Torts And Damages Case Digest: Gashem Shookat Baksh V.

CA,
Et Al (1993)
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Laws Applicable: Art. 21, Art. 23 and Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Gashem Shookat Baksh (Gashem), a medical student in
Lyceum Northwestern Dagupan City, courted and
proposed to marry 22 years old, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community
 she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married after the end of the school
semester (October that year)
 Gashem visited her parents in Pangasinan for
approval for marriage
 August 20 1987: Gashem forced her to live with him when
she was still a virgin then he started to maltreat and
threatened to kill her resulting into injuries
 would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock
in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
and night until the following day
 she became pregnant, but Gashem gave her some
medicine to abort the fetus
 Gashem continued to live with defendant and
kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he asked her not to live with him anymore
as he is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City
  he lived with another woman in Bacolod
City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff
 resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal
 Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding.
 prayed for judgment ordering Gashem to pay her
damages
 Gashem: never proposed marriage to or agreed to
be married; he did not maltreat her, but only told her
to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport
 RTC: favored private respondent and against Gashem
 gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the
temerity and courage to come to court and expose
her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
ridicule if her claim was false
 CA: affirmed RTC
 Gashem's acts are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are
even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to
our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who
has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of
our institutions of learning
 Gashem criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking
Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring
the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and
 culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if
he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent
failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes
to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on
the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not posses good moral character. Moreover,
his controversial "common law life" is now his legal
wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to
an illicit arrangement
 promised to marry her would not be actionable since mere
breach of promise is not actionable
ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise
to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines

HELD: YES. Petition is denied.

 existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong
 Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above nineteen years of age
 Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-
delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

 Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa

aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
 intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code
 Article 21 fills that vacuum and has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it
has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts
 acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21
 It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
 In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience
about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that
the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left
 him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
 let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable
behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner
stay together in the same room in their house after giving
approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents
to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Fausto Barredo V. Severino
Garcia And Timotea Almario (1942)
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942

Laws Applicable: ART. 1089, ART. 1092, ART. 1093, ART. 1094
of the Civil Code, ART. 101, ART. 102, ART. 103, ART. 365 of
RPC
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 May 3, 1936 1:30 am: road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision
between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis
 The carretela was overturned and its
passenger Faustino Garcia (16 years old boy)
suffered injuries from which he died two days later
 Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap
 he was driving on the wrong side of the road
and at high speed
 criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI
  CA affirmed CFI: he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 1 year and 1 day to 2 years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved.
 March 7, 1939: parents Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario brought an action in the CFI of Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla
 Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding violation which
appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be public and to himself
 Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code
 defense: liability of Barredo is governed by the
RPC>liability is only subsidiary (no civil action
against the driver Fontanilla Barredo cannot be
held responsible in the case)
 CFI awarded damages for P2,000 plus legal interest
 CA: reduced the damages to P1,000 w/ legal interest
 Applied Article 1903: applicable only to those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law
 by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee
ISSUE: W/N the parents may bring separate civil action against
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible
under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer

HELD: YES. CA Affirmed.

  quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime
 Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-
contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in
which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for
the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article
is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who
live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or
incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with
them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally
liable for any damages caused by their employees while
engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a
special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by
the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the
act performed, in which case the provisions of the next
preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the
persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his
employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2,
3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil
liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the
person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined,
even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with
the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification
shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12,
the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily
liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part
of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers
and proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other
persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation
of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or
the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided
that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have
given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed."
 Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-
delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or
corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means
of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because
the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all
 acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

Penal Code Civil Code
minors and
incapacitated other persons
persons
subsidiary
direct (article 19) (articles 20 and direct(Art. 1903)
21)
 same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code
 interpretation of the words of article 1093 "fault or
negligence not punished by law"
 consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code
 The acts to which these articles are applicable
are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one
another.
 But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
 A typical application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway accident
due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would
arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage,
 while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.
 Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability
in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability
shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
 exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of
the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of
a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal
Code
 distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act
may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code
 Rationales:
1. Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to
fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life
2. to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
 preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
3. It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility
should fall upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon
the injured person who could not exercise such selection
and who used such employee because of his confidence
in the principal or director
4. not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D.,vs.HANZ CALAPIZ
G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014

Facts:
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and
HerlitaCalapiz brought their 8-year-old son, HanzCalapiz (Hanz),
for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo
circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of
circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited
blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the
child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the
catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital
over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue
taking antibiotics.On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a
hospital because of the abscess formation between the base and
the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought
about by Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr.
Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a
damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and
thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged
urethra.When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against
the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries.

At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses,

including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the
physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged
urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to
have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to
trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to
strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily
explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by
trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that
had caused the injury.

In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended

that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995,
he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the
appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required
immediate surgical operation; that after performing the
appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents’
consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the
parents’ claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had
then cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had
subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the
penis had been brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.

RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency

of the evidence. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner
was liable for moral damages because there was a
preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the
injurious trauma from his circumcision by the petitioner and
ordering him to pay HanzCalapiz₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
No costs.On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the
award of moral damages. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner did not exercise the required standard of
care in the medical profession to hold him criminally liable.

Ruling:
No, prosecution failed to show that petitioner did not exercise the
required standard of care under similar circumstances.
General rule, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. Although, the acquittal of an accused of the crime
charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. Likewise,
the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that
the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be through the
institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.
Here, the failure of the Prosecution to prove the petitioner’s
criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding
against the petitioner that there was preponderant evidence of his
negligence to hold him civilly liable.The undesirable outcome of
the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young
child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to
repair his damaged urethra. His physical and moral sufferings
properly warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages. The Court AFFIRMS the decision.

MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN GR No. 150157 Date: January 25,

2007 Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J. MAURICIO MANLICLIC and
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, MODESTO CALAUNAN INC.
(PRBLI) Nature of the case: Petition for review assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2001 in
CAG.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil
Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
FACTS Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-
478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic collided with the owner-type jeep with plate number
PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza. The accident happened at around 6:00 to 7:00
o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988 at approximately Kilometer
40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan,
Plaridel, Bulacan. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting
to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and
stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. Respondent suffered
minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan
City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus,
and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical
Center. A criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the
RTC of Dagupan City. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case. When the civil case was heard counsel for respondent
prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the
testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in the
civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to
testify in the civil case. On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered
its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The trial court ordered the herein
petitioners to pay the respondents jointly and solidarily the
amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well
as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and
anotherP100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In
addition, the petitioners are also to pay costs. Petitioners
appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of
Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial
court, affirmed it in all respects. On the other hand, petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries. From the complaint, it can be gathered that the
civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-
delict. Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless
imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was
sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of. ISSUE/S Can Manliclic still be held liable for the
collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of
the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on
his part? RATIO: Yes. Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads: (b) Extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a

declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic
can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section
applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and
not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. A
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that
is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is
now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an
accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime
or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil
liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not
be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. RULING WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 55909 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral
damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of
exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs
against petitioners. )
Torts And Damages Case Digest: German Garcia Et Al., V. The
Hon. Mariano M. Florido Et Al. (1973)
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and
Damages)

FACTS:
 August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis
Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and
boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a
round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the
purpose of attending a conference
  August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was
negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21
km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned
and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven
by Pedro Tumala
 Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization
 Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both
drivers and their owners for driving in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car
 RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict
because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict
despite having a criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case
 essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
 a) act or omission of the private respondents
 b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car
 c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
as a result of the collision
 d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents
  e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties
 violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure
of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests
of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, which failure
resulted in the injury on petitioners
 petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said
accused
 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present
civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in
the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them
in the present civil case
 petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene
therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself
(Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so
does not bar him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal
 SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER v. ANTONIO SAN
ANDRES, GR No. 200444, 2018-08-15
 Facts:
 Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours
Bus with body... owned by
 Antonio San Andres
 Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was
overtaking... hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and
registered in the name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus
 Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by [petitioner] Felix G.
Ruz
 On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the
Court a quo was instituted by [respondent] Antonio San
Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel
Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of the
Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the
amount of P144,500.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.
Claims for attorney's fees of P30,000.00, appearance fee of
P1,000.00, litigation expenses of P20,000.00 and cost of the
suit were also lodged in the complaint.
 Counter Claim by Supreme Bus.
 Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with
Counterclaim. They alleged among others that plaintiff has
no cause of action against them; the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the
[respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel
Tours Bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and
regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle
without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane
coming from the opposite direction resulting to head on
collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the
time of the accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours
Bus outside his franchise and without a registered plate.
 RTC Rulling... the instant complaint for damages filed by the
plaintiff is hereby dismissed for having failed to prove liability
on the part of the defendant. The counterclaim that was filed
by the defendants hereof is also dismissed for failure to
adhere to procedural requirements.
 RTC Rulings
 TC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action precluded their right to
recover damages from the respondent through their
counterclaim.
 CA Rulings.
 In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,
[11] the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating that the
RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not
prosper because their recourse was limited to the
enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code;[12] that "to allow the
counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to double
recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177 of the
New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the Rules;"[13] and
that their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant
that their right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
was deemed instituted with the criminal action.[14] The CA
denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the
resolution promulgated on January 26, 2012.[
 CA Basis
 As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of
action should be limited to the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the
respondent's driver the criminal complaint for criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
 CA Legal Basis
 CA pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve the civil
aspect of the criminal case proscribed them from instituting a
separate civil action based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
to wit: Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil
aspect of the criminal case they have filed. Without so doing,
they were deemed to have elected to recover damages from
the bus driver on the basis of the crime. Therefore, the right
of appellants to institute a separate civil case to recover
liability from appellee based under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Evidently,
appellant's cause of action against appellee will be limited to
the recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103
of the Revised Penal Code. x x x[17]
 Issues:
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO RESERVATION WAS
MADE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-253 FILED AGAINST
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO BELCHEZ.
 Ruling:
 The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have
been dismissed by the RTC and the CA despite their failure
to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the
criminal case they had brought against respondent's driver.
 Principles:
 Not civil liability from a crime ex pari... the petitioners' cause
of action was upon a quasi-delict. As such, their
counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article
2184,[21] in relation to Article 2180[22] and Article 2176,[23]
all of the Civil Code.
 An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as
those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject
to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission or under both causes.

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO
(petitioners)
 vs.
  MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA (respondent)
 FACTS:
 Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the
other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Casupanan, figured in an accident. This prompted the filing
of two cases before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac: 1st – a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property filed by respondent against Casapunan; 2nd – a civil
case arising from a quasi-delict filed by the petitioners
against the respondent. The civil case was filed pending
preliminary investigation on the criminal case. Respondent
as defendant in the civil case filed a motion to dismiss on
ground of forum shopping due pendency of the criminal
case. The MCTC granted the motion for dismissal on basis
of forum shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that a separate civil action
may be instituted separately and independently from the
criminal case. MCTC denied the motion. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari before Capas RTC to
assail MCTC’s Order, however the RTC dismissed the same
for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.
 ISSUE:
 Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case.
 HELD:
 YES. The right of the accused to file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict is akin to the right of the offended party to file
an independent civil action pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
111. Under the said rule, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately
by the offended party even without reservation. The
 commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these
articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from
the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended
party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
other a civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule
on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not
suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
 Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict
for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of
the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of
the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This
is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited
from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused, who is
presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail
of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for
quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in
 the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access
to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
 Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately
by Petitioners is proper.

Austria vs AAA
Facts:
In 2006, the Regional Trial Court convicted Mamerto Austria, a
school teacher, of fivecounts of acts of lasciviousness committed
against private complainants, both 11-
yearold female students. Mamerto moved for reconsideratio
n. Meantime, the trial judgehandling the trial cases was
promoted. On August 15, 2008, the new presiding judgeresolved
the motion and rendered joint orders acquitting Mamerto. Private
complainants were unsuccessful at a reconsideration. They then
filed a specialcivil action for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
alleging that the new presiding judgecommitted grave abuse of
discretion since his Orders merely recited the contents
of Mamerto's motion for reconsideration without stating any
factual and legal basis. On July 31, 2012, the CA ruled in
favor of private complainants and the Joint
Ordersw e r e d e c l a r e d v o i d h e n c e t h i s p e t i t i o n o f M a
m e r t o f o r r e v i e w o n c e r t i o r a r i . H e questioned the legal
personality of the private complainants to question his
acquittalsince they cannot avail of a petition for certiorari without
the participation of the Officeof the Solicitor General (OSG).On
August 3, 2021, the Court required the OSG to file a
comment on the private complainant’s legal standing in a
criminal case. In its comment, the OSG stated that only the
OSG may question the judgments or orders involving the criminal aspect
of thecase. However, it clarified that the private complainants may
appeal insofar as the civilliability of the accused
in concerned, or file a special civil action for certiorari
topreserve his or her interest in the civil aspect of the case.
In both cases, there is noneed to implead the State as the case
involves purely private interests. Lastly, the OSGgave its
conformity to the petition for certiorari that private complainant
filed before theCA. The OSG argued that the trial court’s
Joint Orders are void for failure to stateclearly the factual and
legal bases of Mamerto’s acquittal.
Issues:
1.Whether the private complainants have the legal
p e r s o n a l i t y t o q u e s t i o n petitioner’s acquittal
Ruling:
1 . Y e s .
The Court cited various jurisprudence wherein appeals or
petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittalof the accused,
dismissal of the criminal case, and interlocutor orders rendered
in the criminal proceedingsfiled without consent
or conformity of the OSG were dismissed because of lack
of legal standing of personality. Yet, there are instances where
the Court allowed these appeals or petitions.Given
the divergent decisions on the private
complainant’s legal standing in a criminal
case, privatecomplainants cannot be faulted when they relied on
jurisprudence allowing them to assail the criminalaspect of the
case through a petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of
discretion and denial of due process. Hence, the Court did not
dismiss their remedy.
There are divergent decisions on the private complainant's
legal standing in acriminal case-some petitions without OSG's
conformint were granted and somewere dismissed. In this case,
private complainants cannot be faulted when they

00:064:09

relied on jurisprudence allowing them to assail the criminal

aspect of the casethrough a petition for certiorari on
grounds of grave abuse of discretion anddenial of due
process. Hence, the Court did not dismiss their
remedy. I n f a c t , t h e O S G j o i n e d t h e c a u s e o f p r i v a t e
c o m p l a i n a n t s , a n d g a v e i t s conformity to the petition for
certiorari that the private complainants filed beforethe CA.
TO avoid further delay, the Court deemed it more appropriate and
practical to resolve the issueof whether the CA correctly ruled that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion which it did.

when itdisregarded the constitutional requirement that a decision

must express clearly and distinctly the facts andthe law on which
it is based. The RTC was indeed guilty of grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court then harmonized the case law and formulated an
edifying rule on theprivate complainant’s legal standing to
question judgments or orders in
criminalp r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s e x c l u s i v e r u l
e - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y . P r i v a t e complainant has the legal
personality to appeal the civil liability of the accused orfile a
petition for certiorari to preserve his or her interest in the civil
aspect of thecriminal case. The reviewing court shall require the
OSG to file comment within anon-extendible period of thirty days
from the notice. On the other hand, privatecomplainant has no
legal personality for those involving the criminal aspect
of the case or the right to prosecute, unless made with the OSG’s
conformity. Theprivate complainant must request the OSG’s
conformity within the reglementaryperiod to appeal or file a
petition for certiorari. The reviewing court shall requirethe OSG to
file comment within a non-extendible period for certiorari
questioningt h e a c q u i t t a l o f t h e a c c u s e d , t h e d i s m i s s a
l o f t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e , a n d t h e interlocutory orders in
criminal proceedings on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion or denial of due process.The petition of Mamerto
was denied. The decision of the CA was affirmed
withmodification.
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals

Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga

and Francisco Salva
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
332 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already
filled with passengers so she was given by the conductor an
“extension seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the door. As she
was seated at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Unfortunately, a truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.

Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,

alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing
to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of the truck.

RTC’s decision: Absolved Calalas of liability and ruled that Salva

as third-party defendant was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which
Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

CA’s decision: reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga’s

cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-
delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
required under the Civil Code. It also dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
to Sunga.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in
Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck
liable for quasi-delict.
2. Whether or not respondent carrier is responsible for the injury
caused to its passenger when the accident was caused by
another vehicle.
3. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned
by Salva was a caso fortuito.
4. Whether or not respondent passenger is entitled to moral
damages.

RULING:
1. No. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party
in a pending case was never a party in a previous one. And
besides, the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present
case are not the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand,
the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract
of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.

2. Yes. The liability of petitioner arises from his negligence in the

performance of his contractual obligation or breach of contract of
carriage. Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently in case of death or injuries to passengers, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts
to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is now the duty of
petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. However, in this case, petitioner failed to
prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. It was found that the jeepney was not properly
parked and he took more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity.

3. No. The taking of an “extension seat” is not an implied

assumption of risk on the part of the passenger. A caso fortuito is
an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
obligor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the obligor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.

4. No. Petitioner did not act in bad faith in the performance of the
contract of carriage. As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219
of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death
of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier
is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.

NOTES:

In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly

established because it s the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.

Presumption of Negligence
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common
carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.

Bad faith
The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver
failed to assist the injured passenger in going to a nearby hospital
cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.

The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common carriers

remain basically unchanged even when the contract is breached
by tort although noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may
then be assimilated as also forming part of the governing law.
(Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA
38 [1996])

Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration

of logic, common sense, policy and precedent, is that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occured. (Bank of the Philippine Islands
vs. Court of Appeals, 641 SCRA 326 [2000])

While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be liable in

case of collision, the driver of a moving vehicle who had no
opportunity to avoid the collision due to his own making is not
relieved of liability, such as when his negligence is the immediate
and proximate cause of the collision. (Austria vs. Court of
Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 [2000])
ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL v. KEIHIN-EVERETT
FORWARDING COMPANY, GR No. 191937, 2017-08-09
Facts:
On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking
Service Agreement with Matsushita. Under the Trucking Service
Agreement, Keihin-Everett would provide services for
Matsushita's trucking requirements. These services were
subcontracted by Keihin-Everett to Orient Freight, through their
own Trucking Service Agreement executed on the same day.
When the Trucking Service Agreement between Keihin-Everett
and Matsushita expired on December 31, 2001, Keihin-Everett
executed an In-House Brokerage Service Agreement for
Matsushita's Philippine Economic Zone Authority export
operations. Keihin-Everett continued to retain the services of
Orient Freight, which sub-contracted its work to Schmitz
Transport and Brokerage Corporation.
In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett's Sales Manager,
Salud Rizada, about a column in the April 19, 2002 issue of the
tabloid newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002
interception by Caloocan City police of a stolen truck filled with
shipment of video monitors and CCTV systems owned by
Matsushita.[8] When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news,
Orient Freight stated that the tabloid report had blown the incident
out of proportion. They claimed that the incident simply involved
the breakdown and towing of the truck, which was driven by Ricky
Cudas (Cudas), with truck helper, Rubelito Aquino[9] (Aquino).
The truck was promptly released and did not miss the closing time
of the vessel intended for the shipment
Keihin-Everett directed Orient Freight to investigate the matter.
During its April 20, 2002 meeting with Keihin-Everett and
Matsushita, as well as in its April 22, 2002 letter addressed to
Matsushita, Orient Freight reiterated that the truck merely broke
down and had to be towed.
However, when the shipment arrived in Yokohama, Japan on May
8, 2002, it was discovered that 10 pallets of the shipment's 218
cartons, worth US$34,226.14, were missing
Keihin-Everett independently investigated the incident. During its
investigation, it obtained a police report from the Caloocan City
Police Station. The report stated, among others, that at around
2:00 p.m. on April 17, 2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco
Street, Manila, Cudas told Aquino to report engine trouble to
Orient Freight... fter Aquino made the phone call, he informed
Orient Freight that the truck had gone missing. When the truck
was intercepted by the police along C3 Road near the corner of
Dagat-Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas escaped and
became the subject of a manhunt
When confronted with Keihin-Everett's findings, Orient Freight
wrote back on May 15, 2002 to admit that its previous report was
erroneous and that pilferage was apparently proven
In its June 6, 2002 letter, Matsushita terminated its In-House
Brokerage Service Agreement with Keihin-Everett, effective July
1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence for terminating the
contract, stating that Keihin-Everett's way of handling the April 17,
2002 incident and its nondisclosure of this incident's relevant facts
"amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard of the rule of
law."
Keihin-Everett, by counsel, sent a letter dated September 16,
2002 to Orient Freight, demanding P2,500,000.00 as indemnity
for lost income. It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling of the
situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with
Matsushita
When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a
complaint dated October 24, 2002 for damages... n its complaint,
Keihin-Everett alleged that Orient Freight's "misrepresentation,
malice, negligence and fraud" caused the termination of its In-
House Brokerage Service Agreement with Matsushita. Keihin-
Everett prayed for compensation for lost income, with legal
interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and the costs of the suit.
Orient Freight appealed the Regional Trial Court Decision to the
Court of Appeals.
he Court of Appeals denied Orient Freight's Motion for
Reconsideration in its April 21, 2010 Resolution
The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant
was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury.
Issues:
Second, whether the Court of Appeals, considering the existing
contracts in this case, erred in applying Article 2176 of the Civil
Code;
Third, whether Orient Freight, Inc. was negligent for failing to
disclose the facts surrounding the hijacking incident on April 17,
2002, which led to the termination of the Trucking Service
Agreement between Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co., Inc. and
Matsushita Communication Industrial Corporation of the
Philippines; and
Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court rendered its February 27, 2008
Decision,[20] in favor of Keihin-Everett. It found that Orient Freight
was "negligent in failing to investigate properly the incident and
make a factual report to Keihin[-Everett] and Matsushita," despite
having enough time to properly investigate the incident
The trial court also ruled that Orient Freight's failure to exercise
due diligence in disclosing the true facts of the incident to Keihin-
Everett and Matsushita caused Keihin-Everett to suffer income
losses due to Matsushita's cancellation of their contract.
the Court of Appeals issued its Decision[25] affirming the trial
court's decision. It ruled that Orient Freight "not only had
knowledge of the foiled hijacking of the truck carrying the . . .
shipment but, more importantly, withheld [this] information from
[Keihin-Everett].
Orient Freight was negligent in not reporting and not thoroughly
investigating the April 17, 2002 incident despite Keihin-Everett's
instruction to do so
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly arrived at
the amount of P1,666,667.00 as the award of lost income.
II
Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa
contractual.[46] Culpa aquiliana is the "the wrongful or negligent
act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation,"[47] and is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code:
Negligence in culpa contractual, on the other hand, is "the fault or
negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which
already-existed, and which increases the liability from such
already existing obligation."[48] This is governed by Articles 1170
to 1174 of the Civil Code:[49]
Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on
quasi-delicts differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof.
They generally cannot co-exist.[50] Once a breach of contract is
proved, the defendant is presumed negligent and must prove not
being at fault. In a quasi-delict, however, the complaining party
has the burden of proving the other party's negligence
However, there are instances when Article 2176 may apply even
when there is a pre-existing contractual relation. A party may still
commit a tort or quasi-delict against another, despite the
existence of a contract between them
If a contracting party's act that breaches the contract would have
given rise to an extra-contractual liability had there been no
contract, the contract would be deemed breached by a tort,[61]
and the party may be held liable under Article 2176 and its related
provisions.
However, if the act complained of would not give rise to a cause
of action for a quasi-delict independent of the contract, then the
provisions on quasi-delict or tort would be inapplicable
In situations where the contractual relation is indispensable to
hold a party liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
complained of was done in bad faith and in violation of Article 21
of the Civil Code to give rise to an action based on tort
Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts
regarding the hijacking incident since this was not among the
provisions of its Trucking Service Agreement with respondent.
The obligation to report what happened during the hijacking
incident, admittedly, does not appear on the plain text of the
Trucking Service Agreement. Petitioner argues that it is nowhere
in the agreement. Respondent does not dispute this claim.
Neither the Regional Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals relied
on the provisions of the Trucking Service Agreement to arrive at
their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking Service
Agreement was neither alleged nor proved.
While petitioner and respondent were contractually bound under
the Trucking Service Agreement and the events at the crux of this
controversy occurred during the performance of this contract, it is
apparent that the duty to investigate and report arose subsequent
to the Trucking Service Agreement
Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in
finding petitioner's negligence of its obligation to report to be an
action based on a quasi-delict Petitioner's negligence did not
create the vinculum juris or legal relationship with the respondent,
which would have otherwise given rise to a quasi-delict.
Petitioner's duty to respondent existed prior to its negligent act.
When respondent contacted petitioner regarding the news report
and asked it to investigate the incident, petitioner's obligation was
created. Thereafter, petitioner was alleged to have performed its
obligation negligently, causing damage to respondent.
Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on
negligence in the performance of an obligation should apply.
Principles:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code does not apply when the party's
negligence occurs in the performance of an obligation. The
negligent act would give rise to a quasi-delict only when it may be
the basis for an independent action were the parties not otherwise
bound by a contract.

MARPAGA v. MITSUI O.S.K. LINES DIAMOND CAMELLA, GR

No. 194403, 2019-07-24
Facts:
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, a non-resident corporation, not doing
business in the Philippines, was the charterer of MV Sea Prospect
while Diamond Camellia, S.A., another non-resident corporation,
not doing business in the Philippines, and of Panamian registry is
the registered owner of the said vessel.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay), the manning
agent of the respondents in the Philippines, hired... crew
members
MV Sea Prospect was making a regular traffic between Japan
and Indonesia and arrived at the Port of Sebe, Indonesia in order
to perform loading operations of nickle-ore. Prior to its arrival
therein, it had been raining, hence, the nickle-ore was wet when
loaded onboard MV Sea Prospect.
MV Sea Prospect headed to Japan
Upon inspection, it was found that the cargo was very wet so the
Captain ordered to fill the ballast tanks, thus achieving the
vessel's stability. He then ordered a change in the course of the
vessel to the Island of Okinawa to seek refuge. While nearing the
Island of Okinawa, the vessel listed again 3 to 5 degrees then to
90 degrees, taking water in the bridge, the engine stopping and
the electric power being cut. After 30 minutes, MV Sea Prospect
sunk, drowning 10 crew members
Respondents alleged... petitioners who are heirs and beneficiaries
of the missing seafarers received full payment of death benefits
based on the employment contract as well as the
(CBA) governing the employment of the seafarers.
Petitioners allegedly demanded in writing further compensation in
connection with the sinking of the vessel and threatened that an
action arising from tort would be commenced in Panama should
their demand be unheeded.
respondents filed... a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Approval
of the Compromise/Settlement Agreement against petitioners.
petitioners filed the complaint for damages against respondents
before the Admiralty Court of Panama.
the trial court issued an order confirming the validity of the
settlement agreement, declaring that the petitioners breached the
material provisions of the settlement agreement, and approved
such settlement agreement. The Supreme Court of Panama,
meanwhile, dismissed petitioners' case for lack of jurisdiction
based on forum non conveniens
Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents and
prescription of action.
The petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)... directing the LA to serve summons to
Magsaysay at its business address given to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) so that jurisdiction
may be acquired over the persons of the respondents and proper
proceedings can be held.
LA... dismissing the complaint due to the execution of individual
compromise agreements by petitioners waiving their rights
against respondents.
the NLRC dismissed the appeal saying that the claim, even if
based on tort was already included in the quitclaims executed in
favor of the respondents.
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari to the CA which was
dismissed... iterating the ruling of the LA and NLRC that the
complaint for damages was filed out of time and that the claim
filed with the Admiralty Court of Panama did not toll the
prescriptive period for filing a claim here in the Philippines.
Issues:
Whether petitioners' cause of action has prescribed
Whether the settlement agreement, receipt and general receipt
and release of rights barred petitioners from filing the complaint.
Ruling:
In deciding whether a case arises out of employer-employee
relations, the Court formulated the "reasonable causal connection
rule", wherein if there is a reasonable connection between the
claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the
case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts.
n this case, petitioners' claim for damages is grounded on
respondents' gross negligence which caused the sinking of the
vessel and the untimely demise of their loved ones.[27] Based on
this, the subject matter of the complaint is one of claim for
damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the
regular court's jurisdiction.
Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Here, petitioners argue that respondents are duty bound to
exercise due diligence required by law in order to ensure the
safety of the crew and all the passengers therein. It was further
averred that the negligence on the part of the respondents is quite
apparent when they allowed the vessel to load and transport wet
cargo. For failure therefore to exercise extra ordinary diligence
required of them, the respondents must be held liable for
damages to the surviving heirs of the deceased crew members.
[29] Notwithstanding the contractual relation between the parties,
the act of respondents is a quasi-delict and not a mere breach of
contract.Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise,
not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and
other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the
application of the general civil law, such claim falls outside the
area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to the LA and
the NLRC.[30]Therefore, the LA has no jurisdiction over the case
in the first place; it should have been filed to the proper trial court.
AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO, GR No. L-21438,
1966-09-28
Facts:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in 'first class', but at
Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first
class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the
Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to
vacate his 'first... class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to
said Ernesto G. Cuento, 'many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they... found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified
Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man'
That x x x plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the
Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting
as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which
said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant... agreed to
furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during
the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as
starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, x x x
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to
Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to
 the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by
the plaintiff with defendant's... employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage,
but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class
accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or
Casablanca, x x x the plaintiff has been compelled by
defendant's... employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already
seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's
breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World
Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. [32]...
xxxx
7. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish
First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered
inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings, social humiliation, and the... like injury, resulting in
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00."
Issues:
. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to
and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner
asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew
that he did not... have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first... class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and
discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding
that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first
class... seats on the 'definite' segments of his journey, particularly
that from Saigon to Beirut". [2
Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted
upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; [31]
and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a
finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint
bearing on this issue are:
Ruling:
in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract
to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others,
the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class...
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith
when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his
first class accommodation berth "after he was already seated"
and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he...
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint.
But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth therein. [34] The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the
stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted
portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it
be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to
a... first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this... is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For,
"bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or
for ulterior purpose."
[39]
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express
finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance,
thus:
"The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the
extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to... have him thrown out of the airplane to give the
'first class' seat that he was occupying to, again using the words
of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a 'white man' whom he
(defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this 'white man' had any
'better right' to occupy the 'first class' seat that the plaintiff was
occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding 'first
class' ticket was issued by the defendant to him."

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its

employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. [41]
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
 petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil
Code... says:

"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept;
and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. [43] And this, because
of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It... invites people to
avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have
a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses... from such employees. So it is, that any
rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. [
Thus, "Where a steamship company [45] had accepted a
passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a
right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand
payment... under threat of ejection, though the language used
was not insulting and she was not ejected. [46] And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both
in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the
contract... may be also a tort". [47] And in another case, "Where a
passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect
his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train...
reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as
by calling him a lunatic," and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the... carrier liable for the mental suffering of
said passenger. [48]
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public
duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner-air carrier - a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.

Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges| G.R. No. 156109 | November 18,

2004 | J. Panganiban Petitioner: Khristine Regino assisted and
represented by Armando Regino Respondent: Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology, Rachelle Gamurot, Elissa
Baladlad Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Summary:
Khristine Regino was prevented from taking two of her final
exams when she refused to buy two party tickets for PCST’s
fundraising. The filed in the RTC for damages. The Court ruled
that the doctrine of administrative remedies is inapplicable at the
case at bar. First, petitioner was correct in claiming that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
application where a student is not asking for the reversal of the
policies of an educational institution nor demanding that she be
allowed to take the final examinations that she was prevented
from taking but is praying for damages. Second, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence
on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of Administrative agencies are not courts; they are
neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals. And third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions,
one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within
the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts
FACTS:  





Khristine was a first year computer science student at Pangasinan

Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST) February 2002:
PCST held a fundraising campaign dubbed as the Rave Party and
Dance Revolution, the proceeds of which where to go to the
construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts: o Each
student was required to pay two tickets, P100 each. Students who
purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores, and
those who refused were denied the opportunity to take their final
examinations Khristine refused to pay for the tickets because she
and her family were financially challenged and her religion
prohibited her from attending dance parties and celebrations
Respondents Gamurot and Baladad, her teachers in logic and
statistics, respectively, disallowed her from taking her exams.
Khristine filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for Damages
against PCST, Gamurot, and Baladad Respondents filed a Motion
to Dismiss: petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Jurisidiction should have been with CHED because the question
raised involved a determination of the wisdom of the policy of
PCST RTC: dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It
was CHED, and not the courts, that had jurisdiction over the
controversy Khristine filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45
WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable—NO 1. Petitioner was correct in claiming that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
application where a student is not asking for the reversal of the
policies of an educational institution nor demanding that she be
allowed to take the final examinations that she was prevented
from taking but is praying for damages. a. Factoran, Jr. v. CA:
“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic.
Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have
first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors,
if any, committed in the administrative forum.” b. In the case at
bar, Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of
PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. 2. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
when there is competence on the part of the administrative body
to act upon the matter complained of Administrative agencies are
not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are
they deemed judicial tribunals a. In the case at bar, CHED does
not have the power to award CHED does not have the power to
award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced
her case before the Commission. 3. Third, the exhaustion doctrine
admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely
legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s
action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the
jurisdiction of the courts WON the complaint stated sufficient
cause/s of action—YES, there were two causes of action, first,
breach of contract, second, liability for tort 1. The first cause of
action was for breach of contract a. It was already ruled in Alcuaz
v. PSBA and Non v. Danes II, that a contractual relationship
subsists between the school and the student. This relationship
gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations b. Thus,
students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees,
satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion of
academic requirements and observance of school rules and
regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their
“completion” of the course enrolled in. c. In the present case,
PCST imposed the assailed revenue raising measure belatedly, in
the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a
condition for the students’ taking the final examinations, and
ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The
fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered
into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be
unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees. 2. Second
cause of action is based on liability for tort

a. An academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has

an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated
the contract may also be a tort b. The acts of respondents
supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of
Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code c. In the case at bar, she
was made to sit out her logic class while her classmates took the
exam, and in her statistics class, Baladad announced to the whole
class that she wasn’t allowing petitioner and another student to
take their exams, and then ejected them from the classroom.
WON academic freedom justifies PCST’s acts—NO 1. In their
Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to “academic
freedom.” We are not impressed. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach,
and (4) who may be admitted to study 2. The Court has
emphasized that once a school has, in the name of academic
freedom, set its standards, these should be meticulously
observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain
students After accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot
renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than those
made known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the
school year. Disposition: The petition is granted.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Natividad V. Andamo, Et Al., V.
Intermediate Appellate Court Et Al. (1990)
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and
Damages)

FACTS:
 Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation, built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake
within its land
 inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and
Natividad Andamo's land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction
 July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
 February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
 CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the related
Criminal Case
 spouses contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since
it is predicated on a quasi-delict
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety
HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE
 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
 (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
 (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond
 (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff
 While the property involved in the cited case belonged to
the public domain and the property subject of the instant
case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have
sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation
 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such
a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights
and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of
an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
 Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
 whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter
CASE DIGEST] Elcano v. Hill (G.R. No. L-24803)

May 26, 1977

FACTS:

Reginald Hill was accused of killing Agapito Elcano. Hill was

subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act was not
considered criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake.”

Pedro Elcano, father of the victim Agapito, filed a case for

recovery of damages instead against Reginald and his father,
Marvin Hill, before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.

The Hills filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among others, that

the action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
in res-adjudicata. The CFI granted said motion. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for recovery of damages by the Elcanos is

barred by the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case filed
against him. -- NO.

HELD:
The acquittal of Reginald Hill does not extinguish his liability for
quasi-delict, and the acquittal is not a bar for civil action for
damages.

Under Art 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal

negligence, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, nor for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Art 2177 means that a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

Culpa acquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may

or may not be punished by law.

In the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, the Supreme Court held that
negligent act can result in civil liability under the Penal Code and
the Civil Code. In that case the Court said that an act of
negligence may be a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under the Civil Code (1902).
Cinco vs Canonoy

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON.
LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second
Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS
PEPITO, respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of
damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by
respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the
pre-trial of the civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the
civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b),
Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered
the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the
Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. The Court of

First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review

on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for
damages to property during the pendency of the criminal action.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on
Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which
can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made
essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the
operation of the jeepney
which caused the collision between his automobile and said
jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal
connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of
the defendant-driver
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended,
among others, that
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is
principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-
delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil
case may proceed
as a separate and independent court action as specifically
provided for in Article
2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other
civil
actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same
rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the
Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been
instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on
quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New

Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property.
It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to
"harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not
limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict
in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil
Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke
which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the
criminal action is
finally terminated.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and
Damages)

FACTS:

 August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis

Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and
boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a
round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the
purpose of attending a conference
 August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was
negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at 21
km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned
and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven
by Pedro Tumala
 Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization
 Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both
drivers and their owners for driving in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car
 RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict
because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict
despite having a criminal action.
HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case
 essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
 a) act or omission of the private respondents
 b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car
 c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
as a result of the collision
 d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents
 e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties
 violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure
of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests
of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, which failure
resulted in the injury on petitioners
 petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said
accused
 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present
civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in
the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them
in the present civil case
  petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene
therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself
(Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so
does not bar him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal

R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. LUISITO G. YU, GR
No. 174161, 2015-02-18
 Facts:
 At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta
J. Yu, after having alighted from a passenger bus in front of
Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a
bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who... was then employed
by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was
immediately rushed to Medical City Hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival
 On February 3, 1994, the husband of the deceased,
respondent Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against
petitioner R Transport, Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila
Transport Corporation (MMTC) for the... death of his wife.
 MMTC denied its liability reasoning that it is merely the
registered owner of the bus involved in the incident, the
actual owner, being petitioner R Transport.
 It explained that under the Bus Installment Purchase
Program of the... government, MMTC merely purchased the
subject bus, among several others, for resale to petitioner R
Transport, which will in turn operate the same within Metro
Manila.
 Since it was not actually operating the bus which killed
respondent's wife, nor was it the employer of the... driver
 thereof, MMTC alleged that the complaint against it should
be dismissed.
 petitioner R Transport alleged that respondent had no cause
of action against it for it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its... employees and drivers and
that its buses are in good condition. Meanwhile, the driver
Antonio Gimena was declared in default for his failure to file
an answer to the complaint.
 the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu
ruling that petitioner R Transport failed to prove that it
exercised the diligence required of a good father... of a
family in the selection and supervision of its driver, who, by
its negligence, ran over the deceased resulting in her death.
It also held that MMTC should be held solidarily liable with
petitioner R Transport because it would unduly prejudice a
third person who is a victim... of a tort to look beyond the
certificate of registration and prove who the actual owner is
in order to enforce a right of action.
 On September 9, 2005, the CA affirmed the Decision of the
RTC with modification that defendant Antonio Gimena is
made solidarily liable for the damages caused to respondent.
 Issues:
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY
THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS EMPLOYEE, WHICH WAS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
 Ruling:
 Petitioner insists that the CA and the RTC were incorrect in
ruling that its driver was negligent for aside from the mere
speculations and uncorroborated testimonies of the police
officers on duty at the time of the accident, no other
evidence had been adduced to prove that its... driver was
driving in a reckless and imprudent manner.
 In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly
running at a reckless speed. As testified by the police officer
on duty at the time of the incident[16] and indicated in the
Autopsy Report,[17] not only were... the deceased's clothes
ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her
skull and spilled over the road.
 Under Article 2180[18] of the New Civil Code, employers are
liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence
on the part of the employee is established, a presumption
instantly arises... that the employer was remiss in the
selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To
avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its employee,
it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption
by presenting adequate and convincing proof that it...
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of
any proof showing the exercise by petitioner of the required
diligence.
 Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is
for the better protection of the public for both the owner of
record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and
severally liable with the driver.[28] As aptly stated by the
appellate... court, "the principle of holding the registered
owner liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of
the offending vehicle has already been transferred to
another is designed to protect the public and not as a shield
on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle... to
take refuge in, inorder to free itself from liability arising from
its own negligent act."[
 Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena
was sufficiently proven by the records of the case, and that
no evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner
to support its defense of due diligence in the selection and
 supervision of its employees, petitioner,... as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the
death of respondent Yu's wife.
 Principles:
Tamayo vs. Aquino et al & Rayos May 29, 1959

G.R. Nos. L-12634 and L-12720

Facts: Epifania Gonzales (wife of Aquino) boarded a truck owned

by Tamayo, holder of a certificate of public convenience to
operate. Allegedly, while Epifania was making a trip aboard the
truck, it bumped against a culvert on the side of the road, causing
her death. Aquino et al filed an action for damages against
Tamayo. Tamayo answered alleging that the truck is rd owned by
Rayos, so he filed a 3 party complaint against him (Rayos). The
CFI ruled that Tamayo is the registered owner, under a public
convenience certificate but such truck was sold to Rayos one
month after the accident, but he (Tamayo) did not inform the
Public Service Commission of the sale. CFI held Tamayo and
Rayos jointly and severally liable to Aquino. CA affirmed, holding
that, both the registered owner (Tamayo) and the actual owner
and operator (Rayos) should be considered as joint tortfeasors
and should be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the
Civil Code (solidary). Issue: WON Art 2194 (solidary liability) is
applicable; and, if NOT, how should Tamayo (holder of the cert. of
public convenience) participate with Rayos (transferee/operator)
in the damages recoverable. Held: No, Art 2194 is not applicable.
The action instituted in this case is one for breach of contract, for
failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased for her
destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for
the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising
from a quasi-delict. As the registered owner Tamayo and his
transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict;
their responsibility is NOT SOLIDARY. As Tamayo is the
registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public or to
any passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct. If the
policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered
owner should not be allowed to prove that a third person or
another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be
relieved of the responsibility to the injured. But as the transferee,
who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one
directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn
be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter
may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without
transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service
Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the
registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered
owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his
negligence.

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO (GRN L-21438/September 28,

1966) SANCHEZ, J.: FACTS: Carrascoso was a member of a
group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila forLourdes on March
30, 1958. Air France issued a “first class” round trip ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, passenger Carrascoso
traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France
forced him to vacate the first class seat because a white man had
a better right to it. The purser wrote in his record book “First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and the captain refused to intervene” which was written in French.
Petitioner contends that damages must be averred that there was
fraud and bad faith in order that claim for damages should set in.
ISSUE: Whether or not passenger Carrascoso was entitled to
damages. RULING: Although true that there was no mention of
bad faith in the complaint, the inference of bad faith can be drawn
from the facts and circumstances therein.The petitioner violated
its contract of transportation with the aggravating circumstance
committed by its
manager when it went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in
the presence of many passengers. Northwest Airlines V. Cuenca
G.R. L-22425 August 31, 1965 FACTS • When his contract of
carriage was violated by the petitioner, respondent held theoffice
of Commissioner of Public Highways of the Republic of the
Philippines.Having boarded petitioner's plane in Manila with a first
class ticket to Tokyo, he was, upon arrival at Okinawa, transferred
to the tourist class compartment. Although he revealed that he
was traveling in his official capacity as official delegateof the
Republic to a conference in Tokyo, an agent of petitioner rudely
compelledhim in the presence of other passengers to move, over
his objection, to the touristclass, under threat of otherwise leaving
him in Okinawa. In order to reach theconference on time,
respondent had no choice but to obey. • This is an action for
damages for alleged breach of contract. After
appropriateproceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
which the case was originally filed, rendered judgment sentencing
defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as
petitioner — to pay to plaintiff Cuenca — hereinafterreferred to as
respondent — the sum of P20,000 as moral damages, together
withthe sum of P5,000 as exemplary damages, with legal interest
thereon from the dateof the filing of complaint," December 12,
1959, "until fully paid, plus the furthersum of P2,000 as attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation." On appeal taken by petitioner,
said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except as to
theP5,000.00 exemplary damages, which was eliminated, and the
P20,000.00 award formoral damages, which was converted into
nominal damages. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether or not the
court erred in awarding nominal damage? HOLDING & RATIO
DECIDENDINo. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages." In the case at bar, theCourt of Appeals
has adjudicated no such compensatory, moral and exemplary
damagesto respondent herein. There are special reasons why the
P20,000.00 award in favor of respondent herein is justified, even
if said award were characterized as nominal damages.It is true
that said ticket was marked "W/L," but respondent's attention was
not calledthereto. Much less was he advised that "W/L" meant
"wait listed." Upon the other hand,having paid the first class fare
in full and having been given first class accommodation ashe took
petitioner's plane in Manila, respondent was entitled to believe
that this was aconfirmation of his first class reservation and that
he would keep the same until hisultimate destination, Tokyo.
Then, too, petitioner has not tried to explain or even allegedthat
the person to whom respondent's first class seat was given had a
better right thereto.In other words, since the offense had been
committed with full knowledge of the factthat respondent was an
official representative of the Republic of the Philippines, the sumof
P20,000 awarded as damages may well be considered as merely
nominal. At any rate,considering that petitioner's agent had acted
in a wanton, reckless and oppressivemanner, said award may
also be considered as one for exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against thepetitioner. It is so ordered

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS – TORTS & DAMAGES Page 465 of

528 417. Armovit v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88561 April 20,
1990 FACTS • Dr. Armovit, a Filipino physician and his family
residing in the United States cameto the Philippines on a
Christmas visit. They were bumped off at the ManilaInternational
Airport on their return flight to the United States because of
anerroneous entry in their plane ticket relating to their time of
departure. • In October 1981, they decided to spend their
Christmas holidays with relatives andfriends in the Philippines so
they purchased from Northwest three roundtrip Airlinetickets from
the United States to Manila and back,

plus three tickets for the rest of the children, though not involved
in the suit. • Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the
handwriting of Northwest’s ticketssales agent contains the
following entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of thereturn flight
'Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002 dated 17 January, time 10:30
a.m.Status OK." • On their return trip from Manila to the U.S.
scheduled on January 17,1982, Armovitarrived at the check in
counter of Northwest at the Manila International Airport at9:15 in
the morning, a good one (1) hour and Fifteen (15) minutes ahead
of the10:30 a.m. scheduled flight time recited in their ticket. They
were rudely informedthat they cannot be accommodated
inasmuch as flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking
off and the 10:30 a.m. flight entered in their plan e ticket
waserroneous. • Previous to the said date of departure the
petitioners re-confirmed their reservationsthrough their
representatives who personally presented the three (3) tickets at
theNorthwest office. The departure time in the three (3) tickets of
the petitioners wasnot changed when re-confirmed. The names of
petitioners appeared in thepassenger manifest and confirmed. •
Petitioner Dr. Armovit protested that because of the bumped-off
he will not be ableto keep his appointment with his patients in the
United States. Petitioners sufferedanguish, wounded feelings, and
serious anxiety day and night of January 17th untilthe morning of
January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will
beavailable for them on the flight of that day. The trial court
rendered judgmentagainst the airline as follows: P1,300.00 actual
damages; P500,000.00 moral damages;P500,000.00 exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 nominal damages in favor of Dr.
Armovit; also moral damages of P300,000.00; exemplary
damages of P300,000.00; nominal damages of P50,000.00 each
in favor of Mrs. Armovit andMiss Jacqueline Arrnovit. • The Court
of Appeals modified the trial court’s judgment as follows: TheP
900,000.00 moral damages and P100,000.00 nominal damages
awarded to petitioners were eliminated ; exemplary damages
were reduced from P500,000.00to P50,000.00 in favor of Mrs.
Armovit and from P300,000.00 to P20,000.00 infavor of Miss
Jacqueline Armovit. ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N the Armovits
are entitled to Nominal Damages HOLDING & RATIO
DECIDENDINO. NOMINAL DAMAGES CANNOT COEXIST
WITH ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. • The
Supreme Court further modified the Court of Appeals judgment as
fo llows: Actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit, P1,300.00 with
legal interest from January 17, 1982; moral damages at
P100,000.00, and exemplary damages at P100,000.00 infavor of
Dr. Armovit; Moral damages at P100,000.00 and exemplary
damages atP50,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Armovit; Moral damages
at P100,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.00 in favor of
Mrs. Jacqueline Armovit; and attorneys fees at5% of the total
awards under above paragraphs, plus costs of suit, and o 1. The
gross negligence committed by Northwest in the issuance of the
tickets with entries as to the time of the flight; the failure to correct
such erroneousentries and the manner by which petitioners were
rudely informed that they were bumped off` are clear indicia of
such malice and bad faith and establishthat respondent has
committed a breach of contract which entitle petitioners tomoral
damages. o 2. Considering the circumstances of this case
whereby Northwest attended tothe flight of the petitioners, taking
care of their accommodation while waiting and boarding them in
the flight back to the United States the following dag;. theCourt
finds that petitioners are entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 each. o

3. By the same token to provide an example for the public good,

an award of exemplary damages is also proper, the award of the
appellate court is adequate. o 4 . The deletion of nominal
damages by the appellate court is welltakensince there is an
award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with
actual and compensatory damages Trans World Airlines (TWA)
vs. CA Facts: Vinluan, a practicing lawyer in Manila had to travel
to several cities in Europe and US. While in Paris, he went to the
office of TWA to confirm his reservation for first class
accommodation. It was confirmed twice. During the time of the
flight, he was told that there was no 1st class seat available.
Hence, he was downgraded to economy. He protested but he was
arrogantly treated by a TWA employee. And while waiting for his
flight, he saw white Caucasians who arrived much later than him,
in first class seats. Issue: WON Vinluan is entitled to damages.
Held: Yes. 1 The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to
which private respondent was subjected is undeniable.
Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the
respondent court is in order. 2 Inattention and lack of care for the
interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost
consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad
faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages.
More so in this case where instead of courteously informing
private respondent of his being downgraded under the
circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of
petitioner. Zulueta vs. Pan Am Facts: Mr. Zulueta and his wife and
child boarded a flight of Pan Am from Wake Island to the Phil. Mr.
Zulueta, however, had to relieve himself and thus looked for a
secluded place in the beach. As a result, he was delayed in
boarding for some 20 or 30 minutes. While Mr. Zulueta was
reaching the ramp, the captain of the plane demonstrated an
intemperate and arrogant tone thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to
answer back. Thus, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded. The airport
manager of then sent Mr. Zulueta a letter stating that his stay in
Wake Island would be for a minimum of one week during which
he would be charged $13.30 per day. Issue: WON Pan Am should
be held liable. Held: Yes. Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded to retaliate
and punish him for the embarrassment and loss of face thus
suffered by defendant’s agent. The Zuluetas had a contract of
carriage with the defendant, as a common carrier, pursuant to
which the latter was bound, for a substantial monetary
consideration paid by the former, not merely to transport them to
Manila, but, also, to do so with “extraordinary diligence” or “utmost
diligence.” The responsibility of the common carrier, under said
contract, as regards the passenger’s safety, is of such a nature,
affecting as it does public interest, that it “cannot be dispensed
with” or even “lessenedby stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise.” In the present case, the
defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to transport
Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to
humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him
the greatest possible inconvenience.
——————————————————— With regard to
DAMAGES It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at
Wake Island, under the circumstances,

defendant’s agents had acted with malice aforethought and

evident bad faith. If “gross negligence” warrants the award of
exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified
when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with
bad faith. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages
is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for
public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith,
the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in
addition to moral damages ORTIGAS V. LUFTHANSA Francisco
Ortigas, and defendant Luthansa German Airlines, from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch Y,
“condemning the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of
P100,000 as moral damages, P30,000 as exemplary or corrective
damages, with interest of both sums at the legal rate from the
commencement of this suit until fully paid, P20,000 as attorney’s
fees and the costs” for the former failure to “comply with its
obligation to give first accommodation to (the latter) a (Filipino)
passenger holding a first class ticket,” aggravated by the giving of
the space instead to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its
agents in dealing with him during the occasion of such
discriminatory violence of its contract of carriage.

Issue: Whether Lufthansa is liable for damages?

Held: The court said that when it comes to contracts of common

carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier
resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in
class contracted for

Transportation Law Case DigestsRespondent herein boarded a

bus of the plaintiff herein which was bound for Pampanga
fromManila. He sat a few seats behind the driver on the left side
of the bus near the window. While on routeto Pampanga, the bus
sideswiped with a freight truck owned and operated by Transport
Contractors, thelatter coming from the opposite side of the
highway. The window glass near the driver's seat of the buswas
detached and the left side of its body was damaged. During the
course of the accident, the left f o r e a r m o f E s g u e r r a w a s
h i t b y a hard blunt object. It caused the breaking of its b o n e s i
n t o s m a l l fragments whi le the soft tissues of the muscles and
the skin were mascerated. He was immediately brought to the
Bulacan Provincial Hospital in Malolos, Bulacan for treatment.
Unfortunately, because of the severe damage caused, his left arm
was amputated.Defendant herein filed a case to recover
damages. The lower court rendered a decision in favor o f
Esguerra, finding that both vehicles were reckless i n d r i v i n g .
O n a p p e a l , t h e c o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e decision of the
lower court and awarded actual and moral damages to the
respondent herein. Hence thispetition. Issue: Whether or not the
respondent is entitled to receive moral damages. Held: The Court
held that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding moral damages
to the respondentherein. As a general rule moral damages are not
reco verable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the
contract of transportation, as in the instant case, in view of the
provisions of Articles 2219and 2220 of the New Civil Code. The
exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
fraud or bad faith, even if death doesnot result. In the case at bar,
the Court finds that both vehicles were in their respective lanes
and bothwere equally negligent. The Court does not find that
there was malice or bad faith on the part of the driver of the
petitioner herein. Therefore the award of moral damages is
deleted and the rest affirmed Sweet Lines v. Court of Appeals121
SCRA 769Facts: 100

amounts to bad faith and fraud which entitles the passenger to the
award of moral damages in accordance with the 2220 of the Civil
Code. But in the instant case, the breach appears to the graver
nature, since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over
plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff’s
rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who
may not be discriminated against with impunity, as found by the
court below what worsened the situation of Ortigas was that
Lufthansa succeeded in keeping him as its passenger by assuring
him that he would be given first class accommodation at Cairo,
the next station, the proper arrangements therefore having been
made already, when in truth such was not the case.
Transportation Law Case DigestsPetitioner is booked on a first
class accommodation in defendants airline from Rome to Manila.
Thebookingwasconfirmedbyitsairlinesoff
ice. The airline employee upong seeing his Filipino nationality
disallowed his boarding and the seat was given to a Belgian.
Petitioner has a heart ailment and is advised by physician to take
only frst class accommodations. He was promised to be
transferredto first class on all succeeding layovers from Cairo to
Hongkong to no avail. Damages was filed. Trialcourt awarded
Moral and Exemplary damages. Issue: Whether or not defendant
is liable for damages. Held: Yes. Inattenton and lack of care on
the carrier rsul ting in the failure of the passenger to
beaccommodated in a class availed of and contracted amounts to
bad faith and fraud. Furthermore, the p r e f e r e n c e t o a B e l g
i a n p a s s e n g e r i s also a wanton disregard of his right from d
i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h e successive false representations of
transferring him to first class is an act of malice and bad faith.
Thisentitles petitioner to moral damages in accordance to Articlec
2220. Moral damages is increased toPhp15,000 and Exemplary
damages to Php100,000. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v.
Esguerra117 SCRA 741Facts: 99

Transportation Law Case DigestsThe responden ts, having first

class tickets, boarded the M/V Sweet Grace to Catbalogan.
Thevessel had some engine problems which led to a change of
schedule and they were thus delayed for asubstantial amount of
time. Furthermore, the vessel bought the respondents to Ta
cloban instead of Catbalogan. This led the respondents to
purchase another set of tickets and to ride another ferryboatgoing
to Catbalogan. The respondents then sued the petitioner carrier
for damages for the breach of contract of carriage. Issue: Whether
or not the petitioner is liable for damages. Held: The Court held
that the petitioner is liable for damages specifically moral
damages because therewas bad faith on its part. The Court found
that such bad faith is present based on three circumstances
namely:1 . P e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t g i v e a n y n o t i c e t o t h
erespondentsastothechangeofscheduleof
the vessel.2 . T h e p e t i t i o n e r k n e w f u l l y t h a t i t w o u l
dtakenolessthanfifteen(15)hourstoeffectt
h e repairs of the damaged engine. The petitioner also assured
that the vessel will leave within ashort period of time and when
the defendants wanted to leave the trip petitioner stated that
the“the vessel is already leaving.”3 . T h e p e t i t i o n e r d i d n o
tevenoffertorefundtheticketsandprovidefo
r t h e i r transportation from Tacloban to Catbalogan. Prudencio v.
Alliance Transport System148 SCRA 440Facts: 101
Transportation Law Case DigestsDra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was
driving her own car along Taft Avenue to go to the Philippine
Normal College Compound where she would hold classes. As she
was moving slowly in a normal rate,her car was then hit by the
taxi operated by the respondent. The accident caused the
petitioner

physicalinjuries and a brain concussion. She then filed for an

action for damages against respondent. The lower court, finding
the respondent’s driver to be negligent, granted the damages and
the Court of Appeals reduced the damages. The petitioner then
appealed from the decision of the appellate court. Issue: Whether
or not the award of damages by the Court of Appeals was correct.
Held: The Court held that the reduction of the moral damages by
the appellate court to the petitioner was unreasonable and drastic.
The reason was that the trial court found the respondent to be gro
sslynegligent in injuring the petitioner. The award of moral
damages was proper. The appeal by the petitioner is proper
because, as a doctor, she has reasonable fears that such
accident due to the carelessness of the respondent’s driver can
greatly affect her profession.Exemplary damages are also
awarded to the petitioner to provide for an example or correction
topublic good. The reason is that the respondent’s driver was
driving at a high speed on a rainy day and ona slippery road with
complete disregard with the safety of other people. PAN-AM V.
IAC Private respondent Tinitigan, filed a complaint agai nst
petitioner for damages arising fromdefendant's alleged refusal to
accommodate her on Pan Am Fli g h t N o . 4 3 1 f r o m S t o . D
o m i n g o , Republica Dominica to San Juan, Puerto Rico
notwithstanding that she possessed a confirmed planeticket. She
is a businesswoman and a multimillionaire (proprietor of
Sampaguita Restaurant, New YorkCity USA; Treasurer of the
Molave Development Corp., Phil., proprietor of Cavite Household
Appliancesand Rowena's Handicraft, Phil.), was on a business
trip with a Pan-Am ticket. While in Sto. Domingo,Tinitigan is
expected to be in San Juan that same day to meet a client to sign
a contract or lose it. Shewas expected to make a profit of $1,000
in said contract but her failure to board the flight, said profit
waslost. The refusal of accommodation caused her to suffer
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirchedreputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation She prayed that she be awarded
moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of
P200,000.00, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and actual
damagess u s t a i n e d b y h e r i n t h e a m o u n t o f U S $ 1 ,
546.15.Defendantdeniedthatplaintiffwasa
c o n f i r m e d passenger since the ticket issued to her was on
an open space basis, which meant that she could onlybe
accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show
up at the airport before departure.The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded the amount of damages
as prayedfor. Said decision was affirmed hence the instant
petition. Issue: Whether or not the award of damages was proper.

Held: Yes, but subject to modifications. Other instances which

caused moral damage to the plaintiff arethe following:1. While
plaintiff was standing in line to board the aircraft, a Pan Am
employee ordered her in a loud voice to step out of line because
her ticket was not confirmed to her embarrassment in the
presence of several people who heard and order. Despite her
Pleas she was not allowed to board the aircraft. And her seat was
also given to a Caucasian.2. When the plane took off without her
but with her lugga ge on board. She was forced to return to her
hotel without any luggage much less an extra dress.Evidence
shows petitioner as confirmed passenger. 1.) Defendant issued a
Passenger Ticket andBaggage Check with assigned seat and the
corresponding pass and baggage claim symbol. 2.) Plaintiff paid
the fare and terminal fee. 3.) plaintiff's passport was stamped by
immigration. 4.) Plaintiff's namewas included in the passenger
manifest. There is a contract or carriage perfected between
plaintiff anddefendant for the latter to take plaintiff to her place of
destination. By refusing to accommodate plaintiff insaid flight,
defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of
carriage and failed to bring theplaintiff to her place of destination
under its cont ract with plaintiff. There is showing of bad faith. Self
-enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have
been the motive of

defendant, but it ismalice nevertheless. Malice is shown by the

fact that that plaintiff was ordered out of the line under
somepretext in order to accommodate a white man.Exemplary
damages and Attorney’s fees are also awarded. The rational
behind exemplary or corrective damages is, to provide an
example or correction for public good. SC reduced the moral
andexemplary damages to the combined total sum of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos and theattorney's fees
to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. The award of actual
damages in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Forty Six
American dollars and fifteen cent s (US$1,546.15) computed at
the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment is hereby
retained and granted.

Armovit v. Court of Appeals184 SCRA 476 Facts: The petitioners

in this case all resided in the United States and went home to the
Philippines for aChristmas visit. On their return trip to the United
States, they were bumped off at the airport due to anerroneous
entry in their plane tickets relating to the departure time. The
petitioners checked in the airportan hour and fifteen minutes
earlier than what was indicated in their airline tickets. Upon their
check in,the employees of the respondent airlines impolitely
informed them that the plane was already taking off and that their
check in time was way earlier and entirely different from what was
stated in their tickets.The petitioners then sued the respondent
airlines for damages. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is
liable for damages. Held: The Court held that the respondent is
liable for damages. Actual damages were awarded to
thepetitioner due to bumped off that occurred. Moral damages
were also awarded because the Court foundthat the respondent
was gross negligent in the issuance of the tickets as to the correct
time of departure.In addition, the act of the respondent in rudely
informing the petitioner of such bumped off is an indicationt h a t t
h e r e was bad faith and malice on the part of the r e s p o n d e n
t . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e l a t i v e o f t h e petitioner stated
how badly wounded the feelings of the petitioners were.
Exemplary damages were alsoawarded as to provide for an
example to the public good. Lastly, nominal damages were
properly deletedsince such damages cannot co-exist with actual
damages. Cachero v. Manila Yellow Taxicab FACTS: Atty.
Cachero, plaintiff herein, boarded a taxicab owned by the Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. The said taxicab bumped against a
Meralco post. The taxicab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell
out of the vehicle to the ground. As a result of the accident, he
suffered slight physical injuries. The driver of the taxi was
prosecuted and convicted criminally. Respondent herein offered
to settle the case and the plaintiff demanded the amount of
P79,245.65 as for damages. Respondent refused to pay the said
amount. Plaintiff then proceeded to file a case to recover the
same amount through the courts. The CFI rendered a decision in
favor of the plaintiff and ordered that respondent pay the amount
of P700 for medical and transportation allowances, attorney’s fees
and professional fees. Both parties appealed and the decision
was affirmed. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Cachero
is entitled to recover damages other than those already awarded.
HELD: The Court modified the decision of the lower court. The
award of professional fees were reduced to P2,000 and the award
of moral damages of P2,000. Plaintiff in this case did not maintain
his action against all persons liable for the breach of the contract
of common carriage. Since he did not include the driver in this
complaint he may not recover moral damages. Respondent
herein did not commit any criminal offense against the plaintiff, it
was the driver who was the reason behind the injury. This case
does not fall under Article 2219 of the NCC therefore he is not
entitled to be awarded moral damages. Fores v. Miranda FACTS:
Ireneo Miranda, a professor of Fine Arts, was a passenger of a
passenger jeepney registered to Fores but actuall operated by

Sackerman. The vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at

an excessive rate of speed, and the driver lost control of the same
which caused it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. As a result of
the accident, Five of the passengers were injured, including the
respondent herein. He suffered a fracture of the upper right
humerus. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for
treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations. At
the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had not yet
recovered the use of his right arm. The driver was charged with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon
interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. The lower
court awarded actual damages to the respondent. On appeal, the
Court reduced the amount of actual damages and added the
award of moral damages and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fee was proper. HELD: The Court held that the award
of moral damages is not proper in this case. As a general rule,
moral damages are not awarded to the victim in cases of breach
of contract of common carriage. The exception is that if such
accident resulted in the death of the passenger, in which case
Article 1764 of the NCC, makes the carrier subject to Article 2206
of the NCC. In case death did not result from the accident, moral
damages may be recovered if the common carrier is found guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith or malice. In the case
at bar there was no bad faith on the part of the common carrier.
Therefore, respondent is not entitled to moral damages. As to the
issue of attorney’s fee, the court may moto proprio award moral
damages as the case may be. Attorney’s fees may be awarded by
the court if it is deemed to be just and equitable. Therefore, the
Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals as far as
moral damages are concerned. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
Cornista FACTS: Appeal of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., from a
judgment of Court of First Instance of Batangas wherein appellee
Herminio L. Nocum was plaintiff, sentencing Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. to pay Nocum the sum of P1,351.00 for actual damages and
P500.00 as attorney's fees with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint plus costs. Nocum, who was a passenger in Lagunna
Tayabas Bus No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita,
Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the
explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus
and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and
miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. The findings of fact of the
trial court are not assailed. The appeal is purely on legal
questions.
Bataclan v. Medina
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]
MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts:
 At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and
driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the
town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to Pasay City,
one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-
zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the
road and turned turtle.
 Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
but the three passengers seated beside the driver, named
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind
them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed
passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made
any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
 After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all
but consuming the bus, including the four passengers
trapped inside it.
 That same day, the charred bodies of the four
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his
 widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her
five minor children, brought the present suit to recover
from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150.
 After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value
of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay
City for sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs
and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed
the case to SC.
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus, including the
4 passengers left inside.

Held:
 The Court held that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus because when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected.
 The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available.
 In other words, the coming of the men with a torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
 Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver
 and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline
tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.
 The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even
from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps
to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus.
 In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation because the Medina Transportation failed to
carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There
was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding and that the driver failed to changed the tires into
new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina.
 The driver had not been diligent and had not taken
the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in
front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do,
probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not
have occurred.
Ratio:

 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
 Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
 and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.

G.R. No. 188715 REGALA v. CARIN

REGALA v. CARIN
G.R. No. 188715
April 6, 2011

FACTS: Regala and Carin are adjacent neighbors. Regala

decided add a second storey to his house, under the guise of
merely building an extension to it, and asked Carin for permission
to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their
respective properties, to which Carin verbally consented.

Regala suffered from the dust and debris, hence, he filed a

complaint before the City Engineers Office for lack of building
permit and before the Office of Barangay for encroachment,
invasion of privacy, damages arising from construction and illegal
construction of scaffoldings in his (Regala) property. However,
Regala still continued the work despite several notices from the
City Engineers Office.

Carin filed a complaint for damages before the RTC alleging that
instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner
demolished the whole length of the wall and that debris and dust
piled up on his property.
Regala answered that he was the sole and exclusive owner of the
wall referred to as a perimeter wall and that securing the consent
was a mere formality to facilitate the issuance of a building permit.

Engineer Haduca found an encroachment by petitioner of six

centimeters. Hence, RTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carin is entitled to damages arising the

wrongful or illegal act or omission of Regala.

RULING: No. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the

lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to
his abode.

While he initially did not have a building permit and may have
misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought
respondents consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential
since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions
or penalties.

However, Regala cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever.

Carin and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their
property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the
incident borne of petitioners construction work. Any pecuniary loss
or damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the
records are bereft of any factual evidence to establish the same.
Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, respondent herein, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
ALBERT TISON v. SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN AND
CONSORCIA PONCE POMASIN, GR No. 173180, 2011-08-24
Facts:
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni's father, was on board the
jitney and seated on the passenger's side. He testified that while
the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a
tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching
on the... jitney's lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and
it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its
passengers.[3]
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was driving the
tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off
the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag
manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To
avoid... collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to
the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the
jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was
thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise...
damaged.[4]
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of
petitioners.
petitioners countered that it was Laarni's negligence which
proximately caused the accident. They further claimed that
Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an
amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.
Notwithstanding... the affidavit, petitioners complained that
respondents filed the instant complaint to harass them and profit
from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners counterclaimed for
damages.
Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
dismissing the complaint for damages
The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the
incident more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorio's, a
mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is
not as focused as that of the driver.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and ruled that
the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision.
the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gregorio's testimony that
Jabon was driving the tractor-trailer downward too... fast and it
encroached the lane of the jitney. Based on the gravity of the
impact and the damage caused to the jitney resulting in the death
of some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that Jabon
must be speeding.
The appellate court noted that the restriction in
Jabon's driver's license was violated, thus, giving rise to the
presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident.
Issues:
Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
Ruling:
The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give
weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion
reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer
caused the vehicular collision.
One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon
was because his concentration as driver is more focused than
that of a mere passenger.
In the case of a running or travelling vehicle, especially in highway
travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in ordinary
roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving... continuously
from moment to moment even in long trips.
So that as between the respective versions of the plaintiffs thru
their passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to
the cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision
in this case, the version of the driver of... defendant should
ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger
of Plaintiffs' vehicle, simply because the attention of the
passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of
the driver, consequently the capacity for observation of the latter
of... the latter on the matter testified to which is the precise point
of inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident --- is more
reasonably reliable.
We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that
the truck was actually ascending the highway when it collided with
the descending jitney.
Jabon narrated that the tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of
35 to 40 kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on the
opposite lane running in a zigzag manner
Significantly, this is a confirmation of the testimony of Jabon.
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was
straightforward and consistent. The recollection of Gregorio
veered from "curving and downward" to uphill.[24] On this point,
Jabon and his testimony is more credible.
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The
fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of
the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner
before it hit the tractor-trailer
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding.
There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was
in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the
tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully
loaded jitney... which was running downhill in a zigzagging
manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight,
it can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right
upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the
tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and,
understandably in... this case, leaving the driver without sufficient
time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer
uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established
between the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the
vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently
explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not
including... restriction code 8 in his license.
Principles:
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of
negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was
violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam
Laundry,... Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that a causal
connection must exist between the injury received and the
violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the
violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause
of... the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury.

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, GR No.

143363, 2002-02-06
Facts:
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin
Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos
filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and
St. Mary's Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City.
Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the
commission of the tort and who was under special parental
authority of defendant St. Mary's Academy, is ABSOLVED from
paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Mary's Academy, and... subsidiarily, against his
parents;
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995,
defendant-appellant St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A
facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective... enrollees were studying. As a student
of St. Mary's Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva... on their way to
Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle
Issues:

1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable

for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
 2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of

moral damages against the petitione
Ruling:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child... care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of... the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody
is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or... custody
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident.[11]
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it
must be shown that the 'injury for which recovery is sought must
be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural... sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury... complained of.' And 'the proximate cause of an injury
is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.'"
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and
Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that
the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was
not the recklessness... of James Daniel II but the mechanical
defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including
the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin
Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the... accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to
turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show
that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Hence, the respondents' reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that "those... given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor" was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.
He was driving... the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a
minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary's Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may... not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19]
The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of
the liability of defendants, excluding... petitioner St. Mary's
Academy, Dipolog City.
Principles:
Our lady of Lourdes Hospital vs. Capanzana
2019-10-02administrator
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, Petitioner vs. SPOUSES
ROMEO AND REGINA CAPANZANA, Respondents
G.R. No. 189218

Facts:
Regina Capanzana was pregnant with her third child. A week
before her scheduled caesarean section (C-section), she went
into active labor and was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital
for an emergency C-section. She went into a pre-operative
examination done by Dr. Ramos and Dr. Santos. They proceeded
with the operation after having found Regina fit for anesthesia.
The operation was successful and she gave birth to a baby boy.

Thirteen hours after her operation, Regina complained of a

headache, a chilly sensation, restlessness and shortness of
breath. She asked for oxygen and later became cyanotic. After
undergoing x-ray, she was found to be suffering from pulmonary
edema. Since her condition showed no improvement, she was
transferred to the Cardinal Santos Hospital. The doctors in said
hospital found that she was suffering from rheumatic heart
disease mitral stenosis with mild pulmonary hypertension, which
contributed to the onset of Fluid in her lung tissue (pulmonary
edema). This development resulted in cardio-pulmonary arrest
and, subsequently, brain damage.

Regina lost the use of her speech, eyesight, hearing and limbs.
Due to this, spouses Capanzana filed a complaint for damages
against Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital along with Dr. Ramos, Dr.
Santos and the nurses on duty stationed on the second floor.
During the course of the proceedings, Regina died and was
substituted by her heirs.

The RTC found no negligence on the part of Dr. Ramos and Dr.
Santos as they were compliant of the standard practices in
attending to a patient during a C-Section. The court reasoned that
the primary cause of Regina’s vegetative state, amniotic fluid
embolism, was not within the control of the doctor to anticipate.
The Court, however, found the nurses on duty liable for their
failure to immediately administer the oxygen. This failure having
contributed to the onset of hypoxic encephalopathy.

The Court held that the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital is free from
liability as it was able to discharge the burden of proof that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC except as to the liability of the midwife (Ballano)
and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital. It was found that while
there was evidence to prove that petitioner hospital showed
diligence in its selection and hiring processes, there was no
evidence to prove that it exercised the required diligence in the
supervision of its nurses.

Issue:
Whether Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital is liable for damages due
to its failure to exercise due diligence in the supervision of its
nurses.

Ruling:
YES. The plaintiff must show the following elements by a
preponderance of evidence: duty of the health professional,
breach of that duty, injury of the patient, and proximate causation
between the breach and the injury.

The Negligence of the Nurses

The SC found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
nurses were negligent. When Regina was gasping for breath and
turning cyanotic, it was the duty of the nurses to intervene
immediately by informing the resident doctor. Had they done so,
proper oxygenation could have been restored and other
interventions performed without wasting valuable time.

According to the expert witness, the occurrence of “hypoxic

encephalopathy” could have been avoided since lack or
inadequate supply of oxygen to the brain for 5 minutes will cause
damage to it. It was found that the nurses took 10- 15 minutes to
respond to the call of Regina’s niece before going to the room.
Also, it took about 20 minutes before the oxygen arrived. Another
instance of negligence was the delay in the removal of Regina’s
consumed dextrose which caused Regina discomfort. The nurses
only attended to her after being called twice.

In Ramos, the SC defined “Proximate cause” as that which, in

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately
caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage;
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the
dominant, moving or producing cause.

Applying the above definition to the facts in the present case, the
omission of the nurses — their failure to check on Regina and to
refer her to the resident doctor and, thereafter, to immediately
provide oxygen — was clearly the proximate cause that led to the
brain damage suffered by the patient. The liability of the hospital
The Our Lady of Lourdes hospital is liable under Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of its employees
based on its responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
The liability of the employer under this provision is “direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the
negligent employee or a prior showing of the insolvency of that
employee.” The employer may only be relieved of responsibility
upon a showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The SC
held that the hospital sufficiently proved due diligence in the
selection of the nurses. The nurses undergo a series of
examination, orientation, training, on the job observation and
evaluation before they are hired as regular employees. However,
it failed to prove due diligence in their supervision. The
formulation of a supervisory hierarchy, company rules and
regulations, and disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach, is indispensable. However, to prove due diligence in the
supervision of employees, it is not enough for an employer such
as petitioner to emptily invoke the existence of such a formulation.
What is more important is the actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. In this case, it
was found that there is failure on the part of the hospital to
sanction the tardiness of the nurses which shows an utter lack of
actual implementation and monitoring of compliance with the rules
and ultimately of supervision over its nurses. Also, on the nights
subject of the present controversy, there is failure to show who
were the actual nurses on duty and who was supervising these
nurses due to the conflicting accounts on the documents of the
hospital. All these negate the due diligence on the part of the
nurses, their supervisors, and ultimately, the hospital. Thus,
petitioner was held liable for damages.

EDGAR JARANTILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS – G.R. No.

80194 March 21, 1989

Fact:
EDGAR JARANTILLA the Petitioner allegedly with his
Volkswagen Beetle, side-swiped Private Respondent Jose Kuan
Sing. Petitioner was criminal charged for Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Serious Physical Injury. During trial, Private
Respondent did not reserve the separate prosecution of his civil
action and participated in the prosecution of the criminal action.
The criminal court eventually dismissed the criminal complaint for
failure to prove the guilt of the Petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. Subsequently, Private Respondent filed in the CFI a civil
action against the Petitioner to which the latter filed a motion to
dismissed. The CFI denied the motion of the Petitioner and
suggest bringing the action to the Supreme Court to which the SC
denied for lack of Merit. Continuing the prosecution of the civil
action, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the Petitioner to pay
the Private Respondent for the actual and moral damages,
including Attorney’s Fees.

Petitioner appealed to the CA who affirmed the decision with

modification on the moral damages. Petitioner filed a motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA.
hence this appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether the failure of the complainant to reserve the prosecution
of his civil action and actively participated in the criminal action is
barred to subsequently pursue the former action when accused
was acquitted in the latter action for failure to prove his guilt
beyond reason doubt.

Held:
No, the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent
sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability
on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil
liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise
either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these
two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability.
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be
recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that
based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of
the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged.
Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act
or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter,
which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence.
Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the
rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same
criminal act or omission.