What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements

in Article 315
(2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.1âwphi1 Under the latter law, mere
issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between
the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
even if he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3)
estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against
public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are
mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita. 25

Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People v. Reyes26 even instructs that the simultaneous filing of BP 22 and
estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy:

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of
offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another law as in
the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of
elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
double jeopardy.27

Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present
different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other.
Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the
prohibition on double recovery. 28 Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the
accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this
instance.

G.R. No. 203583               October 13, 2014

LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
approved on April 3, 1979 which provides that:

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall
in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.

and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud;

x x x           x x x          x x x
 (d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315
(2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a
check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal
Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-
d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed
in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.

These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions on the passage of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 between the author of the bill, former Solicitor General and Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the Honorable
Estelito P. Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as follows:

MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence demonstrating that the act committed does not only violate this
proposed Act but also the Revised Penal Code, there will be further prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code. That is why it is proposed in this Act that there be a single uniform penalty for all
violations in this Act. However the court is given the discretion whether to impose imprisonment or
fine or both or also in whatever severity the court may consider appropriate under the circumstances.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not so. So precisely, if I file a case for estafa against a
particular person for issuance of a bouncing check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted under
this proposed bill. On the other hand, if a person is prosecuted under the proposed bill, it does not
necessarily follow that he can be prosecuted for estafa.

MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a certain set of circumstances, the offense under this
Act is the only offense committed while under a different set of circumstances, not only the offense
described in this Act is committed but also estafa. So that, for example, if a check with sufficient funds
is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation and the position of the Government should turn out to
be correct that there is no estafa, then the drawer of the check would only be liable under this Act but
not under the Revised Penal Code. But if he issues a check in payment, or contemporaneously with
incurring, of an obligation, then he will be liable not only for estafa but also for violation for this Act.
There is a difference between the two cases. In that situation where the check was issued in payment
of a pre-existing obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause damage to the payee and so it
is but appropriate that he should not be held for estafa but only for violating this Act. But if he issued
a check to induce another, to part with a valuable consideration and the check bounces, then he does
inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating this law. In that case, it should be but fair
that he be subject to prosecution not only for estafa but also for violating this law.

MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor General on that point but my worry is with respect to
situations where there is prosecution first to estafa.

MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . .

MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the issuance of a bouncing check, in which case it will be
mandatory on the part of the prosecuting official to also file a case for violation of this offense under
the proposed bill.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a situation because if the offender did not only cause
injury on account of the issuance of the check but did issue a bouncing check penalized under this
Act, then he will be liable for prosecution under both laws. I would admit that perhaps in such
situation, the penalty may be somewhat severe. As a matter of fact, in other jurisdictions, the
issuance of bouncing checks is penalized with substantially lower penalty. However, because of the
situation in the Philippines, the situation being now relatively grave that practically everybody is
complaining about bouncing checks, may be it is necessary at least initially, at this point in time for us
to impose a rather severe penalty and even allow liability not only under this Act but also for estafa.
Then perhaps, after the necessary discipline has been inculcated in our people and that the incidence
of the offense has been reduced, we may then decide to amend the law and reduce the penalty. But
at this time, shall we say the evil is of such magnitude that only a dramatic and expeditious effort to
 prosecute persons who issue bouncing checks may be necessary to curb quickly this evil.
(explanations given by Solicitor General ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan Pambansa during
his sponsorship speech of BP 22 which he authored, pages 1037-1038, Record of the Batasan,
Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4, 1978). (Emphasis supplied). (pp. 115-117, Rollo or pp. 9-11,
Memorandum for respondents).

Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that:

Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code.

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution
thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and
where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at
bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in
the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for
the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy
(People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).

In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA 309) that
"when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without prejudice to
reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in People v. Magdaluyo (1 SCRA 990). If
the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because there is still a necessity for the trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions and not because the remedy of appeal is
unavailing.

G.R. Nos. 59568-76               January 11, 1990

PETER NIERRAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV,
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte, respectively, respondents.

Victor C. Veloso for

Sole Issue:

Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar

to Civil Action in Estafa Case

Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pending before the MTC for violation of
BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the
RTC. She hinges her theory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. -- Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense."

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

"The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

"When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
xxxxxxxxx

"(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

"Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

"Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions."

Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following
instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a
private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but
(a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been
instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution
becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.8 None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the
private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit.

True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and another for
violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party,
who has sustained only a single injury.9 This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo,10 which we quote in part as follows:

"Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that ‘Every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable’ (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that
when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity
called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this
rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as
a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal
prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act
or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of
the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247)."

Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil
actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and
violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution
of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to this party,
there can be no forum shopping.11

Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses. At the present stage, no judgment on the civil
liability has been rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the offended party to elect remedies and,
after choosing one of them, be considered barred from others available to her.

Election of Remedies

Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of remedies. "In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the
choice by a party to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the
same facts, but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the
assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other."12 In its more restricted and technical
sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort
to the others.13

The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v. Magsino14 as follows:

"As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. 15 It is regarded as an application of the law of estoppel, upon
the theory that a party cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis of his
respective remedies. However, when a certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both
founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the
invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall
reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall
have gained an advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the other. 16 It must be pointed out that
ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits. 17

"Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, opined that while some American authorities hold
that the mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative
courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other
party supervenes.18 This is because the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the modern procedural
concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for
relief without being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of the litigation."19

In the present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of
civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies
that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law 20 precludes the
institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.

The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the
committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases
was added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as
collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary
inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid down to
prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge. 21

Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa
case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other.
There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses
charged in the informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in
point of fact.22

What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action.1âwphi1 The
criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. "[U]nless a separate civil action has been filed
before the institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal action has been filed as
the same has been included therein."23 In the instant case, the criminal action for estafa was admittedly filed prior to the
criminal case for violation of BP 22, with the corresponding filing fees for the inclusion of the corresponding civil action
paid accordingly.24

Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases cannot deprive private
complainant of the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules on BP
22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding civil case exclusively in the court trying the BP 22 criminal case. 25

In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect their
interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules "shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights."26 Private complainant’s intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only
for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the
Constitution.27

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the
proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of
BP 22 pending before the MTC. A recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that
under the other. Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment, 28 this is in essence the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005

MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
Hon. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in Her Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and GLADYS NOCOM, Respondents.

We are not persuaded.

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.11 Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but
less than evidence which would justify a conviction. 12 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.13 It does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.14 The complainant need not present at
this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation
of the parties’ evidence.15 It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, credence is given to the
finding and determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation. 16

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, respondent sufficiently established the existence of probable cause for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following elements must be present:

1) The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.17 In Lozano v. Martinez,18 we have declared that it is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.19 In People v. Nitafan,20 we said that a check issued as an
evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has the same effect as an ordinary check and
would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
In this case, petitioner issued the two subject checks in favor of respondent, and when respondent presented them for
payment, they were dishonored for reason of the stop payment order issued by petitioner. Notably, a certification 21 from
the bank showed that they returned the checks for that reason. In addition, contrary to the claim of petitioner, at the time
the said checks were presented for deposit/payment, there were no sufficient funds to cover the same. The mere act of
issuing a worthless check -- whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt -- is malum
prohibitum.22

Petitioner claims that the subject checks were merely accommodation checks in favor of Aguilar, as they were not issued
to account or for value, since she had no business transactions with respondent-payee. However, petitioner admitted that
she issued the checks for the rice procurement of Aguilar from respondent which was a valuable consideration. Notably,
in respondent’s complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the subject checks were given to him by Aguilar in payment of the
latter’s rice procurements, with the representation that the subject checks were her collection checks and assuring
respondent that they would be good upon presentment.

On record is a letter23 dated July 31, 1996 of respondent’s counsel to petitioner on the matter of petitioner’s subject
FEBTC Check No. 08A096028P dated July 25, 1996, a letter in which the counsel wrote that the check which was in
partial payment of the obligation due from Aguilar, and that in return for petitioner’s issuance and delivery of the said
check, Aguilar acquired a temporary reprieve on her obligation.

The validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 24 A finding of probable cause does not
ensure a conviction or a conclusive finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The allegations adduced by the prosecution
will be put to test in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or disproved. 25

In fact, petitioner’s argument that respondent was aware of the fact that the subject checks were only accommodation
checks in favor of Aguilar is not a defense against a charge for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People of the
Philippines,26 where the accused interposed the defense of accommodation party, we held:

It bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent. When the intent of
the parties does not appear on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in the light of the surrounding facts
and circumstances. Invariably, the tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds test. x x x. And even
assuming she was such party, this circumstance is not a defense to a charge for violation of B.P. 22. What the
law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely as an
accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.27

In Meriz v. People of the Philippines,28 we held:

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the check is inconsequential in
determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court has since said that a "check issued as an evidence of
debt, although not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and must thus be held to
be "within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank gives it the
usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation. BP 22 does not
appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to
instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a
policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be
made. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one
of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of
issuing a bad check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer. 29

Also, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 we held:

It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued
merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the
said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not
made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application.
Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the
prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This
intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later
into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was
introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks, from becoming ‘useless scraps of
 paper’ and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the
checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the
original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a
check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on
the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose
of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular Session, December 4,
1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question
to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the
accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee.31

Petitioner invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals32 where the accused therein was acquitted of B.P. Blg. 22 for
issuing checks to collateralize an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of actual account or for value. In Magno,
the accused, who was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, was provided with credit facilities by LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from MANCOR the needed equipments. As part of their
arrangement, LS Finance required a 30% warranty deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments to be
transacted upon. Accused then asked the LS Finance Vice President Joey Gomez to look for a third party who could lend
him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit as he did not have such amount, however, unknown to the accused, it
was Corazon Teng (Vice President of MANCOR) who advanced the deposit in question on condition that the same would
be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. The accused subsequently issued checks to collateralize an accommodation
made by Teng amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P29,700.00) as warranty deposit.
Subsequently, the said checks bounced; thus the accused was prosecuted and the lower courts convicted him of B.P. Blg.
22. On a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we however acquitted the accused and held that the "cash out" made by Teng
was not used by the accused who was just paying rental on the equipments. To charge him for the refund of a "warranty
deposit" he did not withdraw, because it was not his own account and it remained with LS Finance, would be to make him
pay an unjust "debt," to say the least, since he did not actually receive the amount involved. We also held that this is a
scheme whereby Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of Mancor, would be able to sell or lease its goods as
in this case, and at the same time privately finance those who desperately needed petty accommodations as obtaining in
said case; that this modus operandi, in so many instances, victimized unsuspecting businessmen who likewise needed
protection from the law by availing themselves of the deceptively called "warranty deposit," not realizing that they would
fall prey to a leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement, when it was a scheme designed to skim
off a business client.

It bears stressing that Magno was decided after a full-blown trial, and the proof needed to convict the accused was proof
beyond reasonable doubt, which was not established in that case.

On the other hand, herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information.33 It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty. 34 It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 35 We
are in accord with the Justice Secretary’s finding that there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
has been committed by petitioner, thus, we refrain from prejudging the applicablity or inapplicability of Magno in this case.

Petitioner alleges that at the time she issued the subject checks, she has substantial funds in the bank to cover the value
thereof. This is evidentiary in nature which must be presented during trial more so in the light of the bank certification that
there were no sufficient funds to cover the checks when presented for deposit/payment.

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. 36 If not rebutted, it suffices
to sustain a conviction.37

We also find no merit in petitioner’s claim that since the Secretary of Justice absolved her of estafa, she should also be
absolved of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, since both offenses arose from the same subject checks. While deceit and damage
are essential elements in estafa, they are not required in B.P. Blg. 22. As already aforestated, under B.P. Blg. 22, mere
issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the same without sufficient funds and is hence punishable.

We do not subscribe to petitioner’s argument that for Aguilar’s rice procurements from respondent, Aguilar had made
substantial payments to respondent through cashier’s checks totalling P313,255.00; that despite these substantial
payments, respondent still wanted to collect from petitioner’s subject checks the total amount of P863,110.00; that
respondent wanted to collect from both petitioner and Aguilar for the latter’s rice procurement. It is during the trial of this
case that evidence may be introduced to prove petitioner’s contentions. As of now, it has been established that when the
subject checks were deposited, they were all dishonored.

Furthermore, the allegation of petitioner that if the information for B.P. Blg. 22 would be filed and in the remote event that
petitioner would be found guilty thereof, then the trial court may impose a fine double the amount of the checks, which fine
may amount to millions of pesos; and that this is unjust enrichment on respondent’s part at the expense of petitioner and
Aguilar deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to state that the fine that may be imposed by the court is not awarded to
the private complainant. Fine is imposed as a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or injury.38

In fine, the CA did not commit any error in upholding the findings of the Secretary of Justice that probable cause exists
that the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2002 and the Resolution dated July 29, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154438             September 5, 2007

ALICIA F. RICAFORTE, petitioner,
vs.
LEON L. JURADO, respondent.

We affirm the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes of estafa,
defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, and of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, we
hold that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Indeterminate Sentence Law was not applicable to accused-appellant
because the penalty imposable on the latter was reclusion perpetua.

First. The elements of estafa, as defined under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and amended by Republic
Act No. 4885, are: (1) that the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of
the postdating or issuance; (2) that at the time of the issuance of the check, the offender had no funds in the bank or the
funds deposited were insufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) that the payee has been defrauded. 10

These elements are present in this case. Accused-appellant admitted that she issued PCIB Check No. 558574, dated
October 20, 1992, for ₱662,250.00 to Pacita G. Del Rosario.11 The check was issued as payment for a ring and the
₱250.00 transportation fare which accused-appellant received from complainant. Accused-appellant testified during direct
examination that the check was issued merely as a security for the loan, which was payable within one year. During
cross-examination, however, accused-appellant contradicted her statement by testifying that the excess amount indicated
in the check represented interest for the whole year. According to her testimony:

q Now, where did you obtain the loan of ₱662,250.00 from the private complainant if this check was really issued in a
cash loan?

a The ₱50,000.00 on September.

q Do you mean to tell this Court you did not actually receive the amount of ₱662,250.00 as indicated in this check

a No, sir. It was supposed to be the capital interest for the whole year na gagamitin ko ang pera niya.

q And by the way, what is your highest educational attainment?

a Third year college, sir.

q And you know the implication considering your educational attainment, third year college and I also notice your
proficiency testifying in English. You know the implication of issuing a check amounting to ₱662,250,00 when in fact you
stated that you were extended a loan of ₱50,000.00?

a I knew its implication, I notice it in the first place, sir.

q And you also testified that the [o]ther account or the excess of the loan will correspond to the alleged interest for the
time for all the time you are going to use that money?

a Yes, sir.

q And you testified you obtained the loan on September 1992?

a Yes, sir. Me and my mother at that time.

q And the date of your check October 2[0], 1992?

a Yes, sir.

q Do you mean to tell this Court and you want this court to believe that for a month period the ₱50,000.00 will earn an
interest of more than ₱600,000.00?

a The agreement is for a year period, sir.

q Even assuming you agreed on one year term loan, do you want the court to believe you that for a one year period, the
₱50,000.00 loan extended to you earn more than ₱6,000.00?

a By September, she went Out of the country around that time, she went back.

q And considering that the alleged loan that you obtained is around ₱50,000.00, how did you arrive[d] at this figure of
₱662,250.00?

a She was the one who gave that amount, she was the one who required me to place that amount of ₱662,250.00.

q And you place and wrote this amount as you said required, asked by her?

a Yes, sir.

q Is it not true madam witness that this amount of ₱662,250.00 is the prize or the amount corresponding payment of a
diamond ring that you obtained from the complainant?

a I never bought a jewelry because my husband used to buy all our jewelry.

q Is it not true that as indicated in the check there is an additional ₱250.00 because at the time that you issued the check,
the private complainant you informed her that you have no money for transportation is it not?

a That is true, sir.

q So that the complainant loaned to you gave you ₱250.00 and for said amount you added this in this check, is it not?

a Yes, sir.

q And at the time that you are transacting business with the complainant, the complainant is a labor arbiter at NLRC
department of labor and employees, is it not?

a Yes, sir.
q And do you want to impress this Court that a person like the private complainant occupying a very dignified position of
labor arbiter which correspond to this position of a judge in civil court will force you to issue something or will force you to
do something which is illegal?

a I don’t consider that as illegal because the money was for my use for a period of a year because that was a loan with
her. I consented, I agreed to that. I don’t consider anything against her regarding that money because I fully consented to
that.

q How did you and complainant arrived to this amount of ₱662,250.00?

a She was the one who made the computation.

q In your presence?

a Yes, your Honor.

q What was the basis?

a I actually do not know how she compute.

q This is for one year?

a Yes, your Honor.12

It is improbable for a businesswoman like accused-appellant to agree to pay an interest of more than ₱600,000.00 for a
loan of ₱50,000.00. Indeed, if the loan, which she incurred in September 1992, was payable in one year, the check should
have been postdated a year later, in September 1993, and not on October 20, 1992. These glaring contradictions and
improbabilities make accused-appellant’s claim implausible.

The testimony of complainant that the check represented payment for a ring which she sold to accused-appellant must be
given credence. Complainant would not have given the ring to accused-appellant had the latter not issued the check and
assured complainant that it was fully funded. 13 Nor has it been shown that complainant had ill motive in filing this case
against accused-appellant. Complainant, it appears, was a labor arbiter in the Department of Labor and Employment. It is
hard to believe she would fabricate the charges against accused-appellant. Indeed, accused-appellant herself admitted
that she had a good relationship with complainant prior to the filing of the case. 14

The fraudulent intent of accused-appellant had been proven to exist at the time of the issuance of the check. She
misrepresented to complainant that she was financially stable and that her business was flourishing. 15 In reality, however,
accused-appellant had no funds sufficient to cover the check she issued to complainant. 16 It is thus clear that she obtained
the amounts of ₱662,000.00 and ₱250.00 through deceit. As already stated, the account was closed on the very date of
the postdated check issued to complainant.

Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that the failure of the drawer of the check to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that the said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretenses or fraudulent act. In this case, accused-appellant received two demand letters, dated
November 10, 1992, from complainant for the payment of the value of the check. She never contested the contents of the
letters.17 Despite extensions granted to her, she failed to pay the value of the check. Her refusal to make good her
obligation is indicative not only of her inability to pay but also that she employed false pretenses in incurring her obligation
in the first place.

Second. Accused-appellant was likewise guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.1âwphi1 The elements of this crime are: (1) the
accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.18

These elements are present in this case. Accused-appellant issued PCIB Check No. 558574, dated October 20, 1992, in
the amount of ₱662,250.00 payable to Pacita G. Del Rosario as payment for the diamond ring sold to her. Accused-
appellant admitted she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time she issued it. The check, which was
deposited on the date indicated therein, was subsequently dishonored because the account from which the money should
have been drawn against was closed by her on the same date. Despite demands made on her by complainant to pay the
value of the check, accused-appellant failed to pay. Nor did she make arrangements for payment in full of the checks by
the bank within five banking days after notice of dishonor so as to absolve her of any liability for issuing a bouncing
check.19

Third. The Court of Appeals held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply because the amount defrauded
was ₱662,250.00 and the consequent penalty imposable on accused-appellant for the crime of estafa is imprisonment of
thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua.20 This is based on Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
P.D. No. 818, which provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall be no case
exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;

We have recently ruled that the term reclusion perpetua, as used in the above quoted provision, is not the penalty
prescribed for the offense but a mere description of the penalty imposed where the amount defrauded exceeds
₱22,000.00.21 Rather, the prescribed penalty under §1, par. 1 of P.D. No. 818 is reclusion temporal. Thus, even if the
amount of fraud involved exceeds ₱22,000.00, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable in determining the
imposable penalty.

Now, the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, can be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, while
the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.22

Hence, as the amount involved (₱662,250.00) exceeds ₱22,000.00, accused-appellant should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be reclusion temporal, to be imposed in its maximum period, plus
one year for each additional P10,000.00 of the amount of fraud in excess of ₱22,000.00. The total penalty, however, shall
not exceed thirty (30) years. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law for the offense, without considering in the meantime the modifying circumstance, which in
this case refers to the incremental penalty for the amount of fraud in excess of ₱22,000.00. 23 Such penalty is prision
mayor, with a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.24 In line with this Court’s rulings,25 the
minimum term shall be fixed in this case at twelve (12) years.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting accused-appellant for estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that in the case
of estafa, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 146921-22               January 31, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARY GRACE CAROL FLORES, accused-appellant.

Generally, findings and conclusion of the trial court are binding upon us in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness
or palpable error23 or unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.24

We agree with the OSG that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
offense of estafa as defined by the Revised Penal Code in Article 315, 2 (d), was committed by the appellant. More
particularly, the prosecution did not prove the existence of fraud to constitute the issuance of the check as fraud
contemplated by the law on estafa. As we previously held:
To constitute estafa under this provision the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender
must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of a check whether postdated
or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the
check.25

In this case, the trial court failed to consider the testimonies of both the private complainants with respect to the
agreement that the checks issued by appellant shall be mere guarantees for the eventual payment of the money given to
appellant.

As aptly pointed out by the OSG, Norma Abagat admitted on cross-examination that the checks that appellant issued
merely guaranteed the payment of the loan.26 Rodrigo Abagat likewise admitted as much and even testified on cross-
examination that he intended to impose a monthly interest at the rate of 5% on the amount lent. 27 The OSG observed that
it was not the issuance of the checks that prompted the Abagat spouses to part with their money but rather, the liberality
to help appellant who is the wife of Norma’s cousin, as well as the expectation to collect interest payment for the loan
extended to appellant.

The transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was one for a loan of money to be used by
appellant in her business and she issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the obligation to
make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of
fraud, no criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a
guarantee of repayment. We find appellant’s allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered into a joint venture agreement
with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is self-serving. But we also note that the trial court convicted appellant
on a general allegation that all the elements of estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code had been proved
by the prosecution without making any reference to or giving any proof of the actual fraud that appellant allegedly
committed to make her liable for estafa. It is elementary that where an allegation in the information is an essential element
of the crime, the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. In this case, the prosecution did
not establish specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offenses charged.

Considering that the informations against appellant involved violation of Art. 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, we
take exception to the OSG’s recommendation28 that appellant should be held liable for violations of BP 22. Appellant
cannot be convicted of a crime for which she was not properly charged, for that would violate appellant’s constitutional
right to be informed of the accusation against her.29 The purpose of the constitutional guarantee that a person accused of
an offense be informed of the accusation against him is (a) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; (b) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against
a further prosecution for the same cause; and (c) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. 30

The informations filed with the regional trial court were for three counts of estafa. Earlier, the informations for BP 22
covering the same checks filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 44, were provisionally dismissed
on November 13, 1996.31 These cases were not re-filed nor consolidated with the informations for estafa before the RTC
of Pasay. Accordingly, appellant was never apprised of the fact that she may still be held liable for BP 22 and so never
had an opportunity to defend herself against an accusation for an offense under the special law. BP 22 cannot be deemed
necessarily included in the crime of estafa under RPC, Article 315, 2 (d). The offense of fraud defined under the Revised
Penal Code is malum in se, whereas BP 22, also known as Bouncing Checks Law, is a special law which punishes the
issuance of bouncing checks, a malum prohibitum. Fraud or estafa under the Revised Penal Code is a distinct offense
from the violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. They are different offenses, having different elements. 32 In this case, since
appellant is accused of violating a particular provision of the Revised Penal Code on estafa, she may not be convicted for
violation of BP 22 without trenching on fundamental fairness.

The trial court found sufficient evidence that appellant already paid the amount of P425,000 out of her total indebtedness
of P855,000. Apparently, appellant made a belated effort to make good her obligation. Be that as it may, there is a
remaining balance of her obligation in the amount of P430,000 as the difference between P855,000 less P425,000. This
amount of P430,000 should be paid by appellant as a just obligation owing to the spouses Rodrigo and Norma Abagat. In
addition, interest of 12 percent per annum, to be computed in accordance with Article 1169, 33 should also be paid by her.
For where the debtor incurs in delay, he has to pay interest by way of damages, in conformity with our ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. 34

WHEREFORE, the judgment dated December 20, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 95-7580, 95-7581, and 95-7582 finding appellant RICA G. CUYUGAN, liable for three counts of
estafa is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove fraud beyond
reasonable doubt. However, she is ordered to pay private complainants the balance of her obligation in the amount
of P430,000 plus interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum until fully paid. She is hereby ordered RELEASED
immediately from confinement in the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, unless she is being held for
another lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to inform the Court of the action taken hereon
within five days from notice.
G.R. Nos. 146641-43             November 18, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICA G. CUYUGAN, accused-appellant

DECEIT AND DAMAGE AS ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA

Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, 20 the elements of estafa are: (1) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and must be
established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 21 Thus, the drawer of the dishonored check is given three days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit
arises.

The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit was successfully rebutted by
appellant’s evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check.22 Good faith may be demonstrated, for
instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made
arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of
the dishonored checks.

It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent
denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence
of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the "criminal mind" behind the "criminal act." Thus, to
constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As we
held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan:23

The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved falsification of public documents and
estafa:

"Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting."

American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent in embezzlement is not
based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no
embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.

The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert the money or goods for
his personal benefit.24 We are convinced that appellant was able to prove the absence of criminal intent in her
transactions with Chua. Had her intention been tainted with malice and deceit, appellant would not have exerted
extraordinary effort to pay the complainant, given her own business and financial reverses.

LACK OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR

We also note that the prosecution presented virtually no evidence to show that the indispensable notice of dishonor was
sent to and received by appellant. Excerpts from the following testimony of complainant are significant:

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, Mrs. Witness, when these checks from Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘V’ have bounced, what steps, did you do?

A I consulted my lawyer and she wrote a Demand Letter.

COURT:

Q What is the name of that lawyer?

A Atty. Virginia Nabora.

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, you mentioned a Demand Letter sent by Atty. Virginia Nabor, I am showing to you this Demand Letter
dated March 16, 1988, will you kindly examine the same if this is the same Demand Letter you mentioned a
while ago?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, on this second page of this Demand Letter there is a signature above the printed name Virginia
Guevarra Nabor, do you know the signature, Mrs. Witness?

A Yes, that is the signature of my lawyer.

ATTY. ANGELES:

May we request that this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988 consisting of two (2) pages, Your Honor, be
marked as Exhibit ‘W’ and that the signature on the second page of this letter of Virginia Guevarra Nabor be
encircled and be marked as Exhibit ‘W-1’ and that the attached Registry Receipt, Your Honor, be marked as
Exhibit ‘W-2’.

COURT:

Mark them.

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, Mrs. Witness, why do you know that this is the signature of Virginia Guevarra Nabor?

A After preparing that I saw her sign the letter.

Q Now, after sending this Demand Letter, do you know

If the accused herein made payments or replaced

the checks that were issued to you?

COURT:

Q Of course, you assumed that the accused received that letter, that is his basis on the premise that the
accused received that letter?

ATTY. ANGELES:

A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q What proof is there to show that accused received the letter because your question is premises (sic) on the
assumption that the accused received the letter?

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, do you know Mrs. Witness if the accused received the letter?

A There is a registry receipt.

COURT:
 Q Now, later on after sending that letter, did you have communication with the accused?

A I kept on calling her but I was not able to get in touch

with her.

Q But do you know if that letter of your lawyer was received by the accused?

A I was not informed by my lawyer but I presumed that

the same was already received by the accused.

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, aside from sending this Demand Letter, do you know what your lawyer did?

A We filed a case with the Fiscal’s.25

Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter was made by the prosecution. The prosecution
claimed that the demand letter was sent by registered mail. To prove this, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well
as the registry return receipt bearing a signature which was, however, not even authenticated or identified. A registry
receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing.26 "Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove
themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters." 27

It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand letter prepared and
sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew
was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that presumption,
her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscal’s office28 without any confirmation that the demand letter
supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by appellant.

With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of
such notice violated appellant’s right to procedural due process. "It is a general rule that when service of notice is an
issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service."29 The burden of proving receipt of
notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by appellant. But it
did not. Obviously, it relied merely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.

This Court therefore cannot, with moral certainty, convict appellant of violation of BP 22. The evident failure of the
prosecution to establish that she was given the requisite notice of dishonor justifies her acquittal. 30

As held in Lao vs. Court of Appeals:31

"It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator ‘a compromise by allowing
him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is
abated.’ This was also compared ‘to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time
to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability.’ In this
light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a
‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor
be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness require
-- that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. 22.

Stated otherwise, responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor was necessary. Consequently, while there may have been constructive notice to appellant regarding the
insufficiency of her funds in the bank, it was not enough to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the RPC and Sec. 2 of BP
22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check
within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the
amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary
for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds
cannot be presumed and no crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda
is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 88-66228 for estafa and in Criminal Case Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to
88-66240, 88-66242, 88-66243, 88-66245 to 88-66248 for violation of BP 22.

G.R. Nos. 104238-58             June 3, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CORA ABELLA OJEDA, appellant.

The petition lacks merit.

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.11

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos through the present
petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the
dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such
notice of dishonor,12 although not as an element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was
aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of
the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, 13 as it reads:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days
fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of dishonor from FWCC
was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently
established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented by
the prosecution. The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover
registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of
checks.1âwphi1 The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be
regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element of the
offense.14

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to
reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank,
BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she
was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of
the checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from
FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were receipts 16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22,
1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from ₱2,500.00 to
₱15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she
had. not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the
bank and the dishonor of her checks.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making arrangements for payment
in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in
the instant case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that
the same had been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover,
documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried
in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged
negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial,17 it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her
client. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the
conviction of Campos.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 187401               September 17, 2014

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondents.

Evidently, there is a need to resolve in this case the question of whether the postdated check was issued at the time the
obligation of the petitioner to pay the consideration for the dump truck was contracted or thereafter.

It is significant to note that the trial court did not make any finding or any categorical statement on the matter, it having
concluded simply that petitioner issued a worthless check in payment of the dump truck. Neither did the Court of Appeals
make such finding in affirming petitioner's conviction, it having also simply stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

What motivated the accused to issue the postdated check was the sale of the vehicle to him. Had
there been no contract of sale in the first place, he would not have issued the check. 16

The testimony of the sole prosecution witness Alberto Joven is also not enlightening. A perusal of said testimony would
readily show that no categorical statement was made either relative to the date in issue. Alberto Joven testified on direct
examination that:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when Mr. Nieva offered to buy the dump truck instead of just bringing it back to Bacolor,
because it was repaired and rentals were not paid, what did your father say?

A: My father quoted his price for the truck, sir.

Q: And after quoting the price, what happened?

A: They both agreed and the accused gave him a postdated check. 17

and on cross-examination, that:.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: You were present when the negotiation for the purchase of the motor vehicle
was made by your father and the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell the date?

A: I cannot remember the date, sir.

Q: But it was in 1985?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that sale was consummated I presume?

 A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell when it was consummated?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: But it is in 1985?

A: Yes, sir. 18

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: On August 2, 1985, did you know where your father was the whole day of
August 2, 1985?

A: I cannot remember.

Q: You cannot remember either whether your father received a check from the
accused for this, did you?

A: I can remember he received the check but not the date, sir.

Q: But it was in 1985?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Neither could you remember when your father, after receiving the said check
delivered by the accused to your father, encashed the same?

A: No, Sir.19

(Emphasis ours.)

In contrast, we note the petitioner's positive averment that he issued and delivered the postdated check to Atty. Joven one
week after Atty. Joven and he entered into the contract of sale, stressing that the deed of sale was handed to him by Atty.
Joven without asking for any payment. Petitioner testified in this manner:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: You just stated in the direct examination that the said check was postdated
July 31, 1985. Mr. Nieva, when did you actually issue the said check postdated
July 31, 1985?

A: That was one week after he gave me the deed of sale. He gave me the deed
of sale without asking me for the payment. 20

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be
the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. 21 The
offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check or that
the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property had there been no check
issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party
deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 22

It will be recalled that petitioner has been in possession of the dump truck as early as April 30, 1985. The property had
been delivered to and obtained by petitioner initially for the purpose of having the same repaired by the petitioner so that it
could be rented out to him. When it turned out, however, that the same was not repaired nor the rentals therefor paid,
Atty. Joven demanded that it be returned and what dissuaded him from taking it away from petitioner in order to be
brought back to Bacolor, Pampanga was petitioner's offer to buy the same. The offer having been accepted with the
consideration having also been agreed upon, Atty. Joven let the dump truck remain in the possession of petitioner. An
absolute deed of sale was accordingly executed and entered into by the parties on June 10, 1985, during which Atty.
Joven did not ask for payment. As has heretofore been clearly shown, petitioner issued and delivered to Atty. Joven the
postdated check in payment of the dump truck a week later. Needless to state, it was not by reason of the issuance of the
check that petitioner has remained to be in possession of the dump truck but the perfected contract of sale entered into by
petitioner and Atty. Joven a week earlier than the issuance of the check.

In fine, we find and so hold that petitioner did not commit the fraud or deceit envisioned in the law as to make him liable
for estafa when he issued the postdated check, such issuance having been clearly made in payment of a pre-existing
obligation.

We, however, sustain petitioner's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

It bears stressing that while this is also an appeal on petitioner's conviction of the offense under BP Blg. 22, the
arguments in his brief, except on the issue of jurisdiction, had not dwelt thereon. Nevertheless, we note that upon the facts
adduced, his conviction of the said offense is proper.

The elements of the offense under Section 1, BP Blg 22, are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
to account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 23

It will be noted that BP Blg. 22 requires that the drawer of the check must have knowledge at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. Under Section 2 thereof, the making, drawing and
issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of
the check. However, the prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency does not lie when the maker or drawer
pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

It has been established in this case that petitioner issued to Atty. Joven the postdated check — CBM Check No. 015417
dated July 31, 1985 in the amount of P70,000.00 as payment for the dump truck sold by Atty. Joven to him. He knew that
he had no funds with the bank to cover the said check at the time he issued or postdated it, such knowledge being evident
from his own admission that the check would be funded from out of his collectibles from the Development Bank of the
Philippines but which, however, did not materialize as expected, not to mention the legal presumption of such knowledge
arising from the dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds. The check was presented for payment on August 2, 1985
or within 90 days from date of issue and the same was dishonored by reason of "closed account" stamped on its face.
Petitioner did not pay Atty. Joven the amount due on the check despite demand; neither did he make arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within five (5) banking days after notice of non-payment.

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein
as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The
evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the
crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of BP Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes 24 and so is the crime of estafa. 25 The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 26

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court in Criminal Case No. 3228 is hereby
REVERSED and petitioner Antonio Nieva, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The decision in Criminal Case No. 3229 sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the offense under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is hereby AFFIRM ED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 95796-97 May 2, 1997

ANTONIO NIEVA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different
offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of
each crime has to be satisfied.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with
satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction. 10 For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither
essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to
apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 11 Hence, it is incorrect
for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the
estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be
satisfied.

In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of
money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various
charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that
jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that
complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the
alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject
checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered,
dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the
Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of
his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still
without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is
that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part
committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover
the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on
the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in
upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.

In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent
relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner
raised the issue of jurisdiction.

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure
of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a
motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in
paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. 12

After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a
memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot
countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see that even if a party
fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be
raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. 14

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of
the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
case 15 in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the
Sibonghanoy case not in point.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 16 the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that
the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further
that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite
is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
 conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to
be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. 17

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred
by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost
fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by
laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 18

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered
by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not
fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum
before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a
court maybe raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court. 19

WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335
to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated
24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against
petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 119000 July 28, 1997

ROSA UY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true
copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the
record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also
observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable
to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The
running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.17 when it
held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.

Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is
no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of
the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special
laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al., 23 the Court
even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City
Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was
notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the
MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question".
The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were
filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on
her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the
requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.

G.R. No. 152662               June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondent’s obligation to make good the value of the checks in exchange for the
cash he delivered to respondent. In other words, petitioner’s cause of action is the respondent’s breach of the contractual
obligation. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict. 22 The nature of a cause of
action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or
suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 23

Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the civil action ex
delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code "[w]hen
the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa
contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter." Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,24 the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held
that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex
contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and
may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. 25 In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action
filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based
on the same act.26 Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of
the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did not amount
to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by
petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The
criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. 27

Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for collection of the value of the checks issued
by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which
require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not operate to bar the
same.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1, 1998
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 133978             November 12, 2002

JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner,

vs.
EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.

We agree with this position.

A careful review of the rulings of the lower courts would show that the only piece of evidence they considered connecting
the alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the affidavit-complaint of Villegas. In
this affidavit, the allegation that the subject checks were issued in Manila was mentioned only once even though the
circumstances behind the issuance of the checks were referred to a couple of times.26 Moreover, the phrase "in Manila"
only appeared in the ninth paragraph of Villegas' affidavit where the elements of the offense were already being
summarized. Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as to where the subject checks were really issued.

More importantly, we agree with petitioners that Villegas could not have testified or alleged in his affidavit that the checks
were issued in Manila because he was not privy to the contractual negotiations with L&S Resources nor was he present
when petitioners issued the checks. In fact, his position in the company did not give him any opportunity to deal directly
with his clients as brought out in his cross-examination:

Q: Mr. Villegas, you said that you are an Operations Manager of the Vill Integrated Transport Corporation?

A: Yes sir.
xxxx

Q: You said that you are the operations manager, specifically said that your main duties and responsibilities (sic) to
oversee maintenance of your tugboat, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So directly or indirectly, you are not involved in dealing with customers of Vill Integrated Transport Corporation, is that
correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So, in the particular case the dealing with Rolan Onal and Raffy Brodeth, you are not involved in any way, is that right?

A: No sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, Mr. Villegas, in the Contract dated 16 August 1999 that was previously marked by your counsel,
you were never a signatory to that contract?

A: No sir.

Q: That confirmed a fact that you are not in any way directly or indirectly involved in the transaction with both accused.

A: No sir.27

Furthermore, petitioners claimed in defense that the checks were issued as a guarantee for the payments. As admitted by
Vill Integrated's liason officer, their company collects payments from its clients in their respective offices. 28 Considering
that L&S Resources' principal place of business is in Makati City, it would be out of the ordinary course of business
operations for petitioners to go all the way to Manila just to issue the checks.

Our ruling in Morillo v. People29 is instructive as to where violations of B.P. Blg. 22 should be filed and tried:

It is well-settled that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that
some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while
some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and
the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was issued, delivered and
dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Big. 22 case." The Court,
however, cannot sustain such conclusion.

In said case, the accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof,
he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San
Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other
efforts to demand the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of
B.P. Big. 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends
that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was issued,
delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court,
however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch,
evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:

Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has
been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro
Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the
check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the
places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or
dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored by
the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The
place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly manifested
in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed
in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.

The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check drawn
in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however,
was it held, either expressly or impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions
involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. It is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the fact that the check was issued and
delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan while the same was deposited with the PS Bank of San Juan. But such
differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of the place of deposit cannot
exercise jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22. In the absence, therefore, of any ground, jurisprudential or otherwise,
to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at
hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant
case.1âwphi1 In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the Commercial Bank
of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of
Philippine Islands. Joven was advised, however, that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason
that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was charged with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said court had no jurisdiction
to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein
as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The
evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the
crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at hand,
the Court similarly inferred:

Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the ground
that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential
thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the
crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying
these principles, a criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements
occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that
Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the
territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was
deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off
the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and
presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCIBank. The Me TC of Makati, therefore, correctly took
cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. 30 (emphases in the
original and citations omitted)

From the foregoing, we can deduce that a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed and tried either at
the place where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. In the present case, however, evidence on record
is missing at any of these material places.

Again, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the Me TC is the allegation that the subject checks were issued in
Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed must be
proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or
holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not' be made equivalent to proof.

All said, since the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila nor was any evidence shown
that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in Manila, the MeTC has no factual basis for its territorial jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The 17 May 2011 Decision and the 20 July 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. Criminal Case Nos. 371104-CR & 371105-CR
are DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 197849

RAFFY BRODETH and ROLAN B. ONAL, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ABRAHAM G. VILLEGAS, Respondents

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

In Griffith,the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the filing of the Information for
violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount greater than the value of the bounced
checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court
disagrees with such conclusion.

The CA found Griffithin applicable to the present case, because the checks subject of this case are personal checks,
whilethe check involved in Griffithwas a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or miscommunication could easily
occur between the signatories of the check and the corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present
case are not exactlythe same as those in Griffith, it should be noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to
petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign
contribution to Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop
Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were used as payment, were
not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it was Castor who was
supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying
with the instruction to stop payment since he believed Castor's wordthat there is no longer any valid reason to pay
complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two monthsafter receiving the demand letter from
private complainant and just several days after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued
a replacement check which was successfully encashed by private complainant.

The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving the subpoena from the
Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle
his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused
therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the
proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's property. In saidcase, the Court did not differentiate as to whether
payment was made before or after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It only mattered that the
amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before the Information against the accused was filed in
court. In thiscase, petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no justification
for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffithand in this case, petitioner had paid the
amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why the same
liberality granted to the accused in Griffithshould not likewise be extended to herein petitioner. The precept enunciated in
Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks
that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if
the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it
life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact
subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, viaauction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P.
22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two
years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not
be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x x8 (Emphasis supplied)

In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, 9 the foregoing principle articulated in
Griffithwas the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the
elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for
value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." 10 To facilitate proving the second element, the law
created a prima faciepresumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown
that the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to fully pay the
amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the drawer pays
the value of the check within the five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential
elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment
withinthe period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.

Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period would exculpate the
accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in Tan:

In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover
the value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense
under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to the institution
of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's
impounded properties, with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.

xxxx

In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in possession the four
buses – trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust
Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about ₱6.6 million." It thus appears that the total amount of the
dishonored checks – ₱1,785,855.75 – , x x x was more than fully satisfied priorto the transmittal and receiptof the July 9,
1992 letter of demand. In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to
have obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.

It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.1âwphi1 And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the
application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x x11 (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22,
would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence
of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused
would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, 12 petitioner should not be
penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to bepresent. The fact that the issuer of the
check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information incourt. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the
protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have
evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against
them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has been filed in
court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the
accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there
is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied
to its full extent.

Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from cases where the
accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit
are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case,
paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil
liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.

In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of Informations with the
court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009, in CA-GR. CR No. 31725, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 190834               November 26, 2014

ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.30

Anent the first error raised by petitioner, this Court finds that, given the facts of the case and the evidence on record, the
evidence is wanting to prove that petitioner had misappropriated or converted the pieces of jewelry entrusted to her by
Victoria.

In his Complaint-Affidavit,31 Dennis alleged that petitioner gave the pieces of jewelry to her sub-agent Bisquera for the
latter to sell the same. Furthermore, Dennis alleged that the checks issued as payment were dishonored, the reason
being that the accounts were closed.

Petitioner does not deny entrusting the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera. The records of the case reveal that petitioner had in
fact entrusted the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera as evidenced by two receipts 32 dated February 16, 1992. The same is
bolstered by the testimony of Tapang, who testified that he witnessed petitioner give the pieces of jewelry to
Bisquera.33 Thus, since the pieces of jewelry were transferred to Bisquera, petitioner argues that she could not be guilty of
misappropriation or conversion as contemplated by Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.1avvphi1

The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate
for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right.34
The factual milieu of the case at bar is similar to Serona v. Court of Appeals 35 (Serona) where pieces of jewelry were also
transferred to a sub-agent. The Solicitor General, however, contends that the doctrine laid down in Serona is inapplicable
as the agreement between complainants and petitioner provide a clear prohibition against sub-agency. 36

The conditions set forth in the two trust receipts signed by petitioner read:

x x x in good condition, to be sold in CASH ONLY within _____, days from date of signing this receipt. If I could not sell, I
shall return all the jewelry within the period mentioned above. If I would be able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and
account the whole proceeds of the sale thereof to the owner of the jewelries (sic) at his/her residence: my compensation
or commission shall be the over-price on the value of each jewelry quoted above. I am prohibited to sell any jewelry
on credits or by installment, deposit, give for safekeeping, lend pledge or give as security or guarantee under
any circumstances or manner, any jewelry to other person or persons, and that I received the above jewelry in
the capacity of agent.37

Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the aforementioned conditions do not, in any way, categorically state that
petitioner cannot employ a sub-agent. A plain reading of the conditions clearly shows that the restrictions only pertain to
the manner in which petitioner may dispose of the property: (1) to sell the jewelry on credit; (2) to sell the jewelry by
installment; (3) to give the jewelry for safekeeping; (4) to lend the jewelry; (5) to pledge the jewelry; (6) to give the jewelry
as security; and (7) to give the jewelry as guarantee. To this Court's mind, to maintain the position that the said conditions
also prohibit the employment of a sub-agent would be stretching the plain meaning of the words too thinly.

Petitioner is thus correct in citing Serona, which is instructive and may be applied by analogy, to wit:

Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through conversion or misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to
a sub-agent for sale on commission basis. x x x

It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment by an agent of a substitute or sub-
agent in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the
appointment of Labrador as petitioner’s sub-agent was not expressly prohibited by Quilatan, as the acknowledgment
receipt, Exhibit B, does not contain any such limitation. Neither does it appear that petitioner was verbally forbidden by
Quilatan from passing on the jewelry to another person before the acknowledgment receipt was executed or at any other
time. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner’s act of entrusting the jewelry to Labrador is characterized by abuse of
confidence because such an act was not proscribed and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.

xxxx

In the case at bar, it was established that the inability of petitioner as agent to comply with her duty to return either the
pieces of jewelry or the proceeds of its sale to her principal Quilatan was due, in turn, to the failure of Labrador to abide by
her agreement with petitioner. Notably, Labrador testified that she obligated herself to sell the jewelry in behalf of
petitioner also on commission basis or to return the same if not sold. In other words, the pieces of jewelry were given by
petitioner to Labrador to achieve the very same end for which they were delivered to her in the first
place.1avvphi1 Consequently, there is no conversion since the pieces of jewelry were not devoted to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon.

Similarly, it cannot be said that petitioner misappropriated the jewelry or delivered them to Labrador "without right." Aside
from the fact that no condition or limitation was imposed on the mode or manner by which petitioner was to effect the sale,
it is also consistent with usual practice for the seller to necessarily part with the valuables in order to find a buyer and
allow inspection of the items for sale.

In People v. Nepomuceno, the accused-appellant was acquitted of estafa on facts similar to the instant case. Accused-
appellant therein undertook to sell two diamond rings in behalf of the complainant on commission basis, with the
obligation to return the same in a few days if not sold. However, by reason of the fact that the rings were delivered also for
sale on commission to sub-agents who failed to account for the rings or the proceeds of its sale, accused-appellant
likewise failed to make good his obligation to the complainant thereby giving rise to the charge of estafa. In absolving the
accused-appellant of the crime charged, we held:

Where, as in the present case, the agents to whom personal property was entrusted for sale, conclusively proves
the inability to return the same is solely due to malfeasance of a sub-agent to whom the first agent had actually
entrusted the property in good faith, and for the same purpose for which it was received; there being no
prohibition to do so and the chattel being delivered to the sub-agent before the owner demands its return or
before such return becomes due, we hold that the first agent cannot be held guilty of estafa by either
misappropriation or conversion. The abuse of confidence that is characteristic of this offense is missing under
the circumstances.
Furthermore, in Lim v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing Nepomuceno and the case of People v. Trinidad, held that:

In cases of estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the accused personally, through his own acts, and his
mere negligence in permitting another to take advantage or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1-b, of the Revised Penal Code; unless of course the evidence should
disclose that the agent acted in conspiracy or connivance with the one who carried out the actual
misappropriation, then the accused would be answerable for the acts of his co-conspirators. If there is no such
evidence, direct or circumstantial, and if the proof is clear that the accused herself was the innocent victim of her sub-
agent’s faithlessness, her acquittal is in order.38

Petitioner thus cannot be criminally held liable for estafa. Although it cannot be denied that she received the pieces of
jewelry from complainants, evidence is wanting in proving that she misappropriated or converted the amount of the pieces
of jewelry for her own personal use. Likewise, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show that petitioner had
conspired or connived with Bisquera. The mere fact that petitioner failed to return the pieces of jewelry upon demand is
not proof of conspiracy, nor is it proof of misappropriation or conversion.

In addition, this Court takes notice of the findings of fact by the RTC in the separate civil action instituted by complainants,
the same docketed as Civil Case No. 63131, dealing with the civil aspect of the case at bar:

xxxx

Jane Bisquera cannot interpose the defense that she is not privy to the transaction. Her admission that she has
indeed received the pieces of jewelry which is the subject matter of the controversy and her offer to extinguish the
obligation by payment or dacion en pago is contradictory to her defense. Therefore, she is estopped from interposing
such a defense.

Furthermore, earlier in her transaction with Wilma Tabaniag, the principals, Sps. Espiritu, were not alien to her
but were in fact disclosed to her, hence, she has knowledge that the spouses are the principals of Tabaniag.

Bisquera, being a sub-agent to Tabaniag, is in fact privy to the agreement. x x x39

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had in fact transferred the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera. Thus, contrary to
the finding of the CA, petitioner could not have converted the same for her own benefit, especially since the pieces of
jewelry were not with her, and there was no evidence of conspiracy or connivance between petitioner and Bisquera.

Moreover, even Victoria cannot deny knowing that petitioner had given the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera, as Victoria
herself was the one who deposited the checks issued by Bisquera to her account, to wit:

Q. Now, madam witness, there is a (sic) mentioned here an amount of ₱300,000.00 regarding the violation of
bouncing check, am I correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And according to you, these were payments made by Wilma Tabaniag, am I correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who is the drawer of these checks with a ₱300,000.00 that you mentioned in this particular document, not
less than ₱300,000.00?

A. The total check ₱300,000.00 was under my name.

Q. No, I mean, who is the drawer?

A. Mrs. Tabaniag issued and the other pieces of jewelry were issued by a certain Jane Bisquera.

Q. No, not jewelries, checks.

A. I'm sorry, checks.

 Q. How much was issued by Jane Bisquera?

A. The total is ₱320,872.00

Q. That was by Jane Bisquera alone?

A. Yes, sir.40

Lastly, although petitioner may have admitted that the cases she filed against Bisquera do not involve the same checks,
which are the subject matter of the case at bar, the same does not necessarily manifest a criminal intent on her part. On
the contrary, what it shows is that petitioner too may be an unwilling victim of this day-to-day malady of bouncing checks,
common in our business field. Certainly, petitioner may have been negligent in entrusting the pieces of jewelry to
Bisquera, but in no way can such constitute estafa as defined in the RPC.

As a final note, a reading of the records and transcript of the case seemingly shows an unintentional reference by the
parties in describing the transaction as one of sale.41 The foregoing notwithstanding, if this Court were to consider the
transaction as one of sale and not one of sub-agency, the same conclusion would nevertheless be reached, as the critical
elements of misappropriation or conversion, as previously discussed, are absent in the case at bar.

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion so that conviction becomes the
only logical and inevitable conclusion. 42 What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral
certainty.43 In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Based on the foregoing, it would then be
unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.

Notwithstanding the above, however, petitioner is not entirely free from any liability towards complainants. The rule is that
an accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so
warrant.44 However, since there is a separate civil action instituted by complainants, this Court deems it proper for the civil
aspect of the case at bar to be resolved therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24906, dated
February 27, 2004, and its Resolution dated September 22, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Wilma
Tabaniag is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, without prejudice, however, to the recovery of civil liability in Civil Case
No. 63131, before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 268, Pasig City.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 165411               June 18, 2009

WILMA TABANIAG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden

Essentially, the issue is whether John Dy is liable for estafa and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

First, is petitioner guilty of estafa?

Mainly, petitioner contends that the checks were ineffectively issued. He stresses that not only were the checks blank, but
also that W.L. Foods' accountant had no authority to fill the amounts. Dy also claims failure of consideration to negate any
obligation to W.L. Foods. Ultimately, petitioner denies having deceived Lim inasmuch as only the two checks bounced
since he began dealing with him. He maintains that it was his long established business relationship with Lim that enabled
him to obtain the goods, and not the checks issued in payment for them. Petitioner renounces personal liability on the
checks since he was absent when the goods were delivered.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, avers that the delivery of the checks by Dy's driver to Maraca,
constituted valid issuance. The OSG sustains Ong's prima facie authority to fill the checks based on the value of goods
taken. It observes that nothing in the records showed that W.L. Foods' accountant filled up the checks in violation of Dy's
instructions or their previous agreement. Finally, the OSG challenges the present petition as an inappropriate remedy to
review the factual findings of the trial court.
We find that the petition is partly meritorious.

Before an accused can be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885,12 the following elements must concur: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) damage to the payee thereof.13 These elements are present in the instant case.

Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law14 defines "issue" as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to
a person who takes it as a holder. Significantly, delivery is the final act essential to the negotiability of an instrument.
Delivery denotes physical transfer of the instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to convey title to the
payee and recognize him as a holder. 15 It means more than handing over to another; it imports such transfer of the
instrument to another as to enable the latter to hold it for himself.16

In this case, even if the checks were given to W.L. Foods in blank, this alone did not make its issuance invalid. When the
checks were delivered to Lim, through his employee, he became a holder with prima facie authority to fill the blanks. This
was, in fact, accomplished by Lim's accountant.

The pertinent provisions of Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law are instructive:

SEC. 14. Blanks; when may be filled.-Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in
possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a
signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be
converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount.
…. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the law merely requires that the instrument be in the possession of a person other than the drawer or maker. From
such possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material particular, the law presumes agency to
fill up the blanks.17 Because of this, the burden of proving want of authority or that the authority granted was exceeded, is
placed on the person questioning such authority. 18 Petitioner failed to fulfill this requirement.

Next, petitioner claims failure of consideration. Nevertheless, in a letter 19 dated November 10, 1992, he expressed
willingness to pay W.L. Foods, or to replace the dishonored checks. This was a clear acknowledgment of receipt of the
goods, which gave rise to his duty to maintain or deposit sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks.

More significantly, we are not swayed by petitioner's arguments that the single incident of dishonor and his absence when
the checks were delivered belie fraud. Indeed damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.20 Deceit as an element of estafa is a specie of fraud. It is actual
fraud which consists in any misrepresentation or contrivance where a person deludes another, to his hurt. There is deceit
when one is misled -- by guile, trickery or by other means -- to believe as true what is really false. 21

Prima facie evidence of deceit was established against petitioner with regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615 which was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The letter22 of petitioner's counsel dated November 10, 1992 shows beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner received notice of the dishonor of the said check for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner,
however, failed to deposit the amounts necessary to cover his check within three banking days from receipt of the notice
of dishonor. Hence, as provided for by law,23 the presence of deceit was sufficiently proven.

Petitioner failed to overcome the said proof of deceit. The trial court found no pre-existing obligation between the parties.
The existence of prior transactions between Lim and Dy alone did not rule out deceit because each transaction was
separate, and had a different consideration from the others. Even as petitioner was absent when the goods were
delivered, by the principle of agency, delivery of the checks by his driver was deemed as his act as the employer. The
evidence shows that as a matter of course, Dy, or his employee, would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or check upon pick
up of the stocks of snack foods at the latter's branch or main office. Despite their two-year standing business relations
prior to the issuance of the subject check, W.L Foods employees would not have parted with the stocks were it not for the
simultaneous delivery of the check issued by petitioner.24 Aside from the existing business relations between petitioner
and W.L. Foods, the primary inducement for the latter to part with its stocks of snack foods was the issuance of the check
in payment of the value of the said stocks.

In a number of cases,25 the Court has considered good faith as a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check.
This good faith may be manifested by making arrangements for payment with the creditor and exerting best efforts to
make good the value of the checks. In the instant case petitioner presented no proof of good faith. Noticeably absent from
the records is sufficient proof of sincere and best efforts on the part of petitioner for the payment of the value of the check
that would constitute good faith and negate deceit.
With the foregoing circumstances established, we find petitioner guilty of estafa with regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615
for P226,794.36.

The same, however, does not hold true with respect to FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60. This check was
dishonored for the reason that it was drawn against uncollected deposit. Petitioner had P160,659.39 in his savings deposit
account ledger as of July 22, 1992. We disagree with the conclusion of the RTC that since the balance included a regional
clearing check worth P55,000 deposited on July 20, 1992, which cleared only five (5) days later, then petitioner had
inadequate funds in this instance. Since petitioner technically and retroactively had sufficient funds at the time Check No.
553602 was presented for payment then the second element (insufficiency of funds to cover the check) of the crime is
absent. Also there is no prima facie evidence of deceit in this instance because the check was not dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds. Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds. The prima facie presumption of deceit
arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Notably, the law speaks of insufficiency
of funds but not of uncollected deposits. Jurisprudence teaches that criminal laws are strictly construed against the
Government and liberally in favor of the accused.26 Hence, in the instant case, the law cannot be interpreted or applied in
such a way as to expand its provision to encompass the situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law
more onerous on the part of the accused.

Clearly, the estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a check is
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected deposit.27 Corollarily,
the issuer of the check is not liable for estafa if the remaining balance and the uncollected deposit, which was duly
collected, could satisfy the amount of the check when presented for payment.

Second, did petitioner violate B.P. Blg. 22?

Petitioner argues that the blank checks were not valid orders for the bank to pay the holder of such checks. He reiterates
lack of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds and reasons that the checks could not have been issued to apply on
account or for value as he did not obtain delivery of the goods.

The OSG maintains that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It cites pieces of evidence that
point to Dy's culpability: Maraca's acknowledgment that the checks were issued to W.L. Foods as consideration for the
snacks; Lim's testimony proving that Dy received a copy of the demand letter; the bank manager's confirmation that
petitioner had insufficient balance to cover the checks; and Dy's failure to settle his obligation within five (5) days from
dishonor of the checks.

Once again, we find the petition to be meritorious in part.

The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 28 The case at bar satisfies all
these elements.

During the joint pre-trial conference of this case, Dy admitted that he issued the checks, and that the signatures appearing
on them were his.29 The facts reveal that the checks were issued in blank because of the uncertainty of the volume of
products to be retrieved, the discount that can be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders. Nevertheless, we must
stress that what the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating thereto.30 If inquiry into the reason for which the checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions of their issuance is required, the public's faith in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes will certainly erode.31

Moreover, the gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum.
The only valid query, then, is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so
much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.32 Indeed, non-fulfillment of the obligation is immaterial. Thus,
petitioner's defense of failure of consideration must likewise fall. This is especially so since as stated above, Dy has
acknowledged receipt of the goods.

On the second element, petitioner disputes notice of insufficiency of funds on the basis of the check being issued in blank.
He relies on Dingle v. Intermediate Appellate Court33 and Lao v. Court of Appeals 34 as his authorities. In both actions,
however, the accused were co-signatories, who were neither apprised of the particular transactions on which the blank
checks were issued, nor given notice of their dishonor. In the latter case, Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the
corporation.35 Lao was only a minor employee who had nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of
checks.36 In contrast, petitioner was the proprietor of Dyna Marketing and the sole signatory of the checks who received
notice of their dishonor.

Significantly, under Section 237 of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner was prima facie presumed to know of the inadequacy of his
funds with the bank when he did not pay the value of the goods or make arrangements for their payment in full within five
(5) banking days upon notice. His letter dated November 10, 1992 to Lim fortified such presumption.

Undoubtedly, Dy violated B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553615. When said check was dishonored for
insufficient funds and stop payment order, petitioner did not pay or make arrangements with the bank for its payment in
full within five (5) banking days.

Petitioner should be exonerated, however, for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553602, which was dishonored for the reason
DAUD or drawn against uncollected deposit. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank
because the check deposit made by petitioner, which would make petitioner's bank account balance more than enough to
cover the face value of the subject check, had not been collected by the bank.

In Tan v. People,38 this Court acquitted the petitioner therein who was indicted under B.P. Blg. 22, upon a check which
was dishonored for the reason DAUD, among others. We observed that:

In the second place, even without relying on the credit line, petitioner's bank account covered the check she
issued because even though there were some deposits that were still uncollected the deposits became "good"
and the bank certified that the check was "funded." 39

To be liable under Section 140 of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

In the instant case, even though the check which petitioner deposited on July 20, 1992 became good only five (5) days
later, he was considered by the bank to retroactively have had P160,659.39 in his account on July 22, 1992. This was
more than enough to cover the check he issued to respondent in the amount of P106,579.60. Under the circumstance
obtaining in this case, we find the petitioner had issued the check, with full ability to abide by his commitment 41 to pay his
purchases.

Significantly, like Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, B.P. Blg. 22 also speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does
not treat of uncollected deposits. To repeat, we cannot interpret the law in such a way as to expand its provision to
encompass the situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the part of the accused.
Again, criminal statutes are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused. 42

As regards petitioner's civil liability, this Court has previously ruled that an accused may be held civilly liable where the
facts established by the evidence so warrant.43 The rationale for this is simple. The criminal and civil liabilities of an
accused are separate and distinct from each other. One is meant to punish the offender while the other is intended to
repair the damage suffered by the aggrieved party. So, for the purpose of indemnifying the latter, the offense need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of evidence. 44

We therefore sustain the appellate court's award of damages to W.L. Foods in the total amount of P333,373.96,
representing the sum of the checks petitioner issued for goods admittedly delivered to his company.

As to the appropriate penalty, petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 81845 (P.D. No. 818).

Under Section 146 of P.D. No. 818, if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty of reclusión temporal is
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000 but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty
(30) years, which shall be termed reclusión perpetua.47 Reclusión perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense,
but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. John Dy is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711
for estafa, and Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, but he is ORDERED to pay W.L. Foods the
amount of P106,579.60 for goods delivered to his company.

In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713 for estafa, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30)
years of reclusión perpetua, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, and
John Dy is hereby sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment and ordered to indemnify W.L. Foods in the amount
of P226,794.36.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158312             November 14, 2008

JOHN DY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

We hold the petition to be meritorious in part.

Anent the issue of whether or not co-petitioner Basilio Ambito’s conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562 for the
seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was in accordance with law, petitioners argue that he cannot be convicted of
the same since the prosecution allegedly failed to prove the dispensable elements of prior notice of dishonor and demand
for payment of the checks at issue.19 Furthermore, they insist that there is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22, particularly in
Criminal Case Nos. 14556, 14557 and 14558 as the subject checks therein were presented for payment more than ninety
(90) days from date.20

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners’ claim of necessary and indispensable
elements of notice of dishonor and demand to pay cannot be found in the statute defining the essential elements of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The OSG further insists that, from among the said essential elements, there is no particular
manner prescribed in which the person who made and issued the dishonored checks should be notified of the fact of
dishonor.

Be that as it may, the OSG avers that as far as the checks subject of the charges of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in these
criminal cases are concerned, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito had been more than sufficiently notified of the fact of dishonor
because on December 28, 1979, Pacific Star, Inc. (PSI) filed with Branch 2 of the RTC of Manila a civil complaint for
collection against petitioners, or more than three (3) years before the thirty-two (32) Informations for violations of B.P. Blg.
22 and for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against petitioners on May 10, 1982. Within
that three-year span of time, the OSG points out, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito failed to pay the value of the checks despite
having been notified of their dishonor. 21

As to petitioners’ contention that the prosecution was not able to prove the indispensable element that the drawer had
knowledge that the checks were not backed up by sufficient funds since the checks subject of Criminal Case Nos. 14556,
14557 and 14558 were presented for payment more than ninety (90) days from date, the OSG claims that the said
element had been clearly established by the petitioners’ testimony in the lower court where petitioners contend that the
subject checks were issued only as mere guarantee and, as such, were not supposed to be deposited as previously
agreed by PSI and petitioners. 22 In any case, the OSG argues that under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, the maker’s knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. 23

After carefully reviewing the records and the submissions of the parties, we find that the prosecution’s evidence was
inadequate to prove co-petitioner Basilio Ambito’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for seven (7) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.

The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for
value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.24

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.25 Thus, the mere act of issuing a worthless check – whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as
evidence of pre-existing debt – is malum prohibitum. 26
In light of the foregoing, petitioners’ contention in the lower court that the subject checks were only issued as mere
guarantee and were not intended for deposit as per agreement with PSI is not tenable. Co-petitioner Basilio Ambito would
be liable under B.P. Blg. 22 by the mere fact that he issued the subject checks, provided that the other elements of the
crime are properly proved.

With regard to the second element, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. A disputable
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is assumed from the act of making, drawing,
and issuing a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90
days from the date of issue. However, such presumption does not arise when the maker or drawer pays or makes
arrangements for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been
dishonored. In order for the maker or drawer to pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the
period prescribed by law, it is therefore necessary and indispensable for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor
of the check.

Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that was subsequently
dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or
she failed, within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or
to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper. 27

The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the
accused. The accused has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness require – that the notice of dishonor
be actually sent to and received by the same to afford him/her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. 28

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was given any notice
of dishonor by PSI or by Manila Bank, the drawee bank, when the subject checks were dishonored for insufficiency of
funds upon presentment for payment. In fact, all that the OSG can aver regarding this matter is that co-petitioner Basilio
Ambito had been notified of the fact of dishonor since PSI filed a collection case against petitioners more than three (3)
years before the same filed the criminal cases before this Court.29

Likewise, respondent CA merely cited, in its assailed Decision, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito’s July 17, 1989 trial court
testimony as basis for concluding that he was properly informed of the dishonor of the subject checks, viz:

Appellant Basilio’s claim that he was never notified of the dishonor of the checks he issued in partial payments of the
purchases Kazette Enterprises made from PSI is belied by his own admission made when he testified in the Court a quo
thus:

xxx

Q Inspite of you agreement they deposited and when presented they bounce?

A That was in the receipts.

Q So you admit you have presented these checks already marked as Exhibit ‘A’ for the prosecution for criminal cases
Nos. 14556 to 14562, inclusive, were all returned for insufficiency of funds by the depository bank?

A Yes, sir. (t.s.n., Ambito, page 35, July 17, 1989)

Nothwithstanding his notice of the dishonor of the checks, Appellant failed to replace the same with cash or make
arrangements with PSI, for the payments of the amounts of the checks.30

Verily, the aforementioned circumstances are not in accord with the manner or form by which a notice of dishonor should
be made under the law and existing jurisprudence.

The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the check, or the
offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail. The notice of dishonor to the maker of a check must be in
writing.31

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such
fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay would
appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court has previously held that both the spirit and letter of the
Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that
is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule
is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 32

There being no proof that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was given any written notice either by PSI or by Manila Bank
informing him of the fact that his checks were dishonored and giving him five (5) banking days within which to make
arrangements for payment of the said checks, the rebuttable presumption that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his
funds has no application in the present case.

Due to the failure of prosecution in this case to prove that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was given the requisite notice of
dishonor and the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, We cannot with moral
certainty convict him of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

However, Basilio Ambito’s acquittal for his violations of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt did not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. In a
number of similar cases,33 we have held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court’s
directive for Basilio Ambito to indemnify PSI the total sum of ₱173,480.55, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12%
per annum from the date of filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid, and to pay the costs is affirmed.

Anent the question of whether or not petitioner spouses Liberata and Basilio Ambito’s conviction for the offense of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioners interposed the
defense that they cannot be properly convicted of the same as there was no finding of false narration of facts and of
deceit.

Petitioners assert that PSI was not deceived by the issuance of the subject credit certificates of time deposit (CCTDs),
which did not contain a false narration of facts, for the reasons that: (i) said CCTDs, which were undated as to their
respective dates of issuance, did not state that funds had already been deposited by PSI; (ii) during the course of their
alleged fourteen-year long business relationship, PSI, which had been accepting said CCTDs, knew that they were
unfunded as said certificates of time deposit were issued to serve as "promissory notes" to guarantee payment for the
balance of the invoice price of the machineries;34 (iii) petitioners did not represent to PSI that "the money was already
deposited" because the subject CCTDs were "even postdated";35 (iv) the amounts stated in the CCTDs were not
"downpayments" but "CREDIT extended to petitioner Basilio Ambito payable six months after the sales/purchases were
made;36 (v) petitioners’ obligation is civil in nature because current and savings deposits constitute loans to a bank and,
thus, a CCTD is an evidence of a simple loan; 37 (vi) the essential element of fraud was absent because PSI knew that the
CCTDs issued to it by petitioners were not covered by funds because it knew that the deposits were yet to be made when
the farmers, to whom Basilio Ambito resold on credit the machineries, shall have deposited in the rural banks their
payments for those machineries;38 (vii) the subject certificates of time deposit issued to PSI were not ordinary certificates
of time deposit but "CREDIT certificates of Time Deposit" because the term "credit" indicates a "deferred or delayed
nature of the payment," thus, signifying a promise to pay at a future date; 39 (viii) PSI was not defrauded as it gave
discounts in its sales invoices if petitioners paid in full the value of the certificates "on or before 180 days" from delivery.
By giving discounts for early payment, it was thus aware of the possibility that said certificates might not be funded when
they fell due;40 (ix) the sales invoices issued by PSI gave it the right to institute civil actions only and not criminal
actions;41 and (x) petitioners had already performed their obligations to PSI by way of the payment of the amount of
₱300,000.00 and the return of one unit Kubota machinery valued at ₱ 28,000.00. 42

We are not persuaded. We find no reason to disturb the identical findings of the CA and the RTC regarding the particular
circumstances surrounding the petitioners’ conviction of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents because
the same are adequately supported by the evidence on record.

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of
the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion.43

The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the following – (a)
that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. (c) That the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part
with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d) That as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.44
In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,45 it is indispensable that the element of deceit,
consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously
with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.

The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it
being essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces
the offended party to part with his money. In the absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however
fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision. 46

In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the unpaid
balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners’ banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI)
and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI
and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to
the purchase cost of the machineries and equipment that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as evidenced by
the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not apply for and secure loans from RBBI
and RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-petitioner Basilio Ambito were engaged in a vendor-purchaser business relationship while
PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as depositor-depository. It is likewise established that petitioners employed deceit
when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through down
payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in PSI’s name
with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made any deposits in the said Banks under the name of
PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator
appointed by the Central Bank of the Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her
testimony during the trial. 47

As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners’ representations were outright distortions of the
truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito
machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of
PSI, as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the machineries.
PSI was an innocent victim of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which resulted in its pecuniary
damage and, thus, confirming the lower courts’ finding that petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents.

The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by petitioners is proper because,
whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC48 as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex
crime is formed by the two crimes.

Under Article 48 of the RPC,49 a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies
that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other
(or others). Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act;
or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others). 50

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing Estafa, because before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of Estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit the estafa.51

In the case before us, the issuance by petitioners of CCTDs which reflected amounts that were never deposited as such
in either RBBI or RBLI is Falsification under Articles 17152 and 17253 of the RPC. The particular criminal undertaking
consisted of petitioners, taking advantage of their position as owners of RBBI and RBLI, making untruthful
statements/representations with regard to the existence of time deposits in favor of PSI by issuing the subject CCTDs
without putting up the corresponding deposits in said banks.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC,54 the elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful
narration of facts are: (1) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) the offender
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false;
and (4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person. 55

As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or purchasing various
machinery and equipment from PSI amounts to the criminal offense of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.56 The
petitioners falsified the subject CCTDs, which are commercial documents, to defraud PSI. Since the falsification of the
CCTDs was the necessary means for the commission of Estafa, the assailed judgment of the appeals court convicting
petitioners of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents is correct.

Quite apart from the prosecution’s successful discharge of its burden of proof, we find that the accused failed to discharge
their burden to prove their defense. To begin with, there appears to be no proof on record of the alleged 14-year financial
arrangement between accused and PSI or the purported "consignment only" agreement between them other than the
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused. Moreover, we uphold the findings of the CA and the court a
quo as to the proper characterization of the CCTDs and the lack of credible, independent evidence of the alleged payment
of the accused’s obligations to PSI.

Finally, with respect to co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s ruling that he is liable for
only the crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents in connection with CCTD Nos. 039 and 040 of RBLI, there being
no showing that the said CCTDs were used to purchase farm implements from PSI. 57

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 29, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with respect to petitioner spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito’s
conviction for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents (in Criminal Case Nos. 14563 to 14585) and with
respect to co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito’s conviction for Falsification of Commercial Documents (in Criminal Case Nos.
14586 and 14587). However, the aforesaid Decision is REVERSED with respect to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito’s
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562), who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the portion of the said Decision insofar as it
directs Basilio Ambito to indemnify Pacific Star, Inc. the total sum of ₱173,480.55, with interest thereon at the legal rate of
12% per annum from the date of filing of the Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid, and to pay the costs (also in
Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562) is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 127327               February 13, 2009

LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO AMBITO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-
84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the
essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the
residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur
that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and
had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience
suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the
transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner
and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second,
he further argues that it does not follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs,
the transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no competent
proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the
subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. 14 The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. 15 It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.16

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was properly laid in the RTC
of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took
place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence17 from the Bureau of Customs.
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that
the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.18

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction happened in
Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests
that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila
does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from
going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case
at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite
City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks
issued by petitioner’s late wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila
or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive
and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason
is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. 19 It is to be pointed out that
the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 20 In
the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place
in Cavite City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84
was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing
delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact
remains that there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no competent
evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt 21 executed by petitioner is very
clear evidence that he received the ring in question. Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and merely
executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation of what he executed and signed.
The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions
have been fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed 22 Thus, it is presumed that
one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner
understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome
these presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the
receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It
is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant
in Cavite City.

Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter
testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March 1984. 24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding
the same occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner
respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished
by novation. The personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that complainant executed Affidavits of
Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the
rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of said
ring and his claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely to
preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said
case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their
good relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the novation rule
in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation 25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner
that the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to
complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the cases
against petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him
were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the
properties he received were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein. 26 In particular, he said that
petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as
payment.27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal
cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it
rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court of Appeals did
not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take place, four
essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a
new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No.
136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks issued as
payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear
that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring that could have extinguished his old
obligation and brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1)
the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or
property.28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond (men’s ring),
valued at ₱200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his own benefit and even
denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the
proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004
dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 170298              June 26, 2007

MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The petition is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the felony are as follows:

1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.

2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.

3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means.

4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 36

In People v. Balasa,37 this Court explained that fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise,
trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. The
false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. 38

The prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the felony and that the
petitioner, Tulalian and Bartolata conspired to commit the crime charged. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of
guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not required by the law to convict of any crime charged but moral certainty is required
and this certainty is required to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 39 The reasonable doubt
should necessarily pertain to the facts constituted by the crime charged. Surmises and conjectures have no place in a
judicial inquiry and thus are shunned in criminal prosecution. For the accused to be acquitted on reasonable doubt, it must
arise from the evidence adduced or from lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt is not such a doubt as any man may start
questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts, for it is always possible
to question any conclusion derived from the evidence on record. Reasonable doubt is the state of the case which after a
calibration and assessment of the totality of the evidence of the prosecution leaves the mind of the judge in that condition
that he cannot say that there is a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.40

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence as shown by the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the felony. An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused, by their collective
acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another so as to complete it with a view
to the attainment of the same objective, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. 41 Mere
knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to
constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.42 Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 43 Where conspiracy is
shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual becomes secondary. The act of one becomes the
act of all.44

In this case, the prosecution was burdened to prove the charge of estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-5020. The prosecution
was burdened to prove that: (a) the petitioner in concert with Tulalian deceived the private complainant into granting them
a loan of ₱3,000,000 and delivering to them the said amount on their representations and assurances that: (1) they would
use the said amount to secure the US$2,000,000 loan from abroad, and this, in turn, would be used to pay the loan as
well as the purchase price of ₱22,000,000 for the Bel-Air property; (2) the petitioner was the exclusive owner of the
Binangonan property which they mortgaged to the private complainant to secure the payment of the said loan; (3) the
three checks drawn and issued by Tulalian and Bartolata to the private complainant to secure the obligations were drawn
against insufficient funds in the drawee bank when presented for payment; (b) the private complainant later discovered
that: (1) they did not have the slightest intention of paying the said loan of ₱3,000,000; (2) the three checks were not
covered by sufficient funds and were in fact all dishonored by the drawee bank on the said ground when presented for
payment; and (3) the petitioner was not the exclusive owner of the Binangonan property but was merely a co-owner with
his brothers Romulo and Jaime Alcantara.

The prosecution failed to discharge its burden.

First. As gleaned from the deed of conditional sale,45 Tulalian alone received the proceeds of the ₱3,000,000 loan from
Carlita. He then obliged himself to pay the said loan within sixty days from date thereof, to purchase Carlita’s Bel-Air
property for ₱22,000,000, and to pay for the same from the proceeds of Tulalian’s US$2,000,000 loan from abroad:

2. That the Sales price agreed upon between the parties, VENDOR and VENDEE, is TWENTY-TWO MILLION PESOS
(₱22,000,000.00).

6. That Party of the Second Part shall proceed with his mission abroad to release his approved loans within a period of
sixty days and that the Party of the First Part to facilitate and enable the Party of the Second Part to obtain and secure the
release of loan from abroad, the proceeds of which shall be applied for the payment of the total cost of sale of the
property, shall grant him a loan in the amount of THREE MILLION PESOS (₱3,000,000.00) with interest of 10% per
month which shall be added to the total cost of sale to defray his expenses;46

Second. Under the deed of assignment of title of real property, the petitioner merely guaranteed the payment of Tulalian’s
loan and used his Binangonan property as collateral to answer for the loan. The private complainant executed the deed of
conditional sale with Tulalian and the petitioner. Thus, she knew that it was Tulalian who had an approved loan from
Singapore, and that it was he who needed ₱3,000,000 for expenses to cause the release of the US$2,000,000 loan from
Singapore.

The petitioner had nothing to do with Tulalian’s prospective loan transaction in Singapore.1âwphi1 In fact, only Tulalian
and Bartolata went to Singapore to follow up the release of the proceeds of the approved loan, while the petitioner
remained in the Philippines.

Third. Only Tulalian and Bartolata drew and issued ICB Check Nos. 07034049 to 07034051. 47 There is no evidence on
record that the petitioner assured the private complainant that the three checks would be honored by the drawee bank
when presented by her for payment.

Fourth. The petitioner did assure the private complainant and represent to her that he was the sole owner of the property
covered by OCT No. M-5410. The correctness and validity of the representation is evidenced by the said title, where it
appears that the petitioner is the sole owner of the property. The names of the brothers of the petitioner, Jaime and
Romulo Alcantara, do not appear in the said title as co-owners thereof. Parenthetically, the private complainant has only
herself to blame when she agreed to the arrangement that the petitioner use his property as collateral to guarantee the
payment of Tulalian’s loan. She should have rejected the proposal outright. This is so because as gleaned on the face of
OCT No. M-5410, the said title was issued based on a free patent granted on December 21, 1988. Thus, the said property
could not be encumbered within a period of five years from the date of the said patent except in favor of the government,
its branches, units or institutions:

To All Whom These Presents Shall Come, Greetings:

RICARDO A. ALCANTARA, Filipino, of legal age, married to TERESITA BARRETTO and a resident of 155 Haeg Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila possessing all the qualifications and having fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements of Republic Acts Nos. 782 and 3872, Chapter VII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 223 is hereby granted this Free Patent for the land situated in Macamot, Binangonan, Rizal with an area
of FIFTY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED sq.m., more particularly bounded and described at the back hereof subject,
however, to the provisions of Sections 118 which provide, among others, that except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units, or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to encumbrance
for a period of five (5) years from date of this patent, 119, 121 as amended by P.D. No. 763, 122 and 124 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and P.D. No. 1198; to all public easements and servitudes prescribed in
Sections 109, 110, 111, 112 as amended by P.D. No. 1361, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;
and to the right of government to administer and protect the timber found thereon for a term of five (5) years from the date
of issuance of the patent, provided, however, that the grantee or his heirs may cut and utilize such timber as may be
needed for his or their personal use.48

As such, the deed of assignment of title of real property executed by the petitioner in favor of the private complainant as
collateral for Tulalian’s loan is null and void.49

Fifth. The allegations of the petitioner in his answer in Civil Case No. 549-B and in his waiver dated June 4, 1991
appended to the complaint in the said case, that he and his brothers Jaime and Romulo Alcantara were co-owners of the
property, are false. His claims are belied by the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 549-B that the sole vendee and
owner under the deed of absolute sale executed by Juana Aramil over the said property was the petitioner, thus:
The Court, likewise, finds that the complaint of Giovani Diestro which alleged that the portion of the land covered by OCT
No. 5430, containing an area of 15,326 square meters belongs to him by virtue of a deed of sale in his favor and now
under Tax Declaration No. 15-0716 is baseless. The records show that the Deed of Absolute Sale by Juana Aramil in
favor of Ricardo Alcantara, Romulo Alcantara and Jaime Alcantara consists of three parcels of land – the first parcel
containing an area of 20,576 square meters located at Macamot, Binangonan, Rizal and covered by Tax Declaration No.
15-0179. In Tax Declaration No. 15-0719, it is shown that the area in Tax Declaration No. 15-0570 is 20,576 less the area
of 5,144 square meters sold to Diestro and the remaining portion is 15,432 square meters. At the back, it is stated that this
tax declaration, (15-0719) cancels Tax No. 15-0569 and begins with the year 1988. The tax declaration in the name of
Giovani Diestro with regard to the 5,144 square-meter land sold to him by Romulo Alcantara, his father-in-law is in Tax
Declaration No. 15-0718. So the land with an area of 5,144 sold to Giovani Diestro is separate and distinct from the land
covered by OCT No. 5410 in the name of Ricardo Alcantara, married to Teresita Barretto. Plaintiff is liable for damages. 50

The Court is convinced that the petitioner made the said allegations in his Answer in Civil Case No. 549-B dated October
1, 1991 and in his Waiver dated June 4, 1991 long after he executed the deed of assignment of title of real property in
favor of the private complainant on November 5, 1990. This was done to fend off the prospective foreclosure of the said
mortgage by the private complainant upon Tulalian’s failure to pay the loan. In fine, the petitioner’s false allegations in his
answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 549-B and in his waiver were not used to induce the private complainant to
grant the ₱3,000,000 loan to Tulalian. The petitioner made the allegations long after the private complainant had parted
with her ₱3,000,000 and had given the same to Tulalian.

Sixth. The mere fact that the petitioner was an officer of Junior Express, Inc., that he agreed to use his property as
collateral to guarantee Tulalian’s loan, and that he was in the company of Tulalian when they transacted with the private
complainant in her boutique do not prove the existence of conspiracy to commit estafa against her.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the
petitioner of estafa under Criminal Case No. 92-5020 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ricardo Alcantara is
acquitted of the said charge. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147259               November 24, 2003

RICARDO ALCANTARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the petitioner has not made
any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the
amount of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
cases.13

This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency
of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained
pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 14 that the possible
single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed
instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining
party, without traversing the prohibition against forum shopping.15 Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP
Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly
instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other. 16

The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused
and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature
—produced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly
instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code. 17

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on
reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the
BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the question that arises is
whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s
action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were
dismissed?

Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of
the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her
BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.18

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil
action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing
of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed
is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the
BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for
failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP
Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. 19

Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient,
and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective. 20

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover
from respondents the ₱600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of Claim
involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin
Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an
unreasonable length of time.21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected
to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22
proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when
he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action
deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would
have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks.
Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure
to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability
of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to
digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 22 But this rule admits of
exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in
court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law.23 Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.

It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar. 24 Further, lawyers in the government service
are expected to be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.25 Apparently, the public
prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases,
the only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the
dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the
respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case
No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven
true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as
they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against
petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party
has no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.26

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which
will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of
justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities. 27 For reasons of substantial justice
and equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and
Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 174238               July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the

Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v.
Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:
 xxx

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on
account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity
which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime
(Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a
penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair
of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).

xxx

Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of
money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private
party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable
to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the
payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22.
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees
shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. 18

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00
on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply
that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made
to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the
rules of procedure,20 except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such
retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.21

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right, because the
new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth
be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making
or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.22

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in
accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks
to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in
the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2
(a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on
November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia
Dynamic Electrix Corporation, 23 thus:

xxx

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil
action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The
Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x
 (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but
because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket
fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22
cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for
actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes,
upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is
also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which
means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for
the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-
consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate
action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar. 24

The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez 25 to give due course to the civil action of Chan
independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a
prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court
has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of
BP 22,26 the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-
interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or
may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, 27 as DMPI Employees has
allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the
reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of
BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action

on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing
of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is
necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of
the third becomes nil.28
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis
pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case
No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00
payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the
reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would
necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis
pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 157547               February 23, 2011

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

We sustain the petitioner's conviction.

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by the place where the elements of
making, issuing, or drawing of the check and delivery thereof are committed. Thus, as explained in People
vs. Yabut, 29 "[t]he theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where
the offense was in part committed. . . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or
determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation."

In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were delivered by the petitioner to their residence
in Gumaca, Quezon.

It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. Indeed, the
trial court has the advantage of hearing the witness and observing his conduct during trial, circumstances which carry a
great weight in appreciating his credibility. 30 We see no oversight on the part of the trial court in giving credence to the
testimony of Maria Negro. Besides, we have repeatedly ruled that the testimony of a lone witness, when credible and
trustworthy, is sufficient to convict. 31

Besides, it is not without convincing reason to believe that delivery of the checks was in fact made at Gumaca, Quezon, it
being the place of business of the late Manuel Trivinio and from where the animal feeds were delivered. Consequently,
payment should be considered effected at Gumaca, Quezon. 32

The petitioner's defense of accommodation cannot exculpate him from his wrongdoing. The case of Magno is inapplicable
to him. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In Magno,
the bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the
financier of the deposit. It was as modus operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the same
goods at the same time privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the
check thus becomes an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker
did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the
receipt of an actual account or credit for value. Also, in Magno, the payee in the former was made aware of the
insufficiency of the funds prior to the issuance of the checks.
Equally untenable is the petitioner's argument that since he issued the checks prior to 8 August 1984 as accommodation
or security, he is similarly situated with Co in the Co case. In Co, we held that the rubber checks issued prior to 8 August
1984 as a guarantee or as part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection was a valid defense in
view of Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice. In the case of the petitioner, although he issued the checks prior
to such date, they were issued in payment of his indebtedness, and not for the accommodation of the Trivinios nor
security of their indebtedness.

Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made as a favor to another, not upon a consideration received. On the other
hand, guarantee refers to a promise to answer the debt of another, in case the latter should fail to do so. 33 Neither
occurred in this case.

The petitioner's theory of accommodation is debunked by the following circumstances: (1) The checks were issued after
all deliveries were made at such time when the petitioner's obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the checks
equalled the petitioner's total obligation in the amount of P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner prepared a statement of
account, 34 where the checks issued were applied to his accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The act of the petitioner in
issuing three checks of different dates is inconsistent to his claim 35 that Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated check to
show to his creditors; and (5) After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered a property for its replacement. 36 All these
incidents verily indicate that the checks were issued as payment and for value and not for accommodation. Needless to
state, the checks failed to bear any statement "for accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the petitioner's intent.

The fact that the object of the contract, the animal feeds, was not of good quality is irrelevant in the prosecution of a case
involving B.P. Blg. 22, for the said law was enacted to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of
making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. 37

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62,
Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 117488 September 5, 1996

SANTIAGO IBASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Ma. Eliza C. Garcia has been erroneously convicted and sentenced
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Bilang 22).

Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in convicting her for violation of B.P. 22 despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She claims that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the
person or persons who issued or drew the checks. She further asserts that the penalty meted her was erroneous, harsh,
and improper.

The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, avers that private complainant positively identified petitioner as the one
who issued and signed the subject checks.13 The OSG stresses that the penalty imposed by the CA was justified under
the Revised Penal Code and prevailing jurisprudence.

The elements of the violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for
value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.14

We find the foregoing elements present in this case. Petitioner issued City Trust Check No. 057066, dated January 8,
1996, in the amount of P323,113.50 and payable to Carl Valentin, representing proceeds of his stock market investments
which she brokered. She also issued for the same purpose City Trust Check No. 057067, dated January 24, 1996, in the
amount of P146,886.50 also payable to Carl Valentin. It is undisputed that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the
checks at the time she issued it. The checks, which were deposited on the date indicated on each, were subsequently
dishonored because the account from which the money should have been drawn against was closed by petitioner.
Despite demands made on her by private complainant to pay the value of the check, petitioner failed to pay. Neither did
she make arrangements for payment in full of the checks by the bank within five banking days after notice of dishonor so
as to absolve her of any liability for issuing a bouncing check.
Quite tellingly, petitioner does not categorically deny issuing the two checks or that the signature on those checks were
hers. Neither does she deny the ownership of the account against which the checks were drawn. She merely claims that
the prosecution failed to establish that the signature appearing on the two checks were her handwriting. However, her
contentions lack persuasiveness. Private complainant unwaveringly testified that petitioner issued to him the checks.
Being the one who issued the checks, it is easy to infer that petitioner was also the one who signed them in view of the
fact that her signatures thereon match those in the confirmation slips that she prepared and issued in private
complainant’s presence. Further, while it is true that the dishonored checks are the best evidence to prove violation of
B.P. 22, the lower court is not precluded from admitting proof other than these checks themselves to prove that petitioner
indeed issued them.

Second, Section 3 of B.P. 22,15 which is in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of
the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or attached thereto,
giving the reason therefor, shall constitute prima facie proof of the making or issuance of said check, and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof. While it is true that the presumption is merely prima
facie, the accused must, nonetheless, present proof to the contrary to overcome this presumption.

On this point, both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner failed to present a well-grounded defense to exculpate her
from criminal liability. In any event, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the settled rule that the factual
findings of a trial court especially when affirmed by the appellate court are binding on the Supreme Court 16 and entitled to
utmost respect.17 We find no palpable error that would warrant a reversal of the CA’s finding of facts, particularly since
such conclusion is supported by the evidence on record, to sustain the judgment of the lower courts convicting petitioner.

In People v. Locson, 26 the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for the bank. He was
found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. We explained in
Locson that

The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of the defendant
was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and
appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the
definition of the crime of theft. 27

In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 28 a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to return to
his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable
for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained
the distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability

The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson. 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that appellant only had
the material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said case
the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft
on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the
possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the
proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third
persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has
no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even
assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in
consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him
for damages suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code: Article 1730, old).

Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of
juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. 29

However, there is need to modify now the penalty imposed in view of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, Re: Penalty for
Violation of B.P. 22,18 which provides:

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds for
Credit and for Other Purposes) imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than
one (1) year OR a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case
exceed P200,000, OR both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998; 298 SCRA 656, 664) the
Supreme Court (Second Division) per Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the
amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.
Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of
discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely,
that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to
double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G. R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000), the Supreme Court
en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the
maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that "such would best serve the ends of
criminal justice."

All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the Supreme Court on the matter
of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

xxx

Considering the circumstances in Criminal Cases Nos. 21632 and 21633, the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in
both cases is proper.

Under B.P. 22, Section 1, par. 1, the fine that may be imposed is "not less than, but not more than double, the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos." Thus, in lieu of imprisonment, petitioner
herein shall pay a fine for each violation in the amount of P200,000 in Criminal Case No. 21632,19 and another P200,000
in Criminal Case No. 21633. 20

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21239 dated October 9, 1998 is AFFIRMED with
modification. Petitioner Ma. Eliza C. Garcia is hereby ordered to pay private complainant, Carl W. Valentin, the sum of
three hundred twenty three thousand one hundred thirteen pesos and fifty centavos (P323,113.50) in Criminal Case No.
21632, and one hundred forty six thousand eight hundred eighty six pesos and fifty centavos (P146,886.50) in Criminal
Case No. 21633, by way of restitution representing the face values of the checks, plus legal interest thereon of 6 percent
per annum from the filing of the respective informations until the amount is fully paid. Petitioner is further ORDERED to
pay a fine for each violation of B.P. 22, in the amount of P200,000 in Criminal Case No. 21632, and P200,000 in Criminal
Case No. 21633, with subsidiary imprisonment in the event of nonpayment.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138197             November 27, 2002

MA. ELIZA C. GARCIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The petition is without merit.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. -- Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when
he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit or to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
Two distinct acts are punished under the above-quoted provision:

(1)The making or drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank; and

(2)The failure to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.24

In the first situation, the drawer knows of the insufficiency of funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance; while in
the second situation, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain
credit within ninety days from the date appearing on the check. The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the
time of issuance, since the drawer has neither sufficient funds in, nor credit with, the drawee bank at the time; while that
involved in the second offense is good when issued, as the drawer has sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank
when issued. In both instances, the offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or
credit.25

It can be gleaned from the allegations in the information that petitioner is charged with the first type of offense under
B.P. Blg. 22.

The elements of the first type of offense are as follows:

(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 26

Petitioner admitted that he issued the two postdated checks worth P75,000 each. He did not deny that the same were
dishonored on the ground that the account from which they were to be drawn was already closed at the time the checks
were presented for payment. Neither did he rebut the prosecution’s evidence that the account against which he drew his
two postdated checks had been closed in May 1985 yet, or more than four years prior to the drawing and delivery of the
checks.

The fact that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 is of no moment.
We held in Wong v. Court of Appeals 27 that the 90-day period is not an element of the offense but merely a condition for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; thus:

That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption
of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty
to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check
becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days.

In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,28 we ruled that such prima facie presumption is intended to facilitate proof of knowledge,
and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge; thus, the only consequence of
the failure to present the check for payment within the 90-day period is that there arises no prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds.29 The prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence.

In this case, FEDCOR presented the checks for encashment on 22 February 1990, or within the six-month period from the
date of issuance of the checks, and would not therefore have been considered stale had petitioner’s account been
existing. Although the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise, such knowledge was sufficiently
proved by the unrebutted testimony of Mirano to the effect that petitioner’s account with the Security Bank was closed as
early as May 1985, or more than four years prior to the issuance of the two checks in question.

Thus, we find no error in the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the trial court’s decision convicting petitioner of violations of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner’s alternative prayer for the modification of penalty by retroactively applying Vaca v. Court of Appeals30 and Lim
v. People31 must likewise be denied. We quote Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 clarifying Administrative Circular No.
12-2000; thus:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither
does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of
B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

In this case, when petitioner issued the subject postdated checks even though he had no more account with the drawee
bank, having closed it more than four years before he drew and delivered the checks, he manifested utter lack of good
faith or wanton bad faith. Hence, he cannot avail himself of the benefits under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.

We likewise sustain petitioner’s conviction for the crime of estafa.

The crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, has the following
elements: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.32

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be
the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of fraud. The
offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, or the
person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property had there been no check
issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party
deceived of his money or property, and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 33

The existence of the first two elements in the case at bar is not disputed. Petitioner maintains that the third element is not
present.

Damage as an element of estafa may consist in (1) the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result
of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in property right; or (3) temporary prejudice. 34

In this case, the deprivation of the property of FEDCOR is apparent.1âwphi1 Undoubtedly, the reason why FEDCOR
delivered the backhoe to petitioner was that the latter paid the P50,000 down payment and issued two postdated checks
in the amount of P75,000 each.

Petitioner’s claim that he returned the equipment was not duly proved; he never presented as witness the agent who
allegedly received the equipment from him. Moreover, he admitted that he never wrote FEDCOR about the return of the
allegedly defective backhoe to Ronnie Bote; neither did he go to FEDCOR to claim the return of the equipment or of the
cash down payment and the two checks.35 Such admissions belie his allegation that he returned the equipment to
FEDCOR. Besides, on cross-examination he admitted that during the pendency of the case, he paid Santander, through
FEDCOR’s lawyer, on two separate occasions in the total amount of P15,000 upon the advice of his own lawyer that he
had to pay because he was guilty; thus:

Q During the pendency of this case you paid Engr. Santander cash, is that correct?

A I paid the amount of P10,000.00 and then another P5,000.00 because according to my first lawyer I have to pay this
because I am guilty and this is B.P. case [sic].

Q You delivered the money to Engr. Federico Santander?

A To you Atty. Paray.

Q And I was the lawyer of Engr. Federico Santander?

A Yes, sir.36

If indeed petitioner returned the backhoe to Ronnie Bote and yet the latter did not heed his demands for the return of his
cash payment and the checks, he (petitioner) should have, at the very least, gone to or written FEDCOR itself about the
matter. Instead, he again paid FEDCOR the amount of P15,000 during the pendency of the case. Such payment to
FEDCOR negates his claim that he returned the backhoe; it may even be tantamount to an offer of compromise. Under
Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is an implied admission of
guilt.

Finally, by appealing his conviction, petitioner has thrown the whole case open for review.1âwphi1 It becomes the duty of
this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed judgment, even though it was not made the subject of
assignment of errors.37 This Court finds to be erroneous the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime of estafa, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which is seven years and four months of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and
six months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The penalty for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks has been
increased by Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on 22 October 1975. Section 1 thereof provides in part as
follows:

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case
exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua….

Petitioner NAGRAMPA defrauded FEDCOR in the amount of P135,000 (P150,000 [value of the checks] minus P15,000
[payment made by petitioner during the pendency of these cases]). Applying P.D. No. 818 and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period, plus one year for each additional
P10,000 of the amount of the fraud; and the minimum shall be prision mayor, which is the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense without first considering any modifying circumstances or the incremental penalty for the amount
of fraud in excess of P22,000.38

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-15797, Q-90-15798 and Q-90-15799 is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner Manuel Nagrampa is hereby sentenced to suffer (1) an
imprisonment of one year for each of the two counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22, and (2) an indeterminate penalty of eight
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-eight years, four months and one day of reclusion perpetua as
maximum for the crime of estafa; and to pay private complainant Fedcor Trading Corporation the amount of P135,000,
plus legal interest thereon from 9 October 1990 up to the time of full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 146211              August 6, 2002

MANUEL NAGRAMPA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
This is to enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of an offense unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information.13

From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined.17 In the case at bar, the Information alleged
that petitioner issued the questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they
were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is committed as follows:

xxxx

2(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover this check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element – false
pretenses or fraudulent acts – the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently.
Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a).

Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless
there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can
be deemed to exist. So holds the 2004 case of People v. Ojeda.14

x x x [N]otice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the R[evised] P[enal] C[ode] and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the
RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check within three days from receipt of
notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the amount of the check within five days from
receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP
22). Without proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime (whether estafa or
violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notice of dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, failure to prove it
is a ground for acquittal thereunder.

In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling in the 2003 case of Garcia v. People16 wherein this
Court upheld the appellate court’s affirmance of the trial court’s conviction of the accused for Estafa under Article 315, "Section 2(2)
[sic] of the Revised Penal Code." In that case, the accused was charged as follows:

That on or about and during the period comprised between June 20, 1995, and August 15, 1995, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said
DOLORES S. APOLONIO to the effect that accused has three (3) checks which according to her have sufficient funds and if
encashed, the same will not be dishonored; and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the
said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to accept the following checks:

Name of Bank Check No. Amount Date Payable to

Phil. Nat’l. Bank 046884 P28,000.00 6-20-‘95 Cash

- do - 047416 34,000.00 8-15-‘95 - do -

Pilipinas Bank 60042087 25,000.00 7-25-‘95 Garcia Vegetable

Dealer

as payments of assorted vegetables which accused purchased and received from said DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the amount
of P87,000.00, said accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and representations were all false and untrue as said
checks when presented to the bank for payment were all dishonored for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds," and
were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain assorted vegetables in the amount of P87,000.00; which once
in her possession and with intent to defraud, she willingly, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said assorted vegetables or the value thereof to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P87,000.00, Philippine Currency.17 (Underscoring supplied)
 The therein accused Garcia argued that since, under the above-quoted Information, she was charged of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, it was error for the appellate court to affirm her conviction by the trial court under Article
315, paragraph 2(d).

The Court in Garcia held that there is "no basis for [her] to conclude that she was convicted under Article 315, paragraph 2(d)," but
that "[e]ven supposing that the trial court apparently discussed estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), it was only pointing out the
absurdity of [Garcia’s] argument that she could not be held liable under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as she was

not the drawer of the therein involved checks." Reliance on Garcia is thus misplaced.

In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received
notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to
all but one of the checks, the prima facie  presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.

This leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it to state that petitioner’s defenses of good faith and lack of
criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her
bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the
amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total
payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by
the P76,654 Allied Bank check.

IN FINE, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner
was clearly charged, her acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. Petitioner, Goretti Ong, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decision bearing on her civil liability is AFFIRMED, however.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

G.R. No. 165275

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 23, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

G.R. No. 177438               September 24, 2012

AMADA RESTERIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of a check should
be written. If the service of the written notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer of the dishonored check is by
registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also
of the registry receipt together with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without the
authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in
court on the sending by registered mail.

The petition is meritorious.

For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Prosecution must prove the following essential elements, namely:

(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment. 7

The existence of the first element of the violation is not disputed. According to the petitioner, she was "required to issue a
check as a collateral for the obligation," and that "she was left with no alternative but to borrow the check of her friend xxx
and used the said check as a collateral of her loan."8 During her cross-examination, she stated that she did not own the
check that she drew and issued to complainant Bernardo Villadolid. 9

Yet, to avoid criminal liability, the petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was applicable only if the dishonored
check was actually owned by her; and that she could not be held liable because the check was issued as a mere
collateral of the loan and not intended to be deposited.

The petitioner’s contentions do not persuade.

What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the
actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the
drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her
incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People, 10 the Court debunked her contentions and
cogently observed:

In Lozano v. Martinez, this Court ruled that the gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes
all checks drawn against banks. The law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a
crime against public order to be abated. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, either as a deposit, as a guarantee, or
even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. 22. It is a crime classified as
malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who
has no account with a bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented for payment. As
the Court in Lozano explained:

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated –

The "check flasher" does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a
mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and
for whom the constitutional inhibition against "imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud" was intended as a shield
and not a sword.
Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction on one who draws and issues a worthless check against insufficient
funds or a closed account in the drawee bank, there is, likewise, every reason to penalize a person who indulges in the
making and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the latter’s consent, which account has been
closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee bank.11 (Bold emphases supplied)

The State likewise proved the existence of the third element. On direct examination, Villadolid declared that the check had
been dishonored upon its presentment to the drawee bank through the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) as the
collecting bank. The return check memorandum issued by BPI indicated that the account had already been closed. 12 The
petitioner did not deny or contradict the fact of dishonor.

The remaining issue is whether or not the second element, that is, the knowledge of the petitioner as the issuer of the
check that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, was existent.

To establish the existence of the second element, the State should present the giving of a written notice of the dishonor to
the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check. The rationale for this requirement is rendered in Dico v. Court of
Appeals,13 to wit:

To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish that a check was issued and that the
same was subsequently dishonored, it must further be shown that accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check
that he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment.

This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check is the second element of the
offense. Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the check which is
difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge. Said section reads:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer

pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make
arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such
notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice
was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue.
The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral
notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.14 (Bold emphases
supplied)

The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second element arising from the
presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the offender
to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment
in full of the check by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been
paid.15 The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not giving the proper notice of
dishonor. The nature of this opportunity for the accused to avoid criminal prosecution has been expounded in Lao v. Court
of Appeals:16

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator ‘a compromise by allowing him to
perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated’ xxx In
this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a
‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulate of fairness require – that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22." 17 (Bold emphases
supplied)

To prove that he had sent the written notice of dishonor to the petitioner by registered mail, Villadolid presented the
registry return receipt for the first notice of dishonor dated June 17, 2002 and the registry return receipt for the second
notice of dishonor dated July 16, 2002. However, the petitioner denied receiving the written notices of dishonor.

The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to establish the fact that written notices of
dishonor had been sent to or served on the petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the
written notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return receipts by themselves were not proof of
the service on the petitioner without being accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person or persons who had
actually mailed the written notices of dishonor, or without the testimony in court of the mailer or mailers on the fact of
mailing. The authentication by affidavit of the mailer or mailers was necessary in order for the giving of the notices of
dishonor by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of the notices of dishonor to predicate the existence
of the second element of the offense. No less would fulfill the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, for, as the
Court said in Ting v. Court of Appeals:18

Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed
from the above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove mailing, it
presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no attempt was made to show that
the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry return receipt
authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of private complainant as to who sent the
demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry return
receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that the same was actually
received by petitioners or their agents.

As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the
issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging
that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests
upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal
cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to be
made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends had existence, otherwise
the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In the instant case, the prosecution did
not present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return
receipt. In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office
and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing
as proof of service be presented, then with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is
insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit,
of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter was sent. xxx

Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners’
denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent
through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed to do.
Instead, it merely presented the demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was
equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters
(Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).

Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the
addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but
the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the addressee’s
name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort was made to
show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature
on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the
petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or
their authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable
doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the
presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.

As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000, 311 SCRA 397), "penal statutes must be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the weakness
of the evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an offense. Having failed to prove all the
elements of the offense, petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. (Bold emphases
supplied)1âwphi1
Also, that the wife of Villadolid verbally informed the petitioner that the check had bounced did not satisfy the requirement
of showing that written notices of dishonor had been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of
dishonor were not effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor must be in writing. 19 The Court
definitively ruled on the specific form of the notice of dishonor in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals: 20

Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such
fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay would
appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing
Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is
dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is
that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. (Bold emphases
supplied; italics in the original text)

In light of the foregoing, the proof of the guilt of the petitioner for a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing to
Villadolid the unfunded Chinabank Check No. LPU-A0141332 in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 did not satisfy the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. According to Section 2 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, which does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty; only a moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof that produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. This is the required quantum, firstly, because the accused is presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and, secondly, because of the inequality of the position in which the accused finds herself, with the
State being arrayed against her with its unlimited command of means, with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who
are regarded as public officers, "and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of (the accused)
engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life."21

Nonetheless, the civil liability of the petitioner in the principal sum of ₱ 50,000.00, being admitted, was established. She
was further liable for legal interest of 6% per annum on that principal sum, reckoned from the filing of the information in
the trial court. That rate of interest will increase to 12% per annum upon the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December
4, 2006, and ACQUITS petitioner AMADA RESTERIO of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as charged for failure to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BERNARDO VILLADOLID the amount of ₱ 50,000.00, representing the face
value of Chinabank Check No. LPU-A0141332, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the filing of the information until
the finality of this decision, and thereafter 12% per annum until the principal amount of₱ 50,000.00 is paid.

The Ruling of this Court

We deny the petition.

Nite was acquitted by the trial court of violation of Section 19 of BP Blg. 178 and estafa. Hence, the only issue here is
Nite’s civil liability after her acquittal.

Bancom asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the civil liability it is claiming pertains to Bancap’s and not to
Nite’s. Bancom cited Section 31 of the Corporation Code which provides:

Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. – Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent
to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members
and other persons.

Bancom insists that while the question raised is one of fact, the factual findings of the lower court, sustained by the Court
of Appeals, are based on a misapprehension of facts. Bancom alleges that since Nite actively participated in the
commission of a patently unlawful act, she is personally liable to Bancom for the amount of treasury bills undelivered by
Bancap.

We do not agree.
The general rule is that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it, or from any other legal entity that it may be related to.12 The obligations of a corporation, acting through its
directors, officers, and employees, are its own sole liabilities.13 Therefore, the corporation’s directors, officers, or
employees are generally not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation. 14

Bancom alleges that his case falls under the exception to the general rule and that Nite should be held personally liable
for Bancap’s obligation. Bancom alleges that Nite signed the Confirmation of Sale knowing that Bancap did not have the
treasury bills, and thus, sale was illegal.

Bancom’s arguments have no merit.

To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) complainant must
allege in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer
was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) complaint must clearly and convincingly prove such unlawful acts,
negligence or bad faith.15 To hold a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, and thus pierce the veil of
corporate fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly. 16

It is settled that the transaction between Bancom and Bancap is an ordinary sale. We give weight to the finding of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that Bancap’s liability arose from its contractual obligation to Bancom. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals found that Bancom and Bancap had been dealing with each other as seller and buyer of
treasury bills from December 1992 until the transaction subject of this case on 25 April 1994, which was no different from
their previous transactions. Nite, as Bancap’s President, cannot be held personally liable for Bancap’s obligation unless it
can be shown that she acted fraudulently. However, the issue of fraud had been resolved with finality when the trial court
acquitted Nite of estafa on the ground that the element of deceit is non-existent in the case. The acquittal had long
become final and the finding is conclusive on this Court. The prosecution failed to show that Nite acted in bad faith. It is no
longer open for review. Nite’s act of signing the Confirmation of Sale, by itself, does not make the corporate liability her
personal liability.

In addition, we consider the testimony of Lagrimas Nuqui, the Legal Officer in Charge of the Government Securities
Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas from 1994 to 1998, who explained that primary issues of treasury bills are
supposed to be issued only to accredited dealers but these accredited banks can sell to anyone who need not be
accredited, and such buyers, who may be corporations or individuals, are classified as the secondary market. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals found that Bancap sold the treasury bills as a secondary dealer. 17 As such, Bancap’s act of
selling securities to Bancom is at most ultra vires and not patently unlawful.

Base on the foregoing, we cannot hold Nite Personally liable for Bancap’s corporate liability.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

We grant the petition.

It is a settled rule that the remedy of appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
contemplates only errors of law and not errors of fact. 2 The issues of: (1) whether or not the subject checks were issued
for valuable consideration; and (2) whether or not the demand letter sent by Sehwani constituted the notice of dishonor
required under B.P. 22, are factual matters that belong to the proper determination of the MeTC, the RTC and the CA. But
when such courts have overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect
the result of the case, this Court may re-examine their findings of facts.3

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 4

In this case, the third element is present and had been adequately established. With respect to the first element, the Court
gives full faith and credit to the findings of the lower courts that the checks were issued for value since San Mateo herself
admitted that she drew and issued the same as payment for the yarns she ordered from ITSP. Besides, the Court has
consistently pronounced that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on
dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. 5

But the Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Section 26 of B.P. 22 creates the presumption
that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it.
This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that,
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. 7

Here, there is no basis in concluding that San Mateo knew of the insufficiency of her funds. While she may have
requested Sehwani in her letters dated October 8, 2005 and November 11, 2005, to defer depositing all the checks, with
maturity dates of July and August 2005, otherwise, her account will close, such act did not amount to an admission that,
when she issued those checks, she knew that she would have no sufficient funds in the drawee bank to pay for them. 8

Upon the other hand, the records show that Sehwani tried to serve the notice of dishonor to San Mateo two times. On the
first occasion, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo’s residence at Greenhills, San Juan which the
security guard refused to accept. Thus, the liaison officer left the letter with the security guard with the instruction to hand
it to San Mateo. But the prosecution failed to show that the letter ever reached San Mateo.

On the second occasion, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail which was returned
with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite three notices to her.

It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves
prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor.9 To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a
notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the
fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. 10

In King v. People,11 the complainant sent the accused a demand letter via registered mail. But the records showed that the
accused did not receive it. The postmaster likewise certified that the letter was returned to sender. Yet despite the clear
import of the postmaster’s certification, the prosecution did not adduce proof that the accused received the post office
notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. The Court held that it was possible that the drawee bank sent
the accused a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that the
accused actually received it. It was also possible that the accused was trying to flee from the complainant by staying in
different addresses. But speculations and possibilities cannot take the place of proof. The conviction must rest on proof
beyond reasonable doubt.12

Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of
the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise. For this reason, the Court cannot convict her with moral certainty of violation of
B.P. 22.

Nevertheless, San Mateo’s acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of her civil liability for the dishonored checks. 13 An
acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages. 14 For this reason,
the trial court’s directive for San Mateo to pay the civil liability in the amount of ₱134,275.00 representing the total value of
the 11 checks plus 12% interest per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until fully paid,
stands.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The assailed Decision dated August 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 33434 finding petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo guilty of 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Erlinda C. San Mateo is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered, however, to indemnify the complainant, ITSP International, Incorporated,
represented by its Vice-President for Operations Ravin A. Sehwani, the amount of P 134,275.00 representing the total
value of the 11 checks plus 12% interest per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 200090               March 6, 2013

ERLINDA C. SAN MATEO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

uling of the Court

We affirm the conviction.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.20 The deceit should be the efficient cause of the
defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. 21

All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued
the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the
checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would
not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva
gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved
by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of ₱995,000.00.

In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or encash the checks
only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account. Villanueva posits that the receipt the
Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody such agreement.

This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable
character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement
between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or present
the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When the
payee was informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.22

Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed
agreement.1âwphi1 The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks by listing
the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the
checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in the receipt as
an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another document with Madarang's express conformity for
Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the supposed
agreement that would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a
businesswoman23 presumably made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded checks.24 All that she is claiming
here is that the receipt did not express the true intention of the parties, implying that no written document substantiated
her alleged defense. She did not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as written.
Her self-serving statements on the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her assertions, for they were not
proof.25
Under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818, the penalty for estafa when the total value of
the checks exceed ₱22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four moths and one day to 20
years), plus one year for each additional Pl0,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be
from six years and one day to 12 years of prision mayor. In imposing the indeterminate sentence of eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, the CA correctly applied the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is well to state that reclusion perpetua merely describes in this instance the penalty
actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. 26

We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC of 12% interest accruing from the time that the
information was filed until the full satisfaction of the obligation in the amount of ₱995,000.00. Conformably with the ruling
in Nacar v. Gallery Frames27 applying Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB),
said amount should earn interest of 12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30,
2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on May 25, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION that the amount of
₱995,000.00 shall earn interest 12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30,
2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 163662               February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

At the outset, it must be stated that the petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. Petitioner’s remedy from the adverse decision
of the Court of Appeals would have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days after notice
of denial of its motion for partial reconsideration. This is the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court
of Appeals. However, instead of a petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals when it substituted the penalty of imprisonment with
a fine of ₱200,000,00 for each case.

A petition under Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own neglect or
error in the choice of remedies. And under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, an error in the choice or mode of
appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal.16

Furthermore, the instant petition lacks merit. It seeks to impose a harsher penalty upon respondent in clear violation of
Section 2 of Rule 122. Indeed, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government
may do so only if the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. Moreover, the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. 17

In People v. Leones,18 we held that while "it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error
committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an
appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the
accused against double jeopardy."19 Further, it added:

This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his conviction,
an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double
jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed. x x x

xxxx
Even assuming that the penalties imposed by the trial court were erroneous, these cannot be corrected by the Court on
appeal by the prosecution. x x x.20

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach, or the penalty may be increased is through a petition
for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner availed of this remedy, however, it failed to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.

In praying to reinstate the penalty of imprisonment, petitioner is asking this Court to re-evaluate the evidence relied upon
by the Court of Appeals vis-avis the philosophy enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim v. People in fixing the
penalty, that is, the redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.21 This cannot be done via petition
for certiorari or appeal.

There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that respondent deserves the penalty of imprisonment considering that she is a
white-collared offender who introduced into circulation several bum checks and that several cases for estafa are pending
before the trial courts. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

There is nothing in the case at bench which warrants non-application of the policy enunciated in the Vaca and Rosa Lim
cases. The interests of justice would be better served if fine rather than imprisonment is imposed on petitioner who did not
personally benefit from the transaction. A fortiori, a fine in the maximum amount of ₱200,000.00 for each case in lieu of
imprisonment would be more appropriate penalty for her, aside from being held civilly liable for the value of the checks.

As it is, petitioner has not yet been convicted of any criminal offense by final judgment. While it may be true that she has a
string of cases, nonetheless no final judgment has as yet been rendered in any of those cases. Hence, she is still entitled
to the presumption of innocence. Absent any showing of bad faith on the part of petitioner, deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment is proper. Should petitioner, however, be unable to pay the fine, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary imprisonment shall apply.22

Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals is now final and executory and can no longer be reviewed, nor be
modified by imposing harsher penalties as this would place respondent in double jeopardy.

Besides, even assuming that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the evidence and erroneously substituted the penalty
of imprisonment with a fine, these cannot be corrected on an appeal by the prosecution. Given the far-reaching scope of
private respondent’s right against double jeopardy, an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not
lie.23 Whatever error may have been committed by the Court of Appeals was merely an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. For, as long as it acted within its jurisdiction, any alleged
error committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable and may be
corrected by a timely appeal.24

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. G.R. No. 172989           
June 19, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARGARITA C. SIA, respondents.

DECISION

The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are the following: (1)
postdating or issuing checks in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the checks were issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover said checks; (3) knowledge on the part of the drawer of checks of such lack or insufficiency
of funds; and (4) damage capable of pecuniary estimation to the payee thereof. 16 Underlying all these must be the
presence of fraud or deceit.

The peculiarity of the instant case rests on the fact that the person who issued the checks is not the lawful owner of the
checking account from which the checks were drawn. Thus, at the time these checks were issued by Gulion it is a
foregone conclusion that Molina would never recover from the checks because the drawee bank would not recognize the
signature of Gulion. In other words, the dishonor of the checks will not only be on account of lack or insufficiency of funds
in Miones's account but also because the checks are invalid for having been issued by an unauthorized person. Thus,
while to an extent we agree with accused-appellant that there was no valid issuance of the said checks we hold that
accused-appellant could still be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code even if
he is not the owner of the checking account in question if it is shown that he conspired with accused-at-large by knowingly
signing the latter's checks to ensure Molina's inability to encash the said checks. Under a theory of conspiracy, it is
sufficient that the accused is possessed of guilty knowledge that his co-accused had no funds in the bank when the
checks were negotiated.17

There is thus an issue as to whether the prosecution has ably proved that accused-appellant conspired with accused-at-
large by signing the checks, knowing that those were checks of Miones and that Miones had no funds in the bank to cover
them when presented, with a view to cheat Molina of his money.

The existence of a conspiracy may be implied from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime, showing that the accused had acted under a common purpose or design.18 Like the crime itself, the conspiracy
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 19 The Court of Appeals found that apart from the signature of accused-
appellant on the checks of accused-at-large, there were sufficient indicators from the evidence of both prosecution and
defense that accused-appellant shared a personal closeness and familiarity with accused-at-large. To recapitulate:
Miones freely walked in and out of Gulion's private office room with or without securing the permission of the latter; and,
when Miones opened a checking account with FEBTC, she was recommended by Gulion. The Court of Appeals also
noted that Miones opened her FEBTC checking account on December 6, 1989, or just a few months before the checks
were issued and negotiated to Molina.

For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 20 We find that while the abovenamed circumstances establish the
friendship between the two accused and the trust that accused-appellant reposed upon accused-at-large, they are
insufficient to merit the conclusion that accused-appellant conspired with accused-at-large by affixing his signatures on
the latter's checks knowingly and with an intent to defraud Molina. A closer look at the circumstances under which the
checks were negotiated reveal that it was Miones alone who delivered the checks to Molina and received payment
therefor. There is no evidence that Miones was authorized by accused-appellant to exchange, on his behalf, the checks
for cash. There is also no evidence that accused-appellant received from Miones any portion of the proceeds of the said
checks. It is principal in a case of estafa through postdated checks that the accused must have been shown to have
obtained money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check.21 There is likewise no showing
of past instances where Molina "rediscounted" Gulion's checks through Miones; the lower courts simply and
unquestioningly accepted as fact that Miones was an authorized agent of Gulion in transacting with Molina.

In other words, the prosecution failed to show by the conduct of accused-appellant before, during and after the
commission of the crime that he was a participant to the defraudation of Molina. It certainly cannot be conclusively inferred
from proof of his friendship with accused-at-large, or from his adamant refusal to pay Molina, or to even recognize the
existence of the debt.

In contrast to the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, accused-appellant presented a fairly cohesive and logical
explanation for how his signatures figured in the questioned checks. He stated that as the proprietor of an insurance
agency, he habitually signed blank checks for agents' commissions and office bills, which his secretary then filled out with
the pertinent names of payees, dates and amounts. He signed Miones's checks while in a hurry as he had an
appointment at another town, thinking them to be the usual blank checks laid out by his secretary on his table for his
signature. His insistence that the checks were so much like his own is believable, because he also had a checking
account with FEBTC. Contrary to the RTC's observation that his story was incredible because the account number
displayed on the upper left hand corners of the checks would have readily informed him that the checks were not his, we
find that such oversight is not highly unlikely if we consider that the first six figures of his and Miones's account numbers
are the same. Following his version of the story, it is not altogether improbable that a trusted friend of his like Miones (who
was frequently in and out of his office and could have been very familiar with his work habits and schedules) took
advantage of his carelessness and stealthily placed her three blank checks on his office table with the design to obtain
money from Molina using his signature. Then Miones filled in the other details in the checks, by postdating them, making
them payable to "CASH", and even affixing her signature thereto as indorser.

Not surprisingly, the checks were dishonored upon presentment, for the reason "Account Closed and Signature Differs on
File." Accused-appellant came to know of his alleged involvement in these unpaid obligations only when Molina's lawyer
sent him a demand letter, to which his reaction was to disown owing any debts to, or having issued any checks in favor of,
Molina.

Good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check. 22 This may be manifested by the accused's offering to
make arrangements with his creditor as to the manner of payment23 or, as in the present case, averring that his placing his
signature on the questioned checks was purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that
he himself became a victim of the trickery and manipulations of accused-at-large.

We further note from the findings of the RTC that in all the previous transactions of accused-appellant with Molina, he
always made good on the checks he issued. It is also undisputed that accused-appellant himself filed a case for estafa
against Miones, respecting a check for P15,000.00 which Miones drew in favor of accused-appellant from the same
FEBTC checking account subject of this case. Obviously, accused-appellant had abandoned the trust with which he
regarded Miones as he also deemed himself defrauded by her issuance of yet another worthless check. Moreover, the
check in this other estafa case was issued by Miones on February 3, 1990, postdated to February 16, 1990, 24 or about the
same time as the checks in the instant case were issued and negotiated. Accused-appellant even testified that he
accompanied the police in arresting Miones, who fled to Butuan City. 25

We cannot fully agree with the reasoning of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that this other estafa case has no
significance to the case at bench, simply because it involves a different check. In the present case where there is no direct
proof of conspiracy between the accused, and where an implied conspiracy is sought to be proved by an evaluation of the
conduct of accused-appellant before, during, and after the commission of the crime, accused-appellant's acts of filing
estafa charges against his supposed co-conspirator, and his actively seeking her arrest and participating in the operations
that led to her arrest, cast doubt on the prosecution's theory of implied conspiracy.

Based on all the foregoing, we hold that accused-appellant cannot be held guilty for estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code because the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove his guilt.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and accused-appellant Danilo Gulion
is ACQUITTED. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless held for some other legal cause. No
costs.

G.R. No. 141183       January 18, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO GULION and MARILYN MIONES, accused.
DANILO GULION, accused-appellant

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The petition is partly meritorious.

As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts. However, there are well- recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is
when certain relevant facts were overlooked by the lower court, which facts, if properly appreciated, would justify a
different conclusion from the one reached in the assailed decision.10 Reviewing the records, we find that the lower courts
misappreciated the evidence in this case.

Suarez insists that BPI was negligent in handling his account when BPI dishonored the checks he issued to various
payees on 16 June 1997, despite the RCBC check deposit made to his account on the same day to cover the total
amount of the BPI checks.

Negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent man and
reasonable man could not do."11 The question concerning BPI's negligence, however, depends on whether BPI indeed
confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check’s face value to Suarez’s BPI account.

In essence, Suarez impresses upon this Court that BPI is estopped12 from dishonoring his checks since BPI confirmed the
same-day crediting of the RCBC check deposit and assured the adequacy of funds in his account. Suarez points out that
he relied on this confirmation for the issuance of his checks to the owners of the Tagaytay properties. In other words,
Suarez claims that BPI made a representation that he had sufficient available funds to cover the total value of his checks.

Suarez is mistaken.

Based on the records, there is no sufficient evidence to show that BPI conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting of
the RCBC check which Suarez’s client deposited late on 16 June 1997. 13 Suarez’s secretary, Garaygay, testified that she
was able to talk to a BPI male employee about the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. 14 However, Garaygay failed to
(1) identify and name the alleged BPI employee, and (2) establish that this particular male employee was authorized by
BPI either to disclose any information regarding a depositor’s bank account to a person other than the depositor over the
telephone, or to assure Garaygay that Suarez could issue checks totaling the face value of the RCBC check. Moreover, a
same-day clearing of a ₱19,129,100 check requires approval of designated bank official or officials, and not any bank
official can grant such approval. Clearly, Suarez failed to prove that BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC
check, or that BPI assured Suarez that he had sufficient available funds in his account. Accordingly, BPI was not
estopped from dishonoring the checks for inadequacy of available funds in Suarez’s account since the RCBC check
remained uncleared at that time.
While BPI had the discretion to undertake the same-day crediting of the RCBC check, 15 and disregard the banking
industry’s 3-day check clearing policy, Suarez failed to convincingly show his entitlement to such privilege. As BPI pointed
out, Suarez had no credit or bill purchase line with BPI which would qualify him to the exceptions to the 3-day check
clearing policy.161awph!1

Considering that there was no binding representation on BPI’s part as regards the same-day crediting of the RCBC check,
no negligence can be ascribed to BPI’s dishonor of the checks precisely because BPI was justified in dishonoring the
checks for lack of available funds in Suarez’s account.17

However, BPI mistakenly marked the dishonored checks with "drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF), " instead of "drawn
against uncollected deposit (DAUD)." DAUD means that the account has, on its face, sufficient funds but not yet available
to the drawer because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.18 DAIF, on the other hand, is a condition in
which a depositor’s balance is inadequate for the bank to pay a check.19 In other words, in the case of DAUD, the
depositor has, on its face, sufficient funds in his account, although it is not available yet at the time the check was drawn,
whereas in DAIF, the depositor lacks sufficient funds in his account to pay the check. Moreover, DAUD does not expose
the drawer to possible prosecution for estafa and violation of BP 22, while DAIF subjects the depositor to liability for such
offenses.20 It is clear therefore that, contrary to BPI’s contention, DAIF differs from DAUD. Now, does the erroneous
marking of DAIF, instead of DAUD, give rise to BPI’s liability for damages?

The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury — whether physical, mental or
psychological — clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) the culpable act or omission is factually established; (3) the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 221921 of the Civil Code.22

In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of
DAIF on the checks. Proximate cause has been defined as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have
occurred."23 There is nothing in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the
checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered humiliation
and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to the Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his
checks,24 not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt
feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified dishonor of the
checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence.25

While the erroneous marking of DAIF, which BPI belatedly rectified, was not the proximate cause of Suarez’s claimed
injury, the Court reminds BPI that its business is affected with public interest. It must at all times maintain a high level of
meticulousness and should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. 26 Suarez had a right to
expect such high level of care and diligence from BPI. Since BPI failed to exercise such diligence, Suarez is entitled to
nominal damages27 to vindicate Suarez’s right to such high degree of care and diligence. Thus, we award Suarez
₱75,000.00 nominal damages.

On the award of actual damages, we find the same without any basis. Considering that BPI legally dishonored the checks
for being drawn against uncollected deposit, BPI was justified in debiting the penalty charges against Suarez’s account,
pursuant to the Rules of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, 28 to wit:

Sec. 27. PENALTY CHARGES ON RETURNED ITEMS

27.1 A service charge of ₱600.00 for each check shall be levied against the DRAWER of any check or checks returned for
any reason, except for the following:

a) Account Closed

b) No Account

c) Under Garnishment

d) Spurious Check

e) Documentary Stamps Missing (for foreign checks/drafts only)

f) Post-Dated/Stale-Dated
 g) Validity Restricted

h) Miscleared Items

I) Deceased Depositor

j) Violation of Clearing Rules and/or Procedures

k) Lost by Presenting Bank while in transit to clearing

as well as other exceptions which may be defined/circulated by PCHC from time to time. 29

In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in part. The Court SETS ASIDE the 30 November 2004 Decision and 11
April 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76988, and deletes the award of all damages and fees.
The Court awards to respondent Reynald R. Suarez nominal damages in the sum of ₱75,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 167750               March 15, 2010

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,

vs.
REYNALD R. SUAREZ, Respondent.

Hence, this petition.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court held in First Women’s Credit Corporation v. Perez that:13

It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused
should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors. The
court’s duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial
determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed
by injunction, preliminary or final, albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized. The rule is
also consistent with this Court’s policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to
the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.

While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, their findings are
subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

And it held in UCPB v. Looyuko: 14

Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of
probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.

xxxx

In other words, judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however,
look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The issue on appeal before the Court of Appeals was whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in
determining that there was insufficient evidence showing probable cause to hale petitioner Esperanza into court.

It is hornbook principle that the term "grave abuse of discretion" means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.15 The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation
of law.16

The DOJ, in reversing the City Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause and ordering the discharge of Esperanza, noted
that although the evidence on record fully supported the finding of probable cause against Sagum based on his
admission that he forged herein respondent’s signature on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage without the participation of
Esperanza, there was no basis to hold that Esperanza conspired with him to effect the forgery. The DOJ, citing Dans, Jr.
v. People,17 ruled that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven by competent proof, independently and beyond
reasonable doubt.

A reading of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor does not at all indicate why conspiracy was present
between Esperanza and her uncle. The City Prosecutor’s Resolution merely states: 18

In other words, Sagum did it in conspiracy with Aduan, his niece, who stands to benefit from the forgery as she is the
purported mortgagee of the house that belongs to the Chongs. (Emphasis supplied)

There was thus no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in issuing its Resolutions.

Contrary to the City Prosecutor’s finding, which was adopted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, that
Esperanza was the mortgagee of the subject property does not, without more, show conspiracy in the commission of the
forgery admitted to have been done by Sagum alone.  If everyone who stands to be benefited from a forged document can
be deemed a conspirator, then Nelia Chong as mortgagor may likewise be held liable since the mortgage deed which she
signed, albeit under duress according to her, was used to guarantee the loan she admittedly contracted.

In loan transactions secured by mortgages, both mortgagee and mortgagor stand to benefit from the execution of the
documents. To assume that Esperanza is a conspirator in the commission of the forgery simply because she was to
benefit as mortgagee from the execution of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is thus absurd. Absent then any evidence
to indicate conspiracy, the City Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause against Esperanza fails, as correctly held by the
DOJ.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of dated March 27, 2006 and Resolution dated May 22, 2006
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice Resolution dated November 5, 2004, as well as that of
March 14, 2005, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 172796               July 13, 2009

SPS. ARTEMIO and ESPERANZA ADUAN, Petitioners,

vs.
LEVI CHONG, Respondent.

The appeal has no merit.

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:17

"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
 "(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."

Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had
no pre-existing transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement
to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.18 These defenses cannot save the day for her. The first
and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was
absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient.
She did not prove this.

B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present.19 If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. 20

The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment
within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor. 21 The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public
welfare.22 Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. 23 Why and to
whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of
the checks are also irrelevant.24

Unlike in estafa,25 under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that
there was damage. The damage done is to the banking system.26

In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, "has the law been violated?" When
dealing with acts mala prohibita27 --

"… it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent.1âwphi1 In many crimes, made such by
statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it
were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In
many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those
cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person
performing the act is good or bad."

This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. Petitioner issued two checks. They were dishonored upon
presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was closed. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she
knew her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks. And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or
make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly
violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is
written.

However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. B.P. No. 22 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one year or a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the Court."28

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material,
and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double
the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no
violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term."30 We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of
criminal justice.

Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner. The two fines imposed for each violation, each
amounting to ₱200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient.

The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney's fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the Court of Appeals. 31 We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of
imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months. 32 We DELETE the award of moral damages and
attorney's fees. The rest of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pangniban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., In the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., On leave.

G.R. No. 130038               September 18, 2000

ROSA LIM, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The petition is unmeritorious.

It appears that prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, petitioner had already filed separate criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of respondent
corporation, Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat. They were docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304 7 and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300,8 respectively, and were both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. These cases involve the
same checks which are the subjects of Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil
action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. 9 The
Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall
pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but
because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket
fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22
cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for
actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes,
upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.10 The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is
also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which
means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for
the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-
consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate
action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.11 In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code12 cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.

The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another
court on the ground of litis pendentia. The elements of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.13

We reject petitioner’s assertion that there is no identity of parties and causes of action between the civil case, Civil Case
No. MC 01-1493, and the criminal cases, I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.

First, the parties in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 represent the same interests as the parties in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and
I.S. No. 00-01-00300. I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 were filed against the officers of respondent
corporation who signed the checks as agents thereof. The records indicate that the checks were in fact drawn in the
account of respondent corporation. It has not been alleged in the suit that said officers acted beyond their authority in
signing the checks, hence, their acts may also be binding on respondent corporation, depending on the outcome of the
proceedings.

Second, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 and I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 seek to obtain the same relief.
With the implied institution of the civil liability in the criminal actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime
purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose,
meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. 14 Hence, the relief sought in the
civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493,
that is, the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner, represents the amount to be paid by
respondent for its purchases. To allow petitioner to proceed with Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 despite the filing of I.S. No.
00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to a double payment of its claim.

Petitioner contends that there is no identity of causes of action in the civil and criminal cases as the amount claimed in
Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is greater than the total amount of the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No.
00-01-00300. We are not persuaded. We find that the inclusion of additional checks in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is an
attempt to circumvent the rule against forum shopping, to make it appear that the objects of the civil and criminal
proceedings are different. It is clear from the records that the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 15 and I.S. No. 00-
01-0030016 are the same checks cited by petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. 17 The Court will certainly not allow
petitioner to recover a sum of money twice based on the same set of checks. Neither will the Court allow it to proceed with
two actions based on the same set of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable ruling. Such runs counter to
the Court’s policy against forum shopping which is a deplorable practice of litigants in resorting to two different fora for the
purpose of obtaining the same relief to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. 18 It is a practice that
ridicules the judicial process, plays havoc with the rules on orderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the other
parties of the case.19

Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 163597. July 29, 2005

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., Petitioners,

vs.
ASIA DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174
rendered by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of BP 22. For every count of
violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, petitioner was meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the penalty for being out of the range of the penalty
prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and the subsidiary imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000
and 13-2001, and the holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals. 20 Petitioner asserted that the maximum penalty of fine that
can be imposed against her in each count of violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the dishonored
check only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus excessive. She further implied that the imposition
of subsidiary imprisonment contravened Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a
punishment for not paying a debt.

Section 1 of BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused found criminally liable for
violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more
than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment.
The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to the
court.

If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount of the face value of the rubber check which
in no case should exceed ₱200,000.00.

Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty
of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the amount double the face value of each check.
Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1
of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount of the face value of each check that was dishonored.

Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of fine
using the total face value of the six checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in Abarquez v. Court of
Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the consolidated cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-
8137) to only double the amount of the face value of the subject check.

Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory after petitioner failed to timely file a
Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land.22 Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. 23

Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to
suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it. 24 After all, procedural rules
were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter,25 as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.

Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at stake and where
special and compelling reasons called for such actions. 26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we declared as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor
or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be
so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.

The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison 28 when the Court
corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused which exceeded the
period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of justice and only for the penalty imposed
against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else.29

Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and inherent power of the Court to correct the erroneous
penalties meted on the accused in a final and executory judgments, and make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.

The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons anchored upon in Estrada v.
People32 in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though the notice of appeal was
belatedly filed.

In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by
law was duly corrected even if it was already final on the ground of substantial justice, thus:

In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner.1awp++i1 If his penalty of
imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the
minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while
the maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion
temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court
to suspend its own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x
Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice." Suspending the Rules is justified
"where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."
After all, the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x." 34 All the accused in Almuete v.
People,35 People v. Barro,36 Estrada v. People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,38 failed to perfect
their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding
the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to
deprive the petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which
imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized
by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the
excess.39

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, since the term of
the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, 40 if
petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted
on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the
penalty of fine of ₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each count of violation of
BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.

Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and Administrative Circular No. 12-200042 that supposedly
limited to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary imprisonment, suffice it to quote the
clarifications in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001:

x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to

1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Big. 22; and
 2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of violating the provisions
of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering that Administrative Circular
No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998,
298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy
of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big. 22, without
mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay the
fine.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Big. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither
does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of
B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that

1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22;

xxxx

3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of
the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)

In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes
imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the negative in Lozano v. Martinez. 44 Pertinent
portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:

Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.

xxxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. 45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the interest of
justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos.
321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS
(₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of
₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 197582               June 29, 2015

JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

The crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (1)
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2)
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. 19 As with all other forms of estafa, the
element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable.20

In the instant case, the presence of the first element is not contested. There is no pre-existing obligation; rather, the
obligation which gave rise to the issuance of the check was the purchase of 5,000 bags of refined sugar from La Perla.
Clearly, La Perla would not have parted with its delivery order for the sugar if not for the simultaneous delivery by
accused-appellant of the postdated check. The second and third elements were also successfully proved by the
prosecution. The bank records follow the movement of the funds in accused-appellant's account, and establish that on
January 15, 1994 (when accused-appellant issued the postdated check) and on January 18, 1994 (the date on the check),
his account had a balance of only P9,423.19. By the time the check was deposited for clearing, the balance of
P2,241,957.43 was still insufficient to cover his obligation of P3,425,000.00 to La Perla. Furthermore, a "stop payment"
order had been issued, ensuring the impossibility of La Perla's recovery under the said check.

However, all this would amount to only civil liability on the part of accused-appellant unless it is satisfactorily shown that
fraud or deceit attended his issuance of the check. In this connection, accused-appellant invokes our ruling in People vs.
Singson, 215 SCRA 534, which also involved a sugar trader who purchased sugar by the issuance of several postdated
checks which were subsequently dishonored. In acquitting her, this Court found reasonable doubt on the existence of
fraud, since in the trade of commodities such as sugar and rice it is not unusual that postdated checks are used for the
purchase of such goods, and that these checks are funded by the goods' subsequent resale. The Court was convinced
that Sucrex Marketing Corporation (the wholesaler in the Singson case) had knowledge that the means by which Singson
would fund or cover her checks would be by reselling the sugar she purchased, and concluded that upon such knowledge
there can be no deceit. Noteworthy also is the fact that as soon as the checks were dishonored, Singson offered to make
replacement checks and when these, again, were dishonored, made partial cash payments and returned to Sucrex the
unsold bags of sugar.

Singson serves to underscore the rule in estafa that the fraudulent intentions of the accused must have been shown to
exist at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks or prior thereto. Where such fact of fraud is not ably proven,
and the inability to make good on the check may have been occasioned by unforeseen business reverses after the
obligation had been taken out, there can only be civil liability but no conviction for estafa. Unfortunately for accused-
appellant, the factual considerations of the herein case do not merit application of the above rule.

The two cases are similar only in the sense that both Singson and accused-appellant resold the sugar they purchased
from their respective wholesalers in time for the maturity of their postdated checks. However, unlike the accused Singson,
accused-appellant had outstanding obligations with creditors other than La Perla, all of which were covered by postdated
checks issued against the same bank account as where La Perla's check was to be drawn. Thus, while accused-appellant
did sell his sugar to Babylyn General Merchandising, enabling him to make a deposit of P3,325,000.00 on January 19,
1994, his other creditors encashed their checks also on the same date, effectively reducing the balance in accused-
appellant's account to P2,241,957.43.

Despite his denials during testimony, it is obvious that accused-appellant was aware, at the time he made out the
postdated checks to his creditors including La Perla, that he would have several debts maturing at the same time, all of
which are recoverable from the same bank account. Thus, by purchasing and immediately reselling La Perla's sugar and
depositing the substantial proceeds thereof, he was able to pay off his other creditors; then, knowing that the balance is
insufficient to cover La Perla's check, he immediately ordered the drawee bank to stop its payment. These circumstances,
taken together, indicate the accused-appellant's intent to deceive and defraud La Perla at the time he issued the check ---
he knew that he could not pay all of his debts from the proceeds of La Perla's sugar alone, least of all La Perla from whom
he incurred the largest debt. Had La Perla been aware of the existence of accused-appellants' other creditors, it certainly
would not have authorized withdrawal of the sugar.

It also does not help accused-appellant's cause that the trial court saw through his untruthful and elaborate alibi. In its
decision, the trial court observed that "the demeanor of both the accused and his wife, whose claim of lack of knowledge
regarding the nature of the transaction entered into by her husband and private complainant, served all the more to reveal
the fraudulent scheme employed by the accused to the damage and prejudice of the private complainant." 21 Thus, the trial
court dismissed the wife's testimony as nothing but a "desperate attempt" to save her husband from likely conviction. 22 We
come to the same conclusion as the trial court upon a reading of the transcripts. In one instance, accused-appellant could
not directly answer whether he endorsed Delivery Order No. 9247 to Babylyn General Merchandising, thus enabling the
latter to withdraw the sugar from the refinery. At first, he denied the accusation and even insisted that the delivery order
was not given to him by Minda Anib but after some vigorous questioning, he conceded that he did sell the delivery order
but could not remember if it was to Babylyn General Merchandising.23

However, this is not to say that the conviction of accused-appellant rested solely on the weakness of the defense, as
insisted by defense counsel in their brief. Quite to the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution, consisting of the
testimonies of Imelda Bernardino and Antonio Fernandez and the entries in the bank ledger presented by Enrique Orense
sufficiently and cohesively prove the elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The crime
was proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the trial court also observed from accused-appellant's and his wife's
prevaricated testimonies a resolve to further deceive and conceal the truth of the transaction. After all, the trial court is
most competent to deal with and resolve the issue of credibility of witnesses, having had the firsthand privilege of
observing their behavior on the stand, and we see no reason in the herein case not to uphold it.1avvphi1

We also sustain the finding of the lower court that accused-appellant's partial payments only mitigate his civil liability. The
lower court is correct in not treating the delivery of a title to land to La Perla as payment; such delivery does not transfer
ownership, nor indicate an intent to transfer, and there is no proof submitted that a deed of sale was executed conveying
to La Perla ownership over the said parcel of land.

Finally, some clarifications on the imposable penalty. The trial court convicted accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua,
following the amendment to Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code by Presidential Decree No. 818, which
increased the penalty for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks.

Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion
perpetua;

x x x           x x x          x x x

As used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense, but merely
describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds
P22,000.00.24 People vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, promulgated October 28, 1999, summarizes the rules in
determining the imposable penalty in such cases:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such as estafa,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense.25 The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for
the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.
The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.26

Applying the above rules to the instant case, accused-appellant shall suffer an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of
which shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 of the amount
of the fraud, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years. The minimum of this indeterminate sentence shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Such penalty is prision mayor,
with a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.27 In accord with standing jurisprudence28 , we fix the
minimum period of the indeterminate sentence in the herein case at twelve (12) years.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Meynard Panganiban is
hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30)
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and to indemnify complainant La Perla Sugar Export Corporation in the amount
of P2,757,935.86 plus legal interest thereon from January 21, 1994 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 133028             July 10, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MEYNARD PANGANIBAN, accused-appellant.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

G.R. No. 159823               February 18, 2013

TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22)
arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection with the sale.

Antecedents

On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation
(Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed
of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth
₱10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of ₱3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the
balance of ₱7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the
restructuring of his obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-
dated checks that would include interest at the rate of ₱25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the obligation
on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31, 1998. 1

Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes issued and delivered the
following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of ₱7,125,000.00 drawn against the United Coconut Planters
Bank,2 to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

72807 April 30, 1998 P 25,000.00

79125 May 1, 1998 1,000,000.00

72802 May 30, 1998 2,000,000.00

72808 June 30, 1998 25,000.00

72809 July 31, 1998 25,000.00

72801 August 31, 1998 2,000,000.00

 72810 September 30, 1998 25,000.00

72811 October 31, 1998 25,000.00

72903 November 30, 1998 2,000,000.00

Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No. 72808) on their maturity dates in
Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon
Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.3

Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced Foundation’s account at the PCI
Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore
deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that they would be similarly dishonored. 4

In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q98-35109 and entitled Teodoro A. Reyes v.
Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional sale
"rescinded and of no further force and effect," and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the ₱3,000,000.00
downpayment with legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorney’s fees, and various kinds
and amounts of damages.5

On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No.
72809 and No. 79125. Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802. 6

On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati, 7 claiming that
the checks had not been issued for any valuable consideration; that he had discovered from the start of using the
dredging pump involved in the conditional sale that the Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been rated at
only 560 horsepower instead of the 1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had represented to him; that welding works
on the pump had neatly concealed several cracks; that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced Foundation
complaining about the misrepresentations on the specifications of the pump and demanding documentary proof of
Advanced Foundation’s ownership of the pump; that he had caused the order to stop the payment of three checks (i.e.,
No. 72806, No. 72807 and No. 79125); that Advanced Foundation had replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that
the pump had been sold to him on an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent another letter to Advanced Foundation
on May 18, 1998 to reiterate his complaints and the request for proper documentation of ownership; that he had
subsequently discovered other hidden defects, prompting him to write another letter; and that instead of attending to his
complaints and request, Advanced Foundation’s lawyers had threatened him with legal action.

At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the criminal charges
against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as well as argued that the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for
rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings. 8

On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation recommended the dismissal
of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based
on a prejudicial question.9

On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling Assistant City
Prosecutor,10 stating:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for Estafa is respectfully recommended to be dismissed, as upon
approval, it is hereby dismissed.

Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the charge for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against the respondent be suspended until the prejudicial question raised in Civil Case Q-98-35109 for Rescission of
Contract and Damages which is now pending with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224, has been duly resolved.

Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the Secretary of Justice, by
resolution of July 24, 2001, denied Rossi’s petition for review.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension of the criminal proceedings by the City Prosecutor
of Makati on account of the existence of a prejudicial question, and in sustaining the dismissal of the complaints for estafa.

On May 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,11 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED and the instant petition
is GRANTED in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is concerned. Accordingly, the order
suspending the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 98-40024-29 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the dismissal of the
complaint for estafa is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

Hence, this appeal by Reyes.

Reyes asserts that the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
criminal proceedings against him; that the petition suffered fatal defects that merited its immediate dismissal; that the CA
was wrong in relying on the pronouncements in Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan12 and Umali v. Intermediate Appellate
Court13 because the factual backgrounds thereat were not similar to that obtaining here; and that the Secretary of Justice
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In his comment,14 Rossi counters that the petition for review should be outrightly dismissed because of its fatal defect; that
the CA did not err in ruling that the action for rescission of contract did not pose a prejudicial question that would suspend
the criminal proceedings.

Reyes submitted a reply,15 declaring that the defect in the affidavit of service attached to his petition for review had been
due to oversight; that he had substantially complied with the rules; that there existed a prejudicial question that could
affect the extent of his liability in light of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000; and that the CA erred in
finding that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

To be resolved is whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial question that
required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Ruling

The petition for review is without merit.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.16 The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions.17

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly stated in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 the concept of prejudicial question is explained in this wise:

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other,
then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if
the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question, Reyes posits that the resolution of
the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he was criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. He states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be
extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced Foundation did not comply with its
obligation actually seeks one of the alternative remedies available to a contracting party under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in reciprocal obligations. The condition is
imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation
for this is that in reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part of the contract;
hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind the obligation if the other does not
perform, or is not ready and willing to perform.19

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it was never created,
the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie,
leaving things in their status before the celebration of the contract. 20 However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical
tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions, reference is
made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon
presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of
Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil
action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the
contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing
the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the violations upon the
dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His
obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future
event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal
proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for
rescission of the conditional sale.
Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the rescission of contract was not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of Reyes. We consider the exposition by the CA of its reasons to be appropriate enough, to wit:

xxxx

We find merit in the petition.

A careful perusal of the complaint for rescission of contract and damages reveals that the causes of action advanced by
respondent Reyes are the alleged misrepresentation committed by the petitioner and AFCSC and their alleged failure to
comply with his demand for proofs of ownership. On one hand, he posits that his consent to the contract was vitiated by
the fraudulent act of the company in misrepresenting the condition and quality of the dredging pump. Alternatively, he
claims that the company committed a breach of contract which is a ground for the rescission thereof. Either way, he in
effect admits the validity and the binding effect of the deed pending any adjudication which nullifies the same.

Indeed, under the Jaw on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract unenforceable but merely voidable, the
remedy of which would be to annul the contract since voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are annulled. On
the other hand, rescission of contracts in case of breach pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also
presupposes a valid contract unless rescinded or annulled.

As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative
of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case.

In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the proceedings in the
preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to
be valid until rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have been validly made, thus
demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time when the subject checks were dishonored.
(Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 30, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

We find petition without merit.

The conviction of ALBERTO must be sustained. The law enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 to be (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 8

The issuance of the twelve checks and its subsequent dishonor were admitted by ALBERTO. His defense rests solely on
the payment of the obligation by Sarangani, Inc. including its interests, which was allegedly accommodated by him.
ALBERTO insists that as a guarantor, he merely issued the twelve checks to replace the bad checks that were previously
issued by Sarangani, Inc., and considering that the total amount of the checks encashed by ROBERT have exceeded the
amount of the bad checks including the interest, then the twelve checks already lack valuable consideration.
The issue of whether the twelve checks were issued merely to accommodate the obligation of Sarangani, Inc. as well as
the issue of payment of the said obligation are factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. Well-settled is
the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and
respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. 9 The jurisdiction of this court over
cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is confined to the review of errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose
findings of fact are conclusive, absent any showing that the findings by the respondent court are entirely devoid of any
substantiation on record.10

In the instant case, we see no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court which has been affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. ALBERTO’s allegation that the checks were issued to replace or accommodate the bad checks of
Sarangani, Inc. is not worthy of belief. The seven(7) checks issued by Sarangani, Inc. were all dated and dishonored in
September 1989. The twelve (12) checks including the other fifty-two (52) checks were all dated November 1992, hence
the same cannot be a replacement of the bad checks which were dishonored as far back as three years ago.

In addition, even the corresponding amount of the checks negates said conclusion. The total amount of the seven (7)
checks, representing the obligations of Sarangani, Inc., is only P1,600,000,11 while the sum total of the twelve (12) checks
and the remaining fifty-two checks is P7,455,000. 12 If we add the P7,455,000 to the value of the more than three hundred
checks, which ALBERTO alleged to have been issued also in payment of the said obligation then the total amount of all
the replacement checks will be P111,476,000.

Moreover, records show that the twelve(12) checks and the other fifty-two (52) checks were issued sometime May 1992
and all postdated 1992,13 whereas the 330 checks which were submitted to prove the fact of payment were all encashed
before the issuance of the said checks. Thus, if full payment was made as early as July 22, 1991, the date of the last
check of the 330 checks, why would ALBERTO issue the twelve (12) checks and the fifty-two (52) checks, if not for a
consideration other than to answer for an obligation which was already paid. Hence, the 330 checks submitted by the
defense did not prove that the twelve checks were not issued for valuable consideration. On the contrary, it supported the
version of the prosecution that the checks were issued for rediscounting and not as replacements for the bad checks of
Sarangani, Inc., as claimed by ALBERTO.

Further, if indeed it were true as claimed by ALBERTO that the indebtedness covered by the checks sued upon has been
paid, the petitioner should have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business. But the same
checks remained in the possession of the complainant who asked for the satisfaction of the obligations involved when
said checks became due, without the petitioner heeding the demand for him to redeem his checks which bounced. 14

Hence, without evidentiary support, ALBERTO’s claim that the twelve checks lacks valuable consideration must fail. Upon
issuance of the said checks, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for
valuable consideration. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the issuance of a bouncing check. It is also worthy to note that it is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment.15 The purpose for which it was issued and the terms and conditions relating to its issuance are
immaterial. What is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to
appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22. This is because the mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.16

ALBERTO’s alternative prayer for the modification of penalty by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu
thereof, that a fine in an increased amount be imposed must likewise be denied.

His reliance in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is misplaced. As clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg.
22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be
considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment
is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
In this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals in upholding the trial court’s imposition of imprisonment. ALBERTO is not
a first time offender. He has previously been convicted of 50 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
93-44583 to Q-93-44632, and was placed on probation. 17

However, despite his prior conviction, he claims that the same shall not be taken against him. He argues that:

It bears emphasis that the sixty-four postdated checks which include the subject checks in the subject decision,
were issued by the petitioner to Mr. Lu all at the same time to cover the unpaid obligation of Sarangani.
Undeniably, should only one single complaint was filed for all the sixty-four checks which bounced, then all of
the cases should have been brought up and heard in only one branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. But, as fate have it, two criminal complaints were separately filed by Mr. Lu which complaints were
eventually heard buy two branches of the said court, to wit: Branch 90 and Branch 103.

With the aforesaid scenario, petitioner had been put into a bind. Thusly, when the joint decision [Annex "G"] was
promulgated by RTC-Branch 103, petitioner seasonably applied for probation, which application was granted by
the court, after the latter has determined to its satisfaction the qualification of petitioner. Nonetheless,
petitioner’s worries are far from over because when the decision of RTC-Branch 90 was subsequently
promulgated, petitioner was left with no recourse but to appeal. Needless to state, petitioner can no longer
apply for probation because of his earlier availment in the first complaint of Mr. Lu. This, notwithstanding the
fact that all the sixty-four checks were issued by the petitioner to Mr. Lu at the same time and meant to cover an
obligation of like nature. Whereas, had there been only one complaint filed for all the said checks, there should
have been only one judgment of conviction and petitioner could have had fully availed of the benefits of the
Probation Law [PD 968 as amended].It is, therefore pathetic to even contemplate on the prospect of petitioner
languishing in jail only because of the fact that the sixty-four bum checks he issued were divided into two
criminal complaints.18

The foregoing arguments must be rejected. His allegation that the checks subject of that previous conviction were part of
the sixty-four (64) checks which he issued at the same time to cover one and the same obligation, is not true. A reading of
the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. Q93-44583 to Q93-44632 will show that there are two accused namely, ALBERTO
and William Tan,19 since the checks subject of those cases were issued and signed by both accused. Also, the amount of
each of the fifty (50) checks ranges from P122,595.77 to P546,114.00 while the sixty-four (64) checks including the twelve
checks were issued and signed solely by ALBERTO, the amount of which ranges from P10,000 to P300,000. Hence the
fifty (50) checks subject of his prior conviction and the twelve (12) checks subject of the present case are different from
each other.

His act of issuing the fifty (50) and the sixty-four (64) bouncing checks is a serious offense. To impose only fine would be
to depreciate the seriousness of his malefactions. The importance of arresting the proliferation of bouncing checks can not
be overemphasized.

Besides, it is of no moment even if the fifty (50) checks were part of the sixty-four (64) checks. Each act of drawing and
issuing a bouncing check constitutes a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The rule that there is only one offense when the offender
is moved by one criminal intent or purpose does not apply because in a statutory offense or malum prohibitum malice or
criminal intent is immaterial.20 The mischief of circulating unfunded checks is injurious not only to the payee or holder of
such checks but to society in general, and the business community, in particular. The nefarious practice "can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest."21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Quezon, City in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46489 to 46500 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 143231            October 26, 2001

ALBERTO LIM, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Discussion
I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.

Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on her lack of
personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment
on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy." 42

We disagree with Chua.

Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the
State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.

In Villareal v. Aliga,43 we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may question
the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:

x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is
solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may
question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this
view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated
that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to question
such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by
the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the
Court again upheld this guiding principle.

xxx

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the
State and not the private complainant.44 The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only
to the civil liability.45 In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom
on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. 46 The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. 47

Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an offended party, we
direct the OSG to file its comment. 48 When through its comment, the OSG takes a position similar to the private
complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private complainant's petition as its own. 49 However, when the
OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition be granted nor expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we
hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on personality or legal standing. 50

In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment51 dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the view that Chua's petition
will place Chiok in double jeopardy:

x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in acquitting private
respondent, a perusal of the allegations will reveal errors of judgment in the appreciation of evidence, not error of
jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have
also reviewed the evidence of the accused in order to satisfy ourselves about the essential question of misappropriation or
conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce that his version on the matter was probably
credible." Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent accused readily leads to the conclusion
that it is very far from being probably credible.

Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the trial. Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of
the Court of [Appeals] appreciation of evidence x x x.52

In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances of this case
warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this procedural rule, we find that the merits of the case still calls for
the dismissal of Chua's petition.

II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.

The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy. 53 Section
7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the
following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the
crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. 54

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal,
whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.55 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained in People v.
Velasco:56

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the
laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State, x x x."
Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repealed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose
as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature
of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is
easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of
repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests
upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This
interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury
empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its
very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet
animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment,
the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and its resultant
doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.

In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of mistrial. In
declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which
resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, we found that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were
denied due process of law with a partial court and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of his instructions." 58 We considered the
acquittal as void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.

In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal when the CA found him to have jumped
bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this case is an exception to the rule on
double jeopardy.

A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.

Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in the bail case
which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The logical and legal
consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to automatically revive the CA's Resolution dated September 21,
1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Chiok and the
proceedings therein are null and void.

We find no merit in Chua's claims.

At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June 18, 1999 at
the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure explicitly provides that the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited when an accused fails to appear during
the promulgation of judgment.60 Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal and the subsequent denial of the
prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by the RTC in its Order 61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA
completely acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.

After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising jurisdiction
over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section
8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may, upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)

The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. This authority to
dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary.62 When an accused jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the
appellate court may exercise its discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it outright. 63 In several cases, we
still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at large during the pendency of the appeal. 64

In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest was not
served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its discretion, this time to
entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court when it reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated February 29, 2000. This resolution, which effectively
replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal, has already attained finality.

Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining Chiok's arrest did
not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being a discretionary act on the part of the
appellate court. Consequently, we reject the claim of Chua that the first jeopardy did not attach because the whole
proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null and void.

B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly, she submits
that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of
the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the
case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.

Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they have
resulted in acquittals."66 Chua anchors her claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban that there were
unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the bouncing checks cases67 (BP 22 case) she filed against Chiok, and that a
TSN in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed from
the record.

We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.

The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we concluded that there
was a mock or sham trial because of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures made by former
President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the case, which prevented the prosecution
from fully ventilating its position and offering all evidence. We recognized the intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted
by the highest official in the land that resulted to a miscarriage of justice.

In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the BP 22 case
against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his implied
admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out
by Chua were in a different case and when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence
but of the testimony of Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court considered
Chiok's offer of settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is
asking us to nullify the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it
would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence which
cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in fact, actively
participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief69 dated December 23, 2003, as
well as its Rejoinder Brief70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her petition, the OSG was able to present its
case before the appellate court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this case on the merits is clear in the submissions it has
filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder Brief..." 71 Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed
where both parties had the opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its
decision is based, as in this case.72

Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.73 Chua failed to do so.

III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of ₱9,563,900.00.

Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res
judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of
₱9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount should be ₱9,563,900.00.

We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of ₱9,563,900.00.

In Castillo v. Salvador 75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this
regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.76

While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of Chua's
money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua
and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.

Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account in the
amount of ₱7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of ₱2,463,900.00. Chiok's
admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount of ₱9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was
"for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates Chua's
evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the amount of "₱7.9"
million in June 1995 and for "₱1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the
amount of ₱9,500,000.00 only.

However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October 13, 1997, the
reference to "₱9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of ₱9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)

ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is ₱9,563,900.00 covered by
the two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x77

TSN October 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is the] subject matter of this case
of estafa?

WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?

WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?

WITNESS[:] In Peso.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?

WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?

WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)

Accordingly, the amount admitted should be ₱9,563,900.00.

There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the same
transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of
judgment."

The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of Section 47,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit.79 Stated differently, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different cause of
action.80 This principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 81

In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action in estafacase. In
rejecting the theory of petitioner therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for violation of BP 22 precludes
the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule
111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP
22, without need of election by the offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously
available to the offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil
actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery of the single civil liability.

We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether an accused's civil
liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases. We held that
both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final adjudication-both as to their criminal and civil aspects—subject
only to the prohibition on double recovery.

Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts and issues
were actually and directly resolved in a previous case. 84 However, the records show that in the BP 22 case, the facts and
issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly resolved in the decision, viz:

The court is not persuaded.

First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its dishonor. There is no
showing dial this requirement was complied by the prosecution. Second, the drawer must be given at least 5 banking days
from such notice of dishonor within which to pay the holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for
payment in full by the drawee of such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have been furnished
the accused and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking day to make good
aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application by giving the drawer an
opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot be said that accused was ever given that opportunity simply
because the prosecution failed to prove that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.

xxx

Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the dishonor of the
checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still the prosecution cause must fail because there are more
reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will be
explained hereunder.

xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused from criminal as well as
civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support the charges levelled against him.

Costs de officio.

No other pronouncements.

SO ORDERED.85

The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to Chiok.
The discussion that the prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary, and was not necessary, for accused's
acquittal. There were no findings of fact on the transaction which gives rise to the civil liability.

In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars Chua from
recovering any civil claims.

Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,86 the foregoing amount of ₱9,563,900.00 shall earn interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the
date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED. The
Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount of
₱9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995 until the date of
finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

December 7, 2015
G.R. No. 179814

WILFRED N. CHIOK, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and RUFINA CHUA, Respondents

The issues raised by petitioners are divided into the procedural issue of whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to
the Court of Appeals and the substantive issue of whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.

On the procedural issue, petitioners contend that SMC’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was an improper remedy
because the DOJ’s act of sustaining the investigating prosecutor’s resolution to suspend the criminal proceedings due to a
valid prejudicial question was an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioners further assert that nevertheless, an
error of judgment is not correctible by certiorari when SMC had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, which was to file
an appeal to the Office of the President.

The procedure taken up by petitioner was correct.

The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the DOJ through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. 6

In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez,7 we stressed that the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice
Secretary who exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm,
nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the
Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction. 8

Also, in Tan v. Matsuura,9 we held that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not
preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings. In the
exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence
to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a petition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.10

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it affirmed the prosecutor’s suspension of the
criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged prejudicial question.

We expound.

Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled against the existence of a prejudicial question by separately
treating their joint savings account and Argovan’s current account, and concluding therefrom that the civil and criminal
cases could proceed independently of each other.

It is argued that the appellate court overlooked the fact that petitioners had an automatic transfer arrangement with
AsiaTrust Bank, such that funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to their checking account
whenever a check they issued was presented for payment.

Petitioners maintain that since the checking account was funded by the monies deposited in the savings account, what
mattered was the sufficiency of the funds in the savings account. Hence, petitioners’ separate action against AsiaTrust
Bank for unlawfully garnishing their savings account, which eventually resulted in the dishonor of their check to SMC,
poses a prejudicial question in the instant criminal proceedings.

Moreover, petitioners argue that they were not required to fully and exhaustively present evidence to prove their claims.
The presentation of their passbook, which confirmed numerous withdrawals made on the savings account and indicated
as "FT" or "Fund Transfer," proved the existence of fund transfer from their savings account to the checking account.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.11
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary for a civil case to be
considered a prejudicial question, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied).

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 12

The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in
the civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the ₱378,000.00 from petitioners’ savings account.

The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioner’s savings account.1âwphi1 Based on
petitioners’ account, they deposited the check given to them by Fatima in their savings account. The amount of said check
was initially credited to petitioners’ savings account but the Fatima check was later on dishonored because there was an
alleged alteration in the name of the payee. As a result, the bank debited the amount of the check from petitioners’
savings account. Now, petitioners seek to persuade us that had it not been for the unlawful garnishment, the funds in their
savings account would have been sufficient to cover a check they issued in favor of SMC.

The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being conducted by the
prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature
of the alleged materially altered check leading to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners’ savings
account. The source of the funds of petitioners’ savings account is no longer SMC’s concern. The matter is between
petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued
a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer products.

The gravamen of the offense punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.13 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the mere act of issuing
a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was
made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer.14 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making
of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. 15

Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful garnishment of petitioners’ savings
account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
because the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in
itself the offense.16

Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners, who then, should have immediately funded the check.
When they did not, their liabilities under the bouncing checks law attached. Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged
prejudicial question because their failure to fund the check upon notice of dishonour is itself the offense.

In the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, deceit and damage are additional and
essential elements of the offense. It is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check that is
penalized.17 A prima facie presumption of deceit arises when a check is dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds.18 Records show that a notice of dishonor as well as demands for payment, were sent to petitioners. The
presumption of deceit applies, and petitioners must overcome this presumption through substantial evidence. These
issues may only be threshed out in a criminal investigation which must proceed independently of the civil case.

Based on the foregoing, we rule that the resolution or the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative or the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal investigation against them. There is no necessity that the civil case be
determined firrst before taking up the criminal complaints.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11 March 2008 and its
Resolution dated 16 July 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 88431, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 188767               July 24, 2013

SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO, Petitioners,

vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The issues raised by Chua involve

questions of law.

The OSG argues that the issues raised by Chua involve questions of fact which are not within the province of the present
petition for review on certiorari. The Court, however upon perusal of the petition, finds that the issues raised and the
arguments advanced by Chua in support thereof, concern questions of law. "Jurisprudence dictates that there is a
‘question of law’ when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on
the other hand, there is a ‘question of fact’ when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the appellation given by the
parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to
the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However,
if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual." 31

Chua raises two issues in this petition, to wit: (1) whether the MeTC, RTC and the CA correctly applied the legal
presumption that Chua has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time he issued the check based on his alleged
receipt of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 and his failure to make good the checks five days from such
receipt; and (2) whether the said courts correctly considered the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as newly
discovered evidence. As to the first issue, it is not disputed that the subject demand letter, while bearing the signature of
Chua, does not indicate any date as to his receipt thereof. There being no disagreement as to this fact, the propriety of the
conclusion drawn from the same by the courts below, that is, the date of the said letter is considered as the date when
Chua received the same for the purpose of reckoning the five-day period to make good the checks, clearly refers to a
question of law. Similarly, the second issue is one concerning a question of law because it requires the application of the
provision of the Rules of Court concerning a newly discovered evidence. 32

Nevertheless, assuming that the questions posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule that factual findings of the
lower courts are not proper subject of certiorari petition admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the lower
courts failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of
the case. The Court finds the said exception applicable in the instant case. Clearly, the petition deserves the consideration
of this Court.

The prosecution failed to prove all the

elements of the offenses charged.

In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential elements must be present:
"(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment."33 "Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of
mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only
after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. 34

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that the absence of the date of
his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 prevented the legal presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the other hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s actual
receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date of the
demand letter (November 30, 1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel
as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. By reason of such stipulation, they all held that
Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of actual receipt of the notice of
dishonor, viz.:

In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, it
is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person
who issued the check knew ‘at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.’ Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult
to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:

‘SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the
insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment."

Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount
indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to
mitigate the harshness of the law in its application.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check,
or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption or prima
facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period."36 (Italics in the original, emphasis supplied)

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of BP 22 would start
and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC
cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof. There is simply
no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently
denied having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still
blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it
behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However,
all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual
receipt thereof. It must be stressed that ‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor]
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the
accused."37 "The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice"38 which the Court finds wanting in
this case.

Anent the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel, the MeTC stated:

In the course of the said proceedings, the defense counsel manifested that he is willing to stipulate as to the existence of
the demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected on the face of the demand letter. x x x

xxxx

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice of dishonor of the subject
checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In fact, the defense stipulated in open court the
existence of the said demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter. x x x In
view of that stipulation, the defense is now estopped in denying its receipt thereof. 39

As earlier mentioned, this ruling of the MeTC was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only refers to the existence of the
demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. In no way can an admission of Chua’s receipt of the demand letter be
inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua cannot be considered estopped from claiming non-receipt. Also, the Court observes that
Chua’s admission with respect to his signature on the demand letter is consistent with his claim that See made him sign
blank papers where the contents of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 were later intercalated.

In view of the above discussion, the Court rules that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently prove the existence of the
second element of BP 22.

At any rate, the demand letter dated

November 30, 1993 deserves no weight
and credence not only because it does
not qualify as a newly discovered
evidence within the purview of the law
but also because of its doubtful
character.

As may be recalled, the prosecution had already long rested its case when it filed a Motion to Re-Open Presentation of
Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion To Allow Prosecution To Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28,
2003. Intending to introduce the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as a newly discovered evidence, See attached
to the said motion an affidavit40 of even date where he stated the circumstances surrounding the fact of his location of the
same, viz.:

2. When we initially presented our evidence in support of these criminal complaints, I was already looking for a
copy of the demand letter personally served by the affiant (See) and duly received by [Chua];

3. That despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x x x dated November 30, 1993, the same was not
located until sometime in February 2002 when I was having our old house/office located at C-5 Christian Street,
Grace Village, Quezon City, cleaned and ready to be rented out;

4. x x x [upon] showing the same to the new handling public prosecutor, he advised the affiant to have it
presented in Court.41

In Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon,42 the Court held that:

x x x The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence
discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement
of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded
as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang
into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had
nonetheless failed to secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends
upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with
"reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time
component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering
evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the
defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
facts known to him.43

"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change
the judgment."44

In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a newly discovered
evidence within the purview of the law. Per See’s statements in his affidavit, the said evidence was already known to him
at the time he filed his complaint against Chua. It was also apparently available considering that it was just kept in his
house. Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand letter and
presented it during trial. However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at the time he filed the
complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 was referred to in the
complaint, which per See’s own allegations, was also not actually received by Chua. In addition, the prosecution failed to
present the original copy of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on the basis of the demand
letter dated December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot possibly establish the existence of the second element of
the offense. Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 make it susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction was a mere afterthought – a belated attempt to fill in a
missing component necessary for the existence of the second element of BP 22.

It may not be amiss to add at this point that out of the 54 cases for violation of BP 22 filed against Chua, 22 involve
checks issued on November 30, 1993 or thereafter. Hence, the lower courts grievously erred in convicting Chua for those
22 cases on the basis of a purported demand letter written and sent to Chua prior to the issuance of said 22 checks.
Checks can only be dishonored after they have been issued and presented for payment. Before that, dishonor cannot
take place. Thus, a demand letter that precedes the issuance of checks cannot constitute as sufficient notice of dishonor
within the contemplation of BP 22. It is likewise significant to note that aside from the absence of a date, the signature of
Chua appearing on the questioned November 30, 1993 demand letter is not accompanied by any word or phrase
indicating that he affixed his signature thereon to signify his receipt thereof. Indeed, "conviction must rest upon the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense." 45 In view of the
foregoing, the Court cannot accord the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 any weight and credence. Consequently,
it cannot be used to support Chua’s guilt of the offenses charged.

All told, the Court cannot convict Chua for violation of BP 22 with moral certainty.

Chua’s acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. 46 "An acquittal
based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages." 47 For this reason, Chua
must be directed to testitute See the total amount of the face value of all the checks subject of the case with legal interest
at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the time the said checks became due and demandable up to June 30, 2013
and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. 48

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The assailed Decision dated November 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR. CR No. 33079 which affirmed the Decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 and the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 finding petitioner Robert Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 54
counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Robert Chua is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and
ordered RELEASED immediately / unless he is detained for some other legal cause. He is ordered, however, to indemnify
the private complainant Philip See the total value of the 54 checks subject of this case plus legal interest of 12% per
annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

July 13, 2015

G.R. No. 196853

ROBERT CHUA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIIlLIPPINES, Respondent.