Module 1:

How Do We Study Terrorism?

Nine Myths of Terrorism

Part 2
Dr. Gary LaFree
University of Maryland
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Recap
• Common myths about
terrorism
• Black Swan nature leads to
stereotypes based on high
profile attacks (like 9/11)
• Stereotypes often don’t hold
up to fact
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Myth 6:

Most terrorist attacks are

extremely lethal
 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Total Fatalities per Terrorist Attack, 1970-2011 (n=104,689*)

60.00% 55.87%
Source: Global Terrorism Database
50.35%
50.00%

40.00%
Percent of Attacks

1970-2006 2007-2011
30.00%
24.71%
19.40%
20.00%
15.10%
13.05%

10.00% 6.79% 6.01%

3.47% 2.60%
1.42% 1.25%
0.00%
0 1 2-4 5-10 11-25 Over 25
Number of Fatalities
*Data on fatalities were missing in 6.6% of cases
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Reality:
• Most attacks that receive
publicity are very lethal
• However, GTD shows 50% of all
attacks result in no fatalities
– Why?
• Sometimes terrorist destroy property
as a goal
• Some attacks fail
• Sometimes killing is not the aim- such
as in warned attacks (ex. IRA)
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

• Brian Jenkins: Terrorist want

many watchers but not dead
• GTD: 50% of attacks produced
1 fatality
• GTD: 2% (12,000) of attacks
produced more than 25
fatalities
• Jenkins revised statement to
say: modern terrorist want
many people watching and
many dead
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Myth 7:

Most terrorists attacks rely on

sophisticated weaponry
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Reality:
• Most attacks rely on non-
sophisticated, readily available
weapons
• 80% of attacks rely on mostly
common explosives and
firearms
• Chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear
weapons are rare
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Weapons Used in Terrorist Attacks,

1970-2011 (n=104,689)
Other, Melee,
0.46% 2.17% Incendiar
y, 7.37%

Unknown,
Explosives 8.44%
/
Bombs/
Dynamite, Firearms,
46.27% 35.28%

Source: Global Terrorism Database

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Myth 8:

Most terrorist organizations are

long lasting and difficult to
eradicate
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Longevity of Terrorist Groups, 1970-2011

80.00%

Percent of all Perpetrator Groups

70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Life Span (Years)
Source: Global Terrorism Database
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Reality:
• GTD includes 2000 terrorist groups
that have operated from 1970 –
present
• Often judge activity based off of
how long ago the last attack was
• GTD: 75% of terrorist organizations
last less than a year
• Like business startups they often fail
early on
• Psychological: Media coverage of
longstanding groups makes it seem
as if all terrorist last a long time
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Myth 9:

Terrorist groups are impervious

to governmental counterterror
policies and they rarely make
mistakes
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Reality:
• Myth of the “Superterrorist”
• Events like Mumbai give the
feeling of groups being
infallible
• However, many terrorist groups
lead to their own destruction
• Ample evidence shows terrorist
make frequent strategic errors
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Case study: Armenian Secret Army for

the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
• Based in Turkey during the ‘70s
and ‘80s; Why did it end?
• Strategic error led to their end
• Targeting went from Turks to
unbiased killing
• Loss of outside view of “just
cause”
• Random violence created a
polarized climate among
former supporters and funders
 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Attacks by ASALA and JCAG, 1975 to 1988

Source: Dugan, Huang, LaFree and McCauley (2009)

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Examples of Terrorist
Fallibility
• Oklahoma City Bombing culprit
Timothy McVeigh was arrested
for driving without a license
plate
• The 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing terrorists were
arrested after trying to collect a
rental deposit on the van used
as a car bomb.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Summary
• MYTH 1: Terrorist attacks were rapidly
increasing in the years leading up to 9/11.
• MYTH 2: Terrorist attacks reach every corner
of the world.
• MYTH 3: The U.S. is more frequently
targeted than any other country.
• MYTH 4: Most terrorist attacks involve
disgruntled groups and individuals from one
country carrying out attacks on civilians in
other countries.
• MYTH 5: Terrorism is unrelated to political
grievances.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Summary (Cont.)
• MYTH 6: Most terrorist attacks are
extremely lethal.
• MYTH 7: Most terrorist attacks rely on
sophisticated weaponry.
• MYTH 8: Most terrorist organizations
are long lasting and difficult to eradicate.
• MYTH 9: Terrorist groups are
impervious to governmental counter
terrorist policies and they rarely make
mistakes.
 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

For Further Reading:

• LaFree, Gary and Laura Dugan. Trends in Global Terrorism, 1970-2011.
2013. In Peace and Conflict: 2014. David Backer, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and
Ted Robert Gurr (eds.). Boulder: Paradigm Publishers (forthcoming 2013).

• LaFree, Gary and Laura Dugan. The Global Terrorism Database, 1970-2010.
Forthcoming in Computational Approaches to Counterterrorism Handbook.
V.S. Subrahmanian (ed.) (forthcoming).