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Fourth Edition

RUSS SHAFER--LANDAU
University ofWisconsin, Madison

New York Oxford

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shafer-Landau, Russ, author.
The fundamentals of ethics I Russ Shafer-Landau, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Fourth edition. I New York: Oxford University Press, [2018] I
Includes bibliographical references and index.
LCCN 2016040690 I ISBN 9780190631390 (pbk.)
LCSH: Ethics.
LCC BJ1012 .S43 20181 DDC 170 dc23 LC record available at
https://lccn.loc.gov/2016040690

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America

Printed by LSC Communications, Inc
 A father's greatest pleasure:

Pride in his children's character

Joy in their company

To my darlings

Max and Sophie

 CONTENTS
............. ~ ............ .

Preface xv
New to the Fourth Edition xvi
••
Instructor's Manual and Companion Website XVll

A Note on the Companion Volume xvii

Acknowledgments xviii

INTRODUCTION 1
The Lay of the Land 1
Skepticism about Ethics 3
Ethical Starting Points 5
What Is Morality? 7
Moral Reasoning 9
The Role of Moral Theory 16
Looking Ahead 17

PART ONE

eGoodLife
CHAPTER 1 Hedonism: Its Powerful Appeal 23
Happiness and Intrinsic Value 23
The Attractions of Hedonism 25
There Are Many Models of a Good Life 26
Personal Authority and Well-Being 27
Misery Clearly Hampers a Good Life; Happiness Clearly
Improves It 27

••
VII
 •••
Vlll CONTENTS

Ihe Limits of Explanation 28

Rules of the Good Life and Their Exceptions 28
Happiness Is What We Want for Our Loved Ones 29

CHAPTER 2 Is Happiness All that Matters? 32

The Paradox of Hedonism 32
Evil Pleasures 34
The Two Worlds 35
False Happiness 36
The Importance of Autonomy 37
Life's Trajectory 40
Unhappiness as a Symptom of Harm 41
Conclusion 42

CHAPTER 3 Getting What You Want 44

A Variety of Good Lives 45
Personal Authority 45
Avoiding Objective Values 46
Motivation 4 7
Justifying the Pursuit of Self-Interest 48
Knowledge of the Good 49

CHAPTER 4 Problems for the Desire eory s1

Getting What You Want May Not Be Necessary for
Promoting Your Good 51
Getting What You Want May Not Be Sufficient for
Promoting Your Good 52
Desires Based on False Beliefs 52
Disinterested and Other-Regarding Desires 53
Disappointment 54
Ignorance of Desire Satisfaction 55
Impoverished Desires 55
Ihe Paradox of Self-Harm and Self-Sacrifice 56
Ihe Fallibility of Our Deepest Desires 57
Conclusion 58
 Contents ix

PART TWO
•
tng
CHAPTER 5 Morality and Religion 63
Three Assumptions about Morality and Religion 63
First Assumption: Religious Belief Is Needed for Moral
Motivation 64
Second Assumption: God Is the Creator of Morality 66
Third Assumption: Religion Is an Essential Source of
Moral Guidance 71
Conclusion 74

CHAPTER 6 Natural Law 76

The Theory and Its Attractions 76
Three Conceptions of Human Nature 80
Human Nature as Animal Nature 80
Human Nature Is What Is Innate 81
Human Nature Is What All Humans Have in Common 82
Natural Purposes 83
The Argument from Humanity 87
Conclusion 89

CHAPTER 7 Psychological Egoism 91

Egoism and Altruism 91
Does It Matter Whether Psychological Egoism Is True? 95
The Argument from Our Strongest Desires 95
The Argument from Expected Benefit 98
Two Egoistic Strategies 100
Appealing to the Guilty Conscience 100
Expanding the Realm of Self-Interest 100
Letting the Evidence Decide 101
Conclusion 105

CHAPTERs Ethical Egoism 107

Why Be Moral? 107
Two Popular Arguments for Ethical Egoism 110
The Self-Reliance Argument 111
The Libertarian Argument 112
The Best Argument for Ethical Egoism 113
X CONTENTS

Three Problems for Ethical Egoism 115

Egoism Violates Core Moral Beliefs 115
Egoism Cannot Allow for the Existence of
Moral Rights 115
Egoism Arbitrarily Makes My Interests All-Important 117
Conclusion 118

CHAPTER 9 Consequentialism: Its Nature

and Attractions 120
The Nature of Consequentialism 122
Structure 122
Maximizing Goodness 123
Moral Knowledge 124
Actual Versus Expected Results 125
Assessing Actions and Intentions 126
The Attractions of Utilitarianism 127
Impartiality 127
The Ability to Justify Conventional Moral Wisdom 128
Conflict Resolution 129
Moral Flexibility 130
The Scope of the Moral Community 131
Slippery Slope Arguments 135

CHAPTER 10 Consequentialism: Its Difficulties 139

Measuring Well-Being 139
Utilitarianism Is Very Demanding 143
Deliberation 143
Motivation 144
Action 145
Impartiality 147
No Intrinsic Wrongness (or Rightness) 149
The Problem of Injustice 151
Potential Solutions to the Problem of Injustice 152
Justice Is Also Intrinsically Valuable 153
Injustice Is Never Optimific 154
Justice Must Sometimes Be Sacrificed 154
Rule Consequentialism 155
Conclusion 158
 Contents xi

CHAPTER 11 e Kantian Perspective:

Fairness and ustice 160
Consistency and Fairness 161
The Principle ofUniversalizability 163
Morality and Rationality 166
Assessing the Principle of Universalizability 170
Integrity 171
Kant on Absolute Moral Duties 172

CHAPTER 12 e Kantian Perspective:

Autonomy and Respect 175
The Principle of Humanity 176
The Importance of Rationality and Autonomy 178
The Good Will and Moral Worth 180
Five Problems with the Principle of Humanity 183
Vagueness 183
Determining Just Deserts 184
Are We Autonomous? 186
Moral Luck 188
The Scope of the Moral Community 189
Conclusion 191

CHAPTER13 e Social Contract Tradition: e eory

and Its Attractions 194
The Lure of Proceduralism 194
The Background of the Social Contract Theory 195
The Prisoner's Dilemma 196
Cooperation and the State of Nature 199
The Advantages of Contractarianism 200
Morality Is Essentially a Social Phenomenon 200
Contractarianism Explains and Justifies the Content of
the Basic Moral Rules 201
Contractarianism Offers a Method for Justifying
Every Moral Rule 202
Contractarianism Explains the Objectivity of Morality 202
Contractarianism Explains Why It Is Sometimes Acceptable
to Break the Moral Rules 203
xii CoNTENTS

More Advantages: Morality and the Law 204

Contractarianism Justifies a Basic Moral Duty to Obey the Law 204
The Contractarian Justification of Legal Punishment 204
Contractarianism Justifies the State's Role in Criminal Law 205
Contractarianism and Civil Disobedience 205

CHAPTER 14 e Social Contract Tradition:

Problems and Prospects 2os
Why Be Moral? 208
The Role of Consent 212
Disagreement among the Contractors 215
The Scope of the Moral Community 216
Conclusion 219

CHAPTER 15 Ethical Pluralism and Absolute Moral Rules 221

The Structure of Moral Theories 221
Is Torture Always Immoral? 222
Preventing Catastrophes 224
The Doctrine of Double Effect 225
A Reply to the Argument from Disaster Prevention 227
How the DDE Threatens Act Consequentialism 227
Distinguishing Intention from Foresight 228
Moral Conflict and Contradiction 230
Is Moral Absolutism Irrational? 231
The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing 233
Conclusion 237

CHAPTER 16 Ethical Pluralism: Prima Facie Duties

and Ethical Particularism 239
Ross's Ethic of Prima Facie Duties 239
The Advantages of Ross's View 241
Pluralism 241
We Are Sometimes Permitted to Break the Moral Rules 241
Moral Conflict 241
Moral Regret 242
Addressing the Anti-absolutist Arguments 243
A Problem for Ross's View 244
Knowing the Fundamental Moral Rules 245
Self-Evidence and the Testing of Moral Theories 246
Knowing the Right Thing to Do 247
Ethical Particularism 249
 Contents xiii

Three Problems for Ethical Particularism 251

Its Lack of Unity 251
Accounting for Moral Knowledge 252
Some Things Possess Permanent Moral Importance 252
Conclusion 254

CHAPTER 17 Virtue Ethics 256

The Standard of Right Action 257
Moral Complexity 258
Moral Understanding 259
Moral Education 261
The Nature of Virtue 262
Virtue and the Good Life 264
Objections 266
Tragic Dilemmas 266
Does Virtue Ethics Offer Adequate Moral Guidance? 267
Is Virtue Ethics Too Demanding? 269
Who Are the Moral Role Models? 270
Conflict and Contradiction 271
The Priority Problem 272
Conclusion 274

CHAPTER 18 Fetninist Ethics 276

The Elements of Feminist Ethics 276
Moral Development 278
Women's Experience 279
The Ethics of Care 282
The Importance of Emotions 283
Against Unification 284
Against Impartiality and Abstraction 285
Against Competition 285
Downplaying Rights 286
Challenges for Feminist Ethics 287
Conclusion 289

PART THREE

Metaethics: e Status of Morality

CHAPTER 19 Ethical Relativistn 293
Moral Skepticism 293
Two Kinds of Ethical Relativism 295
xiv CoNTENTS

Some Implications of Ethical Subjectivism

and Cultural Relativism 296
Moral Infallibility 296
Moral Equivalence 298
Questioning Our Own Commitments 299
Moral Progress 299
Ethical Subjectivism and the Problem of Contradiction 300
Cultural Relativism and the Problem of Contradiction 302
Ideal Observers 305
Conclusion 309

CHAPTER 20 Moral Nihilistn 310

Error Theory 311
Expressivism 316
How Is It Possible to Argue Logically about Morality? 318
Expressivism and Amoralists 319
Ihe Nature of Moral Judgment 320
Conclusion 321

CHAPTER 21 Eleven Arguments Against Moral

Objectivity 323
1. Objectivity Requires Absolutism 324
2. All Truth Is Subjective 325
3. Equal Rights Imply Equal Plausibility 326
4. Moral Objectivity Supports Dogmatism 327
5. Moral Objectivity Supports Intolerance 328
6. Moral Objectivity Cannot Allow for Legitimate Cultural
Variation 330
7. Moral Disagreement Undermines Moral Objectivity 331
8. Atheism Undermines Moral Objectivity 333
9. The Absence of Categorical Reasons Undermines Moral
Objectivity 334
10. Moral Motivation Undermines Moral Objectivity 336
11. Values Have No Place in a Scientific World 338
Conclusion 341

References R. .l
Suggestions for Further Reading FR-1
<Jlossary CJ . . l
Index J. . l
 PREFACE
............. ~ ............ .

his book is divided into three parts one on the Good Life,
another on Doing the Right Thing, and the last on the Status of
Morality. You can read these parts in any order. Many will want
to begin at the end, for instance, with a discussion of whether morality
is a human invention, or is in some way objective. Some will prefer to
start in the middle, asking about the supreme principle of morality (and
whether there is any such thing). And others may want to begin at the
beginning, by thinking about human well-being and the quality of life.
Each part can be understood independently of the others, though there
are of course many points of connection across the three main branches of
moral philosophy. No matter where you begin, there are footnotes in most
chapters that provide cross-references to relevant discussions elsewhere in
the book.
When beginning a new area of study, you're bound to encounter some
unfamiliar jargon. I've tried to keep this to a minimum, and I suppose that
you can be thankful that we're doing ethics here, rather than physics or
anatomy. I define each technical term when I first use it, and have also put
together a glossary, which appears at the end of the book. Each specialized
term that appears in boldface has an entry there.
You may be interested enough in what you read here that you'll want
to continue your studies in moral philosophy. There is a natural place to
begin the companion volume to this book, The Ethical Life, described
later in this preface. I have also compiled a list of Suggestions for Further
Reading for each chapter or pair of chapters. This list appears at the end of

XV
xvi PREFACE

the book, just before the Glossary. I have selected the readings with an eye
to what might be accessible and interesting to those just beginning their
study of moral philosophy.
There is so much that is fascinating about ethics. This tempts a text-
book author to go on and on. And yet page limits must be respected.
Deciding what to keep and what to leave on the editing floor has been a
real challenge. Perhaps you think that the balance hasn't always been well
struck. Perhaps you find certain discussions unclear or boring. Io like to
know about this. The best way to get in touch is by email: RussShafer
Landau@gmail.com.

New to the Fourth Edition

I'm very pleased that students and instructors have found this book useful
enough to warrant a new edition. In the interests of maintaining conti-
nuity with the previous edition, I have tried to introduce only relatively
modest changes. While I have made many dozens of small changes in the
hopes of improving clarity and accuracy, I have also introduced several
larger revisions. Here is a brief list:
• Chapters 3 and 4 now include discussions that reflect clearer dis-
tinctions between the intrinsic and instrumental values of desire
satisfaction.
• Chapter 7 includes a new discussion of the empirical literature on
altruism.
• Chapter 19 includes a new discussion of the attractions of ethical
subjectivism and relativism.
• Substantive improvements have also been made to many sections,
including:
• Happiness and Intrinsic Value in chapter 1
• The Paradox of Hedonism in chapter 2
• Two Popular Arguments for Ethical Egoism in chapter 8
• The Structure of Consequentialism in chapter 9
• Slippery Slope Arguments in chapter 9
• Measuring Well-Being in chapter 10
• Ideal Observers in chapter 19
• The comprehensive companion website associated with this book
has been updated, as has its Instructor's Manual. These resources
 Preface xvii

contain loads of helpful material so much so that they deserve a

brief summary all their own.

Instructor's Manual and Companion Website

The website designed to support this book offers about 250 multiple-choice
questions for students to test their comprehension of the materials here. It
also contains a glossary and links to other websites of further interest. You
can visit the companion website at www.oup.com/us/shafer-landau.
In addition, the Instructor's Manual can be accessed on the Oxford
University Press Ancillary Resource Center (ARC) at https://arc2.oup-arc
.com/access/shafer-landau-fundamentals-of-ethics-4e-instructor-resources.
The manual itself has summaries for all twenty-one chapters, more than
100 essay questions, over 200 multiple-choice questions (in addition to
those available elsewhere on the website), about 200 PowerPoint slides to
help organize lectures, and a variety of links that point students to websites
with content that supplements the material in this book. The ARC is a con-
venient, instructor-focused, single destination for resources to accompany
this text. Accessed online through individual user accounts, the ARC pro-
vides instructors with up-to-date ancillaries at any time while guarantee-
ing the security of grade-significant resources. In addition, it allows Oxford
University Press to keep instructors informed when new content becomes
available.
The work for these ancillary materials was undertaken by my stel-
lar research assistants: Justin Horn, who provided all of the Web materi-
als associated with the first two editions, and Ben Schwan, who provided
updates associated with the third and this latest edition. I am very grateful
for their dedicated efforts in making these first-rate resources.

A Note on the Companion Volume

There are two kinds of introductory books. One is the sort that you have
in your hands right now. It's one person's take on the subject, and your
fate, dear reader, depends on how reliable and engaging that author hap-
pens to be. I have tried to be both, but you will be the judge of that. There
are benefits to a single-authored book. At its best, you'll get a coherent
narrative that draws connections between various discussions. You'll be
handed the important highlights, be introduced to the really big ideas,
and get an accurate map of the relevant terrain.
 •••
XVlll PREFACE

But there is another approach, equally valid. And that is to hear what
the major figures in the area have to say, to familiarize yourself with the
original voices in the field. For those with an interest in going this route,
I have put together a companion volume, The Ethical Life: Fundamental
Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, which allows you to do just that.
The Ethical Life gathers together readings from more than forty
authors on the main subjects that are covered here. There are many
entries on the good life, on the central ethical theories, and on the status
of morality. There are also twenty additional readings on pressing moral
problems, such as the death penalty, abortion, animal rights, and other
urgent matters. There are many resources that can help readers through
that book introductions to each reading, study questions, suggestions
for further reading, and a website with sample quizzes, essay questions,
and lots of extra materials.
The fullest introduction to ethics would include both of these
approaches. The Ethical Life will give you lots of primary sources, and Fun-
damentals can help you to place them in context, clearly setting out their
ideas and providing some critical evaluation of their strengths and weak-
nesses. For those who are content to take my word for it, Fundamentals
will be enough. For those who want to see what other philosophers have
to say about these important matters, The Ethical Life might be a good
place to start. And for those of you attracted by both approaches, working
through each in tandem with the other can provide a well-rounded pic-
ture of what moral philosophy is all about.

Acknowledgments
I wrote this book because my editor, Robert Miller, asked me to. Well, not
really. He asked, and I refused. He did it again, and I refused. Obviously,
I did finally give in. I want to thank Robert for his persistence, but much
more importantly for his unflagging enthusiasm and his uncommon good
sense. His assistant Alyssa Palazzo has been a dream to work with.
One of Robert's many kindnesses was to solicit feedback from so
many talented philosophers. I hope that the following folks will accept my
gratitude for having provided very helpful comments on drafts and previ-
ous editions of this book: Paul Abela, Luke Amentas, Martin Andersson,
Kristopher Area, Thomas Avery, Ralph Baergen, Stacy Bautista, Jeffrey
Brand-Ballard, Don Carrell, Tom Carson, Michael Cholbi, David Detmer,
Josh DiPaolo, Howard M. Ducharme, Matthew Eshleman, Daan Evers,
 Preface xix

Bud Fairlamb, Robert M. Farley, Steve Finlay, Robert Fischer, Deke Gould,
Christopher Grau, Clifton F. Guthrie, Craig Hanks, Dan Hausman, Rich-
ard Haynes, Kelly Heuer, Darren Hibbs, Ryan Hickerson, Richard Hine,
John Huss, Clark Hutton, Scott James, Julian Katz, Jacquelyn Ann Kegley,
Dan Kofman, Avery Kolers, Keith Allen Karcz, Jacob Krch, Robert Lane,
Patrick Linden, Jessica Logue, Andres Luco, Eugene Marshall, Michael
McKenna, William Darryl Mehring, Brian Merrill, John G. Messerly,
Richard Mohline, Nathan Nobis, Kristian Olsen, Aleksandr Pjevalica,
Philip Robbins, Barbara R. Russo, Jesse Steinberg, Glenn Tiller, James
Woolever, and Ruigand Xu. A superstar trio Tyler Doggett, Christian
Miller, and David Sobel deserve special mention for having devoted an
extraordinary amount of serious attention to the initial draft of this book.

R.S.L.
Madison, Wisconsin
Autumn 2017
 INTRODUCTION
............. ~ ............ .

The Lay of the Land

There is so much to know about our world. And for those who are the
least bit curious, we have more resources than ever to give us the insights
we seek. We can turn to a variety of scientists, doctors, economists, histo-
rians, and journalists to help us better understand ourselves, our world,
and our place within it.
But there is a set of vital questions that such experts will never answer.
These are questions about how we ought to live. Sure, financial advisors
can tell us how we ought to invest our money. Personal trainers can advise
us on getting in shape. Career counselors can steer us in one direction
or another. But if we are interested instead in what our guiding ideals
should be, in what sort of life is worth living, in how we should treat one
another, then we must turn to philosophy. Ethics also known as moral
philosophy is the branch of knowledge concerned with answering such
questions.
The field of ethics is vast, and bad news first there is no chance of
covering all of its interesting and important issues within these pages. In
selecting the topics for treatment, I have chosen those that seem to me
most central. These can be grouped under three headings, each represent-
ing a core area of moral philosophy:

1
2 INTRODUCTION

1
1. Value theory What is the good life? What is worth pursuing for its
:

own sake? How do we improve our lot in life?

2. Normative ethics: What are our fundamental moral duties? Which
character traits count as virtues, which as vices, and why? Who
should our role models be? Do the ends always justify the means, or
are there certain types of action that should never be done under
any circumstances?
3. Metaethics: What is the status of moral claims and advice? Can
ethical theories, moral principles, or specific moral verdicts be
true? If so, what makes them true? Can we gain moral wisdom? If
so, how? Do we always have good reason to do our moral duty?
The structure of this book mirrors this threefold division. The first
part is focused on the good life, with an emphasis on explaining the nature
and sources of well-being. We ask, for instance, about whether happiness
is the he-all and end-all of a good life, the only thing desirable for its own
sake. And, naturally, we'll consider views that deny this, including, most
importantly, the theory that tells us that getting what we want whatever
we want is the key to the good life.
Then it's off to normative ethics, which is devoted to examining our
moral relations with one another. Who counts are animals, ecosystems,
or fetuses morally important in their own right? Is there a fundamen-
tal moral rule, such as the golden rule, that can justify all of our spe-
cific moral duties? What role do virtue, self-interest, and justice play in
morality? Are we ever allowed to break the moral rules? If so, when and
why? These are among the most important questions taken up in norma-
tive ethics.
Finally, to metaethics. This part of moral philosophy asks questions
about the other two. Specifically, it asks about the status of ethical claims,
rather than about their content. We all have views about what is right and
good. Are these just matters of taste? Is moral authority based on per-
sonal approval? Social customs? God's commands? Or none of the above?
Is morality in more or less good working order, or is it just a convenient
fiction that keeps us in our place? These are the questions that we will take
up in the last section of the book.

1. All technical terms and phrases that appear in boldface are defined in the Glossary at
the end of the book.
 Introduction 3

There is no shortage of folks offering advice about these questions.

The self-help industry has its gurus, motivational speakers, and best
sellers, each aimed at guiding us on the path to a good life. Political
pundits, religious leaders, and editorial writers are more than happy to
offer us their blueprints for righteous living. They don't always agree,
of course. It would be nice to have a way to sort out the decent advice
from the rest.
Those of you turning to philosophical ethics for the first time are likely
to be hoping for something that I can't provide, namely, a simple recipe for
doing the sorting. It is perfectly natural to want a clear method for distin-
guishing correct from incorrect answers about the good life and our moral
duty. Indeed, when I first went to college, I enrolled in a philosophy course
hoping for just such a thing. My failure to find it left me deeply disap-
pointed. I abandoned philosophy for a few years, and even dropped out of
college for a while. After I returned, I went looking for it again. I've finally
realized that in this area of life, while there is plenty of good advice, it can't
be summed up in one snappy formula, captured in a neat slogan that can
be inscribed in a fortune cookie or on a bumper sticker.
Ethics is hard. It needn't be weakness or fuzzy thinking that stands in
the way of knowing the right thing to do, or the proper goals to strive for.
We are right to be puzzled by the moral complexity we find in our lives.
While we might yearn for clarity and simplicity, this wish for easy answers
is bound to be repeatedly frustrated.

Skepticism about Ethics

When people learn of the difficulties that face each important attempt to
solve ethical puzzles, they often give in to skepticism. The major tempta-
tion is to regard the entire enterprise as bankrupt, or to think that all ethical
views are equally plausible.
Doubts about morality are plentiful, and it would be silly to ignore
them in a book that is so focused on trying to improve our moral under-
standing. Chapters 19, 20, and 21 are entirely devoted to such doubts;
those who feel them acutely might do best to start with those chapters,
and then work their way to the other parts of the book that are focused on
the good life and normative ethics.
For now, let me say just a few things to the doubters. Perhaps the most
important is this: among those who have thought longest and hardest
about ethics, the view that morality is all make-believe, or that all moral
4 INTRODUCTION

standards are correct only relative to individuals or societies, is deeply

controversial. There are lots of problems with such views. Some of these
problems may be devastating.
As a result, it would be a serious mistake just to assume that morality
is a fiction, or that personal or cultural opinion is the ultimate measure of
what is right and wrong. We must follow the arguments where they lead.
They may indeed lead us ultimately to embrace such positions. But they
might not. And we can't know one way or the other until we've actually
done the hard work.
Since I really love this part of ethics the metaethical part I can't
resist saying just a bit more here. In my experience, most of those who
harbor serious doubts about morality base their skepticism on one or
more of the following considerations:
(A) Individuals constantly disagree about what's right and wrong, and
societies do, too. If there were some objective truth in ethics, then
we should expect all really smart people to agree on it. They don't.
So there is no objective truth in ethics.
(B) There are universally correct moral standards only if God exists.
But God doesn't exist, so ethics is just a ((human construct:'
(C) Science tells us the truth about the world, and science says nothing
about what's right and wrong. And that's because nothing really is
right or wrong.
(D) If there were a universal ethic, then that would make it okay for
some people to impose their own views on others. But that's not
okay at all. Therefore there is no universal ethic.
(E) If there were objective moral rules, then it would always be wrong
to break them. But every rule admits of exceptions; no moral
rule is absolute. That shows that we do make up the moral rules
after all.
This is going to sound like cheating, but here goes: every single one of
these arguments is problematic. I'm not going to defend that claim right
now that's what the last three chapters of this book are for. So I don't
expect you to believe me (yet). Still, there is a lesson here: until these (or
other) arguments are laid out with care and successfully defended, we are
in no position to assume that the skeptics about morality are right.
I think you'll soon see that we can make a lot of progress in our moral
thinking. And even if morality is in some way a human invention, there
is still lots to learn, and there are many ways to make mistakes when
 Introduction 5

thinking about what is good and right. It's important to avoid these errors.
Doing moral philosophy can help with this.
Look at it this way. Lots of people believe that when it comes to art,
beauty is in the eye of the beholder there are no objective, universal
standards of good taste. Suppose that's true. And suppose that morality is
just like art in this respect. Still, our tastes can be educated and improved.
Many people are much wiser than I am about music and painting, for
instance. Even if there are no universal standards of good taste, it would
be silly of me to pass up a chance to talk with people who have thought
long and hard about artistic matters. Why should I dismiss their opinions
and refuse to hear them out? I'm no genius. Maybe I could learn a thing
or two.
That's exactly the right attitude to take about ethics. Especially when
so much is at stake the very quality of our life and our relations with
others it would be terrible to close our minds to new and challenging
ideas. Those who have thought so hard about the central questions of exis-
tence may well have something to teach us.
I encourage you to resist the diagnosis that in ethics, anything goes.
As you'll see, good moral thinking is disciplined thinking. There are many
ways that we can go wrong in our moral reflections, and failure here can
have the most disastrous results. Though it is sometimes hard to know
when we have got it right in ethics, it is often very easy to know when we
(or others) have made a mistake. There are clear cases of people ruining
their lives, or doing morally horrific things. We should keep that in mind
before siding too quickly with a skepticism that says that every moral view
is as good as every other.

Ethical Starting Points

One of the puzzles about moral thinking is knowing where to begin. Some
skeptics about morality deny that there are any proper starting points for
ethical reflection. They believe that moral reasoning is simply a way of
rationalizing our biases and gut feelings. This outlook encourages us to
be lax in moral argument and, worse, supports an attitude that no moral
views are any better than others. While this sort of skepticism might be
true, we shouldn't regard it as the default view of ethics. We should accept
it only as a last resort.
In the meantime, let's consider some fairly plausible ethical assump-
tions, claims that can get us started in our moral thinking. The point of the
6 INTRODUCTION

exercise is to soften you up to the idea that we are not just spinning our
wheels when thinking morally. There are reasonable constraints that can
guide us when thinking about how to live. Here are some of them:

• Neither the law nor tradition is immune from moral criticism. The law
does not have the final word on what is right and wrong. Neither
does tradition. Actions that are legal, or customary, are sometimes
morally mistaken.
• Everyone is morally fallible. Everyone has some mistaken ethical views,
and no human being is wholly wise when it comes to moral matters.
• Friendship is valuable. Having friends is a good thing. Friendships
add value to your life. You are better off when there are people you
care deeply about, and who care deeply about you.
• We are not obligated to do the impossible. Morality can demand only
so much of us. Moral standards that are impossible to meet are il-
legitimate. Morality must respect our limitations.
• Children bear less moral responsibility than adults. Moral responsibil-
ity assumes an ability on our part to understand options, to make
decisions in an informed way, and to let our decisions guide our be-
havior. The fewer of these abilities you have, the less blameworthy
you are for any harm you might cause.
• Justice is a very important moral good. Any moral theory that treats
justice as irrelevant is deeply suspect. It is important that we get what
we deserve, and that we are treated fairly.
• Deliberately hurting other people requires justification. The default
position in ethics is this: do no harm. It is sometimes morally ac-
ceptable to harm others, but there must be an excellent reason for
doing so or else the harmful behavior is unjustified.
• Equals ought to be treated equally. People who are alike in all relevant
respects should get similar treatment. When this fails to happen-
when racist or sexist policies are enacted, for instance then some-
thing has gone wrong.
• Self-interest isn't the only ethical consideration. How well-off we are is
important. But it isn't the only thing of moral importance. Morality
sometimes calls on us to set aside our own interests for the sake of
others.
• Agony is bad. Excruciating physical or emotional pain is bad. It may
sometimes be appropriate to cause such extreme suffering, but doing
so requires a very powerful justification.
 Introduction 7

• Might doesn't make right. People in power can get away with lots of
things that the rest of us can't. That doesn't justify what they do. That
a person can escape punishment is one thing whether his actions
are morally acceptable is another.
• Free and informed requests prevent rights violations. If, with eyes
wide open and no one twisting your arm, you ask someone to do
something for you, and she does it, then your rights have not been
violated even if you end up hurt as a result.
There are a number of points to make about these claims.
First, this short list isn't meant to be exhaustive. It could be made
much longer.
Second, I am not claiming that the items on this list are beyond criti-
cism. I am saying only that each one is very plausible. Hard thinking might
weaken our confidence in some cases. The point, though, is that without
such scrutiny, it is perfectly reasonable to begin our moral thinking with
the items on this list.
Third, many of these claims require interpretation in order to apply
them in a satisfying way. When we say, for instance, that equals ought to
be treated equally, we leave all of the interesting questions open. (What
makes people equals? Can we treat people equally without treating them
in precisely the same way? Etc.)
Not only do we have a variety of plausible starting points for our ethi-
cal investigations; we also have a number of obviously poor beginnings
for moral thinking. A morality that celebrates genocide, torture, treachery,
sadism, hostility, and slavery is, depending on how you look at it, either
no morality at all or a deeply failed one. Any morality worth the name will
place some importance on justice, fairness, kindness, and reasonableness.
Just how much importance, and just how to balance things in cases of
conflict that is where the real philosophy gets done.

at Is Morality:
Before investing yourself too heavily in a subject matter, it would be nice
to first have some idea of what you are getting yourself into. One way-
sometimes the best to gain such an understanding is by considering a
definition. When you open your trigonometry text or chemistry hand-
book, you'll likely be given, very early on, a definition of the area you are
about to intensively study. So, as a responsible author, I would seem to
have a duty now to present you with a definition of morality.
8 INTRODUCTION

I'd certainly like to. But I can't. There is no widely agreed-on defi-
nition of morality. We know that it is centrally concerned with protect-
ing people's well-being, with fairness, justice, respect for others, virtue,
responsibility, rights, liberties, social cooperation, praise, and blame. But
the precise nature of such concern is highly disputed, as we'll soon see.
The absence of a definition does not leave us entirely in the dark.
(After all, no one has yet been able to offer informative definitions of lit-
erature, or life, or art, and yet we know a great deal about those things.)
We can get a sense of our subject matter by considering the questions that
are distinctive of ethics namely, those that structure this book, the ones
focused on the good life, our duties to others, the nature of virtue, etc. We
can supplement this by considering the starting points listed above, and
many others that we could easily identify.
We can also better understand morality by contrasting its principles
with those that govern the law, etiquette, self-interest, and tradition. Each
of these represents a set of standards for how we ought to behave, ideals
to aim for, rules that we should not break. But the fact that a law tells us
to do something does not settle the question of whether morality gives its
stamp of approval. Some immoral acts (like cheating on a spouse) are not
illegal. And some illegal acts (like voicing criticism of a dictator) are not
immoral. Certainly, many laws require what morality requires, and forbid
what morality forbids. But the fit is hardly perfect, and that shows that
morality is something different from the law. That a legislature passed a
bill is not enough to show that the bill is morally acceptable.
We see the same imperfect fit when it comes to standards of etiquette.
Forks are supposed to be set to the left of a plate, but it isn't immoral to set
them on the right. Good manners are not the same thing as morally good
conduct. Morality sometimes requires us not to be polite or gracious, as
when someone threatens your children or happily tells you a racist joke.
So the standards of etiquette can depart from those of morality.
The same is true when it comes to the standards of self-interest. I've
just been watching the entire run of The Shield, a police drama set in a
crime-ridden district of Los Angeles. Early in the series, the main char-
acter, Vic Mackey, murders a fellow police officer who was set to reveal
Mackey's corruption. Mackey successfully frames a criminal for the
murder: a classic case of protecting one's own interests by acting immor-
ally. Though the relation between self-interest and morality is contested, it
is a plausible starting point to assume that morality can sometimes require
us to sacrifice our well-being, and that we can sometimes improve our lot
Another random document with
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think it’s a nice way of beginning a letter, I’m sure. Yet she evidently
means it as a compliment—“You were so perfectly delicious that I
could scarcely forbear from giving you a kiss.”—Extraordinary!
—“Indeed I think I will to-morrow, just to make the boys desperate. I
only hope your life is insured, for Dennis will probably chuck you out
of the window, when I do, and it’s too cold for the window to be
opened. Fortunately there is plenty of soft snow to break the fall.”—
Now isn’t that a nasty way of joking! One would actually think she
enjoyed the prospect of seeing me thrown out the window.—“I have
given directions that you are to be called early, and as soon as you
can, I want you to come to the valley summer-house. Turn to your
right, and walk straight towards the river, and you can’t miss it.
There you will find a bevy of maidens waiting to metaphorically hug
and kiss you, and instruct you so that you may play the part of
George Augustus Guelph Dunstan, Earl of Ferrol and Staunton, with
sufficient stupidity and vanity. Amy”—Now I should like to know
what all that means. (Reflectively.) Amy—she’s the one who told me I
was beautiful the first time she spoke to me. I should like to know
what she means!
Enter Mrs. W. r. d.
Mrs. W. (crossing to c.). Why, I didn’t know you had come
downstairs, Lord—I hardly know whether to call you Lord Ferrol, but
I suppose it is safer.
Lord F. (surprised). Eh?
Mrs. W. (confidentially). I was immensely amused just now in
coming down. There are all the boys and girls sitting in the upper
hall, each intent on getting a few words with you, or of preventing the
others.
Lord F. I suppose I ought to be vastly flattered. Yet I thought the
gentlemen disliked me.
Mrs. W. (laughing). Oh, they will probably kill you before the end
of your visit.
Lord F. Good gracious, Mrs. Wycherly, you’re not speaking
seriously!
Mrs. W. You play your part so well that I myself should think that
you were to the manner born.
 Lord F. (aside). I wonder if it is the fashion of the house to speak
in innuendoes. (Aloud.) Er! Mrs. Wycherly, I am so new to your ways
that I should really like to ask you about one or two questions of
etiquette. You know that it differs so in countries, and I never want
to seem cold or rude. Now, over here, is it customary for young ladies
to say that they want to kiss fellows (voices outside) who are no
relations of theirs?
Mrs. W. Why, I never heard—
Enter all, r. d. Helen, George, and Steven cross to l. Rose comes
down r. to writing-desk. Dennis and Amy stand at fireplace.
Amy (to Lord F.). Oh, here you are! We’ve all been waiting
upstairs for you.
Lord F. Er, thanks.
Rose. I hope we are not late, Mrs. Wycherly.
Mrs. W. (going up stage to fireplace). Oh, it doesn’t matter in the
least. You will simply have grieved Seymour over the dinner.
Rose. I know I shall grieve him by my appetite. (Over desk to Lord
F.) Why, Lord Ferrol, I am hungry enough to eat you.
Lord F. (half turning). Er, thanks, awfully. (Aside.) Now, what
does she mean?
Amy. Oh, I wouldn’t eat Lord Ferrol, for you can’t eat your cake
and have it. (Coming down center to Lord F.) But I should like to
kiss him, if he will let me.
Lord F. Er, charmed,—if Mrs. Wycherly thinks it proper.
Dennis (seizing paper-knife from desk and rushing down between
them). This is too much, Parker! You are getting more than your
share. (Turning to Amy.) Avaunt, woman! you have raised the
savage in me, and behold the consequences!

[Uses the knife as a scalping

knife, and then tears off
Lord F.’s wig,
revealing a perfectly
bald head.

Lord F. Gad, sir! what do you mean?

 Omnes. Why, who are you?

[Amy crosses to l. as if
bewildered.

Lord F. Who am I?
Mrs. W. (with horror). You are not really Lord Ferrol?
Lord F. Who else should I be?
[Pause.
Amy (sinking faintly into chair). And I asked leave to kiss him!
Mrs. W. (coming down to c. and speaking with great anxiety).
Lord Ferrol, my young people here were each trying to play a joke on
the other, and by a horrible coincidence you have been the victim.
(Imploringly.) Will you not try to forgive us now, and let me explain
at dinner?

[All come down stage and

seem to plead.

Lord F. Well, really, if it’s a mistake, of course I can’t cut up rough.

(To Amy.) Then you don’t think I’m a dear love of a snob, eh?
Amy (faintly). Oh, no, Lord Ferrol.
Lord F. And you don’t want to kiss me?
Amy (more faintly). No, indeed, Lord Ferrol.
Lord F. Then, Miss Sherman, I will try to make you do both.
Steven (coming down c.). There, didn’t I tell you the real English
swells were very jolly, gentlemanly fellows?

[Shakes hands with Ferrol.

Lord F. And didn’t I tell you the Americans were always joking in
the wrong place? (To Dennis.) Er, I’ll thank you for my hair.

Curtain
 “MAN PROPOSES”

IN

SEVERAL DECLARATIONS

AND

ONE ACT

Place

Morning room at the Wortleys.

Time

After dinner, and before the masked ball.

Characters

Miss Agnes Wortley

(A winner of hearts).

Mrs. Van Tromp

(A widow to be won).

Polly
(A serving maid who serves).
 Mr. Stuart
(A theoretical bachelor).

Mr. Reginald De Lancey Van Tromp

(A man with ancestors).

Mr. Charlie Newbank

(A man with money).

Mr. Frederick Stevens

(A man with neither).

Scene.—Morning room in city house,—doors l. and b. Fireplace

with fire l. c. Writing-desk, with matches, pens, ink, paper, and
handbell back centre—chair at desk. Down stage l., easy-chair,
and an ottoman or light chair c. At extreme down stage r.
corner, a bay window, with practical curtains, and a divan
seat. On mantel a clock which strikes ten as soon as curtain
rises.
Enter Polly l. d.
Polly (coming down wearily). Mercy, how tired I am! And no
chance of rest for at least six hours (drops into chair c.). Dinners and
balls may be fun for those who do the eating and dancing, but it’s
death on us poor servants. I’m worked hard enough usually, in all
conscience’ sake, but Miss Agnes has given me just the hardest day
I’ve ever seen! (Imitates Agnes giving orders.) “Polly, is my bath
ready?” “Polly, give me my dressing-gown.” “Polly, bring me my
coffee.” “Now dress my hair, Polly.” “Get me my habit, Polly.”
(Rises.) “While I’m in the park, Polly, sew the ribbons on my two
dominos.” “Oh, and I’ll be too busy to-day to write acknowledgments
for the bouquets, Polly, so you may write to Mr. Stevens and Mr. Van
Tromp and Mr. Newbank, and any others that come, thanking them
for their lovely flowers, which are now filling my room with
sweetness!” From seven till eight it’s been nothing but “Polly, do
this,” and “Polly, do that,” and “Where’s Polly?” And no one so much
as said “Polly, want a cracker?” I haven’t had a chance to sit down
since I got up. I even had to eat my dinner off the laundry tubs
(mimics eating with pen and paper-cutter at desk) standing,
because the caterers were everywhere, getting the dinner and ball
supper ready. Miss Agnes says she’s all “worn out.” I wish she could
try my work once in a while. How I should enjoy telling the rich and
sought-after Miss Agnes Wortley to (mimicking) “button my shoes,”
(sticks out foot) or (waves her hand) “fetch me my gloves!” I would
give a month’s wages if I could only take her place just for to-night at
the masked ball. (Speaking with excitement.) When she decided that
she must have two dominos, so that she could change in the middle
of the ball, I thought to myself: ‘What’s to prevent your slipping on
the domino she isn’t wearing, and going downstairs?’ (Muses.) If I
only dared! I could easily slip out before she wanted to change!
(Pause.) No! I mustn’t even think of it or the temptation will be too
great.

[Goes to fireplace, and sitting

on rug pokes the fire.

Stuart appears b. d. and looks in.

Polly. It would be such fun! Think of being Miss Agnes for one
evening and dancing with all her admirers! Oh, my! Supposing one
should propose! Mr. Newbank! (Laughs.) Or Mr. Van Tromp!
(Laughs again.) I’d know what I’d say to them! Mr. Stevens? I
wonder if she cares for him.
Stuart. And how about Mr. Stuart?
Polly (springing up, flustered). Oh, Jiminy! Oh—I beg your
pardon, Mr. Stuart, I was—I—
[Hesitates.
Stuart (laughing). Poking the fire, eh? Is this room free territory?
Polly. Yes, Mr. Stuart. It’s Miss Wortley’s boudoir, but she thought
it would be a nice place for people to come when they were tired of
dancing downstairs.

[Curtsey's and exits l. d.

Stuart (calling out r.). This way, Fred. Here’s a quiet nook saved
from the universal ruin and bareness of downstairs.
 [Comes down.

Enter Fred, b. d., slowly.

Stuart. Isn’t this luck?
Fred (gloomily). There isn’t any such thing! Or if there is, I never
get any.
Stuart. Now, Fred, you can’t say that after this. You and I don’t
want to stay and smoke with the men. Neither do we want to join the
ladies. The other rooms are as bare and uncomfortable as waxed
floors and camp-chairs can make them. I suggest trying upstairs, and
when I discover and pilot you to this oasis in the desert, you at once
begin to grumble.
Fred. I’m sorry I’m bad company, Mr. Stuart; but if I’m so to you,
just think what I must be to myself.
Stuart. There is something in that.
Fred. And you only see me occasionally, and I’m with myself day
and night.
Stuart (laughing). Pity you can’t hire some one to kill your
disagreeable companion. I wonder if a jury wouldn’t bring in a
verdict of justifiable homicide, if you drowned or hung him.
Fred. I’d like to!
Stuart. Curious. Such a dinner, even when I know it’s to be
followed by a ball, always puts me in a beatific state of mind.
Fred (wearily). I thought it very long and tedious.
Stuart. And what is worse, you looked it. You looked as glum all
through as if you were waiting for the last trump.
Fred (crossly). It wasn’t the last trump I was waiting for. I was—
Stuart (interrupting). No, I misworded my sentence. You were
waiting for the last of Van Tromp.
Fred. Oh, pshaw!

[Rises and crosses to r.

angrily.

Stuart (laughing). You don’t seem to enjoy my pun?

 Fred. Oh, if it pleases you, go ahead.

[Goes up and sits on desk.

Stuart. Fred, you make a mistake to go into society while you are
in this mood. Take a friend’s advice and cut it till you are better
tempered.
Fred (impatiently). I don’t go because I enjoy it.
Stuart (sarcastically). Ah! You go to make it pleasant for others.
Fred. No, I go because she goes.
Stuart (laughing). Will you tell me why a woman’s reason is
always a “because,” and a man’s is always a “she”?
Fred. She‘s an excuse for anything!
Stuart. Even for Charlie Newbank?
Fred (rising angrily). Look here, Mr. Stuart, I’ll take a good deal
from you; but there is a limit.
Stuart (soothingly). Excuse me, my boy. It is brutal in me, but I
am trying to see if I can’t laugh you out of it.
Fred (sits chair l. as if discouraged). No use! As they say out West,
it’s come to stay and grow up with the country.
Stuart. Oh, I didn’t mean your love for Miss Wortley. She’s a
sweet, unspoiled girl, in spite of her own and her papa’s money, and I
hope you’ll win her. I was only trying to cheer you out of your dumps,
and make you look at the golden side of things.
Fred. That’s just what I see all the time, and what comes between
us. I can’t forget her money.
Stuart (springing to his feet). There! That goes to prove a pet little
theory of mine, that it is rather hard for a rich girl to marry well.
Fred. I should think you needed a confirmatory evidence.
Stuart. You are just like the rest! You take the conventionally
superficial view of it.
Fred. Very well, turn lawyer and argue your case before referee Mr.
Frederick Stevens, junior member of the celebrated firm of Mary,
Green and Hart.
 Stuart. You fire my ambition. Well, (rising and imitating legal
style) your honour, and gentlemen of the jury, a priori and imprimis
we start with the postulate that the party of the first part, otherwise
the girl with money, is usually so spoiled that most fellows won’t care
for her. But we will leave that out of the argument and say that she is
a nice girl. Well, by her parents, her friends, and her reading, she is
taught to think that every man who is attentive to her may be a
fortune-hunter. The consequence is that she is suspicious, and may
say or do something to wound or insult a fellow who cares for her,
and so drive him off.
Fred. That’s one point for your side.
Stuart. But even if she is not made suspicious by her money,
(points at Fred) he is. A decent man dreads to have his motives
misjudged. He’s afraid that the girl, or her father, or her mother, or
her friends, or his friends, will think he is fortune-hunting.
Fred. I should think he did!
Stuart. Finally, her money draws about her a lot of worthless
fellows. As a consequence, she is always beset and engaged. You
must remember that in this country a man, if he amounts to a row of
pins, is a worker, and not a drone. He cannot, therefore, dance the
continual attendance that is necessary to see much of a society girl
nowadays. This can only be done by our rich and leisured young
men, who are few and far between; by foreign titles, who are quite as
scarce; and by the idlers and do-nothings, who, if the girl is worth
winning, are as distasteful to her as they are to the rest of mortal
kind. (Sits chair c.) I submit my case.
Fred. Mr. Stuart, you entirely missed your vocation. Allow me to
congratulate you on your maiden argument. But at the same time the
referee would call your attention to the fact that you have failed to
take the relatives into account. They can overcome all this by heading
off the undesirables and encouraging their choice.
Stuart. But that’s just what they won’t do, and which I don’t think
they could to any extent, even if they tried. How much can Mr.
Wortley and Mrs. Van Tromp control Miss Agnes’ companions at the
dinners and dances and other affairs, which are practically the only
places where she meets men?
Fred. Here they can.
 Stuart. But they don’t. You say Mr. Wortley favours Newbank and
Mrs. Van Tromp encourages her brother-in-law. Naturally, then,
they don’t approve your very evident liking for Miss Agnes. Yet I see
you here quite as often as either of the favoured ones. Do you think if
this system of exclusion were possible, it would not have been
practised long ago?
Fred. If you ask it as a conundrum I give it up. But I know that
neither of them want me to marry Miss Wortley. Mr. Wortley wishes
Newbank’s millions to add to the family. Mrs. Van Tromp hopes to
graft Miss Wortley on the fine old stock of Van Tromps.
Stuart. And what does the person most concerned want? In this
glorious country of ours, where children always know more than
parents, the girl’s consent is really the only requisite. What does Miss
Wortley want?
Fred. I only wish I knew!
Stuart. Well, how does she treat you compared with the other
men?
Fred. At first she was very nice and friendly, but latterly she’ll have
nothing to do with me.
Stuart. A girl of taste!
Fred. I’m in the mood to enjoy such friendly jokes.
Stuart. It was meant kindly, Fred, as you will see in a moment.
Now, my boy, I’m going to give you a talking to, and if you resent it, it
will only be further confirmation of another little theory of mine, that
a man’s an ass who concerns himself in other people’s affairs.
Fred. Go ahead. I’m blue enough to like anything sour or
disagreeable.

[Sits, desk chair, and leans on

desk.

Stuart. Now, there at once you give me the text to preach from.
(Walks behind chair l. and leans on back, speaking over it down r.)
About a year ago a certain gentleman named Fred meets a certain
lady named Agnes. We’ll say he met her at a dance—
Fred. No, it was yachting.
 Stuart. Ah!—excuse my lack of historical accuracy. Well, on a yacht
—he met her; then at a ball—he met her; then at a cotillion—he met
her; then at a dinner—he met her. In short, he met her, and met her,
and met her.
Fred (gloomily). Yes, and what is more, he spent hours trying to.
Stuart. Well, she was pretty and charming and—I’m short of an
adjective, Fred.
Fred. Of course you are! There isn’t one in Webster’s Unabridged
which would do her justice!
Stuart. That should have been said to her and not wasted on me.
Well, we’ll say the girl is plu-perfect. The fellow is rather good
looking—eh, Fred?
Fred. I don’t know.
Stuart. He talks and dances well; and is, in fact, quite a shining
light among her devotees.
Fred (irritably). Oh, cut it, for heaven’s sake!
[Rises impatiently.
Stuart (laughing). Excuse me,—the story-teller never cuts; it’s the
editor who does that.
Fred (angrily). Oh, go on.
Stuart. Well, at first this masculine paragon whom I have so
meagrely described seems to be doing well. She likes his society and
shows it. (To Fred.) Right?
Fred. I thought so.
Stuart. But as he gets more interested, he changes. He makes his
attentions and feelings too marked—something no girl likes. Then he
is cross and moody when she does not give him most of her time and
dances. He is inclined to be jealous of every Tom, Dick, and Harry
who comes near her, and absurdly tries to dictate what she shall do
and not do; which she resents. In short, the very strength of his love
makes him an entirely different kind of a man. He is neither
companionable nor entertaining; he is both surly and passionate. Do
you blame her for repulsing him?
Fred. No, you are right. I know I’ve given her reason for turning
me the cold shoulder.
 Stuart. Then if you’ve known this, why haven’t you behaved
yourself?
Fred. I’ve tried to, over and over again; but when I see such cads as
Van Tromp and Newbank and the rest of the pack around her, I get
perfectly desperate.
Stuart. And why? Now, Van Tromp is not only a fool, which I
suppose is the fault of his ancestors, but he is so impecunious that
every girl who has money must suspect his motives. Newbank is
wealthy, but is the kind of man who makes one think of Wendell
Phillips’ remark, that “the Lord showed his estimate of money by the
people he gave it to.” Why should you be jealous of such rivals? You
stand at least as good a chance as they.
Fred. No I don’t. Look here, I’ve just been made a member of the
firm. That will give me something like $4,000 a year at first. How
can I ask a girl living as she does to try and get along on that?
Stuart. You forget her own income.
Fred. That’s just what I can’t do. I’ve tried to tell her that I love
her, but her money makes the words stick in my throat.
Stuart. And yet Van Tromp, who hasn’t a cent in the world, and
never will have, if he has to make it himself, will say it as glibly as
need be.
Fred. It’s that makes me desperate. I try to be good company, but I
feel all the time as if it weren’t an even race, and so I can’t.
Stuart. My dear boy, no race in this world is even. If it were
anything but a woman’s heart in question, I would bet on you as the
winner; but as that commodity is only to be represented by the
algebraic x, I never wager on it.
Fred (scornfully). How learnedly a bachelor does talk of women’s
hearts! One would think he had broken a lot in order to examine
their contents.
Stuart (a little angrily). I never lost a girl through faint heart,—or
lost my temper with both her and my best friend.
Fred (apologetically). There! Of course you are right and I am a
fool.
Stuart (looking at watch). There being no dissent to that opinion,
and the ladies being now ready to see us, you had better go
downstairs and show Miss Wortley that the Fred Stevens of a year
ago is still in the flesh.
Fred (going to b. d.). And you?
Stuart. I’ll stay here and have a cigar.

[Exit Fred, b. d.

Stuart (taking out cigar-case). How that poor fellow does carry his
heart in view! (Takes match from desk.) No wonder Miss Wortley
keeps hers to herself, with such an example!
[Strikes match.
Enter Polly, l. d., carrying black domino and lace mask.
Stuart. Hello! One minute, please. Whose domino is that?
Polly (halting). I mustn’t tell, sir.
Stuart. No, of course not. Quite right. (Tosses away match and
jingles coins in his pocket.) Perhaps, though, you can tell me to
whom you are carrying it.
Polly (coming down). Perhaps I might, sir.
Stuart (taking out money). Well?
Polly. I was carrying it to Mrs. Van Tromp’s room, sir.
Stuart (giving money). Thank you. (Takes domino and mask from
her.) Mr. Stuart told you Miss Wortley wanted you to come at once to
her, and so you left these in this room—understand? (Gives more
money) Now be off to your mistress.
Polly. Yes, sir.
[Exit Polly l. d.
Stuart. It’s better to be born lucky than rich. (Pats domino
tenderly, and arranges it neatly in chair c.) You’re luckier, though,
for you belong to the dearest and most heartless woman in this
world. (Looks at mask.) And you! She doesn’t need you to mask her
feelings, confound and bless her inscrutable face! You’ll be pressing
against it ere long. (Kisses mask.) Take that to her.
Mrs. V. T. (outside). No, I sent Polly for my domino, but she hasn’t
brought it.
Stuart. Speaking of angels— And she mustn’t discover that I know.
 [Hurriedly seizes mask and
domino and tosses
them behind curtains of
bay window; then
strikes match as if
about to light cigar.

Mrs. Van Tromp appears at b. d. and looks in.

Mrs. V. T. Shall it be a cigar or my society? “Under which king,
Bezonian? Speak or die.”
Stuart (throwing match in fire). That goes without saying. The
cigar is my slave; I am Mrs. Van Tromp’s!
Mrs. V. T. Was that impromptu?
Stuart. Coined for the occasion, and needing only the approval of
your majesty to make it gold in my eyes.
[Bows.
Mrs. V. T. I am too good a queen to help stamp worthless money,
and that’s what a compliment is. As the French say, “Fine words cost
nothing and are worth just what they cost.”
Stuart. Anglisé in “Fine words butter no parsnips.” You know, I’ve
always wanted to send that proverb to Delmonico. He takes
something uneatable, and by giving it a sauce and a high-sounding
French title, deludes the public into ordering it. You pay five cents
for the basis, ten for the sauce, and the other thirty-five for the
French, which no man can understand or pronounce.
Mrs. V. T. He didn’t serve this evening’s dinner.
Stuart. Far be it from me to suggest that there was anything wrong
in the cuisine to-night. The only criticism I could possibly make on
the dinner was that there were twenty-four too many people.
Mrs. V. T. (counting on fingers). Twenty-four from twenty-six—
that leaves two?
Stuart. Let me congratulate you on your mental arithmetic.
Mrs. V. T. Have you actually reached that time of life when one
ceases to enjoy dinners?
Stuart. I hope not. I was even flattering myself that my tastes were
becoming more juvenile.
 Mrs. V. T. In what does that show itself?
Stuart. In wanting something I can’t have. I believe it’s considered
infantile to want the moon.
Mrs. V. T. You want the moon? Then you must be in love! I’m so
sorry I can’t stay and let you tell me all about her. I came upstairs for
my domino and mustn’t tarry.
[Starts up back.
Stuart (standing between her and the door). One moment, Mrs.
Van Tromp. I’ll not bore you with my own love affair, but I should
like to ask your help in another.
Mrs. V. T. (turning and coming down l.). I promise my assistance.
I love to help on—other people’s love affairs.
Stuart. There is a poor fellow downstairs who is eating his heart
out with love for your cousin Agnes. He thinks you are against him.
Mrs. V. T. You mean Mr. Stevens?
Stuart. Yes.
Mrs. V. T. Why, Mr. Stuart, I like Mr. Stevens, and he would be my
second choice—
Stuart (interrupting). For yourself?
Mrs. V. T. (laughing). No, for Agnes. But surely you don’t expect
me to work against my brother-in-law?
Stuart. But Agnes is your cousin. Do consider her!
Mrs. V. T. Mr. Stuart, I married Alexander Van Tromp without
caring that (snaps her fingers) for him. Yet we hit it off together very
nicely. He obtained income and I won social position. By it I have
been able to introduce my uncle into good society, and give Agnes
her pick of the best. Do you think I do her wrong in planning the
same kind of a marriage for her?
Stuart. Has Cupid no rights?
Mrs. V. T. He can come later. The Van Tromps are too old a family
for the members to live long. So I am only giving Agnes a few years of
matrimony, like my own; and then—well, you know whether my life
is gloomy or otherwise.
Stuart. Mostly otherwise, I should say.
 Mrs. V. T. No girl of nineteen knows enough to pick out the man
she can breakfast with three hundred and sixty-five days in the year
for half a century. Moreover, a young girl cannot have a large enough
choice. She can only say “yes” or “no” to those who ask her. On the
contrary, a woman of—we’ll say twenty-eight—picks out her man and
fascinates him. To quote the French again: “A girl of sixteen accepts
love; a woman of thirty incites it.”
Stuart. As you have been doing?
Mrs. V. T. Agnes shall sample matrimony with Regie; see just what
it is like; and then be prepared to select a second time with wisdom
and discrimination—like her aged and venerable cousin.
Stuart (hesitatingly). Will you pardon the question,—but was Mr.
—was, ah, the brother of Reginald anything like, ah, his brother?
Mrs. V. T. (laughing). Very!
Stuart (confidentially). What did you do with him?
Mrs. V. T. On the day we married, he put a ring on my finger; I put
one through his nose. Then he led very nicely.
Stuart. And is that your ideal of a husband?
Mrs. V. T. Unless I find a man capable of not merely doing the
leading, but by whom I shall wish to be led.
Stuart. And how is this man to prove his capacity?
Mrs. V. T. Oh, it’s merely a matter of cleverness or mastery. Let a
man outwit me, and I will (curtseys) ever after sign myself, “Your
obedient, humble servant.”
Stuart. Don’t you see that you are bribing your own undoing?
Mrs. V. T. How so?
Stuart. Why, your conditions are almost in the nature of a
challenge. Now you know, of course, Mrs. Van Tromp, that I don’t
love you, yet you make me want to enter the rather formidable
competition just to see if I couldn’t get the better of you.
Mrs. V. T. (laughing). Well, I have no wish to balk you. But it must
be a game of forfeits. If you fail, you must pay a penalty.
Stuart. Isn’t failure to win Mrs. Van Tromp penalty enough?
Mrs. V. T. Not to so confirmed a bachelor as Mr. Stuart. Come, if
you beat me, I will do any one thing you wish; if you are beaten, you
must do the one thing I wish. Is it a bargain?
Stuart. Done! (Kissing Mrs. V. T.’s hand.) Perdition have my soul!
Mrs. V. T. And now for my domino.

[Hurries up and exits l. d.

Stuart (at l. d.). But, Mrs. Van Tromp, you haven’t told me in what
I am to beat you?
[Exit Stuart, l. d.
Enter Charlie and Agnes, b. d.
Charlie. Thith ith better than down thairth, Mith Wortley, ithn’t it?
Agnes (sinking into chair c. with sigh). Oh, much!
Charlie. I’ve been wanting to thuggeth it before, Mith Wortley, but
that bore Van Tromp wath alwayth round, and if he heard me, he
would intrude hith thothiety upon uth.
Agnes. Why. Mr. Newbank, I thought you were friends.
Charlie. We uthed to be, till the fellowth came out thuth a thnob.
Agnes. That is where you men have such an advantage. Now we
girls have to put up with every donkey that comes near us.
Charlie. That ith hard, Mith Wortley. But it theemth to me that
you might thave yourthelf by a little diplomathy.
Agnes (eagerly). Do tell me how!
Charlie. Why don’t you get rid of Van Tromp?
Agnes. Why, I can’t be rude to him. You must remember he is a
relation.
Charlie. I didn’t mean rudneth.
Agnes. What then?
Charlie. Why, he athkth you to danth; you are out of breath or
tired. He thitth down by you; you want a glath of lemonade, or
thomething elth, it dothn’t matter what.
Agnes (aside). Does he really think that’s an original idea?
(Aloud.) How clever!
Charlie. Yeth, I rather think thatth a good nothon.
Agnes. Isn’t it warm here?
 Charlie. Very. I’ve thought of thuggethting that we open a window.
Agnes. Oh, I’m so afraid of drafts. Did you see where I left my fan?
Charlie. No,—unleth you left it down thairth in the library.
Agnes. Won’t you see if I did?
Charlie (going up l. b.). With the greateth of pleathure.
Agnes. And, Mr. Newbank, (Charlie turns) don’t tell Mr. Van
Tromp I’m here. [Reg. appears at b. d.
Charlie. I’ll tell any lie thooner. (Turns.) Ah!! (Politely.) Mither
Van Tromp, Mith Wortley ith fatigued and wanth to retht a little.
Reg. Aw! Then she shows gweat good sense in sending you away.
Charlie (angrily). Thir, you thouldn’t inflict your thothiety on a
lady who hath juth been athking me how to get rid of you.
Reg. (coolly). I hope you told her it was by keeping you about her.
Charlie. If thatth the cathe, I’ll be back very thoon.
[Exits b. d.
Reg. Aw, I’m deucid sowy that boah Newbank has tired you, Miss
Wortley. You weally should not be so awfully good natured, don’tcher
know.
Agnes. Oh, we have to be, and he’s no worse than a lot of others.
Reg. I jolly wish, you know, that I could save you fwom it.
Agnes. Don’t you think it warm here?
Reg. Weally, but it is, pon honour.
Agnes. And I’m so thirsty. Would it trouble you too much to get me
a glass of water?
Reg. (rising and going up l.). Chawmed, I assure you.
Charlie appears b. d. and they run into each other.
Reg. Aw, I thought you were going to allow Miss Wortley a little
west.
Charlie. Thatth why I wath coming back. I didn’t think the would
thend you away.
Reg. I’ll be back soon, deah boy.

[Exits b. d.
 Charlie. I’m thorry, Mith Wortley, but your fan ith not in the
library.
Agnes (aside). Tell me something I don’t know. (Aloud.) Have the
rest of the men finished their cigars?
Charlie. Yeth.
Agnes. I suppose I ought to go down.

[Rises.

Charlie. Yeth, we’ll go together, and tho ethcape Van Tromp.

Agnes (aside). What a pity some glue company can’t buy those two
and melt them down into mucilage! (Aloud.) Yes, but first won’t you
see if I didn’t leave my fan on the piano in the music-room?
Charlie. Why, thertainly.

[Starts up to b. d.

Agnes (aside). While you’re gone I’ll get into my domino, and if
you catch me afterwards, it’s my fault.

[Exit Charlie. Loud

exclamation outside.

Charlie (outside). You donkey, you ran into me on purpoth, and

thpilled that water on me.
Agnes. Do for once temper the wind to the shorn lamb!

[Looks around room

helplessly, and then
rushes to bay window
and hides.

Reg. (outside). I beg pawdon, but it was you who wan into me.
Cawnt cher see where you are going?
Reg. appears b. d. with a glass containing very little water, wiping
his coat sleeve with handkerchief, and looking angrily after
Charlie.
 Reg. I’m deucid sowy, Miss Wortley, but that clumsy fool has
spilled most of the water (coming down). One can always tell the
nouveaux wiche by their gaucherwies. (Finds chair empty—starts,
and looks round room.) Pon honour, if he hasn’t dwiven her away!
[Stands looking about.
Charlie appears at b. d.
Charlie. I met your maid, Mith Wortley, and the thaid your fan
wath in your room, (coming down r.) and that the’ll get it.
(Discovers Agnes’ absence.) Now then, I hope you are thatithfied
with having driven her away.
Reg. Oh, I dwove her away, did I?
Charlie. Yeth.
Reg. (laughing). That is wich!
Charlie. Well, thath more than you are!
Reg. Cholly Newbank, you get worse form everwy day.
Enter Polly with fan l. d.
Polly. Here is the fan, Mr. Newbank.
Charlie (taking fan). Can you tell me where Mith Wortley ith?
Polly (starting to go). No, sir.
Stuart appears in b. d. and stands and listens.
Charlie. One moment, girl. (To Reg.) Mither Van Tromp, will you
oblige me by leaving the room?
Reg. By Jove! The bwass of the man would start a foundwy.

[Sits chair l. with emphasis.

Charlie. Thir, in the future I thall refuth to recognith you.

Reg. Thanks, awfully.
Charlie (taking bank-note from pocket). Girl, do you thee thith?
Polly. Oh, yes, sir.
Charlie. What ith Mith Wortleyth domino like?
Polly. Oh, indeed, sir, I don’t dare to tell you.