1

Shades of Fake News: How Fallacies Influence Consumers’ Perception

Sven Beisecker

Christian Schlereth

Sebastian Hein*

Forthcoming: European Journal of Information Systems

Abstract

So far, fake news has been mostly associated with fabricated content that intends to manipulate
or shape opinions. In this manuscript, we aim to establish that the perception of information as
fake news is influenced by not only fabricated content but also by the rhetorical device used (i.e.,
how news authors phrase the message). Based on argumentation theory, we advance that
fallacies – a subset of well-known deceptive rhetorical devices – share a conceptual overlap with
fake news and are therefore suitable for shedding light on the issue’s grey areas. In a first two-
by-two, between-subject, best-worst scaling experiment (case 1), we empirically test whether
fallacies are related to the perception of information as fake news and to what extent a reader can
identify them. In a second two-by-two experiment, we presume that a reader believes that some
of a sender’s messages contain fake news and investigate recipients’ subsequent reactions. We
find that users distinguish nuances based on the applied fallacies; however, they will not
immediately recognize some fallacies as fake news while overemphasizing others. Regarding
users’ reactions, we observe a more severe reaction when the message identified as fake news
comes from a company instead of an acquaintance.

Keywords: Fake News; Best-Worst Scaling; Fallacies; Social Media; Argumentation Theory;
Rhetorical Devices

*WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Marketing and Sales Group, Chair of Digital
Marketing, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, Germany, Phone: +49-261-6509-458,
sven.beisecker@whu.edu, christian.schlereth@whu.edu, sebastian.hein@whu.edu

Acknowledgments: The authors gratefully thank Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Klaus Brockhoff for
initially igniting the research direction of this paper. The authors further thank the SALTY
professors for participating in our post-study. Finally, the authors would like to thank the
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. for financially and intellectually supporting the first author
through a PhD scholarship.
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1 Introduction

“Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President.” This headline

turned out to be what is commonly classified as fake news; still, it generated 960,000

engagements on Facebook (Silverman, 2016). Rather than being an outlier, this anecdote is

emblematic of our current social media landscape, in which a broad audience creates, shares, and

consumes false information without further reflection (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).

The term fake news has been gaining relevance due to its far-reaching implications for

society, most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic. Fake news on topics like the safety of

vaccinations and political measures to contain the spread of the virus can influence individuals’

adoption behavior, with downstream consequences for national and global health (Laato, Islam,

Islam, & Whelan, 2020). For these reasons, policymakers around the world have taken steps to

limit the dissemination. For instance, Germany’s parliamentary body passed the Network

Enforcement Act, which requires social media platforms to remove fake news, hate speech, and

other unlawful content within one day after notification, or else face fines of up to €50 million

(Bundestag, 2017). However, apart from the dissemination of unlawful content such as

propaganda material and insults, the law does not specify what exactly fake news is. In

policymakers’ defense, scholars also lack a clear definition of the concept and have mostly

focused on the facticity of news content (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2018).

Kim, Moravec, and Dennis (2019) defined fake news as “news […] that are intentionally

and verifiably false and could mislead readers” (p. 934). Here, we emphasize the quality of being

misled, which can encompass the use of not only fabricated content, but also certain rhetorical

devices. We focus on one prominent subset of deceptive rhetorical devices: namely, fallacies,
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which have a well-documented ability to misinform and shape opinions. We argue that, because

of their deceptive nature, fallacies share a conceptual overlap with fake news.

The goal of our research is to examine this overlap in the perception between fake news

and fallacies. In two hypotheses, we draw on argumentation theory and advance that the

rhetorical device shapes the perception of information as fake news to a certain, device-specific

degree, independent of the content. We further argue that not all fallacies are equally detectable:

Some require more deliberate consideration than others.

As a second goal, we follow up on the idea that readers of news statements are skeptical

that some information from a specific sender is fake news. We study how the users react, i.e., to

what extent their reaction is directed toward the platform that distributes the information in

question or toward the sender, and how this reaction is linked to observable characteristics of the

reader and the sender. We thereby shed light on the repercussions that may accrue for

individuals, companies, and platforms that share or distribute fake news. The second goal

deviates from previous research on user reactions, which has mainly examined why some readers

share information even though they likely perceived it as fake (Kim & Dennis, 2019; Kim et al.,

2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2021). In contrast to previous research, we focus on the sub-

population that is skeptical that a post contains fake news and study its reaction.

Empirically, we examine the two hypotheses by employing best-worst scaling in a two-

by-two, between-subject experiment. Thereby, we compare respondents’ perceptions of

statements as fake news when a) evaluated with or without explanations of the fallacies and b)

when applied to different contexts (in this case, a political and a business context). To study their

reactions, we used another two-by-two, between-subject experiment, in which we varied the type

of sender (company vs. acquaintance) and the share of information perceived as fake news in
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posts. Here, respondents stated how likely they are to express different reactions against the

sender and the platform that distributed the information.

The insights from this research can be used in manifold ways. First, if the perception of

information as fake news relates to not only the facticity of content, but also the rhetorical device

used, then fake news detection algorithms could be extended to automatically identify those

fallacies that are highly related to fake news perceptions. Indeed, there are already initial NLP-

based machine learning algorithms being developed to detect some fallacies, such as ad hominem

(Delobelle, Cunha, Cano, Peperkamp, & Berendt, 2019; Li, Thomas, & Liu, 2021). Concurrently,

the field of argumentation mining is researching methods for analyzing people’s reasoning

(Habernal & Gurevych, 2017). Second, because some other fallacies, such as formal logical errors,

are difficult to detect automatically (Delobelle et al., 2019), social media platforms may strive to

educate readers to help them manually detect fake news. Third, by studying user reactions, we

outline who has more to lose when readers perceive certain messages as fake news (companies or

individuals). Finally, we challenge the common wisdom that fake news is primarily related to

politics (Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, & Cannon, 2019; Faragó, Kende, & Krekó, 2020).

Instead, and in line with, e.g., Visentin, Pizzi, and Pichierri (2019), we show that the perception of

information as fake news can be independent of the context, as well as have severe business

implications.

We first review the literature related to fake news and people’s reactions upon detecting

fake news. Afterward, we derive the hypotheses for our study and introduce the setup before

reporting the results and conclusions.

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2 Related Work on Fake News

2.1 Operationalization

Even though the search term ‘fake news’ peaked in early 2020 on Google Trends (Google

Trends, 2021), the underlying concept has a long history that goes far beyond the recently

surging interest. One of the earliest known examples of fake news dates back to the Middle

Ages, when the duke of Austria, Rudolf IV, falsely claimed that his lineage, the Habsburgs, had

received an imperial certificate called “privilegium maius” that would grant them a vote in the

election of the emperor (ZDF, 2021). Since then, researchers have studied this multi-faceted

issue from various historical angles (Weiss, Alwan, Garcia, and Garcia (2020). For instance,

Weiss et al. (2020) noted that rumors are one expression of fake news, i.e., unintentional

information distortions that occur out of ignorance and are repeated by different people over

time—and, thus, are difficult to control (Shibutani, 1966). According to Allport and Postman

(1947), rumors are formed through leveling (conveyed information is shortened over time),

sharpening (selective reporting of limited details), and assimilation (information becomes

consistent with the person’s prior views). The accuracy of a rumor decreases the more their

spreaders are subject to narrowed attention, limited memory, and perceptual biases (Buckner,

1965; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Knapp, 1944).

While the issues that encourage rumors are largely baked into human psychology, they

may be exacerbated by recent developments. In the present paper, we follow the belief of authors

like Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019), Laato et al. (2020), and Moravec, Minas, and Dennis (2019)

in arguing that fake news is strongly connected to the rise of social media. With many users able

to share and interact with news on social media, information generally spreads faster and often

without users reflecting on the credibility of the source compared to traditional media.
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Because modern communication technology enhances people’s tendency to deceive and

lie (Hancock, 2007), the advancement of social media makes it increasingly difficult to

distinguish professional from unprofessional content (Wineburg, McGrew, Breakstone, &

Ortega, 2016). Likewise, properly fact-checking digital information gets harder with an

increasing amount of information (Lecheler & Kruikemeier, 2016). Based on 4.5 million tweets,

Vosoughi et al. (2018) concluded that fake news is more likely to go viral and spread much faster

than accurate news. Against this background, researchers have begun to study fake news from

different angles—particularly its creators and their motivations, its recipients, and the

mechanisms that foster or prevent dissemination. Without claiming completeness, Table 1

summarizes the extant literature.

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Table 1 Extant literature on fake news

Study Fake News Definition Binary? Methodology Main Contribution

Pennycook and Rand False or highly misleading Yes Literature review Lacking discernment between true and false information is related to lack of
(2021) political 'news' stories, primarily originating on social media careful reasoning
Schuetz, Sykes, and Intentionally and verifiably false news Yes Survey Awareness of fake news and commenting on articles instead of reading them is
Venkatesh (2021) positively related to fact checking
Jones-Jang, Mortensen, Fabricated information that mimics news media content in Yes Survey Information literacy aids identification of fake news
and Liu (2021) form but not in organizational process or intent
Alonso et al. (2021) Provably false pieces of information created with the Yes Literature review Fake news detection through sentiment analysis
intention of deception
Brasoveanu and News items with verifiably false content Yes Machine learning Semantic fake news detection method based on features like sentiment and
Andonie (2021) models factual accuracy
Mazzeo, Rapisarda, and - Yes Machine learning Fake news identification on web search engines based on structural features of
Giuffrida (2021) models URLs
Bryanov and Non-factual messages resembling legitimate news content Yes Literature review Belief in fake news depends on message characteristics and individual factors
Vziatysheva (2021) and created with an intention to deceive
Pennycook and Rand Information that mimics the output of the news media in Yes Survey Tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences is positively
(2020) form, but not in organizational process or intent; a subgenre related to perceived fake news accuracy and negatively to the ability to
of the broader category of misinformation—of incorrect differentiate between fake and real news
information about the state of the world.
Moravec, Kim, and News articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and Yes Experiment Fake news flags relying on both System 1 and System 2 processing are most
Dennis (2020) could mislead readers effective
Bago, Rand, and Fabricated information that mimics news media content in Yes Experiment Deliberation reduces individuals’ beliefs in false headlines
Pennycook (2020) form but not in organizational process or intent
Martel, Pennycook, and Fabricated information that mimics news media content in Yes Exploratory study, Reliance on emotion increases belief in fake news
Rand (2020) form but not in organizational process or intent experiment
Pennycook, Bear, Fabricated stories presented as if from Yes Experiment False headlines that fail to get tagged are seen as more accurate (implied truth
Collins, and Rand legitimate sources effect)
(2020)
Weiss, Alwan, Garcia, No uniform definition, but several components: principle of No Survey Conceptions of fake news differ among university faculty members
and Garcia (2020) least effort, poisoned public discourse, logical fallacies,
overconfidence, post-truth, propaganda, rumor,
misinformation, conspiracy theory, parody, satire, political
kayfabe
Laato, Islam, Islam, and False or inaccurate information, especially that which is No Survey Information overload and trust in online information are strong predictors of
Whelan (2020) deliberately intended to deceive users' tendency to share COVID-19 related fake news
Zhou and Zafarani Intentionally false news published by a news outlet Yes Conceptual News can be detected based on false information, writing style, propagation
(2020) patterns, and source credibility
Altay, Hacquin, and Fabricated information that mimics news media content in Yes Experiment Sharing fake news hurts sharer’s reputation and readers’ trust in the source
Mercier (2020) form but not in organizational process or intent
Kim, Moravec, and News articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and Yes Experiment Source ratings influence users’ belief in an article, particularly for low expert
Dennis (2019) could mislead readers and user article ratings
Kim and Dennis (2019) News articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and Yes Experiment Highlighting the source of an article makes users more skeptical, independent of
could mislead readers source credibility; low source ratings affect believability when source is
unknown
Moravec, Minas, and Misinformation on social media Yes Behavioral and Presence of a fake news flag increases users’ time spent on news headlines but
Dennis (2019) EEG data does not affect truth assessments
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Bronstein, Pennycook, Fabricated news stories that are presented as being from Yes Survey Delusion-prone individuals are more likely to believe fake news headlines
Bear, Rand, and Cannon legitimate sources and promoted on social media to deceive
(2019) the public for ideological or financial gain
Egelhofer and Lecheler All news which is “inaccurate” Yes Conceptual Fake news consists of two dimensions, fake news genre (deliberate creation of
(2019) disinformation) and fake news label (use of the term to discredit media sources)
Pennycook and Rand Fabricated information that mimics news Yes Correlational study Propensity to engage in analytical reasoning is negatively associated with
(2018) media content in form but not in organizational process or perceived accuracy of fake news and positively with ability to discern fake news
intent from real news
Pennycook, Cannon, and News stories that were fabricated (but presented as if from Yes Experiment Exposure to fake news headlines increases subsequent perceptions of accuracy
Rand (2018) legitimate sources) and promoted on social media to (illusory truth effect)
deceive the public for ideological and/or financial gain
Lazer et al. (2018) Fabricated information that mimics news media content in Yes Conceptual Interventions against fake news should either focus on empowering individuals
form but not in organizational process or intent to evaluate fake news or preventing their exposure to fake news
Berthon and Pitt (2018) False information Yes Conceptual Brands can be impacted by (e.g., as target of fake news) and actively impact
(e.g., by deliberate or unintentional association with dubious content) fake news
in different ways
Vosoughi et al. (2018) News that has been verified as false Yes Descriptive, Fake news on Twitter is retweeted by more people, and far more rapidly than
investigation of real news, especially for posts in a political context
rumor cascades
Tandoc, Lim, and Ling Several components including news satire, news parody, No Literature review Fake news can be categorized across the two dimensions of levels of facticity
(2018) fabrication, manipulation, advertising, and propaganda and deception
Allcott and Gentzkow News articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and Yes Web-browsing Social media are important channels to distribute fake news and may influence
(2017) could mislead readers data, survey public elections
Shu et al. (2017) Low-quality news with intentionally false information Yes Literature Review Summary of different approaches to detecting fake news
Berkowitz and Schwartz Content that blurs lines between nonfiction and fiction No Textual analysis Differentiation between fake news and satire
(2016)
Wineburg, McGrew, - - Survey Students largely fail to accurately evaluate the trustworthiness of news articles
Breakstone, and Ortega
(2016)
Lewandowsky et al. Misinformation, false beliefs Yes Conceptual Continued influence effect (retractions fail to eliminate the influence of
(2012) misinformation)
Hancock (2007) Use of various concepts of deception and lying Yes Conceptual Modern communication technologies facilitate deception and complicate
deception detection
DiFonzo and Bordia Rumors - Conceptual Definition of rumors, psychological aspects of rumor spreading
(2007)
Gilbert, Krull, and - - Experiment Interruptions in information processing make subjects more likely to consider
Malone (1990) false propositions true
Begg, Armour, & - - Experiment New details about familiar topics are rated truer than new details about
Thérèse (1985) unfamiliar topics
Gardner (1975) Advertisements that leave the consumer with factually Yes Conceptual Identification of a three-level typology of advertising deception, focused on
untrue or potentially misleading impressions and/or beliefs consumer reaction: unconscionable lie, claim-fact discrepancy, and claim-belief
interaction
Shibutani (1966) Rumors - Conceptual Definition of rumors, processes by which rumors form
Buckner (1965) Rumors - Survey Effect of rumor network interactions on the accuracy of rumor transmission
Allport and Postman Rumors - Conceptual Definition of rumors, processes by which rumors form
(1947)
Knapp (1944) Rumors - Conceptual Systematization and classification of rumors
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With the present research, we aim to investigate whether additional factors play a role in

defining fake news. We contribute to this ongoing literature stream by studying the perception of

information as fake news beyond the facticity of content. Thereby, we focus on news headlines

and how the framing of an argument impacts readers’ perceptions. We follow the work of

Shibutani (1966), who, in the context of rumors, stated that how something is said matters just as

much as what is said. To this end, we dwell on a subset of well-studied rhetorical devices called

fallacies (Dowden, 1993; Van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009). Although these devices

have been extensively studied, we are not aware of any empirical work that links the different

types of fallacies to the perception of information as fake news. While a few extant studies have

discussed certain individual fallacies, none have performed a comparison. For instance, Van

Eemeren et al. (2009) found that respondents consider fallacies to be less reasonable than sound

statements; however, focus solely on the ad hominem fallacy, i.e., attacking the arguer instead of

the argument. Another study relates to the false dilemma fallacy, i.e., framing a situation as

having only two options when there are in fact more. Brisson, Markovits, Robert, and Schaeken

(2018) found that an individual’s tendency to fall for this fallacy depends on their background

knowledge and their ability to retrieve options from memory other than the ones presented.

A second deviation from the literature is the treatment of fake news as a multi-level

construct. Although most empirical studies do not explicitly make this conceptual distinction

(e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Vosoughi et al., 2018), they do operationalize the fake news

construct solely in binary terms (i.e., as either true or false). A binary classification simplifies the

process by matching existing statements with fact-checking websites. However, it reduces fake

news detection to only explicitly verifiable cases, allowing current detection mechanisms to

underestimate the severity of fake news. With our focus on fallacies, we deviate from most

previous research by treating fake news as non-binary (two exceptions with explicit non-binary
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classifications are: Tandoc et al. (2017), who characterized fake news by the “level of facticity”

and the “author’s immediate intention to deceive”, as well as Berkowitz and Schwartz (2016),

who defined fake news as content that “blurs lines between nonfiction and fiction”).

2.2 Efforts to Prevent Dissemination

Previous literature has proposed a portfolio of actions to prevent the dissemination of

fake news. We structure these efforts along the following dimensions: 1.) detecting fake news,

2.) understanding what impacts believability and dissemination, and 3.) educating people to help

them avoid falling for fake news.

There are several characteristics of fake news that make it detectable. According to Zhou

and Zafarani (2020), detection approaches should address false information, writing style,

propagation patterns, and source credibility. The first approach studies whether the news content

is factually flawed by either manual or automized fact-checking against external sources

(Alonso, Vilares, Gómez-Rodríguez, & Vilares, 2021; Shu, Sliva, Wang, Tang, & Liu, 2017).

The second approach aims to assess whether readers are intentionally misled due to how the

news is written or presented (Shu et al., 2017). Here, certain text features (such as swear words

or emotional words) and the characteristics of associated news images are analyzed using

sentiment analysis (Alonso et al., 2021; Brasoveanu & Andonie, 2021). In line with our research,

this approach transcends the notion of factual accuracy. The third approach studies information

diffusion patterns. However, platforms and researchers can observe such patterns only in

hindsight (Zhou & Zafarani, 2020). The fourth approach aims to detect fake news by evaluating

the credibility of the news source. This approach is preoccupied with identifying unreliable

websites: for instance, based on structural features of the URL (Mazzeo, Rapisarda, & Giuffrida,

2021) or malicious social media users such as bots (Shu et al., 2017; Zhou & Zafarani, 2020).
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Moreover, the extant literature has identified several factors that influence the extent to

which people believe in fake news. First, individuals’ traits and characteristics can determine

how prone they are. Bronstein et al. (2019) found that proclivities for delusion, dogmatism, and

religious fundamentalism make individuals particularly suspectible to believing fake news.

Second, the tendencies to engage in elaborate cognitive reflection (Fiske & Taylor, 2013;

Pennycook & Rand, 2021) and analytical reflection (Pennycook & G. Rand, 2018) are associated

with a lower belief in fake news. Similarly, individuals who score high on information literacy

are more likely to correctly detect fake news (Jones-Jang, Mortensen, & Liu, 2021). Third,

people are impacted by the circumstances and timing of fake news exposure. In the study of

rumors, Shibutani (1966) noted that people’s default stance is to implicitly believe in the

truthfulness of anything they hear. They will only distance themselves from this initial belief if

presented with considerable reason for doubt. However, a person’s proclivity to doubt what they

hear or read depends on several factors: Martel, Pennycook, and Rand (2020) found that people

in an emotional state are particularly prone to believing fake news. Aspects like a person’s time

constraints and current energy level also play a role (Wilson & Brekke, 1994), as do

interruptions in information processing (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). Pennycook, Cannon,

and Rand (2018) determined that repeated exposure leads to increased accuracy judgments,

which they termed the illusory truth effect. Finally, the characteristics of the message itself can

influence believability. In line with confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), users tend to believe

news that aligns with their prior views (Kim & Dennis, 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2021). At the

same time, users are less likely to believe news with an incoherent story (Lewandowsky, Ecker,

Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012) or a dubious source (Begg, Armour, & Thérèse, 1985), while

being more likely to believe news with trusted endorsements (Bryanov & Vziatysheva, 2021).
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Another strategy to prevent fake news dissemination is by introducing mechanisms to

social media platforms that educate users about news consumption. Here, researchers have

mainly proposed remedies that address fabricated content. For instance, Moravec, Kim, and

Dennis (2020) studied the design of fake news flags (tags attached to news articles containing

disputed content) as a potential remedy. Relying on dual-process theory, Kahneman and Egan

(2011) investigated how people’s beliefs in disputed news articles are affected by interventions

focusing on either System 1 (automatic evaluation triggered by a stop sign icon) or System 2

(deliberate evaluation triggered by a text warning). Pennycook, Bear, Collins, and Rand (2020)

explored the psychological effects of attaching warnings or ratings to the article source. In a

similar vein, Kim et al. (2019) examined three types of ratings, namely: expert (an expert judges

the source), user source (users judge the source), and user article ratings (users judge individual

articles). The authors found that expert ratings were the most effective in reducing the perceived

believability for low-rated articles.

In this research, we focus on the detectability of fake news. In line with Clarke, Chen,

Du, and Hu (2020), we define detectability as the outcome effectiveness of an approach that aims

to identify fake news. We contribute to style-based detection approaches, as we do not focus on

detecting certain words or sentiments, but on the use of fallacies and how they influence the

perception of information as fake news. Fallacies use true information in a reliable context, but

exaggerate or modify certain elements that distract from the factual level (Fearnside & Holther,

1959). The detection of certain fallacies is becoming operationally feasible thanks to early NLP-

based machine learning algorithms (Delobelle et al., 2019; Li et al., 2020). Thereby, we treat

fake news as a continuum between clearly fabricated information (i.e., alternative facts) and

news statements containing deliberately misleading elements. This broadened view can

substantially extend the possibilities of combatting fake news by allowing one to: (i) train
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algorithms to better detect fake news automatically and (ii) educate readers about the use of

fallacies in order to sensitize them to manually detecting fake news.

2.3 Reaction after Detection

Given our presumption that social media can detect and flag fake news messages, as well

as prompt users to reflect on the veracity of a message, this paper’s final question is how readers

react when they are skeptical that a sender is sharing such messages. Altay, Hacquin, and

Mercier (2020) demonstrated that sharing fake news has damaging effects on the sharer’s

reputation and on readers’ trust in the source, independent of whether it is a media outlet or an

individual sharing the news. Ultimately, sources suffer a greater loss of trust when sharing fake

news than they gain from sharing a real news story (Altay et al., 2020).

Even in situations where companies are the targets, rather than originators, of fake news,

their reputations can still be sullied. In such cases, readers of fake news may react by changing

their consumer behavior, which can have severe consequences for businesses. Berthon and Pitt

(2018) noted that consumers tend to dissociate from brands that have been targets of fake news,

with negative downstream consequences for companies’ brand equity. Prominent examples of

companies impacted by fake news include PepsiCo and New Balance (Di Domenico & Visentin,

2020). However, brands do not seem to suffer if their advertisements appear next to fake news

articles if the host website is generally regarded as credible (Visentin et al., 2019).

In this study, we explore the reaction of users who are suspicious that one of their

contacts has shared fake news. Thus, compared to previous literature, we do not focus on why

content is shared despite being perceived as fake news, nor on the consequences of fake news for

companies’ brand equity. Instead, we distinguish reactions toward the sender and the platform

that shared the content, thereby focusing on the potential damage for the parties involved.
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3 Theoretical Framework

In this section, we develop a theoretical framework to underpin our empirical study. We

derive our understanding of theory from Gregor's (2006) theoretical taxonomy, with a particular

focus on his theory type III (”Theory for Predicting”). This type of theory is used to discover

previously unknown regularities in order to predict outcomes from a set of explanatory factors,

but without determining the underlying causal connections between the dependent and

independent variables (Gregor, 2006). In short, parts of the system remain a “black box.”

A core claim of our article is that fake news is not defined by content alone, but also

depends on the employed rhetorical devices. Based on this argument, we derive the central

hypotheses below. Thereby, we employ Gregor's (2006) type III understanding of theory in order

to demonstrate the relationship between rhetorical devices and the perception of information as

fake news. In doing so, we leave out the question of why specific rhetorical devices are more

strongly related to the perception of information as fake news than others.

3.1 Relation between fake news, rhetorical devices, and fallacies

We build our hypotheses on the groundwork of argumentation theory, which studies the

requirements for an argument to be correct (D. Walton, 2009). An argument refers to finding

support for a conclusion based on one or several reasons (Dowden, 1993). In argumentation

theory, there are certain rules for how an argument should be presented. Van Eemeren,

Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans (2002) produced the most prominent summary of ten

rules for sound argumentation. For instance, one rule (burden-of-proof rule) states that the

burden of proof always lies with the person who puts forth a standpoint. Another rule (relevance

rule) establishes that a person can only defend their standpoint based on arguments relevant to

said standpoint (Van Eemeren et al., 2002). In this sense, a related goal of argumentation theory
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is to improve argumentative discourse (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Johnson, Plantin, &

Willard, 2013). This entails efforts to evaluate and resolve rule violations (i.e., errors arising in

argumentation; Van Eemeren et al., 2013).

A fallacy occurs when an argument contains such errors (D. Walton, 2009). Fallacies

represent a well-documented subset of rhetorical devices (Dowden, 2019), which news authors

use to shift readers’ perception of information, even in cases where the information itself is

factually correct (Madon, Fadzil, & Rahmat, 2021). They stand apart from other rhetorical

devices: they contain purposely made errors in reasoning or unsound or illogical arguments that

claim to conform to the rules of sound argumentation while actually failing to do so (Fearnside &

Holther, 1959). Fallacies conceptually differ from falsifiable information in that they use true

information in a reliable context, but exaggerate or modify certain elements to distract from the

factual level (Fearnside & Holther, 1959). In other words, they are arguments that seem valid,

but are actually invalid (Van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2010). Scholars have

complemented this theoretical view with empirical evidence: A wide array of experiments—

involving a total of more than 1,900 participants—indicate that the average person’s perception

of reasonableness largely accords with the theoretical perspectives on argumentation (Van

Eemeren et al., 2010).

In the present research, we advance that fallacies (as a subset of rhetorical devices)

overlap with the concept of fake news. Our position follows from Lazer et al.'s (2018) argument

that “fake news overlaps with other information disorders, such as misinformation (false or

misleading information) and disinformation (false information that is purposely spread to

deceive people)” (p. 2). Notably Tandoc et al. (2018) already stated that deception is a necessary

precondition for news to be regarded as fake: Fake news has no impact if audiences do not

erroneously perceive it as real (Tandoc et al., 2018). Thereby, fallacies share common ground
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with fake news since both intend to deceive, misinform, and shape the opinions of recipients.

Based on the extant literature (Table 1), we recognize that prior research operationalized fake

news only as fabricated information. We extend this understanding by including the rhetorical

presentation of an argument, which can also affect whether information is perceived as fake

news.

Fig. 1 visualizes the proposed relation among fake news, rhetorical devices, and fallacies.

The relationship implies that some rhetorical devices and fallacies do not overlap with fake

news. One potential example is the conjunction fallacy, i.e., a formal fallacy that occurs when a

decision-maker assumes that specific conditions are more likely than a single general one

(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

Fig. 1 Relation among fake news, rhetorical devices, and fallacies

Fallacies can be nuanced, as there are many ways to produce an error in reasoning. As

Van Eemeren et al. (2002) showed, fallacies can occur by violating any one of several rules for

sound argumentation. Given the variety of ways in which fallacies may obscure an argument’s

construction, we anticipate that some fallacies are more closely linked to today’s common
 17

perception of fake news than others. As such, they might be able to (partially) explain the grey

area of fake news. Based on this reasoning, we introduce our first hypothesis (H1):

H1: As a subset of rhetorical devices, fallacies can help to distinguish nuances (i.e., grey

areas) in the perception of information as fake news.

3.2 Detectability of fallacies

In order to uncover (and rectify) errors in reasoning, argumentation theory pursues the

following tasks: identification (identifying an argument’s premises and conclusion), analysis

(finding implicit premises, i.e., the unstated assumptions of an argument, as well as conclusions

that need to become explicit), evaluation (evaluating the strength of an argument), and invention

(developing new arguments to support the conclusion; D. Walton, 2009). Certain fallacies are

harder to identify and analyze than others. This is because there are different ways in which

people can be lured into errors in reasoning (Dowden, 1993). Reviewing different fallacies,

Dowden (1993) summarized several approaches by which these errors can be detected: focusing

on the reasons instead of the reasoner; pointing out choices other than the ones mentioned;

assessing the credibility of the argument source, and noticing when an argument attempts to

divert a reader’s attention from the issue at hand. Given the different ways in which fallacies can

deceive an audience, “it makes no more sense to suppose that they must all be given a common

analysis than it does to suppose that all diseases should be given the same diagnosis and

treatment” (Van Eemeren et al., 2013, p. 237).

For illustration, we consider two prominently used fallacies: a) ad hominem (e.g., Barnes,

Johnston, MacKenzie, Tobin, & Taglang, 2018; D. N. Walton, 1987), i.e., an author deliberately

attacks the person who has brought forth an argument instead of the argument itself, often

accompanied by insults about the counterpart’s personality, and b) formal logical error (e.g.,
 18

Binoy, 2014; Fearnside & Holther, 1959; Floridi, 2009), i.e., an author deliberately makes a

deductively invalid argument that typically commits a logical error. Recognizing the former, i.e.,

seeing the insult as a distraction from the argument itself, can be done with relative ease, but

recognizing the latter demands more cognitive deliberation from the reader.

Dual-process theory (Kahneman & Egan, 2011) complements argumentation theory by

explaining how people process information and make judgments. Both Kahneman and Egan

(2011) and Strack and Deutsch (2004) differentiated between two systems that work together to

guide human behavior: an impulsive (also referred to as System 1) and a reflective (also referred

to as System 2) system. While the former primarily relies on associative links, the latter is

governed by structured decision processes and a clear intent (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). System 1

operates on a low cognitive capacity and is always active per default, whereas System 2 requires

more cognitive investment and can be easily disturbed (e.g., through distraction or arousal;

Strack & Deutsch, 2004).

On social media, where more than half of U.S. adults consume their news (Shearer,

2021), readers tend to consume news incidentally as it arises in their newsfeed—i.e., they do not

deliberately search for the news (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018). The resulting lack of

critical thinking and deliberation strongly suggests a predominance of System 1 processing when

it comes to news consumption on social media. Relying on System 1 processing may prevent

readers on social media from detecting the fake news character of certain news headlines,

especially if the latter employ fallacies that are subtle in their intent to misinform and cannot be

detected without further deliberation. Hence, we introduce our second hypothesis:

H2: Fallacies are not all equally detectable as fake news.

 19

Based on this hypothesis, we argue that educating readers on social media about the

presence and type of fallacy in a news headline can help them manually detect errors in cases

that require more cognitive deliberation.

4 Empirical Study

To test the two hypotheses, we conducted an experimental study that employed the best-

worst scaling method, case 1 (e.g., Hinz, Schlereth, & Zhou, 2015; Kaufmann, Rottenburger,

Carter, & Schlereth, 2018; Louviere, Flynn, & Marley, 2015; Louviere, Lings, Islam, Gudergan,

& Flynn, 2013). Directly afterward, we conducted a second experimental study to assess the

reactions of readers who suspect that a contact has shared information perceived as fake news

(described later in Section 4.4). We implemented and executed the questionnaire using the online

survey platform DISE (Schlereth & Skiera, 2012).

The best-worst scaling method is a variant of discrete choice experiments (e.g., Hauser,

Eggers, & Selove, 2019; Schlereth & Skiera, 2017) that has recently gained popularity because it

allows one to measure an individual’s strength of preference for, or level of agreement with, a

number of items. An item can be a statement or some other element of interest. This method is

notable for ensuring that respondents hold consistent interpretations of the same decisions

(Mueller Loose & Lockshin, 2013). Compared with verbal measurement scales (e.g., Likert

scales), respondents do not use artificially numerical, subjectively interpretable representatives

for their preferences. Instead, they choose among alternatives that are easy to understand and that

can be quickly evaluated. Consequently, the results from this method provide a higher degree of

discrimination, while allowing a consistent interpretation of responses across participants.

With the best-worst scaling method, we aim to measure the individual strength of

respondents’ perception that a specific fallacy in a news statement represents fake news. Put
 20

differently, we investigate whether fallacies can influence the perception of information as fake

news and whether readers distinguish nuances (i.e., grey areas) based on the applied fallacies.

Fig. 2 illustrates the use of the best-worst scaling method. Respondents repeatedly see choice

sets, each consisting of a different subset of items, and choose the best and worst item from each

set (Mueller, Lockshin, & Louviere, 2010). The terms “best” and “worst” constitute a metaphor

for the extremes of a latent, subjective continuum (Louviere et al., 2015). In our study, we

operationalized the “best” and “worst” labeling by letting respondents decide which item in each

choice set “most closely resembles fake news” and “least closely resembles fake news”,

respectively.

Most closely Least closely

resembles fake resembles
news fake news
The author deliberately conveys a completely made-up statement, which is by
no means backed by objective evidence.
X
e.g., " Emissions scandal: For years, competitor BMW bribed VW employees
to manipulate their emissions values and thus harm the VW brand."

The author deliberately attacks the person who has brought forth an argument
instead of the argument itself, often not shying away from insults about
counterpart’s personality.
e.g., "Herbert Diess is an absolutely unqualified and incompetent CEO: The
entire VW board of directors has known about the emissions scandal for
years."

The author deliberately uses stylistic flaws, including the use of emotion
evoking words, excessive punctuation marks, and case insensitivity.
X
e.g., "ATTENTION!!! - The entire VW board of directors has known about the
emissions scandal for years!"

Fig. 2 Illustrative example choice set

4.1 Setup of the fallacy experiment

In total, we used nine items: six items represented one particular fallacy each, two items

represented additional rhetorical non-fallacy devices, and a final item represented fabricated

content. Respondents saw the implementation of each item in the form of an exemplary headline
 21

that represented a news statement. In some versions of the experiment, respondents also saw

brief explanations of the rhetorical device employed in the shown headline.

We implemented news statements as headlines because they are a common method of

garnering consumers’ attention. The goal of headlines is to make readers click on the article or

provide the reader with immediate opinions. The headline is one of the most influential elements

because it is prominently visible anywhere a page is shared or linked. Often, the headline is the

most visible (and clickable) part, as it shows up in the link preview when anyone shares an

article, and it shows up in any browser tab. So, when many tabs are open, the headline may drive

the reader back to a tab.

We implemented the best-worst scaling method in a two-by-two between-subject

experimental setting to empirically test the two hypotheses. We varied a) the topic of the news

statement (business or political context) and b) whether respondents saw brief explanations of

the rhetorical devices or just the news statements alone. Respondents who saw no explanations

made their decisions solely based on the exemplary news statements. In cases where respondents

saw the explanations, we instructed them to focus on the explanations and consider the

corresponding statements as illustrative examples.

To empirically test our hypotheses, we studied the correlations between the best-worst

scores of the different versions of our experiment. The use of correlational analysis corresponds

to Gregor's (2006) understanding of type III theory in information systems. If respondents in the

political and business scenarios produce comparable rankings of the rhetorical devices when

given explanations, then we can conclude that they complied with our instructions and focused

on the explanations. If, in addition, the rankings correlate between the political and business

context within the experimental condition that only contained the exemplary news statements

and no explanations, we would consider this scenario as support for the first hypothesis (H1, i.e.,
 22

that fallacies as a subset of rhetorical devices can help illuminate nuances, i.e., grey areas, in the

perception of information as fake news).

By taking the differences in the perceptions as fake news between an item that included

explanations and the corresponding item that did not include explanations, we can identify which

rhetorical device is over- or under-detected as fake news. If this difference is also similar

between the two contexts, we can consider that as support for the second hypothesis (H2, i.e.,

that fallacies are not all equally detectable as fake news).

4.2 Fallacy and item selection

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists over 200 fallacies (Dowden, 2019). Even

though the underlying rhetorical devices of fallacies are well understood, we are not aware of

any empirical work that examines how audiences react to different types of fallacies. One

exception is the study by Van Eemeren et al. (2009), who found that respondents generally

consider fallacies as less reasonable than sound statements. However, the authors solely focused

on one fallacy (i.e., ad hominem) and thus did not provide comparisons (e.g., according to the

degree of deception) across different fallacies.

Given our lack of knowledge on how fallacies differ in their degree of deception or usage

frequency, we selected six exemplary fallacies based on our subjective determination that they

would be suitable for detecting nuances in people’s perceptions of information as fake news1.

Besides the aforementioned ad hominem and formal logical error, the remaining four fallacies

are false dilemma, argument from ignorance, bandwagon effect, and false attribution. Some of

the chosen fallacies provide an invalid argument because their pattern of reasoning is wrong;

1
Later, in Section 4.6, we present the results of a post-study, in which we challenged our anticipation through an
expert survey with researchers in the field of communication.
 23

others use a poor reasoning structure. We acknowledge that these fallacies do not represent the

full range of possible fallacies and want to emphasize that other fallacies could have sufficed.

We added another item to this list of fallacies that researchers consider quite common in

Internet articles: what is frequently referred to as “clickbait” or “stylistic flaws” (Rubin, 2017).

These terms acknowledge that many creators design their statements to generate as much

audience attention as possible through sensational and emotionally appealing headlines (Bakir &

McStay, 2018). They often encourage consumers to click on a link through the excessive use of

punctuation marks or upper-case writing (e.g., “DANGER!!!”).

Finally, we added two additional items as an upper and lower extreme on the range of

perceptions of fake news. The item serving as an upper range limit is alternative facts: a phrase

that U.S. presidential counselor Kellyanne Conway used in a 2017 press conference (Bradner,

2017), defined as a “completely made up statement”, i.e., fabricated content. The item serving as

a lower range limit is rhetorical question, which is a statement that is suggestive but not

necessarily false. We summarize all items alongside the corresponding descriptions in Table 2.
 24

Table 2 Rhetorical device descriptions and exemplary statements of rhetorical devices

(translated from German language)

Item Description; exemplary statements (business and politics)

The author deliberately conveys a completely made-up statement, which is by no means backed by objective evidence.
Alternative facts
(Boundary item “After U.S. election results: Trump founds consulting firm for successful social media manipulation in political
through made-up elections.”
content) “Emissions scandal: For years, competitor BMW bribed VW employees to manipulate their emissions values and thus
harm the VW brand.”
The author deliberately frames a situation as “either/or” when there are, in fact, more than two options.
False dilemma
“Dilemma: Either use social media and support potential election manipulations or stop using them at all.”
(Fallacy)
“VW dilemma: Either accept that the entire VW board of directors has known about the emissions scandal for years or
stop using VW cars.”
The author deliberately makes a deductively invalid argument that typically commits an easily recognizable logical error.

Formal logical error “Proved: Social media allows for election manipulation. Trump used social media extensively. Therefore, social media
(Fallacy) manipulation is the main reason for the presidential election results.”
“Proved: Car manufacturers manipulated the emission levels. The board of directors has insight into all activities of the
company. The entire VW board of directors has known about the emissions scandal for years!”
The author deliberately states he/she doesn’t have to prove his/her claim; instead someone else has to disprove it.
Argument from
ignorance
“No counterevidence: Social media manipulations are the main reason for the U.S. presidential election results!”
(Fallacy)
“No counterevidence: The entire VW board of directors has known about the emissions scandal for years!”
The author deliberately assumes that the probability of individual adoption increases along with the overall proportion of
people who adopt a practice/opinion.
Bandwagon effect
“General public is certain: Social media manipulation is the main reason for the U.S. presidential election results – Here
(Fallacy)
is why you should think so!”
“Majority of frustrated VW users switch to other cars because the entire VW board of directors has known about the
exhaust gas scandal for many years – Here is why you should think so too!”
The author deliberately appeals to an irrelevant, unqualified, unidentified, biased or fabricated source in support of an
argument.
False attribution
“Close friend of a government official who wishes to remain anonymous, confirmed: Social media manipulation is the
(Fallacy)
main reason for the U.S. presidential election results.”
“Several employees who want to remain anonymous confirm: The entire VW board has known about the emissions
scandal for years.”
The author deliberately attacks the person who has brought forth an argument instead of the argument itself, often not
shying away from insults about counterpart’s personality.
Ad hominem
“Marc Zuckerberg is a completely unqualified and incompetent CEO: Social media manipulation is the main reason for
(Fallacy)
U.S. presidential election results”
“Herbert Diess is an absolutely unqualified and incompetent CEO: The entire VW board of directors has known about
the emissions scandal for years”
The author deliberately uses stylistic flaws, including the use of emotion-evoking words, excessive punctuation marks,
and case insensitivity.
Stylistic flaws
(---)
“WATCH OUT!!! - Social media manipulations are the main reason for the presidential election results of the USA!”
“ATTENTION!!! - The entire VW board of directors has known about the emissions scandal for years!”
The author deliberately frames a question such that it has an obvious or implied answer.
Rhetorical question
(Boundary item with
“Will you really continue to use social media, even if manipulation is the main reason for the U.S. presidential election
no or low expected
results?”
relationship to fake
“Will your next car really be a VW, even though the entire VW board of directors has known about the emissions scandal
news)
for years?”
 25

4.3 Topic choice and example construction

We chose one political- and one business-related context for the topic manipulation. The

business version, illustrated in Fig. 2, dealt with VW’s software-based manipulation of emission

values in their diesel cars. The political version dealt with the influence of social media on the

2016 U.S. election results. News media prominently discussed both topics at the time of the

study.

To construct suitable headlines for each rhetorical device, we kept the facticity of

statements about equal for each topic. The factually true parts were always VW’s manipulation

of emission values and the Trump campaign’s social media activities. We then exaggerated or

added made-up elements to this existing context. For example, we stated that social media was

the “main reason for the U.S. election results” and that the “entire VW board has known about

the emissions scandal for years.” All headlines might have been true or false, at least to some

degree, except for alternative facts, which were factually flawed. Table 2 lists all exemplary

headlines.

In total, each respondent saw nine items. For these items, we used a balanced incomplete

block design with 12 choice sets consisting of three items each, which ensures level balance

(each item appears four times) and orthogonality (each pair of items appears once) across

respondents. Respondents chose the items that most and least resembled fake news in each of the

twelve choice sets. To avoid order effects, we randomized the choice set and item order within a

choice set across respondents.

4.4 Setup of the reaction experiment and sampling

The second experiment directly followed the first. Its goal was to examine how readers

react in cases where they are skeptical that a certain social media user is posting information that

they perceive as fake news. On a scale between 1 (= totally disagree) and 7 (= totally agree), we
 26

asked how likely they a) would stop paying attention to the account, b) report the account to the

platform, c) stop receiving messages from the account, and d) stop using the whole platform.

These questions also contained an attention check that read “please click ‘totally disagree’ to

demonstrate that you read the questions carefully.”

We randomly assigned respondents, independent of the first experimental assignment, to

one of the following conditions: a) we varied the type of account (labeled as either an

acquaintance, i.e., not-so-close friend, or a company) and b) the frequency of posts containing

fake news (every 4th message or every 10th message). Regarding the first experimental condition,

we manipulated the sharing party’s closeness to the reader.

Following the work by Clark and Mills (1993), we anticipated that relationships with a

company (a non-personal contact) would be governed more by exchange norms (i.e., norms that

focus on self-interest and material gain; Aggarwal & Larrick, 2012), while relationships with an

acquaintance (a person known to the reader) would be governed more by communal norms (i.e.,

norms that focus on mutual caring and trust; Aggarwal & Larrick, 2012; Clark & Mills, 1993). In

the former relationship, the user expects a certain benefit in return for following the company (in

this case, the provision of truthful content); they become willing to withdraw from the

relationship if this benefit disappears. In the latter relationship, the user may not be guided solely

by norms of reciprocity, but instead value aspects like mutual support (Aggarwal & Larrick,

2012; Clark & Mills, 1993), which extend beyond the truthful sharing of information. As a

result, we expected users to show a stronger reaction to a company relative to an acquaintance.

A total sample of 488 participants, gathered through a professionsl panel provider in

Germany, completed the online survey in the fourth quarter of 2019. We excluded 72 of these

respondents because they failed the attention check. The final sample consisted of 416

respondents (201 male; Mage = 52.68 years).

 27

4.5 Results of the fallacy experiment

One strength of best-worst scaling is that its observations are easy to analyze without any

proprietary software. Simply counting the number of best choices for an item and subtracting the

number of times a respondent chose this item as worst provides individual or aggregate sample

preference estimates, which we subsequently refer to as BW scores (Finn & Louviere, 1992;

Mueller Loose & Lockshin, 2013). Each item appeared four times (= 12 x 3 / 9). Consequently,

an item may generate BW scores ranging between -4 and +4, depending on how frequently a

respondent chose it as “most likely resembles fake news” (+1), as “least likely resembles fake

news” (-1), or not at all (+0). Adding +5 to all BW scores will transform them into a range

between 1 and 9, i.e., the response we would observe on a nine-point Likert scale. After the

estimation, we followed Louviere et al. (2015) and normalized the BW scores between 100 (most

closely resembles fake news) and 0 (least closely resembles fake news).

Fig. 3 visualizes the normalized BW scores for all items and combines three types of

results. First, it visualizes the BW scores of each experimental condition and summarizes their

values in a table below. Furthermore, we report changes in the ranking positions between the

experimental condition in which respondents saw explanations of the rhetorical device and the

experimental condition in which they did not see them, as well as display the differences of the

two normalized BW scores for an item. Finally, we statistically tested how the BW scores relate

to each experimental manipulation using the Pearson correlation coefficient on the right-hand

side of Fig. 3.
 28

Explanations in business context Explanations in political context

Statements alone in business context Statements alone in political context
100.00
Normalized Best Worst Scores

90.00
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
Alternative False Ad Formal logical Stylistic Argument from Bandwagon False Rhetorical
facts attribution hominem error flaws ignorance effect dilemma question

Alternative False Ad Formal Stylistic Argument Bandwagon False Rhetorical Techniques in business Techniques Statements
facts attribution hominem logical flaws from effect dilemma question context in political alone in
error ignorance context business context
Explanations in business context, normalized mean
100.00 60.67 44.51 32.93 30.79 36.28 17.07 15.24 0.00 Correlations
BW scores
Explanations in political context, normalized mean
100.00 75.70 52.11 51.76 51.06 25.35 17.25 7.04 0.00 .94***
BW scores
Statements alone in business context, normalized
100.00 9.40 69.59 0.00 40.44 20.69 73.67 51.10 27.27 .39 .23
mean BW scores
Statements alone in political context, normalized
86.58 13.42 100.00 12.99 80.52 27.71 43.72 24.68 0.00 .51 .50 .73**
mean BW scores
Differences between explanations vs. statements alone
Difference in ranking positions for business context 0 -6 0 -5 0 -1 5 4 3 Correlation in ranking
differences between .85***
-1 -5 2 -4 2 1 3 2 0
Difference in ranking positions for political context contexts
Difference in normalized mean BW scores for Correlation in
0.00 -51.27 25.08 -32.93 9.65 -15.59 56.59 35.85 27.27
business context normalized mean BW
.83***
Difference in normalized mean BW scores for score differences
-13.42 -62.28 47.89 -38.77 29.46 2.35 26.47 17.63 0.00
political context between contexts

Note: N = 416; *: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***p < .01

Fig. 3 Results of best-worst scaling analysis

Running head: SHADES OF FAKE NEWS 29

When looking at the first two rows (i.e., the ones related to the explanations of the

rhetorical device), we found that alternative facts most closely resembled fake news (BW scores

= 100.00 for both groups) while rhetorical question least closely resembled fake news (0.00 for

both groups). A “grey area” of perception of information as fake news existed between these

two. False attribution (mean BW score of both groups = 68.19), ad hominem (48.31), and formal

logical error (42.34) ranked relatively high in terms of their perception as fake news, followed

by stylistic flaws (40.92), argument from ignorance (30.82), bandwagon effect (17.16), and false

dilemma (11.14).

When respondents saw the explanations of the applied fallacy, we observed a high

Pearson correlation coefficient of .94 (p < .01) between the normalized BW scores of the two

contexts. A likely explanation is that respondents followed our instructions and concentrated on

the explanations. However, when respondents saw the exemplary news statements without the

explanations, the normalized BW scores were also highly correlated between the political and

business contexts, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of .73 (p < .05). This high correlation

supports our first hypothesis (H1) and suggests that fallacies and rhetorical devices can indeed

capture the grey areas of fake news, i.e., the nuances in perception.

We noticed substantial differences between respondents who saw the news statements

alone and those who also saw the explanations. The correlation between the two groups was not

significant for either the political or business context (p > .10). While respondents in the first

group identified the news statement that employed alternative facts as made up and likewise

awarded rhetorical question with a relatively low BW score (13.64), the BW scores of false

attribution and formal logical error were substantially lower compared to the case where the

explanations were also provided. For example, the item ranking position of false attribution

decreased without the explanations by up to six ranks. Conversely, respondents strongly

 30

overemphasized the bandwagon effect and false dilemma technique as fake news compared to

those who received the explanations. Meanwhile, the BW scores of stylistic flaw and ad

hominem were congruent for both groups.

To test the second hypothesis (H2), we calculated the differences in BW scores and

ranking positions between the versions in which explanations were provided vs. the versions in

which the statements appeared alone. Fig. 3 lists the results in the final rows. The Pearson

correlation coefficients for the two contexts were .85 (p < .01) when comparing the differences

in the ranking positions and .83 (p < .01) when comparing the differences in the BW scores. As

such, we found empirical support for H2.

In a final step, we investigated the heterogeneity of the (normalized) BW scores. We

regressed the experimental condition together with the demographics age and gender on each

score and report the results in Table 3. We additionally regressed them on a consistency measure,

i.e., a quality measure of respondents’ choices, which we adapted from Louviere et al. (2015).

The authors propose that consistency for each respondent should be measured as the individual

sum of all squared BW scores. Given the properties of the balanced incomplete block design

(i.e., level balance and orthogonality), a perfectly consistent respondent achieves the highest

consistency measure (in our case, with each item appearing four times: 2·4²+2·3²+2·2²+2·1² =

60). Inconsistent responses result in a consistency measure close to zero.

 31

Table 3 Examination of heterogeneity in BW scores

Coefficients for each Alternative False Ad Formal Stylistic Argument Bandwagon False Rhetorical
independent variable (linear facts attribution hominem logical flaws from effect dilemma question
regression; DV: normalized BW error ignorance
scores)

46.12 66.10 51.44 .56 48.86 63.70 45.15 51.76 42.72

Intercept
(7.78)*** (8.41)*** (8.40)*** (.49) (8.41)*** (7.87)*** (7.66)*** (7.74)*** (7.76)***

Techniques in business context

-9.23 .33 -.33 .42 6.49 -7.16 -.32 -2.88 1.63
(Reference: explanations in
(4.07)** (4.40) (4.40) (.26) (4.40) (4.12)* (4.01) (4.05) (4.06)
political context)

Statements alone in business

-2.93 -25.79 10.11 -1.32 2.13 -9.11 23.24 14.66 9.32
context (Reference: explanations
(4.24) (4.58)*** (4.57)** (.27)*** (4.58) (4.29)** (4.17)*** (4.21)*** (4.23)**
in political context)

Statements alone in political

-16.26 -19.23 13.21 -.46 13.31 -4.35 8.19 4.53 3.13
context (Reference: explanations
(4.04)*** (4.37)*** (4.36)*** (.26)* (4.37)*** (4.09) (3.98)** (4.02) (4.03)
in political context)

-6.51 -2.43 1.23 .05 2.10 -1.63 -4.35 5.78 5.73

Female (Reference: Male)
(2.90)** (3.13) (3.13) (.18) (3.13) (2.93) (2.85) (2.88)** (2.89)**

.33 -.07 -.05 .00 -.18 -.25 .06 -.02 -.04

Age
(.10)*** (.10) (.10) (.01) (.10)* (.10)** (.10) (.10) (.10)

Consistency .47 -.02 .09 -.01 .14 -.02 -.11 -.33 -.26
(.11)*** (.12) (.12) (.01)* (.12) (.11) (.11) (.11)*** (.11)**
R² .108 .119 .037 .111 .037 .030 .102 .076 .035
Note: N=416; *: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***p < .01

The experimental conditions mostly explain the differences in individual BW scores: in

particular, whether respondents saw the explanations for the respective rhetorical devices or not.

For instance, without explanations, respondents did not perceive the news statements that

contained false attribution as fake news to the same degree (-25.79 and -19.23, p < .01). In

contrast, they overemphasized ad hominem as fake news (+10.11 and +13.21, p < .05) compared

to the condition in which we provided explanations. With few exceptions, the coefficients of

gender, age, and the consistency measure were significant for those items that we added as

natural boundaries of the experiment (i.e., alternative facts and rhetorical questions). For

example, regarding the dependent variable alternative facts, the positive and significant value for

age (.33) indicates that older respondents had a strong perception that this item constitutes fake

news (also, when we did not provide the explanations). Yet, most of the fallacies were unaffected
 32

by these variables. This suggests that the degree to which people perceive fallacies as fake news

is mostly independent of age, gender, or the consistency of best-worst choices.

We tested the robustness of the results and replicated the political subset of the first

experiment (i.e., the two experimental conditions with explanations of the rhetorical device and

without) with 100 undergraduate students. We found that the consistency in their best-worst

choices (again calculated as the individual sum of the squared BW scores) was substantially

higher compared to the respondents in the panel. Nevertheless, the normalized BW scores were

similar with correlation coefficients of .94 (p < .01) and .73 (p < .05). We conclude that the

results are robust across different samples of respondents.

4.6 Post-hoc support for item selection

To solidify our assumption that the included fallacies are suitable for detecting nuances in

people’s perceptions of information as fake news, we conducted a post-study with either tenured

professors or assistant professors with a background on communications (either from

Information Systems or Marketing). Thereby, we tested two underlying assumptions of our main

study, namely: (i) that the used techniques are deceptive (in the sense of opinion-shaping) and

(ii) that news authors use them in news statements on social media.

We sent participation requests to about 60 professors and obtained a sample of 30: 25 full

professors and 5 assistant professors or post-doctoral researchers. Of the 30, 93% indicated that

they used one or more social media platforms at least once per month (Facebook: 73%,

LinkedIn: 73%, Twitter: 47%, Instagram: 37%), which we took as a sign that they were likely

familiar with news on social media.

We asked them to assess whether the techniques are deceptive. The respondents saw

eleven techniques: namely, the nine techniques from the main study and two new fallacies that

we considered when designing the main study, i.e., “post hoc ergo propter hoc” and “relative
 33

privation” (Bennett, 2012; Fearnside & Holther, 1959). For each technique, the respondents

evaluated the following statement on a Likert scale from 1 to 7 (1: do not agree at all, 7: fully

agree): “I perceive the technique as deceptive (in the sense of opinion-shaping).” In Fig. 4, we

summarize the results.

Fig. 4 Mean evaluation of deceptiveness, by technique

Alternative facts were perceived as the most deceptive, followed by the remaining

techniques that we had chosen for the main study. The two newly added techniques, post hoc

ergo propter hoc and relative privation, ranked lowest among the studied items. These results

strengthen our anticipation that the chosen exemplary fallacies are suitable for detecting nuances

in people’s perceptions of information as fake news. Interestingly, among the experts, rhetorical

devices were perceived to be more deceptive than we anticipated and observed in the main study.

Subsequently, the respondents evaluated how often they thought news authors use each of

the eleven techniques in social media news statements (not at all, seldom, frequently, very

frequently). Out of all 330 (=30x11) evaluations, only five evaluations were “not at all”. Hence,
 34

the majority of respondents felt that the techniques are actually used in social media. We

summarize the results in Fig. 5.

Fig. 5 Frequency distributions of technique use on social media

Finally, respondents evaluated the following statement on a Likert scale from 1 to 7 (1:

do not agree at all, 7: fully agree): “I perceive a social media news statement as fake news when

the afore-shown techniques are used.” We deliberately placed this question toward the end of the

survey and used the term “fake news” here for the first time so as not to reveal the topic of the

main study in the previous questions. We obtained an average score of 5.50 on this measure,

indicating that the average participant agreed that using these techniques influences the

perception of information as fake news (see Fig. 6).

 35

Fig. 6 Perceived link between use of techniques and fake news

4.7 Results of the reaction experiment

Table 4 summarizes the results on how respondents would react to posts of a social media

account containing fake news in their news feed, as derived from our second study. Consumers

who noticed fake news in their news feed primarily reacted toward the authors of the post, i.e.,

acquaintance or company (4.60-5.59), and less toward the platform (2.82-3.88). To explore this

finding further, we estimated a linear regression with each reaction as the dependent variable,

while the author of the post, frequency, gender, age, and social media usage intensity were

treated as independent variables. We furthermore controlled for potential yea- or nay-saying

behavior in Likert scales, which is also referred to as acquiescence bias (e.g., Dinev, Xu, Smith,

& Hart, 2013; Johnston, Werkentin, McBride, & Carter, 2016; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &

Podsakoff, 2003). To this end, we incorporated an additional independent variable. For each

reaction, the additional variable consisted of the product of the other three reactions, and thus, it

captures respondents’ tendency to answer on the right- or left-hand side of the scale.
 36

Table 4 Results of reaction towards fake news in social media feed

Pay less attention Report friend Stop following Stop using

Mean Likert scores (scale with 1=lowest, 7=highest) to account to platform account platform
Acquaintance, 4th message 5.56 (1.81) 3.78 (2.12) 4.64 (2.09) 3.08 (2.10)
Acquaintance, 10th message 5.34 (2.21) 3.88 (2.12) 4.60 (2.16) 2.82 (2.09)
Company, 4th message 5.59 (1.79) 3.79 (2.10) 5.25 (1.97) 3.69 (2.21)
Company, 10th message 5.46 (2.05) 3.80 (2.11) 5.30 (2.05) 3.74 (2.42)
Coefficients for each independent variable (linear Pay less attention Report friend Stop following Stop using
regression; DV: Likert scores) to account to platform account platform
Intercept 4.73 (.56)*** 2.79 (.60)*** 2.97 (.58)*** 4.61 (.61)***
Company (baseline: acquaintance) .07 (.19) .27 (.20) -.49 (.19)** -.70 (.20)***
4th message (baseline: 10th message) .19 (.19) -.04 (.20) .09 (.19) .07 (.20)
Gender .05 (.19) -.09 (.20) -.03 (.19) -.12 (.20)
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .02 (.01)*** .01 (.01)
Social media usage intensity .04 (.08) .14 (.08)* .19 (.08)** -.57 (.08)***
Acquiescence bias .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** .00 (.00)**
Note: N=416; *: p < .1; **: p < .05; ***p < .01

The regression results show that companies generally suffer more from spreading fake

news than acquaintances: In such cases, it is significantly more likely that consumers will stop

following the company’s account or leave the platform entirely. The actual posting frequency

(every 4th vs. every 10th message) had no significant impact. Regarding social media usage, we

found that people who use social media more frequently have a more pronounced reaction when

they notice fake news in their news feed: They are significantly (albeit weakly) more likely to

report the friend to the platform (p < .1), significantly more likely to stop following the account

(p < .05), but significantly less likely to stop using the platform (p < .01). Heavy users have

developed a habit for social media use and may therefore be less likely to abandon the platform.

At the same time, fake news detracts from the user experience and perceived value of the

platform, leading people to take corrective action by reporting a friend who shares fake news.

Heavy users should also be more acquainted with the features offered by social media platforms,

such as the ability to unfollow or report an account, and may, therefore, be more prone to using

them.

To conclude, the frequency of messages that users perceive as fake news is not important for

users’ reaction toward the platform or the sender. However, we observe a more severe reaction
 37

among users when the message comes from a company instead of an acquaintance. Together

with the findings on fallacies, we conclude that companies must be cautious about how readers

perceive their messages and should carefully evaluate their choice of rhetorical devices.

5 Discussion and Conclusions

While other disciplines have generally conceptualized fake news as binary (either true or

false) and lacked a common definition, our manuscript represents a first step in analyzing and

defining the term “fake news” apart from its content. Without claiming to cover the whole

spectrum of fake news, we propose that rhetorical devices play a fundamental role in people’s

perception of information as fake news. Thus, we sought to study the use of exemplary fallacies

in the context of news headlines.

In our paper, we observed that consumers differentiate nuances of fake news (i.e., grey

areas) with high correlations between political and business contexts. However, without

explanations, some fallacies successfully manage to distract their audience from the statements’

contents. Readers perceive these statements to a lesser degree as fake news when presented in

isolation rather than when presented alongside the underlying rhetorical device. For example,

respondents who did not receive explanations about false attribution did not immediately

recognize this fallacy as fake news. At the same time, they overemphasized the perception of

other fallacies like the bandwagon effect.

Our study challenges the simplistic view that fake news has a binary operationalization

based on the availability of facts. Instead, fake news is more multi-faceted. Focusing attention on

fallacies in news statements can enhance consumers’ information literacy (i.e., their ability to

discriminate between credible and fake news) and help them overcome common individual

prejudices. Besides, such a focus provides further opportunities for scholars and practitioners to
 38

identify and prevent fake news. This would help not only in social media, but also in a traditional

media context (e.g., newspapers or their associated websites).

Our study also points out that fake news is not only of concern in politics, but that the

studied rhetorical devices are similarly perceived as fake news in our business context. This

observation suggests that fake news can cause extensive harm to companies. Business cases

support this argument: For instance, in November 2016, PepsiCo’s CEO was misquoted as

saying that Trump voters should “take their business elsewhere” (Picchi, 2016); this proved

damaging to the brand’s reputation and resulted in a plunge of its stock price, which took more

than a month to recover. Of course, fake news has implications that go far beyond politics or

business and can impact society at large. The COVID-19 pandemic and the issue of climate

change are two prominent breeding grounds for fake news, as many decisions are irreversible

and important data for their evaluation is simply missing.

The results of the reaction experiment suggest that users show a stronger reaction when a

message perceived as fake news originates from a company instead of an acquaintance. In

particular, we found that users are less likely to withdraw from a relationship with an

acquaintance (as opposed to a company) by unfollowing the account or leaving the platform

altogether. This is in line with our expectations based on Clark and Mills (1993), who suggested

that the relationship with an acquaintance is governed by communal norms, while the

relationship with the company follows exchange norms. Regarding respondents’ characteristics,

our results indicate that heavy users are more likely to report a friend to the platform and stop

following an account but are less likely to quit using the platform altogether.

Like any research, ours contains several opportunities for future studies. For example, we

selected only a small number of fallacies. Future scholars could more deeply examine other

fallacies to determine which ones drive the perception of information as fake news. Moreover,
 39

we only presented items in a textual format. Future studies could investigate the effect of other

mediums of communication, such as pictures or videos.

When comparing the influence of respondents’ characteristics on how fallacies were

ranked (see Table 3), we only collected and compared age and gender to keep the questionnaire

as short as possible. These demographic details mainly affected the ranking of the items

“alternative facts” and “rhetorical questions”, but not the ranking of the fallacies. Future research

may collect additional characteristics to shed light on individual differences in the perception of

information as fake news. For example, extant research finds that fake news believability is

largely driven by confirmation bias and thus determined by a reader’s prior views on an issue

(Kim & Dennis, 2019). Ricco (2007) found that performance in fallacy identification and

explanation tasks is unrelated to income and education level. However, social media usage

intensity has been linked to a higher belief in certain conspiracy theories and misinformation

(Enders et al., 2021).

Another limitation is that we only conducted our study in the German market. Future

research may acknowledge the existence of cultural differences in the creation and perception of

information as fake news. The method chosen in this study should be well-suited for this task,

since best-worst scaling offers the advantage of using scales that are similarly interpreted by

subjects of different cultural backgrounds (Adamsen, Rundle-Thiele, & Whitty, 2013). As a

result, if replications of the study measure differences in the perceptions across respondents of

different cultures, these differences can be directly linked to variable perceptions of information

as fake news across cultures. In other words, they will not be affected by different interpretations

of the scale used to study the perceptions. Furthermore, our best-worst scaling approach provides

new opportunities to classify and compare fallacies.

 40

A final limitation is that, while we can place all fallacies on a scale that ranges between

“most” and “least likely resembles fake news”, we cannot determine a threshold whereby

respondents become indifferent in their perceptions. We welcome methodological approaches

that enable researchers to measure this threshold when applying best-worst scaling. Usefully,

Dyachenko, Reczek, and Allenby (2014) and Louviere et al. (2015) have provided some initial

ideas in this direction.

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