PEOPLE v.

VERA
G.R. No. 45685
November 16, 1937

FACTS: On Jan. 8, 1934, the CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu

Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prison mayor.

Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate
penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six
months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other
respects.

Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new
trial which were denied. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for
certiorari. The Supreme Court, likewise, denied the motion for reconsideration or new trial
and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of
Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states in his petition, inter alia, that
he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and
that he would observe good conduct in the future.

Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera
presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the
City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng.

The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other
things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV
of the Constitution, constitute as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal of Manila files a
supplementary petition affirming the issues raised by HSBC, arguing that probation is a
form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief
Executive. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Section 11 of Act. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal
protection of the laws.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that the Probation Act denies the equal protection
of laws.
Further, this basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the
three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation
and eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Of
course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question
not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification
on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the
result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners
in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to
defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so.
In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in
the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would
be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly
situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate
the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces,
in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in
operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the
provincial boards.
On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be
entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no
province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the
probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention
that, for the purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a
province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the
salary of a probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while
inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits
therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be
the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed.
There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection
of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that
score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11
of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law
which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection
of the law it is unconstitutional.
Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate for
the salary of a probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year —
and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent
years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies,
it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable
in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty
of the equality clause but "a rope of sand".