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Pseudoscience

Pseudoscience consists of statements, beliefs, or practices that claim to be both scientific and
factual but are incompatible with the scientific method.[Note 1] Pseudoscience is often
characterized by contradictory, exaggerated or unfalsifiable claims; reliance on confirmation bias
rather than rigorous attempts at refutation; lack of openness to evaluation by other experts;
absence of systematic practices when developing hypotheses; and continued adherence long
after the pseudoscientific hypotheses have been experimentally discredited.[4] It is not the same
as junk science.[7]
A typical 19th-century phrenology
chart: During the 1820s, phrenologists
claimed the mind was located in
areas of the brain, and were attacked
for doubting that mind came from the
nonmaterial soul. Their idea of
reading "bumps" in the skull to predict
personality traits was later
discredited.[1][2] Phrenology was first
termed a pseudoscience in 1843 and
continues to be considered so.[3]

The demarcation between science and pseudoscience has scientific, philosophical, and political
implications.[8] Philosophers debate the nature of science and the general criteria for drawing
the line between scientific theories and pseudoscientific beliefs, but there is widespread
agreement "that creationism, astrology, homeopathy, Kirlian photography, dowsing, ufology,
ancient astronaut theory, Holocaust denialism, Velikovskian catastrophism, and climate change
denialism are pseudosciences."[9] There are implications for health care, the use of expert
testimony, and weighing environmental policies.[9] Recent empirical research has shown that
individuals who indulge in pseudoscientific beliefs generally show lower evidential criteria,
meaning they often require significantly less evidence before coming to conclusions. This can
be coined as a 'jump-to-conclusions' bias that can increase the spread of pseudoscientific
beliefs.[10] Addressing pseudoscience is part of science education and developing scientific
literacy.[11][12]

Pseudoscience can have dangerous effects. For example, pseudoscientific anti-vaccine activism
and promotion of homeopathic remedies as alternative disease treatments can result in people
forgoing important medical treatments with demonstrable health benefits, leading to deaths and
ill-health.[13][14][15] Furthermore, people who refuse legitimate medical treatments for contagious
diseases may put others at risk. Pseudoscientific theories about racial and ethnic classifications
have led to racism and genocide.

The term pseudoscience is often considered pejorative, particularly by purveyors of it, because it
suggests something is being presented as science inaccurately or even deceptively. Therefore,
those practicing or advocating pseudoscience frequently dispute the characterization.[4][16]

Etymology
The word pseudoscience is derived from the Greek root pseudo meaning "false"[17][18] and the
English word science, from the Latin word scientia, meaning "knowledge". Although the term has
been in use since at least the late 18th century (e.g., in 1796 by James Pettit Andrews in
reference to alchemy[19][20]), the concept of pseudoscience as distinct from real or proper
science seems to have become more widespread during the mid-19th century. Among the
earliest uses of "pseudo-science" was in an 1844 article in the Northern Journal of Medicine,
issue 387:

That opposite kind of innovation which pronounces what has been recognized as a
branch of science, to have been a pseudo-science, composed merely of so-called
facts, connected together by misapprehensions under the disguise of principles.

An earlier use of the term was in 1843 by the French physiologist François Magendie, that refers
to phrenology as "a pseudo-science of the present day".[3][21][22] During the 20th century, the word
was used pejoratively to describe explanations of phenomena which were claimed to be
scientific, but which were not in fact supported by reliable experimental evidence.

Dismissing the separate issue of


intentional fraud – such as the Fox
sisters' "rappings" in the 1850s[23] –
the pejorative label pseudoscience
distinguishes the scientific 'us ', at one
extreme, from the pseudo-scientific
'them ', at the other, and asserts that
'our ' beliefs, practices, theories, etc.,
by contrast with that of 'the others ',
are scientific. There are four criteria:
(a) the 'pseudoscientific' group
asserts that its beliefs, practices,
theories, etc., are 'scientific ';
(b) the 'pseudoscientific ' group
claims that its allegedly established
facts are justified true beliefs;
(c) the 'pseudoscientific ' group
asserts that its 'established facts '
have been justified by genuine,
rigorous, scientific method; and
(d) this assertion is false or
deceptive: "it is not simply that
subsequent evidence overturns
established conclusions, but rather
that the conclusions were never
warranted in the first place"[Note 2]
From time to time, however, the usage of the word occurred in a more formal, technical manner
in response to a perceived threat to individual and institutional security in a social and cultural
setting.[25]

Relationship to science
Pseudoscience is differentiated from science because – although it usually claims to be
science – pseudoscience does not adhere to scientific standards, such as the scientific method,
falsifiability of claims, and Mertonian norms.
Scientific method

The scientific method is a continuous


cycle of observation, questioning,
hypothesis, experimentation, analysis
and conclusion.

A number of basic principles are accepted by scientists as standards for determining whether a
body of knowledge, method, or practice is scientific. Experimental results should be reproducible
and verified by other researchers.[26] These principles are intended to ensure experiments can be
reproduced measurably given the same conditions, allowing further investigation to determine
whether a hypothesis or theory related to given phenomena is valid and reliable. Standards
require the scientific method to be applied throughout, and bias to be controlled for or eliminated
through randomization, fair sampling procedures, blinding of studies, and other methods. All
gathered data, including the experimental or environmental conditions, are expected to be
documented for scrutiny and made available for peer review, allowing further experiments or
studies to be conducted to confirm or falsify results. Statistical quantification of significance,
confidence, and error[27] are also important tools for the scientific method.

Falsifiability
During the mid-20th century, the philosopher Karl Popper emphasized the criterion of
falsifiability to distinguish science from non-science.[28] Statements, hypotheses, or theories
have falsifiability or refutability if there is the inherent possibility that they can be proven false,
that is, if it is possible to conceive of an observation or an argument that negates them. Popper
used astrology and psychoanalysis as examples of pseudoscience and Einstein's theory of
relativity as an example of science. He subdivided non-science into philosophical, mathematical,
mythological, religious and metaphysical formulations on one hand, and pseudoscientific
formulations on the other.[29]

Another example which shows the distinct need for a claim to be falsifiable was stated in Carl
Sagan's publication The Demon-Haunted World when he discusses an invisible dragon that he
has in his garage. The point is made that there is no physical test to refute the claim of the
presence of this dragon. Whatever test one thinks can be devised, there is a reason why it does
not apply to the invisible dragon, so one can never prove that the initial claim is wrong. Sagan
concludes; "Now, what's the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who
spits heatless fire and no dragon at all?". He states that "your inability to invalidate my
hypothesis is not at all the same thing as proving it true",[30] once again explaining that even if
such a claim were true, it would be outside the realm of scientific inquiry.

Mertonian norms
During 1942, Robert K. Merton identified a set of five "norms" which characterize real science. If
any of the norms were violated, Merton considered the enterprise to be non-science. These are
not broadly accepted by the scientific community. His norms were:

Originality: The tests and research done


must present something new to the
scientific community.
Detachment: The scientists' reasons for
practicing this science must be simply
for the expansion of their knowledge.
The scientists should not have personal
reasons to expect certain results.

Universality: No person should be able


to more easily obtain the information of
a test than another person. Social class,
religion, ethnicity, or any other personal
factors should not be factors in
someone's ability to receive or perform a
type of science.

Skepticism: Scientific facts must not be


based on faith. One should always
question every case and argument and
constantly check for errors or invalid
claims.

Public accessibility: Any scientific


knowledge one obtains should be made
available to everyone. The results of any
research should be published and
shared with the scientific community.[31]

Refusal to acknowledge problems


In 1978, Paul Thagard proposed that pseudoscience is primarily distinguishable from science
when it is less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and its
proponents fail to acknowledge or address problems with the theory.[32] In 1983, Mario Bunge
suggested the categories of "belief fields" and "research fields" to help distinguish between
pseudoscience and science, where the former is primarily personal and subjective and the latter
involves a certain systematic method.[33] The 2018 book about scientific skepticism by Steven
Novella, et al. The Skeptics' Guide to the Universe lists hostility to criticism as one of the major
features of pseudoscience.[34]
Criticism of the term
Larry Laudan has suggested pseudoscience has no scientific meaning and is mostly used to
describe human emotions: "If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we
ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science' and 'unscientific' from our vocabulary; they are just
hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us".[35] Likewise, Richard McNally states, "The
term 'pseudoscience' has become little more than an inflammatory buzzword for quickly
dismissing one's opponents in media sound-bites" and "When therapeutic entrepreneurs make
claims on behalf of their interventions, we should not waste our time trying to determine whether
their interventions qualify as pseudoscientific. Rather, we should ask them: How do you know
that your intervention works? What is your evidence?"[36]

Alternative definition
For philosophers Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz "pseudo-science may be defined as one
where the uncertainty of its inputs must be suppressed, lest they render its outputs totally
indeterminate". The definition, in the book Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy,[37]
alludes to the loss of craft skills in handling quantitative information, and to the bad practice of
achieving precision in prediction (inference) only at the expenses of ignoring uncertainty in the
input which was used to formulate the prediction. This use of the term is common among
practitioners of post-normal science. Understood in this way, pseudoscience can be fought
using good practices to assess uncertainty in quantitative information, such as NUSAP and – in
the case of mathematical modelling – sensitivity auditing.
History

The astrological signs of the zodiac

The history of pseudoscience is the study of pseudoscientific theories over time. A


pseudoscience is a set of ideas that presents itself as science, while it does not meet the criteria
to be properly called such.[38][39]

Distinguishing between proper science and pseudoscience is sometimes difficult.[40] One


proposal for demarcation between the two is the falsification criterion, attributed most notably
to the philosopher Karl Popper.[41] In the history of science and the history of pseudoscience it
can be especially difficult to separate the two, because some sciences developed from
pseudosciences. An example of this transformation is the science of chemistry, which traces its
origins to the pseudoscientific or pre-scientific study of alchemy.

The vast diversity in pseudosciences further complicates the history of science. Some modern
pseudosciences, such as astrology and acupuncture, originated before the scientific era. Others
developed as part of an ideology, such as Lysenkoism, or as a response to perceived threats to
an ideology. Examples of this ideological process are creation science and intelligent design,
which were developed in response to the scientific theory of evolution.[42]
Indicators of possible
pseudoscience

Homeopathic preparation
Rhus toxicodendron, derived
from poison ivy

A topic, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be termed pseudoscientific when it is


presented as consistent with the norms of scientific research, but it demonstrably fails to meet
these norms.[43][44]

Use of vague, exaggerated or


untestable claims

Assertion of scientific claims that are


vague rather than precise, and that lack
specific measurements.[45]

Assertion of a claim with little or no


explanatory power.[46]

Failure to make use of operational


definitions (i.e., publicly accessible
definitions of the variables, terms, or
objects of interest so that persons other
than the definer can measure or test
them independently)[Note 3] (See also:
Reproducibility).

Failure to make reasonable use of the


principle of parsimony, i.e., failing to
seek an explanation that requires the
fewest possible additional assumptions
when multiple viable explanations are
possible (See: Occam's razor).[48]

Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-


supported scientific theories possess
well-articulated limitations under which
the predicted phenomena do and do not
apply.[49]

Lack of effective controls in


experimental design, such as the use of
placebos and double-blinding.

Lack of understanding of basic and


established principles of physics and
engineering.[50]
Improper collection of evidence

Assertions that do not allow the logical


possibility that they can be shown to be
false by observation or physical
experiment (See also:
Falsifiability).[28][51]

Assertion of claims that a theory


predicts something that it has not been
shown to predict.[52][45] Scientific claims
that do not confer any predictive power
are considered at best "conjectures", or
at worst "pseudoscience" (e.g., ignoratio
elenchi).[53]
Assertion that claims which have not
been proven false must therefore be
true, and vice versa (See: Argument
from ignorance).[54]

Over-reliance on testimonial, anecdotal


evidence, or personal experience: This
evidence may be useful for the context
of discovery (i.e., hypothesis
generation), but should not be used in
the context of justification (e.g.,
statistical hypothesis testing).[55]

Use of myths and religious texts as if


they were fact, or basing evidence on
readings of such texts.[56]
Use of concepts and scenarios from
science fiction as if they were fact. This
technique appeals to the familiarity that
many people already have with science
fiction tropes through the popular
media.[57]

Presentation of data that seems to


support claims while suppressing or
refusing to consider data that conflict
with those claims.[58] This is an example
of selection bias or cherry picking, a
distortion of evidence or data that arises
from the way that the data are collected.
It is sometimes referred to as the
selection effect.
Repeating excessive or untested claims
that have been previously published
elsewhere, and promoting those claims
as if they were facts; an accumulation of
such uncritical secondary reports, which
do not otherwise contribute their own
empirical investigation, is called the
Woozle effect.[59]

Reversed burden of proof: science


places the burden of proof on those
making a claim, not on the critic.
"Pseudoscientific" arguments may
neglect this principle and demand that
skeptics demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an
assertion regarding the efficacy of a
novel therapeutic technique) is false. It
is essentially impossible to prove a
universal negative, so this tactic
incorrectly places the burden of proof on
the skeptic rather than on the
claimant.[60]

Appeals to holism as opposed to


reductionism to dismiss negative
findings: proponents of pseudoscientific
claims, especially in organic medicine,
alternative medicine, naturopathy and
mental health, often resort to the
"mantra of holism" .[61]
Lack of openness to testing by other
experts

Evasion of peer review before


publicizing results (termed "science by
press conference"):[60][62][Note 4] Some
proponents of ideas that contradict
accepted scientific theories avoid
subjecting their ideas to peer review,
sometimes on the grounds that peer
review is biased towards established
paradigms, and sometimes on the
grounds that assertions cannot be
evaluated adequately using standard
scientific methods. By remaining
insulated from the peer review process,
these proponents forgo the opportunity
of corrective feedback from informed
colleagues.[61]

Some agencies, institutions, and


publications that fund scientific
research require authors to share data
so others can evaluate a paper
independently. Failure to provide
adequate information for other
researchers to reproduce the claims
contributes to a lack of openness.[63]

Appealing to the need for secrecy or


proprietary knowledge when an
independent review of data or
methodology is requested.[63]
Substantive debate on the evidence by
knowledgeable proponents of all
viewpoints is not encouraged.[64]

Absence of progress

Failure to progress towards additional


evidence of its claims.[51][Note 5] Terence
Hines has identified astrology as a
subject that has changed very little in
the past two millennia.[32][49]

Lack of self-correction: scientific


research programmes make mistakes,
but they tend to reduce these errors over
time.[65] By contrast, ideas may be
regarded as pseudoscientific because
they have remained unaltered despite
contradictory evidence. The work
Scientists Confront Velikovsky (1976)
Cornell University, also delves into these
features in some detail, as does the
work of Thomas Kuhn, e.g., The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962) which also discusses some of
the items on the list of characteristics of
pseudoscience.

Statistical significance of supporting


experimental results does not improve
over time and are usually close to the
cutoff for statistical significance.
Normally, experimental techniques
improve or the experiments are
repeated, and this gives ever stronger
evidence. If statistical significance does
not improve, this typically shows the
experiments have just been repeated
until a success occurs due to chance
variations.

Personalization of issues

Tight social groups and authoritarian


personality, suppression of dissent and
groupthink can enhance the adoption of
beliefs that have no rational basis. In
attempting to confirm their beliefs, the
group tends to identify their critics as
enemies.[66]
Assertion of a conspiracy on the part of
the mainstream scientific community,
government, or educational facilities to
suppress pseudoscientific information.
People who make these accusations
often compare themselves to Galileo
Galilei and his persecution by the
Roman Catholic Church; this
comparison is commonly known as the
Galileo gambit.[67]

Attacking the motives, character,


morality, or competence of critics (See
Ad hominem fallacy).[66][68]
Use of misleading language

Creating scientific-sounding terms to


persuade non-experts to believe
statements that may be false or
meaningless: for example, a long-
standing hoax refers to water by the
rarely used formal name "dihydrogen
monoxide" and describes it as the main
constituent in most poisonous solutions
to show how easily the general public
can be misled.

Using established terms in idiosyncratic


ways, thereby demonstrating
unfamiliarity with mainstream work in
the discipline.
Prevalence of
pseudoscientific beliefs

Countries
The Ministry of AYUSH in the Government of India is purposed with developing education,
research and propagation of indigenous alternative medicine systems in India. The ministry has
faced significant criticism for funding systems that lack biological plausibility and are either
untested or conclusively proven as ineffective. Quality of research has been poor, and drugs
have been launched without any rigorous pharmacological studies and meaningful clinical trials
on Ayurveda or other alternative healthcare systems.[69][70] There is no credible efficacy or
scientific basis of any of these forms of treatment.[71]

In his book The Demon-Haunted World, Carl Sagan discusses the government of China and the
Chinese Communist Party's concern about Western pseudoscience developments and certain
ancient Chinese practices in China. He sees pseudoscience occurring in the United States as
part of a worldwide trend and suggests its causes, dangers, diagnosis and treatment may be
universal.[72]

A large percentage of the United States population lacks scientific literacy, not adequately
understanding scientific principles and method.[Note 6][Note 7][75][Note 8] In the Journal of College
Science Teaching, Art Hobson writes, "Pseudoscientific beliefs are surprisingly widespread in
our culture even among public school science teachers and newspaper editors, and are closely
related to scientific illiteracy."[77] However, a 10,000-student study in the same journal concluded
there was no strong correlation between science knowledge and belief in pseudoscience.[78]

During 2006, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) issued an executive summary of a
paper on science and engineering which briefly discussed the prevalence of pseudoscience in
modern times. It said, "belief in pseudoscience is widespread" and, referencing a Gallup
Poll,[79][80] stated that belief in the 10 commonly believed examples of paranormal phenomena
listed in the poll were "pseudoscientific beliefs".[81] The items were "extrasensory perception
(ESP), that houses can be haunted, ghosts, telepathy, clairvoyance, astrology, that people can
communicate mentally with someone who has died, witches, reincarnation, and channelling".[81]
Such beliefs in pseudoscience represent a lack of knowledge of how science works. The
scientific community may attempt to communicate information about science out of concern for
the public's susceptibility to unproven claims.[81] The NSF stated that pseudoscientific beliefs in
the U.S. became more widespread during the 1990s, peaked about 2001, and then decreased
slightly since with pseudoscientific beliefs remaining common. According to the NSF report,
there is a lack of knowledge of pseudoscientific issues in society and pseudoscientific practices
are commonly followed.[82] Surveys indicate about a third of adult Americans consider astrology
to be scientific.[83][84][85]

In Russia, in the late 20th and early 21st century, significant budgetary funds were spent on
programs for the experimental study of "torsion fields",[86] the extraction of energy from
granite,[87] the study of "cold nuclear fusion", and astrological and extrasensory "research" by the
Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and
the State Duma[86] (see Military Unit 10003). In 2006, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of
the Russian Federation Nikolai Spassky published an article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, where
among the priority areas for the development of the Russian energy sector, the task of extracting
energy from a vacuum was in the first place.[88] The Clean Water project was adopted as a
United Russia party project; in the version submitted to the government, the program budget for
2010–2017 exceeded $14 billion.[89][88]

Racism
There have been many connections between pseudoscientific writers and researchers and their
anti-semitic, racist and neo-Nazi backgrounds. They often use pseudoscience to reinforce their
beliefs. One of the most predominant pseudoscientific writers is Frank Collin, a self-proclaimed
Nazi who goes by Frank Joseph in his writings.[90] The majority of his works include the topics of
Atlantis, extraterrestrial encounters, and Lemuria as well as other ancient civilizations, often with
white supremacist undertones. For example, he posited that European peoples migrated to
North America before Columbus, and that all Native American civilizations were initiated by
descendants of white people.[91]

The Alt-Right using pseudoscience to base their ideologies on is not a new issue. The entire
foundation of anti-semitism is based on pseudoscience, or scientific racism. In an article from
Newsweek by Sander Gilman, Gilman describes the pseudoscience community's anti-semitic
views. "Jews as they appear in this world of pseudoscience are an invented group of ill, stupid or
stupidly smart people who use science to their own nefarious ends. Other groups, too, are
painted similarly in 'race science', as it used to call itself: African-Americans, the Irish, the
Chinese and, well, any and all groups that you want to prove inferior to yourself".[92] Neo-Nazis
and white supremacist often try to support their claims with studies that "prove" that their claims
are more than just harmful stereotypes. For example Bret Stephens published a column in The
New York Times where he claimed that Ashkenazi Jews had the highest IQ among any ethnic
group.[93] However, the scientific methodology and conclusions reached by the article Stephens
cited has been called into question repeatedly since its publication. It has been found that at
least one of that study's authors has been identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a
white nationalist.[94]

The journal Nature has published a number of editorials in the last few years warning
researchers about extremists looking to abuse their work, particularly population geneticists and
those working with ancient DNA. One article in Nature, titled "Racism in Science: The Taint That
Lingers" notes that early-twentieth-century eugenic pseudoscience has been used to influence
public policy, such as the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States, which sought to prevent
immigration from Asia and parts of Europe. Research has repeatedly shown that race is not a
scientifically valid concept, yet some scientists continue to look for measurable biological
differences between 'races'.[95]

Explanations
In a 1981 report Singer and Benassi wrote that pseudoscientific beliefs have their origin from at
least four sources.[96]
Common cognitive errors from personal
experience.

Erroneous sensationalistic mass media


coverage.

Sociocultural factors.

Poor or erroneous science education.


A 1990 study by Eve and Dunn supported the findings of Singer and Benassi and found
pseudoscientific belief being promoted by high school life science and biology teachers.[97]

Psychology
The psychology of pseudoscience attempts to explore and analyze pseudoscientific thinking by
means of thorough clarification on making the distinction of what is considered scientific vs.
pseudoscientific. The human proclivity for seeking confirmation rather than refutation
(confirmation bias),[98] the tendency to hold comforting beliefs, and the tendency to
overgeneralize have been proposed as reasons for pseudoscientific thinking. According to
Beyerstein, humans are prone to associations based on resemblances only, and often prone to
misattribution in cause-effect thinking.[99]

Michael Shermer's theory of belief-dependent realism is driven by the belief that the brain is
essentially a "belief engine" which scans data perceived by the senses and looks for patterns
and meaning. There is also the tendency for the brain to create cognitive biases, as a result of
inferences and assumptions made without logic and based on instinct – usually resulting in
patterns in cognition. These tendencies of patternicity and agenticity are also driven "by a meta-
bias called the bias blind spot, or the tendency to recognize the power of cognitive biases in
other people but to be blind to their influence on our own beliefs".[100] Lindeman states that
social motives (i.e., "to comprehend self and the world, to have a sense of control over
outcomes, to belong, to find the world benevolent and to maintain one's self-esteem") are often
"more easily" fulfilled by pseudoscience than by scientific information. Furthermore,
pseudoscientific explanations are generally not analyzed rationally, but instead experientially.
Operating within a different set of rules compared to rational thinking, experiential thinking
regards an explanation as valid if the explanation is "personally functional, satisfying and
sufficient", offering a description of the world that may be more personal than can be provided
by science and reducing the amount of potential work involved in understanding complex events
and outcomes.[101]

Anyone searching for psychological help that is based in science should seek a licensed
therapist whose techniques are not based in pseudoscience. Hupp and Santa Maria provide a
complete explanation of what that person should look for.[102]

Education and scientific literacy


There is a trend to believe in pseudoscience more than scientific evidence.[103] Some people
believe the prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs is due to widespread scientific illiteracy.[104]
Individuals lacking scientific literacy are more susceptible to wishful thinking, since they are
likely to turn to immediate gratification powered by System 1, our default operating system
which requires little to no effort. This system encourages one to accept the conclusions they
believe, and reject the ones they do not. Further analysis of complex pseudoscientific
phenomena require System 2, which follows rules, compares objects along multiple dimensions
and weighs options. These two systems have several other differences which are further
discussed in the dual-process theory.[105] The scientific and secular systems of morality and
meaning are generally unsatisfying to most people. Humans are, by nature, a forward-minded
species pursuing greater avenues of happiness and satisfaction, but we are all too frequently
willing to grasp at unrealistic promises of a better life.[106]

Psychology has much to discuss about pseudoscience thinking, as it is the illusory perceptions
of causality and effectiveness of numerous individuals that needs to be illuminated. Research
suggests that illusionary thinking happens in most people when exposed to certain
circumstances such as reading a book, an advertisement or the testimony of others are the
basis of pseudoscience beliefs. It is assumed that illusions are not unusual, and given the right
conditions, illusions are able to occur systematically even in normal emotional situations. One of
the things pseudoscience believers quibble most about is that academic science usually treats
them as fools. Minimizing these illusions in the real world is not simple.[107] To this aim,
designing evidence-based educational programs can be effective to help people identify and
reduce their own illusions.[107]

Boundaries with science

Classification
Philosophers classify types of knowledge. In English, the word science is used to indicate
specifically the natural sciences and related fields, which are called the social sciences.[108]
Different philosophers of science may disagree on the exact limits – for example, is
mathematics a formal science that is closer to the empirical ones, or is pure mathematics closer
to the philosophical study of logic and therefore not a science?[109] – but all agree that all of the
ideas that are not scientific are non-scientific. The large category of non-science includes all
matters outside the natural and social sciences, such as the study of history, metaphysics,
religion, art, and the humanities.[108] Dividing the category again, unscientific claims are a subset
of the large category of non-scientific claims. This category specifically includes all matters that
are directly opposed to good science.[108] Un-science includes both "bad science" (such as an
error made in a good-faith attempt at learning something about the natural world) and
pseudoscience.[108] Thus pseudoscience is a subset of un-science, and un-science, in turn, is
subset of non-science.

Science is also distinguishable from revelation, theology, or spirituality in that it offers insight
into the physical world obtained by empirical research and testing.[110][111] The most notable
disputes concern the evolution of living organisms, the idea of common descent, the geologic
history of the Earth, the formation of the Solar System, and the origin of the universe.[112]
Systems of belief that derive from divine or inspired knowledge are not considered
pseudoscience if they do not claim either to be scientific or to overturn well-established science.
Moreover, some specific religious claims, such as the power of intercessory prayer to heal the
sick, although they may be based on untestable beliefs, can be tested by the scientific method.

Some statements and common beliefs of popular science may not meet the criteria of science.
"Pop" science may blur the divide between science and pseudoscience among the general
public, and may also involve science fiction.[113] Indeed, pop science is disseminated to, and can
also easily emanate from, persons not accountable to scientific methodology and expert peer
review.

If claims of a given field can be tested experimentally and standards are upheld, it is not
pseudoscience, regardless of how odd, astonishing, or counterintuitive those claims are. If
claims made are inconsistent with existing experimental results or established theory, but the
method is sound, caution should be used, since science consists of testing hypotheses which
may turn out to be false. In such a case, the work may be better described as ideas that are "not
yet generally accepted". Protoscience is a term sometimes used to describe a hypothesis that
has not yet been tested adequately by the scientific method, but which is otherwise consistent
with existing science or which, where inconsistent, offers reasonable account of the
inconsistency. It may also describe the transition from a body of practical knowledge into a
scientific field.[28]

Philosophy
Karl Popper stated it is insufficient to distinguish science from pseudoscience, or from
metaphysics (such as the philosophical question of what existence means), by the criterion of
rigorous adherence to the empirical method, which is essentially inductive, based on observation
or experimentation.[46] He proposed a method to distinguish between genuine empirical,
nonempirical or even pseudoempirical methods. The latter case was exemplified by astrology,
which appeals to observation and experimentation. While it had empirical evidence based on
observation, on horoscopes and biographies, it crucially failed to use acceptable scientific
standards.[46] Popper proposed falsifiability as an important criterion in distinguishing science
from pseudoscience.
To demonstrate this point, Popper[46] gave two cases of human behavior and typical
explanations from Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler's theories: "that of a man who pushes a child
into the water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his life in an
attempt to save the child."[46] From Freud's perspective, the first man would have suffered from
psychological repression, probably originating from an Oedipus complex, whereas the second
man had attained sublimation. From Adler's perspective, the first and second man suffered from
feelings of inferiority and had to prove himself, which drove him to commit the crime or, in the
second case, drove him to rescue the child. Popper was not able to find any counterexamples of
human behavior in which the behavior could not be explained in the terms of Adler's or Freud's
theory. Popper argued[46] it was that the observation always fitted or confirmed the theory which,
rather than being its strength, was actually its weakness. In contrast, Popper[46] gave the
example of Einstein's gravitational theory, which predicted "light must be attracted by heavy
bodies (such as the Sun), precisely as material bodies were attracted."[46] Following from this,
stars closer to the Sun would appear to have moved a small distance away from the Sun, and
away from each other. This prediction was particularly striking to Popper because it involved
considerable risk. The brightness of the Sun prevented this effect from being observed under
normal circumstances, so photographs had to be taken during an eclipse and compared to
photographs taken at night. Popper states, "If observation shows that the predicted effect is
definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted."[46] Popper summed up his criterion for the
scientific status of a theory as depending on its falsifiability, refutability, or testability.

Paul R. Thagard used astrology as a case study to distinguish science from pseudoscience and
proposed principles and criteria to delineate them.[114] First, astrology has not progressed in that
it has not been updated nor added any explanatory power since Ptolemy. Second, it has ignored
outstanding problems such as the precession of equinoxes in astronomy. Third, alternative
theories of personality and behavior have grown progressively to encompass explanations of
phenomena which astrology statically attributes to heavenly forces. Fourth, astrologers have
remained uninterested in furthering the theory to deal with outstanding problems or in critically
evaluating the theory in relation to other theories. Thagard intended this criterion to be extended
to areas other than astrology. He believed it would delineate as pseudoscientific such practices
as witchcraft and pyramidology, while leaving physics, chemistry, astronomy, geoscience,
biology, and archaeology in the realm of science.[114]

In the philosophy and history of science, Imre Lakatos stresses the social and political
importance of the demarcation problem, the normative methodological problem of
distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. His distinctive historical analysis of
scientific methodology based on research programmes suggests: "scientists regard the
successful theoretical prediction of stunning novel facts – such as the return of Halley's comet
or the gravitational bending of light rays – as what demarcates good scientific theories from
pseudo-scientific and degenerate theories, and in spite of all scientific theories being forever
confronted by 'an ocean of counterexamples'".[8] Lakatos offers a "novel fallibilist analysis of the
development of Newton's celestial dynamics, [his] favourite historical example of his
methodology" and argues in light of this historical turn, that his account answers for certain
inadequacies in those of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn.[8] "Nonetheless, Lakatos did recognize
the force of Kuhn's historical criticism of Popper – all important theories have been surrounded
by an 'ocean of anomalies', which on a falsificationist view would require the rejection of the
theory outright...Lakatos sought to reconcile the rationalism of Popperian falsificationism with
what seemed to be its own refutation by history".[115]

Many philosophers have tried to solve the problem of demarcation in the following
terms: a statement constitutes knowledge if sufficiently many people believe it
sufficiently strongly. But the history of thought shows us that many people were
totally committed to absurd beliefs. If the strengths of beliefs were a hallmark of
knowledge, we should have to rank some tales about demons, angels, devils, and of
heaven and hell as knowledge. Scientists, on the other hand, are very sceptical even
of their best theories. Newton's is the most powerful theory science has yet
produced, but Newton himself never believed that bodies attract each other at a
distance. So no degree of commitment to beliefs makes them knowledge. Indeed,
the hallmark of scientific behaviour is a certain scepticism even towards one's
most cherished theories. Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue:
it is an intellectual crime.

Thus a statement may be pseudoscientific even if it is eminently 'plausible' and


everybody believes in it, and it may be scientifically valuable even if it is
unbelievable and nobody believes in it. A theory may even be of supreme scientific
value even if no one understands it, let alone believes in it.[8]

— Imre Lakatos, Science and


Pseudoscience
The boundary between science and pseudoscience is disputed and difficult to determine
analytically, even after more than a century of study by philosophers of science and scientists,
and despite some basic agreements on the fundamentals of the scientific method.[43][116][117]
The concept of pseudoscience rests on an understanding that the scientific method has been
misrepresented or misapplied with respect to a given theory, but many philosophers of science
maintain that different kinds of methods are held as appropriate across different fields and
different eras of human history. According to Lakatos, the typical descriptive unit of great
scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but "a powerful problem-solving machinery,
which, with the help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, digests anomalies and even
turns them into positive evidence".[8]

To Popper, pseudoscience uses induction to generate theories, and only performs


experiments to seek to verify them. To Popper, falsifiability is what determines the
scientific status of a theory. Taking a historical approach, Kuhn observed that
scientists did not follow Popper's rule, and might ignore falsifying data, unless
overwhelming. To Kuhn, puzzle-solving within a paradigm is science. Lakatos
attempted to resolve this debate, by suggesting history shows that science occurs
in research programmes, competing according to how progressive they are. The
leading idea of a programme could evolve, driven by its heuristic to make
predictions that can be supported by evidence. Feyerabend claimed that Lakatos
was selective in his examples, and the whole history of science shows there is no
universal rule of scientific method, and imposing one on the scientific community
impedes progress.[118]

— David Newbold and Julia


Roberts, "An analysis of the
demarcation problem in
science and its application to
therapeutic touch theory" in
International Journal of
Nursing Practice, Vol. 13
Laudan maintained that the demarcation between science and non-science was a pseudo-
problem, preferring to focus on the more general distinction between reliable and unreliable
knowledge.[119]

[Feyerabend] regards Lakatos's view as being closet anarchism disguised as


methodological rationalism. Feyerabend's claim was not that standard
methodological rules should never be obeyed, but rather that sometimes progress
is made by abandoning them. In the absence of a generally accepted rule, there is a
need for alternative methods of persuasion. According to Feyerabend, Galileo
employed stylistic and rhetorical techniques to convince his reader, while he also
wrote in Italian rather than Latin and directed his arguments to those already
temperamentally inclined to accept them.[115]

— Alexander Bird, "The


Historical Turn in the
Philosophy of Science" in
Routledge Companion to the
Philosophy of Science
Politics, health, and
education

Political implications
The demarcation problem between science and pseudoscience brings up debate in the realms
of science, philosophy and politics. Imre Lakatos, for instance, points out that the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union at one point declared that Mendelian genetics was pseudoscientific
and had its advocates, including well-established scientists such as Nikolai Vavilov, sent to a
Gulag and that the "liberal Establishment of the West" denies freedom of speech to topics it
regards as pseudoscience, particularly where they run up against social mores.[8]

Something becomes pseudoscientific when science cannot be separated from ideology,


scientists misrepresent scientific findings to promote or draw attention for publicity, when
politicians, journalists and a nation's intellectual elite distort the facts of science for short-term
political gain, or when powerful individuals of the public conflate causation and cofactors by
clever wordplay. These ideas reduce the authority, value, integrity and independence of science
in society.[120]

Health and education implications


Distinguishing science from pseudoscience has practical implications in the case of health care,
expert testimony, environmental policies, and science education. Treatments with a patina of
scientific authority which have not actually been subjected to actual scientific testing may be
ineffective, expensive and dangerous to patients and confuse health providers, insurers,
government decision makers and the public as to what treatments are appropriate. Claims
advanced by pseudoscience may result in government officials and educators making bad
decisions in selecting curricula.[Note 9]

The extent to which students acquire a range of social and cognitive thinking skills related to the
proper usage of science and technology determines whether they are scientifically literate.
Education in the sciences encounters new dimensions with the changing landscape of science
and technology, a fast-changing culture and a knowledge-driven era. A reinvention of the school
science curriculum is one that shapes students to contend with its changing influence on human
welfare. Scientific literacy, which allows a person to distinguish science from pseudosciences
such as astrology, is among the attributes that enable students to adapt to the changing world.
Its characteristics are embedded in a curriculum where students are engaged in resolving
problems, conducting investigations, or developing projects.[11]

Alan J. Friedman mentions why most scientists avoid educating about pseudoscience, including
that paying undue attention to pseudoscience could dignify it.[121]

On the other hand, Robert L. Park emphasizes how pseudoscience can be a threat to society and
considers that scientists have a responsibility to teach how to distinguish science from
pseudoscience.[122]

Pseudosciences such as homeopathy, even if generally benign, are used by charlatans. This
poses a serious issue because it enables incompetent practitioners to administer health care.
True-believing zealots may pose a more serious threat than typical con men because of their
delusion to homeopathy's ideology. Irrational health care is not harmless and it is careless to
create patient confidence in pseudomedicine.[123]

On 8 December 2016, journalist Michael V. LeVine pointed out the dangers posed by the Natural
News website: "Snake-oil salesmen have pushed false cures since the dawn of medicine, and
now websites like Natural News flood social media with dangerous anti-pharmaceutical, anti-
vaccination and anti-GMO pseudoscience that puts millions at risk of contracting preventable
illnesses."[124]

The anti-vaccine movement has persuaded large numbers of parents not to vaccinate their
children, citing pseudoscientific research that links childhood vaccines with the onset of
autism.[125] These include the study by Andrew Wakefield, which claimed that a combination of
gastrointestinal disease and developmental regression, which are often seen in children with
ASD, occurred within two weeks of receiving vaccines.[126][127] The study was eventually
retracted by its publisher, and Wakefield was stripped of his license to practice medicine.[125]
Alkaline water is water that has a pH of higher than 7, purported to host numerous health
benefits, with no empirical backing. A practitioner known as Robert O. Young who promoted
alkaline water and an "Alkaline diet" was sent to jail for 3 years in 2017 for practicing medicine
without a license.[128]

See also

Antiscience

Credulity

Factoid

Fringe theory

List of topics characterized as


pseudoscience

Magical thinking

Not even wrong

Normative science

Pseudo-scholarship
Pseudolaw

Pseudomathematics

Notes

1. Definition:
"A pretended or spurious science; a
collection of related beliefs about the
world mistakenly regarded as being
based on scientific method or as
having the status that scientific truths
now have". Oxford English Dictionary,
second edition 1989.

"Many writers on pseudoscience have


emphasized that pseudoscience is
non-science posing as science. The
foremost modern classic on the
subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title
Fads and Fallacies in the Name of
Science. According to Brian Baigrie
(1988, 438), '[w]hat is objectionable
about these beliefs is that they
masquerade as genuinely scientific
ones.' These and many other authors
assume that to be pseudoscientific,
an activity or a teaching has to satisfy
the following two criteria (Hansson
1996): (1) it is not scientific, and (2)
its major proponents try to create the
impression that it is scientific."[4]

'"claims presented so that they appear


[to be] scientific even though they
lack supporting evidence and
plausibility" (p. 33). In contrast,
science is "a set of methods designed
to describe and interpret observed
and inferred phenomena, past or
present, and aimed at building a
testable body of knowledge open to
rejection or confirmation" (p. 17)'[5]
(this was the definition adopted by (ht
tps://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind0
2/c7/c7s5.htm) the National Science
Foundation)
Terms regarded as having largely the
same meaning but perhaps less
disparaging connotations include
parascience, cryptoscience, and
anomalistics.[6]

2. Blum (1978), p. 12 [Yeates' emphasis];


also, see Moll (1902), pp. 44–47[24]
3. 'Most terms in theoretical physics, for
example, do not enjoy at least some
distinct connections with observables, but
not of the simple sort that would permit
operational definitions in terms of these
observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of
operational definitions were to be
followed, therefore, most of theoretical
physics would have to be dismissed as
meaningless pseudoscience!'[47]

4. For an opposing perspective, e.g. Chapter


5 of Suppression Stories by Brian Martin
(http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/
dissent/documents/ss/ss5.html)
(Wollongong: Fund for Intellectual Dissent,
1997), pp. 69–83.
5. "We can now propose the following
principle of demarcation: A theory or
discipline which purports to be scientific
is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has
been less progressive than alternative
theories over a long period of time, and
faces many unsolved problems; but the
community of practitioners makes little
attempt to develop the theory towards
solutions of the problems, shows no
concern for attempts to evaluate the
theory in relation to others, and is
selective in considering confirmations and
non confirmations."[58]

6. "Surveys conducted in the United States


and Europe reveal that many citizens do
not have a firm grasp of basic scientific
facts and concepts, nor do they have an
understanding of the scientific process. In
addition, belief in pseudoscience (an
indicator of scientific illiteracy) seems to
be widespread among Americans and
Europeans."[73]

7. "A new national survey commissioned by


the California Academy of Sciences and
conducted by Harris Interactive® reveals
that the U.S. public is unable to pass even
a basic scientific literacy test."[74]

8. "In a survey released earlier this year


[2007], Miller and colleagues found that
about 28 percent of American adults
qualified as scientifically literate, which is
an increase of about 10 percent from the
late 1980s and early 1990s."[76]
9. "From a practical point of view, the
distinction is important for decision
guidance in both private and public life.
Since science is our most reliable source
of knowledge in a wide variety of areas,
we need to distinguish scientific
knowledge from its look-alikes. Due to the
high status of science in present-day
society, attempts to exaggerate the
scientific status of various claims,
teachings, and products are common
enough to make the demarcation issue
serious. For example, creation science
may replace evolution in studies of
biology."[9]

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Further reading

Alcock, J. (2001). Science vs.


Pseudoscience, Nonscience, and Nonsense.
The Skeptical Inquirer, 25(3), 50–54.

Bauer HH (2000). Science or Pseudoscience:


Magnetic Healing, Psychic Phenomena, and
Other Heterodoxies (https://archive.org/detai
ls/scienceorpseudos00henr) . University of
Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-02601-0.

Charpak G, Broch H (2004). Debunked: Esp,


telekinesis, other pseudoscience (https://arc
hive.org/details/debunked00geor) (in
French). Translated by Holland BK. Johns
Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-
7867-1. "Debunked." Originally published
2002 by Odile Jacob as Devenez sorciers,
devenez savants

Cioffi F (1998). Freud and the Question of


Pseudoscience (https://archive.org/details/fr
eudquestionof00ciof) . Chicago and La Salle,
Illinois: Open Court, division of Carus.
pp. 314 (https://archive.org/details/freudque
stionof00ciof/page/314) . ISBN 978-0-8126-
9385-0.

Derksen AA (1993). "The seven sins of


pseudo-science". J Gen Phil Sci. 24: 17–42.
doi:10.1007/BF00769513 (https://doi.org/10.
1007%2FBF00769513) . S2CID 140478903
(https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:1
40478903) .

Derksen AA (2001). "The seven strategies of


the sophisticated pseudo-scientist: a look
into Freud's rhetorical toolbox". J Gen Phil
Sci. 32 (2): 329–350.
doi:10.1023/A:1013100717113 (https://doi.o
rg/10.1023%2FA%3A1013100717113) .
S2CID 141312494 (https://api.semanticschol
ar.org/CorpusID:141312494) .

Frietsch, Ute, The Boundaries of Science/


Pseudoscience (http://ieg-ego.eu/en/thread
s/crossroads/knowledge-spaces/ute-frietsch
-the-boundaries-of-science-pseudoscience?s
et_language=en&-C=) Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20210411124606/http://ieg
-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/knowledge-s
paces/ute-frietsch-the-boundaries-of-science
-pseudoscience?set_language=en&-C=) 11
April 2021 at the Wayback Machine, EGO –
European History Online (http://www.ieg-ego.
eu/) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/
20130208042444/http://www.ieg-ego.eu/) 8
February 2013 at the Wayback Machine,
Mainz: Institute of European History (http://w
ww.ieg-mainz.de/likecms/index.php)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2016
0219021834/http://www.ieg-mainz.de/likec
ms/index.php) 19 February 2016 at the
Wayback Machine, 2015, retrieved: March 8,
2021 (pdf (https://d-nb.info/1073221725/3
4) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20
210716200304/https://d-nb.info/107322172
5/34) 16 July 2021 at the Wayback
Machine).

Gardner M (1957). Fads and Fallacies in the


Name of Science (https://archive.org/detail
s/fadsfallaciesinn0000gard) (2nd, revised &
expanded ed.). Mineola, NY: Dover
Publications. ISBN 978-0-486-20394-2. "fads
and fallacies." Originally published 1952 by
G.P. Putnam's Sons, under the title In the
Name of Science.

Gardner M (1990). Science – Good, Bad and


Bogus (https://archive.org/details/sciencego
odbadbo00gard) . Prometheus Books.
ISBN 978-0-87975-573-7.
Little, John (29 October 1981). "Review
and useful overview of Gardner's book"
(https://books.google.com/books?id=Gf
h9AnIDxS8C&q=%22Science+%E2%80%
93+Good,+Bad+and+Bogus%22&pg=PA3
20) . New Scientist. 92 (1277): 320.

Gardner M (2000). Did Adam and Eve Have


Navels?: Debunking Pseudoscience (https://
books.google.com/books?id=z1NdAgAAQBA
J) . New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
ISBN 978-0-393-32238-5.

Gordon MD (2021). On the Fringe: Where


Science Meets Pseudoscience. Oxford
University. ISBN 978-0-19-755576-7.

Hansson SO (1996). "Defining


pseudoscience". Philosophia Naturalis. 33:
169–76.

Kaufman, Allison B. & Kaufman, James C.


(eds.), Pseudoscience: The Conspiracy
Against Science, The MIT Press, (Cambridge,
MA), 2018. ISBN 978-0-262-53704-9

Martin M (1994). "Pseudoscience, the


paranormal, and science education". Science
& Education. 3 (4): 1573–901.
Bibcode:1994Sc&Ed...3..357M (https://ui.ads
abs.harvard.edu/abs/1994Sc&Ed...3..357
M) . doi:10.1007/BF00488452 (https://doi.or
g/10.1007%2FBF00488452) .
S2CID 22730647 (https://api.semanticschola
r.org/CorpusID:22730647) .

Pigliucci M, Boudry M (2013). Philosophy of


Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the
Demarcation Problem. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-05196-3.

Pratkanis AR (1995). "How to Sell a


Pseudoscience" (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20061211055201/http://www.positiveathei
sm.org//writ/pratkanis.htm) . Skeptical
Inquirer. 19 (4): 19–25. Archived from the
original (http://www.positiveatheism.org/wri
t/pratkanis.htm) on 11 December 2006.

Shermer M (2011). "What Is Pseudoscience?:


Distinguishing between science and
pseudoscience is problematic" (https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-pseu
doscience/) . Scientific American. 305 (3):
92. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0911-92
(https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fscientificameric
an0911-92) . PMID 21870452 (https://pubme
d.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21870452) . Archived (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20180729171335/
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
what-is-pseudoscience/) from the original
on 29 July 2018. Retrieved 28 April 2018.

Shermer M, Gould SJ (2002). Why People


Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience,
Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our
Time. New York: Holt Paperbacks. ISBN 978-
0-8050-7089-7.

Wilson F. (2000). The Logic and Methodology


of Science and Pseudoscience. Canadian
Scholars Press. ISBN 978-1-55130-175-4.

Wolpert, Lewis (1994). The Unnatural Nature


of Science (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=67Mr-fhfZmQC) . Vol. 341. Harvard
University Press. p. 310. doi:10.1016/0140-
6736(93)92665-g (https://doi.org/10.1016%2
F0140-6736%2893%2992665-g) . ISBN 978-
0-674-92981-4. PMID 8093949 (https://pubm
ed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/8093949) .
S2CID 44724752 (https://api.semanticschola
r.org/CorpusID:44724752) . {{cite
book}}: |journal= ignored (help) First
published 1992 by Faber & Faber, London.

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