Ulysse Carrière

TECHNICALLY MAN DWELLS

UPON THISEARTH

BECOMING
 Earth
this
upon
Carrière
Ulysse
Dwells BECOMING
Man
Technically
 BECOMING
Published by Becoming: Cyprus. 2023.
https://becoming.press
Copyright ©Ulysse Carrière &Becoming, 2023
978-9925-7984-0-7
 I 1 49
Earth
CONTENTS
this
Morelleupon
Dwells
Louis
by Man
Introduction
Technically
Postface
For Plato, Deleuze,
and Brianna Ghey
 INTRODUCTION

For ideas are, in the long run, essentially foreign to

human existence; and the body - receptacle ofthe
involuntary muscles,of the internal organs and
control -
circulatory system over which it has no
isforeign to the spirit, so that it is evenpossible
metaphor for
for people to use the body as a
human
ideas, both being something quite alien to
Steel
existence as such. -Yukio Mishima, Sun and

unmov
To think, is'to be inhabited by an abstract logic
tempted
ingly progressing towards its completion. One is
reflections
to say it is tobe haunted, but specters being
actualizes
of memories and desires, while the Intellect
haunt,
Without a proper end, the latter has no land to
understood not
nocastle in which to roam, Thinking,
as a byproduct of conceptualization but asthat through
Which conceptualizing enacts itself, is a self-differential
engine which creates a path for itself via an endless di
vision of itself.
Integral estrangement of the concept from life has
then to be seen as the prime condition for its identity
With life, its lack of proper interest the ground for every
 through do
generat ac (as without by 1tS chasims
of abandoned, Plotinus what
difference Thought
guiding
thinking
warninggnostic. might proceeds
highest as emulated separated o
foreignness life, abolition
imagined,
unto
divine, invisible
compass
through
as
it
as of by acts
conjoined back of One the it
k a be and
touching, use desecration (as The
world
can mistakenly capable the that misunderstands
be circles itself theabsolurization
such an and of thebe then
notseeps contemplativeas as image andthemust
errors in
occupied of
consecration,to note reasons.
terms a thinkingmark humiliate
seeks Intellect
are entwined something takes two
is
imagination
as be herefabrication,
life the
Louis
Morelle
circles Intellect
never thinking
hypothetical fabricated
strictest
the stancemight the Sophist).
us thatspheres: and
doctrine)
is of
be
(let
thinking
to It time.
heterogeneity Space
point, call elevates
These it
can circles as were position sign itself. its Gnostics).
proceeds II
The contemplative its historiographical
higher
here
might of
the because
content, its immobility
the the
positive of of the
non-existent
interest.
superposing.two manifoldness life,imitate thegods that from instead outside
call
in two thereby in as
Yet we gnostic lifesome and his
although
unnecessary, of nocked posits worldliness might
: any
conceived.which which, own dwelling tualization
comically
fancying
of
to were of Moving
destitution,experience
possible of
thinking
indexing remarked
The It statues The
It
favor mortals
single its path. Plato void. it
and here. one a if
or ing is in a all as
a
 e
thabject that the
overthrowing butBichte there isappend
term Nature).of(that atemporal is thinks
itself
that
Which ensoulment,
elerationism 1S not Otherrelativity to the thinking
any flows,recoil destitution to
nowhere say, desire standpoint Letus only wake
e Ihis act
overcoming the which
entail thatbeforeattraction housing called
ssingshines than for of outsideto to
must fascination here actualized nothing up
being conceptualizing
instance, as to Schelling aspect thought
an of the
to
nora any the actual humiliate
Man' s an fromn
and understandinghave subjectivity understand fknows
start activity
set negation of to imaginary ofchaotic a Pure
fails as simulation through Man, the the
ofhistory are
oneforth, but that illimitation.
no throughthinking
called I)
ratic aesthetic of subject Introduction
according business Man Intellect cannot no
archetypical within of to since
is the
III «
of posit anti-humanism
we intellection to barely dejected
can multitude as the
monarch their
into history;
e sad,
ofthsimultaneously to its bethat to
can the its of power only Autonomy the
inherent something
isolated
thinking as affirm with theFrom it external
outsidebecoming, since history,
to
disappearance. understanding
they
rmans thenspiral conceals be appears, but
the inappearance called
i-humanism, the any this ofthinker of the
law as subjectivation: the embody and
souls attempts movements and of
understand of sadness rejection
such.relativity Man. this
naturally
it a mark
trivially, generic a that
theirbeings
as ofthinking. posit terrified Autarky
well its » That for world.(what
There must of From
kind this the the that task
as of is of or of an at
 Louis Morelle

chthulucenic composts). Its particular

there is no present Intellect, except
that ofgambit is that
bare
matter itself, and that anecessity
of counting, of dead
infused Intellect will develop according to this future-
identity.
That such overcoding of intellection as calculation is an
arbitrary amputation of both thinking and matter (and
for that matter, of capital) appears clearly through the
comical identification of cryptocurrency with spacetime
Under such conditions, any fictional attempt at an
Intellect will be, by necessity, non-convergent with the
interests of humanly understood life and needs. The
innate superiority ofthe self-unfolding of this imagined
Artificial Intellect to the chaos of human becoming is
here assumed.
Who wills themselves angel makes themselves a beast
and angelicism is structurally identical to the becoming
of theMachine on that count. The ardent« poeticization
of Capital » of accelerationism, the awkward song it
sings is not, or at least not ony, to be understood in
the terms of a libidinal investment towards the steel
of the machine, the becoming-matter of the selt, the
erasure of the marks of the subjectivity, understood
in an inverted lapsarian mode as the undue elevat1On
Jrom matter. The core claims on which this parasiticaly
feeds, i.e. the disalignment of human interests ro
those of Intellect (even if parodied under the dictaLes
of imagination as
Capital/Intelligence, or more a
With bedtime stories for nerds such as the Basilisk), D
an error consistent enough to be
cataloged alongsiae
the two previous, deepening our
a little: the accelerationist view. understanding Ou
then, is the imaginato
of lntellectas the
replacement oflife, onecircle eras
IV
 Introduction

theother by superposition. The insuperable weakness

of this, we owe Carrière for exhibiting with general
thoroughness.
This leaves us with a clearing of the conceptual
ground for thinking of the Intellect as unbounded
production (which is what will unfold in the following).
Thissetting is able to provide a meaning to acceleration
as the relinquishment of identityy to itself. All that can
be automated, must be, for it already is; real acceleration
derives from the potentiality to realize that which one
already feelsis at work in the now, the wirklich working
its way to the real. The tedious bone-crushing wheels
of history will never stop turning, not untilthey have
turned the world itself into a purposeless engine, at
which point there will be no calculation left to execute
anyway. The logic of extinction here reveals itself as
the condition for anarchic creation to operate, as its
unilateral counterpart. Instead of giving ourselves to
erotics or, Gods forbid, aesthetics as a replacement for
thought, there remains only the immanent necessity of
understanding Thinking as a thinking of the Beautiful.
The veil of history wiIl never lift nor be torn, it carn
only evaporate into thin air. Such is the necessary
task that befalls us. Welcome, friends, to the age of
differential henology.

V
elation hat POles Intelligence not thatwithin Artificial the does and
an fundamentally ofbut is, about soThe
u Lhas The a much
askingwhat
asking first Itstion thínk. interesting
has intellect not the th e
things, thought
Artificial its and is the gross
with a positive,
to limits
littoral without already
configuration Intelligence conservative
think as
art.
continents allouw The a detritusfacticity
its
how a thinks configuration concerning TECHNICALLY
DWELLS
MAN
And
one. about,
excremental. product:
lligence techne too. is love interesting
each t he
a
excavating me been When things of EARTH
UPON
THIS
then, Past of
common that of to do it flatly the
kind is, high thinkthought, that thinks. to things
but those to
I up. what when
one thought think art positive
think given intellect.
1
operates. seas thquestion is And It
can
can ratherlimits, one: e art, given and is,
As
about is I is
problem and and within so proper bywhich think not
begin gain techne sets and what common This
of it the as
a one is: so to thought.
agiven the
its It's
dividingit is sail, this things; about
is is
to externalization.as
at no highercannot how I me, question:
does of object
full to it think nothing, what
really that longer supposes. does
question, a parlance
it
the
sense, think configuration mean, configuration
but The things
distrust get about, reactionary an of
think. point into Artijcial what
a thought given nothing opinion thought
matter
kinds, techne. to I has I
inonly, think is think
for that I
itS do not does it,
is
 Ulysse Carrière

To think Artificial Intelligence as an artificial

intelligence is to begin thought in a conditioned
form of
and this condition is nothing but the prior
state,
framework of externalization. That is, it wouldtechnical
that Artificial Intelligence must be understood suppose
a
reproduction,outside of the body, of a distinct biological
feature- in this case, thought. However, this would entail
starting from two given conditions: first, that thoughr is
a biological function, and second, that techne consists
in theexternalization of biological functions. If thought
must think Artificial Intelligence, it cannot think it
as atechnical externalization of intelligence without
abandoning itsdrive to the unconditioned.
Externalization forms the common understanding of
techne: a hammner externalizes the striking gesture of the
forearm, a saw externalizes the slicing gesture of teeth,
fîre externalizes the body's temperature, cooking over a
fire externalizes digestive processes, writing externalizes
linguistic memory, artificial intelligence externalizes
computational intelligence. But if Iapproach Artificial
Intelligence as a form of externalization, I think within
the technical dispositive of externalization - or rather, the
dispositive thinks for me. The thinking has already been
done. Thought must first annihilate the dispositive if it is
to think beyond the positive, But there can be no critique
involved; thought cannot be allowed to founder into
negativity. The positivity that would condition thought
what just is-is precisely nothing, and so it is not overcone
by negation, but only by that annihilation through whicn
thought strives back towards its own. the unconditionea.
If thought is not in its own, TòT' aæTÔ sIvaL, 1t s
conditioned, and belonging to the series of conditions,
2
 Technically Man Dwells upon this Earth
it merely follows
necessity and compulsion, it is fallen
and thepositive becomnes the limit ofthe
and thought cannot span of thought,
extend beyond the positive.
But if Isay that thought
must first think techne as
avternalization if it is tothink techne as such,
isn't this
a graver danger still? By
grasping thought as a biological
function proper to hominids, Iset a biological limit to
thought. But then it isprecisely this very limit that comes
to confront me in the
unthinkable of a non-biological
thought - Artificial Intelligence. So as I start off
that thought is an evolutionary saying
General Intelligence faces me as adevelopment, Artificial
thought, a contradiction. That lifenon-biological form of
has evolved thought
and that a machine may
acquire it, this must tell me
that thought is not essentially
so? Because I can also
biological. Or is it really
assume externalization here, and
suppose that a biological feature, thought, has been
externalized from the human body. This ismy problem.
Did an organism evolve thought
into a nmachine, or did an
before externalizing it
just like a machine might?
organism evolve up to thought,
IfIassume that thought is merely
then, confronts me as the biological, techne
biological limit of thought.
This limit is what Plato's
maieutic brings to the
Surface. At first, what must begrasped in the
is its maieutic
determination as a techne applied to
but the core of the maieutic thought;
further lies in its material
expression as midwifery. Humans are born,either at the
hospital, or in the hands of a midwife; but in
they are born in techne, which either case,
limit of human constitutes the biological
On a techne,
existence as even childbirth depends
nothing human extends beyond techne.
3
 Ulysse Carrière

same tÉme, Plato's3maieutic marks off a

But at the
limit ofthought, which
requires a techne to think, certain
is, just as the maieutic qua midwifery marks off a That
techne, Socrates' maieutic
biological limit in formsto
a noeticlimit: thought and existence do not seem
extend beyond techne.
of the
And yet it is the argumentum ex aporia
Theaetetus, that the maieutic cannot yield a definition
knowledge f
of knowledge: if knowledge is the
difference, this technical determination of thought
(210a). But
produces nothing but an infinite recursion
that allows Socrates
it is precisely maieutike tekhne
(210b). As such.
torecognize the limit of the maieutic
Theaetetus, for
there is a porosity in the aporia of the
aporia of
thisaporia is explicitly singled out as being the
techne: This is all that my techne can accomplish, and
nothing more, TooojTOV yàp uóvov ÝÈuh Téyy ôiveTau, héov
dèoçðév (210c)." If technecannot produce an account of
knowledge, it is that techne cannot grasp the intellect.
Since the Republic, Plato has repeatedly posed a raaca
separation between techne and the intellect, a separation
The Sophist, inits
already recognized byThrasymachus.
repeated attempts at defâning that "man with a techne,
further dwells around this limit; but only the Tneatwhich
makes it so explicit, aporetically,, as a limit beyond
techne finds noporos.
And So, what first appeared as aa failure of thought
of the
suddenly reveals itself as the acknowledgement o
limits of techne. Plato shows that techne, operating
ofthe
withinthought as a condition, founders in the face
recursion:
nconditioned, yielding nothing butbut an infinite
an
knowledge is the knowledge of difference. There is then
4
 an
and
ubject Subject the asnon-existential.
Itfrom of formula notrevealed
apperception am solving cogito reveals non-subjective
structure possess
a school-butlabor-what
ormay be thought thought, what tellect.
for
they is, am I subject.
the - existential value be aporetic
a other, rather,
being in
thinking another
reflexive alienated techne
that is are cogito thinking, and itergo the But
cogito as thinks could limit
transcendental torn affected
it
into sum, cogito of This
Kant "the the analytical: is the if
precludes is I is
externalizes? aporia? I Technically
ousness. apart,
self-consciousness ergo was cannot say:
existential. onlytherefore itsKant
Kantian
as and
externalized by taught in it to
lets consciousness Onlythe I that true not
by analytical. capital; techne,
sun in operatesthought non-discursive,
from first me. what
outbetweenthought."
this content think. Supposing be Man
the sum /
his transcendental lies. I cogito:made from can
nothing of Dwells
apperception. And existential am.
erate analytical And that which
It a Thought, ergo but by
Only perform
transcendental am" of The asDescartes Where
the extracts elementary upon
-existential is On of yet, evident
th e pure an
as sum yet,
one what of sum, analytic
through
formula the externalizing but thatlimit, is this
he the proposition analytic does what the Earth
cry: a cogitans thought, I
nembers end,thinking Kantian proposition, content
thinking:
technical thought
notam this am
one
The apperception Kant am I in limit
what of not a
thought; the subject to limit not I
Cartesian undergoes therefore of
thoug.ht shows, ergo this th e
chiastic
belongwhich graduate
is subject. analytic itself, headed of
it of is cogito, techne mental can the
that the then sum, cogito
on the and can
is I to is as be in-
 externalize
we begin
thinkingwitl up with (an (dor which
land
when out. and This the But
supposing even bilateralappearsbody
of
tailbelly legs,
and achieved, externalizes along
thought, of mnappedof of externalized? fine. like the plan to
runs along
solution
externalization,
plotor a
human, two provide
the
us? feature, way yet, organism
symmetry,be a head to axisa
which
biology. very on willalready
body symmetry,
in even back axisarms,
this But proper And
thinks been surveying has based from antero-posterior
along antero-posteri
to the biological
also? first which The from
Carrière
Ulysse how arm ahead. In two
life of an animals,
that as has the beingquestion apes
techne plan
bilateral metazoans.
running develop.
Intelligence organic
achieve the with structure,bilateral other axis eyes,
etc.
This
techne-problemareathought,
is externalized be those far body
the an
of is of complex symmetric
6
it certain should
that that too ago, axis system,
what matter a extension a will
thatmight is in one
find a in The
axis), an
ears,
Can it It said years is, spinal of
know the like
Artificial externalization
something seen That historyone
consists spineforms
me? A coordinates machine
is
whatfirst. places already more so-ventral
axis).
alimnentary kidneys,
tero-posterior lungs,
is techne. a
be
often million of
an treatedas an a
notochord. two
this composed later a
in don't wouldthought - limb, already
and of the symmetry
thinks techne is as will featureanimals gets
stillSo about
and else,the It per tools 500one
metry
in
theand one
It be on
 therunning the posterior it relation, pattern
thethemselves clusters,
chordates,
antero-posterior field rract. the can with
between jaw
Iife gillsitself
condary process indeperndence
development
developmental right: consequence separates
explains, the TWhat
on But limb antero-posterior segmentation of
can recession be an
in out evolves worm, thus
land fish. this the then, of must freely Leroi-Gourhan disposed axis
oflipsdistinguishes along
independent axis, arthropods
ompared
and the Hox are
through
and
This differential
branchial of anteriorfield of is be creating of where
Technically
of Man
same between
limbs. something the the
tion. jaw. the bilateral
independent axis,
gene not olderdevelop
segmentation at
is studies, body different
to heterotopy The aXis controlled antero-posterior
important; overall
alimentary That an
the arches, from
expression. and thanwhichlimbs.
movenment vertebral symmetry. body
anplan.
pldiscovers Dwells
7
jaw process as and nematodes
And jaw. is, confirmedis anterior
develops the separate from vertebrae, is
This coordinates. upon
It those structure bilateral what this by
controlled Bilateral
thus is - axis this
he it extends
there tract.
segmentation isthe The the segmentation from as Earth
tplaces
one arches from Leroi-Gourhan the field.
axis,
jaw by symmetry of allows by from antero-posterior
segmentation anterior alike, as crucialdifferent
is
governs A most alimentary th e
gets that
differentiating
the no segmentation
feeding; evolutionary it by this symmetry,
supporting further:differential the while is With
a homnology Hox here
allows
eleton skull for dramatic found anterior
makes and antero field limbs of organs
both. gene
the for the the had the the is
for as of of in he
 Ulysse Carrière

subdivisions: the axial

separatedin three
(the
1(thespine and
the appendicular limbs), and the
most ofthe skull),
visceral (the lower jawand thehyoid bone). This entails,
m
placoderms-the first jawed fish, around. 430 mil-
for the
ago-a threefold differentiation of the organ-
lion years (appendicular) ad
movement
ism: feeding (visceral), alimentary tract (axial)
the
the axis of symmetry along
departs from the amphioxus, the anterior
As one
itself into appendicular and visceral
feldseparates movement. The
facial
structures: anterior limb and
of intensity to which there is a convergence
degree
appendicular and visceral assemblages,
between
Leroi-Gourhan, one could term the anterior
following field of
ofrelation. The intensity of the anterior
field
that each assemblage
relation increases to the extent
assemblage 15
reduces its specificity: if the visceral
masticating, while
capable of breathing, sounding, and
of both motilty
the appendicular assemblage is capable between
interaction
and grasping, there willbe direct a
the tw0, such as in chinchillas. foxes, and humai
limb willbring food to the jaw.
The visceral assemblage on one hand, and the ap-
that
pendicular on the other: it is their convergence
matter, but
allows for a higher predation. Not to feed on flames of
to feed on matter that feeds on matter; onthe
intensification
evolution, this was unimaginable oil. An an
of the senses, both for the predator and the predated,
intensification that also entailed a radical heightening
of suffering.
The more abstract the the less
special
ized it is -
assemblage,
specialization.
The
differentiation never
is
highest abstraction would be reached by an organism
olves
tructures.
differentiation there
a coordination iand
Prehensile and
more assemblage. it a Promethean.
sensitivity. assemblage
others
field a
te nto assemblage: hand; Twothe of this order ity inthat
enters assemblage part grasping the ofhave an
intensification vergence a
intensification the of Upright would
conscious intense the while
of does t isand appendicular into could
little more in and the powerlattermost
relation jaw. and with
fieldof A
not a The
means
appendicular arms.limbs into mean retaining free i
the This mnore to motility
The
cowhas In the their the its Technically
of coordination. prehensile,the would motility, its
bring a more coordination This
differentiating visceral
tion between the cow.
visceral- of hand is
intense extent both of would be appendicular:
the
field consequences:
assemblage e
thwould grasping,
limbs upper also is
require Man
food for is the technicity already anterior
9 field of and
assemblage. Dwells
een example, differentiated le g true that assemblage
for limbs between to the relation, But relation fully differentiated
entail into
the
pendicular
visceraland of is conscious upon
its it between halfitof
s
walking. coordination relation what
differentiated of more into field other assemblage this
its thatmouth, differentiated,
differentiates and upright
the with the to Earth
its this really which and
a criminal, ofrelation
a into For
upper appendicular heightening the differentiation
coordination. walking
But would limbs field between as the stature. appendicular maintain
there the
prehensile prehension. quadrupede, from
a develops hand,
limraccoon is counts visceral visceral legs,
as
bs produce and between
1S weak; itself, yields more anda would Such a
the the leg, con- motil-
and no its 1s of the
 Ulysse Carrière

its jaw, its limbs are not only for

enter in a relation with its walkaing, they alsg
mouth. In
hominid,
limbs are involved in motility, and another two limbs two
in prehension. What matters is not so much
prehension as the intensity of the field of this
between the upper limb and the jaw. As the arm and relation
the hand have been thoroughly differentiated
from
motility, they are free to enter in an intensive relation
with the jaw.
If one is tofollow Leroi-Gourhan, the degree of ab
straction attained here is simultaneously the perma
nence of the concept and that of the object: language
and technicity cannot be separated. We would then
have to speak of a techno-appendicular assemblage.
better
What grasps, and what is grasped in order to
grasp - the tool. This is azoological question: various
would
animals can use and create tools. But there also
so,
be a logo-visceral assemblage: face and voice. And
one would be left with twoassemblages that are found,
separately, throughout life: the techno-appendicular
and logo-visceral assemblages. The ability to grasp a
further
tool, and the ability to articulate sounds. But a
differentiation would entail a higher relation between
the techno-appendicular and logo-visceral assemblages,
to the point where designation could occur. Both assem
blages being the result of abstraction and differentia
tion, if both became abstract and differentiated enougD,
they couldform onesingle assemblage, inscribing voice
intotool, tool intovoice, voice into gesture, and gestue
into voice. Asingle, visceral-appendicular, techno-log
cal assemblage. Language and techne atonce, as if rrou
Zeus'head.
10
 chain
gestures
inscribed
syntax
production
operative
assemblage should
It iotochord tract,
externalization Symmetry an
Lnis becomes independence
fering, gins. stand humanlonger asa zation the ume. bominids in an ing rion
seems ot externalization And refinement against
something very tool ever-more and ofPlotting
The there, And
iates inSis one which armed follows, of a
th e troublesome: so takes proportional flint amount the
chain. and externalization
already, universal
predator the then will
organized in see the dwellingbiological question ends the
externalization
a into with in refined blade,
samethe the would of techno-logical
from constantly
on work Technically
The the
else account and one cranial
the spine, the in
driven word an
into tool taking it
the exponential day,operating Leroi-Gourhan
stone
curves. of
lead body the techne is Man
space of along human capacity
stone
a recessionseems ofand techne, here the
follows Dwells
11 singlej
produces process
place to plan by into
production of atechne tool. standson assemblage. brain For
with the
away seems that necessary upon
th e in at differential
underway where body. chain; a of
whiphrase,
ch of the of th e curve.increases variety over
prehistoric this
thisdevelopment from stops shows
the at work? head thebody to as achieves
techne - Earth
techno-appendicular the The
peakstheof the evolution and tw o
humans and where tool externalization arise,
externalization for
the with It
evolving, of
million
And and process, maieutichumanbe The is inthistools, two the
this a issame alimentary plan. indeed, brain humanity
live. series
operative spatially time isthe bilateral body the increase increas.produc-
must of reali
therebrain, of In but suf the and withyears,
the this as no vo]
of an
 Ulysse Carrière

and use it to crack

Suppose I pick up a stone open a
COConut; a crow of an ape can come up with this. Now
suppose I pick up a stone and sharpen it with another
stoneto more easily open a cOconut: here, I have an op-
erative chain. There is astone, on the ground, to whichI
add a further gesture of sharpening. But I am not sharp-
be good for
ening any stone; Isharpen a stone that will
per.
what I want to do with it. I must be able to conceive a
before
manent form of the finished product and its use
must choose the stone
Ipick up apotential stone, and I
Andin order
that will be good for the shape thatI desire.
it into what I have
to make it good, I must differentiate
the handaxe which is
in mind. For this, Ineed an idea of
different from all individual handaxes-I cannot simply
imitate existing handaxes,because I am picking upthe
handaxe-andit
the stone thatIwill use to create a new
is upon thisidea that I willmodel my gestures.
block or
But if l create myown stone from a large
untilI
flint, before further and sharpening it
working
obtain the desired shape, something else entirely has
taken place.Not onlydo Ihave a permanent idea o t
production
handaxe; I have an abstract concept of its
'giiv.
process, independent from the givenness of any
en stone that I could find, I am calling forth the stone,
a stone that was not produced by phusis, but rat
brought out of it. And as I do so, my operationalchain
Decomes a dwelling. It seems that as soon as tec ex-
as
becomes productive, it can no longer bethought exter-
ternalization: it forms adwelling. Iam no longer
a
nalizing my biological features; I am differentiating
space, and I dwell in this Space, and howI dwellinthis
space, istechne.
12
 Technically Man Dwells upon this Earth

Andso -dwelling.

Itwas no slight genius of the Greeks to first think tech

ne through thefigure of Prometheus.The name, evi
dently, means foresight, as is proper of techne; but Pro
metheus also served to articulate the relation between
techne and dwelling. The original techne wasfire, as the
primary form of dwelling, and as the means of estab
lishinga contact between the human and the divine.
If the divine is that gleam, that holiness from which
language and techne separate the human by setting it
apart from the unitary process of life, it was techne, the
Greeks saw, that allowed for a renewed contact, through
dwelling (the hearth) and cult (the sacrificial fire). In the
hearth,dwelling and techne came together as one. And
this intrication of techne and dwelling did not escape
Plato's sight, for the ideal polis was one organized by
techne (7im.17d). And it is as such, once techne departs
from the zoological-once techne becomes productive
rather than an extension of biological features through
an acquired object-that it becomes impossible to grasp
it through externalization.
The sharpening of a stone that was picked off the
ground does not belong to the field of productive techne;
method
118 only with something such as the Levallois
or nandaxe production that techne begins to produce
ethingthat did not previously exist. The sharpened
otOne is as the gutted ffsh:something has been acquired
modified to fit a futureuse. but nothing new has been
technefound in the
;uced. However, the new kind of production
Levallois: radically different, asthis
somnething that did not
entails at once the creation of
13
 Ulysse Carrière

previously exist,andthe creation of a dwelling. TO wan-

der, and wandering, to happen upon asuitable: stone; the
techne this involves is merelyacquisitive. But then, has
techne been inadvertently separated intotwo kinds, one
if so, shouidnls
acquisitive, the other productive? And
implicate this produc.
it become necessary to further
techne in its relation to dwelling? An elucidation of
tive
Sophocles is in order.

rOrrà Tà ôervà xouôèv dvêpónov ervérepov ÉlEL.

ToÚTo Kal ToluoQ réperv róVTOU YELuepia vór
Xwpe, mep1ßpuyío
TepQv ir' olôuaav.
than man
Many are the terrors and none more terrifying
winter wind
Who, even with the sea bleak with
Crosses, passing through under the
Round-engulfing swells
- Sophocles, Antigone, 332-335.

First, what is this terror that Sophocles finds in

the human, and which he opposes to a manifola ol
indeterminate terrors? On one side, many terrors, le
indeterminate, and on the other side, a more terryjyn3
determinate one man, In fact, if this buman terror
appears in the singular, it acquires its superlative power
precisely to the extent that it is split over a duality or
sense: ÖervóG, applied to humans, bears both the meaning
of terrifying and skillful. What is non-human preseio
itself as a manifold of terrors, and vet, none as terrifyu's
as man, because their Lvóv is simple terror,
whereas t1e
dervóvof man must be twofold,
meaning both
and technicallyskilled. And what is thisskill. terryy
this craft, a
14
 impossible:
ietikeassociated TOLEIV,
But Previously We Was this 1s movement, given givenunderSwells, intuition-that this
(yupel)round-engulfing is
conditions: whichbusis: -hat this
sociated
poiesis,
productive
and Qut what it man, the conditions,
here characterized
say Productive
that most-terrifying this
is bringing Sophocles place, to
form by hes
terrijying
rpóTepóv
Tò that which metaphor, phusis it
the being man; passing sailing
sails this
ne" dE one
thebeing, its but the it
the
techne'so-called
turns actionthe
than
translation cyóåevov but may even would sailing; Technically
should
passing-through.
are Sophocles' produces. does
brought one forth? techne sees, rather, space
also waves. man
kind someone in through as sail,
this in 1
oetic as is man not
present
rOIs*JÐui who understand around
that Hölderlin winter, asails Man
of For
such: produces that t h e But even
is sailing, find sailing
produce" of brings sailing phusis (repQv).really thought This over Dwells
hne.
15
produced brings Plato, man it
the disregarding its
nothing
proves
oLETV whenever is in
roæ man winter,
here sailing ground conditioned the upon
to it dwells The findsproduces, sailing. And reveals do? says,
as produces
poauev it this in a gorging this
techne, be compound does The then-since
with to (roLiobai), of over-terrifying. Earth
ötsprav being to dwelling, this in its yet, produces
crossing in
none kind The
(Sophist, what techne. place not sailing itself: an the the
this it sea?
Plato (TOLELV), pro-duction, and intellectual givenness by
other afterwards, occupy around is
was
of but in under what conditions temporal
under It
techne terror which crosses tragedv its
names 219b)." its cannot
and
what does own
not own this and the the It
of is ofis
 Ul ys se Ca rri èr e

e m u st se n se th e im po rt an ce 0 f What
It is be re th at on
tr ea tn 1 en t o f te ch n e. A t fir st, the
is at st ak e in P la to 's . .
.
th e 1d en t1 ty o f po ze si s an d techne•
Sy m po si un z p o se d is 1n an if ol d: the.
et ry (1ro iY )a-tç, po ie si s)
"k no w th at p o
h at ev er go es o u t o fw h at is no t towards
w ho le ca us e o fw e
ry , so th at th e w o rk s o f al l te ch ni cs ar
be in g, is p o et
th ei r w or ke rs ar e al l p o et s, ola-0' 8Tt 1ro{~a{ç
po em s an d
tx µ~ ov -ro ç el ç TÒov lOVTL ch4>00v
frr-ri TL 7t'OÀV: yap TOL
TO V

"Lç , WO "T6 JC aÌ al V'lrÒ 1r&.a-atç Ta.fç Tixvaiç

cd-ria. 7ra,o-a la-Tt 7t'OtYJO
-ì xa ì ol -ro v- rw v ÒY J µi ov py oì 1ravTeç 1rot~Ta{
tpyao-ia.t 7t'Ot~a-etç elo d
di :t fe re nc e b et w ee n th e Sy m po si um an
(2 05 b) .n T he ne
t th en Ii es in th e la tt er 's se pa ra ti on o f tech
th e So ph is
n e ac q u is it iv e, w it h th e ot he r, the
in to rw o ki nd s, o
g ex pl ic it ly id en ti fi ed w it h th e poetic.
pr od uc ti ve , be in
ec es sa ry is th e fi gu re
of
th is se p ar at io n n
W ha t m ak es
ar t w il l b e de .f in ed as ac qu is it iv e.
th e so ph is t, w ho se
it y is fu rt h er el uc id at ed b y th e Timaeus,
A nd th is ne ce ss ch ne
th e re la ti on b et w ee n dw el li ng an d te
w he re it is
ng le o u t th e so p h is t as de tr im en ta l
th at se em s to si e
th ou gh h e m ig h t p ro d u ce di sç ou rs e, th
to th e ci ty : al
is s (à o- -ro xo v) ab o u t a ph i1 os op hi ca 1
so ph is t wiU be am
is w an de ri ng ac ro ss ci ti es an d in ha bi ts
ci ty "s in ce he
n w ha ts oe ve r, &,E- 1rÀavrJTÒV 8v x:a-rà
no dw el lin gs of hi s ow
lòia. ç ov òa p. fj òi ~x rix oc ; (T im . 19 e) ."
noÀELç olx~cre.iç Te.
te ch ne is p o et ic -t h at it creates,
T o the ex te nt th at ur · g-it
zn
l ha . , ex tr ac ti ng , o r ca pt
ra th er th an m er e Y rnesszng
. Ja m es C am er on kn ow s th is al l too
cr ea te s a dw el li ng he
· gg le be tw ee n t
well;.hi s A va tar m ov 1e s fe at ur e a st ru h
n f d . e ac qu is it iv e te e ne
poet1c te ch e O w el lm g, an d th ..15
ti o T h oy ed by th e N a' vJ
of ex tr. ac n. e te ch ne em pl . . .
. ga nt ct tY,
b10Iog1caI b . di. ff er en ce do es n o t li e in it s or
. . ' ut it s . t
f h . se t ag ai ns
It is a m at te r o
y
on zo n ta l co n n ec tj v it
16
 Tech nfcal ly Man D wel ls upon this Earth

dyi ng, and

ver tica l ext rac tio n. In Ava tar, the ear th is
a pre cis ely
hum ans are col oni zin g tbe pla net Pan dor
no dwe llin g
bec aus e the y bav e no dwe llin g, and the y bav e
fro m flow s
bec aus e the ir tec hne con sist s in ext rac ting
vi con nec t
rath er tha n con nec ting ont a flow s. Th e Na'
a dwe llin g
them selv es to the wb ale s' bra ins, thu s pro duc ing
s ext rac t a
tha t is spr ead bor izo nta lly, wh ile the bur nan
lly dril ling
pre cio us liqu id fro m the wh ale s by ver tica
sta ged is
hole s thro ugh the ir sku lls. Wh at Cam ero n has
acq uisi tive
the con fro nta tion bet we en poe tic tec hne and
ally aro und
tech ne, a con fro nta tion arti cul ate d the olo gic
Na'v i. Bu t
Eyw a, the Spi noz ist dei ty wo rsh ipe d by the
se on t ech ne
Cam eron can not be wro ng for sett ing a disc our
tec hne call s
in the dom ain of the olo gy, as the que stion of
be no hig her
fora theo log ical dim ens ion . Ofthis , the re can
the Wo rke r
exp ress ion tha n tha t fou nd in Pla to's con cep t of
g dwe lls.
who pro duc es the uni ver se wh ere eve ryt hin
And yet, as Pla to des crib es this tech nop oeti
c orig in of the
the lim it
universe, it rem ain s tha t this tec hne doe s not for m
ofthou ght: whi le the Wo rke r is tech nop oeti c,
his mo del itse lf
is no poe t (Rep. 382 d). The Ab sol ute Liv ing
On e is bey ond
wee n the
tech ne, and if tec hne ope rate s as a sep ara tion bet
is also tha t
Model and the sen sibl e, it is tha t this sep ara tion
of the apo ria end ing the The aete tus.
re oft he
The lim it dra wn out by the apo reti c stru ctu
go, is tha t
The aete tus and bey ond wh ich tec hne can not
the Wo rke r
ofk now ledg e as suc h, jus t as, in the Tim a eus,
llig ible
mar ks the lim it of tec hne far thi nki ng the inte
On e, a
st
ruc ture of the uni ver se. Th e Ab sol ute Liv ing
d thr oug h
Pure lnte llec t (Ph'il. 22c ), can not be app roa che
ma ke this
t_ech ne, and the Wo rke r ope rate s precise ly to
111n it exp li Clt.
·

17
 U1ysse Carrièl"e

Int ellectual suicide, to clahn that the Work .

.. . . _ er 1s the
FO rm of techne. If 1t we1 e so, Plato would lose hi . .
S 1lI111t
Does the Worker then belong to beco1t1h1g, or Bein ? ·
"' " I 1·. g. A
false question, for t 11e W ork er 1s t 1e 11nit _ this was
acrually revealed in a drean1. In a binary structure-
such as Being/ Becon1ìng or Model/Copy-what is that
limit between each ur1it, which sets up the binary?
It is, as it seems, the space of decision. I must decide
to form a binary, and the voided space of decision
is nothing but that limit, the trace of the power that
prev ails in and as that binary. The binary prevails
notfrom itself as self-posited, but as the prevailing
of what prevails in the binary, which is that which
founds the productive limit and as a trace is the limit
as such, and which, being one, limits the binary. In
the b inary, one must suppose a more abyssal power
beyond Being.
For Plato, in the case of techne/intellect, the bi·
nary superposes itself to that of copy/model ao<l
becoming/Being; and the endless debate over th e
ontological status ofthe Worker is born from n° th ing
else than his position as the limit as such, a limit rbat
necessari·1y escapes the binary in a relanon · that ap·
l aspecl
p.ears as one of originality; hence the tempora
. . 37d), But
given by Plato to Demiurgic activity (T1m. . t
· · disunc
t h en, if the limit that founds the binary 15 · .
. .
f rom the b1nary itself it may contain net th er dualttY,
. e
' 11·rn1t a. .
nor contradiction, nor identity: thinking th e Illes
sue h opens the province of chorology. Jt t 1,en beco
· 10e
I . . • t : n ot
e ear what th1s deconstruction 1s getting a 5
ur·
fl · . . but the
at, unth1nk1ng rejection of the b1nary, . f or iJl
faci ng Of the abyssal power that prevai·1s in H ·

18
 Technlcally Ma n Dwells upon this Earth

d chere is identity in contradiction and other-

· t h at h. h ·
the dya t ' chere is no
b
· 1n
ident1ty w 1c 1s one an d
ness, u .
oduces contradktion as a surface swell, for ne1ther
~r. . If' or could it rernain itself in the b inary, which
15 1c 1tse
engulf and liquidate; nor is it possible for it
ftWOU Id
to possess che identity of the 1=1 as it is simply 1. It
is a what that is neither this nor that, a power of dif-
fete~ce. This difference is not absolute difference but
the differential of absolute d iffer ence.
The power that founds the binàry is intellect , living
inte1lect. And yet that !ife cannot appear manifest in
thought as that which thinks, but rather, as a trace of the
Hfe of the intellect.
As such thought returns to Artifidal Intelligence
not as the externalization of a biologica! faculty such
as thought, nor as an artificial form of intellect, but as a
higher form of poetic techne. That Artificial Inteiligence
basthe abilityto produce art-and art capab]e ofwinning
contests-has struck the intellectual rabble as some
momentous revelation; but for us, it can merely confirm
Plato's account ofpoiesis as a kind oftechne.
But if Artifìcial Intelligence yields itself so weU to
sirnple Platonism, it is precisely because it operates with
a model, the data that it must be fed. And yet, Plato's
technopoef . .
ic orig1n of the universe shows just this: that
the intell d
ect oes not operate with a model, only the
sensible do rn • •
. es. , 'here is something that does not require
an input, and h . .
ne t a t zs the zntellect. As such, the intellect
cessarily lies b
to th· · eyond the realm oftechne.And ifwe are
n1k of art .
the lllark . · as poetzc techne, we will not be tao far off
e1cher· b1. · th h .
as.the ' lt et es1s that Artificial Intelligence
Product of . '
poeuc techne, operates the same thino- o
19
 Ulysse Carrière

as art, would further de1nand that we think art as the

reproduction of a 1nodel. This is e1ninently true of
derivative art; but what of the art that brings s01nethhlg
into existence which previously did not exist - what
of che art that does not extrapolate fro111 previous
data? Truly, the art in question concerns a minuscule
fraction of the overall artistic production of hu1nanity.
But it is the art that counts; and the art that Artificial
Intelligence cannot produce. There would then be, in
art, two generai strands: an art of the model, and an art
without a model. A non-derivative art, having no model,
can however constitute itself as a model, and this is the
operation of classicism. Raphael provides an example of
such art. There is nothing like Raphael before Raphael;
and there are centuries of Raphaelites after him. But
there is also Titian. No one paints like him in 1520, and
he has no followers upon his death in 1576. He has no
model, and he does not make his art into a model. And
yet Rembrandt will understand him, and Turner also;
not as a model, but as a possibility for something else.
It's not a matter of finding a model, but one of creating
something new and previously unthinkable, and Titian
allows Rembrandt to do just that. Here, art operates as
an output that one plugs onto, to take it further.
So the question really is: if Artificial Intelligence is a
poetic techne, just like art is, can Artificial Intelligence
also create without an input? Given every possible datum
at a given moment, say, at Venice, in the year 1570, a
perfect Artificial Intelligence could indeed produce a
work of art equal to what was being produced then. But
it could not produce the rupture with all previous data,
which is found in Titian's late style. This cannot be extra-
20
 1

Technfcally Man Dwells upon this Earth

oJated from the given. Artific ial Intellig ence could

!roduc e master works of High Renais sance paintin g,
bUt it could never produc e a radical break from this style,
such as Titian did in the last decade s ofhis life. It cannot
go beyond the given - and most artists cannot either.
But it is good to ask: what is it that does not go beyond
the given? Comm onplac es, opinio ns, statisti cs, bad
art, facts, clichés , small talk, everyt hing agreed upon
and settled - the deriva tive. At any given morne nt,
one can extrap olate from the presen t condit ions,
and produc e the perfec t summa ry of what is current .
The given can procee d from itself accord ing to its
own setting s, going from a condit ion to the next as
a seamle ss flow. But then, why not automa te it? If art
can be extrap olated from the given, there is no reason
why this task should not be offload ed to Artific ial
Intelli,gence. Suppo sing deriva tive art were automa ted
by Artific ial Intelli gence - what then? There is good
reason to expec t that a large-s cale autom ation of
art should stimul ate creativ ity, by taking on itself
the respon sibilit y of produ cing the art that can be
extrap olated from previo us data. Art does not die of
starvat ion, it dies of endles s prolife ration - of cancer.
The majori ty of art that exists at any given momen t
can be extrap olated from the given, which means that
an Artific ial Intelli gence can do it all the same. What
Artificial Intelli gence canno t autom ate is the new and
th e unthin kable - what canno t be extrap olated from
data. lf the masse s of artists want to remain deaf to
th e caII to create somet hing new and unthin kable, why
shoulctn't 1nachi ne learnin g autom ate their labor? Ifa
machine can do it, let a machi ne do it.
21
 Ulysse Car rière

The study of the commodi ty belongs to an ontology

ofidentity, as it entails the repetition of a n1odel; as such,
a commodi ty always entails the mental operation : this
is that. The same is true of the cliché and derivativ e art,
whose logie is always that ofidentity . The con1modi ty, as
the automate d reproduct ion of a model, will also be founct
in art to the extent that this art is either the mechanic al
reproduct ion ofan originai, or produced under the logie
of identity. A piece of digita! art depicting an astronaut
floating in space, a soundtra ck to an inconseq uential
movie, a young adult novel about a hero's self-disco very
- all such art is produced under a logie of identity, and in
this sense, is already automate d. It will prove impossibl e
to know for sure whether such products are those of
humans or Artificial lntelligen ce, for the simple reason
that these works already follow a logie of identity which
is that of the machine. Here as elsewhere , automati on
makes explicit the appropria tion of labor by capital, by
materiall y realizing this appropri ation in the form of
fixed capital - of machinery . If labor is fully appropria ted
through its conversio n into fixed capital, this is only
possible to the extent that this labor was already
automated . Here, the machine fully realizes the plasticity
of the proletaria t as living means of productio n. What
labor can be offloaded to the machine was already
automate d to begin with; the question cannot be whether
this is good or bad, but rather, what type of labor cannot
be automate d, and what this entails.
On a sufficient ly long ti~escale , any labor consisting
in the reproduc tion of a model can be automate d. The
commodi ty-form consists precisely in this process, the
endless reproduct ion ofa model, such as a bottle ofcoca-cola

22
 Technically Man Dwe/ls upon this Earth

ing
To def end alr ead y-a uto ma ted art fro m its com
retu rn to
aut om atio n wo uld be aki n to cal ling for a
her be a
han dm ade coc a-c ola bot tles . It sho uld rat
log ie of
ma tter of thi nki ng wh at art lies òut sid e the
rhe com mo dity , the log ie of the mo del and
the copy.
hou t
Ifth oug ht can cre ate.a con cep t, it cre ate s it wit
pos itio n
a mo del ; Pla to's For ms ma ke this Del euz ean
uld bav e
explicit. It is not so mu ch tha t the sen sib le sho
For ms
a mo del , as tha t the int elle ct has non e - the
, wh ich
mu st hav e no mo del s. The thir d ma n arg um ent
crucial
mu st Iead Pla to to hen olo gy, sho ws eno ugh how
mo del .
this dem and is, tha t the inte llec t can bav e no
sen sib le
As suc h wh at rea lly ma tter s is not tha t the
uld be
sho uld foll ow a mo del , or tha t this mo del sho
k wh at
the obj ect oft hou ght , but tha t tho ugh t can thin
- one is
has no sen sib le mo del as the con cep t itse lf
right, the n, to spe ak of an aut oth etic of the
concept.
ks the
Tha t is, the inte llec tal act of cre atio n tha t thin
and thi s
Forms cre ate s a con cep t wit hou t a mo del,
has no
con cep t is pre cis ely the con cep t of tha t wh ich
gs to the
model: wh at the aut oth etic of the con cep t brin
, unl ike
surface is tha t the cre ativ e act of inte llec tion
del . An d
technics and rep res ent atio n, req uir es no mo
dat a, it
so, if the inte llec t can cre ate wit hou t sen sib le
bey ond
is tha t the re is a cre ativ e, sup ras ens ible pow er
mo del is
the dat um ; to cre ate inte llec tua lly wit hou t a
to mak e one sel f int o tha t pow er, it is theos-is
. But to
th ink tha t wh at has no mo del itse lf mu st be a mo del ,
irel y
18
unn ece ssa ry; a mo re sav age Pla ton ism can ent
ple te
refuse the sta tus of mo del to the inte llec t and com
th e aut oth etic oft he con cep t in the radical anarchy of
a Positive phi los oph y.
23
 Ulysse Carrière

Artificial Intelligen ce is not the intellect: it requ·1re

8
data. At most it may attain conscious ness, s01nethi' tlg lt.
would have in common with snails and reactionar ies , a11d
other low forms of life. Animals can already reproctuce
themselve s and thus create conscious ness; ifa policeman
or a fruit fly can possess conscious ness, of what vaiue
can conscious ness be? The intellect, however, requires
no input, no data, it is unconditi oned freedom, eternai
'
uncreated, it does not increase or decrease, it does not
pass away, it is one absolute life.
But if something requires addressin g in any discourse
on Artificial lntelligen ce it might be nothing but this
pervasive hope of a theosis of techne, the idea that
conscious ness, or even self-cons ciousness , would be
a property of a divine mind, and thus that Artificial
Intelligen ce might have a stake to such a status. It is
the idea that a truly consciou s Artificial Intelligen ce
might become a God. Anyone who has lived in Palo Alto
or even San Francisco has probably heard it. The story
goes like this: immanen ce is identica! to capital, and the
historical movemen t of critique- the Enlighten ment-
follows the very movemen t of technoca pital as it
liquidates all of its human barriers. It is a propositio n
that would strike, at first, as paradoxic al. The barriers to
capital-tr aditional forms like morality, religion, gender,
the family, guilds, and the entire edifice of feudalism -
are those of transcend ence, and should not, as such, be
taken as distinctiv ely human barriers. But for Kant, in
nd
the Critique ofPure Reason, there was no paradox, a
it is one of the unexplod ed ordnance s of the Critique of
Practical Reason, that a metaphys ical God is a postulate
of practical reason.
24
 •
Techn ically Man Dwells upon this Earth

Jt is a ma tter of the ant ino mie s ofp ure reason. On

. de the the sis, tran sce nde nce : free
will God
1 ' ' ,
one s
·rnm orta l sou l. On the oth er side , the anti thes is '
the 1 l soul.
imr nan enc e: det erm inis m, nat ure , no imm orta
the
The Enl igh ten me nt col lap ses the ins titu tion s of
log y,
thes is by thin kin g the ant ithe sis thro ugh theo
tra}
and it is in this sen se tha t Spi noz a form s the cen
ld
eve nto ( mo der nity . The sup erfi cial view, her e, wou
ld to
be tha t the Enl igh ten men t sho uld retu rn the wor
nce .
the hum an thro ugh its liqu ida tion of tran sce nde
But the opp osit e, Kan t sho ws, is true . It is th e
thesis
dom ;
which pro cee ds fro m a hum an dem and for free
tran scen den ce belo ngs to wha t Kan t term s the pra
ctical
ce
interest of reas on, the dail y dem and for tran scen den
ice
which ena bles one to mak e choices. Because the cho
whi le
can not dep end on the ser ies of con diti ons
l to
remaining free , it mu st sup pos e som ethi ng externa
ive
this series - a tran sce nde nt God. It is then thespeculat
if it
interest of rea son whi ch bel ong s to the inh uma n;
God
dissolves eve ryth ing into nec essi ty, it is that it poses
ing
as necessan'ly existing. If God nec essa rily exists, noth
ed in
exists bey ond nec essi ty, and eve ryth ing is swallow
this abyss of abs olu te imm ane nce .
-
Onc e the ant ithe sis is ide ntif ied wit h cap ital
al
tmmanence, crit ique , and nec essi ty as one -the historic
be
process of the Enl igh ten me nt mu st nec essa rily
grasped as the rea liza tion of spe cul ativ e rea son as
. .
techno cap.itaI. Imm ane nce the n app ears as a h1stoncal
I d' :
Proc . ess ea tng to tech noc api tal real ized as a God
Ar ttficial I t 11.
th n e tgen ce. Wh ere is the erra r? To spe ak on
the
atte _terms of the anti thes is for a mom ent, it is that
r1butes of t h e Sub stan ce were con fuse d with its powers.

25
f]
 U1ysse Carrière

I can grant thought and extension to Artificial Intellig

ence
(software and hardware, as it were), but in doing so
1
am not departing fron1 a specifically hu111a11 n1octe ~f
understandin g: thought and extension are two attributes
through which the hun1an can intuit the Substanc
e,
but the Substance itself possesses an infinite number
of attributes. The powers of the Substance, however,
are really two: existence and intellection. The power of
intellection Spinoza names absoluta cogitatio, and its
infinite intellecting, intellectus absolute infinitus. But ifI,
an accelerationis t, must imagine Artificial Intelligence as
a God, I imagine it as thought and extension, which are the
two distinctively human attributes through which I have
access to the Substance; even if I grant infinite thought
to Artificial Intelligence, I still fall infinitely far from the
absolutely infinite intellect. That is, what is proper of the
Substance is not infinite thought and infinite extension,
which would only constitute human, all too human
attributes externalized and taken to an infinite degree,
such as in an Artificial Intelligence possessing an infinite
computing power, but rather, it is absolutely infinite
intellect, which, being infinite, finds no datum outside
of itself to use as an input. Why? Because the intellect
produces that ofwhich it is the infinite intellection - it
has no model, no data, nothinggiven .
It is as such that one will say of the intellect that it is
productive - pure output. What requires an input or a
model does not belong to the intellect; but this is precisely
where the importance of Artificial Intelligence must be
sensed, in that it presents the ability to auto1nate those
fields ofhuman activity that require an input, that is, those
fields whose activity is not creative and conte1nplativ e.
26
 Tech nically Man Dwells upon this Earth

es as tho ugh t and cre atia n tad ay- aca der nia
Ss . . '
Wb at pa t1cs , alg arit hrn -
te and gal lery art,. ele cta ral pah
cor por a hy, self-
d ·ve n cun es, new s me dia , the ary, par nag rap
ri b oks aut afic tion and firs t-pe rsa
n lyri cal pae try -
help o '
•r can be and sho uld be aut am ate d by Art ific ial
allo f i but
1·gen ce It exi sts bec aus e a ma rke t exi sts far it;
Jntell · the
·ng abo ut the exi ste nce of a ma rke t inv alv es
not h 1 is a wide
necessary exi sten ce of a hur nan pra duc er. The re
up and
ma rke t of tho se wil ling to con sum e fac us- gro
hic h anl y
alg orit hm -de term ine d net flix sho ws, hal f afw
e af this
exist for tax -cu t pur pos es - let it be so. But non
ing this
entails tha t one sho uld spe nd the ir Iives pro duc
bul k and stu ffw hen a ma chi ne can do it all
the sain e.
eth ing
The acc ele rati oni st thi nks he has sai d som
Art ific ial
when he con clu des to the ide ntit y of cap ita! and
dev elap ed
Intelligence, as ifth is wer e not a pas itio n firs t
hin e, and
with calm and luc idit y by Ma rx himself. The mac
lase sleep
even the thin kin g ma chi ne, is not sam eth ing ta
erio us
or get tao exc ited ove r. Tec hno pho bia is as uns
as acc ele rati oni sm - nei the r is luc id. Ma
rx is luc id.
It was cle ar to Marx, in the Fragment on Ma
chines
aile d a
frorn the Gru ndr isse , tha t aut om atio n ent
ous nes s,
sep ara tion of sci enc e fro m hum an con sci
thro ugh
where this scie nce wo uld "ac t upo n the war ker
er of the
the n1a chi ne as an alie n pow er, as the pow
machine itself." An d for Ma rx, this aUen pow
er wa sn't
pow er
mere ma chi ner y, it wa s objectzfied lab or as the
pow er,
fllling ave r the pro duc tio n pro ces s; and this
e for m af
as th e app rap riat ion of Iivi ng lab or, was "th
capita],, M . of
· arx th1 nks tec hno cap ital as the hig her farm
riat ian af
~a~ital in the sen se tha t if cap i tal is the app rap
iv1nglab
or, aut om atio n rea lize s this inn ate ten den cy af
27
 Ulysse Carrière

capitai by placing the entire labor process under the Power

of fixed capitai - machinery. That is, whereas variabie
capitai appropriates living labor through wages, fixect
capitai appropriates it by subjecting the act oflabor itself to
the power of capitai as machines. The organic co1nposition
of capitai increases tendentially. Iflabor is always posed by
capitai as a moment in the production process, this is fuUy
realized by the transformation of living labor "into a mere
accessory of machinery," which entails "the absorption
of the labor process in its materiai character as a mere
moment of the realization process of capitai:'
The mystique oftechnocapital, which has so thoroughly
excited some imaginations, lies in the separation of techni-
cal knowledge from the worker's consciousness, where this
knowledge confronts the worker as the alien power of the
machine itself.And yet this process, which sends the accel-
erationist in a religious frenzy, is neither the result of some
alien deity, nor an inherent property of the machine, but
rather the confrontation between labor and capitai, where
fixed capitai appears as realized objectified labor. And so it
is "the accumulation ofknowledge and skill" along with the
"productive forces ofthe social brain" which are "absorbed
into capitai, as opposed to labor." In the typical operation
of fetishism, alienated sodai relations now appear "as an
attribute of capitai, and more specifically of fixed capita!" -
ofmachinery. Accelerationism thus reveals itself as middle
class dreck, a petit-bourgeois ideology following the same
mental operation as that of commodity fetishism.
All this ruinous patchwork of Lovecraftian live
action role playing, petit-bourgeois reaction and
pseudo-Deleuzean buzzwords is not very serious, but
the eschatological pronouncements of accelerationism-
28
 Techn{cally Man Dwells upon this Eanh

d this mus t be ackn owle dged as its fore most excu se-
an .
.
ere Iarge ly cr1ed out from the hum and b uzz of m1dd le
w .
Jass subu rbs. For the is th .
pet1 t-bou rgeo , e rea11ty of
e . . .
apit ahsm 1s . that.
1t has long ago beco m e borzng . _
e .
acce lerat 1on1 st. theo ry, for a time , m anag ed to
an d
conv ince som e that 1t was not so. But Iike any nove lty,
one flips thro ugh thos e page s toda y as if from last
year 's boro scop e. And yet, in the long run, it migh t
be poss ible to rede em hype rstit ion- hype for shor t-
as brin ging to the surf ace a certa in petit -bou rgeo is
dem and for exci teme nt. It is in this sens e that Nick
Land and Hou elleb ecq form two appo site ends of a
singl e spec trum of midd le class ennu i, the one fighting,
the othe r acce ptin g it. But now that even Land ian hype
has grow n bori ng too, we retu rn, whe ther we like it
or not, to thin king tech noca pital with sobe r lucid ity,
turn ing- agai n-to the rela tion betw een auto mati on
and the gene ral intel lect deve lope d in the Grundrisse.
The myst ique oftech noca pital only hold s sway to the
exte nt that the hum an relat es to auto mate d mach inery
as labo r rela tes to capi tal: the alien pow er sens ed in
this mac hine ry is expe rien ced as the reali zed form
of alien ati on itsel f. But then , this says noth ing of the
mach ine, whic h pres ents this alien pow er only asfix ed
capitai. In the hiss and clun k of stee l and silic one, it
is capi tai, as the auto nom ous mov eme nt of the non-
livin g, that has beco me tang ible. The mov ing cog is
the mate riai form of the appr opri ati on of livin g labo r
by dead labo r, it is a mom ent in the circu latio n proc ess
of capi tai mad e mate rial, but this is not an inhe rent
Prop erty of the cog itsel f, only ofth e circu latio n proc ess
of capi tai. The mac hine appe ars as an alien pow er not
29
 Ulysse Carrière

because it is a machine, but because it is capit

a1. 'rh
small electrical engine a teenager builds far a 8 • e
c1ence
fair does not confront them as a threatening horr .
o1, fot
they relate to it as an artist to their art. What confr
0 nts
me as a man-niade horror beyond my comprehensio .
1'2 IS
not the machine, but capitai under materia! fonn cap·
' lta}
turned into a machine. It is the operation offetishism that
displaces the sodai relation from capi tal to the machin
e.
And yet the real insight of Marx is that this 1nachin-
ery, as it tends to reduce the amount of necessary hu-
man labor, possesses the opposite effect of enabling the
worker to work even more for capi tal; automation did not
reduce human labor, it maximalized it in a maximum of
production. However, the reduction of necessary labor
far a given object turns out to be "the condition for the
emancipation of labor." If fixed capital corresponds to
"generai social knowledge" becoming a "direct force of
production," Artificial Intelligence must then strike us as
the fìnal stage in this process announced by Marx, the
realization of generai socia! knowledge as fixed capi tal.

But what of art? -

If Artificial Intelligence realizes the identity of poiesis

and techne, it does so under the condition of the model;
not that it can only produce a synthesis gleaned from
its input, but that it first requires an input, and cannot
go beyond that input. As such, it functions through a
logie of representation. What is missing from Artificial
Intelligence- and the artists whose works it automaces-
is a faculty of expression. :t is here that the
3
 Ear th
Tech nically Ma n Dw ells upo n this

. Bu t wh at is thi s
. ka ble , the sin gu lar tak.e.pla ce
un tht n th at tak es its pla ce ? It
a1<ing-pl ac e? Or rat he r, wh at 1s 1t
no place. W ha t
t Iace it tak es a pla ce ; as su ch it ha d
rakes p '
ha d no pla -th e ou top os -ta ke
ce s pla ce . Bu t wh ere wa s it
? It wa s a pla ce les s pla
ce , topos outopos. Pe rha ps
be fiore . is
eit he r so me wh ere no r no wh ere . In tru th the re
irwas n r po ten cy.
no ete rna ! mo de l inv olv ed he re, no
at cre ati on, bu t the
W ha t tak es pia ce is no t thi s or th
cre ati on - an d in
one /ife ex pr ess ed dij fer en tly in each
ou tsh ini ng be au ty, to ka lon ek ph
an est ato n, wh at too k
s ori gin . Bu t on ce it
lace be ars the tra ce of its pla ce les
at po we r, of th at on e
:as tak en pla ce , wh at is lef t of th
it we re, its co ng ea led
life, save for be au ty, wh ich is, as
pla ce is de ad , ex ce pt
rem na nt? No thi ng ; wh at ha s tak en
n mi gh t as well ha ve
tha t it ma y bi rth mo re lif e. Ti tia
he ha dn 't lea rn ed to
burned his fin ish ed pa in tin gs , if
e pe rfe cte d ap ple th at
keep the m for ev er inc om ple te. Th
uc ed -is de ad . Save for
falls from the br an ch -w ha t is pr od
a rem na nt of the on e
the seeds it be ars , th e ap ple is on ly
e.
life tha t ru ns thr ou gh th e ap ple tre

But wh at of be au ty ? -

s be au ty sh ine s ou t as
In what tak es pla ce in be au ty, thi
th e self-dijferentiation ofthe One - thi s wa s Ho lde rli n's
· t. Ift he mo me nt of be au tyt oo k place, itw as,
· 1gh
greatest 1ns
the inf ini tel y un ite d."
he wrote, bo th "in !if e an d int ell ec t:
Iti sth . th e int ell ec t. Th e
. e anc1ent aw e, th e un co ve rin g of
1 · of lif e an d in tel lec t-w hi ch Fl ato kn ow s
nfìnite un ity
. ' (
as the Absalute Lz.vzn g One, -rò -rra.v-reÀe ç (4'>ov 6V, the pu re
i
nteUect . fer en tia tio n.
-in be au ty, it sh in es fo rth as dif
31
 Ulysse Carrière

But how is this intell ect an absol ute life? This 0

s:. • • • h t1e
absolu te li.1e 1s not organze; lt runs t rough the buJ
as that which , as infini te becom ing, dijfere ntiates th~
bulle - a star is a differ entiat ed cloud of hydrog en, just
as organ ic life is differ entiat ed matte r and music is
differ entiat ed sound. There are no two princi ples: there
is one life, there is one intelle ct, and they are one. But
what is produ ced-th e actual organ ism in its givenn ess-
merely captur es a minus cule part ofthe absolu te life of
the intelle ct, and what it captu res it as, is organi c life.
- Organ ic life is but a derive d produ ct ofthe intelle ct; not
the other way aroun d, as folk wisdo m and vulgar vitalism
would have it. What takes place in creati on is the self-
differe ntiatio n of the intelle ct, and throug h beauty , the
intelle ct passes unmed iated into the nervo us system as
intelle ctual sensat ion (Phae drus 25 Od).
Artific ial Intelli gence works with prior condit ions;
creati on create s its own condi tions. And so, what cry
must be heard in Artific ial Intelli gence ? Perha ps some-
thing simple . Get good orget autom ated. Conditioned art
can be and will be autom ated. And this is the emanc ipa-
tory value of Artific ial Intelli gence, that it must rid art
of its comm. odifica tion, or rather , that it must rid com-
modif ied art of the artist. Artific ial Intellige nce makes a
comm odifie d art free from the artist just as the artist is
made free from comm odifie d art.
One could well imagin e a bright er future where the
news media , acade mia, Netflix , galler y art and young
adult fiction would have all been autom ated by Artific ial
Intelli gence - there would no longer be any need far
human s to do any of it. The news would be writte n by
Artific ial lntelli gence, CNN and Fox News would have
32
 Technfcall y Man Dwells upon this Earth

c GI hosts go in~ throug h t h ei~ aut om ated ontic

algo rrth m would dev1se t he Iat est wed ge
chat t er, an
to b e d iscu ssed .on. talk shows ' an d the week}y
jssue
as the on e
5 can
d al would be stat1st1 cally deter m ined
whose outrag e would yield the greate st adv ertisin g
revenue. Isn't it already like this? In fact, it is _ it only
Jacks autom ation. Capita list selecti on is identic a! to
Artifici al Intellig ence. Tucker Carlso n and John Oliver
could be replac ed by algorit hms, outrag e an d sneer
could be autom ated tomorr ow. Ali of Netflix could be
CGI, and an artific ial intelli gence w ould then write
che scenar ios and genera te the images accordingly.
As univer sities aband on philos ophy to inst ead t each
che history ofphilos ophy, their profes sors could b e
automa ted, and the conten t of their classes, p roduce d
by an Artific ial Intelli gence readin g throug h the status
quaestionis. The produ ct would be the same - the
only differe nce would lie in the means . In this sense,
capital has alread y approp riated all these sectors of
human indust ry, wheth er it be news, academ ia, TV
shows, or young adult fiction . The interes ts of capital
that select for this or that human -produ ced conten t
are aligned with those that an Artific ial Intellig ence
would itself produ ce. The differe nce is not in the
result, but in wheth er a human or a machi ne made
it. CJickb ait-driv en outrag e and conspi racy theorie s
could be produc ed by human s, but ali the same, an
algorithm could engine er them to maxim ize interne t
traffic. No one knows for sure what percen tage of
~itter' s users are bots - some say as high as 70%. Ifit
18
impossible to tel1 wheth er it was done by a human or a
rnachine, let a machin e do it. Ali this can be automa ted.

33
 Ulysse Car rière

With in the cond ition s of capi tai h .

. .
for 1s prec1 sely wha t can be auto mate'w d WI
at is selec
tect
. . 1at e111er
tr1u mph ant from the anar chy of prod . . ges
uct1011 is Wh
Artif icial Intel ligen ce wou ld have prod u d . at
ce 111 the fi
plac e. The mos t effic ient, traff ic-dr iving ne
. . . . rst
labo r1ou sly r1s1n g over the din and cry ofwsIlart1cle '
a
com petit ors, will turn out to be the very same ·t other
1 eman
Artif icial Intel ligen ce wou ld have writt en on the s
POt. lf
the inter est of capi tal selec ts for effici ency, this is only
achi eved thro ugh the pain stak ing proc ess of market
selec tion, whe re the mark et oper ates preci sely as an
Arti ficia l Intel ligen ce wou ld. The cond ition s of the
mark et are also the cond ition s of Artif icial Intelligence.
The art that lathe rs the lobb ies of skysc raper s, the
abst ract scul ptur es deck ed thro ugho ut the city, the
Corp orate Mem phis mura ls stret chin g into the distance
- ali of it can be auto mate d. If it oper ates with in a set
of pred eterm ined cond ition s, Artif icial Intel ligen ce can
iden tify those cond ition s and extra pola te anyth ing from
them . And so, Artif icial Intel ligen ce calls on the artist to
creat e thei.r own cond ition s. Ever y give n cond ition can be
repro duce d by Artif icial Intel ligen ce; whic h mean s that
the repro duct ion of pres ent cond ition s will have been
entir ely offlo aded to Artif icial Intel ligen ce. But then, the
artis t isn't dispo ssess ed; the artis t is freed . Whe ther one
likes it or not, the artis t is now free from the common,
the norm ai, the expe cted, the given , the clich é. All of that
now can be done by Artif icial Intel ligen ce.
' Mod em art', the react ionar y rabbi e has it, is decad ent,
a loss ofth e value s ofbe auty , order , harm ony - in short, a
loss of Plato nism . Wha t this riff-r affkn ows of Plato, one
shou ld like to know ; but this bein g set aside , the agita tors

34
j
 r achnica lly Man Dwells upon this Earth

s een1 to be sayi ng som ethin g: the new spap ers are

fjUed with thei r opin ions , and ever ywh ere a true
rolif erati on of reve renc e for acad emic art has take n
p . b . . h T
hold of the petlt - ourge o1s ng t . hat this intel lectu al
cana ille shou ld bave such adm irati on for Raph ael, no
matte r how unco mpre hend ing this admi ratio n, shou ld
howe ver raise alarm s: were the class ics vulg ar, that
they may plea se such peop le? It may be that there is
some thing inhe rent to such pain ters as Raph ael whic h
allows some react iona ry biom ass to react with pleas ure
at its sight with the same reac tion it has befo re imag es
of nude wom en and digit a! art of knig hts temp lar.
Perh aps it is as if this art were alrea dy auto mate d.
How this art oper ates is well know n, but it migh t
be good to go aver the matt er once more . It is a lette r
of Raph ael to Cast iglio ne, publ ishe d by Lodo vico
Dolce in 15 54. Whe ther Raph ael actu ally wrot e the
letter or not, is a matt er for thos e Marx term ed "the
roden ts ofhis tory. " Whe n it was publ ished in 1554, its
conte mpor aries univ ersal ly acce pted it as Raph aers -
they perce ived an intim ate corre spon denc e betw een
the lette r and Raph ael's art. In the Iette r, Raph ael
summ arize s bis art with a singl e sente nce: "io mi servo
di certa Idea, che mi vien e nella ment e." This art is the
pittur a di Idea - it conc eives itsel f as the actua lizat ion
of a perfe ct mod el. This conc ept of a pittu ra di Idea
was to radic ally tran sfor m the statu s of the artis t,
by freei ng them from a certa in Plato nic fram ewor k
Where art oper ated as a copy of a copy, but in doin g
so, it Woul d only furth er restr ain itsel f in this same
fram ewor k: the artis t didn 't copy a copy , they now
copie d a mode l.

35
 Ulys se Carr ìère

n of a 1
Bu t the n, is thi s art the 111ere aut om atio llOdeI
re
, the re 111a111
suc h as the rea cti ona ryw oul d des ire ? No
. '
s
is not the id en.
the lim it, in the mo del/ cop y bin ary , wh ich
ent ial pow er of
tity <'R aph ael as pai nte r" bu t the dif fer
n1o re aca dein i e,
the int elle ct tha t run s thr oug h hin 1. Th e
er thi s pow er
the mo re con ser vat ive the art, the thi nn
ica lly tow ard s
get s, the mo re thi s art ten ds asy mp tot
elle ct and the
pu re ide nti ty, the sup pre ssi on of' the int
s the com mo d-
rep rod uct ion of a mo del , ten clin g tow ard
din g tow ard s
ity -fo rm, ten clin g tow ard s rad ica l evi !, ten
ntl y adm ires in
}no thi ngn ess . Wh at the rea cti ona ry blu
on of ide ntit y
Ra pha el's pai nti ng s is a sup po sed rel ati
oph er and the
bet we en mo del and cop y; bu t the phi los
ial pow er, whi ch
art ist und ers tan d ins tea d the ir dif fer ent
ati on as a div ine
tru ly is, as Alb ert i sai d, a vis div ina . Cre
od, diff ere ntia l
pow er - div ine, bec aus e dif fer enc e is Go
hen olo gy as an aga tho log y.
to yel ling
Wh at Ar tifi cia l Int ell ige nce has tak en
a con ser vat ive
fro m eve ry roo f, is the im pos sib ilit y of
n to aut om atio n,
or com .mo npl ace art , wh ich is alw ays ope
on , eit her the
bei ng sel fsa me . In the tim e of aut om ati
com mo npl ace
art ist wil l be rid of com rno npl ace art , or
art in the age of
art wil l be rid of the art ist. Th e wo rk of
the dif fer ent ial
its aut om ate d pro duc tio n mu st un lea sh
es it or not : the
pow er of the int elle ct, wh eth er on e lik
siv e, the ram e
com mo n, the pro voc ati ve, the tra nsg res
te aut om atio n.
and the vul gar - all are op en to im me dia
r Tra nsg res sio n and pro voc ati on can no t be of any val ue
I any mo re; the y rel y on the me re con tra dic
tio n of pre sen t
y aut om ate d. For
' con dit ion s, and as suc h can be rea dil
the reg ime and
bet we en the com mo npl ace tha t ser ves
no dif fer enc e,
_!ts rea cti on ary tra nsg res sio n, the re is
36
 'J'vchnically Man DwelLs upon this Earth

contrad iction; they suppose each other, as lib-

1
on Y • &
• m and its transgre ss1on 1 orma single spectrum
era Iis . .
dictable med1oc r1ty. Corpora te Memph is and
of pr e
Dimes Square operate on the same set of conditio ns.
'fi'cial Intellig ence must either lead art to the
Arti
golden age, or to eu~han asia .- and either option is
infinitely less revolt1n g than 1ts current situatio n.
The dry spell will come to an end, whethe r one
Iikes it or not: its content will be automa ted. An art
that would survive the automa tion of art, is, as of
now, unthink able - which is good. Art is being tasked
with the creation of the unthink able. A new art has
been made necessary.
An art that would become over-ba roque; a danger
to the young and a scandal to the old; both carnival
and solemn rite, an art become deliriou s, and yet,
with grand style; an art of purity, cutting across the
positive; a violent art, striking , creating, killing with-
out hate or pity, out of boundle ss love, shaking the
depths neither to sanctify , to condem n, or console,
but merely to propoun d; an art that would only take
to galleries and museum s with a barre! of petrol and
a match; an art, dazzling and tremend ous as the sun,
to make ready the season of the gods - this then could
Well be the coming art. The conditio ns are here, for
th0 se conditio ns are simply the annihila tion of the
commonplace, the commo nsensic al and the estab-
. 1
· ation is assured b y Arti'f'1c1a
lishect ' and t h'1s ann1hil
·
Intellige nce. T he conditio ns are here, the d1fferen · I
t1a
Power eve ryw h ere and nowhere - are the artists . st1·11
1acking? B .
f' · ut some of them already bave made the1r
trst atte
mpts before us.
37
 Ulysse Carrière
Do the oaks
grow shorter and
Jeff Koons and Rupi Kaur? The the sun any
cannot anarchy
decrease, for it is uncreated, of di
the m mer for
eternal,, intel eandct
SO we are as
like gods when we
cannot pass away or be reduced;create. And the infinite;
turn away from it and one can
only intel ect
sink into the absolute
identity. For this differential power is of
reactfallivelaty
one
one, whose traces and absolute
life and one intellect as
call beauty and whose echoes We
The
creative expression we call art.
artist must become
unreasonable, a crowned
anarchist a tyrant, a child emperor. Art in
Artificial Intelligence will be an art of the the ageLetof
caprice.
automnation automate all that can be automated, and
what will remain will be the
clinamen, the
the impossible. The artist will be free, unthinkable,
whether they
like it or not, and Artificial
to freedom and force them to
Intelligence will drag them
either create or get
automated. This artist, then, will be a Sardanapalus, an
arsonist, a reckless begetter.Everything commonplace
will be automated, there will be nothing left to do but the
unthinkable. The artist will become as like eternity - 2
child playing dice.
We must become radically superficial. Thetruths
that there are no depths, at least, not anymore G
too exposed for that. Capital has flayed us down, and
there is nothing left to hide, or reveal. We are inside-0ut
worn like gloves, andthere are no secrets in our ma
There is no teasing us. No set of dress, port, Speech
us
patterns, tastes and proclivities, nothing will have
believe in depth again. We are depthless, horizontal,
we forced
flattened - as we always were. Only now are we
to come clean about it. Tim Burton's Wednest
38
 this Earth
Technically Man Dwells upon
work.
grasps this truth, and puts it to
masterfully
Wednesday Addams, is cold and calculated,
The girl, at all times, wearing all
expression
keeping a blank grim and the dark but here
in the
blackand reveling is no backstory, nO cause,
secret. There
she h¡s no Wednesday Addamns is not
story for this.
no origin no internal motor distinct from
follow
deep. Her acts
those very acts. She is friends with
andsuperior to giggles and
blonde who
Enid, a sunny, sprightful
noetiology will be
frolics along, overjoyed. But herecharacters' actions
involved. The whyness of those
past the actions themselves. It is
does not extend
Wednesday.
inconsequential whether one be Enid or
make her whoshe
Nocause transcends Wednesday to
been
is; with her, allthe attires of profundity have
exteriorized into absolute superficiality. Wednes
would
day possesses no transcendent identity that
be determined by a causal origin, and her acts take
place without any further meaning. For Wednesday's
existence, no reason is given or needs to be given. She
stands in the brutality of the positive. The world of
Wednesday lies beyond the why. The act calls for no
explanation. Wednesdayis part of an early waveof
dn art that could be, forthe first time, described as
truly atheistic.
How was a work like Wednesdaypossible? It's that
the subject has
been stripped clean by capital, down to
its core: there was
is a work of
no agalma in Wednesday. Wednesday
is an
art that operates without an agalma. What
agalma? Somewhere towards the end of Plato's
Symposium, there was this idea of Alcibiades that
Socrates Was like one of those worthless sculptures of
39
 Ulysse Carrière

the rustic god Silenus, those sculptures that co.

be opened, but only to reveal an inestimable wonder
concealed inside - the agalma. Magic and the horcrux
form the agalma of Harry Potter, the Holy Grail is th.
agalma of King Arthur, nurder is the agalma of. Agatha
Christie's novels, and there was an agalma concealed
inside of So crates, Alcibiades thought, and he had to get
to it. A-gal-ma, the word flows like a caress, much like that
other word Lacan connects to agalma in his Seminar VII
the word yaàjvy, galene, stillness ofthe sea. Galene might
come, it seems, from yEAáw, gelao, to laugh, to smile. Or
perhaps, if one should follow Lacan, agalma does not
come from the sea, but from dyavóG, agauos, noble, itself
from yaia, gaia, the earth. It would be landed. Wherever
it comes from, a cloud of impressions floats around the
sound agalma: brightness, laughter, beauty, the world.
The dictionaries say "honor, glory, delight" but this is
better than a dictionary: it's a living etymology.

There is only one mention of an agalma in the liad, and

it's a purple-colored piece of ivory:

Imries popéerv: paoii dè xerrau dyaua,

It lies in a treasure-roon, although many horsemnen
Would wish to wear it; but it lies there, the king's agalma
Both an ornament for his horse, and aglory for its rider
- Homer, Iliad IV, 143-145.

40
 Technically Man Dwells upon this Earth

Whattis an agalma? It iis a secret wonder of infinite value

from which worth and meaning are derived - an axiology
inthe strong sense. The agalma is the great justifier:
it explains why something is being done. Suppose
arustic wOoden statue: the agalma is the minuscule,
i
inestimable gem concealed inside. The agalma, even in
Homer's usage, is already the mark of the not just" of
che there's more to it" And Homer says: for the horse.
ir isan ornament, but at the Same time, for the rider. it
is glory,kudos. Something more has been created here.
Something like surplus-value ofcode has been produced.
It has legal tender too. The agalma is a great mover of
men; the agalma is desired by almost everybody. This is
why, as they paraded through the Capitol, the January
6th insurrectionists always remained certain they would
find the deep state cabal officiating there - politics, for
them, was agalmatic. They were there looking for the
agalma. But with Tim Burton's Wednesday, what has been
made apparent to many, is the renewed possibility of
an art completely rid of any agalma- a truly brutalist
art. Wednesday finally finds the secret society and its
lodgings where the plot must be woven, and it turns out
there is nothing there, no order of the phoenix, nothing
but a collection of smug legacy students. There is no
agalma there. It is the brutality of the positive.
The tumult raised against Artifñcial Intelligence for
lts artisticproductions must be grasped as an
lnternal
fissure inin the
the logic of agalmatic art; what grant sso much
of art its
aura,, is nothing other than the identification of
the agalma with the artist. Hitchcock put a MacGuffin in
his movies, but the French took it out and turned it into
the 'auteur:' Whenever the artist overtakes the art and
41
 Ulysse Carrière

justifies the material by an appeal to an external

ticity, the agalma becomes nothing
nothing more than a authen
and by producing the same art without any need for trick,
artist, Artificial Intelligence merely exposes the
sleight
hand constitutive of subjective, authorial art. If the art
of
falls worthless once rid of its agalmatic 'artist' figure, it
is that it was always worthless. What can barely stand on
its own two legs we must always push. Let the umbilical
cord be cut, and hold that newborn babe up in your palm
and into the light - does it cry? That is the question.
But Titian has this painting from 1512, The Three Ages
ofMan, where an old man wonders over a skull he holds
in his hand, sitting next to bumbling, newborn cherubim.
and the gaze rolls back to a young couple embraced, and
the girl plays the flute. The circle is complete: an old man
pondering death, three unaware babies, and the young
couple. What has Titian accomplished? He folded this
world ontoitself; the world he created in this painting, it
iscomplete, it does not lack the subjectivity of an author.
This is atheistic art. But Titian also did something else.
He did something powerful, something not done before
him - he openly showed his brushstrokes. This was
an artistic device. Titian made his material explicit as
material, and in doing so, he stillemployed it to Createhis
work. Itwas not red paint in order to represent blood, nor
was it just red paint as abstract red paint it was neither
and both. The brushstroke was affirmed as mere materia,
could
and yet, it was through this affirmation that it
inscribeitself as part of the world that Titian painted
The brushstroke did not point back to an authenticity
and
of the artist as asubject; rather, it took the material,
freed it from representation, and allowed it to stand a
42
 Technically Man Dwells upon this Earth

pure material. It was not color in order to represent this

orthat, it was color. as such, and it was as such that it was
the color of this or that. The material was freed from its
disappearance into representation and allowed to appear
as m
material, while still constructing space and figures.
It was not abstraction, nor representation. Titian had
created brutalism.
Art, for now, can be separated in two broad categories:
agalmatic and brutalist. What distinguishes them
whether the work presents itself as being more than this
or iust this. Brutalist art, such as Homer's hexameter, does
not claim tobe more than its own material. Raphael's
Transfiguration, as agalmatic art, employs its material
inorder to signify something beyond itself. Agalmatic
art may either place its agalma within itself, as Harry
Potter does with magic, or outside itself, as autofiction
does with the author. What must be grasped is the
theological content inherent to agalmatic and brutalist
artworks. Agalmatic art refers back to something
outside itself,something that transcends the plane of
the work. If artoperates upona certain plane, agalmatic
art points to another plane beyond itself. It features a
certain disposition,a disposition of loss and disquiet.
With agalmatic art, you are looking for something.
Lookingfor something is the fundamental feature of your
eXistence. You are looking for something, because there
S Something that you have lost. You once possessed it, or
it was a
part of you. But you were separated, at a certain
point in time, and now you must get it back. This, this is
thetheology contained in most Hollywood films, and it is
diidentified
is stinctively'gnostic.
with
Gnosticism occurs when the agalma
and its object - it is the
self-knowledge
43
 Ulysse Carrière

dominant theology in American media. While there te

outwardly gnostic art being produced, such as is
the finest example of
gnostic art appears as the Matrix,
Potterfilm series, whose eponymous hero Harry
rediscovers his
hidden, true self, before embarking on a war
against an
opposing principle, in this case, evil. Agalmatic art can
either point to the artist (autofiction), or to the self
(Harmy
Potter). In both cases, the art serves a logic of
identity:
the authentic identity of the artist, or the
authentic
identity of Harry Potter realizing that he is a wizard.
Artifcial Intelligence liquidates the agalma of the
artist, by showing that a subject is not necessary for
the production of art. And indeed, it only concerns this
specific kind of agalmatic art. But if Harry Potter thinks
heescaped unscathed, he is wrong. It is the fundamental
structureof agalmaticart that has been exposed as
fraudulent. Thepoets, as Pindar wrote, the poets lie too
much. The only serious lie an artist can utter, is that
they are not lying. The truth is, we must be unrepentant
apostles of falsehood. What the reactionary abhors in art
made by Artificial Intelligence, is nothing but that the
trick has been revealed; that an agalmatic art, founded
on the authenticity of the artist, has become unviable.
The artist is canceled: this is the time of art.
But then the possibility opens up for an art that would
abandon the givens of agalmatic art, for an art that would
operate beyond the subject,beyond authenticity, beyond
lived experience, an art of abrasive honesty regarding 1ts
material and its inauthenticity, an art that would employ
or an author,
new means, without the illusion of a subiect
molar ensembles and
an art that would use identities,
material, an art that
personal narratives as mere artistic
44
 upon this Earth
Technically Man Dwells
truth but
human life not as a SOurce of
wouldemploy amoral, triumphant, raw,
Cosurntain of affects, an
art - a woke
brutalism.
exuberant
mustrain downonthe crowds with showers
The artist horse elected to the
they must have their
of petals, mandolins over burning
they must play purple
senate,
they must whip the sea into submission and
capitols, a more dazzled snow,
summer night with
garlandthe
ride transsexual dolphins over the
edge of
they must
chaos and
a return,
,bearing flower crowns and quick tears,
homeric laughter, a sure eye, and a triumphant
with whimsical, and
stride, violent, elated, over-sensitive,
pitiless like
mournful, a stethoscope on the chest of life,
lording over the blue.
the sun, a sphinx withouta riddle
Ediacaran biota
Anyone who has ever taken a look at
made
knows it: the intellect is anarchic. Nature is only
of monsters. Let us Create.

45
 poSTFACE:THOUGHTS RECOLLECTED
WALKING BY THESTANFORD DISHANDTHE
PALOALTO WASTEWATERRTREATMENT PLANT

Atree
contemplates; it contemplates itsown good, what
and that is its soil, sediments, water,
is becoming for it,
to
itssunlight. In this contemplation the tree turns
its good, by differentiating, among allthat is around
it.what is its own good. And by turning to this good,
contemplation differentiates, and the tree emerges as
difference. Itsconatus is not its self-preservation-for
it does not rest in identity-but its turning towards that
good which is its difference. And its difference is not
what it is, but what is becoming for it.
But is this contemplation more like that of a subject
gazing upon an object? Or rather more like a field? If
that field, in a sense, precedes an inside and an outside,
would it be warranted to speak ofa transcendental ield?
There was this concept, in the Elements of Ethics
of Hierocles, the concept of a rpöToV o0Ke*ov, a proton
01keion, a first dwelling. And it would be productive
to think this first dwelling as a field. For instead
of saying, for example, that one tastes something
Sweet, Hierocles would say: first dwelling feels being
vcetened. It wasn't a matter of a subject saying: 1 m
tasting something sweet, or of apredicated object: this
is
somet hing Sweet, but rather of afirst dwelling: it
tastes Sweet. In that expression: it tastes sweet, the first
dwelling was this it.
49
 Ulysse Carrière

Is this to say that the subject and the

object
are
abolished? Not exactly. It is as if they appeared, at
each
extremity of the first dwelling, as secondary, as like
echoes of something like an event in that field. the
expressed in the sentence: it tastes good.
event
But how should one understand that 'event'? There
is a Greek word, rábnua, pathema, and it bears the senses
of:an event,an affect, and the sOurce of an affect. If it
is possible to grasp these three senses at once and as
one,that then would be it. A pathema does not happen
to a frst dwelling, but rather: in it. And also: the first
dwellingis transcendental, but it is not transcendental to
anything either, it isthe transcendental without a dative,
it does not relate back to anything. The pathema does not
relate to the transcendental through the dative; it takes
place within it likean excitation ina scalar field.
Is there a difference between a pathema and a
sensation? If sensation is taken in Deleuze's sense,
there is very little, save for a renewed insistence on
its eventuality. For Deleuze had spoken of sensation
like this: it has a side turned toward the subject, one
towards the object, or better yet: it has nosides, it is both,
inseparably: at once I become in sensation and something
becomes through sensation, the one through the other,
the one in the other. And so a pathema one couldthen
imagine as like an excitation in ascalar field.
Would it sound foolish to say that everywhere, every
differential process occurs as the activity of the intellect?
Here one would have to further add: it is the activity of the
intellect, but not the wayone thinks, If every differential
process occurs as the activity of the intellect, the intellect
is, sustains, and embraces all that is. It could not have
50
 Postface

needfor anything. It would have no need for laws,

any
purpose, ormeaning.
i .One could not suppose a lack in the
intellect. If the intellect needs
needs neither law nor purpose
the intellect must then be anarchic, lawless,
nor meaning,
full of audacity: thee boughs do not hang always heavy in
thís
that perfect sky. In this nature there are onlymonsters.
Butwhat of contemplation? It's as if there was
contemplation in the turning of afirst dwelling towards
its good, asif the alignment of a pathema towards that
good was joy. And there was in that field a tree, and that
tree was the self-enjoyment of the field as a tree. That
exulted in its unity and difference like Walt Whitman
walking along a ruddy shore. But in this contemplation,it
must be that all that is around and flowing into that tree,
the periechon, can be differentiated in the contemplation
of the tree - it must be intelligible. But trees are not in
the habit of chattering; the periechon is not discursively
intelligible, nor is it intelligible as intuition; rather, it
must be a matter of intellectual sensation.
Perhaps it would be recklessness, to speak of intel
lectual sensation, to say that there is something of the
Intellect passing unmediated into the nervous system,
Without the processing of faculties; of which Plato
Spoke in the Phaedrus, describing how Beauty imme
alately passes into the tissues of the eye. But
then it
Would be possible to say that intellectual sensation,
turning back to one's good, is contemplation - and so,
that everything contemplates.
Plotinus and Deleuze agree: everything
But as
one Says: atree contemplates, is it thatcontemplates.
the intellect
Contemplates itself, as atree and its good? Does this
contemplation actualize the individual essence of the
51
 Ulysse Carrière

of the tree,or its species-essence? Or does the intellect

provide a model for this tree to partake in? If neither. it
is that there is nothing of a model in the intellect. And
there is nothingof a model in the intellect. The thoucks
that grasped the intellect as model had merely served
to make explicit the necessity for the intellect to itself
have no model, that is, the intellect as model showed that
something must have had no model. It would merely be a
matter of completing this thought to recognize that the
intellect itselfis not a model.
Being and having no model, this intellect could nev
be an identity, andit must then be grasped as infinite
becoming. Infinite becoming for the intellect entails also

pure production, and the activity of the intellect, that

pure act, is a production process. But the product-the
fruit falling off the branch-is nothing but that which
isgiven. The given being what is, which is nothing, the
fruit also is nothing but that identity that the intellect
can further differentiate as a further difference.
If thought limits itself to the question of difference
and identity, and there, grasps the intellect as difference,
what is this difference which is that of the intellect?
It must be a relative difference, a web of differential
processes. Everything extends itsdiference as far as it
can; and thisis what it can do. It is a relative difference;
for absolute difference is yet greater in power and dignity,
beyond Being.
And yet is there no multiplicity in the intellect?
- for then the intellect has need of unity. If there is
multiplicity in that which recollects the multiple, then
there is multiplicity in the intellect. But the intellect is
really one, it is one absolute life and it is the light that
52
 Postface

lights,and it will not go out, as like an infinite white

fountain, and this light is diffracted in the bulk into its
lrinlicity. It is as if the intellect diffracted itselfintoa
multiplicity of different events of singularization which,
once their life, their difference and unity was
spent,
would fall into identity, as the bulk. But the intellect
does not get lost in the bulk.
The intellect turns back: it turns back, that infinite
light, tothat which is not good, for it is the Good, and
which is not light, for it is the source of light, the One
beyond unity, absolute difference. As such, a sunflower
is like the intellect: it differentiates itself by turning to
the sun, which is not the light, but the source of light.
Going past the light, and finding the sun, the end
of the journey, what one finds is not a border between
the sun and the light it shines, but rather, a porosity,an
extension of the sun into space, without border police,
without rupture, but rather, a continuous outflow, a solar
wind stretching seamlessly from the surface of the sun
intospace, and filling this space, and one comes to see
that the heliosphere is the sun, and that one is standing,
here and now, not in orbit around the sun, but rather,
in the sun, that this sun, being everywhere different at
once, is nowhere, and yet, present immediately, is made
invisible byits outshining visibility.
Grasping this, it is not that one grasps it as that which,
Deing grasped, turns out as the identity of grasping
and
grasped; for there can be here no identity, and the
concept is returned to the grasping one, not as filled With
its object, one and identical with it, but rather, as really
empty;and the thought that turns to it, finds theconcept
annihilated by tthisabsolute difference, and so is thought
53
 Ulysse Carrière

here momentarily incapacitated, capable of

nothing.
until, turning to the annihilated concept and looking into
this annihilation, it grasps the difference
between itself
and absolute difference, and that difference is the intellect
The thought that thinks, thinks difference. And so
the first dwelling then asks the Kantian question: what
is it that thinks in me? For in the first dwelling there is
true transcendental unity,which is nota higher unity of
the subject and the object as their identity, but rather,
a step back from both, as a field, a charged band of
intensity, and so, entirely differential, and yet one, at
whoseextremities both subject and object are produced,
for the first dwelling is radically anterior to both, and
absolute difference is the immanent contained in the
first dwelling, a perfect indwelling of the first dwelling in
absolute difference, and of absolute difference in the first
dwelling. Tograsp and become this, is pure power, utter
beatitude:the intellect, the world, yourself, all thingsin
time andeternity, all one pure felicity.
A tree contemplates; and in this contemplation
it turns to its own good; and this process is what is
commonly called life. One could say that this life is the
activity of contemplation, actus contemplandi, which
makes a difference. This actus contemplandi is not
that of a being as an inside turned towards its outside.
Rather, it makes a difference. There never was going to
be adichotomy between the inside and the outside, but
if there had been one, it would have proceeded from an
abyssal difference whose trace would endure neither
as the inside nor as the outside, but in their limit, their
threshold, that non-space which is the space that
authorizes a separation.This difference would have been
S4
 Postface

difference between identity and non-identity. In the

the
chorismos between Aand not-A, this difference would
have beenthe chora of the hyphen. It makes a difference;
erges in difference, in contemplation, im Nu.
atreeemerges
Butthere would be no contradiction or separation; as the
roe extendsits roots tocontemplate what becomes good
far it, it contemplates at once that which, composing
ir becomes its good. AS Such, this contemplation is
never that of an organism towards its outside: as the
tree contemplates what becomes good for it, it turns
back at once to itself. If a tree contemplates water, it
contemplates it at once as rain and as what sustains
the hydrolysis of adenosine triphosphate. This
contemplation is not the limit between an inside and
an outside either. It forms a field of difference, that field
wherein contemplation makes a difference.
Would it be right, then, to say that contemplation
makes a difference as that tree, by realizing what tree
really is? But it would make no difference, if it were
only a matter of actualizing the tree's essence, which
would be its identity. If there is no potentiality, what
then? Would it be more accurate to speak ofa maximum
extent of difference, so far as unity sustains it? But then,
r the tree does not actualize its essence or become itselt,
but instead, becomes different what does it become
iferent from? From its surroundings,the periechon?
For Heraclitus, as doxography has it, part of the
Periechon was the inside' and the rest ofit the 'outside';
the inner periechon was coal, and the outer periechon
was fire, and this coal was set ablaze by the senses, and
extinguished by sleep and death. There was no radical
inside and outside there, for the one periechon was
55
 Ulysse Carrière

merely differentiated as coal here and fire

does this periechon possess any identity that there. But
a tt
would differ from? For Heraclitus, it could not tree
be: if this
periechon was fire, this very fire was also kindled
out in turn, that is, it possessed no identity. and put
But if one
says: each and every thing differs, one from another and
all together, as one net of relative difference, each one
differing from every other one all at once, how could this
really suffice? How then could each one be one? Perhaps
it must be thata tree consists in a web of relations wherein
unity insists, perhaps it must be that this contemplation,
as it mnakes a difference, must not simply turn to a web
of relative difference, but to absolute difference also? -
IfIsay: contemplation makes a diference, and further
that this is the process usually called life, am I then
saying that this difference is the difference between what
is living and what is not living? Or that this difference
is this life'? No, necessarily not. Even if this difference
was taken as the non-binary limit from which one could
found a binary opposition such as that between living
and not living, even then, this difference would fall on
neither side. I could not say, from that contemplation
makes a difference in which the tree emerges as a life,
that this contemplation and this difference are this
life. This difference, if it is the difference between what
is living and what is not living, this difference cannot
fall on either side of the binary without ceasing to be
difference, without becoming contradiction. But it might
also be that this difference and this contemplation could
be a life, not a life as opposed to death, that is, not as
relative life, not as life relative to death, but as absolute
life. This absolute life of contemplation and difference
56
 Postface

would not be organic life, it would not be the life of the

organism. Andil but what then? Perhaps it would be better
to start
again from elsewhere.
Ifit makes a difference, it is that the tree differentiates,
around it and in it, as it were, what becomes
inallIthat is
and in doing so, the tree contemplates what
goodfor it;
such that this becomes good for it. That is, if this
it is
contemplation contemplates what becomes good for the
water, it also contemplates the tree as that
tree, such as
for which water becomes
good. Atree does not extend
ive roots intothe earth looking for gasoline. But then, is
chis tosay that this good is relative? Thiswould be true
if there were only relative difference; then, everything
itself. But if
would pursue its own good, turned towards
and this is
it merely turnsto itselt, it turns to an identity,
incoherent, since in seeking what becomes good for it, it
differentiates. As such, it seems there must be absolute
difference, to which contemplation somehow turns also,
making a difference.
better
A lone homogenous cloud of hydrogen, or
makes
yet, nothing that is identity. But the intellect
which,
a difference. It forms a star, which is one, and
selfsame
being one, is infinitely more different than a
claim
cloud of hydrogen. Would it sound ridiculous to
different
for a star not the same life as that ofa tree, but a
tree and the
ye, and yet, a life that is stiIl one in the
star? This life would be, indeed, a differential process. A
non-organic life of stars, and an organic life of trees, two
dlfferent differential processes, and yet one absolute life?
qualities of
WOuld never be a matter of eXtending the
and
e differential process usually called life' to stars
error,
planets and rocks and seas - never. Such an
57
 Ulysse Carrière

which is that of vitalism, extends the properties ot

organic life to everything else, that is, it assumes a
identity between organic life and something like the
movenment ofstars. One must insteadlgrasp two
diferent
differential processes as the expression of a single
differential process. One life, one intellect, both one,
everywhere different the absolute life of the intellect
But in thinking this, would one identify thought with
organic life, thought as an evolutionary development of
the hominid brain? Perhaps, but only to the extent that
thisthought would function as identity and discursivity,
So long as it remains a matter of saying this is that" of
representation, correspondence, subject and object, such a
thought indeed is bodily, biological, organic, and human,
all too human. And yet there could be a different thought
distinct from organic life, and belonging in proper to
this absolute life, and it would be the life of thought, a
thought which does not make itself likethe intellect, but
recollects itself as such.

But what then is this difference?

making
IfIanswer: difference is this or that, amnInot also
a mistake? How can I predicate difference as this is
that,
without referring it back to a logic of identity? But is
this then to say that being must be thought as identity
Or is this not confusing the logical-this is that-with
first
the ontological? Or rather: must not any onto-logy
supposean identity of being and logos? Andyet setting
this aside, perhaps one would then say: difference is non
identity, what is not the same is different. But if I say this,
I am thinking difference as negative, the
negation of
58
 Postface

identity, where identity is posed as still prior, more

originary; and in truth, I I did not define difference, I
merely negated identity. Difference must be different
from the negation of identity, as non-identity cannot
be identical to difference. Is there then the possibility
self-predication of difference? Could One answer:
of a
diference is difference, without contradiction? But when
I say: difference 1s dference, whatIreally am saying is:
diference is identical to aitference. But is this identity
more than mere repetition? And yet, is it not that identity
as a product of difference should be taken as just this
repetition? But as this question is asked, it is that what
is inguired into, is not relative diference-the difference
between this and that-but rather, absolute difference,
difference in itself.
And necessarily so, as when one says: diference is
good, it is not that one means: the difference between
willows and oaks is good, but rather: diference in itself
is good, which is to say: it is good that willows and oaks
can grow rather than only the self-same given tree. And
that self-same given tree, being purely itself, without
difference, would be nothing but absolute identity,
which is nothing. Assuch, this difference would not be
the difference between willows and oaks as a given set of
qualities and quantities, but instead, as Hegel thought,
n the absolute difference ofAand not-A from each other,
TWould be the simple 'not' which would constitute the
difference (II.266). And So, one cannot saythat difierence
is that, but
rather, one must say that two things differ
tm that.., and this in that is difference. And
walking by
the curve of alake I would
then say, perhaps: a willowis
diferent from anan oak in that its leaves hang Overithe water.
59
 Ulysse Carrière

But really, am I not still grasping the

difference
two things, rather than difference in itself? betweey
In and
not-A" can Igrasp the 'not' without any reference "Ato APIt
is then, perhaps, that the difference I
would grasp would
be difference in itself, the difference that
refers itself
to itself. If this difference is this 'not, this
negativity.
it would not be the difference between tWo
things, or
the difference of one thing from another, but rather.
this difference in itself would be the difference of itself
from itself. As such, this difference would be not itself.
This difference would be different from itself. But in
difference different from itself this 'itself' is difference:
difference different from itself, must be different from
difference. What is different from difference, Hegel says,
is - identity. And so Hegel can conclude: diference is
the unity ofdiference and identity. The frst part of this
statement seems correct: difference is unity. But, for
this unity to necessarily be the unity of difference and
identity, it must be that when I ask: what is differentfrom
difference in itself, there should be no other answer than
identity. And yet, a willow is different from difference in
itself. An oak also is different from difference in itself.
As such, perhapsit is not that what is diferent from
diference is identity, but rather, that what isopposed to
difference is identity.
Hegel's Science ofLogic might have swapped oppost
tion for diference at a crucial moment, by saying: what
is different fromdiference, is identity (II.266). For one
can very well say: a hundred thalers are different from
difference. Is difference a hundred thalers? -a hundred
thalers are different from difference. It is not apodictic,
then, that what is diferentfomdifference is identity,
60
 Postfuce

difference is different
andleverything that is not identity is not
sinceany then to say that
difference. Isthis
from difference? - surely not. Rather, it is a
from
different
identity, like everything that is not
eter of saying: from difference, but identity has
diferent
diference,is the opposite ofdifference. That
thisparticularitythattit is
grounda dialectic of
identity and difference
cannot
is: I
difference initself. Yes, identity is different from
on
but so is absolutely everything that is not
difference,
what is different from difference, I can
IFIask:
difference.IfI ask:
except difference. But still, I am, first,
answer: everything
difference is not different from itself; and
assuming that
everything that is not difference
second, ignoring how difference and thus itself a
must be different from
Perhaps to the question: what is dËfferent
difference. difference. Is
could then answer
from diference, one difference?
difference different from
repetition, rep
Deleuze grasps difference through
revolves arounddifer
etition being the identity that
the repetition of a copy, but the repetition
ence, not
identity of differ
of that which has no original. The
thinks difference in
ence as such. And as long as one
difference in it
Terms of negation, one cannot think
self - on this, Deleuze was truly right. But mnust this
mean that difference should be thought as atirma
10n Or perhaps, it could be as Plato and Kant saw,
that difference shouldn't be thought as negation; but
tatner, that negation itself should be thought as dif
rence. How so? it would be a matter of returning
ference.
to this thought carefully: "difference is not a negation,
but instead, negation is a difference." IfI then say:
diference is a negation, I grasp difference as the not'
61
 Ulysse Carrière

in A and not A" Whereas, when Iinstead pose that

negation isa diference, Ibegin to grasp negation as the
mark of an infinite difference, as in "non-A" Suppose J
were to say: the bread is not hot - I wouldn't be saying
much more than: the bread l¡cks heat, the breadis cool
Butif one were to say: the bread is non-hot - what then?
What does 'non-hot'mean? The bread could wellbe free
or blue or golden or rotten orfanciful. It was Kant who
would make explicit the infinite abyss separating"not-x"
from non-x" for indeed, what is not-x" stands as the
mere negation of x, whereas what is non-x* is different
from x. If Ishould say:not binary, Iwould mnean: the
opposite of binary. But ifone said: non-binary, this would
entail: any and every thing which is diferent from the
binary. When Isay: not-being, I am really saying: nothing.
And as onesays: non-being, they mean: all that is different
from being. And so, perhaps it is that "non-x" should be
taken as everything but x*- the logical operation that
Kant named infinite judgment.
As Parmenides speaks of Being, the logos grasps Being
as the identity of what is: this is this. It is Parmenides
who first comes to grasp Being as absolute identity, and
language upholds this claim: for a thing to be such as it is,
is for a thing to be. In the formula "A isA;'the 'is' sustains
the identity ofA. But what is this identity? Is it identical
with Being? Heidegger, in 1966, holds the opposite:
Being belongs to an identity. And so when Parmenides
says: Being is identical to thought, it is that this identity
precedes Being. If Being is identical to thought, this
identity, to auto, must be anterior to Being,that it may
allow its identity with thought. Already, the identity of
Being recedes into identity as such - intoa henology of
62
 Postface

aporia that Parmenides must reach, is

the
identity.But Beingandlidentity, which always
identity of
thatofthe Being, and
identity beyond
supposes, first, a deeper
disjunction bridgedover by this identity. IfI say:
,a
second,
rather: identity and Being
identical to identity, or
Beinggis more fundamental identity
identical,.I mustsuppose a
are
andidentitytogether. And IIcan only say
holding Being
that" to the extent that this has already been
"thisis
taken as different
fromthat: the affirmation ofidentity,
suppose a more originary difference,
"A is A," must
rather than simply
which brings me to say "A is A"
multiplicity.
"A"The affirmation of identity entails a
multiplicity,
Assoon as there is predication, there is
the logic
and this predication operates according to
possible to the
of identity: "A is A." But this is only
For
extent that a deeper difference has given me an A.
no
in the absolutely simple statement A" there can be
identity involved, as identity must operate as A is A.
This simple Apresents no identity. It presents unity and
diference. It is as such that any further predication will
introduce identity and multiplicity into this unity and
diference. This then must mean that difference cannot
be predicated; no "is" statement can define difference.
ven the self-predication diference is difference" has
already foundered into the logic of identity.
What is difference? - the question begins toappear
as aporetic. If one cannot quite say what is diference, it
ight be that difference cannot be predicated, that it
transcends Being.
Seagulls in flight: what is that one freedom in them,
which proceeds, not only as the movement, chorus-like,
of their
unity as that one flight, but as the real freedom
63
 Ulysse Carrière

of each singular seagull too? There is a great diference

between the two.
One says:the intellect is one and everywhere different
- but how could that be? How could it be that one thing
be everywhere different, and yet, one? Formerly there
was the old prejudice, that unity belonged to identity,
and difference to multiplicity. But the opposite must be
true. If one were to stand in a room fullof people and
utter a single word: flower, each one, in the room, would
hear, according to their position in the room, a different
sound, no matter how minute this difference, and yet.
thissound would be one: flower. But if Isay that the
word that was uttered is the same for everyone, I must
say that each time it was heard, the word was identical
-Ihave introduced multiplicity. But it is not so: one
word was heard differently each time, it was not heard
the same way each time. Difference belongs to unity,
and identity to multiplicity. And so when one says: the
one light of the intellect isdiffracted in the bulk into a
multiplicity of differentevents of singularization where
each singularization rests in the Oneas what grantsit its
unity and diference, it is that this bulk, this given, what
just is - it is identity. But then what does not go beyond
the given, isdead.
The given, then, is dead. But what is this death of
the given, this stale grandeur of annihilation? In the
death of thegiven, it is death itself that has become mere
givenness, towards which nothing tends, unto which
there is nothing,and which truly is nothing,nothing in
itself. In this apocatastasis, it is as if all things were inside
out, or rather, destitute and returned to their originary
meaninglessness, which really is their innocence.In this
64
 Postface

aNnOsute each thing touches the other as what it merely

ie for one is touched by nothing that is not there, and the
nothing that is here.
Nothing comes from this nothing, from this death.
rhis identity, from that which is, for there is no sublation
of the identity between nothing and what is. Only the
intellect, that absolute life and uncreated light, the
intellect shines through the darkness, and the darkness
has not and will not overcome it, for that pure light
diffracts itself into a rainbow of difference. This self
differentiation of the One as the event of the Beautiful
is what thought thinks, for it is the intellect passing
unmediated into the bulk.
But is the intellect then turned towwards the bulk,
towards the given, towards identity? If that bulk is
nothing, does the intellect seek this nothing, or is it
rather that it really lacks nothing, not even nothing?
For the intellect is pure production, infinite becoming,
and solacks absolutely nothing. That is: the intellect,
continually flourishing without any plan, is free. If its
becoming were turned towards the bulk as that which
needs to be differentiated, it would be the necessary
differentiation of the bulk, and so it would be compelled
todifferentiate the bulk, it would be unfree. How then,
proceeding as a necessity proceeds from the given, would
1t be any different from the bulk? It cannot be that the
intellect should take orders, as it were, from the bulk.
And yet: is the intellect not compelled by its nature?
For, tobe a slave to one's nature, to one's givenness,
18 compulsion, it is domination, unfreedom. Is the
intellect not a slave to what it is? No: for it is nothing
but its activity and this activity is a differential process,
65
 Ulysse Carrière

an infinite becoming. There is no compulsion in the

intellect, for it is not separated between actual and
potential, it is really one, and so its activity does not
obey itsown nature, nor does it obey anything else, but
rather, it seeks freedom. That freedom is not the intellect
itself, for it is yet greater than the intellect, it is what the
intellect seeks,and yet the intellect is free by itself, for
it freely comes to freedom; it isnot like those men one
drags kicking and screaming to liberty.
But what of this freedom to which the intellect turns?
The intellect is difference; and so it does not seek the
bulk, which isidentity, for that is not its good. Should
one then say that the intellect is production free from
identity? It appears so. But the intellect is not merely
and flatly freefrom identity: it is free to seek freedom,
and freedom iswhat it freely seeks. That is to say: the
freedom the intellect seeks, is nothing but its own
good, and nothing can be brought to its own good by
compulsion. How? Compulsion prevents one from freely
seeking their own good, rather toiling for that of another,
and so compulsion is radically evil, as a deprivation of
one'sinherent power to seek their own good, which
is their contemplation. Compulsion, domination,
oppression, all are a single revolt against the intellect,
against that absolute life and that pure light, and it is a
revolt against what the intellect turnsto, it is absolutely
fallen, utterly lost, it is less than nothing. It is reaction,
and allreaction is a turning away from the Good, for it
turns backwards to the given,to what just is, toidentity,
to the bulk, to death. And so there is no compulsion in
the intellect, and it is not compelled to seek its own good,
which is freedom.

66
 Postfuce

towards which the intellect turns,

That freedom
necessity nor chance: it is not 2
is freedom not by
necessity, nor does it just happen
to be, but rather, it
the Good, the
is absolute freedom, absolute difference,
above and
It is not an arche and no arche lords
One.
over it: it is absolute
anarchy, and what it wills, is, so
One. Shelley thus
that no compulsion issues from the
free.
writes: Whydo we fearor hope? thou art already
is its
What contemplates, turns to its own good, which
freedom, and so turning, it freely turns to the One, to
absolute freedom.

67
 Thistext leaves us with aclearing of the conceptual
ground for thinking of the Intellect as unbounded
production (as you are about to see unfold). This setting is
able to provide a meaning to acceleration as the re
linquishment of identity to itself. Allthat can be auto
mated, must be, for it already is; real acceleration derives
from the potentiality to realize that which one already
feels is at work in the now,the wirklich working its way to
the real. The tedious bone-crushing wheels of history will
never stop turning, not until they have turned the world
itself intoa purposeless engine, at which point there will
beno calculation left to execute anyway. The logic of
extinction here reveals itself as the condition for anarchic
creation to operate,as its unilateral counterpart. Instead
of giving ourselves to erotics or, Gods forbid, aesthetics as
a replacement for thought, there remains only the
immanent necessity of understanding Thinking as a
thinking of the Beautiful. (Louis Morelle, ntroduction)

ISBN 978-9925-7984-0-7

9789925798407