Lieberman IdeasInstitutionsPolitical 2002

Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change
Author(s): Robert C. Lieberman

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), pp. 697-712
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American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 4 December 2002
Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Expla

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN Columbia University
nstitutional approaches to explaining political phenomena suffer fr
reductionism, reliance on exogenous factors, and excessive empha
Ideational approaches to political explanation, while often more sen
largely exhibit the same shortcomings. In particular, both perspectives sh
and explaining patterns of ordered regularity in politics, making it hard
of political change. Relaxing this emphasis on order and viewing politics a
necessarily equilibrated order suggests a way of synthesizing institutiona
developing more convincing accounts of political change. In this view
among mismatched institutional and ideational patterns. An account of A
1960s and 1970s, which is not amenable to either straightforward institut
demonstrates the advantages of the approach.
As the time neared midnight on 10 June 1964, that we have arrived at this pass. First, developments
Everett Dirksen took the floor of the United in world politics brought ideas onto center stage. The
States Senate to conclude three months of de- end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism, and
bate on the Civil Rights Act. "It is said that on the the convergence of the world's economic and political
night he died," Dirksen said, "Victor Hugo wrote in his institutions on a new neoliberal paradigm, among other
diary substantially this sentiment: 'Stronger than all the broad shifts, signaled a profound ideological transfor-
armies is an idea whose time has come.' The time has mation in much of the world. Never mind that the so-
come," he went on, "for equality of opportunity in shar- cial sciences utterly failed to predict these phenomena;
ing in government, in education, and in employment. Itwithout reference to the ideological nature of these
will not be stayed or denied. It is here" (Congressional transformations, the new world of the twenty-first cen-
Record 1964, 13319; Whalen and Whalen 1985, 185, tury seems unfathomable and the pathways by which it
198).1 Surely equality of opportunity for all races was
arrived incomprehensible (see Anderson n.d.).
an idea of its time in the United States in 1964, well past Second, prevailing institutional approaches in po-
due according to many. But what made that particular
litical science are limited in their capacity to account
night the moment when this idea arrived, to be enteredfor the substantive course of politics. Given the raw
finally into the nation's lawbooks by vote of a venerablematerial-assumptions about actors' beliefs, prefer-
legislative body that had long resisted it? Many things ences, knowledge, understandings, and expectations-
beyond the force of the idea itself conspired to makeinstitutional theories can effectively derive predictions
this idea arrive at that place at that time: a broad andabout which outcome from among a range of contem-
vigorous social movement espousing it, political parties plated outcomes is likely to occur. But precisely be-
increasingly divided by it and consumed with it, and po-cause material approaches tend to take these things
litical institutions that were able to help its advocatesas given, they are at something of a loss to explain
build and sustain a coalition around it. How did these the appearance at any given moment of any partic-
things contribute to the triumph of the liberal ideal of ular menu of substantive choices. In the case of the
equal rights? As John Kingdon (1984, 1) asks, "What Civil Rights Act, for example, institutional theories
makes an idea's time come?"
can explain why, given the emergence of civil rights
Long dormant in the systematic study of politics, as a salient issue, Congress acted as it did. They can
ideas have staged a remarkable comeback in the social even explain why the American political system at mid-
sciences in the last 15 years or so. Indeed, the challenge
century was particularly susceptible to the appeals of
of "bringing ideas back in" to political science theandcivil rights movement. But they cannot account for
political explanation is one of the central issues now
the substantive content of civil rights demands, or of the
facing the discipline. There are a number of reasonsbeliefs and understandings that led actors to connect
these demands with a particular set of policy solutions.
Ideas,
Robert C. Lieberman is Associate Professor of Political Science and many analysts argue, can fill this explanatory
gap.
Public Affairs, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, After all, they constitute much of the substantive
420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 (RCL15@COLUMBIA.EDU). raw
material upon which institutional theory feeds-
The author thanks the Russell Sage Foundation, the German
the
Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Lyndon Baines Johnson
goals and desires that people bring to the political
Foundation for financial support and Sheri Berman, Mark Blyth, world
Bob and, hence, the ways they define and express
their interests; the meanings, interpretations, and judg-
Jervis, Ira Katznelson, Lauren Osborne, Sven Steinmo, and the editor
and anonymous reviewers for their helpful advice. ments they attach to events and conditions; and their
1 The Hugo quotation is actually a paraphrase of a passage from
beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships in the po-
his historical essay, Histoire d'un crime: Deposition d'un timoin, his
litical world and, hence, their expectations about how
vicious account of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat of 1851. The pas-
others will respond to their own behavior. To the ex-
sage reads, "On r6siste a l'invasion des arm6es; on ne r6siste pas '
l'invasion des id6es" ["The invasion of armies can be resisted; tent
the that these and other things that go on in people's
invasion of ideas cannot be resisted"] (Hugo 1987, 456). heads are not simply a function of something else in
697
Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order December 2002
true that
the political world, institutional ideational
and accounts are often more sensitive
interest-based ap-
to change
proaches will tell only a part of thethan institutional
causal story ones; ideas,
of many after all, are a
significant political phenomenamedium by (Berman
which people can 1998,
imagine a16-19).
state of affairs
other than
With these limitations in mind, the status quo
scholars and such imaginings
studying the might
role of ideas in politics have offered
plausibly spur them a
to bracing
act to try and chal-
make changes.
But
lenge to material perspectives onideasa alone do not create
number of the incentives or oppor-
grounds.
Ideational approaches challenge the
tunities for reductionism
action, of
and not all holders of alternative po-
much institutional theory, litical
which ideas act on them.assumes
often Moreover, ideational
away accounts
of political
any complexity in the substance of change typicallyas
politics, chronicle shifts from one
in spatial
models of voting or legislativeideational equilibrium to that
behavior another. collapse
political disputes typically toThere is no particular
a single dimensionshame in these faults; they
(Black
1958; Downs 1957; Krehbiel are 1988; Poole
the necessary and of
elements Rosenthal
theory building and
generalization that
1997). Ideas in politics, by contrast, are distinguish
often social science from the
complex
and multidimensional. Ideational
description accounts
of singular slicesof of human
politics experience.
also challenge the tendency of Nevertheless,
institutional this set of analytical
theories moves, to common to
take the interests and aims of both theoretical schools,
political actors comes as at some
given, cost. In particu-
whether they are determined lar,
by what Karen Orren andrationality,
individual Stephen Skowronek (1994)
group affiliation, or cultural havepatterns. Rather,
called the "iconography of order,"actors'the quest to find
coherent synchronous
understanding of their own interests is apt patterns-equilibria-in
to evolve as politi-
cal life, changes.
the ideological setting of politics often leaves political
More scientists
gener- scratching their
ally, ideational theories seem heads towhen asked to account
challenge the for political
institu- change.2
tional emphasis on structure, I suggest
aggregatefurther thatorganizational
by substantially relaxing the
or behavioral regularities, as common
the principalfocus on orderguiding
that both sets of approaches
force
behind political behavior. A focus
share, we can makeonprogress
ideas suggests,
in accommodating the two
perspectives.
rather, the possibility that human That is, ancan
agency analytic defyperspectivethethat con-
siders both
constraints of political and social institutions and
structures andideas create
as integral, endoge-
nous explanatory
new political possibilities (Smith 1992). elements, without privileging one or
These challenges zero in on thecan
the other, central shortcom-
go some distance in avoiding these traps.
ings of institutional theories Inofparticular,
politics. analysis that takes both each
Although ideas and insti-
brand of institutionalism has tutions
its own seriously will almost
blind of necessity
spots, shed light on
in their
broadest outlines they share points of friction,
these irregularities, and discontinuities that
characteristics--
reductionism, the exogeneity driveof political change. These
certain discontinuities between
fundamental
elements of political life, andseparately constituted patterns
a privileging of of institutions and ideas
structure
can lead to a reformulation
over agency. Above all, institutional theories of the incentives
share an and op-
emphasis on finding order portunities
and stability, facing politicalcomprehen-
actors and produce large-
siveness and coherence, patterns and
scale political models
change that neitherthat institutionselu- nor ideas,
considered independently,
cidate more or less general propositions aboutcan a explain.
class There of are, to
political phenomena. Because ofbe sure,
theiranalytical costs to this on
emphasis approach,
elic- particularly
the parsimony and clear
iting ordered patterns and regularities foundations
from that often char-
observa-
acterize theories
tions about politics, institutional institutional models of politics. But
in general run there are
into trouble in accounting for corresponding
political analytical
change; gains, particularly
How, af- the ability
ter all, can we explain changetoin account for major political
outcomes change, that make these
by reference
to stable causes? Any searchcosts for worththe paying. After elaborating
sources of change this critique of
both institutional
in this sort of explanatory scenario and ideational theories
inevitably leads I sketch
tothea
problem of infinite regress: To explain a change in some with
outlines of a synthesis and illustrate its possibilities
familiar state of affairs, we must
an exampleassume
taken from theandevelopment
antecedent of civil rights
change in one or more causal policy factors that were pre-
in the United States.
viously part of a stable system. But after making this
move we are left with the same IDEAS AND problem:
INSTITUTIONS: What caused
this antecedent change, if not some
COMMON CHALLENGES change farther back
in the causal chain? At some point in this sequence, the
source of change must come fromA variety outside the
of institutional system.
perspectives has come to oc-
It is one of my contentions
cupy, it is that these
fair to say, same
the ascendant position in the theo-
dilemmas-problems of reductionism,
retical pantheon ofexogeneity,
political science. Thereand is, of course,
structure envy-ironically bedevil much ideational po-
litical analysis, contrary to 2common presumptions
By "order" I refer not to the orderliness of societiesand
and
the self-professed aims of government-what
many ideational theorists
Samuel Huntington (1968, 1) defined as qualities
who define their enterprise as community,
of "consensus, a counterweight to
legitimacy, organization, effectiveness,
[and] stability"-but rather to the recognition of patterned regularity
these particular sins of institutional analysis. Above all
ideational and institutional accounts share the focus in social and political life. Some major works of social science have
focused precisely on finding order among great moments of societal
on ordered regularity that makes problems of change disorder, such as revolutions, as in the work of Barrington Moore
particularly intractable for both camps. It is certainly
(1966) and Theda Skocpol (1979).
698
American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 4
ter of causal accounts of tumultuous

a variety of "new institutionalisms" political change. sci
in political
(and the social sciencesNor more
do they fully generally), rooted
capture political developments that i
variety of methodological involveand disciplinary
basic conflicts and transformations among approac po-
from neoclassical microeconomics
litical ideas and values. Such and thespan
developments theory
the
games to macrohistorical spectrum sociology
of substantive concerns to inthe political sociolo
science:
of organizations and culture (Campbell
the rise of Keynesianism and its eclipseand Peder
by neoliberal-
2001a; Hall and Taylor ism 1996;(CampbellImmergut
and Pedersen 2001b; Hall 1998;
1989, 1993), Pow
and DiMaggio 1991; Thelen the triumph ofand color-blindSteinmo
liberal integrationism 1992).
in the
though these perspectives differ
United States in ofsignificant
over a history race-conscious oppres- w
they share a common set of
sion (Kingconcerns
2000; Smith 1997), andand assumption
the emergence of in-
particularly an interest in the
ternational way
norms in which
of multilateralism and human somerights set
out of(rules
regularities in political life Cold War realism
and(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink org
procedures,
nizational structures, norms,
1999; Sikkink cultural scripts)
1993). If institutionalism wants to shapes
remain
expression and aggregation relevant in of political
political preferences
science, it must prove itself able to
locates power and regulates its exercise,
account convincingly for these changesand there
that manifest
affects political outcomes (Immergut
themselves not simply in new policies1998).
but in fundamen-
Another characteristic tallythese
new ideologicalperspectives
bases for politics. share
a tendency to relegate ideas, The challengehowever theythere-
for institutional approaches, are c
ceived, to the sidelines fore,
in isexplanatory
to find a way to treat ideas accounts
as analytically of
litical processes (see, e.g.,
consequential Berman 1998,
in accounts of political action,14-24,
policy
Hall 1997). One extreme version
development, and of this view
institutional change, and holds
to do so th
ideas are epiphenomenal, withoutsimply
falling into theconsequences
characteristic traps that I haveof m
terial (or structural or institutional)
outlined-particularly the ad arrangements.
hockery with which insti- T
view is most clearly associated
tutional accountswith usuallycertain
appropriate ideas versions
as explana-
Marxism, but it also appearstory factors. Butinthis non-Marxist
must also be done in a way varia that
In such cases, expressions retainsof ideas
the essential in a
strengths politicalin set
of institutionalism
might be taken not as genuine
all its varieties:articulations of belief
its accounts of strategic behavior by
purposive agents
understanding but as strategic under structural constraints,
manipulation or of the
positi
taking aimed at advancing aggregation of interests, of the
an interest or distribution
pursuing and ex- a g
ercise of power, and of the
that is deemed to be fundamental social construction
(see, e.g., May of
1974). political rationality-and its ability to combine and
Even in cases where the analysis is not quite so recombine these elements and mobilize them into con-
doggedly materialist, ideas are seen as exogenous vincing causal explanations of a wide range of politi-
to the more fundamental explanatory framework. cal phenomena, from the presidential veto (Cameron
Ideas often make an appearance in institutional anal- 2000) and the political control of the bureaucracy
yses, where they serve the purpose of patching over (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987) to social rev-
lacunae in the basic explanation. This move has be- olutions (Skocpol 1979), industrial policies (Dobbin
come somewhat common in rational-choice institution- 1994), lawmaking under separated powers (Krehbiel
alism, where ideas operate as focal points that help 1998), and welfare states (Pierson 1994; Skocpol 1992).
solve game-theoretic models with multiple equilibria Our synthesis should recognize, in other words, that
(Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast 1998; Garrett and ideas are not simply tools in the hands of power-seeking
Weingast 1993). Ideas are unquestionably important strategic agents (although they can be and often are)
to such analyses, but not ideas as ideas-that is, their
(Campbell 1998).
content, valence, and intensity are less important than While institutional approaches labor under these dif-
the role they play in a causal tableau. Ideas work inficulties in trying to assimilate ideas, ideational expla-
such instances merely as devices to untangle the knottynations share many of the same blinders. Again, these
problems of institutional models; something else en-difficulties take more and less extreme forms. At the far
tering from the wings would do just as well. More extreme are accounts that posit a single, overwhelming,
generally, as Mark Blyth (1997, 231) has observed, and, above all, stable set of ideas as the driving force
"Ideas in such treatments are ultimately secondary to in politics (see, e.g., Geertz 1964 and Hartz 1955). In
the mode of analysis in which they are employed. Theirsuch accounts it is the substance of ideas that matters
definition, operationalization, and explanatory powerabove all in shaping political outcomes, whether they
are simply derivative of the wider theory in whichare coherent, logical, internally consistent, and thus
they are embedded." Although they might be impor- influential; the causal mechanisms that drive this in-
tant to particular explanations, ideas when adduced in fluence inhere in the ideas themselves. While such an
this way do not fundamentally alter the institutionalistapproach is admittedly rare in the rationalist world of
enterprise. the social sciences, functional explanations of politics
Such moves also ignore commonplace readings of often ascribe this role to political ideas; modernization
history, in which ideas often appear as the prime theory, which ascribes great importance to the logical,
movers of history. Prominent accounts of the Americanfunctional connections among the components of po-
(Bailyn 1967; Wood 1969) and French (Sewell 1985) litical systems, is a prominent example (Almond and
Revolutions, for example, have put ideas at the cen-Coleman 1960; Inglehart 1997).
699
More common are studies that

pendent emphasize
explanatory weight and he political
does not assimilate
ideas as central causal factors but
their effects give short
systematically shrift to
into his framework.
Justideas
the political settings in which as ideas are not merely strategic
become tools, political
influential
and to the causal mechanisms that influence the selec- ideas are not free-floating bits of knowledge and con-
tion among ideas in concrete political choices (Berman jecture, detached from considerations of structure and
2001). In his magisterial survey of the multiple politicalpower, that rise and fall according to the functional
traditions that have challenged liberalism for ascen- logic of the marketplace (to borrow Oliver Wendell
dancy in American politics, for example, Rogers Smith Holmes Jr.'s metaphor) or of natural selection (Abrams
(1997) places his bets squarely on ideational factors,v. United States 1919, 630-31; Mill, On Liberty, chap. 2).
Part of understanding political development and insti-
the interplay of three clusters of ideas about national
membership and civic identity, as the central factor intutional change is understanding which ideas win (or,
shaping American citizenship laws and American po-in fact, which ideas are in the arena to begin with), why,
litical development more generally. Smith (1993, 1997) and with what consequences for whom. The important
brilliantly parses the ideological currents that found point is not only where ideas come from or how they
expression in American citizenship and immigration cohere or collide but also how they come to be promi-
policy and effectively challenges the view of American nent, important, and powerful, even determinative in
culture as thoroughly suffused with egalitarian liberal-shaping political behavior and defining political ratio-
ism that has held sway from Tocqueville through Louis nality. As Sheri Berman (2001, 233) writes, "Political
Hartz and beyond (see also King 1973). These ideo- scientists must be able to explain... why some of the
logical traditions do not stand alone in Smith's work; innumerable ideas in circulation achieve prominence
like a mirror image of institutional accounts that rely in the political realm at particular moments and others
on ideas as catalytic but not constitutive, his account not. Since no intellectual vacuum ever exists, what is
presents evidence about the institutional settings in really at issue here is ideational change, how individ-
which ideas are enacted as policy-courts, legislatures, uals, groups, or societies exchange old ideas for new
administrative agencies, and the like. But these settingsones." These exchange processes, it is clear, occur at
are exogenous to his theoretical framework; they ap- the intersection of ideas and institutions, and any fully
pear conveniently as stage-setters for his interpretive convincing theory of political or institutional change
enterprise but they do not fundamentally change the must incorporate both as constituent elements with rea-
theoretical approach, limiting somewhat his theory's sonably equal weights.
capacity to explain the particular sequence of outcomes
he charts (Orren 1996a, 1996b; Smith 1996, 1999). As
ORDER, DISORDER, AND POLITICAL
Smith (1999, 25) himself notes, CHANGE
Conducive conditions are... not enough to explain out-
The most important limitation on the capacity of both
comes. To grasp how and why early American political
institutional and ideational approaches to come to grips
actors combined liberal, republican, racist, and sexist ideas
and institutions, we must go beyond a Hartzian focus on with processes of change is their common emphasis
their initial material and intellectual circumstances and on ordered, patterned regularity. It is this emphasis,
after all, that distinguishes social science from other
attend to their central political tasks. Those tasks were
not, first and foremost, the carrying on of any particu-modes of inquiry into human experience-the search
lar tradition, although many early Americans identifiedfor general patterns of behavior and interaction.3 This
with historical figures who defended personal liberties and
emphasis on order leads, as Karen Orren and Stephen
championed republican governments. American leaders
Skowronek (1994,1996,1999) argue, to a view of politi-
were most immediately concerned with using available tra-
cal development that consists of periods of stability and
ditions first to mobilize support for the Revolution, then to
coherence, of "politics as usual," punctuated by mo-
build a successful new nation, and finally to maintain and
ments of extraordinary, even transformative change,
extend it in various ways.
after which things settle back down into a reformu-
More precisely, these broad political projects posedlated pattern of ordinariness (see Baumgartner and
Jones 1993 and Carmines and Stimson 1989). Each
particular political challenges to these actors, who had
brand of institutionalism lends itself to this view: Ra-
to negotiate a distinctive and shifting institutional uni-
tional choice, with its emphasis on equilibrium and its
verse to implement them. They had to pass laws, de-
methodology of comparative statics; historical institu-
fend those laws against legal challenges, and administer
tionalism, with its focus on periodization and regimes;
them according to particular institutional rules and log-
ics that were not necessarily connected to (or in synch
with) the ideas these policies embody. These patterns
3 This minimalist definition of social science is intended to be a thor-
surely affected the sequence and substance of the out-
oughly catholic one. I do not mean to endorse a vision of social
comes Smith charts by placing power in certain handsscience that depends on the discovery of Hempelian covering laws
at certain moments, privileging certain interests over
that govern human behavior across time and space, nor do I mean
to exclude interpretive modes of inquiry such as Geertz's (1973)
others, and creating moments of opportunity for politi-
cians to act, whether out of strategic or ideological notion
or of "thick description," which, although it does not endorse
generalization across cultural milieus, nevertheless hews to an idea
some combination of motives (Kingdon 1984; Mayhew of understanding human societies by discerning regular patterns of
2000). These features of the political landscape are not
interaction and signification among their members (Merton 1949;
absent from his account, but they do not carry inde- Zuckerman 1997).
700
and sociological institutionalism, with

(1) to (2). What weits
doaccoun
not ha
taken-for-granted cultural
whymeanings
the world and scripts
changed; tht
underlie action. Although ideational
patterns theories are
of variation in of
m
more attuned to change, they
causal too tend
story abouttothe
empha
em
order and regularity. Ideas do notwe
explanation appear
might willy-n
be abl
in ideational accounts; rather,
would they
have appear in sett
to be exogen
ordered configurations that serve tothat
something organize some r
was simply
sonably broad aspect of political
since model life over
(1)'s some s
parameter
of time, whether as all-encompassing
What all of this ideologies or
abstract sy
what Berman (1998, 21-22)gest calls
is that"programmatic
the only sourceb
liefs" (see also Ecksteincount
1988).for significant polit
Both institutional andbeyond
ideational
the approaches thu
bounds of ordi
exhibit something of aterm,
bias toward finding
the detritus and
of the no
plaining stability in political arrangements.
fairs. These Each
are the things t
of approaches has developed
sideredsophisticated
irrelevant or tools
unnecef
making causal inferences order
about or the elseeffects
too wispy of stable, or et
curring patterns on political
tematic outcomes.
explanation. ThisThis bias,is h
ever, poses a problem when we are
stitutional and ideational confronted
models that focus on ordered w
significant political change.
patternsFrom a perspective
in the political world. To explain the move that e
phasizes stability and relegates
from one set ofthings thatwedo
institutions to another, not fit
need refer-
pattern to the background, theexogenous
ence to something sources of import
to an institutional model
change almost necessarily appear
of the initial to likewise
state of affairs; be for exogenous,
a shift from
result of some sort of one
shock of unknown
ideational pattern to another. The questionorigin
is how t
may or may not be assimilable by
to develop models the
of politics thatprevailing
can account for such orde
What we are after is an explanation
substantial episodes without recourse not of
to such ordin
ad hoc
predictable variation in exogenous
outcomes factors-in otherbut words,of how, extraordin
if possible, to
change, where relationships among
endogenize explanatory
multiple ordered patterns, whether based facto
themselves change. on institutions or ideas, in a single type of explanatory
To put the matter in more
framework analytical
that can help explainterms, conside
how apparently stable
a simple model of some political
institutional phenomenon:
and ideological patterns can change quite
dramatically. There are limits, of course. Not every-
Y = Po + Pl X1 +happens
thing that 2X2 + world
in the political 8.is predictable
(1)
Although the explanatory and consequential
factors, thingsX1happen andthat are quite simply
X2, vary,
model describes a stable beyond the reach of any
pattern ofreasonable model-singular
relationships
tween these factors and events
thesuch as assassinations, for example.
outcome, Y; when Thus we X1
X2 varies by a certain cannot
amount,hope to endogenizeY everything.
changes Nevertheless,
by a p
there does not seem
dictable amount, as described byto be any
the a prioriparameters,
reason why both
and ,2. Anything we do ideas not observe
and institutions, neither of whichor cannot
has such singular m
character, cannot both
sure or consider unnecessary to beexplain
incorporated into reasonable,
the outc
is bundled in the error tractable
term, modelse. of politics.
This model describ
stable pattern, and we can Onetest
way out itsof thisexplanatory
bind is to relax the emphasispower
observing variation on on theorder and regularity in modeling politics.
independent The al-
variables
ternative need not be chaos.
comparing the model's predictions with Rather, we can consider
actual states
the world under a varietythat anyof political moment or episode or But
conditions. outcome is consi
situated
that, for some reason, the within a variety
pattern of ordered institutional
changes, and
requiring
new model to describe ideological
the same patterns, each with its own origins and his-
phenomenon:
tory and each with its own logic and pace (Orren
Y = P3 + -4X- and Skowronek
+ P5sX2 1994, 1996). These
+, patterns,
F it(2) is often
metaphorically said, "take on
This model describes a new set of stable regularities, lives of their own"; that
which the variables are is,the
they come to structure
same and delimit
but the political interests,
relations
understandings, andhave
among them are different-we behavior independently
new paramet of other
factors that might also
64 and fs, in place of the original ones. Now we be important. It is common in h
useful models of two situations, before and after som
transformative change that has altered not just the c
(1) to (2). This eventuality, however, would not change the funda-
ditions that produce some
mental pointoutcome
and would in fact deepen(what
the conundrum that I descr
I am
above as ordinary variation)
illustrating. but the very causal p
5 I offer this
cess at work in producing thestylizedoutcome
example not to suggest, (extraordin
as some have (King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994), that the statistical reasoning represented
change).4 We might even have a description of wh
therein is any kind of gold standard for social scientific inference but
ever happened at the moment of the
rather to demonstrate transformation
distinction I am making between explain- fro
ing stability and explaining change and to point to the need for more
4 For simplicity's sake, I have not considered the possibility that some configurative models of politics that embrace a multiplicity of causal
new variable, X3, may have entered the mix in the transition from elements (Katznelson 1997).
701
resolution,analysis
both institutional and ideational presenting actors
towith contradictoryof
conceive and
multidirectional
political order in holistic terms. A imperatives
political and opportunities.
"order," in
These considerations
this mode, is a regular, predictable, and immediately shift attention
interconnected
pattern of institutional and ideological
away from arrangements
any particular regularity and onto the ten-
that structures political lifesion
inor a
complementarity
given place among patterns that might
at a given
time-"a durable mode of organizing
more plausibly drive the and
dynamicsexercising
of political devel-
opment. If we
political power.., .with distinct picture politics as occurring
institutions, in mul-
policies,
tiple concurrent
and discourses," as David Plotke orders, it isdefines
(1996,1) in the frictionit between
(see
also Skowronek 1993). Such orders
anthat we may more
order might readily find
have the seeds
mul-of
tiple institutional and ideological
change within the components,
politics of any given moment.which
Samuel
shape and constrain political action
Huntington by just
(1981) identifies providing in-
such friction, between
centives, opportunities, andpolitical ideals and the performance
grounds of political insti-
for legitimation
tutions, as the presumption
to political actors. An important motive force behind American behindpolit-
ical development;
this approach is that a political when the gap
"order" isbetween ideals and
internally
institutionsthat
coherent. This definition implies grows large
the enough, he argues, of
effects periods
theof
"creedal passion"
component parts are cumulative and occur in which institutional
mutually reinforc- practices
are reformed
ing, that they generally point most to align
actorsmore closely
in the with the
sameideals.
(or at least complementary) Huntington's
directions approachmost
suggests the
ofimportance
the time. of the
lack conflict,
(This is not to say there is no of fit among multiple
only ideological
that and institutional
conflicts
are fundamentally stable andorders aspredictable
an important motor ofand political change (al-
tend to
be contained and resolved though
within it is unclear
the what the causal mechanism
normal political is).
But hisorder
processes that constitute the view of these
inorders, particularly accord-
question of ideas, is
ing to generally agreed upona relatively
or static one, in which a constant under-
conventionally set of po-
litical ideas-the
stood rules and expectations.) As an American Creed-serves as
analytical a fixed
strategy
point to which this
for explaining political outcomes, politicalapproach
institutions andpre- practices ar
sumes that other factors aretetherednot so that, like a pendulum, they
consequential return with
enough
certain
to create sufficiently strong mechanical regularity
incentives for actors and periodicity
to de- toward
a central
viate from what appear to be the location. Political ideas and
"normal" institutions are of
workings
politics. not fixed, however. Certain ideological constructions,
There is no reason to presume, however, that the at the level of Huntington's Creed (or culture, or ide-
ideological and institutional currents that prevail at any ology, or tradition)-the ideals of liberty and equality,
given time or place are necessarily connected with each for example-have a very long life span and can de-
other in any coherent or functional way. This is true for fine enduring boundaries that a nation's politics will
a number of reasons. First, political arrangements are rarely, if ever, cross (Greenstone 1993). But ideas at
rarely, if ever, the products of a coherent, total vision this level do not offer a concrete guide to understand-
of politics that informs institutions and ideas and knits ing the more precise pathways a country's political de-
them together into a unified whole (and even in times velopment might take. Many particular programmatic
and places that approach this extreme-revolutionary beliefs might be consistent with these broad bound-
France, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany-politics re- ary conditions, and these ideas might change more
mains subject to multiple, discordant forces). Rather, quickly. Moreover, the interpretation and framing even
they are inevitably the products of compromise, partial of deeply rooted ideas might change over time, so that
and circumscribed, incoherent and jury-rigged, rarely concepts such as "liberty" or "equality" might be in-
if ever sweeping away the detritus of a previous or- voked to support very different practices in different
der to construct a new one. New policies, institutional contexts by people who all the while believe themselves
arrangements, or ideological paradigms thus do not to be upholding a timeless and unchanging political tra-
replace the old but are layered atop prior patterns, dition. Similarly, some institutional features of politics
creating what Jeffrey Tulis (1987, 17-18) has called a are relatively stable over long stretches of time, while
"layered text." Second, such arrangements are often others are less fixed and more variable. If we unmoor
the products of some past event, so that while insti- both sets of factors from overly general assumptions
tutions, policies, or sets of ideas might have arisen in about their fixity and stability, new patterns of order
response to particular historical circumstances, they of- and change may well emerge into view.
ten outlast the conditions that led to their creation and
As an example of this analytical dilemma, consider
may persist despite being dysfunctional (North 1990).pluralism and consensus historiography, which dom-
Consequently the ideological and institutional orders inated American social science in the aftermath of
that prevail at any given time or place are unlikely to beWorld War II. This approach, exemplified by such
connected with each other in any coherent or functional scholars as Louis Hartz (1955), Richard Hofstadter
way. There may be instances in which ideological and(1948), and David Truman (1971), offered a view of
institutional patterns "fit" together and cumulate into American politics in which ideology, institutions, and
something that looks like an equilibrium (on the notion behavior were fundamentally aligned with one an-
of "fit" see Skocpol 1992). At other times, however,other. Liberal individualism, skepticism toward the
they will collide and chafe, creating an ungainly con- state, the separation of powers, and a commitment to
figuration of political circumstances that has no cleara set of "rules of the game" all went together to create
702
a unified and ordered whole,about thein which

central ideas,
causes of change, the keyinstitu-
contextual
tions, and interests reinforced onepatterns
factors and political another toto produce
that are likely generate
a frictionless politics of incremental adjustment
friction in the political environment and
will be well known
group accommodation, devoid of intense,
and this is unlikely polarizing,
to be a source of bias in the analysis
(see Lustick
and destabilizing institutional or 1996). Second, the characteristics
ideological confronta- of the
tions (Bell 1960). But this major
schoolsources ofof thought
political order are alsolacked
well known,the
capacity to explain the convulsive changes
through the extensive literatures oninideasAmerican
and institu-
politics in the 1960s, such as
tionsthe civil
and their rights
effects that revolution,
I have already discussed. It
which mounted a profound challenge
is important to note that theto the
approach pluralist
I outline here is
picture of order, consensus,not and
a substitute for work that theorizes about ordertype
functionality-the or
of untidy change that Truman (1971,
discerns and explains xliv,
ordered patterns 524) called
in the political
(with more than a little horror) "the
world, whether whirlwind."
institutional Even
or ideational. In fact, this
writers in this school who recognized
synthesis can only build on thethe civil
advances that haverights
been
challenge, such as Gunnar made Myrdal (1944),
in the last generation by both could
institutionalnot
and
conceive of racism and segregation
ideational theorists and as anything
depends other
on the continuation
than mistakes, deviations, somehow
and expansion external
of these research programs (seeto the
Fiorina
American political tradition
1996). (Smith 1993, 1997). But
an alternative perspective understands the
Thus finding the multiple political orders civil
that com- rights
transformations of the 1950s and 1960s not as alien to bine and potentially clash to produce change is no great
the American political tradition but as outgrowths mystery.
of In general, there will be a finite number of
many of the very ideological and institutional struc- components that will constitute the field of inquiry,
tures that are constitutive of it: an ideology of equal what we might call the dimensions of disorder (or order,
rights; political mobilization and organization; pressure as the case might be). These can be described in three
on policymakers through the courts, electoral politics, clusters, each of which is a familiar presence in political
and other institutional venues, and so forth (Klinkner analysis. The first cluster comprises governing institu-
and Smith 1999; McAdam 1982). In this view, the civil tions, whether the conventional institutions of states
rights revolution arose from a clash among elements (legislatures, executives, courts, bureaucracies), inter-
of the American political system rather than an unex- national organizations, or other governance arrange-
plainable exogenous shock. ments. The second cluster comprises the organizational
The central hypothesis that emerges from this dis- environment, such as political parties and party sys-
cussion is that where friction among multiple political tems, the organization of interests, nongovernmental
orders is more prevalent, the likelihood of significant, organizations, and the like. The third cluster comprises
extraordinary political change (as opposed to normal the ideological and cultural repertoires that organize
variation) will increase. Note that this formulation and
is legitimate political discourse.
not necessarily about friction between ideas and in- Each of these sets of factors generates incentives
stitutions, although it may take this form, but aboutand opportunities and defines repertoires of legitimate
friction among ordered political patterns however con-moves for political actors. Measuring friction, then, is a
stituted, whether institutional or ideational. Institutions
matter of deriving, from the historical record, accounts
can clash with each other, as can ideas. The essential of these incentives, opportunities, and repertoires that
point is to decompose the notion of a single, encompass-arise from multiple sources of political order and im-
ing political "order" into its component parts, whateverpinge simultaneously on the same set of actors. What
form they happen to take, to judge the extent to which is important is the "directionality" of these incentives.
they overlap or conflict, and, finally, to assess whether
Where they point mostly or predominantly in one direc-
the disjunction among them plausibly generates im- tion, at least for most actors most of the time, the result
portant political change. It is an important advantage
will likely be political stability. Friction, on the other
of this approach that it can consider both institutions
hand, occurs when they point in substantially differ-
and ideas as building blocks of an explanation for po-
ent directions, especially where they subject the same
litical change, but it need not do so if the important
sets of actors to conflicting pressures that pose acute
motors of change in a given case fall on one side or dilemmas and make conventional moves untenable. In
other of the ideas-institutions divide. such circumstances, significant political change is more
The challenge of identifying and measuring friction likely to result.
among orders is a serious one. As the pluralism exam- The structure of the multiple-orders argument draws
ple demonstrates, different analysts can find order and significantly on parallels with Paul Pierson's (1993,
disorder in the same material. Most important to the 2000a) work on policy feedback and path dependence.
enterprise is simply the careful historical reconstruction Pierson has called attention to processes by which polit-
of the relevant elements of the political setting of the ical decisions made at particular moments can become
moment under consideration-a policy debate, an era self-reinforcing, making change difficult and costly
in political history, whatever the unit of analysis might even when the policies or institutions become dysfunc-
be. This is not as biased and ad hoc an approach as it tional (North 1990). The causal process in Pierson's
sounds at first blush. First, most episodes of important framework involves the "locking-in" of policies or
political change have already been the subject of vo- other political arrangements through processes of
luminous historical analysis; even if analysts disagree learning, the coordination and organization of political
703
normal
activity, and the adaptation of order of politics is unsettled
expectations. rather than
Political ac-change
tors, whose interests and understandings
per se. Such friction, it is
ofimportant
the to political
note, need not
actually
world are increasingly likely to produce substantial change.
be aligned with Thethese
Clinton ad-
arrangements, act to protect ministration's
them. This health policy effort of 1993-94,
approach, for exam-
with
ple, was a moment
its emphasis on order and regularity, when a variety
is thus of institutional and
particularly
ideological quo
successful at explaining the status currents-electoral
bias ofpolitics,many interest-group
po-
configurations,
litical arrangements, as in Pierson's policy legacies,
(1994) own and analysis
ideas flowing from
of the surprising resiliencethe
ofhealth policy community,
welfare policiesamong in
otherthe
things-
face of strong political andcombined to make the status
ideological quo seem untenable
pressures forand
retrenchment (Wood 2001).to make dramatic policy innovation seem possible, if
not probable
Although the path-dependence (Hacker 1997; Peterson
framework 1998; Skocpol
is espe-
1996).
cially well suited to explaining That Clinton's effortits
continuity, failedfocus
does not diminish
on the
the unfolding of political processes over politics
importance of understanding time draws
in terms of over-
lapping orders; rather,
attention to the particular mechanisms byit which
underscores polit-
the importance
ical processes reinforce themselves
of identifying suchand
momentsconsequently
of prospective choice and
provide an important opening to when
opportunity the new study of genuinely
directions seem politi- avail-
able and tracing
cal change (Pierson 2000b; Thelen the choices
1999; Woodactors make under these
2001).
circumstances.
In particular, its causal approach-its attention to the
incentives, opportunities, and This perspective presents
repertoires that politics as a process that
prevail-
ing structures construct for maypolitical
have stable elements but contains within itself
actors-provides
a useful guide to the causal the seeds of change, much
mechanisms like Joseph
that Schumpeter's
underlie
the multiple-orders approach. (1950, The
83) notion of "creative
causal destruction," which
sequence, in he
which actors adapt to existingcalled "the essential factarrangements
political about capitalism." In this pic-
ture, Schumpeter
and behave in response to them, argues, "analysis
is parallel, butof what
withhappens in
the recognition that at any any particular
given part of [the economy]-say,
moment, politicsinis an in-
situated on multiple "paths," dividual
each concern
of which or industry-may
contributesclarify details of
to the array of the choices mechanism
available to actors.
but is inconclusive When
beyond that." Similarly,
these paths are consonant with the multiple-orders
one another, approach when
suggests that political life
they
point actors in complementary directions,
thus rarely the that
settles into stable patterns result
persist un-
may be stability and incrementalism; when
changing for long periods; rather, they arefruit-
it may be more
ful to regard
not, rather than self-reinforcing politics in terms
patterns of systems, as Robert
of "lock-in,"
the result will more likely be Jervis (1997) argues, in
instability andwhichuncertainty
multiple sets of intercon-
nected relationaland
among actors about how to formulate patterns interact. Analytically,
pursue their this
political aims. turn suggests a move toward a more configurative and
Thus the causal mechanism linking structural fric- relational approach to political change, which focuses
tion and political change is the reformulation of the "less on the causal importance of this or that vari-
incentives and opportunities for individual political able contrasted with others but more on how variables
action that friction produces-the discontinuities be- are joined together in specific historical circumstances"
tween the expectations generated by the "orders" con- (Katznelson 1997, 99).
sidered individually and new opportunities presented Much path-breaking work on political change takes
by the "system" (conceived as a complex of individual something like this approach. In his important account
"orders"). When stable patterns of politics clash, pur- of changing institutional rules in the U.S. Congress,
posive political actors will often find themselves at an Eric Schickler (2001) develops a model of "disjointed
impasse, unable to proceed according to the "normal" pluralism," in which different interests drive the
patterns and processes that had hitherto governed their process of building coalitions for congressional reform
behavior. Political ideas and interests that had formerly at different times, and various reforms adopted to serve
prevailed might no longer find outlets in the same in- different purposes are layered atop one another. "By
stitutional settings, or institutions might no longer be disjointed," he writes, "I mean that the dynamics of
able to resolve (or even paper over) clashes of ideas as institutional development derive from the interactions
before. Political actors in such circumstances will often and tensions among competing coalitions promoting
be induced to find new ways to define and advance theirseveral different interests. These interactions and
aims, whether by finding a new institutional forum that tensions are played out when members of Congress
is more receptive to their ideas or by adapting ideas to adopt a single institutional change, and over time
take advantage of new institutional opportunities. Theas legislative organization develops through the
result of these moves is not that old orders are jetti-accumulation of innovations, each sought by a different
soned but that elements of them are recombined and coalition promoting a different interest" (Schickler
reconfigured into a new set of political patterns that is 2001, 4; original emphasis). The result is a dynamic
recognizably new and yet retains some continuity with process of reform and development, in which members
the old ones (much as Tocqueville [1955] described theof Congress continually find themselves dissatisfied
aftermath of the French Revolution). with their institutional setting, but for shifting reasons
One key to this explanatory strategy is the open-as both interests and institutions evolve. No reform
ness and unpredictability of these moments when theis ever complete in that it does not sweep away old
704
rules to create a new, self-contained, the act's passage, the UnitedcoherentStates had adoptedorder,
just
and it is the constant friction this approach, having among procedural
developed an extensive set of
rules, organizational structure, and members'
race-conscious, group-based policies and practicesgoals
that
that drives the developmental process
offer compensatory advantagesforward.
to members of histor-
Several recent works in the ically ideational camp
or currently disadvantaged also take
groups-known col-
this approach (although lectively rather lessaction.
as affirmative self-consciously)
In his account of the transition This transition,
from from aKeynesianism
convergence on color- to
monetarism in Britain, Peter blindness to an embrace(1993)
Hall of race-conscious remedies how
shows
a process of social learning created
for discrimination friction
(ambivalent not
and controversial, to bejust
within the Keynesian paradigm that
sure), poses a sharp dominated
challenge for both ideational policy
and
but between the shifting ideological institutional explanatory milieu and
approaches. the in-
Color-blindness,
stitutional structure of British as John Skrentny
economic (1996) has policymaking.
pointed out, is part of
What made the ideological drift from
the taken-for-granted ideologicalKeynesianism
and cultural fabric of
toward monetarism particularly American political influential
life: the principle that in funda-
individuals
mentally remaking policy was
should not
be judged andjust affordedthe ideologica
opportunity without
triumph of a new paradigm reference but the
to their race (or difficulties
any other irrelevant char- that
ideational change posed for institutional
acteristic). How, then, did Americanactors-the
policy effectively
Treasury, the Bank of England, turn away from the Cabinet.
this powerful Similarly
idea and embrace its op-
Kathleen McNamara (1998) posite,locates
even after major the causes
legislation effectivelyfor
affirmed the
success of monetary union and institutionalized
in Europe the notion at of color-blindness
the intersec- in
tion of shifting policy ideas and
national policythe
(Bursteinincreasingly
1985)? At the same time, brittle
the
structure of international economic institutions. These agency created to enforce the Civil Rights Act's vision
works show how the disjunction among differently con- of color-blind policy-the Equal Employment Oppor-
stituted political orders, both ideational and institu- tunity Commission (EEOC)-was given no effective
tional, can drive processes of political development. enforcement power and was relegated to a sideline role
as conciliator and investigator. It could neither order
remedies for discrimination nor file lawsuits. Moreover,
IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN the EEOC was embedded in a fragmented and decen-
RACE POLICY tralized state that frustrated the aims of civil rights ad-
vocates who sought vigorous enforcement. And yet the
"weak"
As an illustration of how the overlay of ideological and American state not only proved surprisingly
institutional patterns can generate dramatic and un- at devising means of enforcing antidiscrimina-
effective
expected political change, I sketch an exampletion from
law, but also managed to challenge the color-blind
American political development, the history of race
presumptions of its own law and to forge an extensive
policy in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. The of race-conscious policies and practices that
network
trajectory of race policy provides ample demonstration have proven strikingly resilient in the face of political
of the potential of a multiple-orders approach and legal challenges.
to ex-
plain outcomes that seem to defy analysis in terms of
Analytically, then, the puzzle is that neither ideas
stability and order. In this section, I begin by (the outlin-
apparent triumph of color-blindness in 1964) nor
ing the puzzle that civil rights policy presents, namely, institutions (the apparent weakness of the civil rights
the surprising emergence of affirmative action. Ienforcementthen apparatus) predict the emergence of af-
sketch the institutional and ideological contexts that action in any kind of way that makes sense.
firmative
seemed to make this development unlikely. Finally, NeitherI approach even comes close; both would lead us
show how affirmative action arose out of the tension to expect anemic enforcement, color-blindness because
created by this particular configuration of elements by it rules out collective, compensatory hiring policies and
inducing actors to behave in ways that defied the expec- institutional weakness because it leaves the state with
tations of more linear models of policy development. little or no coercive power to enforce the law. In statis-
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 adopted an explicitly tical parlance, the signs on the parameters are wrong.
color-blind approach to prohibiting racial discrimina- Answering this puzzle thus demands a perspective
tion in employment: Title VII of the act outlawed de-that can account for the development of rather dra-
liberate, individual acts of discrimination such as the matic change out of political elements that seem to
refusal to hire or promote individuals because of theirpoint toward stability. The development of civil rights
race. In doing so, the act appeared explicitly to rule out policy was situated in several ideational and institu-
an alternative, race- and group-conscious approach to tional orders simultaneously. Ideologically, the debates
recognizing and remedying discrimination in the work- over civil rights represented the culmination of a long-
place. It refused to recognize so-called "statistical dis-standing debate in American political and intellectual
crimination" (the inference of discrimination from the life between color-blind and race-conscious visions of
mismatch between an employers' proportion of minor- American society. On one hand, the American liberal
ity employees and the proportion of minorities in thetradition demanded color-blindness-the idea that race
local labor force) and refused to sanction group-basedis irrelevant to citizenship and that the law, the state,
remedies for discrimination, such as targets or quotasand public policy should make no distinctions between
for the hiring of minorities. And yet within 10 years ofpersons on account of skin color. The color-blind vision
705
of civil rights policy invoked the

pivotal deeply
position rooted process
in the policymaking tradi- (Carmines
tions of individual rights and and Stimson
equality 1989; Katznelson,
beforeGeiger, the andlaw Kryder
(Skrentny 1996, 7). This idea 1993).
has These
a long intellectual
characteristics lin- and par-
of congressional
tisan politics
eage in civil rights policy, dating underscored
at least a deep sectional
to 1896, when split that
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in his dissent in had long been a central structural feature of American
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896, 559) that "our Constitution politics and prevented Congress from passing any civil
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes rights legislation from 1875 until 1957 (Bensel 1984;
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens Key
are 1949). Third, civil rights policy was made in the
equal before the law." But Harlan wrote as the lone context of a chronically weak and fragmented state,
in which civil rights authority, such as it was, was
voice against a decision that, in fact, validated an alter-
native vision of civil rights policy, an ascriptive tradi-
already divided among a number of different adminis-
tion of racism that had long challenged liberalism trative
for agencies, most of whom lacked coercive author-
ascendancy in American politics (Smith 1997). In this ity. Moreover, the federal civil rights establishment was
view, race was not only a legitimate but an essential
steeped in the color-blind model of antidiscrimination
political category, and in Plessy's wake racial distinc-
policy (Skrentny 1996, 34). These institutional factors
tions could be (and were frequently) invoked to protect
did not augur well for significant change in civil rights
white supremacy and state-sponsored segregation. policy; rather, they tended to pull policy toward the
Not surprisingly, the race-conscious ideological tra-
status quo or, at least, to foreclose all but incremental
moves toward color-blindness.
dition was not popular among civil rights advocates for
much of the twentieth century. But in debates over Two other elements of the institutional context, how-
how to prevent racial discrimination in such spheres ever, looked more promising. The first was the cycli-
as education, commerce, and employment, it became cal pattern of American presidential elections. Both
increasingly clear that a straightforward color-blindKennedy and then Lyndon Johnson needed to balance
approach would not suffice, because in any context, the electoral demands of Southern whites and North-
simply treating race as irrelevant would not outweighern blacks, each of whom was an essential piece of the
the effects of past discrimination that left many, ifDemocratic
not coalition. Consequently, civil rights leg-
most, African-Americans ill equipped to take advan- islation posed both challenges and opportunities for
tage of the opportunities that color-blindness might building a reelection coalition in 1964 (Miroff 1981).
offer. Beginning in the 1940s with the Fair Employ- Civil rights posed similar challenges and opportunities
ment Practices Commission and continuing through the for Richard Nixon in his own presidential bids, as he
1950s, civil rights advocates and public officials con-
sought to pry the South loose from the Democrats'
cerned with racial equality began to debate whether grip while also competing for minority votes (Frymer
race-conscious means were necessary to achieve man- and Skrentny 1998). For all of these presidents, civil
ifestly color-blind ends (Burstein 1985; King 1995, rights offered an opportunity for distinctive and bold
208-9; Kryder 2000, 88-132; Skrentny 1996, 114-17). action, although one that had to be handled gingerly
(Skowronek 1993). The second such factor, and what
This dilemma found felicitous expression in the phrase
"affirmative action," which was included almost casu-made civil rights an irresistible political force for these
ally in an executive order issued by President John presidents, was the civil rights movement, which em-
E Kennedy in March 1961. The phrase was intended braced race-consciousness in a double sense, both em-
not to supplant the order's fundamentally color-blindbodying it in its embrace of race as a collective political
purpose (to ensure nondiscrimination by federal gov- identity and championing it as a policy paradigm.
ernment contractors) but to supplement it, indicating The conflict and ambivalence among these contend-
vaguely that employers ought to take extra steps ing
toinstitutional and ideological forces, particularly
ensure that hiring was not biased but not indicating between color-blind and race-conscious visions of an-
how they were to go about this (Graham 1990, 40-43; tidiscrimination policy, were played out first in con-
Kennedy 1961; Skrentny 1996, 114). Thus the debate gressional deliberations over the Civil Rights Act of
surrounding the Civil Rights Act occurred on ideolog-1964. Civil rights advocates embraced a policy vision
ical terrain defined by two competing paradigms, eachthat coupled a race-conscious approach with strong
regulatory enforcement by the federal government by
of which had a deep intellectual legacy as well as insti-
tutionally powerful proponents. creating a new agency with the power to uncover and
These debates took place in several nested institu-
prohibit broad patterns of discrimination by employ-
ers. This approach was opposed not only by Southern
tional settings. They were played out, first, in a Congress
still dominated, as it had been for much of the twenti-Democrats, who were almost-unanimous in their unal-
eth century, by Southern Democrats, who wielded dis- terable opposition to any federal action on civil rights,
proportionate power through a variety of procedural but also by Republicans, who mistrusted the expansion
and organizational mechanisms (such as the filibusterof state power it entailed, and the Kennedy adminis-
in the Senate) and who were by and large committed tration, which could ill afford to alienate the South.
A somewhat stripped-down bill passed the House in
to protecting their region's autonomy in racial matters
(Key 1949). Second, they were shaped by a party sys- February 1964, only to run into a three-month fili-
tem in which race was playing an ever-growing role. buster in the Senate. The act's final form was the prod-
In particular, the Democratic party was increasingly uct of a compromise between Senate Republicans and
divided over civil rights, leaving Republicans in Northern
the Democrats, with the blessing of the Johnson
706
among others. The model

administration. The compromise, of enforcement implied
brokered bybySen
minority leader Everett Dirksen,
the law's resolved
color-blind ideological approach was both
one of t
ideological and the institutional
retrospective judgment,questions that w
in which deliberate individual
at the center of the debate. Ideologically,
acts of discrimination could be adjudicatedthe
and pun-Dirk
compromise fell squarely ished
in after the fact.color-blind
the But-and here is the criticalcamp,
source de
ing discrimination as a deliberate
of friction in the civilindividual
rights enforcement regime-the
act and a
law out
parently explicitly ruling did not throw the state's institutional
collective, race-conscioweight be-
hind
remedies. Institutionally, thethis enforcement
compromise model: The EEOC could in-
substantial
hollowed out the enforcement authority
vestigate and conciliate of
in individual cases; thethe
Justice
EEOC (Graham 1990).Department could bring lawsuits, but only in "pattern-
Although the Civil Rights
or-practice"Act certainly
cases where it could documentcounts
systematic,
dramatic political change,
rather it
than was in many
simply individual, ways
discrimination; con
and, after
nant with much that hadJohnson's
come Executive
before,Order 11246
both in 1965,
inthe Labor
its em
brace of color-blindness Department
and incould its threaten to rescind federal contracts
withholding of str
when it from
coercive enforcement power could document
the discrimination (Graham 1990,
state. Moreove
by establishing an apparently
180-87; Johnsonconsistent
1965; Skrentny 1996,and coher
133-34). No arm
set of ideological and institutional parameters
of the federal government possessed the power for
to en-
rights policy, it seemed poised
force the central to lock
employment antidiscrim
discrimination aim of the
tion enforcement into a pattern
Civil Rights Act. of weak
Color-blind enforcemen
antidiscrimination policy,
Looking at the situation focused on punishing particular
prospectively from individual
the instances
vant of
point of 1964, there are several by
discrimination compelling
employers, failed to institutio
take hold not pri-
and ideational reasons to expect
marily because this
of a lack outcome. First w
of consensus on color-blindness
the lack of state power. as The
a goal butEEOC
because the could neither
institutional setting of civilor
employers not to discriminate rights enforcement nor effortssue them.
provided weak supportThe for
ond was the fragmentation this model. of state power. The E
was only one among a veritable alphabet
More particularly, this mismatch between soup
the ideol-of c
rights agencies in the federal ogy embedded in government, each w
the Civil Rights Act and the institu-
its own turf and resources. tional capacity
It was, that it created
likeaffected the incentives age
all federal
cies, subject to the oversight of both
and opportunities of politicalthe
actors inpresident
the civil rights a
Congress, which remained field.subject
For presidents, to
first Johnson
the same and then Richard
elector
and partisan forces that had
Nixon, produced
it posed a political dilemma. the
Vigorouscomprom
enforce-
in the first place. A result ment would of ineffectual
please the act's supporters andbureaucr
assuage
enforcement subject to contending the still vigorous forces interests and poli
of the civil rights movement
cal interference would not have been at all inconsistent but would displease Johnson's fellow Southerners and
with other regulatory initiatives in this period, as insti-other skeptics of strong state civil rights authority. On
tutional theory has frequently confirmed (Fiorina 1977; the other hand, a White House task force in June
Moe 1987, 1989). Finally, the Civil Rights Act insti-1964 doubted "that the bill will make for sufficient
tutionalized color-blindness, writing its presumptionsor sufficiently rapid progress as far as the Negro and
quite explicitly into the law. Both the institutional and a good part of the white community is concerned
the ideational settlements of 1964 seemed to create a to placate the forces that have gathered over the
past years."6 The Johnson administration responded
new status quo, a new equilibrium, that would carry for-
ward, and analytical perspectives that emphasize eitherby temporizing--first by delaying appointing EEOC
institutions or ideas as constraints on political behav-
commissioners, then by only half-heartedly supporting
moves in Congress to expand the EEOC's power, and,
ior or on ordered patterns in political life would expect
this equilibrium to endure. None of these factors points
finally, by developing and then shelving a plan to re-
toward the emergence of a strong, race-conscious quire an- minority hiring targets of federal contractors (the
tidiscrimination enforcement mechanism. "Philadelphia Plan") (Graham 1990, 177-79, 278-97).7
And yet emerge it did. The momentary resolution Nixon faced a similar dilemma. On one hand,
embodied by the Dirksen compromise generated fric- he hoped to pursue a "Southern strategy," winning
tion among its ideological and institutional elements
traditionally Democratic white Southern votes. On
that deflected antidiscrimination policy from the path the other hand, he had to do something; he could
it seemed most likely to take. In particular, the Dirksennot ignore the prevailing (if precarious) civil rights
compromise produced a critical mismatch between the
ideological underpinnings of antidiscrimination policy
6 Task Force Issue Paper, Civil Rights, 17 June 1964, Office Files of
and the institutional capacity created to enforce it. In
Lee C. White, Box 3, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereafter cited as
general, this friction arose because, despite the com-LBJL).
promise, the Civil Rights Act established strong ex- 7 Memorandum, Lee C. White to Johnson, 28 September 1964, LE,
pectations that the federal government would act to White House Central File, Box 167, LBJL; Memorandum, Lee C.
combat employment discrimination, expectations that White to Johnson, 5 October 1965, Civil Rights during the Johnson
Administration, 1963-1969: A Collection from the Holdings of the
shaped the outlooks and interests of presidents and
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, part 1, reel 5; Memorandum,
members of Congress, bureaucrats in the EEOC andRamsey Clark to Joseph Califano, 1966 Task Force Report, Legisla-
elsewhere, and advocates in the civil rights movement, tive Background, Civil Rights Act of 1964, LBJL.
707
consensus in the rest of the of affirmative

country action in theby
form of the same kind of the
burying
problems of employment discrimination hiring targets imposed by the Philadelphia Plan. In
enforcement
(see Skowronek 1993). Although particular, these groups
given thewere equipped to
party's undertake
right
turn on civil rights in the early
the fight 1960s
for affirmative a on
action Republican
the local level. De-
administration was perhaps spitean unlikely
the mass champion
national mobilization of
that characterized
strong federal enforcement,the civil rights
Nixon hadera, the
inattempts
fact to bypass the
long wor- perva-
ried that the United States's record on race relations sive localism of African-American politics-in the civil
weakened its international position in the Cold War rights movement, the War on Poverty, and the courts-
(Dudziak 2000). He opposed expanding the EEOC's did not ultimately forge firm political links between
power and eventually engineered and signed compro- African-Americans and the national state. Despite (or
perhaps because of) overwhelming electoral support
mise legislation in 1972 that gave it the power to file law-
suits (although not to issue regulatory cease-and-desist for Democratic candidates, African-Americans found
orders). Most important, however, Nixon resurrected themselves political captives of an increasingly in-
the Philadelphia Plan, throwing the weight of the exec- different party at the national level (Frymer 1999).
utive branch behind race-conscious antidiscrimination Instead, African-American political organization flour-
policy with the power of coercive sanctions behindishedit at the local level in the late 1960s and early
(Skrentny 1996, 137-39, 193-211). This move-a form 1970s, continuing the traditional pattern of linkages be-
of affirmative action as we know it today-allowed tween African-Americans and the state. But whereas
Nixon to support enforcement efforts in the North these historical patterns of diffusion, decentralization,
and local attachment had long been sources of weak-
while soft-pedaling the issue in the South (where he was
simultaneously winning credit with his vigorous oppo-ness for the political fortunes of African-Americans,
sition to school busing) and to drive a wedge between in the present context they were, ironically, sources of
African-Americans and labor unions, two pillars of the
strength. In particular, federated organizations such as
Democratic party's constituency. It thus proved an apt the NAACP and its Legal Defense Fund could col-
vehicle for Nixon to negotiate his complex partisan, laborate with the EEOC in pursuing race-conscious
sectional, and electoral situation. remedies for employment discrimination in a variety
For other actors as well, the ideological-institutionalof local-level forums (Greenstone and Peterson 1973;
mismatch of the new civil rights regime presented op- Lieberman 1998; Morone 1990, chap. 6; Skocpol, Ganz,
portunities as well as constraints. The unfortunate exec- and Munson 2000).
utives and bureaucrats of the EEOC found themselves The principal institutional arenas for these activi-
in a nearly impossible position. Expected to enforce the ties were collective bargaining between union locals
law but left essentially powerless to do so, the EEOC and employers and lawsuits in the federal courts; both
had to find other outlets to fulfill its enforcement mis- of these arenas allowed the EEOC to get around its
sion. These institutional limitations, however, proved a lack of coercive authority. In particular, the EEOC's
double-edged sword. On one hand, the EEOC's rela- relationship with the federal courts (especially after
tive weakness and political vulnerability reflected the the 1972 amendments) proved empowering, because
general limits on administrative power in American it gave the commission access to a politically and or-
government. On the other hand, these very same in- ganizationally independent means of deciding discrim-
stitutional constraints created a great deal of slack in ination cases and enforcing remedies. It was by these
the commission's political and administrative environ- alternative routes that the EEOC became a key player
ment. Limits on its power forced it to seek other means in subverting the very color-blind model of race policy
of influence, particularly by collaborating with other that it had been created to enforce. It held hearings to
institutions, both inside and outside the state. This im- publicize egregious cases of discrimination, pressuring
perative drove the problem of antidiscrimination en- employers to change their personnel practices. It par-
forcement into the same fragmented and decentralized ticipated with the NAACP and other civil rights organi-
political arena that had produced the EEOC's incapac- zations in precedent-setting antidiscrimination actions
ity in the first place. The struggle for enforcement would in labor negotiations and the federal courts that shaped
be fought out not in terms of administrative power antidiscrimination practices in a wide swath of Ameri-
emanating from Washington but in multiple arenas can industry. The EEOC, for example, played a central
and jurisdictions around the country. In this context, role in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), the case
the EEOC sought to play what role and forge what in which the Supreme Court ruled that employers could
alliances it could as it sought pragmatic rather than ide- not use even ostensibly race-neutral tests or other oc-
ological or coercive solutions to the problem of fulfill- cupational qualifications that tend disproportionately
ing its mandate in constrained environment (Skrentny to bar minority applicants, unless the employer could
1996, chap. 5). show that they were a bona fide qualification for the
In moving away from its prescribed institutional job in question (Graham 1990, 383-90; Stein 1998).
role, the EEOC was also led to move away from the Like the presidential initiatives designed to cut through
color-blind model of antidiscrimination enforcement. the ideological and institutional confusion engendered
Among the EEOC's key partners in this endeavor were by the Civil Rights Act, these moves contributed
African-Americans themselves, especially groups such to the unraveling of the color-blind consensus and
as the NAACP that were important proponents of race- the consolidation of a race-conscious policy approach
conscious approaches to civil rights policy, particularlybacked powerfully by the state by the early 1970s, an
708
outcome that had seemed most

ideological and institutionalimprobable
orders and thus push for- onl
decade earlier. ward the dynamic processes of political change.
The civil rights story underscores the fundamental
point-that neither ideas nor institutions can rightly
CONCLUSIONS claim priority in an account that purports to explain
significant political change (or even to describe it in
a richly complex
This history suggests that the answer to the problem of enough way to make a convincing,
understanding puzzling change in American racetheoretically
policy grounded explanation possible). What has
lies at the intersection of ideas and institutions and in changed, after all, in the civil rights story is not simply
the tension between ideological traditions and institu- the values of a group of right-hand-side independent
tional capacities. In the case of American race policy, variables-public opinion about segregation, say, or the
the Civil Rights Act seemed to embody a particular ide- strength of the civil rights movement, or the level of
ological approach to racial inequality, but the institu- interracial economic competition-resulting in a pre-
tional incentives and opportunities in which key actors dictable change (within standard tolerances) of the
were embedded allowed them to mount a challengeleft-hand-side
to dependent variable-antidiscrimination
this approach even while claiming to maintain it (and policy.
possibly even believing they were doing so). In fact, hadRather, what has changed is the very relationships
the EEOC been given greater coercive powers at the among factors that and the processes by which a set
outset to enforce the color-blind vision of antidiscrim- of underlying conditions generates outcomes. The evo-
lution of race-conscious affirmative action out of the
ination law, it is likely that the impulse for affirmative
action would have been weaker, because the EEOC color-blind premises of the Civil Rights Act resulted
would have turned its attention to an apparently more not simply from the marginal adjustment of a set of
fruitful set of tasks. independent variables producing linear policy effects,
More generally, this analysis suggests that public but from an entirely new configuration of mostly famil-
policies are most fruitfully understood as the results iar elements-the same elements, in fact, that helped to
of political conflicts in which particular elements of shape the Civil Rights Act itself: ambivalence and con-
national cultural and ideological repertoires are mo- tention over color-blindness and race-consciousness as
bilized and enacted into policy. These political strug- ideological models for race policy, and fragmented and
gles take place within historical and institutional con- decentralized political institutions. Neither ideas nor
texts that define the allocation and exercise of political institutions alone are sufficient to explain the trajectory
power and so shape policymaking, especially by con- of American race policy in the 1960s and 1970s. But
straining political behavior through the operation of the configuration of these two elements together en-
rules, norms, and organizational settings (Thelen and abled pragmatic but principled politicians, bureaucrats,
Steinmo 1992). At the same time, institutions also cre- lawyers, civil rights leaders, union leaders, corporate
ate strategic opportunities for purposive political actors executives, and others to grope toward a set of prac-
to further their interests, and they shape political oppor- tices that amounted to a fundamental transformation
tunities for the mobilization of social interests (Tarrow in race policy in a decade or so, one that embraced
1994). Similarly, political ideas and cultural traditions-- race-conscious employment practices and strong state
institutionalized, taken-for-granted understandings of action and one that deeply penetrated the state and
political and social arrangements-also constrain and civil society (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Farhang 2001;
enable policymaking, both by limiting the range of poli- Graham 1990; Skrentny 1996; Stein 1998).
cies that are considered rational and by giving poli- So when does an idea's time come? The answer lies in
cymakers a repertoire of legitimating tactics for their the match between idea and moment. An idea's time
favored policies (Campbell 1998; Dobbin 1994; Hall arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on
and Taylor 1996; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). its own terms, but because opportune political circum-
National political structures thus shape policy out- stances favor it. At those moments when a political
comes not simply by organizing power but also by idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose
acting as gatekeepers for political ideas and cultural institutional position gives them both the motive and
dispositions. Policymaking in democratic government the opportunity to translate it into policy-then, and
is not simply a process of optimizing the choice of only then, can we say that an idea has found a time.
policy instruments to solve readily identifiable social This is not a story of variables but of configura-
problems (Kingdon 1984; Lindblom 1959; Stone 1997). tion, not of ordered patterns of ideas or institutions
Rather, it entails the formation of coalitions among ac- in equilibrium, but of disjunction, friction, and overlap
tors who represent both interests vying for power and among ideational and institutional elements, none of
diverse policy ideas. Because this coalition-building which is sufficient but each of which is necessary for
process combines what Hugh Heclo (1974, 305-6) has a more comprehensive explanation of an important
called "powering" and "puzzling"-clashes of both episode of political change. It suggests the potential
power and culture among social interests-the results power, even the necessity, of an approach that consid-
it produces are not necessarily coherent and orderly ers both institutions and ideas as integral to political
but rather tend to build on prior policies without clear- explanation and it underscores the importance of un-
ing away or dismantling them. The very process of derstanding the ways in which they interact to produce
policymaking can perpetuate the system of clashing outcomes that, from either partial perspective, seem
709
unpredictable. Above all, it shows

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Lieberman IdeasInstitutionsPolitical 2002

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Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change

Author(s): Robert C. Lieberman

Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Expla

ter of causal accounts of tumultuous

More common are studies that

and sociological institutionalism, with

a unified and ordered whole,about thein which

of civil rights policy invoked the

among others. The model

consensus in the rest of the of affirmative

outcome that had seemed most

unpredictable. Above all, it shows

Katznelson, Ira, Kim Geiger, and

Smith, Rogers M. 1992. "If PoliticsInstitutionalism

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