PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-

appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants
appellees.|||

[G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977]

FACTS: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally at CFI Quezon City for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence,
Reginald Hill is still a minor and is already legally married. Reginald is still living and gets subsistence with his father, Atty.
Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake.” Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father, Marvin Hill. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The lower court granted the motion to dismiss; hence the present action

The motion to dismiss is based on the following grounds:

"1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules
of Court;
"2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
"3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage."

It was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating
the above grounds that the following order was issued:
"Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the
arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.”

ISSUES:
1)Whether or not the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
for civil liability was not reversed.
2) Whether or not Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married.
HELD:
1) NO. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
 Separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
 If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life
 To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise. there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
 In reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
2) YES. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
 While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty
to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent
 Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
 GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
FACTS: Private respondent Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married.
Petitioner alleged in said complaint that she is lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community
and that she was a virgin before she began living with him as she never had a boyfriend before; petitioner Baksh, on the
other hand, is an Iranian citizen, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
in Dagupan City.
Respondent courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year.
Petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage. Plaintiff's parents agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in
their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. By reason of that deceitful promise,
private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors.
Thereafter, the parties started to live together in defendant’s apartment. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries.
During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages.
Respondent’s father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after petitioner-defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding.
RTC of Pangasinan:
The RTC, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to
pay the latter damages and attorney's fees.
Court of Appeals:
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court promulgated the
challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling in favor of respondent Gonzales, holding that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise this fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they
do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner argues that Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any
good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. Petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised
to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable.

ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

HELD: The court held that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong; however, damages may be recovered
based on Article 21 due to respondent’s fraud and deceit and wilful injury to respondent’s honor and reputation.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, the Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
The Code Commission states that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in
the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept, while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept.
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned
by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts.
In the line with the purpose of Article 21, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission.
Instant petition is denied, with costs against petitioner
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS.
LYDIA GERONIMO, respondents. G.R. No. 110295, FIRST DIVISION, October 18, 1993, DAVIDE, JR., J
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon
the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could likewise be liable for
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may
be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-
delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a
quasi-delict.
FACTS
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her
complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City, an
enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten
Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke
and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; he then went over
her stock of soft drinks and discovered the presence of some fiberlike substances in the contents of some unopened Coke
bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles to the Regional Health
Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the
Department of Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of
the foreign substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as
low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose
shop on 12 December 1989; she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages
but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5, 000.00 as actual damages, P72,
000.00 as compensatory damages, P500, 000.00 as moral damages, P10, 000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount
equal to 30% of the damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs.
ISSUE
Whether the cause of action involved is quasi-delict
RULING
Yes. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that,
therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the
complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption." The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect
to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in
Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and
an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from
quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Under American law, the liabilities of a
manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds
such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in
Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort
under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit.

Taylor V. Manila Electric Railroad And Light Co.(1910)

FACTS:
 September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named
Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting
Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine
 After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
 they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground
 These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity
 They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves
a considerable explosive power
 the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home
 After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's
home
 The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
  trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result
 break the cap with a stone - failed
 opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches
 David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents
 An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three
 Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck
 Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
 David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
 Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable
ISSUE: 

1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable  - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the damage - NO
HELD:  reversing the judgment of the court below

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx             xxx             xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx             xxx             xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

 in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

1. Damages to the plaintiff
2. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was
guilty.
3. The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
 while we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have relieved
Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to
his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received
 cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion
and of the resultant injuries inflicted 
 Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred
 2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later
he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his
accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for 6 months at a
salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most boys of 15 
 The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by Jessie who
even ran away
 True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and
capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
 The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due
care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to
do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
understand the character of his own acts and their consequences
 he was sui juris  in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own
willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
 rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire
 just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he
can not demand reparation therefor from another
 Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, vs. TIMOTHY TAGARIO,
assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO ,
FACTS: Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by
Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room in Marymount. He
started to panic so he banged and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He then decided to open the window
to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized
and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the
CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses Limon. They claim that the school was negligent for
not installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s comfort room. CLC, in its defense, maintained that there was nothing
defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC
further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-
being and convenience of its students. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their
appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall.

RULING: YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred. In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury
to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2)
failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was defective.
The architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the comfort room was actually put in place. Further,
the fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside.

That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res
ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in
working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was
wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement
under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was approximately
1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet
by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part. Petitioners’ argument
that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not
decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
maintained. The Court’s pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the
door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The
injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening
cause, that originated from CLC’s own negligence. PETITION DENIED.