others.

To analyse whether AMP fits into the frame of a mode of production it is crucial to
explain first the notion of modes of production in Marxist theory that Hindess and Hirst
(1975) adheres to. “A mode of production is an articulated combination of relations and
forces of production structured by the dominance of relations of production.” (Ibid., 9) The
relations of production define a definite mode of appropriation of surplus labour and its
corresponding specific form of the social distribution of means of production. To illustrate
this, consider the case of capitalist mode of production:

Capitalist relations of production define a mode of appropriation of surplus-labour

which works by means of commodity exchange. Capitalists buy means of production
and items of personal consumption from each other. They buy labour-power from
laborers in exchange for wages. With these wages the laborers buy items of personal
consumption from capitalists and must then sell their labour-power for a further
period in order to be able to buy further means of personal consumption.
Appropriation of surplus-labour here depends on a difference between the value of
labour-power and the value that may be created by means of that labour-power.
Surplus-labour takes the form of surplus-value. This appropriation of surplus-labour
presupposes that means of production are in the hands of the capitalists, since
otherwise there is no necessity for the labourers to obtain means of consumption
through the sale of their labour-power. Thus, capitalist relations of production define
a mode of appropriation of surplus-labour in the form of surplus-value, and a social
distribution of the means of production so that these are the property of non-
labourers (Ibid., 10).

Hindess cand Hirst following Marx’s Capital argues that each distinct mode of appropriating
surplus product supposes a distinct structure of relations of production and each structure
of relations of production corresponds to a particular set of forces of production. Therefore,
they consider the mode of appropriation of surplus product as an initial index of the
existence or non-existence of a mode of production.

In the discussions of the Asiatic mode of production, the state stands as the exploiter
of surplus-labour; there is no exploiting class independent of state. The land is the state
property where the state subjects perform their necessary as well as the surplus labour. The
supposed mode of appropriation of surplus labour of AMP appears to be the ‘tax/rent
couple’. For Hindess and Hirst the problem boils down to deciphering the fact that whether
there exists any articulated combination of forces of production (FOP) and relations of
production (ROP) that corresponds to the tax/rent couple.

TAX/RENT COUPLE

Unlike the capitalist ground rent, which denotes only a portion of total appropriated surplus
value paid to the landowner as payment for providing conditions of existence that means a
subsumed class payment in Class-focused Marxist terms (Resnick and Wolff, 1987), the pre-
capitalist forms of rent signify “forms of appropriation of the surplus-product” (Hindess and
Hirst 1975, 189). Thus, pre-capitalist rent is comparable to the surplus-value of capitalist
mode of production. Feudal rent is considered as the fundamental form of pre-capitalist.
Marx in Capital volume 3 mentions another form of pre-capitalist that prevailed in Asia as
the mode of appropriation of surplus labour where the state, in the absence of private
property in land, confronts the subjects simultaneously as their landlord as well as the
sovereign; the rent and tax coincide (Ibid.; Marx Capital, III). The coupling of sovereignty and
landed proprietorship in the state leads to the tax/rent couple.

In order to proceed with the question whether the tax/rent couple corresponds to
any articulated combination of FOP and ROP, Hindess and Hirst (1975) delve deeper into the
aspects of tax/rent related to forces and relation of production. The following conditions
have been deduced from tax/rent system:

1) This mode of appropriation supposes a social division of labour into labourers and non-
labourers. The state assumes the latter role whereas the state subjects the former.
2) The state is the sole proprietor of all land; it appears as the collective landlord. There is
no private property in land.
3) However, there prevails non-separation of the direct producers and the means of
production. The state subjects have effective possession of the land.
4) Non-commodity production prevails in the agriculture. There is no social division of
labour; agriculture and handicrafts form a unity.
5) The state extracts surplus in the form of tax. State taxes are also simultaneously a form
of rent as they represent the conditions of possession and use of land by the state
subjects.
6) The distribution of the means of production is politically determined. “This political
determination of the distribution of the means of production operates within the limits
of the non-separation of the direct producers from the means of production.” (Ibid., 194)
7) As a consequence of this limited state intervention, there arises two distinct units of
production: a) independent peasant farmers; b) collectives of direct producers organized
into communities.
8) These forms of units of production accord with forms of tax. In case of the independent
peasants, the state taxes the independent landholdings which can either be paid by the
individual peasants directly to the state or via a union consisting of individual farmers
responsible to the tax debt. On the contrary, in case of the collectives, even though the
members of the collective pay taxes independently it is the commune that is unit of
landholding and remains ultimately responsible for the tax debt.

Units of Production and The Incoherence in AMP

It seems from the supposed structure of AMP that all the state subjects that means the
direct producers performs the surplus labour and the state’s rulers and functionaries, the
non-labourers, appropriate that surplus through the mechanism of state power. However,
the reality differs a lot more from this scenario. Since the state, apart from granting the
tenancy tenure and fixing the rate of tax, does not seek to exert direct control over the
production process the direct producers obtain certain degree of autonomy regarding the
organization of production process. This results in the emergence of two different types of
units of production – individual farms and communes (here, the forms of units do not
merely correspond to their respective landholdings and tax liability but rather to their
arrangement of production). Moreover, within the communes there exists the division of
labour between the agriculture and handicrafts, which makes the commune self-reliant and
self-reproducing; in case of independent peasant farming, such division of labour takes place
within the local community. Thus, the units of production do not depend on some other
units to secure their conditions of existence.

“The units of production,” Hindess and Hirst argue, “are also separated from the
state which plays no necessary role in production – state taxes are a simple deduction from
an already produced stock of values.” (Ibid., 194-5) In terms of the Class-focused Marxist
understanding, the state receives subsumed class payment (SCP) instead of fundamental
class payment (FCP) as the state does not appropriate the entire surplus produce directly but
acquires its tax/rent from the appropriated surplus-product of the units of production. It,
therefore, rules out the plausibility of any fundamental class relation between the state and
its subjects. In the sphere of production there prevails AA independent class process in case
of individual peasants, and for the communes there exists either CA communitic class
process [exploitative] or the CC communist class process [non-exploitative] (See Resnick and
Wolff 1987; Chakrabarti and Dhar 2009). However, Hindess and Hirst do not follow this Class-
focused Marxist trajectory and hence they explain the incoherence in AMP through their
modes of production understanding.

Hindess and Hirst (1975) recognize two distinct sets of FOP, one corresponding to the
independent peasant farming and the other to communal cultivation. They argue that “scale
and forms of labor involved in communal production are quite different from independent
holdings” (Hindess and Hirst 1975, 196). Communal form of production promotes the co-
operative working by the members of the commune and also division of labor among them,
which enables the commune to perform regularly large-scale tasks such as drainage,
irrigation, etc. On the other hand, the independent peasant farms predominantly depend on
the labor of the peasant and his family, and thus restrict the scope for cooperation and
division of labor; large-scale tasks are undertaken only through special agreement among
independent peasants.

The substitution of one set of FOP for the other does not impact the ROP. That is to
say, if the independent peasant farms are substituted for communal production or vice-
versa that does not transform the tax/rent mode of appropriation of surplus-labor. Nor does
it alter the relation of laborer/non-laborer i.e., the relation between the state and its
subjects. The supposed ROP of the tax/rent couple remains unaltered despite the
alterations in FOP because both sets of forces are equally compatible with and deducible
from this production relations. “There can be no articulated combination of forces and
relations of production here since the relation of the relations (ROP) and forces (FOP) is
characterised by a necessary arbitrariness.” (Ibid., 196)

Thus, the first reason that Hindess and Hirst (1975) identify behind the impossibility
of a mode of production corresponding to the tax/rent couple is the existence of two
different and arbitrarily variant sets of FOP. In addition to this, neither of these two sets of
productive forces corresponds to the so-called production relation which assumes the state
as the exploiter and its subjects as exploited; they adhere to some other relations of
production. Hindess and Hirst mention that neither communal production nor independent
cultivation suppose an exploitative ROP (however, as I mentioned earlier, from the Class-
focused Marxist perspective, in the independent peasant farming non-exploitative class
relations prevails, and for the communes, class relations might be either exploitative or non-
exploitative).

The tax/rent couple fails to establish itself as a “special mode of appropriation

different from the general form of all state taxation.” (Ibid., 197) Further, no articulated
combination of FOP and ROP can be formed corresponding to tax/rent couple. Therefore,
Asiatic mode of production ceases to be a mode of production.