GE a New Way Forward_HW Case BPS (1)

9- 7 2 3 - 3 73
NOV EMBER 7, 2022
DAVID COLLIS
HAISLEY WERT
GE: A New Way Forward?

One of the most iconic American companies, General Electric (GE) was founded in 1892 in New
York state. Named among the original dozen companies on the Dow Jones index in 1896, it was the
list’s most tenacious holdout,1 maintaining its “blue chip” stock status for over one hundred years.2
Throughout its history, GE survived, indeed initiated, revolutions across industries, technologies, and
managerial practices. Far from its original scope of providing affordable electricity and light, it
expanded into a diverse set of businesses including healthcare, transportation, aviation, computing,
entertainment, and financial services.3 Its innovations included a litany of firsts that defined progress
in the twentieth century, pioneering the first voice radio broadcast, radar, home television, medical
imaging, and X-ray, among other inventions.4
GE also set the gold standard for American management in executive training, strategic planning,
quality initiatives, and portfolio selection. GE founded the oldest corporate university in the U.S. in
1956.5,6 Its venerated Crotonville, New York residential training center served to “inspire, connect, and
develop” high-achieving leadership.7 The 60-acre bucolic campus convened executives from around
the globe, including attendance for twelve weeks for the center's flagship advanced management
course.8 The company also led major trends in strategic planning, from the introduction of the Strategic
Business Unit structure in the 1960s and 1970s to a dramatically streamlined, delayered approach in
the 1980s and 1990s.9 Further, GE set cross-industry benchmarks for quality through its acclaimed Six
Sigma program. Launched in 1996, this aimed to slash defect levels to 1/10,000 and lower quality costs
by $8 to $12 billion.10 Its later evolution to a lean enterprise in the first decades of the 2000s signaled a
shift towards agility and resilience.11 The company’s original approach to portfolio configuration led it
to expand from its “electricity” core into adjacent businesses. Organic growth and invention turned
into a strategy of mergers and acquisitions that opened the era of GE as a “conglomerate.” The
progression of the portfolio from products into services, including financial services, towards the end
of the 20th century completed GE’s business evolution. With a track-record of excellence and
adaptation, GE represented the epitome of American management to which competitors aspired.
By the time award-winning “Manager of the Century” Jack Welch retired from his position as CEO
in 2001, GE’s market capitalization was over $410 billion (Exhibit 1).12,13 That peak was never
surpassed, and the subsequent decline tested company leadership. Welch’s hand-picked successor
CEO Jeffrey Immelt oversaw GE’s near-bankruptcy in 2008 and warranted SEC penalties for
misleading investors between 2015 and 2017.14,15,16 Media critiqued his replacement, John Flannery,
for lacking urgency as he slashed the company’s once-coveted dividend in half.17 After another Board
Professor David Collis and Research Associate Haisley Wert prepared this case. This case was developed from published sources. Funding for the
development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class
discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Copyright © 2022 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied,
or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.
This document is authorized for use only in Sebrek Szabolcs 's Business Policy and Strategy 23/24/2. at Corvinus University of Budapest from Mar 2024 to Sep 2024.
723-373 GE: A New Way Forward?
intervention, H. Lawrence Culp became the first outsider CEO in the company’s history.18 With a
changing landscape that had rendered Welch’s handbook outdated and recent leadership that had been
heavily criticized, Larry Culp faced looming strategic challenges.19 Would his financial, managerial,
and structural transformation empower long-term value creation? (See Exhibits 1–5).
Laying the Groundwork for a Legacy

The year 1879 marked a victory for serial inventor and entrepreneur Thomas Edison. After testing
more than 3,000 lightbulb filament designs over two years at his Menlo Park, New Jersey laboratory,
he finally succeeded in developing the world’s first incandescent light bulb with a life of 40 hours. 20,21
Making haste, Edison filed for a patent that week.22 The invention came to exemplify GE’s founding
value: relentless pursuit to deliver the next breakthrough.
By 1889, Thomas Edison’s electricity-related business interests—the Edison Lamp Company,

Edison Machine Works, and Bergmann & Company—were consolidated with its patent-holding
financier, the Edison Electric Light Company.23 One acquisition and three years later, the Edison
General Electric Light Company merged with competitor Thomson-Houston Electric Company to
become General Electric.24
GE then trailblazed inventions that fundamentally changed daily life. The company developed the
first electric locomotive in 1893, X-ray machine in 1896, voice radio broadcast in 1906, electric home
appliances in 1922, home television in 1927, moldable plastic in the 1930s and 1940s, the American jet
engine in 1941, commercial nuclear power plant in 1957, lasers in 1962, and medical imaging devices
in 1976.25
Throughout the decades, hundreds of companies remade themselves in the structural image of
GE.26 In the 1930s and 1940s, GE led the trend towards centralization. Subsequently, CEOs Ralph
Cordiner (1950–1963) and Fred Borch (1963–1972) led pushes toward decentralization to confront the
“profitless growth” of the 1960s.27 To do so, they implemented two key changes. First, Cordiner
identified GE’s largest limitation as a lack of managerial capacity. To equip management with the
agency and shared cultural values needed for decentralization, he founded GE’s training center at
Crotonville.28 The estate, one hour north of New York City, quickly became an epicenter of cultural
values and leadership know-how, even as GE expanded its training initiatives worldwide.29 By the
2010s, GE invested about $1 billion annually in professional development across all levels of the
organization.30 Other large companies followed by establishing their own corporate training centers.31
The second major change to facilitate decentralization was the creation of Strategic Business Units each
with P&L responsibility, which reduced the number of businesses reviewed by the CEO from 190 to
43. To further reduce corporate involvement in business plans, the company’s seventh CEO, Reginald
Harold Jones (1972–1981) added an additional organizational layer, sectors.32
When Reginald Jones passed the torch to his mentee Jack Welch in 1981, GE was in solid standing.
Reginald Jones had just won the title of “Most Influential Man in Business” from the U.S. News &
World Report in 1980. Under his eight-year stead, GE revenues had more than doubled, from $10
billion to $22 billion.33 But that was only the beginning.
‘Neutron’ Jack Welch

By the time CEO Jack Welch retired in 2001, GE’s market cap had multiplied nearly 30-fold from
$14 billion to $410 billion. Its revenue had quintupled over his twenty-year tenure, and Welch bore the
GE: A New Way Forward? 723-373
accolades to match. Fortune magazine dubbed him the “Manager of the Century” and the Financial
Times had honored GE with the title of the “World’s Most Respected Company” for the previous three
years.34 The GE that Welch bequeathed was global and had expanded beyond its traditional
manufacturing realm into financial services and entertainment. 35 Significantly, with a 23% per annum
shareholder return over his tenure, investors regarded GE stock as the gold standard.36
GE’s 1981–2001 era was characterized by Jack Welch’s results-driven and blunt leadership style.
‘Neutron’ Jack did not win his achievements through instant likeability.37 His pejorative moniker was
derived from the Neutron bomb which eradicated people but left physical structures unharmed.38 Even
so, Welch’s approach earned approval with oft-repeated aphorisms exemplifying his principles: “Face
reality,” he directed. “Change, before you have to.”39 For Welch, bureaucracy was the enemy and
targeted action was the means to control GE’s destiny.
Early Years of Overhaul

In the first years as CEO, Welch radically restructured the company to make it more lean and agile
through three main mechanisms.
“Fix, Sell, or Close” To drive performance, Welch challenged each of the 43 Strategic Business
Units to secure the #1 or #2 spot in their industry. 40 If they did not or could not outline a way achieve
market leadership, they were to be disposed of. Between 1981 and 1990, GE sold more than 200
businesses for over $11 billion, while making over 370 acquisitions to the tune of $21 billion. 41
Personnel Reductions Welch also ordered significant staff cuts at all levels. The halving of the
200-person strategic planning group symbolized the overhaul at corporate headquarters. In 1986, he
fired or replaced 12 of the 14 business heads to ensure that all those remaining had an iron-clad
commitment to GE values. Even accounting for acquisitions, total employee numbers decreased from
404,000 in 1980 to 292,000 in 1989.42
Confronting Bureaucratic Processes Welch tossed the strategic planning system that had
been a Hallmark of Reginald Jones’ tenure. He replaced it with a five-page playbook for “real time
planning.” The concise document answered one question per page. It addressed the market,
competitive landscape, GE’s current response, the largest anticipated challenge in the three-year
medium term, and GE’s game plan to attack that challenge. To further simplify unwieldy decision and
reporting lines, Welch got rid of the sector level hierarchy and reduced the number of reporting levels
from nine to, in some instances, four. This change cleared the way for all businesses to report to the
CEO. Additionally, he changed budgeting benchmarks: rather than gauging against past performance,
the new budget system set goals against external market metrics.43
Crafting the Organizational Culture to Sustain Change

With the structural component of change cemented, Welch turned to the cultural DNA of GE
reflecting his belief that a CEO’s job was primarily to cultivate the talent of people in his organization.
From the late 1980s to mid 1990s, he implemented several programs to align staff and company goals.
“Work Out” In Fall 1988, Welch devised the “Work Out” program to systematically solicit and
implement bottom-up, action-ready proposals.44 “Work Out” was a two-to-three-day forum where
anywhere from 20 to 100 participants in a business presented rapid-fire proposals in response to a pre-
defined challenge. The manager was required to provide a clear decision on the spot, whether it be yes,
no, or a request for specific further information and a decide-by date. Proposals were implemented
within 90 days, with monthly check-ins between the ‘agents’ and ‘drivers.’45
Going Global In 1987, Welch refined the “#1 or #2” ultimatum: businesses must not only lead
in the domestic market, but the global market. He campaigned for a series of international deals,
promoting the President of GE Europe Paolo Fresco to membership in the four-person corporate
executive office. Jack Welch also steered regional investments during their economic downturns. In
Europe between 1989-1995, GE made $17.5 billion in investments, in Mexico in 1995 he acquired sixteen
companies within six months, and in Japan from 1997-1998, GE acquired $15 billion of companies.
Between 1993 and 1998, international sales almost doubled to $42.8 billion.46
Maximizing Human Capital Insistent on engineering a workforce of people who delivered

targets and shared GE core values, Welch instituted rigorous evaluation processes. Each year,
managers were required to rank the top 20%, middle 70%, and bottom 10% of their staff—and fire the
bottom 10%.47 For senior executives, the annual Florida Conference presented the opportunity to share
best practices, reinforce corporate values, and establish new corporate initiatives.
The Final Stretch

In the 1990s, as growth in the industrial sector slowed and his compulsory retirement date
approached, Welch was intent on accelerating GE’s momentum.
Boundaryless Growth Welch envisioned a “boundaryless” company, without the silos

between traditional functions, domestic and international operations, or between salaried and hourly
employees. Without rigid barriers, businesses could share processes and resources. The
“boundaryless” initiative also provided a pathway to integration for new acquisitions and partnerships
with outsiders.48
Stretch Goals From the beginning of the decade, Jack Welch promoted stretch goals to managers
that were set alongside standard budget targets. Emphasizing that they were to be challenging yet
attainable goals even if they did not have a clear pathway to be reached, they promoted organizational
efficiency and creative empowerment and yet were not punishable if not achieved. 49
Moving into Services By 1995, middle managers convinced Welch of a realization that he called
a “punch in the nose”—that the service sector was too big an opportunity to miss. GE then pivoted to
aggressively pursue services. By providing maintenance support and productivity insights for
customers’ existing physical assets, such as airplanes and hospital equipment, GE services achieved
$10 billion in revenue just three years after its launch.50 The prime example became jet engines which
were now sold as “flight hours” rather than as a capital good.
In parallel, GE moved aggressively into financial services with the growth of GE Capital, which
encompassed international real estate assets, a commercial American lending business and a sponsor
finance business. At its height, GE Capital accounted for 60% of the company’s earnings51 having
grown voraciously from its 1950s origins financing consumers' appliance purchases.52 GE Capital’s
competitive advantage had been its symbiotic relationship with GE product divisions and its triple-A
credit rating that shaved the cost of capital to be the lowest in the financial services industry. 53
Additionally, as GE was not technically a bank, it avoided regulations that restricted competitors.54
Last but not least, GE Capital provided funds to smooth quarterly earnings reports—from selling part
of a parking lot on the day before the quarter's close, to selling and rebuying assets on days that
straddled the report. None the wiser, Wall Street had lauded the resulting steadiness in GE's results. 55
Six Sigma In 1995, Jack Welch implemented a Six Sigma program to make quality the backbone
of GE and so reduce the cost structure. Through compulsory training, every employee had to become
certified within three years. By 2000, Six Sigma had generated $2.5 billion in savings56 while between
1995 to 1999, GE’s operating profit margin grew from 14.4% to 17.3%.57
GE Under Jeffrey Immelt

Jeffrey Immelt, the 44-year-old head of GE Medical Systems, stepped into his role as CEO in 2001.
Hand-picked by Jack Welch, Immelt mirrored his predecessor: he worked in GE Plastics for a portion
of his career, had a reputation for exacting high-quality work from those he supervised, and ran the
first GE division to implement and reap the rewards of Six Sigma.58 Immelt's characteristic sheen of
optimism and salesmanship bolstered his projections,59 yet over the course of his leadership GE stock
fell around 30%, losing $150 billion in market valuation.60
GE’s Steep Decline

Several key events defined Immelt’s sixteen-year tenure as CEO. Four days after assuming his role,
9/11 shocked the nation. The economic ramifications impacted several GE businesses; shares
plummeted 20%.61
Next, during the 2008 Financial Crisis, GE nearly went bankrupt. At the epicenter of the turmoil
was GE Capital. To avoid bankruptcy in October that year, Warren Buffet kept GE afloat with $3 billion
in funding and the company announced that it would sell $12 billion in common stock. The need for
the infusion was utterly unexpected. Less than a week prior, Immelt confidently told a Wall Street
analyst that GE felt “very secure about how the funding looks." But Immelt missed the warning signs
that triggered Bear Sterns’ collapse, and when the market froze, GE Capital could not buy nor sell
financial assets at the end of the quarter, causing it to miss profit targets by $700 million. 62 Investors
expressed outrage at GE’s newly-revealed smoothing practice, and GE’s stock slid 42%.63 Meanwhile,
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act deemed GE a “Systematically Important Financial Institution,” which placed
GE under the purview of new regulations.64 That year, although GE was still the “world’s biggest
company” according to Forbes, its revenue, profit, and stock market valuation dipped.65
Another emblematic event in Immelt’s attempt to build advantage through building GE’s scale was
the $10.6 billion acquisition of the Alstom power business in November 2015.66 GE's largest acquisition
in history, Immelt believed the deal would center GE Power as the future of the company and make
the pivot away from GE Capital possible. Immelt's confidence even led the unit's head, Steve Bolze, to
pitch a CAGR of 5%, well above the global benchmark and just before a substantial market decline as
renewables replaced traditional gas and coal power plants. Challenged to integrate Alstom, which was
laden with surplus employees and cumbersome assets that were protected under French law, 67 GE
Power sold receivables to GE Capital and incentivized customers to extend their contracts for a
discount, in order to prolong the appearance of growth.
Immelt’s management of the power division sowed the seeds for future SEC charges and dividend
cuts. In October 2018, GE incurred a $22 billion dollar goodwill impairment charge for its acquisition
of Alstom and the downturn in the power market.68 The charge necessitated Immelt’s successor cutting
the dividend from 12 cents to 1 cent per share.69 In 2020 the SEC leveled a $200 million charge against
GE for misleading investors over the performance of its power and insurance divisions.70
Too Big, and Failing

Under the weight of these events, Immelt pared down GE’s reach across industries. GE sold its stake
in NBCUniversal in 2013. The conglomerate further shed GE Plastics, GE Water, and GE Appliances71
while selling off $260 billion in assets from GE Capital over the course of two years, beginning in 2015.72
Yet, in 2017, under pressure from the board, Immelt announced his preemptive retirement. During the
span of his tenure, GE’s total return to shareholders (including dividends) was about 12%, while that
of the S&P 500 was 192%.73
John Flannery’s ‘Reset Year’

30-year GE veteran John Flannery replaced Immelt as CEO in August 2017. Having spent much of
his career in GE Capital, Flannery launched a company-wide review over the course of several
months.74 Investors from the start were dismayed at the slow pace of Flannery's deliberateness. At the
November reveal of his strategy, Flannery delineated GE’s core businesses as aviation, health care, and
power, but did not propose any drastic organizational changes.75 To free up cash, he broke precedent
by cutting GE’s dividend for only the second time since the Great Depression.76
After cutting $1 billion in costs in the industrial sector, Flannery informed analysts, “we’ve
described 2018 as a reset year.”77 In April, he restructured the Board, bringing the members down from
18 to 12, and selected those who would spur debate rather than repeat the affable consensus under
Immelt. Half of the pre-existing members left, and Flannery welcomed three new members, including
former CEO of Danaher, Larry Culp. Flannery convened 50 board meetings and calls in one year,
iteratively making and reconsidering decisions. 78 In June 2018, Flannery announced a breakup: GE
would sell its healthcare, transportation, and oil and gas units, divesting its majority 62.5% stake in
Baker Hughes. The company would slash debt and further shrink GE Capital while deepening GE’s
presence in the power and energy sector. These decisions brought Flannery’s year-long strategic review
to a close and aligned with analyst recommendations from one year prior.79 During those 12 months,
GE’s stock value had halved.
Earlier, on January 16, 2018, Flannery announced the most shocking finding from his company-
wide review. GE faced a $9.5 billion charge on reinsurance contracts and was required to set aside $15
billion in reserves until 2024. Although GE had long stopped issuing new insurance contracts and had
largely exited insurance after 2006, some risky contracts in long-term care remained. As the year
continued, the power division’s profits declined 58%, having only sold 19 gas turbines compared with
41 the previous year. 80 Flannery candidly told the investors that addressing the years of unclear reports
in GE Power would be a “multiyear fix, with some volatility.”81 The Dow Jones finally dropped GE
from its ranks in June 2018 after 111 years.82 By the last week in September, GE stock was at its lowest
in nine years.83
On October 1, 2018, GE communicated to the public that it would write down "substantially all" of
GE Power's goodwill.84,85 That very day, the board forced Flannery’s resignation effectively
immediately, to internal and public surprise alike.
The First Outside CEO

When H. Lawrence Culp Jr. became GE’s new CEO on October 1, 2018, the stock price rose 10%.
The first outside CEO in GE’s history, the Board hoped that Culp would reproduce his track record as
CEO of Danaher. Over the course of his 14-year tenure at that company, he had delivered shareholder
returns that were five times those of the S&P 500,86 and had grown Danaher’s market capitalization
and revenues five-fold to $51 billion and $19.1 billion respectively.87,88 Danaher's success under his
leadership stemmed from its rigorous implementation of kaizen, or continuous improvement, as
originally adapted from Japan's Toyota Motor Corporation. It took the form of the Danaher Business
System (DBS) which bore some similarities to Welch's scrupulous Six Sigma program from the 1990s.89
Up for Sale
Culp faced a tall task: he needed to swiftly raise capital by selling assets, re-establish confidence in
GE's finances, and develop a sustainable business portfolio. In many ways, he faced the most difficult
situation of any GE CEO to-date.90 By December 2018, GE’s market capitalization had shrunk to $70
billion, down nearly half a trillion dollars from its peak.91 But Culp soon turned the tide. On December
13th, J.P. Morgan bumped up its rating on GE from “underweight” to “neutral.” By year’s-end, GE had
slashed debt by completing the sale of its stake in Baker Hughes, an oilfield-services company, and GE
Transportation.92 In February 2019, Culp announced the sale of GE Healthcare's "crown jewel,"
BioPharma, to Danaher for $21 billion. The deal deferred Flannery's plans to spinoff Healthcare while
further relieving some of GE's debt.93
Engineering a Lean Machine

In his first letter to shareholders in February 2019, Culp penned a brisk five pages on his strategy:
axe debt and repair the power business by separating the struggling gas turbines and services business
from a collection of well-performing segments including grid solutions.
Culp attacked debt by enlisting management of all the business units to scour their processes for
opportunities to end operational slowdowns, reduce costs, or improve cash flow. Accordingly, he
further decentralized GE, transferring resources and decision-making responsibilities from
headquarters to business units. He equipped all levels of the company to call out inefficiencies through
lean management techniques and training. For four days in June, Culp corralled almost 50 business
heads into a lean workshop, where they took to the factory floor to track nitty-gritty details and spot
opportunities. Culp himself was no stranger to walking the factory floor. Since assuming the top spot,
Culp travelled frequently for day-and-a-half-long sessions with GE units, factory visits, and trade
shows with customers.94 By teaching employees that attending to even the smallest details could create
value, Culp emphasized the usage of Kaizen to shape bottom-up decisions and Hoshin Kanri, or policy
development, to channel high level initiatives.95
These trainings quickly spurred results. In a GE Power factory in Greenville, South Carolina,
executives modelled the production path of a steel turbine blade. The blade covered nearly 3 miles
during its 85-day production period. By rearranging the machines sequentially and updating
equipment to prevent in-progress pileups, the blade's new journey was cut to 165 feet over a 49-day
production period.96
As much as lean management was a shift in processes, it was also a cultural shift. In Culp's first
three years as CEO, he changed 15 of the top 20 executives, with at least five being outsiders. Although
GE still emphasized leadership training, the locus shifted to factories and fieldwork. Culp affirmed,
"There's a lot that we're doing internally to make sure that we are developing the talent that GE needs
going forward."97
Through COVID-19 Pandemic Headwinds

The 2020 onset of the COVID-19 pandemic curbed GE's share price recovery. Overall revenue
plunged 20%, and by mid-May, shares dropped to their lowest in 28 years.98 With travel ground to a
halt, profits from Aviation, previously the company's highest-earning unit, fell 82% despite reductions
of 10% of its workforce.99, 100
GE’s Big Break

In November 2021, Culp announced his biggest news yet—GE was to split into three public
companies in aviation, healthcare, and energy.101 Shares, which had risen 55% in the past year, rose
another 2% after the announcement.102 The historic decision to split GE put an end to nearly 130 years
of expansion. That same week, two other mainstays, Toshiba Corp and Johnson & Johnson, also
announced plans to split.103
In July 2022, GE made public the names of the new companies; each bore the original GE namesake
(See Exhibits 5–7). The healthcare company would be GE HealthCare. The new energy company—
combining its existing GE Renewable Energy, GE Power, and GE Digital units—was to become GE
Vernova. The remaining aviation company would become GE Aerospace.104
Culp argued that the split would create long-term value for workers, society, and shareholders
alike. As three separate companies, each would be able to have laser-sharp focus on their particular
industries, allocate funding based on their needs, and be strategically nimble to respond to changing
market conditions.105 With greater focus, each could improve operational performance by slashing
overhead costs and homing in on customer needs. Finally, financial flexibility would empower the
companies to pursue growth opportunities.106
Three Independent Companies GE HealthCare would include GE's medical equipment unit
that produced scanners and ultrasound equipment.107 GE planned to retain ownership of a 19.9% stake
in GE HealthCare, while GE HealthCare would sell debt securities to reduce GE's debt. In January 2022,
Peter Arduini became the new President and CEO.108
GE Vernova's name evoked connotations of a new green era, stemming from 'verde', the Spanish
word for 'green', and 'nova', the Latin word for 'new.'109 GE expected that it would attain mid to high
single digit margins, while beating out low growth rates in the sector. Scott Strazik, the CEO of GE
Power, was slated to lead the new GE Vernova.
GE Aerospace would remain after the spinoffs of GE HealthCare and GE Vernova. It would be
responsible for the assets and liabilities of its predecessor, including the insurance contracts. 110 Margins
could reach up to 20%.111 GE Aerospace planned to pursue both organic and inorganic growth paths
to fulfil its goal of decarbonizing flight. In February 2022, GE Aviation announced that Boeing would
join a GE–NASA partnership established the previous November to trial a hybrid-electric single-aisle
airplane. This supported GE's pledge to be carbon neutral by 2030 and net zero by 2050.112 John Slattery
was initially to continue in his role as CEO of GE Aviation until the spinoff, at which point Larry Culp
would take over. However, in July 2022, GE announced that Larry Culp would become the GE Aviation
CEO effective that day, in addition to his duties as Chairman and CEO of GE. Slattery became the Chief
Commercial Officer, where he would continue when GE Aviation became GE Aerospace.
The Future of GE GE anticipated that the split would revive its share price. Culp argued, "The
company has been underinvested by major shareholders who might prefer aviation, health care, or
energy to a broad conglomerate."113 To start the share price off on new footing, in September 2021, GE
completed a rare eight to one reverse stock split. Analysts were lukewarm in their reaction to the news
of the split. Saree Boroditsky of Jeffries recommended that investors hold the stock believing the split
would increase accountability. Boroditsky cautioned that the future GE's natural-gas power generation
was a "melting ice cube" in the current climate, but it might be able to be overcome through its wind
energy operations. Stephen Tusa of J. P. Morgan also recommended a hold. He advised that GE's wind
energy business was not as strong as investors' expectations. "One thing is certain," Tusa warned, "GE
will continue to be a turbulent company with plenty of shareholders watching its every move." 114
Exhibit 1 GE Market Capitalization, 1994-2021 (in Billions USD)
GE Market Capitalization, 1994-2021 (in Billions USD)

600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Mar-11-1994
Mar-11-1995
Mar-11-1996
Mar-11-1997
Mar-11-1998
Mar-11-1999
Mar-11-2000
Mar-11-2001
Mar-11-2002
Mar-11-2003
Mar-11-2004
Mar-11-2005
Mar-11-2006
Mar-11-2007
Mar-11-2008
Mar-11-2009
Mar-11-2010
Mar-11-2011
Mar-11-2012
Mar-11-2013
Mar-11-2014
Mar-11-2015
Mar-11-2016
Mar-11-2017
Mar-11-2018
Mar-11-2019
Mar-11-2020
Mar-11-2021
Source: General Electric Historical Capitalization, Capital IQ, Inc., a division of Standard and Poor’s.
Exhibit 2 GE Compared to the S&P 500 from August 1992—August 2022
Source: "S&P 500 Index," The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/index/SPX/advanced-chart,

accessed August 2022.
723-373 -10-
Exhibit 3 General Electric Income Statement, 1995-2020 (in Millions USD)
For the Fiscal Period Ending on 12/31: 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Revenue 43,357.0 72,954.0 83,566.0 100,436.0 105,808.0 73,022.0

Finance Div. Revenue 25,919.0 56,463.0 51,341.0 47,980.0 9,350.0 6,597.0
Other Revenue 491.0 492.0 1311.0 1151.0 279.0 -
Total Revenue 69,767.0 129,909.0 136,218.0 149,567.0 115,834.0 79,619.0
Cost Of Goods Sold 31,385.0 51,823.0 59,784.0 71,713.0 79,351.0 57,276.0
Finance Div. Operating Exp. 1,117.0 2,045.0 3,239.0 7,085.0 5,854.0 4,246.0
Insurance Div. Operating Exp. 5,285.0 14,399.0 3,374.0 3,012.0 2,605.0 2,397.0
Interest Expense - Finance Division 6,661.0 11,111.0 14,045.0 14,510.0 2,301.0 2,186.0
Gross Profit 25,319.0 50,531.0 55,776.0 53,247.0 25,723.0 13,514.0
Selling General & Admin Exp. 15,014.0 30,993.0 33,278.0 38,033.0 16,327.0 11,122.0
R & D Exp. - - - - - 2,565.0
Other Operating Exp., Total 15,014.0 30,993.0 33,278.0 38,033.0 16,327.0 13,687.0
Operating Income 10,305.0 19,538.0 22,498.0 15,214.0 9,396.0 (173.0)
Interest Expense (649.0) (811.0) (1,319.0) (1,600.0) (1,706.0) (1,333.0)
Interest and Invest. Income 150.0 55.0 - - - 491.0
Net Interest Exp. (499.0) (756.0) (1,319.0) (1,600.0) (1,706.0) (842.0)
Other Non-Operating Inc. (Exp.) 135.0 313.0 915.0 573.0 757.0 (1,618.0)
EBT Excl. Unusual Items 9,941.0 18,873.0 22,094.0 14,187.0 8,185.0 5,197.0
EBT Incl. Unusual Items 9,941.0 18,873.0 22,094.0 14,187.0 8,185.0 5,197.0
Income Tax Expense 3,164.0 5,711.0 3,824.0 1,039.0 6,485.0 (474.0)
Earnings from Cont. Ops. 6,777.0 13,162.0 18,270.0 13,148.0 1,700.0 5,671.0
Minority Int. in Earnings (204.0) (427.0) (916.0) (535.0) (19.0) 158.0

Net Income 6,573.0 12,735.0 16,720.0 11,644.0 (6,126.0) 5,704.0
Supplemental Items
EBITDA 13,899.0 25,923.0 30,339.0 26,757.0 15,905.0 5,732.0
EBITA 10,305.0 20,884.0 22,498.0 16,971.0 11,058.0 1,096.0
Source: General Electric Income Statement, Capital IQ, Inc., a division of Standard and Poor’s.
723-373 -11-
Exhibit 4 General Electric Balance Sheet, 1995-2020 (in Millions USD)
Balance Sheets for the Fiscal

Periods Ending on 12/31: 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2021
Cash And Equivalents 874.0 2,143.0 1,695.0 18,686.0 10,372.0 20,609.0 15,495.0
Short Term Investments - - - - - 7,319.0 5,300.0
Total Cash & ST Investments 874.0 2,143.0 1,695.0 18,686.0 10,372.0 27,928.0 20,795.0
Accounts Receivable 8,735.0 9,502.0 14,851.0 18,621.0 43,013.0 18,060.0 16,014.0
Other Receivables - - - - - 4,395.0 4,098.0
Total Receivables 8,735.0 9,502.0 14,851.0 18,621.0 43,013.0 22,455.0 20,112.0
Inventory 4,395.0 7,146.0 10,315.0 11,460.0 22,449.0 15,890.0 16,790.0
Finance Div. Loans and Leases, 105,689.0 178,815.0 301,971.0 310,583.0 18,834.0 4,596.0 1,457.0
ST
Finance Div. Other Curr. Assets 1,949.0 6,718.0 68,355.0 75,825.0 181,119.0 13,421.0 40,742.0
Restricted Cash - - - - - 2,600.0 2,500.0
Other Current Assets - - 247.0 33,810.0 5,109.0 1,522.0 1,191.0
Total Current Assets 121,642.0 204,324.0 397,434.0 468,985.0 280,896.0 88,412.0 103,587.0
Gross Property, Plant & 24,867.0 30,189.0 39,378.0 - 90,022.0 75,927.0 34,841.0
Equipment
Accumulated Depreciation (14,633.0) (17,990.0) (22,874.0) - (35,927.0) (31,265.0) (18,968.0)
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 10,234.0 12,199.0 16,504.0 12,444.0 54,095.0 44,662.0 15,873.0
Long-term Investments 2,877.0 1,009.0 3,374.0 43,938.0 31,973.0 36.0 150.0
Goodwill 5,901.0 11,962.0 48,274.0 36,880.0 63,156.0 25,524.0 25,333.0
Other Intangibles 742.0 462.0 9,565.0 8,088.0 17,362.0 9,631.0 9,155.0
Other Long-Term Assets 86,639.0 207,050.0 198,170.0 177,458.0 45,589.0 85,187.0 83,035.0
Total Assets 228,035.0 437,006.0 673,321.0 747,793.0 493,071.0 253,452.0 237,133.0
LIABILITIES
Accounts Payable 9,061.0 14,853.0 21,183.0 14,656.0 13,680.0 16,476.0 16,172.0
Accrued Exp. 5,898.0 12,219.0 873.0 837.0 - - -
Short-term Borrowings 64,463.0 119,180.0 158,156.0 117,959.0 49,860.0 4,778.0 5,459.0
Curr. Port. of Leases - - - - - 727.0 -
Finance Div. Current Liab. - - - 29,425.0 47,277.0 - 4,788.0
Unearned Revenue, Current 1,812.0 8,271.0 - - - 18,215.0 16,909.0
723-373 -12-
Balance Sheets for the Fiscal

Periods Ending on 12/31: 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2021
Other Current Liabilities 767.0 1,589.0 21,175.0 29,992.0 27,453.0 15,873.0 14,348.0
Total Current Liabilities 82,001.0 156,112.0 201,387.0 183,869.0 138,270.0 56,069.0 57,676.0
Long-Term Debt & Leases 51,027.0 82,132.0 212,281.0 293,323.0 144,659.0 72,534.0 60,433.0
Finance Div. Non-Curr. Liab. 46,901.0 114,388.0 95,099.0 86,478.0 27,857.0 42,252.0 37,705.0
Unearned Revenue, Non-Current - - 4,456.0 11,142.0 15,776.0 1,801.0 1,839.0
Pension & Other Post-Retire. 2,415.0 3,714.0 8,117.0 19,552.0 - - -
Benefits
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr. 508.0 452.0 3,733.0 (4,237.0) - - -
Other Non-Current Liabilities 12,618.0 24,780.0 30,843.0 33,468.0 63,399.0 43,722.0 40,519.0
Total Liabilities 195,470.0 381,578.0 555,916.0 623,595.0 389,961.0 216,378.0 198,172.0
Pref. Stock, Redeemable - - - - 6.0 6.0 6.0
Pref. Stock, Redeemable - - - - 6.0 6.0 6.0
Common Stock 594.0 669.0 669.0 702.0 702.0 702.0 15.0
Retained Earnings 34,528.0 61,572.0 97,644.0 131,137.0 140,020.0 92,247.0 89,098.0
Treasury Stock (8,176.0) (24,444.0) (17,326.0) (31,938.0) (63,539.0) (81,961.0) (81,314.0)
Comprehensive Inc. and Other 2,663.0 12,695.0 28,364.0 19,035.0 21,085.0 24,558.0 29,672.0
Total Common Equity 29,609.0 50,492.0 109,351.0 118,936.0 98,268.0 35,546.0 37,471.0
Minority Interest 2,956.0 4,936.0 8,054.0 5,262.0 4,836.0 1,522.0 1,484.0
Total Equity 32,565.0 55,428.0 117,405.0 124,198.0 103,110.0 37,074.0 38,961.0
Total Liabilities And Equity 228,035.0 437,006.0 673,321.0 747,793.0 493,071.0 253,452.0 237,133.0
Supplemental Items
Tangible Book Value 17,955.0 23,051.0 27,721.0 44,577.0 14,945.0 248.0 2,951.0
Tangible Book Value/Share $14.37 $18.57 $21.15 $33.59 $12.75 $0.23 $2.69
Total Debt 115,490.0 201,312.0 370,437.0 478,598.0 197,602.0 78,039.0 65,892.0
Net Debt 114,616.0 199,169.0 368,742.0 459,912.0 187,230.0 50,111.0 45,097.0
Full Time Employees 222,000 313,000 316,000 287,000 333,000 174,000 NA
Source: General Electric Balance Sheet, Capital IQ, Inc., a division of Standard and Poor’s.
Exhibit 5a GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2000 (in Billions USD)
GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2000

(in Billions USD)
7.92 10.78
5.89
14.86
11.85
7.78
6.80
Aircraft Engines Appliances

Industrial Products and Systems NBC
Plastics Power Systems
Technical Products and Services
Source: Company 10-Ks.
Exhibit 5b GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2010 (in Billions USD)

(in Billions USD)
8.65
37.51
47.04
37.86
16.90
Energy Infrastructure Technology Infrastructure

NBC Universal GE Capital
Home & Business Solutions
13
Exhibit 5c GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2020 (in Billions USD)

(in Billions USD)
7.25
22.04
15.67
17.59 18.01
Aviation Healthcare Power Renewable Energy Capital
Exhibit 6 Selected GE Business Units 2020 and 2019 Net Earnings Before Depreciation and
Amortization
2020 Net Earnings Before 2019 Net Earnings Before

GE Business Unit Depreciation and Amortization Depreciation and Amortization
Healthcare $3 billion $3.7 billion
Power $900 million $1.1 billion
Renewable Energy ($200 million) (500 million)
Aviation $2 billion $6.3 billion
Source: Lee Samaha, "Here's What General Electric's Big Split Means For Investors," Nasdaq,
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/heres-what-general-electrics-big-split-means-for-investors-2021-11-13, accessed
August 2022.
14
Exhibit 7a Profiles of GE’s Three New Public Companies
Source: Whitney Mercer and Tomas Kellner, "A Defining Moment: GE to Form 3 Industry-Leading Public Companies Focused
on Aviation, Healthcare, and Energy," GE, November 9, 2021, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/a-defining-
moment-ge-to-form-3-industry-leading-public-companies-focused-on-aviation, accessed August 2022.
15
Exhibit 7b Profiles of GE’s Three New Public Companies (Continued)
Source: "GE Plans to Form Three Public Companies Focused on Growth Sectors of Aviation, Healthcare, and Energy," GE,
November 9, 2021, https://www.ge.com/news/press-releases/ge-plans-to-form-three-public-companies-focused-
on-growth-sectors-of-aviation, accessed August 2022.
16
Endnotes
1 Steve Schaefer, “The First 12 Dow Components: Where Are They Now?,” June 15, 2011,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2011/07/15/the-first-12-dow-components-where-are-they-
now/?sh=1beb7846b032, accessed October 2021.
2 Sarah Hansen, “The Rise and Fall of General Electric,” Investopedia, September 24, 2021,
https://www.investopedia.com/insights/rise-and-fall-ge/, accessed October 2021.
4 Eric Owles, “G.E.’s History of Innovation,” New York Times, June 12, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/general-electric-history-of-innovation.html, accessed October 2021.
5 “How GE Builds Global Leaders: A Conversation with Chief Learning Officer Susan Peters,” Wharton University of
Pennsylvania, May 12, 2020, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-ge-builds-global-leaders-a-conversation-
with-chief-learning-officer-susan-peters/, accessed December 2021.
6 Seth Stevenson, “How Do You Make Better Managers? The Strange Power of Corporate Jargon,” Slate, June 9, 2014,
https://slate.com/business/2014/06/ges-crotonville-management-campus-where-future-company-leaders-are-trained.html,
accessed December 2021.
7 “How GE Builds Global Leaders: A Conversation with Chief Learning Officer Susan Peters,” Wharton University of
Pennsylvania, May 12, 2020, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-ge-builds-global-leaders-a-conversation-
with-chief-learning-officer-susan-peters/, accessed December 2021.
8 Jane Nicholls," Inside Crotonville: GE's Corporate Vault Unlocked," GE, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/inside-
crotonville-ges-corporate-vault-unlocked, accessed July 2022.
9 Francis J. Aguilar and Richard Hamermesh, “General Electric Strategic Position – 1981,” HBS No. 381-174 (Boston: Harvard
Business School Publishing, 1993), p. 2.
10 Christopher A. Bartlett and Meg Wozny, “GE’s Two-Decade Leadership Transformation: Jack Welch’s Leadership,” HBS
No. 399-150 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2005), p. 12.
12 Jasper Jolly, “Jack Welch, former GE boss and 'manager of the century', dies at 84,” The Guardian, March 2, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/mar/02/jack-welch-former-ge-boss-and-manager-of-the-century-dies-at-84,
accessed October 2021.
13 Steve Lohr, “Jack Welch, G.E. Chief Who Became a Business Superstar, Dies at 84,” The New York Times, March 2, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/business/jack-welch-died.html, accessed October 2021.
15 Geoffrey Colvin and Katie Benner, “GE Under Seige,” CNN Money, October 15, 2008,
https://money.cnn.com/2008/10/09/news/companies/colvin_ge.fortune/index.htm, accessed October 2021.
16 Jade Scipioni, “Former GE CEO Jeff Immelt on his controversial legacy: ‘I don’t want to hide’,” CNBC, February 23, 2021,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/23/former-ge-ceo-jeff-immelt-talks-about-his-controversial-career.html, accessed October
2021.
17 Michael Sheetz, “Why GE Removed John Flannery as CEO After Little More Than a Year,” CNBC, October 1, 2018,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/01/why-ge-removed-john-flannery-as-ceo.html, accessed October 2021.
17
20 “Triumphant rise, spectacular fall: General Electric's 127-year journey from cutting-edge American icon to possible fraud
case,” Business Insider India, August 16, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.in/slideshows/miscellaneous/triumphant-rise-
spectacular-fall-general-electrics-127-year-journey-from-cutting-edge-american-icon-to-possible-fraud-
case/slidelist/70706379.cms#slideid=70706386, accessed October 2021.
22 “Thomas A. Edison Papers,” Rutgers, http://edison.rutgers.edu/chron2.htm, accessed October 2021.
23 “Edison Companies,” Rutgers, https://edison.rutgers.edu/list.htm, accessed October 2021.
24 “Edison Companies,” Rutgers, https://edison.rutgers.edu/list.htm, accessed October 2021.
27 Francis J. Aguilar and Richard Hamermesh, “General Electric Strategic Position – 1981,” HBS No. 381-174 (Boston: Harvard
Business School Publishing, 1993), p. 2.
28 Jon Chesto, “GE’s Secret Weapon is its training center on Hudson River,” The Boston Globe, February 13, 2017,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/02/13/hudson-river-secret-corporate-
weapon/Iu2txUamtMMT94HZ38ztNM/story.html, accessed December 2021.
29 Jon Chesto, “GE’s Secret Weapon is its training center on Hudson River,” The Boston Globe, February 13, 2017,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/02/13/hudson-river-secret-corporate-
weapon/Iu2txUamtMMT94HZ38ztNM/story.html, accessed December 2021.
30 “The Tussle for Talent,” The Economist, January 8, 2011, https://www-economist-com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/business/2011/01/06/the-tussle-for-talent, accessed December 2021.
33 Wolfgang Saxon, “Reginald Harold Jones, 86, Dies; Led General Electric,” The New York Times, January 2, 2004,
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/02/business/reginald-harold-jones-86-dies-led-general-electric.html, accessed October
2021.
35 Claudio Fernández-Aráoz, “Jack Welch’s Approach to Leadership,” Harvard Business Review H05GN4 (Boston: Harvard
Business School Publishing, 2020), p. 1–4.
37 Stratford P. Sherman and Cynthia Hutton, “Inside the Mind of Jack Welch,” Fortune Magazine, March 27, 1989,
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1989/03/27/71783/, accessed October 2021.
39 Stratford P. Sherman and Cynthia Hutton, “Inside the Mind of Jack Welch,” Fortune Magazine, March 27, 1989,
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1989/03/27/71783/, accessed October 2021.
40 Chris Noon, “Jack Welch, The ‘Ultimate Manager’ Who Oversaw GE’s Rise To The Most Valuable Company, Dies at 84,”
March 2, 2020, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/jack-welch-the-ultimate-manager-who-oversaw-ges-rise-to-the-most-
valuable-company-dies-at-84, accessed October 2021.
18
44 Amir Hartman, “Ruthless Execution,” InformIT, September 5, 2003,
https://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=100665&seqNum=5, accessed October 2021.
45 Don D. Harris, “Work-Out: The Most Powerful Process Improvement Tool,” SixSigma, https://www.isixsigma.com/new-
to-six-sigma/roles-responsibilities/work-out-most-powerful-process-improvement-tool/, accessed October 2021.
47 Claudio Fernández-Aráoz, “Jack Welch’s Approach to Leadership,” Harvard Business Review H05GN4 (Boston: Harvard
Business School Publishing, 2020), p. 1–4.
48 Larry Hirschhorn and Thomas Gilmore, “The New Boundaries of the “Boundaryless” Company,” Harvard Business
Review, May/June 1992, https://hbr.org/1992/05/the-new-boundaries-of-the-boundaryless-company, accessed October 2021.
49 Steven Kerr and Steffen Landauer, “Using Stretch Goals to Promote Organizational Effectiveness and Personal Growth:
General Electric and Goldman Sachs,” The Academy of Management, November 2004, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4166134,
accessed October 2021.
50 Issac Pino, “The Untold Story Behind GE’s Most Lucrative Business,” The Motley Fool, November 2, 2014,
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/11/02/the-untold-story-behind-ges-most-lucrative-busines.aspx, accessed
October 2021.
51 “Back To The Future: GE’s Retooling into An Industrial Powerhouse,” Wharton, University of Pennsylvania, May 12, 2015,
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/back-to-the-future-ges-retooling-into-an-industrial-powerhouse/, accessed
October 2021.
52 Thomas Gryta and Ted Mann, "GE Powered the American Century—Then It Burned Out," The Wall Street Journal,
December 14, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-powered-the-american-centurythen-it-burned-out-11544796010,
October 2021.
56 “Case Study: General Electric and Six Sigma,” 6Sigma, March 13, 2017, https://6sigma.com/case-study-general-electric-six-
sigma/, accessed October 2021.
57 Christian Stadler, “Back to the Future: Four Lessons from the ‘90s Still Relevant Today,” Forbes, January 13, 2015,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christianstadler/2015/01/13/back-to-the-future-four-lessons-from-the-90s-still-relevant-
today/?sh=484db9f0445e, accessed October 2021.
58 Claudia H. Deutsch, “G.E.’s Next Leader: The Overview; G.E. Taps Successor to the Chief,” The New York Times,
November 28, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/28/business/ge-s-next-leader-the-overview-ge-taps-successor-to-
the-chief.html, accessed October 2021.
19
2021.
2021.
October 2021.
65 Dan Roberts, “GE: Why the Largest Company in the World Still Has Spark,” The Guardian, January 14, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/14/general-electric-jeff-immelt-multinational, accessed October 2021.
66 "GE Completes Acquisition of Alstrom Power and Grid Businesses," GE, November 3, 2015,
https://www.ge.com/news/press-releases/ge-completes-acquisition-alstom-power-and-grid-businesses, accessed August
2022.
68 Tatyana Shumsky, “GE’s $22 Billion Charge Intensifies Regulatory Scrutiny,” The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ges-22-billion-charge-intensifies-regulatory-scrutiny-1540942603, accessed October 2021.
69 Jasper Jolly, “Once An American Powerhouse, can General Electric Regain Its Spark?,” The Guardian, December 1, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/01/general-electric-titan-american-industry-lost-spark, accessed October
2021.
2021.
72 Jena McGregor and Thomas Heath, “GE’s CEO Jeffrey Immelt to Step Down After 16 Years,” The Washington Post, June 12,
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/06/12/ges-ceo-jeffrey-immelt-to-step-down-after-
16-years/, accessed October 2021.
73 Jena McGregor and Thomas Heath, “GE’s CEO Jeffrey Immelt to Step Down After 16 Years,” The Washington Post, June 12,
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/06/12/ges-ceo-jeffrey-immelt-to-step-down-after-
16-years/, accessed October 2021.
74 Thomas Gryta and David Benoit, “GE Ousts CEO John Flannery in Surprise Move After Missed Targets,” The Wall Street
Journal, October 1, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-names-new-ceo-replacing-flannery-1538392715, accessed October
2021.
75 Steve Lohr, “GE Reports $9.8 Billion Loss and Discloses S.E.C. Accounting Inquiry,” The New York Times, January 24, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/business/ge-earnings.html, accessed October 2021.
76 Thomas Gryta, “GE’s Profit Falls as Power Division Remains a Drag,” The Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-s-profit-falls-as-power-division-remains-a-drag-1532084387?mod=article_inline, accessed
October 2021.
October 2021.
20
79 “GE Plans to Spin Off its Healthcare Unit and Shed Its Stake In Baker Hughes,” CNBC, June 26, 2018,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/26/ge-plans-to-spin-off-its-health-care-unit-and-shed-its-stake-in-baker-.html, accessed
October 2021.
October 2021.
81 Tim Kilgore and Francine McKenna, “Ousted CEO John Flannery Pays The Price For Taking Out GE’s Trash,” MarketWatch,
October 2, 2018, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ousted-ceo-john-flannery-pays-the-price-for-taking-out-ges-trash-
2018-10-01/, accessed October 2021.
82 Tomi Kilgore, "GE replaces CEO and investors cheer, despite a profit warning and huge charge," MarketWatch,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ge-replaces-ceo-and-investors-cheer-despite-a-profit-warning-and-huge-charge-2018-
10-01, accessed July 2022.
84 Brooke Sutherland, "Investors are Sick of Waiting for GE's Desperately Needed Reboot," Bloomberg Businessweek,
December 6, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-06/investors-are-sick-of-waiting-for-ge-s-
desperately-needed-reboot#xj4y7vzkg, accessed July 2022.
86 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, “Larry Culp Looks for a Repeat Revolution at GE,” The Financial Times, October 1, 2018,
https://www.ft.com/content/ff7e9ae0-c58d-11e8-bc21-54264d1c4647, accessed October 2021.
87 Michael Sheetz, “New GE CEO Larry Culp Signs Stock-Heavy Contract Worth Up To $300 Million If Shares Soar,” CNBC,
October 5, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/new-ge-ceo-larry-culp-inks-stock-heavy-contract-worth-up-to-300-
million-if-shares-soar.html, accessed October 2021.
88 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, “Larry Culp Looks for a Repeat Revolution at GE,” The Financial Times, October 1, 2018,
https://www.ft.com/content/ff7e9ae0-c58d-11e8-bc21-54264d1c4647, accessed October 2021.
89 Bharat Anand, David J. Collis, and Sophie Hood. "Danaher Corporation." HBS No. 708-445, (Boston: Harvard Business
School Publishing, 2015).
90 James E. Ellis, "GE's Path to Recovery," Bloomberg Businessweek, December 10, 2018, p. 23–26.
91 Jasper Jolly, “Once An American Powerhouse, can General Electric Regain Its Spark?,” The Guardian, December 1, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/dec/01/general-electric-titan-american-industry-lost-spark, accessed October
2021.
93 Rich Kirchen, "GE Healthcare Spinoff Likely Shelved for 2019," Milwaukee Business Journal, February 25, 2019,
https://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2019/02/25/ge-healthcare-spinoff-likely-shelved-for-2019.html, accessed
August 2022.
94 Bryan Gruley, Rick Clough, and Polly Mosendz, "GE's Larry Culp Faces Ultimate CEO Test in Trying to Save a Once-Great
Company," Bloomberg Businessweek, June 12, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-06-12/ge-s-larry-
culp-faces-ultimate-ceo-test-in-trying-to-save-a-once-great-company, accessed August 2022.
95 Arpita Agnihotri and Saurabh Bhattacharya, “General Electric: Turnaround Management Under Three Different CEOs,”
Ivey Business School Foundation W20699 (London, Ontario: Ivey Publishing, 2020), p. 4–6.
21
96 Thomas Gryta, Ted Mann, and Cara Lombardo, "Larry Culp Rewired GE. Then He Unwound It," The Wall Street Journal,
November 13, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/larry-culp-rewired-ge-then-he-unwound-it-11636779606, accessed August
2022.
97 Ryan Beene, "GE Always Promoted From Within. Now It's Hiring From the Outside," Bloomberg Businessweek, August 2,
2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-30/ge-ceo-larry-culp-fills-leadership-positions-with-outside-
hires#xj4y7vzkg, accessed August 2022.
99 John Hemmerdinger, "GE Aviation Eyes Recovery This Year, as 2020 Profits Plunge By 82%," FlightGlobal, January 26, 2021,
https://www.flightglobal.com/engines/ge-aviation-eyes-recovery-this-year-as-2020-profits-plunge-by-82/142124.article,
100 "GE's Aviation Unit to Cut 10% of U.S. Workforce: CEO," Reuters, March 23, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
health-coronavirus-ge-idUSKBN21A273, accessed August 2022.
101 Whitney Mercer and Tomas Kellner, "A Defining Moment: GE to Form 3 Industry-Leading Public Companies Focused on
Aviation, Healthcare, ad Energy," GE, November 9, 2021, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/a-defining-moment-ge-to-
form-3-industry-leading-public-companies-focused-on-aviation, accessed August 2022.
102 Jesse Pound, " GE to break up into 3 companies focusing on aviation, health care and energy," CNBC, November 9, 2021,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/09/ge-to-break-up-into-3-companies-focusing-on-aviation-healthcare-and-energy.html,
103 Thomas Gryta, Ted Mann, and Cara Lombardo, "Larry Culp Rewired GE. Then He Unwound It," The Wall Street Journal,
November 13, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/larry-culp-rewired-ge-then-he-unwound-it-11636779606, accessed August
2022.
104 Jack Stebbins, "GE Reveals New Company Names as It Approaches Historic Split," CNBC, July 18, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/18/ge-reveals-new-company-names-as-it-approaches-historic-split.html, accessed August
2022.
105 Meenu Bhatnagar, "General Electric's Restructuring: A Strategic Move?," 322-0121-1 (Bangalore: Amity Research
Headquarters, 2022), p. 1.
Headquarters, 2022), p. 3–5.
107 Al Root, "GE's Three-Way Split Is Near. What The New Companies Will be Called.," Barron's, July 2022,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/ge-stock-split-aerospace-healthcare-51658153577, accessed August 2022.
Aviation, Healthcare, and Energy," GE, November 9, 2021, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/a-defining-moment-ge-to-
109 Al Root, "GE's Three-Way Split Is Near. What The New Companies Will be Called.," Barron's, July 2022,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/ge-stock-split-aerospace-healthcare-51658153577, accessed August 2022.
Aviation, Healthcare, and Energy," GE, November 9, 2021, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/a-defining-moment-ge-to-
Headquarters, 2022).
112 GE Reports, "Electric Skies: Boeing Joins GE And NASA's Hybrid Electric Flight Project," GE Aviation: The Blog, February
3, 2022, https://blog.geaviation.com/sustainability/electric-skies-boeing-joins-ge-and-nasas-hybrid-electric-flight-project/,
22

GE a New Way Forward_HW Case BPS (1)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

GE a New Way Forward_HW Case BPS (1)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9- 7 2 3 - 3 73

NOV EMBER 7, 2022

GE: A New Way Forward?

Laying the Groundwork for a Legacy

By 1889, Thomas Edison’s electricity-related business interests—the Edison Lamp Company,

‘Neutron’ Jack Welch

Early Years of Overhaul

Crafting the Organizational Culture to Sustain Change

Maximizing Human Capital Insistent on engineering a workforce of people who delivered

The Final Stretch

Boundaryless Growth Welch envisioned a “boundaryless” company, without the silos

GE Under Jeffrey Immelt

GE’s Steep Decline

Too Big, and Failing

John Flannery’s ‘Reset Year’

The First Outside CEO

Engineering a Lean Machine

Through COVID-19 Pandemic Headwinds

GE’s Big Break

Exhibit 1 GE Market Capitalization, 1994-2021 (in Billions USD)

GE Market Capitalization, 1994-2021 (in Billions USD)

Exhibit 2 GE Compared to the S&P 500 from August 1992—August 2022

Source: "S&P 500 Index," The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/index/SPX/advanced-chart,

Exhibit 3 General Electric Income Statement, 1995-2020 (in Millions USD)

Revenue 43,357.0 72,954.0 83,566.0 100,436.0 105,808.0 73,022.0

Minority Int. in Earnings (204.0) (427.0) (916.0) (535.0) (19.0) 158.0

Exhibit 4 General Electric Balance Sheet, 1995-2020 (in Millions USD)

Balance Sheets for the Fiscal

Balance Sheets for the Fiscal

Exhibit 5a GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2000 (in Billions USD)

GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2000

Aircraft Engines Appliances

Source: Company 10-Ks.

Exhibit 5b GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2010 (in Billions USD)

GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2010

Energy Infrastructure Technology Infrastructure

Source: Company 10-Ks.

Exhibit 5c GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2020 (in Billions USD)

GE Revenue by Operating Segment, FY 2020

Aviation Healthcare Power Renewable Energy Capital

Source: Company 10-Ks.

2020 Net Earnings Before 2019 Net Earnings Before

Exhibit 7a Profiles of GE’s Three New Public Companies

Exhibit 7b Profiles of GE’s Three New Public Companies (Continued)

23 “Edison Companies,” Rutgers, https://edison.rutgers.edu/list.htm, accessed October 2021.

24 “Edison Companies,” Rutgers, https://edison.rutgers.edu/list.htm, accessed October 2021.

You might also like