The petition is without merit.

At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not
necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-
settled that "the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on
delict may be deemed extinguished if there isa finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him." 22

In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the
crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps.
Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly
traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba
on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the
latter, and assuch, she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check.  Verily,
23

Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of ₱500,000.00 does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the same
despite her acquittal in the estafa case.

In this relation, the CA is also correct in holding that Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent
exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were
founded on the same factual circumstances. In Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy,  the Court laid
24

down the fundamental differences between BP 22 and estafa, to wit:

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are
essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22.  Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored
1âwphi1

gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other
differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check
may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a
preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in
each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to
the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in
se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita. 25

Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People v. Reyes  even instructs that the
26

simultaneous filing of BP 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy:

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer
to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one
offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where
there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another
law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated,
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
double jeopardy. 27

Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of
facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can
proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the
prohibition on double recovery.  Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal
28

and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and
civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.

G.R. No. 203583               October 13, 2014

LEONORA B. RIMANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that the failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that the said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretenses or fraudulent act. In this case, accused-appellant received two
demand letters, dated November 10, 1992, from complainant for the payment of the value of
the check. She never contested the contents of the letters. Despite extensions granted to
17 

her, she failed to pay the value of the check. Her refusal to make good her obligation is
indicative not only of her inability to pay but also that she employed false pretenses in
incurring her obligation in the first place.

Second. Accused-appellant was likewise guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.  The elements of
1âwphi1

this crime are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply to account or for
value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 18

G.R. Nos. 146921-22               January 31, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARY GRACE CAROL FLORES, accused-appellant.

Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, 20 the elements of
estafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the
payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and must be
established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 21 Thus, the drawer of the dishonored
check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the
check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit
was successfully rebutted by appellant’s evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by
postdating a check.22 Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to
arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made
arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-appellant
fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.

It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts
accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is
the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent
which together make up the "criminal mind" behind the "criminal act." Thus, to constitute a
crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan:23

The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved falsification
of public documents and estafa:

"Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting."

Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter was made by the
prosecution. The prosecution claimed that the demand letter was sent by registered mail. To
prove this, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt
bearing a signature which was, however, not even authenticated or identified. A registry
receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. 26 "Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as
proof of receipt of the letters."27

Stated otherwise, responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant; hence, personal

knowledge of the notice of dishonor was necessary. Consequently, while there may have
been constructive notice to appellant regarding the insufficiency of her funds in the bank, it
was not enough to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315
of the RPC and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must
deposit the amount needed to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of
dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the amount of the
check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of dishonor
is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice of
dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime (whether
estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.

G.R. Nos. 104238-58             June 3, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
CORA ABELLA OJEDA, appellant.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, respondent sufficiently established the existence of probable

cause for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but
not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail
to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following elements must be present:

1) The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and

3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of

funds or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment.17 In Lozano v. Martinez,18 we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. 19 In People v. Nitafan,20 we said that a check
issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has
the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
In fact, petitioner’s argument that respondent was aware of the fact that the subject checks
were only accommodation checks in favor of Aguilar is not a defense against a charge for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People of the Philippines,26 where the accused interposed
the defense of accommodation party, we held:

It bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of

intent. When the intent of the parties does not appear on the face of the check, it
must be ascertained in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Invariably, the tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds test. x x x. And
even assuming she was such party, this circumstance is not a defense to a charge
for violation of B.P. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely
as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement surrounding the
issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner. 27

In Meriz v. People of the Philippines,28 we held:

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the
check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court
has since said that a "check issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for
encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and must thus be held to be
"within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a check is presented for payment, the
drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or
just as a guaranty of an obligation. BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what
might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead
ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for
currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance,
before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. The
gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act
effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query
then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad
check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer. 29

Also, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 we held:

It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where
dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The
enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within
its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the
said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction,
inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction
can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of
the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the
prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in
favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor
of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was
introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks, from
becoming ‘useless scraps of paper’ and to restore respectability to checks, all without
 distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as
above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original
text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the
coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill
as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan
deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making
the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular Session,
December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately
issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were
dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely
issued the checks as a guarantee.31

G.R. No. 154438             September 5, 2007

ALICIA F. RICAFORTE, petitioner,
vs.
LEON L. JURADO, respondent.