Sappari K. Sawadjaan v. CA (G.R. No.

141735)
JUNE 4, 2016 JAICDN LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts:
Petitioner Sawadjaan was an appraiser/investigator in the
Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB) when on the basis of his report, a
credit line was granted to Compressed Air Machineries and
Equipment Corporation (CAMEC) by virtue of the two parcels of
land it offered as collaterals. Meanwhile, Congress passed a law
which created Al-Amanah Investment Bank of the Philippines
(AIIBP) and repealed the law creating PAB, transferring all its
assets, liabilities and capital accounts to AIIBP. Later, AIIBP
discovered that the collaterals were spurious, thus conducted an
investigation and found petitioner Sawadjaan at fault. Petitioner
appealed before the SC which ruled against him. Petitioner
moved for a new trial claiming he recently discovered that AIIBP
had not yet adopted its corporate by-laws and since it failed to file
within 60 days from the passage of its law, it had forfeited its
franchise or charter and thus has no legal standing to initiate an
administrative case. The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of AIIBP to file its by-laws within the
period prescribed results to a nullity of all actions and proceedings
it has initiated.
Ruling: NO.
The AIIBP was created by Rep. Act No. 6848. It has a main office
where it conducts business, has shareholders, corporate officers,
a board of directors, assets, and personnel. It is, in fact, here
represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel,
“the principal law office of government-owned corporations, one of
which is respondent bank.” At the very least, by its failure to
submit its by-laws on time, the AIIBP may be considered
a de facto corporation whose right to exercise corporate powers
may not be inquired into collaterally in any private suit to which
such corporations may be a party.
Moreover, a corporation which has failed to file its by-laws within
the prescribed period does not ipso facto lose its powers as such.
The SEC Rules on Suspension/Revocation of the Certificate of
Registration of Corporations, details the procedures and remedies
that may be availed of before an order of revocation can be
issued. There is no showing that such a procedure has been
initiated in this case.

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in
toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance

of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she
is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of
good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is
an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987,
the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private
respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments;
she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started
to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation
with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod
City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the

personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint
and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent;
he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport;
and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of
the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof,
he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court

issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which
the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of

Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
 Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum

Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay

Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since
July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when

the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny
Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on
August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the
Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the
private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the
latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment

is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff

the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff

the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's
fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and
conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers,
(b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c)
petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to
marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner
and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to
public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed
summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the
foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin

at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they
first met. He later proposed marriage to her several
times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal
of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to
get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and
their submarkings) of defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day.
Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents
and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and
because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and
trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the
few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they
continued to live together in defendant's apartment.
However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in
the morning that made her sleep the whole day and
night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant
gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him
of his promise to marry her until he told her that he
could not do so because he was already married to a
girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the
barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer,
her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted
that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
 Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking
for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many
relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent

Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No.
24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in
not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b)
in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the

challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16
October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she

met defendant who was already 29 years old at the
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have
allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was
no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry
her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff
and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the
plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
herself to be photographed with defendant in public in
so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant
where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the manager and employees
of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked
to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of
medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga,
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's
insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents,
and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant
where plaintiff was working and where defendant first
proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair
and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which
she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a

man of good moral character and must think so low and
have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that
he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod
City for several years where he finished his B.S.
Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City.
 In other words, he also lived with another woman in
Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he
felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to
love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent,
trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it

was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming
as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made,
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he
had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition

on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether
or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable
because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed
love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally
invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he
is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that
even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly
allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the
basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial
"common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner
claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the
live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view
of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her

Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply
thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they
subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the

petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the

appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or
values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the
lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this
rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time,
again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely

on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is
a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate
 and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of

any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently,
the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be
respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is

not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from
the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have
made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We
quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach

of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
 the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart
Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article

21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-
delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the

sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed
it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss

or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing

norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of
"X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant.
Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
 incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot
bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is

approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the

notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts
or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious
acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
 postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law
on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of

the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the

petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction
— the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338
of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be
applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a
victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman
because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner

is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be
— when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of
first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit
of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise

hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction,
recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced
that such seduction existed. The following enlightening
disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the

example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that
in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that

—

To constitute seduction there must in all

cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement.
If she consents merely from carnal lust and
the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction,
par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species
of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces
of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the

woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the

willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity for
the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the demoralization
 of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand

out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of
the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence,
we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo

L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a
breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the

intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no
recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such

as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still

subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the
present article31 in the Code. The example given by the
Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense
of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished
without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse
of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age,
has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said
that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by

willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however,
must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because
an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age
may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful
act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability,
even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
 and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of
the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative

proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he
did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are
in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code
and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent
had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter

will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that
she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt,
is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial
assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that
may have been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the

petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then,
from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that
by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,

customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed,
the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest
of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it
is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore,
in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in
delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of

the parties, where his transgression has been brought
about by the imposition of undue influence of the party
on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at

fault, there should be no action by one against the other
(Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has
been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on
both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private

respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner
stay together in the same room in their house after giving
approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged

decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo vs Garcia 73 Phil 607 (1942)

Facts:

On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of

the Malate taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was over-turned, and
one of the passengers, Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries and died
2 days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and
was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition
to reserve the civil action. Parents of the deceased, later, filed a
civil action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab
and employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly
responsible. It is undisputed that Fontanilla’s negligence was the
cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the
road at high speed, and there was no showing that Barredo
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. Main theory of
the defense is that the liability of Barredo is only subsidiary under
the RPC and since no civil action was filed against fontanilla he
cannot be held responsible in the case.

Issue: W/N plaintiffs may bring separate civil action against

Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly
responsible under Art. 1903 of the civil code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla

Ruling: In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of
criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been
held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly
suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own
presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under
article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising
from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's
primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs
were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. The master is liable for the negligent acts of his
servant where he is the owner or director of a business or
enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant
is engage in his master’s employment as such owner.

G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014

DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., Petitioner,
vs.
HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO
CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his

absolution from civil liability.

The Case

In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision

promulgated on February 20, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City
ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
charged against him.2

Antecedents

On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita

Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the
Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo
circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of
circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited
blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the
child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the
catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital
over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue
taking antibiotics.

On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of

the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his
penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by Hanz’s
appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an
urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra.
Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated
on three times to repair his damaged urethra.

When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and

reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against
the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. On April 17, 1997, the information3 was filed in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which
the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22, 1998.4 Under the order of
April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99.5

At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses,

including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the
physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged
urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to
have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to
trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to
strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily
explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by
trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that
had caused the injury.

In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended

that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995,
he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the
appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required
immediate surgical operation; that after performing the
appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents’
consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the
parents’ claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had
then cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had
subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the
penis had been brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.

Ruling of the RTC

In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,6 the RTC acquitted

the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the
evidence. It held that the Prosecution’s evidence did not show the
required standard of care to be observed by other members of the
medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the
RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral damages
because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that
Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by
the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders

judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but
ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,7 sustaining the award of

moral damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily
mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering that the
Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of
Hanz as the result of the circumcision.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the

motion on April 28, 2004.8

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability

despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries.

Ruling

The petition for review lacks merit.

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is

also civilly liable.9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
Manantan v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court elucidates on the two
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different
effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on

the civil liability of the accused.1âwphi1 First is an acquittal on the
ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only.

The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the

judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist."11

Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an

accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the
court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.

Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to

sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging
his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere
preponderance of evidence.12 In this connection, the Court
reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not
require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be
through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.13

The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable

because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant
consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal
negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him
that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold
him civilly liable.14 With the RTC and the CA both finding that
Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the
petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and
that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur
with their uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not
analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of
facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a
clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.

Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his

body.1âwphi1 Although we have long advocated the view that any
physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of
one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not
susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should
be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The
assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of
one’s body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for the
physical injuries sustained.15 In Hanz’s case, the undesirable
outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced
the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in
order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and
moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00
awarded as moral damages.

Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest
of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the award as a
sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is
not only reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless we make
the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing legal
interest on the award, his sufferings would be unduly
compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should
be from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the
making of the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on

February 20, 2003, with the modification that legal interest of 6%
per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award
of:₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.

Mauricio Manliclic v. Modesto Calaunan G.R. No. 150157,

January 25, 2007

FACTS:

Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and

owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and
driven by Marcelo Mendoza. The two vehicles collided. The front
right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the
jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and
then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters
from point of collision. By reason of such collision, a criminal case
was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December
1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.

ISSUE:

Whether failure to object to an evidence offered is a waiver and

the transcripts may be admitted in evidence

HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the transcript of stenographic

notes containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be admitted
in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites
of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.For Section 47, Rule
130 21 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b)

his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or

proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties
or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although
on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness in the former case. Admittedly,
respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set
forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-
89, had no opportunity to crossexamine the three witnesses in
said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees. Notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the
ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when
an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right
to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a
failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to
the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming
ex gratia argument that these documents are inadmissible for
being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the
same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the
facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be
insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is,

like any other evidence, to be considered and given the

importance it deserves.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER

FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL,
MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.

Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.

Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private

respondents.

Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850
(German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated
October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages
against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala
"without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of
the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of
Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said
Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the

Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L.
Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned
and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City
to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of
chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers,
and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga
City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight
curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71
owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven
by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization.

Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus
were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at
a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner
in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German
C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on
September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850)
against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively,
of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision,
with prayer for preliminary attachment.

On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson

filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850
admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by
way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and
reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson,
driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25
coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an
excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop
the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite
of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus
causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private
respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on
petitioners.

On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc.

and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds,
namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action;
2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but
without the requisite verification, hence defective under the
provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the
defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver,
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with
maximum care and prudence.

The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was

that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971,
or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No.
4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and
less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and
that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action
could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has
been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action
is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely
subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence;
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art.
33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not
to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said

motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for damages
was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability
on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action
for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code,
and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to
enforce.

In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850,

the lower court sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or
not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or
civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort
under American law" there "should be a showing that the
offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his
right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the
complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion
of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of
the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the
defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory
and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the
action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial

court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal on certiorari.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the

allegations contained in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles
2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or
omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or
negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in
the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries
and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the
collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual
relations between the parties. The circumstance that the
complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the
driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action,
as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is
merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly
excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of
negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of
the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
(Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is
inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both
complaints would substantially be the same. It should be
emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia,
et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1,
1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted,
however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a
time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
Palileo,2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had
already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had
entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the
course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was
convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by
final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such
reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat3 that when the
criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not
proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the
Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages
suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private
counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal
case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart
an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and,
therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages
subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of
the New Civil Code.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never

intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said
criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of
said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil
action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their
right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have
opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.

As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private

respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the
criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he
has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action.
For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has
disappeared.

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing

damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation
and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ...
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated
in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso."4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the
civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by
petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require
reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution
of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of
the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to
intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of
the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of
the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the
action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no
legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby

reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed
with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.

Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra,

JJ., concur.

Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 200444, August 15, 2018

SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. AND FELIX Q.

RUZ, Petitioners, v. ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not
anymore apply to the independent civil actions under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may be filed at
anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the
same act or omission.

The Case
Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix Q. Ruz
hereby assail the decision promulgated on January 27,
2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240 on November 24, 2008 by the
Regional Trial Court in Tabaco City dismissing their counterclaim
on the ground that to allow their counterclaim was tantamount to
double recovery of damages, considering that the same was not
prosecuted in the criminal action against the respondent's driver.2

Antecedents

The relevant factual background was summarized by the CA

thusly:

On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto

Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours Bus with body
number 1896-C and plate Number TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648
(new), owned by [respondent] Antonio San Andres, along
Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban Norte, Candelaria,
Quezon, going towards the direction of Manila. While traversing
Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota
Revo it was overtaking. The Mabel Tours Bus immediately
swerved to the left lane but in the process, it hit head-on the
Supreme Bus owned and registered in the name of [petitioner]
Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by [petitioner]
Felix G. Ruz, that was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because
of the strong impact of the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed
to the side of the road and the Mabel Tour Bus continuously
moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that was parked on the
side of the road which later on fell on the canal. Nobody died but
all the vehicles were damaged.

Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged

buses as well as the other two (2) vehicles were conducted and
undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of Candelaria, Municipal Police
Station.
[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB
Assembler and Body Builder to have it repaired. The cost of repair
was estimated in the amount of One Hundred Forty Four
Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (Php144,500.00).

On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the

Court a quo was instituted by [respondent] Antonio San Andres
against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus
and unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at
the time it underwent repairs in the amount of P144,500.00 and
P150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of
P30,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00, litigation expenses of
P20,000.00 and cost of the suit were also lodged in the complaint.

xxxx

Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim.

They alleged among others that plaintiff has no cause of action
against them; the proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the
reckless imprudence of the [respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez
operated the Mabel Tours Bus recklessly and in violation of traffic
laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another
vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right
lane coming from the opposite direction resulting to head on
collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of
the accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside
his franchise and without a registered plate.

By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme Transportation

Liner, Inc. alleged that it suffered damages in the aggregate
amount of P500,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for the medical
expenses of its employees and passengers. The unwarranted
filing of the case forced them to secure the services of a counsel
for P50,000.00 plus appearance fee of P5,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of P3,000.00 including traveling
expenses.
xxxx

After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for pre-trial
conference wherein the parties, in an effort to amicably settle the
case, referred the case to conciliation. The parties, however,
failed to hammer out an amicable settlement. Hence, trial on the
merits ensued.

[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence to support

their claims and contentions. [Respondent] presented himself and
Ernesto Belchez who later became a hostile witness. On the part
of [petitioner and Ruz], Felix Ruz, SPO1 Rafael B. Ausa and
Assistant for Operations of [petitioner] Supreme Transportation
Liner, Inc., Jessi Alvarez, were presented.

In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a criminal

complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property against Ernesto Belchez before the Court in Candelaria,
Quezon. The case is now terminated and the accused was
convicted because of his admission of the crime charged. In the
said criminal complaint, he did not reserve their civil claim or
asked (sic) the fiscal to reserve it, which, if itemized, would also
be the amount of their counterclaim in the present civil action filed
by [respondent]. He added that they did not receive any
compensation for the civil aspect of the criminal case, and
although the Supreme Bus was covered by insurance, they did
not claim for any reimbursement in connection with the subject
incident.3

Judgment of the RTC

On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing

the respondent's complaint as well as the petitioners'
counterclaim,4 decreeing:
From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages filed by the
plaintiff is hereby dismissed for having failed to prove liability on
the part of the defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by the
defendants hereof is also dismissed for failure to adhere to
procedural requirements.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the
petitioners' liability;6 and that the petitioners' counterclaim should
also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court,7 whose pertinent portions the RTC quoted in its judgment
as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. � When a

criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the

Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

xxxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions

shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.8

The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action precluded their right to recover
damages from the respondent through their counterclaim.9
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE

COUNTERCLAIM

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE

COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO RESERVATION WAS MADE
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-253 FILED AGAINST PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO BELCHEZ.10

Decision of the CA

In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,11 the

CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating that the RTC had
correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not prosper because
their recourse was limited to the enforcement of the respondent's
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code;12 that "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is
tantamount to double recovery of damages, a prohibition under
Article 2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the
Rules;"13 and that their failure to reserve the separate civil action
meant that their right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code was deemed instituted with the criminal action.14

The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through

the resolution promulgated on January 26, 2012.15

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the petitioners'

counterclaim was correctly denied by the RTC.
 Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been

dismissed by the RTC and the CA despite their failure to reserve
the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they had
brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not
they could recover damages upon their counterclaim presents a
different story, as they should first show that they will not recover
damages twice for the same incident.

1.
Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the
nature of an independent civil action,
required no prior reservation

As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of

action should be limited to the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the respondent's
driver the criminal complaint for criminal negligence under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was seemingly of the
opinion that the petitioners' recourse against the respondent was
limited to recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his
subsidiary liability under and pursuant to Article 10316 of
the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA pointed out that the
petitioners' failure to reserve the civil aspect of the criminal case
proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil aspect of the

criminal case they have filed. Without so doing, they were
deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver
on the basis of the crime. Therefore, the right of appellants to
institute a separate civil case to recover liability from appellee
based under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted
with the criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action
against appellee will be limited to the recovery of the latter's
subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. x x
x17

The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the

petitioners' cause of action as presented in their counterclaim.

We only need to look at the facts alleged in the petitioners'

counterclaim to determine the correct nature of their cause of
action.18 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
the suit are to be determined not by the claim of the party filing
the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.19

The counterclaim relevantly reads:

xxxx

5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular accident is

the reckless imprudence of the plaintiffs driver, one ERNESTO
BELCHEZ, by operating said Mabel Tours bus recklessly and in
violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the
overtaking of another vehicle without regards (sic) to the rightful
vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite
direction resulting to head on collission (sic) on the lane of
defendant's SUPREME bus;

6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the subject

Mabel Tour bus outside his franchise, hence, in violation of his
franchise and allied rules and regulations; operated the san1e
without registered plate and using the route of another franchise
holder; and

COUNTERCLAIM
7. Defendants replead the precedings (sic) paragraphs as they
may be relevant;

8. That as a result of plaintiff's violation of his franchise and gross

negligence of his driver, the defendant's SUPREME bus suffered
damage in the aggregate amount of P500,000.00; medical
expenses for its employee and passengers in the amount of
P100,000.00;20

xxxx

Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners'

cause of action was upon a quasi-delict. As such, their
counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article
2184,21 in relation to Article 218022 and Article 2176,23 all of
the Civil Code. It is relevant to state that even the RTC itself
acknowledged that the counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, as
its ratiocination bears out, to wit:

The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation,

private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages
against the plaintiff under the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable

not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned task, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under

the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal
Code.

However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

while reiterating that a civil action under the above quoted
provisions of the New Civil Code may be brought separately from
the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be
reserved.24

Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its

ratiocination was founded on the obsolete version of the Rules of
Court. By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on
November 24, 2008, the revised relevant rule of procedure had
already been promulgated and taken effect,25 and it had
specifically deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis
the independent civil actions, as follows:

Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. � (a) When

a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action

shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
dan1ages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in

the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall

be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed

by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22

shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.

The en-or committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take

into consideration that the omission of the driver in violation of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could give rise not only to
the obligation ex delicto,26 but also to the obligation based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under the
factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on the
common element of negligence. Article 217727 of the Civil
Code and Section 3,28 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court allow the
injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions
simultaneously. As clarified in Casupanan v. Laroya:29

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed

instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions
based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct
and independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the
criminal action. (Bold emphasis supplied)

The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the injured

parties have to choose the remedy by which to enforce their claim
in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is
because Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars them from recovering
damages twice upon the same act or omission. As ruled
in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco:30

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to

two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising
from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34,
and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33
of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule 111, unlike the

predecessor, no longer includes the independent civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code as requiring
prior reservation to be made in a previously instituted criminal
action. Had it been cautious and circumspect, the RTC could
have avoided the error.

2.
Petitioners should first show that
they would not recover damages
twice from the same act or omission.

Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright the

damages prayed for by the petitioners in their counterclaim.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section
3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which is the applicable rule of
procedure, expressly prohibit double recovery of damages arising
from the same act or omission. The petitioners' allegation that
they had not yet recovered damages from the respondent was not
controlling considering that the criminal case against the
respondent's driver had already been concluded. It remains for
the petitioners to still demonstrate that the RTC as the trial court
did not award civil damages in the criminal case. Consequently,
Civil Case No. T-2240 should be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings, if only to afford to the petitioners the opportunity to
present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the prohibition
against double recovery of damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the

appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil Case No. T-2240 to
the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco City for further proceedings to
allow the petitioners to present evidence on their counterclaim,
subject to the foregoing clarifications.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO

CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the

Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-
C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya

("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya
for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil
case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999
and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted

that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion
for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999

dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a
final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further
held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the
premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such
error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but

the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
2000.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each

one of them may think and believe that the accident was
caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a
criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second
party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his
operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved
parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in
the criminal case."4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending

criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

The Court’s Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which
the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping,
constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and
Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action
resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused
in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was
not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on
quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.

In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective

as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges
that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy
of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition
for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition

raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since
they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the

ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal5 that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal
is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the
MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action

without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of
Rule 41 expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s
order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Forum-Shopping

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits

involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and
reliefs sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant
case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in

damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based
on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes
of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
 "Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he

proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered
damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the
private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action
under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state
only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these
articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on

Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires
the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
to wit:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x

x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be

filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action
to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no
forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing
of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action
provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil
actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed
"impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for
violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.

Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-

delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in
the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such
civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:

"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When

a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under

the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
 A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil

actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice

for the same act or omission of the accused.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on

December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a)

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil

action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x
 Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions."
(Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed

instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the
criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of
the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil
action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the
option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action
before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to
separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a

separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not
be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until
final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based
on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could
proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal
action.

The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules

continues this procedure, to wit:

"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After

the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action

has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until
final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
 the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and
civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of

the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the
rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-
delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section
2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.

When civil action may proceed independently

The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo,

who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a
separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal
case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In

the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the
amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to
bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule
111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action

can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the
accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that
the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule
111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the
accused.

Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero

vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could
validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused
in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for
malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence
of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted
civil actions and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and
disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further
ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the
offended party "after the criminal case is terminated and/or in
accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The
Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate
the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated
in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned
in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing
a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal
case. However, the same provision states that "any cause of
action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate
civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the
offended party is litigated in the criminal action.

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil

action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of
the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same
act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other
a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution
of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be
litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to

invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by

Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the
MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of

the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of
the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in
1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the
Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13 the
Court declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than

this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution —
whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.’"

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent
from the criminal action although arising from the same act or
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing
the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict.
The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took

effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of
dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -

"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be

construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."14
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999
and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99)
are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

Austria v. AAA and BBB

G.R. No. 205275, June 28, 2022

Facts:

Austria, a pubic school teacher, was convicted of 5 counts of acts

of lasciviousness against two 11-year-old female students. On his
motion for reconsideration, he was acquitted by the new presiding
judge who resolved the motion. The private complainants a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Thus, the
private complainants filed a special civil action for certiorari to the
CA. They alleged that the new presiding judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the Joint Orders of acquittal
which merely recited the contents of the accused's motion for
reconsideration without stating any factual and legal basis. The
CA declared the judgment of acquittal as void and that double
jeopardy did not attach.

Austria filed a petition with the SC, invoking his right against
double jeopardy and claiming that the private complainants had
no legal personality to question his acquittal. The SC required the
Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the private
complainants’ legal standing in a criminal case. The OSG gave
its conformity to the petition for certiorari that private complainants
filed before the CA. The OSG argued that the trial court's Joint
Orders were void for failure to state clearly the factual and legal
bases of Austria's acquittal.
Issues:

1. Whether the private complainants had the legal personality to

question the acquittal of the accused.

2. Whether the RTC’s orders of acquittal valid.

3. Whether Austria's right against double jeopardy was violated.

Held:

1. "In any criminal case or proceeding, only the OSG may bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or State before the Supreme Court (SC) and
the CA. This is explicitly provided under Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code of the
Philippines.

"The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the state
is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action and not
the private complainant. The interest of the private offended party
is restricted only to the civil liability of the accused. In the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that
of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through
the OSG. The private offended party may not take such appeal,
but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. Differently
stated, the private offended party may file an appeal without the
intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned. Also, the private complainant may file a
special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of
the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his or her interest in
the civil aspect of the case.
While the private complainants filed the petition before the CA
without the OSG’s prior conformity, they cannot be faulted for
relying on jurisprudence allowing them to assail the criminal
aspect of the case through a petition for certiorari on the grounds
of grave abuse of discretion and denial of due process. Hence,
the Court should not dismiss their remedy. In any event, the OSG
joined the cause of private complainants, and gave its conformity
to the petition for certiorari that the private complainants filed
before the CA.

2. The RTC orders, which simply copied the allegations of Austria

in his motions for reconsideration and memoranda were not valid.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides that
"no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the basis therefor." The failure to comply with the
constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The CA properly struck down as a nullity the RTC's Joint Orders

which simply copied the allegations of JVlamerto in his motions
for reconsideration and memoranda followed by a conclusion
"that the prosecution miserably failed to overcome the legal
presumption of innocence of the accused beyond cavil of
reasonable doubt." They contained neither an analysis of the
evidence nor a reference to any legal basis for the conclusion.
Thus, the Joint Orders are void for failure to meet the standard set
forth in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
3. As the RTC’s acquittal orders were void judgments, they have
no legal effect and thus did not terminate the case. Hence,
Austria’s right against double jeopardy was not violated.

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the

Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City,
and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of
carriage.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private

respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension
seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney

stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of
the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as
she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture
of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular
casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her
confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September
7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a
period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against

Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former
in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party

defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It
took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which
Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court

was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is
entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to
pay plaintiff-appellant:

(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

(5) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil

Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate
cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule
otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the
safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the
jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga
on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.

The petition has no merit.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-
delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case
the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva
and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage
caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in
this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.

Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be

clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage
are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with
regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the

goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,

common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by
articles 1733 and 1755.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the

presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty
of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers.

Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as

human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so.
Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.

First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not

properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters
from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of
the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which provides:

Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall drive

his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or
impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while
discharging or taking on passengers or loading or
unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.

Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more

passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:

Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating

any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more
freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered
capacity.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her
in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome
the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention

that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the
many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is
also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable.3 This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking
his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages

alleging that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this
contention well taken.

In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-

year college student in that school year 1989-1990 at
the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the
second semester of that school year. She testified that
she had no more intention of continuing with her
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not
to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education
"because of my leg which has a defect already."

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she

was under confinement, she cried in pain because of
her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the
Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual
bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not
 to further pursue Physical Education as her major
subject, because "my left leg . . . has a defect already."

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the

inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00,
which is fair, just and reasonable.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions

for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of
the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which
the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art.
1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the
cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.6

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages

since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of
carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open
court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a
nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.
The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to
the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the
accident.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March

31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL v. KEIHIN-EVERETT
FORWARDING COMPANY, GR No. 191937, 2017-08-09
Facts:
On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking
Service Agreement with Matsushita. Under the Trucking Service
Agreement, Keihin-Everett would provide services for
Matsushita's trucking requirements. These services were
subcontracted by Keihin-Everett to Orient Freight, through their
own Trucking Service Agreement executed on the same day.
In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett's Sales Manager,
Salud Rizada, about a column in the April 19, 2002 issue of the
tabloid newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002
interception by Caloocan City police of a stolen truck filled with
shipment of video monitors and CCTV systems owned by
Matsushita.
When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight
stated that the tabloid report had blown the incident out of
proportion. They claimed that the incident simply involved the
breakdown and towing of the truck, which was driven by Ricky
Cudas (Cudas), with truck helper, Rubelito Aquino[9] (Aquino).
The truck was promptly released and did not miss the closing time
of the vessel intended for the shipment.
Keihin-Everett directed Orient Freight to investigate the matter.
During its April 20, 2002 meeting with Keihin-Everett and
Matsushita, as well as in its April 22, 2002 letter addressed to
Matsushita, Orient Freight reiterated that the truck merely broke
down and had to be towed.
However, when the shipment arrived in Yokohama, Japan on May
8, 2002, it was discovered that 10 pallets of the shipment's 218
cartons, worth US$34,226.14, were missing.
Keihin-Everett independently investigated the incident. During its
investigation, it obtained a police report from the Caloocan City
Police Station. The report stated, among others, that at around
2:00 p.m. on April 17, 2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco
Street, Manila, Cudas told Aquino to report engine trouble to
Orient Freight. After Aquino made the phone call, he informed
Orient Freight that the truck had gone missing. When the truck
was intercepted by the police along C3 Road near the corner of
Dagat-Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas escaped and
became the subject of a manhunt.
When confronted with Keihin-Everett's findings, Orient Freight
wrote back on May 15, 2002 to admit that its previous report was
erroneous and that pilferage was apparently proven.
In its June 6, 2002 letter, Matsushita terminated its In-House
Brokerage Service Agreement with Keihin-Everett, effective July
1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence for terminating the
contract, stating that Keihin-Everett's way of handling the April 17,
2002 incident and its nondisclosure of this incident's relevant facts
"amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard of the rule of
law."
Keihin-Everett, by counsel, sent a letter dated September 16,
2002 to Orient Freight, demanding P2,500,000.00 as indemnity
for lost income. It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling of the
situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with
Matsushita.
When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a
complaint dated October 24, 2002 for damages with Branch 10,
Regional Trial Court, Manila.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its February 27, 2008
Decision,[20] in favor of Keihin-Everett. It found that Orient Freight
was "negligent in failing to investigate properly the incident and
make a factual report to Keihin[-Everett] and Matsushita," despite
having enough time to properly investigate the incident.
Orient Freight appealed the Regional Trial Court Decision to the
Court of Appeals. On January 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals
issued its Decision[25] affirming the trial court's decision. It ruled
that Orient Freight "not only had knowledge of the foiled hijacking
of the truck carrying the . . . shipment but, more importantly,
withheld [this] information from [Keihin-Everett]."
Issues:
whether the Court of Appeals, considering the existing contracts
in this case, erred in applying Article 2176 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
However, if the act complained of would not give rise to a cause
of action for a quasi-delict independent of the contract, then the
provisions on quasi-delict or tort would be inapplicable.
In situations where the contractual relation is indispensable to
hold a party liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
complained of was done in bad faith and in violation of Article 21
of the Civil Code to give rise to an action based on tort
Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts
regarding the hijacking incident since this was not among the
provisions of its Trucking Service Agreement with respondent.
There being no contractual obligation, respondent had no cause
of action against petitioner
The obligation to report what happened during the hijacking
incident, admittedly, does not appear on the plain text of the
Trucking Service Agreement. Petitioner argues that it is nowhere
in the agreement. Respondent does not dispute this claim.
Neither the Regional Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals relied
on the provisions of the Trucking Service Agreement to arrive at
their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking Service
Agreement was neither alleged nor proved.
The doctrine "the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort,"
on which the lower courts relied, is inapplicable here. Petitioner's
negligence, arising as it does from its performance of its
obligation to respondent, is dependent on this obligation. Neither
do the facts show that Article 21 of the Civil Code applies, there
being no finding that petitioner's act was a conscious one to
cause harm, or be of such a degree as to approximate fraud or
bad faith
Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on
negligence in the performance of an obligation should apply.
Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, liability for damages arises
when those in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
negligence, among others. Negligence here has been defined as
"the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances just demand, whereby that other
person suffers injury."[77] If the law or contract does not provide
for the degree of diligence to be exercised, then the required
diligence is that of a good father of a family.[78] The test to
determine a party's negligence is if the party used "the reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation"[79] when it performed the negligent
act. If the party did not exercise reasonable care and caution,
then it is guilty of negligence. In this case, both the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner was
negligent in failing to adequately report the April 17, 2002
hijacking incident to respondent and not conducting a thorough
investigation despite being directed to do so. The trial court's
factual findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court and are generally conclusive.
Despite the circumstances which would have cautioned petitioner
to act with care while investigating and reporting the hijacking
incident, petitioner failed to do so. Petitioner is responsible for the
damages that respondent incurred due to the former's negligent
performance of its obligation.
Principles:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code does not apply when the party's
negligence occurs in the performance of an obligation. The
negligent act would give rise to a quasi-delict only when it may be
the basis for an independent action were the parties not otherwise
bound by a contract.

G.R. No. 194403, July 24, 2019

SPOUSES HIPOLITO DALEN, SR. AND FE G. DALEN,

EVERLISTA LARIBA AND THE MINOR BEVERLY T. LARIBA,
MAGDALENA F. MARPAGA AND THE MINORS MIKE
ANTHONY AND THOMIE MAE, BOTH SURNAMED MARPAGA,
AGNES C. MOLINA AND THE MINORS SHEILA, SIMOUN,
STEPHEN JOHN AND SHARON ANN, ALL SURNAMED
MOLINA, EMMA C. NAVARRO AND THE MINORS RAYMOND,
MARAH, AND RYAN ALL SURNAMED NAVARRO, RUTH T.
SULAM AND THE MINOR JEINAR REECE T. SULAM,
PETITIONERS, v. MITSUI O.S.K. LINES DIAMOND CAMELLA,
S.A., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 dated July 20,
2010 and Resolution3 dated October 26, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112551 filed by Sps. Hipolito
Dalen, Sr. and Fe G. Dalen; Everlista Lariba and the minor
Beverly T. Lariba; Magdalena F. Marpaga and the minors Mike
Anthony and Thomie Mae, both surnamed Marpaga; Agnes C.
Molina and the minors Sheila, Simoun, Stephen John and Sharon
Ann, all surnamed Molina; Emma C. Navarro and the minors
Raymond, Marah, and Ryan all surnamed Navarro; Ruth T.
Sulam and the minor Jeinar Reece T. Sulam (Petitioners).
FACTS OF THE CASE

This case arose from a complaint for damages, plus attorney's

fees filed by petitioners together with Teresa Derder and the
minors Vinna Marie Derder, Bon Erik Derder, and Frances Karen
Derder; Lolita Tolentino, minors Ann Brigette Tolentino, Fe Clarin
Tolentino, Elvido Tolentino, Jr., Sarah Mae Tolentino, and Farah
Jane Tolentino; and Luz Marina Reyes and the minors Carolina
Marie Rose Reyes and Rossmark Reyes who, however, did not
join as parties in this petition for review, against Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines and Diamond Camellia, S.A. (collectively, Respondents).4

Based on the records of the case, it was found that Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, a non-resident corporation, not doing business in the
Philippines, was the charterer of MV Sea Prospect while Diamond
Camellia, S.A., another non-resident corporation, not doing
business in the Philippines, and of Panamian registry is the
registered owner of the said vessel.5

On January 1, 1998, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation

(Magsaysay), the manning agent of the respondents in the
Philippines, hired the following, among others, as crew members:

Name Position
1. Rosadel Reyes Captain
2. Simplicia Molina Chief Engineer
3. Antonio Marpaga First Engineer
4. Ramon Navarro Second Engineer
5. Fonillo Derder Second Engineer
6. Hipolito Dalen, Jr. Oiler
7. Vicente Lariba, Jr. Oiler
8. Elvido Tolentino Oiler
9. Joey Sulam Wiper
10. Donato Chief Cook
Cabungcag
11. Felix Makiling Deck Chief
12. Tito Robillos 2nd Officer
13. Emesto 3rd Officer
Gambalan
14. Marlon Marasigan Sailor
15. Eduardo Radio Operator
Camacho
16. Frederick Llanes M/M6

On or about August 15, 1998, MV Sea Prospect was making a

regular traffic between Japan and Indonesia and arrived at the
Port of Sebe, Indonesia in order to perform loading operations of
nickle-ore. Prior to its arrival therein, it had been raining, hence,
the nickle-ore was wet when loaded onboard MV Sea Prospect.7

On or about August 22, 1998, MV Sea Prospect headed to Japan.

While there, or on August 26, 1998, weather was inclement and
the vessel developed a list between 10 and 15 degrees to
starboard. Upon inspection, it was found that the cargo was very
wet so the Captain ordered to fill the ballast tanks, thus achieving
the vessel's stability. He then ordered a change in the course of
the vessel to the Island of Okinawa to seek refuge. While nearing
the Island of Okinawa, the vessel listed again 3 to 5 degrees then
to 90 degrees, taking water in the bridge, the engine stopping and
the electric power being cut. After 30 minutes, MV Sea Prospect
sunk, drowning 10 crew members, namely: (1) Rosadel Reyes;
(2) Simplicio Molina; (3) Antonio Marpaga; (4) Ramon Navarro;
(5) Fonillo Derder; (6) Hipolito Dalen, Jr.; (7) Vicente Lariba, Jr.;
(8) Elvido Tolentino; (9) Joey Sulam; and (10) Donato
Cabungcag. Eleven other crew members were saved and were
brought to the Japanese ports including (1) Felix Makiling; (2) Tito
Robillos; (3) Emesto Gambalan; (4) Marlon Marasigan; (5)
Eduardo Camacho; and (6) Frederick Llanes.8

Respondents alleged that on November 4, 1998, November 5,

1998 and December 10, 1998, petitioners who are heirs and
beneficiaries of the missing seafarers received full payment of
death benefits based on the employment contract as well as the
International Transport Workers' Federation-Japan Seaman
Union Associated Marine Officers and Seafarers Union of the
Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement�� (CBA)
governing the employment of the seafarers. Petitioners were
accompanied by their counsel, Atty. Emmanuel Partido in signing
the settlement agreements, affidavits of heirship and receipts of
payment before the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA).9

According to respondents, the contents of said documents were

explained to petitioners, the pertinent provisions include:

(a) The release of respondents from ALL liabilities, including

those based from torts, arising from the
death/disappearance of the crew members as a result of
 sinking of the vessel;
(b) The Settlement Agreement may be pleaded as an
ABSOLUTE and FINAL bar to any suit which may be filed
by petitioners; and
(c) The commitment by the petitioners that they will not file any
claim or suit against respondents in ANY jurisdiction.10

Petitioners allegedly demanded in writing further compensation in

connection with the sinking of the vessel and threatened that an
action arising from tort would be commenced in Panama should
their demand be unheeded. Hence, on February 26, 1999,
respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 46, a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Approval of the
Compromise/Settlement Agreement against petitioners. On July
9, 1999, petitioners filed the complaint for damages against
respondents before the Admiralty Court of Panama. On
September 28, 2000, respondent converted the petition for
declaratory relief into an ordinary civil action for breach of contract
and damages and prayed for the approval of the settlement
agreement.11

On August 23, 2004, the trial court issued an order confirming the
validity of the settlement agreement, declaring that the petitioners
breached the material provisions of the settlement agreement,
and approved such settlement agreement. The Supreme Court of
Panama, meanwhile, dismissed petitioners' case for lack of
jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens.12

On July 18, 2002, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents and prescription of action. According to the LA,
summonses cannot be validly served upon the respondents being
foreign corporations and not having transacted business in the
Philippines.13 In this case, the action for damages is an action in
personam, wherein jurisdiction over their person is necessary for
the LA to validly try and decide their case. However, since they
are non-residents, personal service of summonses within the
Philippines is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over their
persons.

Moreover, the LA found that the action filed by petitioners has

already prescribed. The Labor Code provides that all money
claims arising from employer� employee relationship accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued. Here, the sinking of
MV Sea Prospect occurred on August 26, 1998, they have three
years to file their claim from such date. They filed their complaint
on April 17, 2002 or more than three years therefrom.

However, the LA referred the case back to the Maritime Court of

Panama where trial on the merits could be had and where any
judgment in favor of petitioners could be sufficiently satisfied from
the letter of guarantee issued by respondents. It held that contrary
to the decision of the Supreme Court of Panama, the Maritime
Court of Panama is the forum in which the action may be most
appropriately brought, considering the best interest of the parties.

The petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) but it was dismissed through a
Resolution14 dated February 4, 2004.

Upon the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the NLRC

issued a Resolution15 dated December 28, 2004 setting aside the
earlier Resolution and directing the LA to serve summons to
Magsaysay at its business address given to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) so that jurisdiction
may be acquired over the persons of the respondents and proper
proceedings can be held. The records were then remanded to the
LA of origin for immediate action.16

Pursuant to this, the LA issued another Decision17 dated

September 30, 2008 dismissing the complaint due to the
execution of individual compromise agreements by petitioners
waiving their rights against respondents. The LA had been aware
of the fact that the trial court as well as the CA had affirmed the
validity of the compromise agreements. Moreover, the petitioners
received their full compensation under the contract and it was not
found that the amount received were unconscionable and grossly
disproportionate. It also did not appear that petitioners were
defrauded or tricked into signing the same.18

Lastly, the LA found that the claim had already prescribed.19

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their appeal to the NLRC.

In a Decision20� dated June 30, 2009, the NLRC dismissed the

appeal saying that the claim, even if based on tort was already
included in the quitclaims executed in favor of the respondents. It
also held that prescription has already set in.21

Still aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari to the CA

which was dismissed in a Decision22� dated July 20, 2010
reiterating the ruling of the LA and NLRC that the complaint for
damages was filed out of time and that the claim filed with the
Admiralty Court of Panama did not toll the prescriptive period for
filing a claim here in the Philippines.23

Moreover, it was decided that the Settlement Agreement, Receipt

and General Receipt and Release of Rights as well as the
affidavits and certifications signed by the petitioners released the
respondents from all liabilities, including those based on tort,
arising from the death/disappearance of the crew members as a
result of the sinking of the vessel. The settlement agreement may
be pleaded as an absolute and final bar to any suit. Also,
petitioners committed themselves not to file any claim against
respondents in any jurisdiction.24

Undaunted, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which

was denied via a Resolution25 dated October 26, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

The issues raised by petitioners are the following:

1. Whether petitioners' cause of action has prescribed;

and
2. Whether the settlement agreement, receipt and general
receipt and release of rights barred petitioners from
filing the complaint.

OUR RULING

The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction

over tort cases

Before going into the issues raised by the parties, it is necessary

to first settle whether the claim for damages based on tort filed by
petitioners before the LA was proper.

The Labor Code provides that:

Art. 224. [217] Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
� x x x

xxxx

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of

damages arising from the employer-employee relations;

xxxx

Similarly, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides:
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. - Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

In deciding whether a case arises out of employer-employee

relations, the Court formulated the "reasonable causal connection
rule", wherein if there is a reasonable connection between the
claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the
case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts.26

In this case, petitioners' claim for damages is grounded on

respondents' gross negligence which caused the sinking of the
vessel and the untimely demise of their loved ones.27 Based on
this, the subject matter of the complaint is one of claim for
damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the
regular court's jurisdiction.

According to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, "Whoever by act

or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict."

Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following

requisites must concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.28

Here, petitioners argue that respondents are duty bound to

exercise due diligence required by law in order to ensure the
safety of the crew and all the passengers therein. It was further
averred that the negligence on the part of the respondents is quite
apparent when they allowed the vessel to load and transport wet
cargo. For failure therefore to exercise extra ordinary diligence
required of them, the respondents must be held liable for
damages to the surviving heirs of the deceased crew
members.29 Notwithstanding the contractual relation between the
parties, the act of respondents is a quasi-delict and not a mere
breach of contract.

Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor

management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and
conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the
general civil law, such claim falls outside the area of competence
or expertise ordinarily ascribed to the LA and the NLRC.30

Therefore, the LA has no jurisdiction over the case in the first

place; it should have been filed to the proper trial court.
The Settlement Agreements signed
by petitioners were valid.

Notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction of the LA to take

cognizance of the case, petitioners still cannot file the complaint
with the trial court because the Settlement Agreement signed by
them was valid.

It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon

and are considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full
measure of the worker's rights and that acceptance of the benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel.31� The reason is plain.
The employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same
footing.32� However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid
as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of change
of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is
shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with
full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.33

In this case, it should be noted that when petitioners signed the

Settlement Agreements, they did it with their counsel of choice. It
could be said that they brought their counsel along to make sure
that they would understand the contents of the agreements and
that they are not tricked into signing the same. A lawyer would
know whether the agreement is unreasonable and one-sided on
its face.
Second, the agreement provides for the "release of respondents
from all liabilities including those based from torts, arising from the
death/disappearance of the crewmembers as a result of the
sinking of the vessel."34� Hence, even claims arising from
quasi-delict would be barred as shown in the blanket waiver of
right to sue.

Moreover, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that they

received less of what they are really entitled to based on said
Settlement Agreements. They wanted the Court to believe that
since their cause of action is for damages and what they received
in accordance with the Settlement Agreement was only those
under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the
overriding CBA, then they are not barred from filing the instant
complaint. Petitioners are misled. As discussed above, the
Settlement Agreement signed by petitioners are comprehensive
enough to include even causes of action arising from quasi-delict.

Having settled that petitioners may no longer pursue their claim

for quasi� delict based on the grounds discussed above, it is
not necessary to consider herein the issue on prescription of
action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated July 20, 2010 and Resolution dated October 26, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA� G.R. SP No. 112551 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.

Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay

respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20
representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various
amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing
of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and
the costs of suit.

On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of

refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10,
and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects",
with costs against petitioner.

The case is now before us for review on certiorari.

The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by

the evidence of record", are:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48

Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30,
1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its

authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff
a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
 From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but
at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a
"better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first
class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all
the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges
that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on
all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider
facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
court's decision.

Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision

shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment
determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that
"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is

open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a
decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write
in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one
party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be
burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the
facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of
the mental process from which the Court draws the essential
ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such
that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision
of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its
conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any
specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law
that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the
decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary
to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution".
It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact
that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning
the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not
recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each
item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not
mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item
of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official
duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within
an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by
it. 15

Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make,

maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as
found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in
issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been
declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal

by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That
judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the
business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions
of fact. 20

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the

findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.

3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to

and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner
asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew
that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.

These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and

discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding
that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first
class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly
that from Saigon to Beirut". 21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the

issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the
 passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the
case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon
arrival at every station for the necessary first-class
reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant
airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out
tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the
corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and
yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
business that the company should know whether or riot the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly
disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:

On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class"
ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see
plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's
testimony and testified as follows:

Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you

know, what does this OK mean?

A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?

A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis

Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for,
and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was
subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit
to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail
over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l",
"C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly
show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket
without any reservation whatever.

Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness

Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class"
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot
believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to
him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. 23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight

difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's
ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that
such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the
lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the
Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance
was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the
assignments of error and all questions that might have been
raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as
free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction
because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this
point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war
with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court
of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which
were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not

entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat
availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What
security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule
to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document
speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so
issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts
refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.

The foregoing are the considerations which point to the

conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals
predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first
class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We
perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by
petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that
respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states,
Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to
confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see
the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class
seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had
a better right to the seat?

4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.

Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted
upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and
that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of
bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:

3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with

the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the
latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the
defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled
to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class
passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of
plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up
to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .

4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to
Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to
the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by
the plaintiff with defendant's employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class

passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class
accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or
Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by
defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already
seated.

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of

the inconvenience and embarrassments brought by
defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid
to Manila.32

xxx xxx xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First

Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered
inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there

was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said
contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith
when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his
first class accommodation berth "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which
he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn
from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract
was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the
stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial,
respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what
Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who
gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in
the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on
the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as
to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to
justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if
any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question
of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:

That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air
France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has
been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony
before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry
made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
notation reads as follows:

"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist

class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene",

and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento,

who was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was
asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one
on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for
defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the
trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but
defendant did neither. 37

The Court of appeals further stated —

Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior

reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class
ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken,
surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the
humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man
the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the
plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was
what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's
witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the
meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of
plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class.
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant,
who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant,
testified as follows:

"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office

know what reservation the passenger has arranged
with you?

A They call us up by phone and ask for the

confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)

In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial

Judge has said on this point:

Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G.

Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat
occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any
right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class"
seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he
paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the

defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could
have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of
the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not
do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par
 (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the
Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the
Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the
plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because
the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white
man".38

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the

quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad
faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein
points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to
go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course,
bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the

express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of
First Instance, thus:

The evidence shows that the defendant violated its

contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with
the aggravating circumstances that defendant's
Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening
the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to
have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first
class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the
 words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man"
whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that
this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the
"first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly
paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class"
ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its

employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the
willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept;

and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42

6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and

degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of
the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to
avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have

a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any
rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. 44

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a

passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a
right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand
payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was
not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both
in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger
on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train
reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as
by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of
said passenger.1awphîl.nèt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public

duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's

testimony, thus —

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant

and purser?

A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I

could not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached
 me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for?
and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist
class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to
accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to
note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".

Q Was she able to note it?

A No, because I did not give my ticket.

Q About that purser?

A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel

uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I stood
up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the
purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident
in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me —
because it was recorded in French — "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene."

Mr. VALTE —

I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the

witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your
Honor.

COURT —

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon
evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent.
We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the
ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. 49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the

dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as
part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of
the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of
the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by
an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were
really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the
purser could have cleared up the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso

is admissible in evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives

the court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in
contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of

exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys'
fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it
is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do
not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well
exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.

10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both

the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as
moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is
primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not
interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that
we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals

does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to
affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. 156109 November 18, 2004

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by

ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner,
vs.
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and ELISSA
BALADAD, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a
reciprocal contract. The students agree to abide by the standards
of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in
the form of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the
start of the school term. Further, the school informs them of the
itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot,
after the enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It
cannot require fees other than those it specified upon enrolment.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 seeking
to nullify the July 12, 20022 and the November 22, 20023 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan
(Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the
first assailed Order reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant motion to

dismiss for lack of cause of action."4

The second challenged Order denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer

science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science
and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to
college mainly through the financial support of her relatives.
During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as
teachers.

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the

"Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were
to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the
price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional
points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied
the opportunity to take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending

dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the
tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of
the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers --
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad --
allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to
petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her
classmates were taking their examinations. The next day,
Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not
permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics
examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected
them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went
unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended
their positions as compliance with PCST's policy.

On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a

Complaint5 for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In
her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages;
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary
damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of
litigation and attorney's fees.

On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss6 on the

ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
According to respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the
PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the
proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED).

In her Comment to respondents' Motion, petitioner argued that

prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary,
because her action was not administrative in nature, but one
purely for damages arising from respondents' breach of the laws
on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.

On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of
cause of action.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In granting respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted

that the instant controversy involved a higher institution of
learning, two of its faculty members and one of its students. It
added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested in the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the supervision and
regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the CHED, not the
courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.7

In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the

Complaint for "lack of cause of action" without, however,
explaining this ground.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions

of law.8

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our

consideration:

"Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies applies in a civil action exclusively for damages
 based on violation of the human relation provisions of the
Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.

"Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of

invalidity of a certain school administrative policy by the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) before a former
student can successfully maintain an action exclusively for
damages in regular courts.

"Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education

(CHED) has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
damages based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions
on human relations filed by a student against the school."9

All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable. The Court,
however, sees a second issue which, though not expressly raised
by petitioner, was impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the
Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner's

alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting
to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the
controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of
PCST's academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been
lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under
Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to "protect,
foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality
education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that
education is accessible to all."10

Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the

present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond
the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the
courts.11

Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In
Factoran Jr. v. CA,12 the Court had occasion to elucidate on the
rationale behind this doctrine:

"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience,
should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to
act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. x x x.13 "

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST.

Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not
adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the
consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or
rectified.

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when

there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act
upon the matter complained of.14 Administrative agencies are not
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals.15 Specifically, the CHED does not have
the power to award damages.16 Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which
arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.17 Petitioner's action for damages
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the
courts.18

Second Issue:

Cause of Action

Sufficient Causes of Action Stated in the Allegations in the

Complaint

As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of

action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal.19 A complaint is said
to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true,
the court should be able to render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint.20

A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action

hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged facts. In their Motion
to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioner's
allegations, and they admitted that "x x x the crux of plaintiff's
cause of action is the determination of whether or not the
assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive."21 They
thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on the Complaint's
alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a reexamination of
the Complaint is in order.

The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:

"10. In the second week of February 2002, defendant

Rachelle A. Gamurot, in connivance with PCST, forced
plaintiff and her classmates to buy or take two tickets each, x
x x;

"11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the

forced distribution and selling of tickets to them but the said
defendant warned them that if they refused [to] take or pay
the price of the two tickets they would not be allowed at all to
take the final examinations;

"12. As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A.

Gamurot bribed students with additional fifty points or so in
their test score in her subject just to unjustly influence and
compel them into taking the tickets;

"13. Despite the students' refusal, they were forced to take

the tickets because [of] defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot's
coercion and act of intimidation, but still many of them
including the plaintiff did not attend the dance party imposed
upon them by defendants PCST and Rachelle A. Gamurot;

"14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two
tickets because aside form the fact that she could not afford
to pay them it is also against her religious practice as a
member of a certain religious congregation to be attending
dance parties and celebrations;

"15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A.

Gamurot gave her class its final examination in the subject
'Logic' she warned that students who had not paid the tickets
would not be allowed to participate in the examination, for
which threat and intimidation many students were eventually
forced to make payments:

"16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay, defendant

Rachelle A. Gamurot inhumanly made plaintiff sit out the
 class but the defendant did not allow her to take her final
examination in 'Logic;'

"17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the final
examination in the subject 'Statistics,' defendant Elissa
Baladad, in connivance with defendants Rachelle A.
Gamurot and PCST, announced in the classroom that she
was not allowing plaintiff and another student to take the
examination for their failure and refusal to pay the price of
the tickets, and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff and the
other student from the classroom;

"18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the examination

but all defendants could say was that the prohibition to give
the examinations to non-paying students was an
administrative decision;

"19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and other
obligations in the school;

"20. That the above-cited incident was not a first since PCST
also did another forced distribution of tickets to its students
in the first semester of school year 2001-2002; x x x " 22

The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach

of contract; and second, liability for tort.

Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract

In Alcuaz v. PSBA,23 the Court characterized the relationship

between the school and the student as a contract, in which "a
student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester."24 Two years later, in Non v. Dames II,25 the Court
modified the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding
that the contractual relationship between the school and the
student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period
the latter are expected to complete it."26 Except for the variance in
the period during which the contractual relationship is considered
to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing
the school-student relationship as contractual in nature.

The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has

consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such
kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations.
The school undertakes to provide students with education
sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and
regulations.27

The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the

moment of its inception -- upon enrolment of the student.
Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior
and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new
students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform
prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of
payment.

In practice, students are normally required to make a down

payment upon enrollment, with the balance to be paid before
every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to
pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the
school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.

The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with

financial obligations; it also underlines the importance of major
examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually fatal
to the students' promotion to the next grade or to graduation.
Examination results form a significant basis for their final grades.
These tests are usually a primary and an indispensable requisite
to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to
their completion of a course.

Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to

determine who is "better educated" than another. Nevertheless, a
student's grades are an accepted approximation of what would
otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study.
The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting
where education is generally the gate pass to employment
opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by
which a prospective employer measures whether a job applicant
has acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular
profession or trade.

Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees,

satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion of
academic requirements and observance of school rules and
regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their
"completion" of the course enrolled in.

The obligation on the part of the school has been established in

Magtibay v. Garcia,28 Licup v. University of San Carlos29 and
Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia,30 in which the Court held
that, barring any violation of the rules on the part of the students,
an institution of higher learning has a contractual obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.

We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to

meet astronomical operating costs; this is a reality in running it.
Crystal v. Cebu International School31 upheld the imposition by
respondent school of a "land purchase deposit" in the amount of
P50,000 per student to be used for the "purchase of a piece of
land and for the construction of new buildings and other facilities x
x x which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the
expiration of its lease contract over its present site."
The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the
school. After noting that the imposition of the fee was made only
after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the
students, the Court held that the school committed no actionable
wrong in refusing to admit the children of the petitioners therein
for their failure to pay the "land purchase deposit" and the 2.5
percent monthly surcharge thereon.

In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising

measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the
dance party fee as a condition for the students' taking the final
examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to
finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-
student contract entered into at the start of the school year.
Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the
enrollees.

Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we

stressed that the school-student contract "is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions."32 Sections 5 (1) and (3)
of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide:

"The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate
steps to make such declaration accessible to all.

"Every student has a right to select a profession or course of

study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements."

The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232,

otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982:
 "Section 9. Rights of Students in School. – In addition to
other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law
and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject

to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."

Liability for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents

"inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty,
religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon
[petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;"33 as a
result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any
of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and
had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental
agony and "demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in
violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These
provisions of the law state thus:

"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights

and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,

personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
 other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family

relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his

friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his

beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition."

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not

otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however,
may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a
tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,34 from which we quote:

"x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains
a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the
petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred
to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not
one arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France
is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even
if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
 be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that revolutionary,
for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar
mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr.
Justice Fisher elucidated thus: 'x x x. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of
an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.'

"Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil

Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x."35

Academic Freedom

In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to

"academic freedom." We are not impressed. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach,
and (4) who may be admitted to study.36 In Garcia v. the Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,37 the Court
upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female student's
admission to theological studies in a seminary for prospective
priests. The Court defined the freedom of an academic institution
thus: "to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to
attain them x x x free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint."38

In Tangonan v. Paño,39 the Court upheld, in the name of academic

freedom, the right of the school to refuse readmission of a nursing
student who had been enrolled on probation, and who had failed
her nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the Court
has emphasized that once a school has, in the name of academic
freedom, set its standards, these should be meticulously
observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain
students.40 After accepting them upon enrollment, the school
cannot renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than
those made known to, and accepted by, students at the start of
the school year.

In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient

causes of action against respondents, and that it should not have
been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not
holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will
have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the

assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to
reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue
the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R.

ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases
Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.

Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built through its
agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its
land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land,
can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil
case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the

owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite
which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and

contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed
away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as

Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another

action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same
court. 1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the

complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections
on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on
respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil
action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case
No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No.
TG-907-82.

Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on

June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the
disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the
civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the
provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action
has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate

Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil

Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming the questioned
order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution
dated May 19, 1986. 6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No.

TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate
Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is

determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law
to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in
his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not
necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the
body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial
of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well
as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants
may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners'

complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:

4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga

(Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the
aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof
leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by
defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented
gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by
defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by
defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said
cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or
opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete
hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented
gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by
defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward
towards a big hole or opening which was also built by
defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from
that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of
the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and
at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year,
during rainy or stormy seasons.

5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land

just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil,
which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from
its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron
pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during
rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water
below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by

defendant's aforementioned water conductors,
contrivances and manipulators, a young man was
drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and
will continue to suffer, as follows:

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were

eroded and converted to deep, wide and long
canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.

b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs

were, on several occasions, washed away.

c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives

of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in
danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other

portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed
to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that
the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and

contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action
if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article

1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any
person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake
and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of
an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the

public domain and the property subject of the instant case is
privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals
of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of
a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without

limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner
of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in
a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand
the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause
injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person

for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not

only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
(if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. 13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the

Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under

the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing

provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a
"culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
"culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that
a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from
a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the
Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact
from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-

delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal
case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There
can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of

the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of
dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18
(Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No.
TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo
vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed
with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as

Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon

City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation

of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the
Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now

final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against

defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation
by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the

defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8,

1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal
of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40,

Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses

Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment
of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT

ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF
COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II
 THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES

2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF

ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-

appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two

decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of

Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability,
was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code
he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact
that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though
a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was
already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which
was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or
fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not
only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the

same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee
who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case

could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an
entirely separate and independent civil action for fault
or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard
to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and
for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,
73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this

Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code.
It is thus that although J. V. House could have been
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable
because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already

invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines
that have been little understood, in the past, it might not
he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes

not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the
Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property-
through any degree of negligence - even the slightest -
would have to be Idemnified only through the principle
of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of
affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation
of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,

proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can
not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions

of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
of understanding of the character and efficacy of the
action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
 common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual
method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It
is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed
by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a

reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that
the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation
of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted
that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine,
no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby
making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions
to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply
says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed
by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under

the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision

(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to

only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability
in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred
to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal

case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's

emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176

is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.
Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial

court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON.
LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second
Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS
PEPITO, respondents-appellees.

Eriberto Seno for appellant.

Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the

Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.

The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as

follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the
City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of
damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the
private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal
case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the
same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b)
of the Rules of Court, which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no

civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered;

The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11,

1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on
September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2

On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition

for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil
action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the
instances when an independent civil action is proper; that
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under
the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal
case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and,
therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of
mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November
14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").

Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we

gave due course on February 25, 1971. 3

Petitioner makes these:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE

MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE
CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE
SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS
RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN

ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY
MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.

3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER,
BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.

4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4

all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether

or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of
Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of
his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage

to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by

their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease

when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)

Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault
or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the
jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between
his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by
petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal
connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and
negligence of private respondents.

Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among

others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence
in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of
her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions
based on quasi-delict. 5

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may

proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as
specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under

the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

The crucial distinction between criminal negligence

and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible from the
foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-
621, 6 thus:

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes

not only reckless but also simple imprudence. if we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any
degree of negligence — even the slightest would have
to be indemnified only through the principle of civil
hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs,
what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa
aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather
than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,

proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make

defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would
be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel
True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there
is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is
more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because
the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful
and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar
public conveyances usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should
the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this
round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of
right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and

direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen
and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is
the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said,
"they should reproach themselves, at least, some for
their weakness, others for their poor selection and all
for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is
much more equitable and just that such responsibility
should fail upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon
the such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many
jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the
principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons
the employer and employee vienen a ser como una
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become
as one personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.)
All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and
there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions

of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
of understanding of the character and efficacy of the
action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the Civil
responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer
be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter
safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes
an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending
on the issues, stations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged
 or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420,
424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is

also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, reading:

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases

provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the c action,
may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section

categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held

that the City Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing
reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases
not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111
above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted
is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based
on quasi-delict

Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when

it provides:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation

not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an

independent source of obligation "not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil
Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

(Emphasis supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based

on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It
makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one
hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word
"damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain
that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm"
is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact,
examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to
property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive
smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to

hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the
criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this
conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the

Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be
reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing
of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER

FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL,
MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.

Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private

respondents.

Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850
(German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated
October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages
against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala
"without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of
the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of
Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said
Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the

Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L.
Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned
and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City
to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of
chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers,
and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga
City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight
curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71
owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven
by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization.

Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus
were at the time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at
a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner
in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German
C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on
September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850)
against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively,
of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision,
with prayer for preliminary attachment.

On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson

filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850
admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by
way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and
reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson,
driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25
coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an
excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop
the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite
of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus
causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private
respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on
petitioners.

On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc.

and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds,
namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action;
2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but
without the requisite verification, hence defective under the
provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the
defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver,
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with
maximum care and prudence.

The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was

that the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971,
or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No.
4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and
less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and
that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action
could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has
been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action
is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely
subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence;
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art.
33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not
to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said

motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for damages
was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability
on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action
for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code,
and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to
enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850,
the lower court sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or
not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or
civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort
under American law" there "should be a showing that the
offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his
right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the
complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion
of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of
the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the
defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory
and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the
action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial

court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal on certiorari.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the

allegations contained in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles
2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or
omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or
negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in
the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries
and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the
collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual
relations between the parties. The circumstance that the
complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the
driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action,
as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is
merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly
excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of
negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of
the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
(Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is
inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both
complaints would substantially be the same. It should be
emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia,
et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).1

It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the

Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1,
1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted,
however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a
time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
Palileo,2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had
already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had
entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the
course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was
convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by
final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such
reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat3 that when the
criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant did not
proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the
Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages
suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private
counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal
case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart
an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and,
therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages
subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of
the New Civil Code.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never

intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said
criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of
said accused.

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil

action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their
right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have
opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.

As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private

respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the
criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he
has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action.
For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has
disappeared.

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing

damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation
and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ...
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated
in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso."4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the
civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by
petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require
reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution
of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of
the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to
intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of
the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of
the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the
action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no
legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby

reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed
with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.

Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra,

JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I would like to limit my concurrence.

I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this

case are Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code which read as
follows:

ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage

to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under

the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and

different from the civil action arising from the offense of
negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No.
2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the
civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see
why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the
specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is
my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being
substantive in character and is not within the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive
but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the
Rules of 1940.

Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be

deemed as the reservation required, there being no showing that
prejudice could be caused by doing so.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of

dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may
proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence
of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two
possible judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively to the
bigger one.

G.R. No. 174161 February 18, 2015

R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
LUISITO G. YU, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated September 9, 2005 and August
8, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84175.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J.

Yu, after having alighted from a passenger bus in front of
Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by
Antonio P. Gimena, who was then employed by petitioner R
Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical
City Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.3

On February 3, 1994, the husband of the deceased, respondent

Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against petitioner R Transport,
Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation
(MMTC) for the death of his wife. MMTC denied its liability
reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus
involved in the incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R
Transport.4 It explained that under the Bus Installment Purchase
Program of the government, MMTC merely purchased the subject
bus, among several others, for resale to petitioner R Transport,
which will in turn operate the same within Metro Manila. Since it
was not actually operating the bus which killed respondent’s wife,
nor was it the employer of the driver thereof, MMTC alleged that
the complaint against it should be dismissed.5 For its part,
petitioner R Transport alleged that respondent had no cause of
action against it for it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees and drivers and that its buses
are in good condition. Meanwhile, the driver Antonio Gimena was
declared in default for his failure to file an answer to the
complaint.

After trial on the merits, wherein the parties presented their

respective witnesses and documentary evidence, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu ruling that petitioner
R Transport failed to prove that it exercised the diligence required
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
driver, who, by its negligence, ran over the deceased resulting in
her death. It also held that MMTC should be held solidarily liable
with petitioner R Transport because it would unduly prejudice a
third person who is a victim of a tort to look beyond the certificate
of registration and prove who the actual owner is in order to
enforce a right of action. Thus, the trial court ordered the payment
of damages in its Decision6 dated June 3, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered ordering defendants Rizal Transport and Metro
Manila Transport Corporation to be primarily and solidarily liable
and defendant Antonio Parraba Gimena subsidiarily liable to
plaintiff Luisito Yu as follows: 1. Actual damages in the amount of
Php78,357.00 subject to interest at the legal rate from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid;

2. Loss of income in the amount of Php500,000.00;

3. Moral damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00;

4. Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00;

5. Attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00; and

6. Costs of suit.7

On September 9, 2005, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC

with modification that defendant Antonio Gimena is made
solidarily liable for the damages caused to respondent. According
to the appellate court, considering that the negligence of Antonio
Gimena was sufficiently proven by the records of the case, and
that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner
to support its defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for the damage caused. The CA
noted that the fact that petitioner is not the registered owner of the
bus which caused the death of the victim does not exculpate it
from liability.8 Thereafter, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was further denied by the CA in its Resolution9 dated August 8,
2006.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner essentially invokes the following ground to support its

petition:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

RULING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE
NEGLIGENCE OF ITS EMPLOYEE, WHICH WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner insists that the CA and the RTC were incorrect in ruling
that its driver was negligent for aside from the mere speculations
and uncorroborated testimonies of the police officers on duty at
the time of the accident, no other evidence had been adduced to
prove that its driver was driving in a reckless and imprudent
manner. It asserts that contrary to the findings of the courts
below, the bus from which the victim alighted is actually the
proximate cause of the victim’s death for having unloaded its
passengers on the lane where the subject bus was traversing.
Moreover, petitioner reiterates its argument that since it is not the
registered owner of the bus which bumped the victim, it cannot be
held liable for the damage caused by the same.

We disagree.
Time and again, it has been ruled that whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass
upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as its jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing errors of law.10 This Court is not bound to
weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties,
particularly where the findings of both the trial and the appellate
courts on the matter of petitioners’ negligence coincide. As a
general rule, therefore, the resolution off actual issues is a
function of the trial court, whose findings on these matters are
binding on this Court, more so where these have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals,11 save for the following exceptional and
meritorious circumstances: (1) when the factual findings of the
appellate court and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the
findings of the trial court are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (3) when the lower court’s inference from
its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; (5) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (6) when
there is a misappreciation of facts; (7) when the findings of fact
are themselves conflicting; and (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record.12

After a review of the records of the case, we find no cogent

reason to reverse the rulings of the courts below for none of the
aforementioned exceptions are present herein. Both the trial and
appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in hitting and
running over the victim and ruled that his negligence was the
proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been defined as
"the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury."13 Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental test of
negligence.14 It is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.15

In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly
running at a reckless speed. As testified by the police officer on
duty at the time of the incident16 and indicated in the Autopsy
Report,17 not only were the deceased’s clothes ripped off from her
body, her brain even spewed out from her skull and spilled over
the road. Indeed, this Court is not prepared to believe petitioner’s
contention that its bus was travelling at a "normal speed" in
preparation for a full stop in view of the fatal injuries sustained by
the deceased. Moreover, the location wherein the deceased was
hit and run over further indicates Gimena’s negligence. As borne
by the records, the bus driven by Gimena bumped the deceased
in a loading and unloading area of a commercial center. The fact
that he was approaching such a busy part of EDSA should have
already cautioned the driver of the bus. In fact, upon seeing that a
bus has stopped beside his lane should have signalled him to
step on his brakes to slow down for the possibility that said bus
was unloading its passengers in the area. Unfortunately, he did
not take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and
bumped the deceased despite being aware that he was traversing
a commercial center where pedestrians were crossing the street.
Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence of a
reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding
cautiously while passing the area.

Under Article 218018 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable
for the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the
employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the
negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict
committed by its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to
rebut this presumption by presenting adequate and convincing
proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees.19

Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of any

proof showing the exercise by petitioner of the required diligence.
As aptly observed by the CA, no evidence of whatever nature was
ever presented depicting petitioner’s due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its driver, Gimena, despite several
opportunities to do so. In fact, in its petition, apart from denying
the negligence of its employee and imputing the same to the bus
from which the victim alighted, petitioner merely reiterates its
argument that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which
bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage caused
by the same. Nowhere was it even remotely alleged that petitioner
had exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee. Because of this failure, petitioner
cannot now avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its
negligent employee.

At this point, it must be noted that petitioner, in its relentless

attempt to evade liability, cites our rulings in Vargas v.
Langcay20 and Tamayo v. Aquino21 insisting that it should not be
held solidarily liable with MMTC for it is not the registered owner
of the bus which killed the deceased. However, this Court, in
Jereos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,22 rejected such contention in
the following wise:

Finally, the petitioner, citing the case of Vargas vs. Langcay,

contends that it is the registered owner of the vehicle, rather than
the actual owner, who must be jointly and severally liable with the
driver of the passenger vehicle for damages incurred by third
persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicle.

The contention is devoid of merit. While the Court therein ruled

that the registered owner or operator of a passenger vehicle is
jointly and severally liable with the driver of the said vehicle for
damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a
consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of the
said vehicle, the Court did so to correct the erroneous findings of
the Court of Appeals that the liability of the registered owner or
operator of a passenger vehicle is merely subsidiary, as
contemplated in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case
did the Court exempt the actual owner of the passenger vehicle
from liability. On the contrary, it adhered to the rule followed in the
cases of Erezo vs. Jepte, Tamayo vs. Aquino, and De Peralta vs.
Mangusang, among others, that the registered owner or operator
has the right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the
amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury
caused.

The right to be indemnified being recognized, recovery by the

registered owner or operator may be made in any form-either by a
cross-claim, third-party complaint, or an independent action. The
result is the same.23

Moreover, while We held in Tamayo that the responsibility of the

registered owner and actual operator of a truck which caused the
death of its passenger is not solidary, We noted therein that the
same is due to the fact that the action instituted was one for
breach of contract, to wit:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it

holds that inasmuch as the third-party defendant had used the
truck on a route not covered by the registered owner's franchise,
both the registered owner and the actual owner and operator
should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made
liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. This
Article is as follows:

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are

liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.1âwphi1 But the action
instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of contract, for
failure of the defendant to carry safely the deceased for her
destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for
the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising
from a quasi-delict. As the registered owner Tamayo and his
transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict;
their responsibility is not solidary as held by the Court of Appeals.

The question that poses, therefore, is how should the holder of

the certificate of public convenience, Tamayo, participate with his
transferee, operator Rayos, in the damages recoverable by the
heirs of the deceased passenger, if their liability is not that of Joint
tortfeasors in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. The
following considerations must be borne in mind in determining this
question. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his
responsibility to the public orto any passenger riding in the vehicle
or truck must be direct, for the reasons given in our decision in the
case of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra, as quoted above. But as the
transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is
the one directly responsible for the accident and death he should
in turn be made responsible to the registered owner for what the
latter may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck
without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public
Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the
registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered
owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his
negligence.24

However, it must be noted that the case at hand does not involve
a breach of contract of carriage, as in Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-
delict under Article 2176,25 in relation to Article 218026 of the New
Civil Code. As such, the liability for which petitioner is being made
responsible actually arises not from a pre-existing contractual
relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a damage
caused by the negligence of its employee. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape its solidary
liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of
its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.27

Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for
the better protection of the public for both the owner of record and
the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with
the driver.28 As aptly stated by the appellate court, "the principle of
holding the registered owner liable for damages notwithstanding
that ownership of the offending vehicle has already been
transferred to another is designed to protect the public and not as
a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to
take refuge in, in order to free itself from liability arising from its
own negligent act. "29

Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena was

sufficiently proven by the records of the case, and that no
evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to
support its defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the death of
respondent Yu's wife.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated September 9, 2005
and August 8, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84175 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-12634 and L-12720 May 29, 1959

JOSE G. TAMAYO, petitioner,

vs.
INOCENCIO AQUINO, ET AL., and SILVESTRE
RAYOS, respondents.

SILVESTRE RAYOS, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE G. TAMAYO and INOCENCIO AQUINO ET
AL., respondents.

Briones and Pascual for petitioner.

Emiliano R. Navarro for respondent Inocencio Aquino et al.
Jose C. Laureta and Naty-Belen N. Milan for respondent Silvestre
Rayos.

LABRADOR, J.:

Inocencio Aquino and his children brought this action against

Jose G. Tamayo, holder of a certificate of public convenience to
operate two trucks for damages for the death of Inocencio's wife,
Epifania Gonzales, while riding aboard Tamayo's trucks. It is
alleged that while his (Inocencio Aquino) wife was making a trip
aboard truck with Plate No. TPU-735, it bumped against a culvert
on the side of the road in Bugallon, Pangasinan; that as a
consequence of this accident Epifania Gonzales was thrown away
from the vehicle and two pieces of wood embedded in her skull,
as a result of which she died; that the impact of the truck against
the culvert was so violent that the roof of the vehicle was ripped
off from its body, one fender was smashed and the engine
damaged beyond repair. Complaint was filed for the recovery of
P10,000 as actual damages, P10,000 as moral damages, and
costs.
Upon being summoned, defendant Tamayo answered alleging a
that the truck is owned by Silvestre Rayos, so he filed a third-
party complaint against the latter, alleging that he no longer had
any interest whatsoever in the said truck, as he had sold the
same before the accident to the third-party defendant Silvestre
Rayos. Answering the third-party complaint, Rayos alleged that if
any indemnity is due, it should come from Jose G. Tamayo,
because he did not have any transaction with him regarding such
sale.

The Court of First Instance found that the truck with plate No.
TPU-735 was one of the trucks of Tamayo under a certificate of
public convenience issued to him; that he had sold it to Rayos in
March, 1953, but did not inform the Public Service Commission of
the sale until June 30, 1953, one month after the accident. On the
basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance ordered the
defendant Tamayo and the third-party defendant Rayos to pay
plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P6,000 as compensatory
damages, and another sum of P5,000 as moral damages, with
interest, and authorized the defendant or third-party defendant,
whoever should pay the entire amount, to recover from the other
any sum in excess of one-half of the amount ordered to be paid,
with interest. The Court also dismissed the third-party complaint.

Appeals against the above decision was made to the Court of

Appeals. This court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First
Instance in all respects, and against this judgment certiorari was
issued by us on separate petitions of Tamayo and Rayos.

Tamayo claims exemption from liability, arguing that the owner

and operator of the truck at the time the accident was not he but
Rayos. In answer we state that we have already held in the cases
of Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz., (11)
4606; Timbol vs. Osias, 98 Phil., 432; 52 Off. Gaz. (3)
1392; Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182; 50 Off. Gaz., 108,
and Roque vs. Malibay, L-8561, Nov. 18, 1955, that the registered
owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that
may be caused to any of the passengers therein, even if the said
vehicle had already been sold, leased or transferred to another
person who was, at the time of the accident, actually operating
the vehicle. This principle was also reaffirmed in the case
of Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil., 103. The reason given by us for the
above liability imposed upon the registered owner of the vehicle
under a certificate of public convenience is as follows:

. . . we hold with the trial court that the law does not allow
him to do so; the law with its aim and policy in mind, does
not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes
and places upon him as an incident or consequence of
registration. Were a registered owner alleged to evade
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or
owner is, it would be easy for him by collusion with others or
otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the
same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways
is usually without means to discover or identify the person
actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means
other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor
Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The
protection that the law aims to extend to him would become
illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to
escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of
the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered
owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the
prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that a third
person or another has become the owner, so that he may
thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured. (Erezo
vs. Jepte, supra).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it
holds that inasmuch as the third-party defendant had used the
truck on a route not covered by the registered owner's franchise,
both the registered owner and the actual owner and operator
should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made
liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. This
Article is as follows:

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are

liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

But the action instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of
contract, for failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased
for her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible,
i.e., for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as
arising from a quasi-delict. As the registered owner Tamayo and
his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-
delict; their responsibility is not solidary as held by the Court of
Appeals.

The question that poses, therefore, is how should the holder of

the certificate of public convenience Tamayo participate with his
transferee, operator Rayos, in the damages recoverable by the
heirs of the deceased passenger, if their liability is not that of Joint
tortfeasors in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. The
following considerations must be borne in mind in determining this
question. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his
responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding in the
vehicle or truck must be direct, for the reasons given in our
decision in the case of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra, as quoted above.
But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the
passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident
and death he should in turn be made responsible to the registered
owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In
operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved
by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as
agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him
(the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the
latter by his negligence.

In the case at bar, the court found, furthermore, that inspite of the
fact that the agreement between Tamayo and Rayos was for
Rayos to use the truck in carrying of gasoline, the latter used the
same in transporting passengers outside the route covered by the
franchise of Tamayo. For this additional reason, the agent or
Rayos must be held responsible to the registered owner, to the
extent that the latter may suffer damage by reason of the death
caused during the accident. The responsibility of the transferee
was already adverted to by us in the case of Erezo vs. Jepte,
supra, when we held expressly:

In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the

defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the
damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he
(defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the
real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required
to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-
appellant. (Erezo vs. Jepte, supra.)

We hereby affirm that the responsibility of the transferee of the

public vehicle be as above denied.

The procedural means by which the liability of the transferee to

the holder of the certificate should be enforced is that indicated by
us in the above-quoted portion of the case of Erezo vs. Jepte.
This procedure was adopted by Tamayo, the defendant herein,
when he presented a third party complaint against Rayos. The
courts below should not have dismissed this third-party complaint,
and should have adjudged the responsibility to make indemnity in
accordance therewith. The transferee is liable to indemnify the
registered owner for the damages that the latter may be required
to pay for the accident, hence the remedy is by third-party
complaint (See Rule 12, Rules of the Court).

We now come to the question of the damages that the Court of

Appeals and the Court of First Instance awarded to the plaintiffs.
The actual or compensatory damage of P6,000 is not seriously
questioned by any of the defendants, but the award of P5,000 as
moral damages is questioned by them in this appeal. We agree
with the appellants that as the responsibility of Tamayo and his
agent Rayos is culpa-contractual, no award of moral damages
can be given. The law on this matter is expressed in Article 2220
of the Civil Code, which provides:

Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding

moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals

considered the violation of the rules of the Public Service
Commission prohibiting transfer of public vehicles without
approval by the Commission as justifying the award of moral
damages. We believe that both courts erred. The law expressly
provides that award of moral damages can be made in a suit for
breach of contact only when the defendants acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. We do not believe that the holder of the certificate,
defendant Tamayo, was guilty of fraud or bad faith. There
appears to be no fraud at all in the transfer. Transfers are
prohibited only if made without approval by the Public Service
Commission. There may have been a violation of the regulations
because Tamayo did not secure a previous authority to transfer
from said Commission, but he actually applied for and obtained
said permission or approval about a month after the accident.
Besides, the truck was transferred to Rayos with the
understanding that the same was not to be used as a public
convenience, so that insofar as Tamayo is concerned, there could
have been no shade or tint of bad faith at all. Consequently, the
ground upon which moral damages may be demanded from him
by the plaintiffs does not exist.

Neither can we find that there was fraud or bad faith committed on
the part of the transferee or agent. There may have been a
breach of the agreement between Tamayo and Rayos, but this
was not the immediate cause of the accident. It was the
negligence of the driver. What the law would seem to consider as
bad faith which may furnish a ground for the award of moral
damages in the case at bar would be bad faith in the securing and
in the execution of the contract and in the enforcement of its
terms (Article 1338, Civil Code), or any other kind of deceit which
may have been used by both defendants. None can be said to
have been present in the case at bar. There was no bad faith on
the part of the agent Rayos; there was negligence of the driver
employed by him, but this certainly not bad faith defendants' part
contemplated by law.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is

hereby modified, in that the defendant-appellant Tamayo is
hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff-appellees the sum of P6,000
as compensatory damages for the death of the deceased, but that
he (Tamayo) has the right to be indemnified by third-party
defendant-appellant Rayos of the amount he is hereby ordered to
pay. With costs against appellants.

G.R. No. 224186, September 23, 2019

SPOUSES EMILIO MANGARON, JR. AND ERLINDA

MANGARON, PETITIONERS, v. HANNA VIA DESIGN &
CONSTRUCTION, OWNED AND MANAGED BY ENGR. JAMES
STEPHEN B. CARPE, RESPONDENT.
 DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing

the Decision2 dated October 20, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated
April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 13
8259.
The Relevant Antecedents

The case stemmed from a complaint for damages under Article

2184 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the same
Code filed by spouses Emilio Mangaron, Jr. and Erlinda
Mangaron (petitioners) against Hanna Via Design and
Construction - Deepwell Drilling Division (respondent), Power
Supply and Equipment Parts (Power Supply) and their company
driver, Crestino T. Bosquit (Bosquit).4

In said complaint, petitioners invoked respondent's vicarious

liability for the negligent driving of Bosquit of an Isuzu Truck with
Plate Number PLM 612 (subject vehicle), which bumped and
dragged their vehicle, a Ford Ranger Pick-Up with Plate Number
XJZ-830. Said collision caused serious physical injuries to
petitioners, who were confined for a whole month at the Davao
Doctors Hospital in Davao City.5

After the petitioners presented their evidence and rested their

case, respondent filed a Motion for Demurrer to
Evidence.6 Among others, respondent questioned the jurisdiction
of the RTC over the case, contending that the complaint is
actually a criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting to
physical injuries. Thus, the complaint should have been filed in
Davao City where the vehicular incident happened.
In an Order7 dated May 20, 2014, the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 11 (RTC), denied the motion. The
RTC held that the issues raised, that is, the ownership of the
subject vehicle, respondent's working relationship with Bosquit,
and its culpability, are matters of evidence. Moreover, the RTC
maintained its jurisdiction over the case as the case is clearly civil
in nature, a complaint for damages.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied

in an Order8 dated September 26, 2014.

Impugning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent filed a Petition

for Certiorari before the CA.

In a Decision9 dated October 20, 2015, the CA upheld the

jurisdiction of the RTC as the complaint spelled out a civil
complaint for damages. However, the CA reversed the ruling of
the RTC insofar as the denial of respondent's demurrer to
evidence. Ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion, the CA opined that the case should have been
dismissed because the registered owner of the Isuzu Truck is
Power Supply, and not respondent. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Orders dated May 20, 2014 and September 26, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 (XI), Malolos City, Bulacan in
Civil Case No. 103-M-2011 are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied in a Resolution10 dated April 14, 2016.

Hence, this Petition.

In essence, petitioners assail the ruling of the CA in: (a) giving

due course to the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent, as the
assailed May 20, 2014 Order is an interlocutory order denying a
motion for demurrer to evidence; and (b) setting aside such Order
when there exists sufficient basis for the same.
The Issue

Summarily, the issue in this case is the propriety of the denial of

the motion for demurrer to evidence.
The Court's Ruling

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in giving due course to the

Petition for Certiorari, being the improper remedy.

The Court disagrees.

An order denying a demurrer to evidence is an interlocutory order

for it does not completely dispose of a case. As an interlocutory
order, the remedy of an appeal is expressly excluded by Rule
4111 of the Rules of Court. Alternatively, as an exception to the
general rule that a writ of certiorari is not available to challenge
interlocutory orders of the trial court, a party may file
a certiorari petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging
that the denial is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.12

As the remedy of certiorari lies, the determination as to whether

the instant case falls under the exception, i.e., whether the trial
court's denial of the demurrer to evidence is issued with grave
abuse of discretion, is now subject of this Court's judicial power of
review.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by

one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue.13

After a careful review of the case, the Court agrees with the CA in
finding that the denial of the motion for demurrer to evidence was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In reversing and setting
aside the May 20, 2014 and September 26, 2014 Orders, the CA
essentially found that the RTC failed to consider the application of
the registered owner rule.

In accordance with the law on compulsory motor vehicle

registration, this Court has consistently ruled that, with respect to
the public and third persons, the registered owner of a motor
vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences
of its operation regardless of who the actual vehicle owner might
be.14

In this case, it is undisputed that the registered owner of the

subject vehicle is Power Supply. However, petitioners try to
convince this Court to pronounce a ruling moored on a pragmatic
stance, that is, by ruling on respondent's liability based on its
admission of its ownership over the subject vehicle.

On this note, the Court stresses that the registered owner rule is
clear and straightforward. Its rationale is to fix liability on the
owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident by clear
identification through registration, to wit:
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative
act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land
registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of
registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of
sale between the parties, but to permit the use and operation of
the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992,
as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running
on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall
these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages
or injuries caused on public highways.15 (Citation omitted)
Truly, what the law seeks to prevent is the avoidance of liability in
case of accidents to the detriment of the public. In case an
accident occurs, the liability becomes definite and fixed as against
a specific person, so that the victim may be properly indemnified
without having to go through the rigorous and tedious task of
trying to identify the owner or driver of the concerned vehicle.

Thus, the registration of the vehicle's ownership is indispensable

in determining imputation of liability; thus, whoever has his/her
name on the Certificate of Registration of the offending vehicle
becomes liable in case of any damage or injury in connection with
the operation of such vehicle inasmuch as the public is
concerned. The case of Equitable Leasing Corporation v.
Suyom16 is illustrative:
Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third
persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being
considered as merely its agent, x x x
As between the registered owner and the driver, the former is
considered as the employer of the latter, and is made primarily
liable for the tort under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.17

However, the application of the registered owner rule does not

serve as a shield of the offending vehicle's real owner from any
liability. The law is not inequitable. Under the principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner who shouldered such liability
has a right to be indemnified by means of a cross-claim as
against the actual employer of the negligent driver.18 In this way,
the preservation of the rights of the parties concerned would be
upheld while championing the public policy behind the registered
owner rule.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is

hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20,
2015 and the Resolution dated April 14, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138259 are AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors

NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO
BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for

plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the

Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen
passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the
passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of
the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name,
seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about
2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within
the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the
right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to
be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside
the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had
clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside
the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who
said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the
evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free
from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers
trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made
to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that
of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as
attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being
carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in
the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us
because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of

common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For purposes
of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods

is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos.
5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety
of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and
1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
 ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and
1755

ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or

injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the order of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon

proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries

suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of
contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation
having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination,
Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was
negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the
blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the
bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about
150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied
the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it
over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and
turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant

carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial
court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire
that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who
were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan,
though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious,
was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death,
but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A
satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and

pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if
through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning
of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the
reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with
a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30
in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part
be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and
its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at
least, the driver should and must have known that in the position
in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering

the earning capacity of the deceased, as well as the other
elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute
satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral,
and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by
plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course
of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by
them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED
(P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the
deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock
us. According to the evidence, one of the passengers who,
because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and
while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano
Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him
speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to
have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were
already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the
driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not
been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires,
specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed
to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated,
the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to
believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently,
resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to
others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and
yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with
his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to
the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to
support the complaint, either failed or appear or were reluctant to
testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several
witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly
testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In
the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion
of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages

awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and
from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800)
PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees,
respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with
costs.

G.R. No. 188715 REGALA v. CARIN

REGALA v. CARIN
G.R. No. 188715
April 6, 2011

FACTS: Regala and Carin are adjacent neighbors. Regala

decided add a second storey to his house, under the guise of
merely building an extension to it, and asked Carin for permission
to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their
respective properties, to which Carin verbally consented.

Regala suffered from the dust and debris, hence, he filed a

complaint before the City Engineers Office for lack of building
permit and before the Office of Barangay for encroachment,
invasion of privacy, damages arising from construction and illegal
construction of scaffoldings in his (Regala) property. However,
Regala still continued the work despite several notices from the
City Engineers Office.

Carin filed a complaint for damages before the RTC alleging that
instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner
demolished the whole length of the wall and that debris and dust
piled up on his property.

Regala answered that he was the sole and exclusive owner of the
wall referred to as a perimeter wall and that securing the consent
was a mere formality to facilitate the issuance of a building permit.

Engineer Haduca found an encroachment by petitioner of six

centimeters. Hence, RTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carin is entitled to damages arising the

wrongful or illegal act or omission of Regala.

RULING: No. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the

lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to
his abode.

While he initially did not have a building permit and may have
misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought
respondents consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential
since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions
or penalties.

However, Regala cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever.

Carin and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their
property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the
incident borne of petitioners construction work. Any pecuniary loss
or damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the
records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same.
Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, respondent herein, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.

G.R. No. 173180 August 24, 2011

ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON, Petitioners,

vs.
SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN and CONSORCIA PONCE
POMASIN, DIANNE POMASIN PAGUNSAN, CYNTHIA
POMASIN, SONIA PEROL, ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA
SESISTA, and REYNALDO SESISTA, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney,1 figured in a vehicular

mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui,
Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving
the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-
trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the
opposite lane going towards Naga City.2

The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident.

Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni’s father, was on board the

jitney and seated on the passenger’s side. He testified that while
the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a
tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching
on the jitney’s lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it
was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.3
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the
tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off
the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag
manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid
collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right
where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still
hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few
meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.4

Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.

Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital

in Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister
Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on
the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and
granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the
hospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter
Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina
Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol
sustained injuries.5 On the other hand, Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.6

Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial

assistance to respondents by giving them ₱1,000.00 each
immediately after the accident and ₱200,000.00 to Cynthia
Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorio’s daughters. Cynthia, in turn,
executed an Affidavit of Desistance.

On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for

damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of
petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs
of those who perished in the accident at ₱50,000.00 each;
₱500,000.00 for hospitalization, medical and burial expenses;
₱350,000.00 for continuous hospitalization and medical expenses
of Spouses Pomasin; ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
₱250,000.00 as exemplary damages; ₱30,000.00 for loss of
income of Cynthia; ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus
₱1,000.00 per court appearance; ₱50,000.00 for litigation
expenses; and cost of suit.7

In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarni’s

negligence which proximately caused the accident. They further
claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to
enter into an amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of
Desistance. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained
that respondents filed the instant complaint to harass them and
profit from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners counterclaimed
for damages.

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in

view of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia. The
motion was denied for lack of merit.8

On 7 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment

in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

defendants and against plaintiffs hereby DISMISSING the instant
complaint considering that plaintiffs have authorized Cynthia
Pomasin to settle the case amicably for ₱200,000.00; and that the
proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or
negligence of defendants’ driver/employee but from plaintiff’s
driver.9

The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the

incident more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorio’s, a
mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is
not as focused as that of the driver. The trial court concluded that
Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The
trial court likewise upheld the Affidavit of Desistance as having
been executed with the tacit consent of respondents.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that
the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision. In
support of such finding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Gregorio’s testimony that Jabon was driving the tractor-trailer
downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney. Based
on the gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jitney
resulting in the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals
inferred that Jabon must be speeding. The appellate court noted
that the restriction in Jabon’s driver’s license was violated, thus,
giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the time of
the accident. Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his
failure to prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was
hired as driver of the truck. Finally, the appellate court
disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia
because the latter had no written power of attorney from
respondents and that she was so confused at the time when she
signed the affidavit that she did not read its content.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is granted, and the trial court’s

Decision dated February 7, 2003 is set aside. Defendants-
appellees are ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants or their heirs the
following:

a) Actual damages of ₱136,000.00 as above computed, to

be offset with the ₱200,000.00 received by plaintiff-appellant
Cynthia Pomasin;

b) Civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for the death of each victim,

to be offset with the balance of ₱64,000.00 from the
aforementioned ₱200,000.00 of civil indemnity received by
 plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Pomasin. Hence, the net amount
is computed at ₱37,200.00 each, as follows:

Narcisa Pomasin ₱37,200.00

Laarni Pomasin ₱37,200.00

Andrea P. Pagunsan ₱37,200.00

Dionisio Perol ₱37,200.00

Annie Jane P. Pagunsan ₱37,200.00

c) Moral damages of ₱50,000.00 to each of the victims; and

d) Attorney’s fees of 10% of the total award.10

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was,

however, denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution11 dated
19 July 2006.

The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact and law
which lead back to the very issue litigated by the trial court: Who
is the negligent party or the party at fault?

The issue of negligence is factual in nature.12 And the rule, and

the exceptions, is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1) the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference made by
the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in
making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on
a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the
facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or
where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record.13

The exceptions to the rule underscore the substance and weight

of the findings of the trial court. They render inconclusive contrary
findings by the appellate court. The reason is now a fundamental
principle:

[A]ppellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with
regard to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The
reason for this is that trial courts have the ‘unique opportunity to
observe the witneses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination.

The exceptions to this rule are when the trial court’s findings of
facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on
record, or when certain facts of substance and value, likely to
change the outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the
trial court, or when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts.14

This interplay of rules and exceptions is more pronounced in this

case of quasi-delict in which, according to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.15 These requisites must be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.16 The claimants,
respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or
cause of action by preponderance of evidence, evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.17

The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give
weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion
reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer
caused the vehicular collision.

One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon
was because his concentration as driver is more focused than
that of a mere passenger. The trial court expounded, thus:

In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one

overriding consideration is their opportunity for observation in
getting to know or actually seeing or observing the matter they
testify to. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or
accident cases which oftentimes happen merely momentarily or in
the split of a second. In the case of a running or travelling vehicle,
especially in highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed
than in ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving
continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. While in
the case of a mere passenger, he does not have to direct his
attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he
may converse with other passengers and pay no attention to the
driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as he may even
doze off to sleep if he wants to, rendering his opportunity for
observation on the precise cause of the accident or collision or
immediately preceding thereto not as much as that of the driver
whose attention is continuously focused on his driving. So that as
between the respective versions of the plaintiffs thru their
passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to the
cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in
this case, the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily
be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of
Plaintiffs’ vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger
is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver,
consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter
on the matter testified to which is the precise point of inquiry ---
the proximate cause of the accident --- is more reasonably
reliable. Moreover, the passenger’s vision is not as good as that
of the driver from the vantage point of the driver’s seat especially
in nighttime, thus rendering a passenger’s opportunity for
observation on the antecedent causes of the collision lesser than
that of the driver. This being so, this Court is more inclined to
believe the story of defendant’s driver Claudio Jabon that the
jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the curved
road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the
process the two vehicles approaching each other from opposite
directions at highway speed came in contact with each other, the
zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender of the truck all the way to
the fuel tank, the violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the
jitney, being thrown away due to the disparate size of the truck.18

The appellate court labelled the trial court’s rationalization as a

"sweeping conjecture"19 and countered that Gregorio was actually
occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view
of the incident despite the fact that he was not driving.

While it is logical that a driver’s attention to the road travelled is

keener than that of a mere passenger, it should also be
considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly
circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it does not
necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a
driver and a passenger, the former is more credible. The factual
setting of the event testified on must certainly be considered.
The trial court did just that in the instant case. Contrary to the
observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative positions of a
driver and a passenger in a vehicle was not the only basis of
analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabon’s alleged
vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court also
took into consideration Gregorio’s admission that prior to the
accident, the jitney was running on the "curving and downward"
portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took into
account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was
their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to reach a
curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and
encroaching the jitney’s lane.

We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that

the truck was actually ascending the highway when it collided with
the descending jitney.

During the direct examination, Jabon narrated that the tractor-

trailer was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour
when he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in a zigzag
manner, thus:

Q: Now, when you passed by the municipality of Polangui, Albay

at about 5:00 of August 12, 1994, could you tell the Court if there
was any untoward incident that happened?

A: There was sir.

Q: Could you please tell the Court?

A: While on my way to Liboro coming from Sorsogon, I met on my

way a vehicle going on a zigzag direction and it even fell on the
shoulder and proceeded going on its way on a zigzag direction.

Q: Could you describe to the Court what was the kind of vehicle
you saw running in zigzag direction?
A: A Toyota-jitney loaded with passengers with top-load.

Q: You said that the top[-]load of the jeep is loaded?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Could you please tell the Court what was your speed at the
time when you saw that jeepney with top[-]load running on a
zigzag manner?

A: I was running 35 to 40 kilometers per hour because I was

ascending plain. (Emphasis supplied).20

In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed that he was

ascending, viz:

Q: Could you please describe the condition in the area at the time
of the incident, was it dark or day time?

A: It was still bright.

COURT: But it was not approaching sunset?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any rain at that time?

A: None sir.

Q: So the road was dry?

A: Yes sir.

Q: You said you were ascending towards the direction of Liboro,

Camarines Sur, is that correct at the time the incident happened?

A: Yes sir.21 (Emphasis supplied).

Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his direct examination
described the road condition where the collision took place as
"curving and downward," thus:

Q: Could you please describe the place where the incident

happened in so far as the road condition is concerned?

A: The road was curving and downward.

Q: And the road was of course clear from traffic, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And practically, your jitney was the only car running at that
time?

A: Yes sir.22 (Emphasis supplied).

Significantly, this is a confirmation of the testimony of Jabon.

However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around and stated that the

jitney was going uphill when he saw the tractor-trailer running
down very fact and encroaching on their lane, to wit:

Q: Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer truck that collided
with your owner jeepney that you were riding testified in open
Court on July 24, 1997 which I quote, ‘while on my way to Liboro
coming to Sorsogon I met a vehicle going on a zig-zag direction
and it even fell on the shoulder and proceeded going on its way
on zig-zag direction’, what can you say about this statement of
this witness?

A: We were no[t] zigzagging but because we were going uphill

and about to reach a curved (sic) we saw the on-coming vehicle
going down very fast and encroaching on our lane so our driver
swerved our vehicle to the right but still we were hit by the on-
coming vehicle.23 (Emphasis supplied).
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was
straightforward and consistent.1awp The recollection of Gregorio
veered from "curving and downward" to uphill.24 On this point,
Jabon and his testimony is more credible.

The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an
undebated fact, supports the trial court’s conclusion that the jitney
was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the
original testimony of Gregorio that the road was "curving and
downward."25 It is this conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of
Gregorio’s testimony, that gives credence to the further testimony
of Jabon that the herein respondent’s jitney, "loaded with
passengers with top-load" "was running in a zigzag manner."26

Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The

fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of
the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner
before it hit the tractor-trailer.

There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There

is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact
ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-
trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded
jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.

Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it

can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon
seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-
trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and,
understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient
time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer
uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.

Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio’s daughter, Laarni was the

proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident,
Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction
imposed on his driver’s license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a
matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office
to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8
which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of
Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic
regulation at the time of the collision.

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of
negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was
violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam
Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 we held that a causal
connection must exist between the injury received and the
violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the
violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause
of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury.28 Likewise controlling is our ruling
in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals29 where we reiterated that
negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic
statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for
damages. In said case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not
attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety
violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself.
Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations
in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable
against the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively
prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can
deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of
proving the cyclist’s own liability."30 We took the occasion to state
that:
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may
arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it
seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to
perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief
when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while
convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide
compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests
have been invaded owing to the conduct of other.31

In the instant case, no causal connection was established

between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his license to the
vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently
explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not
including restriction code 8 in his license.

Petitioners presented the Affidavit of Desistance executed by

Cynthia to exonerate them from any liability. An affidavit of
desistance is usually frowned upon by courts. Little or no
persuasive value is often attached to a desistance.32 The subject
affidavit does not deserve a second look more so that it appears
that Cynthia was not armed with a special power of attorney to
enter into a settlement with petitioners. At any rate, it is an
exercise of futility to delve into the effects of the affidavit of
desistance executed by one of the respondents since it has
already been established that petitioners are not negligent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 94-3418 lodged before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,

vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA
DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL,
SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court
of Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration,
holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that
resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to
visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin

Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos
filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

"‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

rendered in the following manner:

1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby

ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos,
the following sums of money:

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the

loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;

b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages

incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;

c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorney’s fees;

d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral

damages; and to pay costs.

2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel,

Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs
the amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City;

3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the

commission of the tort and who was under special parental
authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED from
paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily, against his
parents;

4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any

liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in
this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED."’ (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-
206)."

"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995,

defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A
facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of
St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.

"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained

from the accident."2

In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed the decision

to the Court of Appeals.3

On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a

decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but
otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4

On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy filed a

motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22,
2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5

Hence, this appeal.6

The Issues
 1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the
petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.

2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award

of moral damages against the petitioner.

The Court’s Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and 2198 of
the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany
the minor students in the jeep.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers.9

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody
is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident.11

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it

must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must
be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.’"12

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of

petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.

Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the

immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of
petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and

Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that
the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not
the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in
the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the
spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin
Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to
turn turtle.

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show

that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that "those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor" was unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the

minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.
He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a
minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the

negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep.

"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural

and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."13

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the

detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.

Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held

liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded
by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may

be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the proximate cause of
the accident was not attributable to petitioner.

For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the
accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner
to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule.15 The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification.16 Thus, the grant of
attorney’s fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of

the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in
fact admitted this fact.1âwphi1 We have held that the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on
the highways or streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals18 and that of the trial court.19 The
Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the
liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy,
Dipolog City.

No costs.

Our lady of Lourdes Hospital vs. Capanzana

2019-10-02administrator
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, Petitioner vs. SPOUSES
ROMEO AND REGINA CAPANZANA, Respondents
G.R. No. 189218

Facts:
Regina Capanzana was pregnant with her third child. A week
before her scheduled caesarean section (C-section), she went
into active labor and was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
for an emergency C-section. She went into a pre-operative
examination done by Dr. Ramos and Dr. Santos. They proceeded
with the operation after having found Regina fit for anesthesia.
The operation was successful and she gave birth to a baby boy.

Thirteen hours after her operation, Regina complained of a

headache, a chilly sensation, restlessness and shortness of
breath. She asked for oxygen and later became cyanotic. After
undergoing x-ray, she was found to be suffering from pulmonary
edema. Since her condition showed no improvement, she was
transferred to the Cardinal Santos Hospital. The doctors in said
hospital found that she was suffering from rheumatic heart
disease mitral stenosis with mild pulmonary hypertension, which
contributed to the onset of Fluid in her lung tissue (pulmonary
edema). This development resulted in cardio-pulmonary arrest
and, subsequently, brain damage.
Regina lost the use of her speech, eyesight, hearing and limbs.
Due to this, spouses Capanzana filed a complaint for damages
against Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital along with Dr. Ramos, Dr.
Santos and the nurses on duty stationed on the second floor.
During the course of the proceedings, Regina died and was
substituted by her heirs.

The RTC found no negligence on the part of Dr. Ramos and Dr.
Santos as they were compliant of the standard practices in
attending to a patient during a C-Section. The court reasoned that
the primary cause of Regina’s vegetative state, amniotic fluid
embolism, was not within the control of the doctor to anticipate.
The Court, however, found the nurses on duty liable for their
failure to immediately administer the oxygen. This failure having
contributed to the onset of hypoxic encephalopathy.

The Court held that the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital is free from
liability as it was able to discharge the burden of proof that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC except as to the liability of the midwife (Ballano)
and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. It was found that while
there was evidence to prove that petitioner hospital showed
diligence in its selection and hiring processes, there was no
evidence to prove that it exercised the required diligence in the
supervision of its nurses.

Issue:
Whether Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital is liable for damages due
to its failure to exercise due diligence in the supervision of its
nurses.

Ruling:
YES. The plaintiff must show the following elements by a
preponderance of evidence: duty of the health professional,
breach of that duty, injury of the patient, and proximate causation
between the breach and the injury.

The Negligence of the Nurses

The SC found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
nurses were negligent. When Regina was gasping for breath and
turning cyanotic, it was the duty of the nurses to intervene
immediately by informing the resident doctor. Had they done so,
proper oxygenation could have been restored and other
interventions performed without wasting valuable time.

According to the expert witness, the occurrence of “hypoxic

encephalopathy” could have been avoided since lack or
inadequate supply of oxygen to the brain for 5 minutes will cause
damage to it. It was found that the nurses took 10- 15 minutes to
respond to the call of Regina’s niece before going to the room.
Also, it took about 20 minutes before the oxygen arrived. Another
instance of negligence was the delay in the removal of Regina’s
consumed dextrose which caused Regina discomfort. The nurses
only attended to her after being called twice.

In Ramos, the SC defined “Proximate cause” as that which, in

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately
caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage;
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the
dominant, moving or producing cause.

Applying the above definition to the facts in the present case, the
omission of the nurses — their failure to check on Regina and to
refer her to the resident doctor and, thereafter, to immediately
provide oxygen — was clearly the proximate cause that led to the
brain damage suffered by the patient. The liability of the hospital
The Our Lady of Lourdes hospital is liable under Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of its employees
based on its responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
The liability of the employer under this provision is “direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the
negligent employee or a prior showing of the insolvency of that
employee.” The employer may only be relieved of responsibility
upon a showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The SC
held that the hospital sufficiently proved due diligence in the
selection of the nurses. The nurses undergo a series of
examination, orientation, training, on the job observation and
evaluation before they are hired as regular employees. However,
it failed to prove due diligence in their supervision. The
formulation of a supervisory hierarchy, company rules and
regulations, and disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach, is indispensable. However, to prove due diligence in the
supervision of employees, it is not enough for an employer such
as petitioner to emptily invoke the existence of such a formulation.
What is more important is the actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. In this case, it
was found that there is failure on the part of the hospital to
sanction the tardiness of the nurses which shows an utter lack of
actual implementation and monitoring of compliance with the rules
and ultimately of supervision over its nurses. Also, on the nights
subject of the present controversy, there is failure to show who
were the actual nurses on duty and who was supervising these
nurses due to the conflicting accounts on the documents of the
hospital. All these negate the due diligence on the part of the
nurses, their supervisors, and ultimately, the hospital. Thus,
petitioner was held liable for damages.
G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.

Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.

Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was
"side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart
Street, Iloilo City" 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred
in the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle which
figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then
driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the
direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent
sustained physical injuries as a consequence. 2

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of

Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in
Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the
complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a
separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said
criminal case through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was
acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against

the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch
IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil
action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in
Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the
petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses that the
private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that
the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment
in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case
was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since
therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively
participated in the criminal case. 8

Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the

trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the
suggestion that "(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that
the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court
by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of
the court". 9

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition

for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as
G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial
court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's
resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October
28, 1975. 11

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in
favor of the herein private respondent and ordering herein
petitioner to pay the former the sum of P 6,920.00 for
hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other actual
expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, and costs. 12

On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed

the decision of the lower court except as to the award for moral
damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A
motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on
September 18, 1987. 14
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is
whether the private respondent, who was the complainant in the
criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the
civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file
a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or
omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal
action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or
awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by

faulting the respondent court for refusing to resolve an
assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court
holding that the main issue had been passed upon by this Court
in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner's
position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said
case, the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the
motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the case'
which would control the subsequent proceed ings in this
controversy.

1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.

The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the

aforesaid posture of the proceedings when the two resolutions
were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992
may have involved some of the issues which were thereafter
submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the
proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo,
specifically, its order denying therein defendants motion to
dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or
explanation as to the legal and factual bases on which its two
resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil
action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that
such resolution was premised on the fact that the Court, at that
stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not
consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for such
resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action,
no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R.
No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court's refusal to consider
petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the separate
action.

'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion

delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established,
as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before
the court (21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis supplied). 16

It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the

court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
questions properly brought before it and that
its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case . . . (Emphasis supplied). 17

It is a rule of general application that the decision of an

appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the
points presented throughout all the subsequent
proceedings in the case in both the trial and the
appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved
and decided on that appeal will be considered on a
second appeal or writ of error in the same case,
provided the facts and issues are substantially the
same as those on which the first question rested and,
 according to some authorities, provided the decision is
on the merits . . . 18

2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now

consider the principal plaint of petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or
omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private
respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi
delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict
or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of
civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability. 19

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la

Cruz, et al., 20 it was held that where the offended party elected
to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal
case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final
judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent
civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not
to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein
was for serious oral defamation which, while within the
contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal omen and cannot
otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And
while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the
Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et
al., 21 this time involving damage to property through negligence
as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced
since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal
action against defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the
later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords
no comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and
even statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions arising
from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our
discussion on the statutory aspects for another case and time
and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal developments
on this issue.

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated

and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against
petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial
court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well
make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused 23 and
the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the
trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of
acquittal. 24

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton

after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil
Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs.
MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. 25 that:

In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la

Cruz was acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant
has the right to institute a separate civil action to
recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See
Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may
still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla vs. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio
 Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987;
Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based
on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution

is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of
evidence ... 26

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the

doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement,
favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused
amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability
litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere
provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it
becomes no longer enforceable. 27

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be

recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that
based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of
the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged.
Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act
or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter,
which action can be proved by mere preponderance of
evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29
enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for
the same criminal act or omission.

The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent

supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed
by the petitioner, thus:

3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about

7:00 o'clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street
from his restaurant situated at 220 lznart St.,
Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a
meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer
Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing
on the middle of the street as there were
vehicles coming from the Provincial Building
towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was
bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car
with plate No. B-2508 W which was on its
way from Plazoleta Gay towards the
Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was
being driven by the defendant in a reckless
and negligent manner, at an excessive rate of
speed and in violation of the provisions of the
Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in
relation to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing
city ordinances, and by reason of his
inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to
act with due negligence and by failing to take
into consideration (sic) his degree of
intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the
place as well as the width, traffic, visibility
and other conditions of lznart Street; 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the
respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his
intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such
separate civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also
heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —

... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a

criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged
criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused . .
.

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et
al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in
arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared
that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a
separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal
case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for
damages, especially considering that the accused therein was
acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes
of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for
damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in
the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon
and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as
authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of

respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of
this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the

decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
without costs.

SO ORDERED.