Journal of Genocide Research

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“Celebrating” Srebrenica Genocide: Impunity and

Indoctrination as Contributing Factors to the
Glorification of Mass Atrocities

Olivera Simic

To cite this article: Olivera Simic (01 Feb 2024): “Celebrating” Srebrenica Genocide: Impunity
and Indoctrination as Contributing Factors to the Glorification of Mass Atrocities, Journal of
Genocide Research, DOI: 10.1080/14623528.2024.2308326

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2308326

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JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2024.2308326

REFLECTION

“Celebrating” Srebrenica Genocide: Impunity and

Indoctrination as Contributing Factors to the Glorification of
Mass Atrocities
Olivera Simic
Griffith Law School, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This paper provides an analysis of the politics and culture of 20 Srebrenica; denial; Bosnia
years of genocide denial in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and and Herzegovina; education;
neighbouring Serbia and Croatia. It shows how denial at the glorification; genocide
political level spilled over to a culture of genocide, which is
pervasive, from public spaces to schools, art, sports and popular
culture. I argue that without significant revision of the Criminal
Code and a radical reform of education, we can expect to see
continuation of the denial of the Srebrenica genocide for many
years to come.

Introduction
In this paper, I build on the arguments that the genocide denial in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (BiH) has reached its eleventh stage, coined by Hariz Halilovich as “triumphalism.”1 At
this level, we see deniers of genocide not just “celebrating” genocide but being officially
awarded for it. As this paper argues, from the very beginning, the reckoning with the Sreb-
renica genocide was divided across ethnic lines and it remains polarized today. The paper
provides an analysis of the politics and culture of 20 years of genocide denial in BiH and
neighbouring Serbia and Croatia. It shows how denial at the political level spilled over to a
culture of genocide, which is pervasive, from public spaces to schools, art, sports and
popular culture.
I first provide a background to the official stance of Republika Srpska and Serbia in
relation to genocide in Srebrenica. I then draw on a recent case study in which the execu-
tioners of denial – rather than being condemned – were officially awarded. I argue that
political elites are important in setting the tone and opening the space for others to inter-
act in this space. The elites in Republika Srpska and Serbia continuously challenge the lib-
erally orientated politics of memory with a nationalistic form of remembrance that “avoids

CONTACT Olivera Simic o.simic@griffith.edu.au Griffith Law School, Griffith University, 170 Kessels Road, Nathan
QLD 4111, Brisbane, Australia
1
Hariz Halilovich, “Globalisation and Genocide,” in Global Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, ed. Ali
Farazmand (New York: Springer, 2018), 2493–2501.
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which
this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
2 O. SIMIC

fully confronting, and accepting guilt for past misdeeds in the name of fostering a puta-
tive sense of national unity.”2 Gavriel Rosenfeld defines such “illiberal memory” as a con-
comitant of the (re-)emergence of right-wing populism across Europe in the twenty-first
century. In order to halt the continuing and persistent denial of genocide in July 2021, the
outgoing international High Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, amended the state
Criminal Code to criminalize the denial of genocide and ban the glorification of war crim-
inals.3 Here, I draw on a secondary literature and media that analysed the state Criminal
Code and built on arguments made by scholars. I also draw on a comment made by the
member of the Office of Prosecutors in BiH. Finally, I problematize the high hopes put on
the education in BiH as a potential “way out” from the denial of genocide4 and argue that
without significant revision of the Criminal Code and a radical reform of education, we can
expect to see continuation of the denial of the Srebrenica genocide for many years to
come.

The Srebrenica Genocide

The killings in Srebrenica went on for days; those killed were dismembered at night. The
bodies were strewn across at least eighty primary, secondary and tertiary mass graves in
the region of Eastern Bosnia.5 Those tasked with recovery and investigation expect to
uncover many more. The government of Republika Srpska has frustrated and slowed
these recovery attempts by obstructing access to “hidden” and suspected mass grave
sites. According to the Chairman of the Bosnian Federal Commission for Missing
Persons, Amor Masevic, at least 80 secondary mass graves remain uncovered. These
graves are expected to hold the bodily remains of more than 100 victims.6
The mass graves already discovered held the dismembered bodies of Bosniak men and
boys. Hidden underground to conceal the mass killings committed by the Army of Repub-
lika Srpska in July 1995, these graves often include fractured pieces of the victim’s bones
and skulls. Such body disposal techniques ensure that the victims cannot be identified,
and prevent the recovery of their remains.7 Adam Boys, Chief Operating Officer of the
International Commission of Missing Persons in BiH, recounts that the remains of
one man can be scattered “in four different gravesites, 50 kilometres apart.”8 In one
instance, he continued, “[They] had to carry out 13 separate DNA tests to identify [the
victim].”9

2
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, “The Rise of Illiberal Memory,” Memory Studies 16, no. 4 (2023): 819.
3
Office of the High Representative, “HR’s Decision on Enacting the Law on Amendment to the Criminal Code of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,” 23 July 2021, http://www.ohr.int/hrs-decision-on-enacting-the-law-on-amendment-to-
thecriminal-code-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina.
4
Jessie Barton Hronesova and Jasmin Hasic, “The 2021 Memory Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reconciliation or
Polarization,” Journal of Genocide Research (2023): 1–19.
5
See Lara J. Nettelfield and Sarah E. Wagner, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013), 12.
6
A. V. Piše, “Amor Mašović: Još najmanje 80 masovnih grobnica sa žrtvama genocida u Srebrenici,” Haber, 4 July 2023,
https://www.haber.ba/vijesti/crna-hronika/961270-amor-masovic-jos-najmanje-80-masovnih-grobnica-sa-zrtvama-
genocida-u-srebrenici.
7
Sarah E. Wagner, To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for Srebrenica’s Missing (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2008).
8
Remembering Srebrenica, “Uncovering Mass Graves,” https://srebrenica.org.uk/what-happened/history/uncovering-
mass-graves (accessed 14 July 2023).
9
Ibid.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 3

After the discovery of the first mass graves, those involved in the crimes were
accused; this was followed by criminal trials and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) recognition of the crime in Srebrenica as “genocide.”10
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and several of ICTY’s rulings confirmed that gen-
ocide has been committed during the conflicts of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
The ICTY rulings promulgated that, over the course of several days, Bosnian Serb forces
killed more than 7,000 men and boys in the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995.11 In the
Bosnia and Herzegovina vs Serbia and Montenegro case, the ICJ found that the latter had
failed “to prevent the genocide committed by the Bosnian Serb army in the Bosnian
town of Srebrenica in July 1995.”12 Of the over thirty individuals indicted and charged
by the ICTY for committing genocide, only those linked to the Srebrenica massacre – a
total of seven high-ranking Bosnian Serbs – have been found guilty.13 It is well known
that the crime of genocide is extremely difficult to prosecute.14 Yet, even once prosecuted,
the governments and majority of citizens of Serbia and Republika Srpska continue to deny
that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide. Ratko Mladic, a Bosnian Serb military leader
who had commanded the Bosnian Serb army during the war, was named as the master-
mind of killings.15 He was convicted for genocide, persecution, extermination, murder,
deportation, and other inhumane acts such as crimes against humanity, in addition to
murder, terror, unlawful attacks on civilians, and hostage-taking as violations of the laws
or customs of war.16 On 8 June 2021 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY affirmed Mladic’s
convictions, and his sentence of life imprisonment.17 Today, Mladic is 81 years-old and
serves his sentence in The Hague18 where his poor health requires frequent visits to the
hospital.19
Despite the abundance of evidence against Mladic and the ICTY findings, large pro-
portions of the Serb community in Serbia and Republika Srpska have dismissed these con-
victions as “unjust.”20 The “pro-Serb” media hail Mladic as “forever a Serbian hero.”21 The
Serbian Interior Minister, Aleksandar Vulin, has reportedly stated that Mladic’s life

10
United Nations, “Mladic, Ratko (MICT-13-56),” United Nations: International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals,
https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-56.
11
William Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes,”
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 2, no. 2 (2007): 101–22. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/
gsp/vol2/iss2/2/.
12
International Court of Justice, “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),” Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, https://www.icj-cij.
org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf; See also Marko Milanović “State Responsibility for Geno-
cide: A Follow-Up,” European Journal of International Law 18, no. 4 (2007): 669–70.
13
See United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Cases,” https://www.icty.org/en/cases.
14
Robert Marquand, “Why Genocide Is Difficult to Prosecute,” Christian Science Monitor, 30 April 2007, https://www.
csmonitor.com/2007/0430/p01s04-wogi.html; See also the comments from International Law Professor, Leila Sadat
in: NPR, “Why Genocide Is Difficult to Prove before an International Criminal Court,” NPR, 12 April 2022, https://
www.npr.org/2022/04/12/1092251159/why-genocide-is-difficult-to-prove-before-an-international-criminal-court.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Stephen Arrig Koh, “The Mladić Appeal Judgment and the Enduring Legacy of the Hague Tribunals,” Just Security, 28
June 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/77197/the-mladic-appeal-judgment-and-the-enduring-legacy-of-the-
hague-tribunals/.
18
Al Jazeera, “Serb War Criminal Ratko Mladic in Hospital in ‘Poor Health’: Son,” Al Jazeera, 11 September 2022, https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/11/serb-war-criminal-ratko-mladic-in-hospital-in-poor-health-son.
19
Ibid.
20
Milica Stojanovic, “Serbian Tabloids Hail ‘Hero’ Ratko Mladic After Verdict,” Balkan Insight, 9 June 2021, https://
balkaninsight.com/2021/06/09/serbian-tabloids-hail-hero-ratko-mladic-after-verdict/.
21
Ibid.
4 O. SIMIC

sentence was “revenge [to Serbs], not a verdict.”22 Shortly after Mladic’s conviction was
confirmed in 2021, the Republika Srpska self-led Commission on Srebrenica reported
that the 8,000 Bosniak men and boys killed “were not civilians but soldiers.” They
claimed that the purpose of the killing was the “elimination of a military threat.”23 Even
as Mladic, in tandem with Radovan Karadzic,24 the former president of Republika
Srpska, was found guilty of the only genocide committed in Europe since WWII, some
members of the Serb community continued to deny these crimes.25 Some even celebrate
their commission. Those who do so remain unpunished. The murals painted in Mladic’s
glory can be seen on the walls of Belgrade’s residential buildings and in different
towns in the entity of Republika Srpska. The murals have become a part of everyday
life for its passers-by, becoming “normalized” feature of the cities they are painted in.
However, the space surrounding murials have often been used as a performative and
ample ground for activists where they show their resistance to the Serbian pro-Mladic
regime and glorification of war criminals. Repainting or washing murials by activists
has seen some of them attacked by hooligans and arrested by police for offences
against the public peace and order.26 These spaces remain contested ground between,
on one hand, extreme right nationalists, pro-government and pro-Mladic supporters,
and, on the other, activists.
Over the past twenty years, during which the genocide in Srebrenica was persistently
denied, generations of young Serbs learned only of the crimes perpetrated against their
own ethnic group. These generations have now grown into adults who have been directly
exposed to these denials for their whole lives. They have listened and watched as their
politicians and other people of authority spoke with impunity of the Srebrenica genocide
as a “made-up crime.”27
In socio-political environments, such as this, many young people, including some stu-
dents from Republika Srpska have adopted the rhetoric of their leaders. A 2019 television
program showed live two male students from Republika Srpska who stated,
The Hague Tribunal is well known for disproportionately prosecting Serbs. As a reasonable
young man I know that everyone committed the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina … Still,
we just talk about the evidence brought before the Hague against Serbs … there is evidence
of the other side’s crimes, but no one cares.28

22
Radio Slobodna Evropa, “Vulin: Doživotni zatvor Mladiću je osveta, a ne presuda,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 8 June 2021,
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/vulin-presuda-mladicu/31296916.html.
23
Nermina Kuloglija, “Bosnian Serb Report Claims Many Srebrenica Victims Weren’t Civilians,” Balkan Insight, 21 July
2021, https://balkaninsight.com/2021/07/21/bosnian-serb-report-claims-many-srebrenica-victims-werent-civilians.
24
Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, IT- 95-5/18-
AR98bis.1, 20 July 2013.
25
According to a 2018 poll, 66 per cent of Serbs in Republika Sroska deny genocide. See Klejda Mulaj, “Constructions of
Genocide Denial and Remembrance: Fractured National Identity in Postgenocide Bosnia,” Postgenocide: Interdisciplin-
ary Reflections on the Effects of Genocide, ed. Klejda Mulaj (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
26
“Unisten mural posvecen ratnom zlocincu Ratku Mladicu u Beogradu,” Al Jazeera, 10 November 2021, https://balkans.
aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2021/11/10/unisten-mural-posvecen-ratku-mladicu-u-beogradu; J.Dikovic, “Gde se sve u
Beogradu nalaze murali Ratku Mladicu?” Danas, 17 November 2021, https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/gde-se-
sve-u-beogradu-nalaze-murali-ratku-mladica/; Ljudmila Cvetkovic and Nevena Bogdanovic, “Kako se stiti Mladicev
mural u Beogradu: ‘Danonocne straze i bezbojni lak’,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 November 2021, https://www.
slobodnaevropa.org/a/mural-ratko-mladic-beograd-straza/31558824.html.
27
Mersiha Gadzo, “Denial of Genocide Prevails in Dream for ‘Greater Serbia’,” Al Jazeera, 11 April 2018, https://www.
aljazeera.com/features/2018/4/11/denial-of-genocide-prevails-in-dream-for-greater-serbia.
28
Prosječna Komunjara, “Nikada nećemo promijenit naziv Radovan Karadžić,” Facebook, 28 March 2019, https://www.
facebook.com/ProsjecnaKomunjara/videos/881019818735125/?extid=SEO----.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 5

Despite goodwill to individualize guilt and diminish the possibility of criminalizing the
Serb community from which the perpetrators came,29 the ICTY failed to achieve its
goal. The Serbs as a nation see themselves collectively prosecuted for war crimes com-
mitted by individual members of their group. These young people are convinced that
Serbs, as an ethnic group, were the victims of a “West” which has no interest in their
suffering.30 They further believe that linking the Serbs to the mass atrocities committed
in the Bosnian war, forged widely accepted perceptions in the West in which “the
Serbs became the Nazis, and the Muslims were the Jews.”31 At the same time, Serbs
were building their own rhetoric in which they compared the Serbs with the Jews,32
and established the Serbs as the nation of both martyrs and victims, but never the perpe-
trators.33 The President of Republika Srpska has publicly and repeatedly stated that Serbs
“can’t trust the West … They come to us and tell us that we must forget everything, move
on.”34 Among Bosnian Serbs, only 10 per cent believe that Bosniaks were killed in Sreb-
renica, while 66 per cent deny the genocide; the rest believe some executions may
have happened but in far lesser numbers than the 8000 men and boys reported.35

Genocide Denial as Official Policy

The genocide denial has been the official policy of Republika Srpska for a long time. It was
already institutionalized in 2002 when the Documentation Centre of the Republic of
Srpska for War Crimes Research published its Srebrenica Report.36 The Report called
the genocide an “alleged massacre” in which “no more than 2,000 Bosnian Army soldiers
were killed.”37 Despite these false statements, an apology came from the then Republika
Srpska former President, Dragan Cavic38 in 2004:
The report makes it clear that enormous crimes were committed in the area of Srebrenica in
July 1995. The Bosnian Serb Government shares the pain of the families of the Srebrenica
victims and it is truly sorry and apologizes for the tragedy.39

At the time, Cavic stated that the “events” in Srebrenica present “a dark page in the history
of the Serb people” and that perpetrators of this crime “cannot justify their actions on any
grounds.”40 Despite referring to “the enormous crimes” rather than to “genocide,” this was
a welcome step towards accepting the mass atrocity in Srebrenica as a genocide.
29
See A. Dirk Moses, The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2021), 480.
30
Florian Bieber, Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 167.
31
Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
2005), 156–59.
32
Jelena Subotic, Yellow Star, Red Star: Holocaust Remembrance after Communism (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2019).
33
Tamara P. Trost and Lea David, “Renationalizing Memory in the Post-Yugoslav Region,” Journal of Genocide Research
28, no. 2 (2022): 29.
34
Tass, “President of Republika Srpska: ‘You Can’t Trust West, Which is Trying to Buy its Way Out’,” Tass: Russian News
Agency, 25 March 2023, https://tass.com/world/1594267.
35
See David Luban et al., International and Transnational Criminal Law, 3rd ed (New York: Aspen publishing, 2018);
Mersiha Gadzo, “Survivors Recount Bosnia’s Srebrenica Genocide, 25 years on,” Al Jazeera, 11 July 2020, https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/11/survivors-recount-bosnias-srebrenica-genocide-25-years-on.
36
Jelena Subotic, “Holocaust and the Meaning of Srebrenica Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 24 no. 1 (2022): 5.
37
Ibid.
38
Dragan Cavic is a Bosnian Serb politician who was the 5th President of Republika Srpska from 2002 to 2006.
39
Monica Hanson Green, Srebrenica Genocide Denial Report 2020 (Srebrenica: Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial, 2020), 27.
40
Stanko Smoljanović, “Čavic priznao masakr u Srebrenici.,” DW, 23 June 2004, https://www.dw.com/bs/čavic-priznao-
masakr-u-srebrenici/a-2485548.
6 O. SIMIC

However, this did not last long. Since his rise to power in 2006, Milorad Dodik, a Bosnian
Serb politician, has become the undisputed leader of Republika Srpska. Since November
2022, Dodik has served as the 8th President of Republika Srpska. Over the last five years,
Dodik has been a member of BiH’s tripartite presidency and has worked tirelessly and con-
sistently to undermine the country in “a bid to weaken it and pursue his separatist
agenda.”41 As Hamza Karcic claims, his actions make Dodik “perhaps the only political
leader in the world who is working tirelessly to ruin the country over which he officially
presides.”42
Over the years, Dodik has minimized and trivialized the genocide and on many
occasions stated that Srebrenica was a “fabricated myth.”43 In the last two decades,
Dodik has created a political and social space in which genocide denials are normalized.
The residents of Republika Srpska commonly hear that those missing from Srebrenica are
“in fact alive and have migrated to the West or that exhumed victims are the Serb victims
of Bosniak atrocities.”44 Apart from these fabrications, some – like my father who is a Serb
and lives in Republika Srpska – think that the dead Bosniak victims “were brought from
other places to be buried there” or that “the burial coffins are in fact empty.” These
stories are adopted by Republika Srpska citizens and mirror the official policy rhetoric
of the government of Republika Srpska. So too are the stories of Republika Srpska’s
strongman, Dodik, who has claimed many times that, “Many of the buried were killed
in fighting and on that list [of buried victims] are people who are still alive.”45
Despite undisputable evidence, as well as international and local judgements which
settled on Srebrenica genocide, I have listened to these manufactured myths for more
than two decades. As a panellist on a recent Srebrenica commemoration conference
suggested, it is not only the atrocities of the past, but the “ongoing genocide denial
[that] pervades the present.”46 According to the Srebrenica Memorial Denial Report,
the number of documented cases of denial surged from 234 to 693 between 2022 and
2023.47 Ninety denial were expressed in public and media spaces, and Dodik was
named, along with a few other political leaders from Republika Srpska, as the main
public figure to frequently deny genocide.48
In many conversations with my father, I tried to argue facts and truths about genocide
but it proved impossible. I argued. I yelled. We fought for years over the lies and the con-
structed and cemented myths. Nothing could change his mind once he became

41
Hamza Karcic, “Putin’s Most Loyal Balkan Client,” Foreign Policy, 7 October 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/
07/bosnia-elections-milorad-dodik-putin-russia/.
42
Ibid.
43
Zamira Rahim, “Srebrenica Massacre is ‘Fabricated Myth,’ Bosnian Serb Leader Says,” The Independent, 14 April 2019,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/srebrenica-massacre-genocide-milorad-dodik-bosnia-
mytha8869026.html; Beta, “Dodik: Bošnjaci od Srebrenice prave mit koji ne postoji,” Danas, 12 April 2019, https://
www.danas.rs/svet/dodik-bosnjaci-od-srebrenice-prave-mit-koji-ne-postoji/.
44
See Hanson Green, Srebrenica Genocide Denial Report, 31.
45
Radio Free Europa: Radio Liberty, “Bosnian Serb Law Makers Reject 2004 Srebrenica Report, Call For New Probe,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 August 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnian-serb-lawmakers-reject-2004-
srebrenica-report-call-for-new-probe/29435079.html.
46
Emily Colchird Schrader, “Srebrenica Conference: Muslims and Jews Stand Together for Genocide Prevention,” Balkan
Diskurs, 24 July 2023, https://balkandiskurs.com/en/2023/07/24/srebrenica-conference/.
47
Srebrenica Memorial Center, Announcement: Srebrenica Genocide Denial Report 2022,” Srebrenica Memorial Center,
21 December 2022, https://srebrenicamemorial.org/en/news/srebrenica-genocide-denial-report-2022/97.
48
Aida Trepanić, “Negiranje genocida smanjeno, ali i dalje značajno prisutno: Izvještaj Memorijalnog centra Srebrenica,”
Detektor, 2 August 2023, https://detektor.ba/2023/08/02/negiranje-genocida-umanjeno-ali-i-dalje-znacajno-prisutno-
izvjestaj-memorijalnog-centra-srebrenica/.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 7

convinced that “there was no genocide in Srebrenica,”49 as Vojislav Seselj, a Serbian war
criminal turned politician50 whom he adores, claimed more than once. My father, unfor-
tunately, is not the only one immersed in such thinking. He is a symbolic representation of
many people, including the youth, who live in Republika Srpska and who became desen-
sitized to the genocide in Srebrenica. They lack any empathy or remorse over the crimes
committed against non-Serbs. In the decades since the commission of the Srebrenica gen-
ocide, the myths surrounding it have hardened, and the culture of denial has become
ingrained.
It has transferred across the generations to the nation’s youth through education, gov-
ernment-led media and the vast and largely uncontrolled apparatus of social media. Inter-
generational trauma, coupled with an intergenerational fabrication of truth, have been
passed down to the next generation. In the absence of the rule of law, these myths
have been accepted as truth. They are further perpetuated by the glorification of war
criminals and a failure to prosecute those who glorify them. For Menachem Rosensaft,
those who deny the massacre become “moral accomplices” of the crime,51 yet there
are no reprimands or sanctions for them. On the contrary, these denials are often met
with praise.
In such circumstances, a rhetoric of minimization and trivialization of genocide became
normalized, even widely accepted, with war criminals officially and institutionally cele-
brated as war heroes. As Goran Simic recently stated, “We love “our” war criminals and
“our” murderers more than we love “other” victims.”52 On 20 March 2016, and in antici-
pation of the verdict against Radovan Karadzic, Dodik opened a student dormitory in
Pale, Republika Srpska. The dormitory was named after Karadzic. At the opening, Dodik
stated: “This student dormitory is to honour a man who lay the foundations of Republika
Srpska.”53 At the time, Karadzic was in a detention centre in the Hague, having been there
since his 2008 arrest. Karadzic was a fugitive from justice for 13 years before his arrest. On
24 March 2016, only four days after the official opening of the student dormitory, Radovan
Karadzic was convicted to life imprisonment for war crimes, the siege of Sarajevo and the
genocide in Srebrenica.54
Once the judgment was promulgated, the High Representative Valentin Inzko
requested that the name of the dormitory be removed. The students of Republika
Srpska and its student union released a statement saying that they would not allow
the plaque with Karadzic’s name to be removed. They stated,
Radovan Karadzic was the first president of Republika Srpska, which is our homeland, which
we love with all our hearts and no one will insult and attack it without receiving the same. His

49
Gadzo, “Denial of Genocide.”
50
Vojislav Seselj is a Serbian politician convicted for the crimes against humanity by the ICTY. He spent almost 12 years
in the United Nations Detention Unit in the Hague, Scheveningen. He was temporarily released in 2014 for medical
treatment. He refused to return to the Hague. He now lives in Belgrade, Serbia where he has a successful political
career.
51
Menachem Rosensaft cited in Ibrahim Sofić, “Svjetski jevrejski kongres: Negatori genocida u Srebrenici su saučesnici u
zločinu,” Al Jazeera, 7 July 2023, https://balkans.aljazeera.net/teme/2023/7/7/svjetski-jevrejski-kongres-negatori-
genocida-u-srebrenici-su-saucesnici-u-zlocinu.
52
Sloboda Narodu, “Panel diskusija: Kako zaustaviti rat u Bosni i Hercegovini?” YouTube, 15 June 2023, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=ED-dzrb_Q8g.
53
021, “Dodik otvorio Studentski dom koji nosi ime Radovana Karadžića,” 021, 20 March 2016, https://www.021.rs/story/
Info/Srbija/131392/Dodik-otvorio-Studentski-dom-koji-nosi-ime-Radovana-Karadzica.html.
54
Menachem Rosensaft, General Counsel of the World Jewish Congress, see Sofić, “Svjetski jevrejski kongres.”
8 O. SIMIC

character and deed will always live through the residents of RS, especially us, students, who
will always respect and remember him.55

Instead of publicly renouncing Karadzic, the youth of Republika Srpska and its students
defended him publicly, and shared their pride in his deeds. Six months later, on 24
October 2016, the Republika Srpska parliament awarded a “certificate of appreciation”
to Karadzic which Karadzic’s daughter, Sonja Karadzic Jovicevic, a deputy speaker of
the parliament at the time, received on behalf of her father.56 In 2018, Republika
Srpska lawmakers voted to annul the 2002 Report on Srebrenica which contained “false
data”57 about “alledged massacre.” In such a “celebratory” atmosphere it is difficult, as
some scholars suggested, “to call liars by their name.”58 A minority of those who dared
to challenge the institutionalized myths have been harassed, intimidated and attacked
for speaking up.59 The fear of persecution has settled in, but so too has resignation,
indifference, and the firm conviction held by many residents in Republika Srpska that gen-
ocide “did not happen.”
The State’s control of media and public spaces has developed under the direction of
strongman Dodik who, in June 2023, announced that he will make “a list of enemies of
the state” and introduced amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina
that criminalize defamation and stifle free speech.60 These threats target a small yet criti-
cal group of human rights activists and journalists in Republika Srpska who have been
vocal about government policies that violate human rights and freedoms.61 Aside from
the fear of thinking differently, there is a widespread apathy towards the future, and a nor-
malization and acceptance of acts which should trigger outrage in any democracy. The
fact that “everyone has become used to his [Dodik’s] threats”62 is problematic. The nor-
malization of otherwise abnormal acts and behaviours in Republika Srpska has happened
gradually. Its citizens have been worn down and grown “accustomed to prevailing con-
ditions, accept[ing] them and treat[ing] them as the normal state of affairs.”63 In this
socio-political process, Dodik has become the seemingly untouchable autocrat who
rules with complete impunity.
In July 2021, the outgoing international High Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko,
amended the state Criminal Code to criminalize the denial of genocide and ban the glor-
ification of war criminals.64 Less than two years after these amendments, on 21 February

55
Radio Sarajevo, “Nakon Inzkove poruke: Studenti iz RS-a ne daju ploču Radovana Karadžićaz,” Radio Sarajevo, 8
November 2020, https://radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/studenti-porucili-da-ploca-sa-imenom-rado
vana-karadzica-nece-biti-skinuta/395850.
56
Daily Sabah: Andolu, “Bosnia’s Serb Republika Honors Convicted War Criminal Karadzic,” Daily Sabah, 24 October 2016,
https://www.dailysabah.com/balkans/2016/10/24/bosnias-serb-republika-honors-convicted-war-criminal-karadzic.
57
Radio Free Europa, “Bosnian Serb Law Makers.”
58
Barton Hronešová and Hasić, “The 2021 Memory Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 18.
59
Azem Kurtic, “Attacks on Critical Journalists’ Property in Bosnia’s Banja Luka Condemned,” Balkan Insight, 10 March 2023,
https://balkaninsight.com/2023/03/10/attacks-on-critical-journalists-property-in-bosnias-banja-luka-condemned/.
60
N1: Sarajevo, “‘Buka’ chief editor: People are Afraid, and Those Who Speak Out are in Danger,” N1, 24 April 2019,
https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-srpska-defamation-law-criminalization-criticism/32512853.html.
61
Mondo, “Ko će sve biti na listi? Dodik najavio donošenje zakona o proglašenju neprijatelja RS,” 18 July 2023, Mondo,
https://mondo.ba/Info/Politika/a1233186/Dodik-pravi-listu-neprijatelja-RS.html
62
Barton Hronešová and Hasić, “The 2021 Memory Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2.
63
Gregorious Ioannou, The Normalisation of Cyprus’ Partition Among Greek Cypriots: Political Economy and Political
Culture in a Divided Society (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 3.
64
Office of the High Representative, “HR’s Decision on Enacting the Law on Amendment to the Criminal Code of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,” 23 July 2021, http://www.ohr.int/hrs-decision-on-enacting-the-law-on-amendment-to-
thecriminal-code-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 9

2023, Milorad Dodik stated publicly, “Over there (in Srebrenica) genocide did not happen
and we all in Republika Srpska know it.”65 While the denial of genocide and glorification of
war criminals continues in Republika Srpska, this denial has now spread to the Federation
of Bosnia and Hezegovina where the President of Federation, Lidija Bradar, and Minister of
Federation for Sports and Culture, Sanja Vlaisavljevic, publicly glorified war criminals and
argued for their rehabilitation.66
Over the last few years, the President of Croatia, Zoran Milanovic, has also publicly
denied the genocide in Srebrenica.67 In the latest genocide denial report, Milanovic’s
name was added to Dodik’s on the list of people who most frequently denied or relati-
vized genocide in Srebrenica between May 2022 and May 2023.68 On 12 August 2023, Pre-
sident Milanovic reportedly stated that “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a clumsy, poorly, and
incompetently governed [country], functioning as a colony where a handful of third-rate
bureaucrats indulge themselves by inventing new criminal acts … .”69
The denial of genocide and glorification of war criminals has spread within BiH and its
neighbouring countries and occupies all spheres of public life: whether in the form of
graffiti, in the names of buildings and streets, on Instagram, Facebook and other social
media. It has infiltrated into all spheres of life unabated. The denial does not happen ran-
domly anymore, as may have been the case in its initial phase. Now, the denial constantly
evolves into new forms, appearing in new spaces and involving different actors within
society. For instance, the media organizes live debates on the denial of genocide with aca-
demics, politicians and convicted war criminals during the days of its commemoration.70
Such debates are mainstreamed nationally, and aim to further negate “the events” in
Srebrenica that were internationally described as genocide.

Celebrating Genocide
On 11 July 2023, during the 28th commemoration of genocide in Srebrenica, two young
female students of the Criminology and Security Studies at the University of Sarajevo
posted on their Instagram profile that Mladic was “a man convicted” not of genocide
but “of immortality” due to his heroic acts. One of them continued by stating, “You
were and will always be our hero. Long live our General.”71 The student printed these
words across her smiling selfies. The young students publicly celebrated – genocide –
65
Radio Slobodna Evropa, “Dodik o genocidu u Srebrenici: Od priznanja do negiranja bez kazne,” Radio Slobodna
Evropa, 23 February 2023, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/milorad-dodik-potocari-srebrenica-genocid-bosna-
hercegovina/32284742.html.
66
Olivera Simic, “Once a War Criminal, Always a War Criminal?” Balkan Insight, 14 June 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/
2023/06/14/once-a-war-criminal-always-a-war-criminal/.
67
Sarajevo Times, “OHR reacted on Denial of Srebrenica Genocide by the President of Croatia,” Sarajevo Times, 18 Sep-
tember 2022, https://sarajevotimes.com/ohr-reacted-on-denial-of-srebrenica-genocide-by-the-president-of-croatia/.
68
Hina, “Milanović se našao na popisu ljudi koji negiraju genocid u Srebrenici,” Index HR, 2 August 2023, https://www.
index.hr/vijesti/clanak/milanovic-se-nasao-na-popisu-ljudi-koji-negiraju-genocid-u-srebrenici/2484432.aspx?index_
ref=naslovnica_vijesti_ostalo_d; See Hanson Green, “Srebrenica Genocide Denial Report,” 18.
69
Al Jazeera, “Milanović nazvao BiH ‘trapavom, traljavom, nesposobno vođenom kolonijom,’” Al Jazeera, 12 August
2023, https://balkans.aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2023/8/12/milanovic-nazvao-bih-trapavom-traljavom-nesposobno-
vodjenom-kolonijom.
70
Igor Spaić, “Šokantno: U Srbiji cijeli dan specijalna emisija posvecena negiranju genocide”, N1, 11 July 2023, https://
n1info.ba/vijesti/sokantno-u-srbiji-cijeli-dan-specijalna-emisija-posvecena-negiranju-genocida/.
71
N. Š., “Studentice koje su veličale zločinca Mladića: U strahu smo za život, zašto je problem da slavimo naše vođe?”
Oslobodenje, 13 July 2023, https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/studentice-koje-su-velicale-zlocinca-mladica-u-
strahu-smo-za-zivot-zasto-je-problem-da-slavimo-nase-vode-876574.
10 O. SIMIC

by posting numerous images with three fingers raised (a Serb nationalist salute), cheering
and praising their “hero” Mladic. To their colleagues who raised their voice against such
posts, one of them replied, “Screw you, it’s good that we killed you all.” At the same time,
families of victims, local and international guests, and human rights activists in Potocari
gathered to commemorate and bury the bodily remains of thirty victims who were bru-
tally killed in July 1995. These bodies belonged to the victims who had been recovered
from the mass graves since the last commemoration in July 2022. I was stopped in my
tracks when I discovered the posts. I watched the smiley face of the student and read
the posts over and over again as they spread rapidly across social media.
Only a few hours earlier, I had read Asim Mujkic’s piece that traced the steps which had
paved the way and encouraged the students’ open swearing and celebration of the
killings.72 Mujkic’s piece captured how the student’s moment of celebration could materi-
alize itself in today’s BiH. He argues that debates surrounding the Srebrenica genocide in
the entity of Republika Srpska started with relativization and then negation. Today, he
claims, we are in the phase where “genocide is sworn and celebrated in orgies called the
“days of liberating Srebrenica.”73 These “celebrations” are held also in Srebrenica by the
government of Republika Srpska during the days of the anniversary of the mass killings.
Are the young students’ open admiration of their hero, Mladic, any different from the
murals painted and preserved on the walls of the cities where the majority of Serbs live?
These murals have remained in place for the past two decades. Are the works of street
artists, indeed, any different from the celebration of the “days of liberating Srebrenica”?
Each year when I return to my hometown in Banjaluka, I stroll through the centre of my
city. There, in the street markets, I can buy a t-shirt featuring an image of Mladic with the
slogan “our hero,” or souvenirs with his name. If there is a market for this, there must be
customers, too. These souvenirs have been in street stalls for many years, and citizens of
Republika Srpska do not pay attention to them anymore.74 No one seems surprised or
outraged that a war criminal convicted of murder, torture and genocide in Srebrenica
is celebrated or that people wear t-shirts with his portrait in public spaces.
What for most outsiders would seem strange, has become normal for the citizens of
Republika Srpska. David Foster Wallace uses an anecdote of two young fish to describes
such normalization: two young fish are swimming along when older member of the
species meets them and greets them by saying “Good morning boys, how’s the
water?” The two young fish continue to swim for a while before one turns to the other
and says, “What the hell is water?” Foster Wallace makes the point that when something
is so big and so close to us we no longer recognize it.75 Wallace uses this story to point out
that often, like fish in the ocean, people are unaware of their surroundings. The denial of
genocide has become so normalized in Republika Srpska that the majority of people no
longer pay attention to it.

72
Asim Mujkic, “Asim Mujkic: Zlocin i kazna za zrtve,” Valter Portal, 12 July 2023, https://valterportal.ba/asim-mujkic-
zlocin-i-kazna-za-zrtve/.
73
Ibid.
74
There is an apparently thriving online market for t shirts and souvenirs glorifying war criminals. See, Nermina Kulo-
glija-Zolj, “Kako prodavnice zaradjuju na odjeci sa simbolima krajnje desnice u Srbiji I BiH,” Deketor 31 July 2023,
https://detektor.ba/2023/07/31/kako-prodavnice-zaradjuju-na-odjeci-sa-simbolima-krajnje-desnice-u-srbiji-i-bih/.
75
Akira the Don and David Foster Wallace, “What the Hell is Water? Video,” https://bosefina.medium.com/this-is-water-
give-the-liberal-arts-majors-a-chance
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 11

What two young students did is not surprising, but, unfortunately expected. It is hard to
be different to your surrounding environment: you have to go against the flow, and those
who do so know very well how dangerous this can be. Attacks on journalists76 and human
rights activists in BiH are a daily reality for people who dare to speak the truth. Students who
think differently and are ready to deal with the past in an open and inclusive way may well
experience stigma and isolation rather than praise and admiration. It is easier to fit in, to go
with the flow, to follow the vast majority. And these young students did just that. So, who is
to blame? Parents, schools, politicians, media, religious institutions? It is probably correct to
say that everyone should share the blame since genocide denial never just happens. There
is always a set of circumstances created to build a climate in which genocide denial can take
place. “Aggressive ideology”77 and “an intense nationalism”78 are some of the prerequisites
mainstreamed by official representatives in Republika Srpska and Serbia to create toxic
spaces in which denialism have thrived.
In contrast to the youth in Germany, some young people in Republika Srpska are not
repulsed by the crimes committed by their fathers. Instead, they actively embrace and
promote the violent past and identify with convicted genociders and murderers. If a gen-
eration of young sons in post-war Germany asked their fathers: “What did you do during
the Third Reich?” the question would evoke shame or guilt. However, as Šušnica writes,
the same question, if asked by a generation of Bosnian Serbs, would not be met with
shame or guilt, but with pride or indifference among the majority of citizens in Serbia
and in Republika Srpska.79 Susanne Karstedt argues that in Germany “young elites
acknowledged moral and legal guilt and supported the trials, reconciliation and compen-
sation.”80 She claims that, younger generations which were not directly involved [in
Holocaust,]
refuse recognition … that to a degree [they] – the generations who come after – might be like
the perpetrators, and that perceptions and attitudes that justified and motivated the atroci-
ties still live on. Within German families and in particular in the grandchildren’s generation,
the desire to believe that [their] “Grandpa was not a Nazi” has been widespread and over-
whelming, notwithstanding the most obvious evidence to the contrary.81

While, in the aftermath of WWII, Germany existed in a similar state of denial with
respect to the complicity of their citizens in the crimes committed by Nazi regime,
elites, at least, did not engage in the public promotion of the Nazis crimes.82 They
were silent, and discussions of the recent past were non-existent. Art contends that the
Germans did not embrace, what he calls, a “culture of contrition” until the 1980s.83

76
Jasmin Begic, “Bosnian Sentenced for Threatening BIRN Journalists on Facebook,” Balkan Insight, 17 July 2023, https://
balkaninsight.com/2023/07/17/bosnian-sentenced-for-threatening-birn-journalists-on-facebook/.
77
Edina Becirevic, Genocide on the Drina River (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 9.
78
Irving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), 65.
79
Srdan Šušnica, “The Legacy of Srebrenica and the Bitter Victories of Genocide” Justice Info, 9 July 2020, https://www.
justiceinfo.net/en/44852-legacy-srebrenica-bitter-victories-genocide.html.
80
Susanne Karstedt, “The Life Course of Collective Memories: Persistency and Change in West Germany between 1950
and 1970,” Polish Sociological Review 165, no. 1 (2009): 27.
81
Susanne Karstedt, “Inheriting the Burden of Guilt: Reflections on Atonement, Responsibility and Accountability” (2023
Tony Fitzgerald Lecture, Griffith Criminology Institute, Brisbane, Australia, 6 June 2023) https://www.griffith.edu.
au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/1821710/TranscriptSusanneKarstedt.pdf.
82
See Jasmina Dragovic-Soso, “Justice and Apology in the Aftermath of War and Mass Crime: Contemporary Serbia and
the German Model,” History and Memory 34, no. 1 (2022): 69–99
83
David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
12 O. SIMIC

According to Karstedt, “the formation of collective memories is embedded in social and

normative change.”84 Such changes in BiH went in the wrong direction.
The celebration of genocide can never happen without a supportive environment in
which celebrators can emerge, grow, and flourish. The celebration comes after denial –
as the eleventh stage in the genocide process.85 Dodik exudes an aura of immunity,
and, as the President of Republika Srpska, he is admired by the young. They see him as
daring since he can “say whatever he wants to the Western leaders in power.” He has
never been sanctioned for hate speech or denial of the genocide, so why would the
youth think that he is wrong or that his actions are unacceptable? The young student
admirers of Mladic are a symbolic representation of everything the governmental insti-
tutions have worked tirelessly towards since the end of the war. These extreme nationalist
ideologies have entered the mainstream, and the students’ worldviews are shaped by
them.86 In just one generation the tables have turned, and a new army of young
deniers were born and now flourish. The unabated indoctrination of young people has
culminated in the students’ public acts of denial of genocide which aimed to rub salt
into the open wounds of victims of the most gruesome crimes. The Republika Srpska gov-
ernment achieved its mission. The rest have failed.

An Award for Swearing Genocide

On 14 July 2023, and after several days of media hype about the two students’ posts, the
Premier of Republika Srpska, Dodik posted on his Twitter account.
These days we are witnesses of the orgies with Muslim war flags with which they [Bosniaks]
came to Republika Srpska. Their [Bosniak] institutions did everything so their provocations
could go smoothly. At the same time in Sarajevo public hatred has been displayed against
two girls who only expressed their opinion which shows that Sarajevo is not a multiethnic
city as it likes to show itself to be. The students who were exposed to public persecution,
if they wish so, can continue their studies at one of the universities in Republika Srpska
and I will personally help them to achieve so.

At the time of Dodik’s post, the survivors of Srebrenica were still holding their annual com-
memoration proceedings. Dodik, himself, promised the two students protection from the
“angry Muslims.” In collaboration with the Serbian Minister of Interior, Aleksandar Vulin,
he arranged for them to continue their studies in Serbia after they experienced a
public “lynching” from their colleagues and the media in BiH. On 17 July 2023, business-
man, Nedeljko Elak, and the two students gave their views to the media about their Insta-
gram posts. Elak said that, on the invitation of Vulin himself, “the two beautiful and brave
girls were invited to continue their education at the Academy for Security Studies in Bel-
grade and their costs will be paid by the government of Serbia.”87 The students then
stated that they were exposed to media harassment, threats from the citizens of Sarajevo
and subjected to “a witch hunt” after publishing their posts, and that they “gladly
84
Karstedt, “The Life Course of Collective Memories,” 27.
85
See Hikmet Karcic, “Srebrenica Genocide Denial:From Dodik to TikTok,” in Bosnian Genocide Denial and Triumphalism:
Origins Impact and Prevention, ed. Sead Turčalo and Hikmet Karčić (Sarajevo, 2021), 60–3.
86
Hikmet Karcic, “How Denial of Bosnian War Crimes Entered the Mainstream,” Balkan Insight, 30 June 2020, https://
balkaninsight.com/2020/06/30/how-denial-of-bosnian-war-crimes-entered-the-mainstream/.
87
Sandzak Danas, “Studenti iz Srbije ogorčeni stipendiranjem veličanja Mladića /VIDEO/,” Sandzak Danas, 17 July 2023,
https://www.sandzakdanas.rs/studenti-iz-srbije-ogorceni-stipendiranjem-velicanja-mladica-video/.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 13

accepted an offer from Mr Vulin to continue [their] studies in Belgrade.”88 The students
left the press conference smiling broadly and convinced that they were in the right. At
the end of the press conference, Elak said “I am glad the students will go to study in Bel-
grade, but I hope they will return to Republika Srpska one day and work in our security
institutions.”89
Similarly, the Minister of Interior of BiH, Nenad Nesic, in his media statements commen-
ted on the two students’ posts stating that,
it is unheard of that someone can be persecuted and threatened for expressing their opinion
and for raising three fingers [Serb national salute]. I don’t see that as a problem in this
country. I think we, in BiH, have many more problems than those caused by expressing
our opinions because expressing opinions cannot incite any pain or crime and it cannot
hurt this state.

Nesic then raised both of his arms and saluted the full media press room with three
fingers.
The Bosniak media related to the fact that the two young Serb women, since they were
“students,” and highly educated and future academic citizens, they “should have known
better.” However, if there is no prosecutorial response to the denial of genocide, the
halting of hate speech remains useless and impotent. Without the reform of the edu-
cation, root causes of the hate speech cannot be eliminated. Younger generations have
grown up in an environment in which war criminals are celebrated, people who com-
mitted genocide are glorified90 and empathy towards victims of other groups is almost
non-existent. The inability to perceive “the other” as people impedes reconciliation.91
Some scholars have raised hope that education can assist in “countering disinformation
with facts”92 and that “forensic truth”93 may be a saviour. The trouble is that education
in BiH is deeply politicized and divisive. Children learn about “their” victims, but not
“their” perpetrators which are portrayed as “heroes.” Education mirrors the sociocultural
milieu of the country in which is impossible to reach any kind of consensus. As Srdjan
Puhalo, a psychologist and analyst from BiH stated,
It would be the best if Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks could write a joint history of the 1990s, but I
am afraid that is unrealistic and hard to achieve. On the other hand, I am afraid that is even
more dangerous to let children learn about the Bosnian history in the 1990s from their
parents and social networks and portals, where you can read all sorts of nonsense.94

The victimhood of each ethnic group in BiH is firmly cemented in the school curriculum
and there is no cross-entity consensus about the 1990s war. The children in BiH were not

88
Face HD TV, “Bruka! Srbija nagradila studentice koje su veličale Ratka Mladića porukom: “Nek smo vas pobili!”
YouTube, 16 July 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWslXoBVWVE.
89
Ibid.
90
Barbora Hola and Olivera Simic, “ICTY Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home,” International Criminal Justice Review
28, no. 4 (2018): 285–90.
91
Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation,” Human Rights Quar-
terly 26, no. 3 (2004): 580.
92
Miloš Gregor and Petra Mlejnková, eds., Challenging Online Propaganda and Disinformation in the 21st Century (Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
93
Ibid.
94
See Srdjan Puhalo, Bosnian psychologist and analyst, in Erna Maćkić, “Episode 87: Education in BiH – What We (Don’t)
Teach our Children in Schools,” Detektor, 18 May 2017, https://detektor.ba/2017/05/18/episode-87-education-in-bih-
what-we-dont-teach-our-children-in-schools/?lang=en
14 O. SIMIC

educated, but indoctrinated with nationalistic narratives that prevail in all segments of edu-
cation. Such education divides students along ethnic lines and cement the ethnocentric
narratives that stimulate the continuous segregation of children.95 Generations of children
in BiH have been deprived of “inclusive education” due to the authorities’ lack of political
willingness to establish a unified and shared program of education across the country.96
The failure to abolish the system of “two schools under one roof” continues to promote
a system of mono-ethnic education. The phenomenon started as a “temporary solution”
for divided communities and to stimulate the return of ethnic minorities to their pre-war
communities, but it has since become a permanent feature of the BiH landscape.
In 2017, there were 32 schools following the “two schools under one roof” system.
According to latest reports there are 56 of these schools in BiH in 2023.97 The system per-
sists despite a 2014 judgement of the Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH which
found that a cantonal public school authority had discriminated against their students
by separating them along ethnic lines.98 The cantonal authorities were ordered to take
all necessary measures to ensure that integrated multicultural schools are established
while respecting students’ rights to an education in their own language. This judgement,
however, remains unimplemented today.
Along with mono-ethnic schools, convicted war criminals in BiH, Serbia and Croatia can
hold roles in public office and some have been active as teachers and educators. Amir
Kubura, is a convicted war criminal who served two years’ imprisonment following the
ICTY decision. Kubura was convicted in 2012, and following his release, was elected as
a member of management committee of Faculty of Political Science.99 Former general,
Vladimir Lazarevic, was convicted by the ICTY for crimes against Kosovar Albanians.
Lazarevic was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity.100
After his release, Lazarevic joined the teaching team at the military academy in Bel-
grade.101 In 2021, he was declared an honorary citizen of a town in Southern Serbia.102
Veselin Šljivančanin, a former major in the (then) Yugoslav Army, was sentenced to 10
years imprisonment for torture and murder103 and was released in 2011. Since then

95
Ibid.
96
See Ibid.; Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report by Nil Muiznieks, Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of
Europe Following His Visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 12 to 16 June 2017,” 7 November 2017, https://rm.coe.int/
report-following-the-visit-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina-from-12-to-16-jun/16807642b1.
97
José Salcedo Jiménez, “Dvije škole pod jednim krovom: Suživot postao paralela postojanju,” Balkan Diskurs, 25 June
2023, https://balkandiskurs.com/2023/06/25/dvije-skole-pod-jednim-krovom/.
98
Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ruling no. 58 0 Ps 085653 13 Rev, 29 August 2014,
http://www.vasaprava.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/11/Vrhovni-sud-Federacije-BiH-odluka-po-reviziji
dvije-%C5–A1kole-pod-jednim-krovom_01.pdf (accessed 13 January 2017).
99
Hrvatski dnevnik, “U BiH osuđeni ratni zločinci mogu voditi obrazovne institucije i općine, sutra možda i državu,”
Hrvatski dnevnik, 20 August 2023, https://hrvatskidnevnik.com/u-bih-osudeni-ratni-zlocinci-mogu-voditi-
obrazovne-institucije-i-opcine-sutra-mozda-i-drzavu/.
100
Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, IT-05-87-A, 23 January 2014.
101
DW, “Srbija: Haški osuđenici kao profesori?,” DW, 20 October 2017, https://www.dw.com/bs/haški-osuđenici-kao-
predavači-na-vojnoj-akademiji-u-beogradu/a-41046046.
102
Radio Free Europe, “‘Glory’ Day: Convicted War Criminal Receives Local Honor In Serbia,” Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty, 5 August 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-war-criminal-honored/31395195.html; Emina Kovačević,
“Lazarević počeo da predaje na Vojnoj akademiji,” N1, 26 October 2017, https://n1info.rs/vesti/a337690-lazarevic-
poceo-da-predaje-na-vojnoj-akademiji/.
103
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Review Judgment Summary for Veselin Šljivančanin,”
Appeals Chamber, The Hague, December 2010, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrksic/acjug/en/101208_review_
judgement_summary.pdf.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 15

Šljivančanin holds public debates and writes books in which he denies war crimes and his
role in them. When the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, was asked how a convicted
war criminal can be so active in Serbian political and public spaces, Vučić replied, “What
do you want me to do with him, he did his imprisonment sentence, no?”104 Dario Kordic,
another convicted war criminal from Croatia, teaches students occasionally.105 Kordic,
sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment for the crimes against humanity by the ICTY106
but released early in 2014, recently incited public debate by declaring that he “would
do them [his crimes] again.”107 On 20 September 2023, Christian Schmidt, the High Repre-
sentative of International Community in BiH, stated in the memorial centre Srebrenica
that he had signed a decision banning war criminals from holding public offices.108
Whether this decision will be implemented, remains to be seen.
Academic, Slavko Kukic, states that BiH students have been victims of the past 30 years
of a “morbid ideological drill”109 which normalizes hate speech and the dehumanization
of “the other.” He argues that, together, normalization and dehumanization can be pre-
cursors to the commission of atrocity crimes. Similarly, Jovo Bakic stated that the
growing relevance of right-wing organizations, which are built on an extreme nationalist
discourse about the past and hero worship of war criminals sentenced by the ICTY, con-
tinues to present a potent alternative for disaffected youth.110 These conditions often
present themselves during, after, and long before violence breaks out; but in BiH we
see its continuation, its solidification and the institutional acceptance and promotion of
these conditions, long after genocide is committed. For the past three decades, BiH has
inhabited a “dirty peace,” in which the armed conflict is over but the “war” is still being
fought by other means, and in hearts and minds of its people.111

The Memory Law and the (Lack of) Criminal Accountability

The 2021 changes imposed by the Higher Representative elaborated on the existing legal
definitions contained in Article 145. According to 145a(2) provision on the Criminal Code,
“Whoever publicly incites to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a
member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent, or national
or ethnic origin … shall be punished by imprisonment for a term between three months
and three years.” According to 145a(3)

104
DW, “Srbija: Haški osuđenici kao profesori?” 95.
105
Tris, “Osuđeni ratni zločinac Dario Kordić predaje studentima o “Bogu iza rešetaka” (?!),” Tris, 4 January 2019, http://
tris.com.hr/2019/04/osudeni-ratni-zlocinac-dario-kordic-predaje-studentima-o-bogu-iza-resetaka/.
106
Prosecutor v Dario Kordič and Mario Čerkez, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals
Chamber, IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004.
107
Sarajevo Times, “War Criminal Dario Kordic on the Question ‘Was it Worth the Prison’: I Would do it all Over Again,”
Sarajevo Times, 11 June 2023, https://sarajevotimes.com/war-criminal-dario-kordic-on-the-question-was-it-worth-the-
prison-i-would-do-it-all-over-again/; Simic, “Once a War Criminal.”
108
Tuzlainfo, Schmidt u Potocarima saopcio da ima spremne odluke o zabrani obavljjanja javnih funkcija ratnim zlocini-
cima,” Tuzlaimfo, 20 September 2023, https://tuzlainfo.ba/index.php/novosti/item/217400-schmid-u-ptocarima-
saopcio-da-ima-spremne-odluke-o-zabrani-obavljanja-javnih-funkcija-ratnim-zlocincima/.
109
Slavko Kukic, “Studentska demonstracija nacionalne svijesti I budućnost BiH”, Valter Portal, 19 July 2023, https://
valterportal.ba/slavo-kukic-studentska-demonstracija-nacionalne-svijesti-i-buducnost-bih/.
110
Jovo Bakic, “Extreme-Right Ideology, Practice and Supporters: Case Study of the Serbian Radical Party,” Journal of Con-
temporary European Studies 17, no. 2 (2009): 193–-207.
111
See Olivera Simić, Surviving Peace: A Political Memoir (Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 2014).
16 O. SIMIC

Whoever publicly condones, denies, grossly trivializes or tries to justify a crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity or a war crime established by among other courts, the ICTY …
directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to
race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, when the conduct is carried out
in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such
a group, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term between six months and five years.112

One of the rationales advanced for enacting the memory law was to protect the
victim’s “feelings of secure existence” that have been threatened by expressions that
deny genocide or which marginalize or offend the victim group.113 The link between
the denial of grave crimes and the defamation of victim groups can be also found
in the idea that in distorting the facts of such crimes, the distortion in fact accuses
the victims of lying about what happened and, thereby, insults the honour of the
victims.114
In the case of two young students, it would have to be proven that their statements on
Instagram directly incited religious and/or ethnic hatred and that such hatred resulted in
an act with consequences. In the case of Milan Mandic et al from 2017,115 the Court of BiH
rejected an indictment raised for breach of the 145a provision of the Criminal Code
because it “could not conclude that, by the alleged statement, the accused incited
hatred among constitutive people in BiH, which in a concrete case would be a conse-
quence of criminal act for which accused was indicted.”116
From July 2021, when the law banning genocide denial first entered into effect, until
today, 30 indictments have been raised, and dismissed, for the denial of genocide and the
glorification of war criminals in media on social networks.117 The large number dismissals
occurred due to the Court’s inability to properly identify the perpetrator. By their very
nature, social media networks create anonymity and generate significant uncertainty as
to the actual perpetrator. However, the most problematic issue regarding provision
145a derives from the overly broad definition of the criminal act and the difficulties in
proving “the consequence of the act.”118 The BiH Criminal Code is not in-line with the leg-
islative framework of other European Union member states or their criminal codes that
ban the denial of Holocaust and other mass atrocities. Unlike the BiH provision, these
laws do not require the incitement to provoke “a consequence.” For example, the

112
Office of the High Representative, “HR’s Decision on Enacting the Law on Amendment to the Criminal Code of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,” 23 July 2021, https://www.ohr.int/hrs-decision-on-enacting-the-law-on-amendment-to-the-
criminal-code-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/. Emphasis added; Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Unofficial,
Consolidated Version (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina” No. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05,
53/06, 55/06, 32/07, 8/10) retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/bih-criminal-code-consolidated-text/16806415c8;
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of the FbiH
36/03) (2003).
113
Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001), 219.
114
Marloes van Noorloos, “Memory law: Regulating Memory and the Policing of Acknowledgement and Denial,” in Tran-
sitional Justice and the Public Sphere, ed. Christje Brants and Susanne Karstedt (London: Hart Publishing, 2017), 263,
266.
115
ATV, “Mandić i novinari nisu krivi za govor mržnje,” ATV, 24 May 2017, https://www.atvbl.rs/mandic-novinari-nisu-
krivi-za-govor-mrznje.
116
Ibid.
117
Azra Husarić Omerović, “Tri stvari koje trebate znati ako želite prijaviti negiranje ratnih zločina,” Detektor, 7 August
2023, https://detektor.ba/2023/08/07/tri-stvari-koje-trebate-znati-ako-zelite-prijaviti-negiranje-ratnih-zlocina/.
118
Lamija Grebo, “Kako su tužioci odbacili 27 prijava za negiranje genocida i veličanje zločinaca,” Detektor, 22
February 2023, https://detektor.ba/2023/02/22/kako-su-tuzioci-odbacili-27-prijava-za-negiranje-genocida-i-velicanje-
zlocinaca/.
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 17

German penal code prohibits publicly denying the Holocaust and disseminating Nazi pro-
paganda, both on and offline. This includes sharing images.119 In 2016 the French Parlia-
ment voted to criminalize the denial of all crimes against humanity.120 Holocaust denial
has been illegal in Belgium since 1995, and applies to anyone who denies, grossly mini-
mizes, attempts to justify, or approves of the genocide committed by the German
National Socialist regime during World War II.121 None of these enected legislations
require a “consequence” to be triggered by denialism.
In order to start successfully prosecuting the denial of genocide in Srebrenica and
other war crimes, according to a member of the Office of Prosecutors BiH,
The third part of the provision 145a must be deleted “ … and carried out in a manner likely to
incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group.” By deleting
the requirement for there to be a direct consequence, responsibility will exist based on the
denial alone. This would create the possibility of sanctioning these acts. The requirement
to prove a consequence, makes it impossible to sanction someone under the act.122

As provision 145a currently stands, the Court would need to prove that the students’
Instagram posts incited violence or hatred against a group or a member of the group.
While the hype of the media lasted several days, and victims and activists demanded
legal action, the discussion and outrage diminished over time. It is not known
whether the posts incited any act of violence in the public. Today, the case appears
closed and the media have moved on to cover more pressing news. It remains to be
seen whether an indictment against the two students will be raised in the near
future. Reportedly, the Office of the State Prosecutor has been collecting evidence
and documentation to raise indictment against the two students for “Provoking
ethnic, racial and religious hatred, conflict and intolerance” Article 145a of the Criminal
Code of BiH.
However, even if indictment is raised, the same problem remains: the necessity to
prove “the consequence” and this is why the indictment will most likely be dismissed.123
So far, cases of alleged hate speech and denial of genocide have been dismissed by the
Court as “inappropriate speech” which represents a “freedom of expression based on per-
sonal views of events.” Such reasoning was put forward in the majority of Court’s judge-
ments, such as Milan Mandic et al from 2017.124 Article 1 of the European Convention for
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is often raised by defence
counsel and used successfully to defend public statements that could be characterized
as hate speech or denial of genocide. However, this right is not limitless, and the
Council of Europe has stated that “neither the denial or revision of clearly established

119
“Strafgesetzbuch – StGB” Criminal Code. “Criminal Code in the version published on 13 November 1998 (Federal Law
Gazette I, p. 3322), as last amended by Article 2 of the Act of 22 November 2021 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 4906)”
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html
120
DW, “French Parliament Criminalizes Armenian Genocide Denital,” DW, 7 February 2016, https://www.dw.com/en/
french-parliament-votes-to-criminalize-denial-of-armenian-genocide/a-193 72985
121
For legal frameworks in selected EU member states, see Piotr Bakowski, European Parliament Briefing, “Holocaust
Denial in Criminal Law: Legal Frameworks in Selected EU Member States” (January 2022), https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698043/EPRS_BRI(2021)698043_EN.pdf
122
Email communication with a member who wanted to stay anonymous on 17 July 2023.
123
For further discussion on the difficulties of applying the 2021 Memory Law in BiH, see, Barton Hronešová and Hasić,
“The 2021 Memory Law.”
124
Prosecutor v Milan Mandic et al, The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no S1 3 K 020812 16 K, 24 May 2017.
18 O. SIMIC

historical facts … nor the containment of mere speculative danger … fall under the pro-
tection of the European Convention of Human Rights … ”125

Epilogue
Endemic impunity for Srebrenica genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals
perpetuates mistrust among ethnic communities in BiH. It tears apart even further coun-
try’s social fabric and any prospect for reconciliation. Thirty years after the genocide, BiH
remains the country of mass graves scattered and unearthed in 400 locations.126 Yet, in
today’s BiH, the majority of ethnic groups favour “their” war criminals and “their”
victims while at best “ignore” and at worst “offend” “other” victims. While BiH has received
a lot of attention from the international community, the trouble remains that none of the
transitional justice mechanisms, such as prosecuting war crimes, came from the bottom.
These mechanisms were forced upon a government who under different conditions127
had been forced to prosecute people who committed war crimes.
If left to the BiH state institutions, perhaps we would not see any – or at most very few –
criminal prosecutions for mass atrocities. The peace in BiH is fragile and the war continues
to be fought by other means. The battlefield has moved to Facebook, Instagram, and count-
less media portals where deniers and others – often anonymously – can spread hate speech
and go unpunished. Whether they do so anonymously or publicly seems to make little
difference since impunity for these crimes remains entrenched and continues unabated.
The crimes of glorification of war criminals by the youth mirrors the state in which they
live in and the government who set up conditions for the harm to occur and be inflicted
upon the victims of mass atrocities. In the latest incident, two young female students,
instead of offering remorse and apology to the victims of genocide in Srebrenica, received
awards from the highest echelons of the country and remain convinced that they have
done nothing wrong. Far from feeling contrite or ashamed, the students came out of the
whole debacle as “the winners,” and showed other young people that offending victims
and denying mass atrocities can benefit their careers. This latest case of genocide denial
emphasizes the appalling state of politics in BiH and its complete shambolic failure to
move forward from its difficult past. The path to the recognition of the past is difficult,
and BiH has been heading in the wrong direction for decades. To correct these wrongs,
new political elites must come to power and demand political accountability and punish-
ment for those that glorify politics and elites that have led to genocide.

Acknowledgment
A 900-word version of this paper was published in an online Bosnian Buka Magazine on 14
July 2023 (https://6yka.com/kolumne/olivera-simic-psovanje-genocida). The paper that
125
Council of Europe, “Thematic Factsheet: ‘Memory Laws’ and Freedom of Expression,” last updated July 2018, https://
rm.coe.int/factsheet-on-memory-laws-july2018-docx/16808c1690.
126
Radio Sarajevo, “Masovne grobnice ubijenih Srebreničana: Kako je zemlja “otkrila” žrtve genocida,” Radio Sarajevo, 11
July 2023, https://radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/srebrenicki-genocid/504088.
127
Such as accessing the EU membership, see Milica Stojanovic, “Brussels Rebukes Ex-Yugoslav States for Slow War
Crimes Justice,” Balkan Insight, 12 October 2022, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/10/12/brussels-rebukes-ex-
yugoslav-states-for-slow-war-crimes-justice/; Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2016).
 JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 19

you are reading is significantly revised and extended. I thank Professor Susanne Karstedt
for her comments on earlier drafts and to the anonymous reviewer whose comments/sug-
gestions helped improve and clarify this manuscript. I would also like to express sincere
thanks to the editorial team at Journal of Genocide Research, specially Dirk Moses, for his
helpful comments on the earlier version of this article.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor
Olivera Simic is an Associate Professor with the Griffith Law School, Griffith University. She has
published four monographs and numerous co-edited collections, book chapters, journal articles
and personal narratives that cut across the themes of international law, transitional justice and
gender.