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Introduction: Concept
Culpa Aquiliana, Quasi-Delict, Torts
PADILLA v. CA – destroyed market stall, criminally acquitted
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. The civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
The ex delicto civil liability is extinguished upon acquittal of the accused but not
the civil liability arising from the quasi-delict.
SYQUIA v. CA – concrete vault submerged in water
Old doctrine: Quasi-delict can only prosper if there is no preexisting contractual
relationship
Negligence definition – omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place
BAKSH v. CA – Iranian promised Filipina to marry then reneged on the same
Breach of promise to marry per se if not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated the provisions on the matter.
Art. 21: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. – designed to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
Distinctions between (1) Culpa Aquiliana, (2) Culpa Contractual, (3) Culpa
Criminal
Culpa Contractual – governed by the Contract itself and Civil Code provisions
on Obligations and Contracts
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every
kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required.
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Culpa Aquiliana – no intent to cause damage
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
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under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Culpa Criminal – if there is intent to cause damage, act or omission becomes a
crime
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon
any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong
which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper
to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved
June 21, 1957).
CALALAS v. CA – passenger on rear end of jeepney
An act or omission may give rise to an action based on delict, quasi- delict and
even contract. Obligation based on one is separate and distinct from another. A
single act or omission may give rise to two or more causes of action.
Although an act or omission may give rise to two causes of action, the plaintiff
cannot recover twice for the same act or omission.
Rule 2, Section 2 (ROC)
Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi- delict,
not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party -
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obligation is created by law itself. Pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
Culpa Contractual Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Criminal is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Governed by:
Contract itself and Arts. 2176-2194, 1172- Art. 365 RPC Elements of Quasi-Delict
Arts. 1170-1174 1174 (1) Culpable act or negligence
Elements: (2) Damage to another
Existence of pre- Act or omission Offender does or fails to (3) Causal relationship between the culpable act or negligence and the
existing contractual constituting fault or do an act damage to another
obligation negligence
Doing or failure to do that PICART v. SMITH – Collision between horse and automobile
Non-performance, or Damage caused by said act is voluntary
performance in the act or omission Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
contravention of the Done without malice caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
tenor of the contract Causal relationship situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence.
between the damage and Material damages results
Debtor is guilty of the act or omission from reckless imprudence DAYWALT v. CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS – alleged
fraud, negligence or interference in contract
delay Inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of Malice is an essential ingredient in cases of interference with contractual
the offender, taking into relations. No liability can arise from a meddlesome and malicious interference
consideration his unless there is force, intimidation, coercion, threats, false or defamatory
employment/occupation, statements, or nuisance or riot.
degree of intelligence,
physical condition and Stranger cannot be more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance
other circumstances of of the contract than the part in whose behalf he intermeddles.
persons, time and place
Evidence required: Damages may be ordinary or special.
Preponderance of Preponderance of Proof Beyond Reasonable
Evidence Evidence Doubt AIR FRANCE v. CARRASOCO – first class plane ticket
Diligence as defense:
Good father of a Good father of family is a Defense not available. A claim for quasi-delict may still prosper even if there is a contractual
family may only proper and complete relationship between the parties.
mitigate damages defense
Independent Civil Independent Civil Action Reservation required Existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
Action tort by the one against the other.
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GILCHRIST v. CUDDY – Zigomar film No Double Recovery Rule

Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise,
industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be protected against competition;
but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference,
disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss comes as a result of
competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with.
Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by
exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but
this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that
contract and causing its breach.
There is nothing in Art. 2176 which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he
causes damages
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
JOSEPH v. BAUTISTA – case against owner (contract of carriage) and case
against driver (quasi-delict)
Compromise agreement inures to the benefit of all solidary debtors. The
judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on
quasi-delict is a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage
since there was already payment in the compromise agreement. A recovery by
the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other.
Negligence Concept

Damnum Absque Injuria - A person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or JARCO MARKETING v. CA – counter fell on child
loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act
or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as Accident Negligence
damnum absque injuria. Injury in in which the loss or harm was not the result An accident pertains to an unforeseen Negligence is the omission to do
of a violation of a legal duty but from the exercise of a right. event in which no fault or negligence something which a reasonable man,
attaches to the defendant. It is a guided by those considerations which
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS v. KALAW – delivery of copra not made due to “fortuitous circumstance, event or ordinarily regulate the conduct of
typhoons happening, an even happening human affairs, would do, or the doing
without any human agency, or if of something which a prudent and
No actionable wrong in damnun absque injuria. happening wholly or partly with reasonable man would not do.
human agency, an event which under
FAROLAN v. SOLMAC MARKETING – customs; allegedly different material the circumstances is unusual or Negligence is the failure to observe,
from what has been declared unexpected by the person to whom it for the protection of the interest of
happens. another person, that degree of care,
Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous precaution and vigilance which the
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnun absque injuria. circumstances justly demand,
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent a whereby such other person suffers
clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence injury.
amounting to bad faith.
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Accident and negligence and intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist
without the other.
Doctrine of attractive nuisance – one who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children
from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years
who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises.
Children below 9 years of age are incapable of contributory negligence.
Applicability of Arts. 1172-1174
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every
kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required. (1104a)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
SARMIENTO v. CABRIDO – earring to ring
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Corrollarily, those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any matter
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of
the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation, and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, the time and of the place.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract unless there is proof that the defendant
acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or
in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.
As proximate cause – Art. 2179
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate Cause Defined – that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which, the result would not have occurred.
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC – exploding caps
The connection of the cause and effect between the negligence and damage
(3rd element) – wanting
Fault or negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and
the injury there exists a relation of cause and effect: but if the injury produced
should not be the result of acts of omissions of a third party, the latter has no
obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omissions were imprudent
or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the
case.
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BATACLAN v. MEDINA – bus accident, burned down by torches
When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to the call for held, made
not only by the passenger, but mostly probably by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was very dark, the rescuers had to carry a light
with them; and the coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights are not available, they had to use a torch the most handy and
available; and what was more natural, than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them.
URBANO v. IAC – tetanus
Death must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds
infliction. Based on medical findings, the infection was an efficient intervening
cause distinct and foreign to the crime. Since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
MCKEE v. IAC – avoided darting boys then collided with another vehicle
Emergency rule – one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopts
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided that
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof. The doctrine applies only in a
situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but
the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
In relation to proximate cause: The subsequent negligence of the defendant in
failing to exercise ordinary case to avoid injury to the plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident.
Proof of Negligence
ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT – boy drowned
The party who alleges negligence has the burden to prove the same.
Presumption of Negligence
(1) Respondeat superior
(2) Violation of rules and statutes
a. Traffic rules
b. Statutes and Ordinances/Administrative rules
(3) Dangerous weapons and substances
(4) Res Ipsa Loquitur
Respondeat Superior (Arts. 1755-1756)
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
1755.
Respondeat Superior - A common-law doctrine that makes an employer liable
for the actions of an employee when the actions take place within the scope of
employment.
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PAL v. CA – co-pilot sustained head injury upon landing
The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers if for
the safety of passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the
complement operating the carrier,.
Even though there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and private respondent, the award of moral damages is still proper in view of
the finding of bad faith or malice. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT v. CA – collision at sea
The applicable law is the Civil Code. The law of the country to which the goods
are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration.
It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are
liable for the damage done when both are impleaded. In case of collision, both
the owner and the agent are civilly responsible for the acts of the captain.
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS v. ARGOS – libel
The designation of the nature of the action, or its title is not meaningless or of
no effect in the determination of its purpose. Here, what is alleged is the
subsidiary liability of the employer.
A pleading must be strictly construed against the pleader.
Art. 33 provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Art. 33 contemplates an action against the
employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the
employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any action brought
against the employer based on subsidiary liability before the conviction of its
employee is premature.
Employer’s subsidiary liability
(1) There is an employer-employee relationship
(2) The acts complained of must be done in the performance of one’s
duty
(3) The employee has been convicted and is insolvent
CASTILEX v. VASQUEZ – using company vehicle in the middle of the night
To hold the employer liable, the plaintiff must show that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
“Within the scope of the employee’s assigned tasks” includes any act done by
an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account
of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.
In this case, the mere fact that the employee was using a service vehicle at the
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle. It must appear that the
employee was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
Traffic Rules
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable. (n)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. (n)
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Presumption of Negligence
(1) At the time of the mishap, driver was violating any traffic regulation.
(2) Driver was found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months, even
though there is no traffic violation at the time of the mishap
Statutes and Ordinances/Administrative Rules
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES v. WCC – employee rode on company truck;
prohibited practice
Violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or Board is not negligence per
se but it may be evidence of negligence. In this case, the prohibition of the
employer couldn’t be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or
board. The referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of
negligence; but it declared that under the circumstances, the laborer could not
be declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition had nothing to
do with personal safety of the riders.
CIPRIANO v. CA – car left for rustproofing; subsequently burned down
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar a finding of
negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Petitioner’s negligence is the
source of the obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual
obligation due to negligence but for his negligence is not complying with a duty
imposed on law by him. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to
private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s
negligence in not ensuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of
the loss.
Violation of statutory duty is negligence per se.
FF CRUZ v. CA – no firewall; fire spread to surrounding houses
The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had
been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY v. CA – collision
Petitioner argues that (1) the other car only had one headlight on and (2) there
is decreased maneuverability because of overcapacity – not proven.
The swerving of petitioner’s panel truck to the opposite lane was the proximate
cause – driver was running the vehicle at very high speed and that he was
tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
N.B. When a policy enacted is primarily for the prevention of an injury, the
violation of such policy results to negligence per se (company policies included)
Dangerous weapons and substances
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
ARANETA v. ARREGLADO – Ateneo-La Salle
Moral damages are recoverable only by the party who suffered them and not
by his next of kin.
The father’s failure to submit the son to a plastic operation as soon as possible
does not prove that such treatment is not called for or that is cost, if actually
necessary, should not enter in the assessment of damages to which the injured
party is entitled.
Res ipsa loquitur – “the thing speaks for itself”; where the circumstances which
caused the accident are shown to have been under the exclusive management
or control of the defendant and in the normal course of events, the incident
would not have happened had such person used proper care, the inference is
that it occurred because of lack of such care
Elements:
(1) Accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent
(2) The cause of the injury was under the exclusive management or
control of the defendant
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(3) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured
N.B. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of inference and not presumption. Negligence is
inferred in the absence of any proof on the part of the plaintiff.
AFRICA v. CALTEX PHILIPPINES – fire broke out while refilling
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was
under the control of appellees (gas station). A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The people who knew or could have
known how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.
CEBU SHIPYARD v. WILLIAM LINES – fire broke out during repair
M/V Manila City caught fire and sank by reason of the negligence of Cebu
Shipyard, when the said vessel was under the exclusive custody and control of
the same.
DMCI v. CA – carpenter fell
Carpenter fell during construction – under the exclusive control and
management of DMCI. The defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred
when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or provide its
defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for
the application of the doctrine has been established.
NAPOCOR v. CA – flooded because of dam
In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have
explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to
reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the
part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at
the maximum lake elevation of 702m. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore.
PERLA COMPANIA v. SARANGAYA – car engine spew flames
Elements of res ipsa loquitur present:
(1) Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is
obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur
when a car engine is revved.
(2) The car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual.
Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and
ensure its proper functioning.
(3) There is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed
to the incident. They had no access to the car and had no
responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a
building they owned.
Defenses
(1) Plaintiff’s negligence is the proximate cause of injury
(2) Contributory negligence
(3) Assumption of risk
(4) Doctrine of last clear chance
(5) Prescription
(6) Force Majeure/Fortuitous event
(7) Diligence
(8) Mistake and Waiver
(9) Emergency or sudden peril doctrine
Plaintiff’s negligence is the proximate cause of injury
PLDT v. CA – swerving; accident mound
The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It
was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of
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respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of
the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes
to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to
danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
TEH LEH KIM v. PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI – passenger caught by propeller
Plaintiff-appellant, a passenger of a hydroplane belonging to defendant
company, acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it
was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him.
AMERICAN EXPRESS v. CORDERO – credit card denied
Private respondent’s failure to verify that he is indeed the authorized
cardholder is the cause of his humiliation and embarrassment.
Contributory negligence – Art. 2179
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
UMALI v. BACANI – boy electrocuted by live wire
Liability of the defendant is mitigated by the contributory negligence of the
parents of the boy in not providing for the proper and delegate supervision and
control over their 3 year old son.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC – protruding truck as proximate cause
Treated merely as contributory negligence:
(1) No curfew pass
(2) Speeding
(3) Headlights off
PCIB v. CA – checks as supposed payment for the CIR; syndicate
Drawee bank and collecting bank held solidarily liable for failure in their
obligations and for being negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
The banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and
confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such that the
appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree
of diligence.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature
of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and
employees. Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees.
ESTACION v. BERNARDO – passenger on rear end of jeepney
Respondent Noe’s act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera
showed his land of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him
harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that to hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning signs of an impending danger
to health and body. Respondent Noe’s act
RAKES v. ATLANTIC GULF – load fell; 50:50
The disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate cause, although not as its primary
cause. The plaintiff was forbidden from walking by the side of the car.
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PBCOM v. CA – bank teller
Proximate cause – assuming that private respondent was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, yet it cannot be denied that the
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury
incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure
Contributory negligence – private respondent was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. This omission amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages which may be
awarded.
LAMBERT v. HEIRS OF CASTILLON – collision
Proximate cause – sudden left turn
Contributory negligence – traveled at high speed and drank a bottle of beer
PNR v. BRUNTY – collision between vehicle and train
Proximate cause – failure to provide adequate warning signs. Every corporation
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where
such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and
erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free
passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed
thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the
necessity of looking out for train.
Contributory negligence – driver of the vehicle was driving at a speed of 70kph
and in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad
track.
Assumption of Risk – Art. 1174
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
AFIALDA v. HISOLE – carabao caretaker
The owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker. It
was the caretaker’s business to try and prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
TRANPORTO v. MIJARES – firecracker bet
Doctrine of volenti non fit injuria – “no wrong is done to him who consents”;
when a person, knowing and appreciating the danger and the risks, elects
voluntarily to encounter them, he can no more maintain an action founded
upon the statute than he can in cases to which the statute has no application;
that to which a persons assents is not esteemed, in law, an injury
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY – electrocution while on the way to check
business
Assumption of risk not applied in cases where an emergency is found to exist or
if the life or property of another is in peril. At the time the fatal incident
occurred, the deceased was at a place where she had a right to be. An
emergency was at hand as the deceased’s property, a source of her livelihood,
was faced with an impending loss.
CO v. CA – carnapped after delay in repair
Liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk. Carnapping is a normal business
risk for those engaged in the repaid of motor vehicles.
Doctrine of last clear chance – the doctrine of last clear chance simply means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
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A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third
person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident
RAYNARD v. HICETA – collision
The direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling
behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in
front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped
with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him.
Driver of vehicles who bump the rear end of another vehicle are presumed to
be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. The
rationale behind this presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full
control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of
him.
Prescription (Art. 1146)
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
KRAMER v. CA – collision at sea; Board of Maritime Inquiry
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action.
Elements:
(1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created
(2) An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right
(3) An act or omission on the part of the defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff
It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law
that a cause of action has arisen. The prescriptive period must be counted
when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the
commission of the act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is
the time when the cause of action arises.
The 4-year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative
body before he can file an action damages.
SPOUSES SANTOS v. PIZARRO – reservation; reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, the petitioners can
pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e. the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved
N.B. 10 years prescriptive period from the finality of judgment to enforce civil
claim arising ex delicto
DE GUZMAN v. TOYOTA CUBAO – engine crack
Under Art. 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the
buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller
for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the
respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner’s complaint for
damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty
against hidden defects, i.e. that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had
sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold
respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle
with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised
this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. Since petitioner
filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than 19 months counted from
November 29, 1997, the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle, his cause of
action had become time-barred.
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Force Majeure/Fortuitous Event (Art. 1174)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Fortuitous Event - a fortuitous event is an unforeseen event or, if foreseen,
inevitable. It is also called an act of God (if due to a natural occurrence, like an
earthquake) and force majeure if caused by man, such as war. There are
ordinary fortuitous events, which are events that normally happen, reasonable
foreseeable and inevitable (like flooding during a typhoon) and extraordinary
fortuitous events, which can't be foreseen/reasonably foreseen and don't
usually happen (like war).
To be excused because of a fortuitous event:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be
independent of human will
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligations in a normal manner
(4) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of
the injury resulting to the creditor
The general rule is that there is no liability in case of a fortuitous event. The
exceptions are the following:
(1) When the law itself expressly declares so:
a. The possessor is in bad faith and the thing is lost or
deteriorates because of the fortuitous event (Art. 552)
b. The obligor/debtor is in delay (Art. 1165)
c. When the debt of a thing certain and determinate proceeds
from a criminal offense, the debtor shall not be exempted
from the payment of its price, whatever may be the cause for
the loss, unless the thing having been offered by him to the
person who should receive it, the latter refused without
justification to accept it. (Art. 1268)
d. The bailee is liable for the loss of the thing, even if it should
be through a fortuitous event:
i. If he devotes the thing to any purpose different from
that for which it has been loaned;
ii. If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated, or
after the accomplishment of the use for which the
commodatum has been constituted;
iii. If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal
of its value, unless there is a stipulation exemption
the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous
event;
iv. If he lends or leases the thing to a third person, who
is not a member of his household;
v. If, being able to save either the thing borrowed or
his own thing, he chose to save the latter. (Art. 1942)
e. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
i. If he undertakes risky operations which the owner
was not accustomed to embark upon;
ii. If he has preferred his own interest to that of the
owner;
iii. If he fails to return the property or business after
demand by the owner;
iv. If he assumed the management in bad faith. (Art.
2147)
f. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall pay
legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable
for fruits received or which should have been received if the
thing produces fruits. He shall furthermore be answerable for
any loss or impairment of the thing from any cause, and for
damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it is
recovered. (Art. 2159)
(2) When expressly stated in the contract (Art. 1174)
(3) When the obligation's nature requires the assumption of risk (Art.
1174)
(4) When the obligor/debtor is in default or has promised to deliver the
same thing to 2 or more persons who don't have the same interest
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(5) The obligor/debtor contributed to the loss of the thing
(6) The obligor/debtor is guilty of fraud, negligence or delay or if he
violated the tenor of the obligation.
GOTESCO v. CHATTO – ceiling collapsed
The burden is upon the building owner to prove that the cause of the collapse
was due to force majeure.
Fore majeure as cause of accident is not necessarily exculpated where
negligence is also proved. Even assuming for the sake of argument, as
petitioner vigorously insists, the case of the collapse was due to force majeure,
petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the
trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier’s definition of and
Cockburn’s elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from any
liability because of it, he must have exercise, i.e., he should not have been
guilty of negligence
SERVANDO v. PHILIPPINE STEAM – delivery to warehouse; warehouse burned
down
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary
event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter
could not have foreseen the event.
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier incurred in delay in
the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only
notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the
same be withdrawn. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse
pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their
knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained
by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant,
the latter having no control whatsoever of the same.
YOBIDO v. CA – blown tire
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be
considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle.
Neither may the fact that the tire brought and used in the vehicle is of a brand
name noted form quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode
within five days’ use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused by
either defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a
caso foruito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.
A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure
or fortuitous event alone – the common carrier must still prove that it was not
negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. While it may
be true that the tire that blew up was still good because the grooves of the tire
were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a
fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was
due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney
driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden
blowing up therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure
injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident.
Diligence (Art. 2180, last paragraph)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
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The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (1903a)
ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER – boy drowned
The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or
death of a patron if said operation had exercised due diligence in the selection
of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence
required by law under the circumstances – in that it has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident
which may cause their death.
In this case – the swimming pools are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof,
towing line, oxygen resuscitator and first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the
pols in painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on
display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all
trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates
of proficiency.
DULAY v. CA – security guard shot Dulay; Alabang fair
There is no justification for limiting the scope of 2716 of the Civil Code to acts
or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
Art. 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional
The term “physical injuries” in Art. 33 has already been construed to include
bodily harms causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
RPC. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide.
GO v. IAC – bank teller; Floverto Jazmin v. Floverto Jasmin
Petitioner’s negligence is the root of all the inconvenience and embarrassment
experienced by the private respondent albeit they happened after the filing o
the complaint with the constabulary authorities. Petitioner Go’s negligence in
fact led to the swindling of his employer. Had Go exercised the diligence
expected of him as a bank officer and employee, he would have noticed the
glaring disparity between the payee’s name and address on the treasury checks
involved and the name and address of the depositor appearing in the bank’s
records. The situation would have been different if the treasury checks were
tampered only as to their amounts because the alteration would have been
unnoticeable and hard to detect. But the error in the name and address of the
payee was very patent and could not have escaped the trained eyes of bank
officers and employees. There is therefor, no other conclusion than that the
bank through its employees was grossly negligent in handling the business
transaction.
Mistake and Waiver
GATCHALIAN v. DELIM – purported waiver signed after accident
A waiver, to be valid and effect, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to intention of a person to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to hum. A waiver may not casually be
attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right bested in such person.
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals,
public policy or good customs. Note that in this case what is involved is a
common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by
an injured passenger would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to
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render that standard unenforceable. The Court held that the purported waiver
is offensive to public policy.
THEIS v. CA – mistake in parcel of land sold
A contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties
was procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence or undue influence.
Art. 1331 provides for the situations whereby mistake may invalidate consent.
In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance
of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which
have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. The
concept of error in this article includes both (1) ignorance, which is the absence
of knowledge with respect to and a thing, and (2) mistake, which is a wrong
conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some circumstances,
fact, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full
and correct knowledge about the thing.
YHT REALTY CORPORATION v. CA – hotel safety deposit box waiver
Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings – a twin duty
which the law does not allow to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called “undertakings” that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signatures.
Art. 2003 provides that the hotelkeeper cannot free himself from responsibility
by posing notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by
any guest. Any stipulation between the hotelkeeper and the guest whereby the
responsibility of the former is suppressed or diminished shall be void. The hotel
business like the common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest.
The provision which exempts hotelkeepers from liability if the loss is due to the
acts of the guests, family or visitors presupposes that the hotelkeeper is not
guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the
occurrence of the loss. A depositary is not responsible ofr the loss of goods by
theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to the loss.
Emergency or sudden peril doctrine – one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence,
if he fails to adopts what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
Before a plaintiff can invoke the emergency or sudden peril doctrine to avoid
an imputation of contributory negligence, it must appear that the emergency
or peril was solely caused by the negligence of the defendant. If the plaintiff’s
negligence led him into an emergency or peril, he cannot benefit from the rule.
The doctrine does not excuse a plaintiff’s contributory negligence if the
emergency was caused or contributed to by the plaintiff’s negligence, or was
occasioned by the concurrent negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. If
the plaintiff is responsible for a peril, he is not entitled to urge it as a ground for
recovery. (57 Am Jur 2d)
Criminal Negligence
What is important here?
Reservation is only needed if you’re claiming civil liability arising ex delicto.
What is prohibited is double recovery not double filing. The latter, of course, is
subject to the rules on forum shopping.
Vicarious Liability /Primary/Solidary Liability
Vicarious Liability (Arts. 2180-2182)
(1) Parents & guardians
(2) Owners & managers of enterprises
(3) Employers
a. Medical negligence/malpractice
(4) State
(5) Teachers/heads of establishments
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
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The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
(n)
Parents & Guardians
Owners & Managers of Enterprises
PESTANO v. SUMAYANG – collision; bus overtook motorcycle; defective
speedometer
Under Articles 2180 and 2176, owners and managers are responsible for
damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to
be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the
employer exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee.
Allowing the driver to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity
on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the
supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision
over its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. That fact that the
driver was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that the
employer was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care
of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law.
REAL v. BELO – LPG leak; food stall fire
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
CASTILEX v. VASQUEZ - using company vehicle in the middle of the night
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business
or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply. Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not
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accurate. The phrase “even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry” found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it
is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of
his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed
either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while
the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the
scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or
not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as
they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They
perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff
must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within
the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is not incumbent upon an employer to present evidence that its employee
was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor
vehicle mishap—it is not under obligation to prove such negative averment.
Employers
CARTICIANO v. NUVAL – collision; allegedly the dismissed driver stole the
vehicle which caused the mishap
The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the
scope of the authority given him when the collision occurred. That he had been
hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected.
True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was
presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s
vehicle. Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the driver was
authorized to operate the jeep only when the employer’s children were on
board the vehicle. Giving credence to this outlandish theory would enable
employers to escape their legal liabilities with impunity. Such loophole is easy
to concoct and is simply unacceptable.
The claim of respondent that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family is not borne out by the evidence. Neither is it supported by logic. His
main defense that at the time of the accident Darwin was no longer his
employee, having been merely hired for a few days, is inconsistent with his
other argument of due diligence in the selection of an employee.
Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the
vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of
proving proper selection of employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show
that he had satisfactorily discharged this burden.
LG FOODS v. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR – boy hit; driver committed suicide
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender.
Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised
 [TORTS AND DAMAGES UNDER ATTY. GO – MIDTERMS REVIEWER – ZANDRO JOSE E. GARCIA – BLOCK C BATCH 2017] 19
Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176
to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the
plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father
of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior
conviction of its employee. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known
his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with the
defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action or
lack of it based on the defendant’s perception that the plaintiff should have
opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Here, the
complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple’s minor son was
caused by the negligent act of the petitioners’ driver; and that the petitioners
themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing “to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if
exercised, would have prevented said accident.”
Medical negligence/malpractice
RAMOS v. CA – faulty intubation
Dec. 29, 1999
Res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that
the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
Anesthesiologist - Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. Dra.
Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the
operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with,
or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the
operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-
up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible
difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the first time only an
hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures
cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of
the physician’s centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this
medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
Surgeon - As the so-called “captain of the ship,”73 it is the surgeon’s
responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper
manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to
exercise the proper authority (as the “captain” of the operative team) in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In
fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified
if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it
does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another
procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy,
and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation. Because of this,
he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties
towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which
resulted in Erlinda’s condition.
Hospital - Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and
the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors
for petitioner’s condition.
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April 11, 2002
Anesthesiologist – same
Surgeon – same. Under the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, a surgeon is likened
to a captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in
the operating room. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away
with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that the Supreme Court
will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual
circumstances obtaining in the instant case justify the application of the
Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.
Hospital – reversed. It has been consistently held that in determining whether
an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the following
elements must be present:
(1) Selection and engagement of services;
(2) Payment of wages;
(3) The power to hire and fire; and
(4) The power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the means
to be used in reaching such an end.
There is no employer-employee relationship between a hospital and medical
consultants.—DLSMC maintains that first, a hospital does not hire or engage
the services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter and grants him or
her the privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients in the
hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the
necessary qualifications, such as accreditation by the appropriate board
(diplomate), evidence of fellowship and references. Second, it is not the
hospital but the patient who pays the consultant’s fee for services rendered by
the latter. Third, a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter
may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital. Lastly,
DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital, it
is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. The
hospital’s obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room
accommodation, the nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the doctor,
the equipment and facilities necessary for the treatment of the patient, as well
as the services of the hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of
ensuring that the doctor’s orders are carried out strictly. After a careful
consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that
respondent hospital’s position on this issue is meritorious. There is no
employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and
Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarity liable for the injury suffered by
petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
NOGALES v. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER – died during delivery
An exception to the general rule that a hospital is not liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor-physician is when the physician is the
“ostensible” agent of the hospital, which exception is also known as the
“doctrine of apparent authority.”
Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously
liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital,
regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the
patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an independent
contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows: For a
hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must
show that:
(1) The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to
be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
(2) Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the
plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
acquiesced in them; and
(3) The plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The element of “holding out” on the part of the hospital does not require an
express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent
is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as
a provider of emergency room care without informing the patient that the care
is provided by independent contractors.
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]hrough estoppel, an admission
or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot
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be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.” Estoppel rests
on this rule: “Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and
to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.”
PSI v. NATIVIDAD – gauze left during operation
Jan. 31, 2007 - employer, doctrine of apparent authority, corporate
negligence
Surgeon - An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To
put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an
inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that
such act is negligence per se.
Hospital – As employer – For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
As principal – Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which
have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for
negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a perfect
platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the
“holding out” theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel,
has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the
reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that
the relationship or the authority exists. The concept is essentially one of
estoppel and has been explained in this manner: “The principal is bound by the
acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the
agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing.
The question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act
placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is
justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular
act in question.
On Corporate Responsibility - Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate
negligence as the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability
for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the
application of respondeat superior or apparent authority. Its formulation
proceeds from the judiciary’s acknowledgment that in these modern times, the
duty of providing quality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative and
responsibility of the physician. The modern hospitals have changed structure.
Hospitals now tend to organize a highly professional medical staff whose
competence and performance need to be monitored by the hospitals
commensurate with their inherent responsibility to provide quality medical
care.
A hospital’s corporate negligence extends to permitting a physician known to
be incompetent to practice at the hospital. With the passage of time, more
duties were expected from hospitals, among them: (1) the use of reasonable
care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the
selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or
supervision of all persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the
formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that
ensure quality care for its patients.
February 11, 2008 – affirmed 2007 decision
Hospital - Contrary to PSI’s contention, the Court did not reverse its ruling in
Ramos. What it clarified was that the De Los Santos Medical Clinic did not
exercise control over its consultant, hence, there is no employer-employee
relationship between them. Thus, despite the granting of the said hospital’s
motion for reconsideration, the doctrine in Ramos stays, i.e., for the purpose of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship exists between hospitals and their consultants.
As principal – While in general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician, the hospital may be liable if the physician is
 22 [TORTS AND DAMAGES UNDER ATTY. GO – MIDTERMS REVIEWER – ZANDRO JOSE E. GARCIA – BLOCK C BATCH 2017]
the “ostensible” agent of the hospital, an exception also known as the
“doctrine of apparent authority” or sometimes referred to as the apparent or
ostensible agency theory.
The act of a hospital in displaying the names of physicians in the public
directory at the lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to the public that
it offers quality medical service through the listed physicians; Under the
doctrine of apparent authority, the question in every case is whether the
principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a
person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature
of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has
authority to perform the particular act in question.
On Corporate Responsibility - The duty of providing quality medical service is
no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility of the physician because the
modern hospital now tends to organize a highly-professional medical staff
whose competence and performance need also to be monitored by the
hospital commensurate with its inherent responsibility to provide quality
medical care. Such responsibility includes the proper supervision of the
members of its medical staff. Accordingly, the hospital has the duty to make a
reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and
administered by the physicians practicing in its premises.
The corporate negligence doctrine imposes several duties on a hospital: (1) to
use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and
equipment; (2) to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) to oversee
as to patient care all persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) to
formulate, adopt, and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality
care for its patients. These special tort duties arise from the special relationship
existing between a hospital or nursing home and its patients, which are based
on the vulnerability of the physically or mentally ill persons and their inability to
provide care for themselves.
February 2, 2010 – no employer-employee relationship, doctrine of apparent
authority, corporate negligence
While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in
reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of
its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. Within that reality,
three legal relationships crisscross:
(1) Between the hospital and the doctor practicing within its premises;
(2) Between the hospital and the patient being treated or examined
within its premises and
(3) Between the patient and the doctor.
The exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the
liability of the hospital for the negligence of the doctor.
No employer-employee relationship - To allay the anxiety of the intervenors,
the Court holds that, in this particular instance, the concurrent finding of the
RTC and the CA that PSI was not the employer of Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as
a determinative factor in testing the employer-employee relationship between
doctor and hospital under which the hospital could be held vicariously liable to
a patient in medical negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established by
preponderance of evidence. Here, there was insufficient evidence that PSI
exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and the
details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the
treatment of Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot be held vicariously liable for
the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of respondeat superior.
As principal - There is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out
to the patient (Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are
the two factors that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital’s implied
manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor
was the hospital’s agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct
of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
On Corporate Responsibility - As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of
operation and consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during
Natividad’s operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to
others—to Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad, and to Natividad
herself to complain before it took any meaningful step. By its inaction,
therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital care. It committed corporate
negligence.
It should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is
different from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The duties of the
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hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-consultant practicing within its
premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as
a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from
that of Dr. Ampil.
State
Teachers//heads of establishment
Republic Act No. 10586 – Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013
SEC. 13. Direct Liability of Operator and/or Owner of the Offending Vehicle. –
The owner and/or operator of the vehicle driven by the offender shall be
directly and principally held liable together with the offender for the fine and
the award against the offender for civil damages unless he or she is able to
convincingly prove that he or she has exercised extraordinary diligence in the
selection and supervision of his or her drivers in general and the offending
driver in particular.
This section shall principally apply to the owners and/or operators of public
utility vehicles and commercial vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo trucks,
container trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for
rent, taxi cabs, and the like.
Primary Liability (Articles 2183-2193)
(1) Possessors/users of animals
(2) Owners of motor vehicles
(3) Manufacturers & processors
(4) Municipal Corporations
(5) Building proprietors
(6) Engineers/architects/contractors
Possessors/Users of animals (Art. 2183)
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be
lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
Owners of motor vehicles (Art. 2184)
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable. (n)
MALLARI v. CA – father – owner; son – driver
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is
binding against petitioner Mallari, Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the
passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in
an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. Under Art.
1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.
Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to
passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s
employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that
it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees. Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by
Mallari, Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury or death that might be suffered by its
passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
Manufacturers & Processors (Art. 2187)
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles
 24 [TORTS AND DAMAGES UNDER ATTY. GO – MIDTERMS REVIEWER – ZANDRO JOSE E. GARCIA – BLOCK C BATCH 2017]
and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or
harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them
and the consumers. (n)
COCA-COLA v. CA – business owner closed down business because of fiber
like substance
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error
or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in
all obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances.
Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their
obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are
liable for damages.
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While
it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a
general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may
itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict.
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations.
Municipal Corporations (Art. 2189)
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision. (n)
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO – manhole; eyeglasses hit
Where a person "fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole
on P. Burgos Avenue," which street is under the control or supervision of the
City of Manila, the latter is liable for damages for the injuries suffered by the
former. The liability of the City of Manila in the case at bar is governed by
Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides that: "Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision."
Section 4 of Republic Act 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code
governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province,
city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or
supervision" over said street or road.
JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILA – manhole; 4 inch nail
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either
"control or supervision" over the public building in question. In the case at bar,
there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management
and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the control of the former. The fact of supervision
and control of the City over subject public market was admitted by Mayor
Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata. In fact, the
City of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose
primary duty is-to take direct supervision and control of that particular market,
more specifically, to check the safety of the place for the public.
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasidelict, one must have
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil
Code). There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise
reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people
frequenting the place for their marketing needs. While it may be conceded that
the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods, it
must however, be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken
during good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb under those
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difficult circumstances. For instance, the drainage hole could have been placed
under the stalls instead of on the passage ways. Even more important is the
fact, that the City should have seen to it that the openings were covered. Sadly,
the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell into the opening, it was
already uncovered, and five (5) months after the incident happened, the
opening was still uncovered. Moreover, while there are findings that during
floods the vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water (Decision,
AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 17), there is no showing that such practice has
ever been prohibited, much less penalized by the City of Manila. Neither was it
shown that any sign had been placed thereabouts to warn passers-by of the
impending danger.
GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN – manhole; leg fractured
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or
supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to
the petitioner under article 2189 of the Civil Code is clear.
QUEZON CITY V. DACARA – street diggings
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for
quasidelicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There
can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in
physical injury. In this case, only the damage to property was proven.
Republic Act No. 7160 – Local Government Code
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials
are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to
property.
Building Proprietors (Art. 2190-2191, 2193)
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with
due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which
have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure;
(4) (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is
responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.
(1910)
DEROY v. CA – wall collapsed
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do
so.
The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.”
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Engineers/Architects/Contractors (Arts. 2192 & 1723)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the
result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third
person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect
or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
(1909)
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications
for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion
of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans
and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is
likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period,
on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If
the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily
liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of
the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the
building. (n)
Solidary Liability (Art. 2194)
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-
delict is solidary. (n)
LANUZO v. PING – rammed into house
Employee liable under 2176. Employer liable under 2180. The liability of the
employer is also primary and direct under 2180. For failure of the employer to
rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision
of his employee, he is likewise responsible for the damages caused by the
negligent act of his employee, and his liability is primary and solidary.
Although the employer is solidarily liable with the employee for damages, the
employer may demand reimbursement from his employee for whatever
amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter’s
claim.
GELISAN v. ALDAY – Gelisan-owner; Espiritu-theft; Alday-contract with
Espiritu; franchise
The claim of the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease contract
executed by and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to
third persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease contract,
adverted to, had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. It is
settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is
transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the
transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons.
Gelisan, the registered owner, is not without recourse. He has a right to be
indemnified by Espiritu for the amount that he may be required to pay as
damages for the injury caused to Alday, since the lease contract, although not
effective against the public for not having been approved by the Public Service
Commission, is valid and binding between the contracting parties.
PHILIPPINE RABIT LINES v. IAC – sudden U-turn
The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of
breach of the contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between
the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the
carrier is exclusively responsible therefor to the passenger, even if such breach
be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither
shift his liability on the contract to his driver, nor share it with him, for his
driver’s negligence is his. Secondly, if we make the driver jointly and severally
liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier’s liability personal instead of
merely vicarious and consequently, entitled recover only the share which
corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Art. 2181.
Note that in this case, what is alleged only is a violation of the contract of
carriage. The driver was not imputed.
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PNCC v. CA – sugar; NLEX
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more
persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the acts of the other tort-feasor.
PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness,
and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two
successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of
Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are solidarily liable.
CHAN v. IGLESIA NI CRISTO – septic tank; hidden treasure
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. As a general rule, joint tort-feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet
the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done if done for their
benefit.
Strict Liability Torts – Exceptionally, liability is created even where there may
have been no fault or negligence
(1) Possessors/users of animals
(2) Manufacturers and processors
(3) Head of family
Possessors/Users of Animals (Art. 2183)
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be
lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
VESTIL v. IAC – dog bite
What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of
the house.
The petitioner’s contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote
control is not acceptable. In fact, Art. 2183 holds the possessor liable even if
the animal should escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. And it
does not matter either that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the
child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers
even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that the victim was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the
animal.
Manufacturers & Processors (Art. 2187)
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles
and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or
harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them
and the consumers. (n)
Head of Family (Art. 2193)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is
responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.
(1910)
Special Torts (Human Relations)
(1) Abuse of Right (Art. 19)
(2) Contrary to Law and Morals (Arts. 20-21)
(3) Unjust Enrichment (Arts. 22-23)
(4) Judicial Vigilance (Art. 24)
(5) Thoughtless Extravagance (Art. 25)
(6) Disrespect for Person (Art. 26)
(7) Dereliction of Duty (Art. 27)
(8) Unfair Competition (Art. 28)
(9) Violation of Civil/Political Right (Art. 32)
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Abuse of Right (Art. 19)
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
VELAYO v. SHELL – Shell PH assigned credit to Shell US
Where a creditor takes advantage of his knowledge of the insolvency
proceedings, said credit acts in bad faith and betrays the confidence and trust
of the other creditors of the insolvent for which he is held liable in accordance
with Art. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Contrary to Law and Morals (Arts. 20-21)
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
HERMOSISSIMA v. CA – teacher, 10 years older, got pregnant
Breach of promise to marry is not actionable from the clear and manifest intent
of Congress to remove provisions on such matter.
The “seduction” contemplated in Art. 2219, as one where moral damages may
be recovered, is the crime punished under the RPC. Where a woman, who was
an insurance agency and former high school teacher, around 36 years old and
approximately 10 years than the man, had intimate relationships with him, it
cannot be said that he is morally guilty of seduction.
PONCE v. LEGASPI – disbarment; malicious prosecution
Malicious prosecution may be invoked against a disbarment proceeding as the
latter is judicial in character.
In order, however, for the malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff
must prove:
(1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with
acquittal;
(2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable
cause; and
(3) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is
by improper or sinister motive.
Malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the
action.
In this case, there was probable cause in the original disbarment case, hence
the subsequent malicious prosecution case will not prosper.
Unjust Enrichment (Art. 22-23)
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was
not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for
indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
PECSON v. CA – BPS analogy
Where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, issue of
good faith or bad faith is completely irrelevant. Thus, in strict point of law, Art.
448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, the Court applied the law
since the primary intent of Art. 448 is to avoid a state of co-ownership.
The purpose of Art. 546 is to administer justice between the parties involved.
Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the
improvement which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary
ruling would unjustly enrich private respondents who would otherwise be
allowed to acquire a highly valued income yielding, four-unit apartment
building for a measly amount.
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SECURITY BANK v. CA – increased construction costs
To allow petitioner bank to acquire the constructed building at a price far
below its actual construction would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment
for the bank to the prejudice of private respondent. Such unjust enrichment is
not allowed by law.
Judicial Vigilance (Art. 24)
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties
is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection.
CRUZ v. NLRC – quitclaim null and void; OFW
It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. Here
there a gross discrepancy between the amount claimed and the amount
allegedly waived.
This decision once again demonstrates the tenderness of the Court toward the
worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer.
The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the
inconvenience and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better
life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.
Thoughtless Extravagance (Art. 25)
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a
period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the
courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution.
Disrespect for Person (Art. 26)
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
TENCHANVEZ v. ESCANO – marriage; woman went abroad
The desertation and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages.
An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does
not lie in the absence of proof or malice or unworthy motives on their part. In
this case, such claim was not proven against the parents.
On the other hand, such false claim against the parents caused them unrest
and anxiety, entitled them to recover damages.
Dereliction of Duty (Art. 27)
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
JAVELLANA v. TAYO – mayor v. municipal council
If the sessions of a municipal council, at which a majority of the members were
present, were held on the days set for the regular sessions of that council,
authorized and approved in a previous resolution, said sessions are valid and
legal under the provisions of the Admin Cod to the effect that “the majority of
the council elected shall constitute a quorum to do business.”
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The award of moral damages to a councilor as a consequence of the municipal
mayor’s refusal to perform his official duties is proper under Art. 27.
Unfair Competition (Art. 28)
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises
or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
MANILA ORIENTAL v. NLU – 36 out of 37 formed new union
Where the purpose of the transfer from one labor organization to another is
merely to disregard and circumvent the contract entered into between the
same employees and the petitioner, knowing fully well that such contract was
effective for one year, and was entered into with the sanction of the ICR, such
act cannot be sanctioned in law or in equity as it is in derogation of the
principle underlying the freedom of contract and the good faith that should
exist in contractual relations. If a CBA is made use as a subterfuge, or as a
means to subvert valid commitments, it outlives it purpose, for far from being
an aid, it tends to undermine harmonious relations between management and
labor. Such a move cannot be considered lawful and cannot receive the
sanction of the Court.
SPINNER v. HESSLEIN – Wigan
The law concerning unfair competition is broader and more inclusive than that
of trademarks. The law concerning the infringement of trademark is more
limited range, but within its narrower range recognizes a more exclusive right
derived from the adoption and registration of the trademark by the person
whose goods or business are first associated therewith.
As a tort of unfair competition is broader, one who fails to establish protection
under trademarks, may yet obtain relief on the ground of his competitor’s
unfairness or fraud. Any conduct may be said to constitute unfair competition if
the effect is to pass off on the public the goods of one man as the goods of
another. It is not necessary that any particular means should be sued to this
end.
Unfair competition – a person is guilty of unfair competition who in selling his
goods shall give them the general appearance of foods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages in which they
are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their
appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the
goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual
manufacturer or dealer.
Violation of Civil/Political Right (Art. 32)
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his
behalf;
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(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise
of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act
or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance
of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his
act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
LIM v. PONCE DE LEON – fiscal; no authority to issue search warrant
A provincial fiscal is without authority to issue a warrant. In the seizure of a
stolen property, a search warrant is still necessary and that in issuing a search
warrant, a judge alone determines whether or not there is probable cause. The
fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure without
a warrant.
Pursuant to Arts. 32 and 2219, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public
officer or employee responsible therefor.
To be liable under Art. 32, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants
should have acted with malice or bad faith.
MHP GARMENTS v. CA – boy scout uniform; no proper warrant
A warrantless arrest can only be undertaken under the following circumstance:
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as a proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
Where a warrantless search and seizure is conducted despite the fact that
there is sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant, the persons who
participate therein take the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would
be proved to violate the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Private persons who instigate an illegal warrantless search and seizure may be
held liable for damages. Private persons who initiate an illegal warrantless
search and seizure, accompany the raiding team and stand by during operation,
apparently assenting thereto, are liable for damages to the same extent as the
public officers themselves.
ABS-CBN v. CA – “Maging Sino Ka Man”
An acceptance of an offer must be unqualified and absolute, i.e., it must be
identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or
meeting of the minds.
Except as provided by law or stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for
actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. In case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which
the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the
constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith malice,
or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and
quasi-delict, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, whether or
not such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonable been foreseen
by the defendant.
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The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract,
delict, or quasi-delict. Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can
only be based on Articles 19, 20 and 21. The elements of abuse of right under
Art. 19 are:
(1) The existence of a legal right or duty
(2) Which is exercised in bad faith; and
(3) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Art. 20 speaks of general sanction for all other provisions of law which dot not
especially provide for their own sanction while Art. 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal
(2) But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy, and;
(3) It is done with intent to injure.
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Arts. 19, 20 and 21. Malice or
bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.
In this case, there is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or
bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had
undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft
contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result
from a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnun absque injuria.
BRICKTOWN v. CA – contract of sell; lots; did not even meet downpayment
The relationship between parties in any contract must always be characterized
and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.
The cancelation of the contracts to sell by petitioner corporation accords with
the contractual covenants of the parties, and such cancelation must be
respected. It may be noteworthy to add that in a contract to sell, the non-
payment of the purchase price can prevent the obligation to convey title from
acquiring any obligatory force.
NEWSWEEK v. IAC – alleged libelous article; “Island of Fear”
To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be identifiable, although it is
not necessary that he be named. Defamatory matter which does not reveal the
identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of
action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the
personality of the individual defamed.
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed to a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply
to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each
individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need
be.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue
for the benefit of all or where the representation of class interest affected by
the judgment or decree is indispensible to make each member of the class an
actual party. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.
MVRS PUBLICATIOn v. ISLAMIC DA’WAH – alleged libelous article on Muslims
Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se,
and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natures, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute as basis for an action
for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact
that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by
itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to
advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding
right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press.
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Defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part
of an individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory
matter.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL v. SOLUTA – hotel v. union; marijuana
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by
implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence
of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must
be proof of the following:
(1) That the right exists;
(2) That the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and
(3) That the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
made.
A violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be
the basis for the recovery of damages under Art. 32 in relation to Art. 2219 (6)
and (10).
RCPI v. VERCHEZ – delayed telegram
In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. A
breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to
preserve the interests of the promise that may include his “expectation
interest” which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in
as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
or his “reliance interest” which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss
caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made or his “restitution
interest” which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to
observe his contractual obligation unless he show extenuating circumstances,
like (1) proof of his exercise of due diligence or (2) the attendance of a
fortuitous event.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI (note that
there is human agency in this case), it should have at least informed Grace of
the non-transmission or the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to
remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence. Knowing
that important messages are coursed through petitioner, it is incumbent upon
them to exercise a greater amount of care and concern than that shown in this
case. Every reasonable effort to inform senders of the non-delivery of messages
should be undertaken.
PEA v. GANAC-CHU – expropriation; pepper trees
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for
actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as duly proved.
In this case, the ownership of the land is immaterial. There is no dispute,
however, that respondent owned the pepper trees that were destroyed by
petitioner. Even assuming that petitioner owns the property, there was no
excuse for petitioner to disregard respondent’s rights over her trees. The
exercise of one’s rights it not without limitations. Having rights should not be
confused with the manner in which the right should be exercised.
Property rights must be considered not as absolute, unrestricted dominions but
as an aggregation of qualified privileges, the limits of which are prescribed by
the equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and obligations necessary for
the highest enjoyment of property by the entire community of proprietors.
Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal therefor, but the exercise
of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule under Art. 19
requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due, and to
observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which
discards these norms resulting to damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
 34 [TORTS AND DAMAGES UNDER ATTY. GO – MIDTERMS REVIEWER – ZANDRO JOSE E. GARCIA – BLOCK C BATCH 2017]

Damages

Concept/Kinds of Damages (Art. 2197)

Art. 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.

SPOUSES ONG v. CA – passenger v. Inland and Philtranco; CA reduced

damages

The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that one injured by a

breach of contract (in this case, the contract of transportation) or by a wrongful
or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation,
commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant’s
acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the general rule, except where
the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages

Actual damages – compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in
the position which he had been before he was injured.