PECLARO VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 111091 AUGUST 21, 1995;
DOCTRINE:
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls under the non-
career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019.
FACTS:
Accused, CLARO J. PRECLARO, is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology
Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute
which is an agency of the DOST.

He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig,
undertaken by Jaime Sta. Maria Construction, with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer. The
structure is jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments.

While Resoso was in the process of evaluating a Charge Order for some electricals in the building, the petitioner
approached him and made some overtures that expenses in the Change Order are deductive by P280,000 (will be
charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of additive (instead of charging it to the
owner).

Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the deductive provided he gets P200,000.00, from the expected profit of
the contractor.

Resoso conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, owner of Sta. Maria Construction. Sta. Maria, Sr. directed Resoso to
proceeded to NBI to report the incident, the latter suggested for an entrapment plan to which the Sta.Maria
conformed. Sta. Maria produced the grease money of 50k in P500 denominations which was dusted with flourescent
powder and placed inside an attache case.

Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at their meeting place, Wendy's. From the moment petitioner received the two
envelopes with his right hand, thereafter placing them under his left armpit, he was accosted by the NBI men.
Petitioner's right palmar hand was tested positive of flourescent powder.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 for committing said
offense in relation to the performance of his official duties.

SANDIGANBAYAN: convicted the petitioner.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
 asserts that he is not a public officer because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but
merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified
period, as evidenced by the contract of services he entered into with the ITDI.
o not issued with appointment paper; not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy
clock neither did he took an oath of office
 he could not be prosecuted under the RA 3019 because his intervention "was not required by law but in the
performance of a contract of services entered into by him as a private individual contractor,"
 asserts that it was improbable for him to have demanded P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso, when he could have
just talked directly to the contractor himself.
 impossible for him to make any demands because the final decision regarding accomplishments and billing
lies with the DOST technical committee
 claim that he was set up by Engr. Sta. Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for revenge on account, for petitioner's failure
to recommend the Sta. Maria Construction to perform the extra electrical works.

ISSUE:
WON accused, a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a public officer.

RULING:
YES. The accused falls under the non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service)
of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by RA No. 3019. The fact that the petitioner is not required to
record his working hours by means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became unessential
considerations in view of the Sec. 2 (b), RA 3019 clearly including the petitioner within the definition of a public officer.

Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to “includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government…”

The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms
"classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service which have been
reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service
Commission and by the Administrative Code of 1987.

N on-career service in particular is characterized by —

(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is
limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure,
or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific
work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency;

Consequently, a private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls
under the non-career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA
3019.

Furthermore, among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the contractor's accomplishment
reports/billings hence, as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to make a
favorable recommendation and act favorably in behalf of the government," signing acceptance papers and
approving deductives and additives are some examples. Even, assuming arguendo that petitioner does not make the
final decision, as supervisor/consultant, his recommendations will necessarily carry much weight

All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore, present.

It is quite irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded his percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the
contractor's project engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso or directly from the contractor himself Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr.
That petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has been
sufficiently established by the testimony of Engr. Resoso.

As related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner considers the P200,000.00 percentage proper compensation since he has
allegedly done so much for the Sta. Maria construction company.

Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. when the latter tried to arrange meetings with him
regarding his demand does not weaken the cause against petitioner. It does not at all prove that petitioner did not ask
for money. Conceivably petitioner did not muster enough courage to ask money directly from the contractor himself.
Getting the amount through the project engineer would be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had refused to give
money, petitioner could always deny having made the demand.

The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the actual turn-over of the money to petitioner is not fatal to the People's
cause. The transaction was witnessed by several people, among whom were Engr. Resoso, Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. and the
NBI agents whose testimonies on the circumstances before, during and after the turn-over are consistent, logical and
credible.

According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they purposely took no photographs of the actual turn-over so as not
to alert and scare off the petitioner. (Intended only to take photos on arrest)

For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the part of the construction company is hardly plausible. It is
highly improbable for the company to embark on a malicious prosecution of an innocent person for the simple reason
that such person had recommended the services of another construction firm. And it is extremely impossible for such
company to enlist the cooperation and employ the services of the NBIfor such an anomalous undertaking. It is more in
accord with reason and logic to presuppose that there was some sort of a mischievous demand made by the accused
in exchange for certain favorable considerations, such as, favorable recommendation on the completeness of the
project, hassle-free release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the rationale for the occurrence of the
meeting and the demand for money is infinite and boundless.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who was then engaged in the construction of
another DOST building, would not risk his business or livelihood just to exact revenge which is neither profitable nor
logical.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that which produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
 MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, OCT. 6, 1998;
DOCTRINE: The following elements of the Section 3(g) of RA 3019 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
1] that the accused acted as a public officer;
2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.

All of the elements of SEC. 3 (g) are not present in this case. 1st: Petitioner not having signed Lease Agreement" as a
Public officer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep Act 3019. 2nd: The
rental rate therein provided was based on a study conducted in accordance with generally accepted rules of rental
computation. There is no established standard by which the contract’s rental provisions could be adjudged prejudicial
to LRTA or the entire government. The lease agreement alone does not prove any offense. Neither does it together
with the Sub-lease Agreement prove the offense charged. It could happen that in both contracts, neither the LRTA nor
the Government suffered any injury. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Moreover, neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without
any criminal liability for signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of
the latter cannot be viewed as an act of the former.
FACTS:
IMELDA R. MARCOS was Minister of Human Settlement while JOSE P. DANS, Jr. was the Minister of Transportation and
Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively, of the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under EO No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

Petitioner Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI (Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.)

Petitioner, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease
Agreement by virtue of which LRTA leased to PGHFI subject lot with an area of 7.340 square meters, at a monthly rental
of P102,760.00 for a period of twenty-five (25) years.

Then, the PGHFI, represented by its Chairman Marcos, sublease the subject property to Transnational Construction
Corporation, wherein said lessee rented the same area for P734,000.00 a month, for a period of twenty-five (25) years.

For executing the Lease Agreement petitioner Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were charged for violation of SECTION 3(G)
OF RA NO. 3019 for conspiring and confederating with each other in entering into subject Lease Agreement under
terms and conditions alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted the both the accused.

THIRD DIVISION: Affirmed judgement for Imelda but reversed the same for Dans.

ISSUE:
WON all the elements of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 have been duly substantiated

RULING:
NO. All of the elements of SEC. 3 (g) are not present in this case. Petitioner not having signed Lease Agreement" as a
Public officer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep Act 3019. Neither can
petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability for
signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be
viewed as an act of the former.

The following elements of the Section 3(g) of RA 3019 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
1] that the accused acted as a public officer;
2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.

As to the FIRST ELEMENT, it is clearly stated on the face of the subject contract that the accused Imelda Marcos signed
the lease contract in her capacity as PGHFI Chairman, and not as Human Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio LRTA
Chairman. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr. who signed said Contract, as ex-officio Vice Chairman of LRTA. Although the
petitioner was the ex-officio Chairman of the LRTA, at the time, there was no evidence to show that she was present
when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the subject lease agreement.

In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused did not
sign the subject Lease Agreement as a public officer, within the contemplation of RA No. 3019 and, therefore, the first
element of the offense under Section 3(g) is wanting.
As regards the SECOND ELEMENT: the Sadiganbayan merely based its findings against Marcos & Dans, by comparing
the two rental rates, it then concluded that the rental price of P102,760.00 a month is unfair, unreasonable and
disadvantageous to the government, compared to the monthly rent of P734,000.00 in the Sub-lease Agreement.

Certainly, such a comparison is purely speculative and violative of due process. The mere fact that the Sub-lease
Agreement provides a monthly rental of P734,000.00 does not necessarily mean that the rental price of P102,760.00 per
month under the Lease Agreement is very low, unreasonable and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government. There are many factors to consider in the determination of what is a reasonable rate of rental.

What is more, as stressed by Jose P. Dans Jr., when subject Lease Agreement was inked, the rental rate
therein provided was based on a study conducted in accordance with generally accepted rules of rental
computation.

Notably, the real estate appraiser who testified in the case as an expert witness assured the court that the rental price
stipulated in the Lease Agreement under scrutiny was fair and adequate. In facts, the reasonable rental for subject
property at the time of executionof the contract was only P73K PER MONTH.

Succinctly, the subject Lease Agreement by itself does not prove that the said contract entered into by petitioner is
"manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government." There is no established standard by which the contract’s
rental provisions could be adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or the entire government. The lease agreement alone does not
prove any offense. Neither does it together with the Sub-lease Agreement prove the offense charged.

At most, it creates only a doubt in the mind of the objective readers as to which between the lease and sub-lease
rental rates is the fair and reasonable one, considering the different circumstances as well as parties involved. It could
happen that in both contracts, neither the LRTA nor the Government suffered any injury. There is, therefore, insufficient
evidence to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a month, did not result in
any disadvantage to the government because obviously, the rental income realized by PGHFI from the Sub-lease
Agreement, augmented the financial support for and improved the management and operation of the Philippine
General Hospital, which is, after all, a government hospital of the people and for the people.

GO VS. THE FIFTH DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 172602 APRIL 13, 2007;
DOCTRINE: CONSPIRACY
Generally, only a public officer can be helf criminally liable for violation of RA No. 3019However, if there is conspiracy,
the act of the public officer in violating RA 3019 is imputable to the private individual, although they are not similarly
situated in relation to the object of the crime. Moreover, Sec. 9 provides a penalty for public officer or private persons
for crime under Sec. 3.

Hence, private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law
to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto.

FACTS:
The Court declared in a case as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental Contracts entered into between the Government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and
PIATCO.

By these PIATCO contracts, the Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the NAIA
Passenger Terminal III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant to BOT Law as amended.

The Court, however, later on ruled that PAIRCARGO CONSORTIUM, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a
qualified bidder as it failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the PIATCO
contracts were declared null and void for being contrary to public policy considering that the 1997 Concession
Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an
entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon:.

Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan charging VICENTE C. RIVERA, then DOTC
Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner HENRY GO, Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA specifically for the substantial
amendment therein providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s
default which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines

Petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty.

Petitioner Go filed a Motion to Quash and contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he
was not a public officer, which is a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
 conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e) the
elements of which include that "the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them. Unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019, Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only public officers as the operative phrase
in the latter provision is "on behalf of the government." Thus, Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be
extended or even enlarged by implication or intendment to bring within its limited scope private persons.
 As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the government," there being no
showing of any agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of the government.
o In support thereof, petitioner invoked the case of Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, and claimed that in the
same manner, the first element of the offense charged against him is absent because he is not a
public officer who is authorized by law to bind the government through the act of "entering into a
contract." hence, there is no other recourse but to quash the Information.
 He insists that the allegation of conspiracy between Rivera and himself is not supported by any evidence. His
mere signing of the ARCA does not allegedly establish culpability for violation of RA 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.

RULING:
YES. The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private persons.

The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer" does not necessarily
preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public
officers in the commission of the offense thereunder.

Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may
lead thereto.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. It is true that Marcos’ acquittal was based on the finding that
she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first element was
wanting. However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that, Dans, the public officer and with
whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted.
Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.

In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his case because he is not
being charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC
Secretary. The case against both of them is still pending before the Sandiganbayan.

xxxx
As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted hypothetically,
establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à-vis petitioner Go:
(1) 1ST ELEMENT: Conspiracy
(2) 2nd ELEMENT: Conspiracy
(3) 3RD ELEMENT: ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the
NAIA IPT III providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s
default which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law and manifestly grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines

The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a function duly belonging to the
latter. The exercise of such function cannot be meddled with by the courts by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference
except for compelling reasons.

To be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be present:
1) that the accused is a public officer;
2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government

MARZAN VS. PP, OCT. 11, 2021

DOCTRINE:
The elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 are:
(i) The offender is a public officer;
(ii) The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act or the offender allows himself to
be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act;
(iii) The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter

Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the following modes:

(1) when the offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the public officer; or

(2) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said act which
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the public officer.

The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced,
is a public officer, such as Marzan. Thus, in reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the one
who induced him was likewise a public officer or a private individual,

FACTS:
Atty. RUPISAN was a Provincial Department Head, being then the Provincial Legal Officer of Nueva Vizcaya. He a
prominent figure in the political and legal arena and a close ally of the Provincial Governor. While Accsued MARZAN
was a Senior Jail Officer 3 (SJO3) of the BJMP. The two were charged with violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 before
the Sandiganbayan when the former

It was alleged that Atty. Rupisan issued a Recognizance without Court approval stating therein that he will take under
his custody the detained persons (Cyrus & Pascua), verbally citing further, in apparent intent to confuse Marzan that
the commitment and detention of the accused are unlawful since no warrant for their arrest was issued which should
preclude the issuance of a commitment order,

Consequently, Manzan release Cyrus and Pascua by virtue of said Recognizance signed by Atty. Rupisan, knowing fully
well that the same was in violation of the law and BJMP rules and regulations.

Cyrus Dulay [Cyrus] and Wendell Pascua [Pascua] were arrested in flagrante delicto during the night duty of SPO2
Tapiru and his team members, when latter passed by a commotion involving some persons who were throwing bottles
of Red Horse Beer. Pascua, Cyrus and a certain Maximo Pascus were apprehended and brought to the patrol car.
After gathering information from bystanders, SPO2 Tapiru's team learned that Dulay, Pascua, and Maximino attacked a
certain DENNIS F. BUTIC (BUTIC), who suffered a broken teeth after being hit with a bottle of Red Horse Beer.

A criminal complaint for Frustrated Homicide was subsequently filed against Dulay and Pascua. They were detained by
virtue of the Commitment Order issued by MTC.

However, when SPO2 Tapiru reported back to the police station and was informed that Cyrus and Pascua were
released on recognizance under the custody of Atty. Rupisan and with the consent of Marzan. SPO2 Tapiru noticed
that the Recognizance was issued by Atty. Rupisan and not by a court.

Meanwhile, Jail Chief Inspector was also informed of the said release and ordered Marzan to re-arrest Cyrus and
Pascua as their release being in violation of BJMP Manual.

In view of the foregoing, Mazan and Atty. Rupisan were both charged with violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019.

MANZAN’S DEFENSE: The subject "Recognizance" and unsigned Commitment Order were shown by his superior, Goyo.
Thereafter, the latter instructed him to release Cyrus and Pascua from detention, to which he obliged.

ATTY.RUPISAN’S DEFENSE: The father of Cyrus, requested that he intercede for the release of Cyrus, to which he obliged
and wrote a letter requesting any officer of the law to release Cyrus, if there is no case filed against him yet.

SANDIGANBAYAN: convicted both of the accused. MR denied. Atty. Rupisan took advantage of his position as
Provincial Legal Officer to exert influence on Marzan as a jail officer.

Hence, this petition for review filed by Manzan.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 he released Cyrus and Pascua from detention pursuant to the instruction of his superior, Goyo, and not by
virtue of Atty. Rupisan's inducement or influence.
 if indeed he was persuaded, induced or influenced to release Cyrus and Pascua from detention, it was
through a private individual Ciriaco, the father of Cyrus, who was a relative of the town's Vice Mayor (Not a
public officer)

ISSUE:
WON Marzan is liable for Section 3(a), RA 3019

RULING:
YES. Marzan is guilty of the second mode of SEC. 3(A), RA 3019 for allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced by Atty. Rupisan who unlawfully issued the Recognizance and consequently caused the release of both
Cyrus and Pascua. The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer, such as Marzan.

Thus, in reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the one who induced him
was likewise a public officer or a private individual, such as Ciriaco

The elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 are:

(iv) The offender is a public officer;
(v) The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act or the offender
allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act;
(vi) The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duty of the latter

All of the elements are present in this case.

First: it is undisputed that Marzan was a public officer at the time of the commission of the crime.
Second: Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the following modes:
(3) when the offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer; or

(4) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said
act which constitutes a violation of rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority or
an offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer.

Atty Rupisan is guilty of the first mode in view of his unauthorized intervention in the processing of the
release of Cyrus and Pascua in the form of a Recognizance despite the pendency of the preliminary
investigation.

While Marzan was guilty of the second mode for allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced
by Atty. Rupisan who unlawfully issued the Recognizance and consequently caused the release of both
Cyrus and Pascua. The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer, such as Marzan.

Thus, in reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the one who
induced him was likewise a public officer or a private individual, such as Ciriaco

Third: Marzan unlawfully released Cyrus and Pascua.

To stress, Cyrus and Pascua were lawfully detained pursuant to a duly issued commitment order of a court of
law and yet they were released pursuant to an improperly issued Recognizance, without an accompanying
Court Order, in violation of the law and BJMP rules and regulations.

In the instant case, all the elements of the offense under Section 3(a) of RA 3019, were established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Court, in imposing the penalty provided under Sec. 9, took into consideration that this is Marzan's very first time
during his long service with the BJMP, thus, Instead of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to
ten (10) years as maximum, he is sentenced to the reduced period of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum
to seven (7) years as maximum.
 PELIGRINO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
, AUGUST 13, 2001;
DOCTRINE:
To convict the accused in a prosecution for the violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, mere receipt of a
gift or any other benefits is enough, even without any express demand for it. The duration of the possession is not
controlling.

Section 3(b) or (c) penalizes three distinct acts — (1) requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) requesting and receiving —
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein a public officer in. an. official
capacity has to intervene under the law. These criminal acts are distinct and different from each other. Proof of
the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pelegrino, an examiner of BIR, together with his supervisor Revenue Offier Atty. Buenafe were assigned to
examine the books of Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano in connection with the investigation of the books of accounts
for income and business tax returns earned by professionals.

Petitioner Pelegrino and Atty. Buenafe went to the complainant’s office and told Dr. Feliciano that his tax
deficiencies would amount to P500k. Shocked, because his books were not even examined, complainant
entertained the idea that it was the beginning of an extortion, and he tried to negotiate for a smaller amount, and
finally the two (2) accused agreed to the amount of 200k, of which 50k would be paid to the BIR, and the rest to
them.

Dr. Feliciano immediately wrote a letter to the NBI requesting for assistance, and an NBI Agent went to his office
where they talked and arranged for an entrapment. On the said entrapment date, neither accused appeared.

The following day, NBI agents returned to the office clinic before lunch time and waited for the two (2) suspects.
The arrangement was that, the NBI agents would stay in one of the rooms of the clinic, would wait for the signal of
the Doctor which was the sound of the buzzer, and when the buzzer was heard they would proceed to arrest the
subject of the operation.

At around 4:30 p.m., accused Peligrino arrived, and so upon hearing the sound of the buzzer, NBI agents
immediately proceeded to the room of Dr. Feliciano, and on seeing the accused in possession of the
brown envelope which contained the marked money, arrested him, and made a body search on him. "The
accused was then brought to the NBI Office in Manila where he was examined for the detection of the
fluorescent powder [o]n his hands and body.

Buenafe and PPeligrino were both charged with violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

PELEGRINO: co-accused Buenafe gave him three (3) copies of ATIPO to deliver the same to Dr. Feliciano, and get the check if
it is already prepared. He arrived at the Office of the Doctor at around 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. While waiting for the ATIPO to be
xeroxed, Dr. Feliciano asked him if he would accept payment in cash to which he said No and he would accept only check
payable to the BIR. Thereafter, the Doctor took a brown envelope from his drawer, threw it in front of him and said 'yan ang
bayad.' The envelope landed close to his arms and so he pushed it asking: 'What is that sir? My purpose in coming here is to get
the check in payment for the BIR'. Instead of answering him, the Doctor stood up and told him he [was] going to get the xerox
copy of the ATIPO.

'The Doctor returned followed by two (2) persons one of whom grabbed his hands from behind while the other standing behind
him wanted him to hold the envelope but he resisted[,] placing his hands against his chest, and since the two men realized he
[could] not be forced to hold the envelope, they let him go, picked the envelope and pressed it against his breast.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted petitioner of the offense charged, but acquitted his co-accused;
 As regards to Buenafe, there was no sufficient proof that he conspired with petitioner.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that it was the latter who
requested the reduction of the amount claimed. He
 incident in complainant's clinic was a frame-up, thus, there could not have been any payoff, inasmuch as
there was no demand.
 Denied that he received payoff money from the complainant.
o According to him, receive, as contemplated in the offense charged, connotes a voluntary act
coupled with knowledge.
o Hence, where the giving of the money affords the accused no opportunity either to refuse or to
return it to the giver, no punishable offense ensues.
o the 40 seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely a momentary
 possession that could not prove "receipt," which the law requires for the offense charged to be
consummated.

ISSUE:

RULING:

The elements of SEC. 3(B),RA 2019 are the following:

(1) the offender is a public officer
(2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit
(3) on behalf of the offender or any other person
(4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government
(5) in which the public officer, in .an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.

Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked to undertake verification of tax
liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors. Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of
taxes due from private complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed.
Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present.

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts –

(1) demanding or requesting;
(2) receiving; or
(3) demanding, requesting and receiving
-- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an
official capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and
different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.

The lack of demand is immaterial. Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 uses the word or between requesting and receiving.

Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by evidence acquired during an entrapment, as the giver or briber is
usually the only one who can provide direct evidence of the commission of this crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted
to in order to apprehend a public officer while in the act of obtaining undue benefits.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that there must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider it as his or her own property from then on. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any
other sign, circumstance or act to show acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime
has been committed. To hold otherwise would encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.

The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in determining receipt or acceptance. In the case at
bar, petitioner opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked inside, closed it and placed the
envelope beside him on the table. Such reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery, especially
considering that he was not supposed to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The PROXIMITY OF THE ENVELOPE
relative to petitioner, as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies petitioner's contention that he refused the
bribe.

A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of a wrongful act is presumed to be both
the taker and the doer of the whole act.

Petitioner alludes to the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to
convict the co-accused, the acquittal of the former should benefit the latter. Such doctrine does not apply to this
case. The strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which
Buenafe was not involved. Hence, the evidence against petitioner and that against his co-accused were simply
not at par with each other.

In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure the accused into committing an
offense, which the latter otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and the law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime
 VILLAUNEVA VS. PP, JULY 8, 2020;
DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
RACE (Rayborn-Agzam Center for Education, Inc) is a private competency assessment center accredited by TESDA.
RACE conducts competency assessment in NC II programs which are needed by applicants for work in hotels and
restaurants domestic or abroad.

The complainant, Raymundo, Manager of RACE, sought the help of Nida in establishing RACE. Petitioner Nida then
became one of the incorporators of RACE. To commence the incorporation of RACE, an indorsement from TESDA was
obtained as a requirement in its application for registration with the SEC.

An Indorsement Letter was issued and signed by Petitioner, EDWIN S. VILLANUEVA (Edwin) was the Provincial Director of
TESDA, Aklan Provincial Office.

After the incorporation of RACE, Nida was employed by RACE as an In-House Assessor.

RACE'S accreditation as a Competency Assessment Center was approved and signed by petitioner Edwin and was
confirmed by TESDA Director

Based from the foregoing, Spouses Villanueva were charged for violation of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019: Accepting or
having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with
him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

NIDA: noble purpose of putting up a TESDA accredited training center; Edwin was not aware of her employment with
RACE.

EDWIN: denied having knowledge that his was was an incorporator of RACE when he signed the Indorsement Letter to
SEC AND THAT his function is ministerial in nature.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted the petitioner for SEC. 3(d)

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 RACE, being a non-stock and non-profit TESDA accredited educational association, may not be within the
purview of the "private enterprise" indicated in Section 3 (b)
o "enterprise" referred to in the law connotes an entity primarily organized for profit.
 despite being a relative of a public officer, Nida's profession falls under the exempted professions under
AdminCode
o Nida's roles as a competency assessor is considered in the category of that of a teacher under the
RACE

ISSUE:
WON provisions of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019 are applicable in this case, considering that the entity into which Nida was
employed is not considered a private entity in contemplation of the law.

RULING:
YES. The law is very clear and straightforward. A public officer or any member of his family cannot accept
employment in a private enterprise with whom such public officer has a pending official business with during the
pendency thereof or within one year from its termination as it is considered a corrupt practice.

The fact that RACE is a non-stock and non-profit educational association is immaterial. Regardless if the enterprise is
for profit or not, stock or nonstock, the law does not distinguish. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that:
where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Thus, mere acceptance by Nida, a family
member, of employment with RACE, which is a private non-stock and non-profit enterprise, renders petitioners liable
under the law.

Violation of Section 3(d) of RA No. 3019 is considered malum prohibitum. Mere acceptance by the co-accused, a
family member, of employment with RACE rendered the accused liable under the law.

In addition, All the elements of violation of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019 are present and duly proven and established in THIS
CASE.

For one to be found guilty under SEC. 3(D), RA 3019, the following elements must be present and proven beyond
reasonable doubt:
 (a) the accused is a public officer;
(b) he or she accepted or has a member of his or her family who accepted employment in a private
enterprise; and,
(c) such private enterprise has a pending official business with the public officer during the pendency of
official business or within one year from its termination.

1ST: Edwin was the Provincial Director of TESDA at the time of commission of the crime
 His wife Nida, though a private citizen, can be validly charged in conspiracy with her husband in the
commission of the crime. It has long been settled that private individuals may be sued and indicted together
with the co-conspiring public officer in abidance with the policy of RA 3019.
 Additionally, Section 9 of RA 3019 concretizes the conclusion that the anti-graft practices law applies to both
public and private individuals.
2ND: Nida accepted employment in RACE, which is a private enterprise, as an In-House Competency Assessor. She is
not only an employee but also an incorporator or part owner of the said entity.

3RD: During the time that Nida accepted employment with RACE, the latter had a pending official business with TESDA
over which Edwin had control and supervision as Provincial Director thereof.
 There is no doubt that Nida's act of accepting employment occurred when RACE, a private enterprise, had a
pending official business with TESDA-Aklan, which is under Edwin's control and supervision.

In the present case, the issuance of the subject Indorsement Letter to SEC and even the signing of the RACE'S TESDA
accreditation cannot be deemed a merely ministerial act on the part of Edwin. It is a discretionary act or function of a
TESDA Provincial Director to sign the foregoing Indorsement Letter in accordance with certain law

Likewise, petitioners cannot extricate themselves from the claws of law by denying Edwin's knowledge of Nida's
employment with RACE. Unsubstantiated denial is a weak defense and cannot be given credence as it is self-
serving. There is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Edwin was aware of the involvement of Nida with
RACE.

Therefore, Edwin, in conspiracy with his wife, was held liable for corruption under Section 3(d) of RA No. 3019. Because
of conspiracy, his wife is also liable. Moreover, under Section 9(a), a private person committing any of the unlawful acts
under this law shall also be punished.

MEJORADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN JUNE 30, 1987

DOCTRINE:
Section 3(e) is not applicable exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions.

FACTS:
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried before the
Sandiganbayan, and substantially allege the same set of circumstances constituting the offense charged under
RA 3019.

Accused Mejorada, a Right-of-Way-Agent of the Office of the Highway District Engineer. As a right-of-way agent, his
main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose
of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.

petitioner contacted the complainants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway.

In the process, Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the “Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair
Market Value of Real Properties and ―Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements'' pertinent to
their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the documents were all about as they were
only interested in the payment of damages.

In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were
made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to
Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower
than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was, in turn, supported by
the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value exactly the same as that
stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only a
difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively.
 Later it turned out that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in
the names of other persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.

accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer to receive payments and
personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks.

After said claim was approved and the corresponding PNB Check was issued and encashed in the amount of
P7,200.00, Mejorada accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of the
amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left,
explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to
complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.

Thereafter, they went with their counsel to the Provincial Fiscal Office of Pasig City wherein informations were filed with
the Sandiganbayan.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTON:
 he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer
contemplated by Section 3 (e).
 denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the payments were allegedly made
on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in
preparing.
 For the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the complainants and the government
must have been caused by the public officer in the discharge of his official functions and inasmuch as when
the damage was caused to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his official administrative
functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.
 cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution
is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery.
 The penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment
is contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed
forty (40) years.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized bysection 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven
by theprosecution;
(2) Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in theinformation and the
offense proved
(3) WON the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive andcontrary to the three-fold rule as provided for
by Article 70 of the RevisedPenal Code;

RULING:
1. YES.
The three essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(2) that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) that the accused caused undue injury to any party including the Government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 refers to ―any public officer‖. It makes no distinction or qualification and specifies
the acts declared unlawful. A violation may occur when an officer takes advantage of his position and divests private
parties of compensation they must receive.

Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 provides that: this provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The last sentence of Section 3(e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of public officers granting lcenses or permits or
other concessions. It should not be interpreted as an exclusionary rule. In sum, Section 3(e) is not applicable exclusively
to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.

1st: accused must be a public officer.

2nd: the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of complainants
which became the basis of the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the
Department of Highways and which eventually became the basis of payment.
His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to
negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their
claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of
the just compensation to which they are entitled.

3rd: the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign
the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value
of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of
the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.

All of the elements are present in this case.

2. NO. As to the argument of the petitioner that the evidenced adduced by the prosecution is that of robbery, the
Court ruled that there is no variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The
prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through
evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the
petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme which
commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their
claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-
Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).

3. NO. Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as setforth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed. Article 70 speaks of ―service‖ of sentence, ―duration‖ of penalty and penalty ―to
be inflicted.‖ Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the ―imposition of penalty.‖ It
merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these
penalties the maximum of which is forty year.

Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate
and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed
by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the
power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed
against the accused-petitioner. Hence, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and
unusual.