The Psychology of Pandemics:

Preparing for the Next Global Outbreak

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The Psychology
ofPandemics
The Psychology
ofPandemics:

Preparing for the Next Global

Outbreak of Infectious Disease

By

Steven Taylor

Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing
The Psychology ofPandemics:
Preparingfor the Next Global Outbreak of I n fectious Disease

BySteven Taylor

This book first published 2019

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

LadyStephensonLibrary, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing inPublication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2019 bySteven Taylor

All rights for this book reserved. No part ofthis book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any fonn or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior pennission ofthe copyright owner.

ISBN (10):1-5 275-3959-8

ISBN (13):978-1-5275-3959-4
For Anna, Alex, and Meeru
 CONTENTS

Foreword.......................................................................................................................... xi

Preface .............................................................................................................................. xv

About the Author ...................................................................................................... xvii

List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................... xix

1. What is a pandemic? ............................................................................................... 1

Overview
Definition
Notable pandemics
Nomenclature
Pandemic influenza
Pandemic-related stressors
Effects on the healthcare system
Economic costs
How do pandemics spread?
Socioeconomic factors
Goals of this volume

2. Contemporary methods for managing pandemics .................................. 15

Overview
Risk communication
Pharmacological treatments
Hygiene practices
Social distancing
Conclusion

3. Psychological reactions to pandemics .......................................................... 23

Importance of psychological factors
Emotional reactions to threats of harm, loss, and change
The desperate pursuit of quack cures and folk remedies
Civil unrest, rioting, and mass panic
viii Table of Contents

Immunologically induced psychological reactions

Interactions between stress and the immune system
Conclusion

4. Personality traits as emotional vulnerability factors ............................. 39

Vulnerability to emotional distress
Personality traits
Negative emotionality
Trait anxiety and harm avoidance
Overestimation of threat
Intolerance of uncertainty
Monitoring versus blunting
Unrealistic optimism bias
Other personality traits
Conclusion

5. Cognitive-behavioral models of health anxiety.........................................49

What is health anxiety?
Misinterpretations of health-related stimuli
Beliefs about health and disease
Focus of attention
Adaptive and maladaptive coping
Treating health anxiety
Conclusion

6. The behavioral immune system ....................................................................... 57

Detection and avoidance of sickly others
Perceived vulnerability to disease
Disgust sensitivity
Pathogens and prejudice
Implications for naming diseases
Conclusion

7. Conspiracy theories............................................................................................... 63
What are conspiracy theories?
Medical conspiracy theories
Causes and correlates of conspiratorial thinking
Methods for reducing conspiratorial thinking
Conclusion
 The Psychology of Pandemics ix

8. Social psychological factors ............................................................................... 69

How do beliefs and fears spread through social networks?
Rumors
Observational learning
News media
Social media
Social media and vaccination attitudes
Conclusion

9. Improving risk communication........................................................................ 79

Goals of risk communication
Logical versus emotional appeals
Promoting adherence by evoking fear?
Psychological distance influences perceived risk
Managing rumors
Conclusion

10. Improving vaccination adherence................................................................ 87

Negative beliefs about vaccination
Factors contributing to vaccination hesitancy
Changing vaccination attitudes
Do it for the herd
Targeting superspreaders
Treating injection phobia
Is mandatory vaccination a viable option?
Conclusion

11. Treating pandemic-related emotional distress ...................................... 99

A screen-and-treat approach
Screening methods
Interventions for pandemic-related distress
Stress management advice for the general public
Helping the helpers
Conclusion

12. General conclusions and future directions............................................ 1 07

A portrait of the next pandemic
Managing future pandemics
A roadmap for future research
x Table of Contents

References ................................................................................................................... 113

Index ............................................................................................................................... 155

 FOREWORD

I've admired Or. Taylor's work since I began reading it as a graduate

student in the mid-1990s. His books and research articles on anxiety
disorders stood out as particularly brilliant and eloquent Inevitably,
our paths began to cross as we attended the same professional
conferences each year and were members of the Obsessive-Compulsive
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) that formed in the late 1990s. But
it was at one particular OCCWG meeting in 2001 in Whistler, British
Columbia-and the ensuing World Congress of Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy in Vancouver-where we developed the collaborative
relationship that has remained to this day. And what a productive
relationship it's been' As of this writing, we have published four books,
2 5 journal articles, and 22 book chapters together (most of them with
a third colleague, Dr. Dean McKay). I have collaborated with countless
colleagues on many research and writing projects, but Dr. Taylor tops
them all when it comes to his astonishing mix of proficiency and
efficiency.
So, what's a psychologist like Or. Taylor doing writing a book about
pandemics-a seemingly medical conundrum for biologists and
physicians to sort out? I'll tell you what: He's synthesizing his interest
in history, extensive grasp of research on social psychology and human
behavior, and his substantial expertise on anxiety disorders to help us
appreciate pandemics as a psychological problem as much as a medical
one.
Communicable diseases existed during humankind's hunter­
gatherer days. But it wasn't until about 10,000 years ago when we
began living in communities and domesticating animals, that outbreaks
of sicknesses such as malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, influenza,
smallpox, and others first appeared. Humans were blindsided, having
little or no immunity to these viruses, and certainly no knowledge of
how they could spread so easily (no one would propose that
microorganisms caused these diseases until after 1000 AD). The more
interactive human civilizations became-forming cities and establishing
trade routes to connect with other cities-the more the probability of
pandemics increased.
xii Foreword

Fast forward to modernity, where people are exceedingly mobile

and more likely to live in densely populated cities-factors tliat
increase the risk of viruses spreading. Where hasty communication
through a dizzying array of media also escalates the risk of panic and
the chance that people who may be infected will travel in an attempt to
avoid illness-potentially contributing to the spread of the virus.
Months or years would go by before vaccines become available. In the
meantime, clinics and hospitals would be overburdened, and there
could be a lack of human resources to provide crucial services, due to
both the demand and illness.
My point is that our behavior increases the chances of a pandemic. ..
and our chances that if one occurred, it could be catastrophic.
And tlien there's the health anxiety factor-which Or. Taylor knows
so well from his decades of research on the topic. Such psychological
elements often receive short-shrift when considered within the context
of medical diseases. But the information age in which we currently live
exposes us to so much data (and distortions) about health and illness
it's not surprising we're vulnerable to overestimating our risk of, and
vulnerability to, disease. Many of us try to cope with inaccurate beliefs
about health and disease in ways that only strengthen such fears and
lead them to persist and even spread. In turn, this leads to the kinds of
unhealthy practices tliat may ironically aid the spread of the next
pandemic.
Other clinical and social psychological factors tliat Dr. Taylor shows
us are relevant for understanding pandemics include prejudices, the
way we name diseases, the role of the media (not surprisingly,
including social media), attitudes toward vaccinations, howwe manage
rumors, and the psychology of conspiracies. Syntliesizing all of tliis, Dr.
Taylor gives us a picture of how human factors impact the spreading of
disease and emotional disturbance. He convinces us that knowledge of
cognition and behavior will be critical for managing it-or, more
optimistically, preventing it Further, he proposes changes to public
health policies and for how we can best exchange information about
health risks.
In classic Steven Taylor style, this work is comprehensive, fusing
viewpoints from multiple diverse disciplines. It is tlioughtful and
persuasive, grounded in scientific facts. And it has clear societal
implications for us to heed. It also provides a call (and outline) for
future research in medicine and clinical, health, and social psychology.
As such, this book more than accomplishes its goals-it makes an
 The Psychology of Pandemics xiii

exceptional contribution and fills a crucial gap in the literature on

pandemics.

Jonathan S. Abramowitz, PhD

Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience
University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill
 PREFACE

There have been numerous pandemics over the past century and
earlier, typically arising from some form of influenza. Pandemic
influenza is widely considered to be one of the leading public health
threats facing the world today. Virologists predict that the next
influenza pandemic could arrive any time in the coming years, with
potentially devastating consequences. People do not have pre-existing
immunity to the pathogens causing pandemics. Effective drug
treatments are not always available. Vaccinations, if available, and
behavioral methods are first-line interventions for reducing morbidity
and mortality. Behavioral methods include hygienic practices (e.g.,
hand-washing) and social distancing methods (e.g., limiting large social
gatherings).
The question arises as to how best apportion healthcare resources
for managing pandemics. Such resources, by definition, are limited. It is
important that resources be apportioned to essential services and to
the development and distribution of vaccines and other methods for
halting or limiting the spread of infection. Remarkably, public health
agencies have devoted few resources for specifically dealing with the
psychological factors that influence pandemic-related emotional
reactions (e.g., fear, anxiety, distress) and behavioral problems (e.g.,
nonadherence, avoidance, stigmatization of out-groups). Healthcare
authorities neglect the role of psychological factors in pandemic­
related infection even though these factors are important for many
reasons. They play a vital role, for example, in adherence to vaccination
and social distancing, both of which are vital for stemming the spread
of infection. Nonadherence to vaccination is a widespread problem
even during pandemics.
Psychological factors also play an important role in the way in which
people cope with the threat of pandemic infection and its sequelae, such
as the loss of loved ones. Although many people cope well under threat,
many other people experience high levels of distress or a worsening of
pre-existing psychological problems, such as anxiety disorders and
other clinical conditions. Psychological factors are further important
for understanding and managing broader societal problems associated
xvi Preface

with pandemics, such as factors involved in the spreading of excessive

fear. People may fear for their health, safety, family, finances, or jobs.
Psychological factors are also important for understanding and
managing the potentially disruptive or maladaptive defensive
reactions, such as increases in stigmatization and xenophobia that
occur when people are threatened with infection.
The purpose of this volume is to fill an important gap in the
literature on pandemics. Goals are to (1) describe the psychological
reactions to pandemics, including maladaptive behaviors and emotional
and defensive reactions, (2) review the psychological vulnerability
factors that contribute to the spreading of disease and emotional
distress, (3) discuss empirically supported methods for addressing
these psychological problems, and (4) outline the implications for
public health policy, including implications for risk communication.
Influenza pandemics are used as prototypic examples because they
have been the most common pandemics over the past century and
influenza is likely to be a source of future pandemics. Other disease
outbreaks are discussed where relevant
To achieve the aims of this volume, the author draws on sources
from multiple disciplines, including virology, epidemiology, public
health, sociology, history of medicine and, of course, psychology.
Numerous sub disciplines within psychology are drawn upon, including
clinical psychology, health psychology, and social psychology. In
addition to drawing extensively from the research literature, case
examples are included throughout this volume to highlight important
issues.
 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Steven Taylor, Ph.D., is a Professor and Clinical Psychologist in the

Department of Psychiatry at the University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada. He received his B.Se. (Hons.) and M.Se. at the
University of Melbourne, and Ph.D. at the University of British
Columbia. Dr. Taylor's research and clinical work focuses largely on
anxiety disorders and related clinical conditions, including fears and
phobias, health anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, and obsessive­
compulsive disorder. He has authored over 300 scientific publications
and more than 2 0 books, which have been translated into several
languages. His books include Understanding and treating panic disorder
(John Wiley & Sons), Treating health anxiety (Guilford Publications),
and Clinician 's Guide to Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (Guilford
Publications). Or. Taylor was a member of the anxiety disorders
committee for the text revision of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders. He has also served as Editor
or Associate Editor of several academic journals, including Behaviour
Research and Therapy, Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, and the
Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders. Dr. Taylor has
received a number of awards for his scholarly work, including awards
from the Canadian Psychological Association, Association for
Advancement of Behavior Therapy, and the Anxiety Disorders
Association of America. In addition to teaching and research, Or. Taylor
maintains a clinical practice in Vancouver, BC, specializing in mood and
anxiety disorders.
ACRONYMS USED THROUGHOUT THIS VOLUME

B1S Behavioral immune system

CBr Cognitive-behavior therapy
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
HCW Healthcare worker
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
PTSD Posttraumatic stress disorder
PVD Perceived vulnerability to disease
PVDS Perceived Vulnerability to Disease Scale
SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome
WHO World Health Organization
 CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS A PANDEMIC?

Overview

Despite the passage of decades, 96-year-old James S. vividly

recalled the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic. He was 8 years old at
the time. The city had ground to a halt Schools and theaters were
closed, and dances and other social gatherings were banned.
James was not even allowed to go to the local playground
because his father feared he would fall ill. Church services were
banned, despite protests from the clergy. James recalled the pine
caskets in the front room of the family home, containing the
bodies of his mother and younger sister. It all happened so
quickly; people could fall sick in the morning and be dead by
evening. People were afraid to leave their homes, he recalled,
although it was necessary for the government to impose fines if
an infected person was out in public, because some sick people
refused to stay indoors.

Pandemic influenza is one of the leading health threats currently

facing the world (World Health Organization (WHO), 2019). The rise of
antimicrobial resistance, along with the emergence of new, highly
pathogenic viral strains, has fueled fears of another global outbreak of
infectious disease (Nerlich & Halliday, 2007). For pandemics in general,
the causal elements are manifold and complex. The essential elements
are an infectious agent (e.g., a virus or bacterium), a host (e.g., a
person), and the environment. The host's resistance to infection
depends on several factors including immunocompetence as well as
psychological factors that influence how the host copes with or reacts
to threatened or actual infection. Environmental factors are numerous
and multiform, including factors that promote or hamper the coping
strategies of the host.
2 Chapter 1

This book focuses on the psychological factors as they pertain to the

host and host-environment interactions in pandemics. Put simply,
pandemics of infectious disease are not just events in which some
infectious "bug" spreads throughout the world. Pandemics are events
in which the population's psychological reactions to infection play an
essential role in both the spreading and containment of the disease, and
influence the extent to which widespread emotional distress and social
disorder occur. When threatened with infection, people vary widely in
their reactions. The complexities of their reactions need to be taken
into consideration in order to understand the psychology ofpandemics.
The present volume aims to explore these issues through a review of
the scientific and historical literatures, supplemented by illustrative
case vignettes derived from various sources including historical
sources and the author's clinical case files. This book also considers the
public health implications for assessing and addressing pandemic­
related emotional distress, and for addressing pandemic-related social
or behavioral problems, such as vaccination nonadherence.
The focus of this book is on influenza pandemics because influenza
is the most likely source of the next pandemic. However, findings from
other pertinent outbreaks, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS), Bubonic Plague, Ebola virus disease, and others, are discussed
where relevant.

Definition

Pandemics are large-scale epidemics afflicting millions of people

across multiple countries, sometimes spreading throughout the globe
(WHO, 2010b). For a virus or bacterium to cause a pandemic it must be
an organism for which most people do not have preexisting immunity,
transmitting easily from person to person, and causing severe illness
(Kilbourne, 1977). Diseases causing pandemics are part of a group of
conditions known as emerging infectious diseases (Lederberg, Shope,
& Oakes, 1992), which include newly identified pathogens as well as
reemerging ones.

Notable Pandemics

The most famous pandemic was the Bubonic Plague (e.g., 1346-
1 3 5 3), attributed to Yersinia pestis, which killed an estimated 50 million
people worldwide Oohnson & Mueller, 2002). Over the past century,
 What is a pandemic? 3

there have been many other pandemics of varying degrees of

contagiousness and lethality. Examples include HIV/AIDS (1981 to
present), the Spanish flu (a strain of the Hi Ni influenza virus; 1918-
1920), Russian flu (H2N2 or H3N8, 1889-1 890), Asian flu (H2N2, 1957-
1958), Hong Kong flu (H3N2, 1968-1969), a second Russian flu
pandemic (H1Nl, 1977-1978), Swine flu (H1Nl, 2009-2010), and the
Zika virus pandemic (2015-2016) (Belshe, 2005; Crosby, 2003;
Doherty, 2013; Honigsbaum, 2014; Morens & Fauci, 2017; WHO,
2010b). Avian flu has been widespread in recent years but at the time
of writing has not reached pandemic proportions.

Nomenclature

The notation system for influenza, HxNx (e.g., H1Nl, H3N8) refers
to the virus's hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) membrane
proteins. Terms such as "Swine flu" and "Asian flu" have become
standard labels for pandemics. Such names are used here because
readers will likely be familiar with them. However, as we will see later,
such terms should be used with caution. The terms "flu" and "influenza"
also can be sources of confusion. With the exception of the established
names for pandemics (e.g., "Swine flu"), the term "influenza" rather
than "flu" will be used throughout this book because "flu" is a vague,
broad term used to describe symptoms and signs that may or may not
be caused by an influenza virus (e.g., fever, cough, runny nose, muscle
aches; Doshi, 2013).

Pandemic Influenza

Pandemics are usually viral in nature, typically arising from animal

influenza viruses that spread to humans (WHO, 201 0b). It is difficultto
predict when the next influenza pandemic will occur.

Despite continuing progress in many areas, including enhanced human

and animal surveillance and large-scale viral genomic screening, we are
probably no better able today to anticipate and prevent the emergence
of pandemic influenza than 5 centuries ago, as shown by the completely
unexpected emergence of the 2009 novel HINl pandemic virus.
(Morens, Taubenberger, Folkers, & Fauci, 2010, p. 1444)

It has been speculated that future pandemics will arise from some
strain of Avian influenza (e.g., H5Nl or H7N9) or from combinations of
4 Chapter 1

Avian and other influenza strains (Kelland, 2017; Li et a!., 2010;

Webster & Govorkova, 2006; Wildoner, 2016). The next influenza
pandemic is inevitable and serious (Laver & Webster, 2001; Webby &
Webster, 2003).

The world's population would have no immunity to this "new" virus.

Because of today's crowded conditions and with modern rapid
transportation facilities, the epidemic would spread like wildfire,
reaching every corner of the globe. Many millions of people would
become ill and there would certainly be many deaths. (Laver & Webster,
2001, p. 1813)

The frequent genetic mutation and genetic reassortment of

influenza viruses make it difficult, if not impossible, to prevent
influenza pandemics from occurring (Kelland, 2017). Compounding the
problem, viral pandemics, just like comparatively smaller-scale
epidemics, are often followed by secondary bacterial infection (e.g.,
hospital-acquired pneumonia), thereby complicating treatment and
increasing the risk of mortality (Morens et a!., 2010). Indeed, 95% of
post-mortem samples from the Spanish flu pandemic showed bacterial
infection complications, and the majority of deaths likely resulted from
secondary bacterial pneumonia caused by common upper respiratory
tract bacteria (Morens, Taubenberger, & Fauci, 2008).
Influenza pandemics and seasonal influenza have some similarities
but important differences. Pandemic influenza can arise during the
usual influenza season-that is, the winter months in temperate
climates-but can also occur during the summer (Taubenberger &
Morens, 2006). Pandemic influenza, by definition, spreads globally (i.e.,
is more transmissible; Fraser et a!., 2009), is often (but not always)
more lethal (Doherty, 2013), and can differ from seasonal influenza in
terms of the people most severely afflicted. Seasonal influenza tends to
be most dangerous to the elderly and medically frail, whereas some
influenza pandemics have taken the greatest toll on other age groups.
To illustrate, consider the Spanish flu, which killed 20% of those
infected (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006), with an estimated death toll
of 35-100 million people worldwide, or 2-6% of the world's population
(Barry, 2009; Johnson & Mueller, 2002). The Spanish flu was most
lethal to children and young adults (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006).
Similarly, young adults were more susceptible to Swine flu than older
adults (Crum-Cianflone et a!., 2009).
 What is a pandemic? 5

Some pandemics killed with great rapidity. In the case of the

Spanish flu, there were numerous accounts of people waking up sick in
the morning and dying later that day, on their way to work, for example
(Crosby, 2003; Pettigrew, 1983). The deaths were sometimes gruesome.
Some victims of the Spanish flu developed pulmonary edema and
became so anoxic that their faces turned blue. Some of these patients
hemorrhaged from the mucous membranes, particularly the nose,
stomach, and intestines, and there was also bleeding from the ears and
petechial (skin) hemorrhages (Taubenberger, Reid, Janczewski, &
Fanning, 2001).

Pandemic- Related Stressors

Pandemics are "frequently marked by uncertainty, confusion and a

sense of urgency" (WHO, 2005, p. 1). Prior to, or in the early stages of a
pandemic, there is widespread uncertainty about the odds and
seriousness of becoming infected, along with uncertainty, and possible
misinformation, about the best methods of prevention and
management (Kanadiya & Sallar, 2011). Uncertainty may persist well
into the pandemic, especially concerning the question of whether a
pandemic is truly over. Pandemics can come in waves (Barry, 2005;
Caley, Philp, & McCracken, 2008; Herrera-Valdez, Cruz-Aponte, &
Castillo-Chavez, 2011). Waves of infection are caused, in part, by
fluctuations in patterns of human aggregation, such as seasonal
movements of people away from, and then into contact with, one
another (e.g., schools closing for the summer and then reopening), as
well as other fluctuations in social aggregation (Caley et aI., 2008;
Herrera-Valdez et aI., 2011). The Spanish flu, for example, came in three
waves (Barry, 2005). Accordingly, there may be uncertainty as to
whether a pandemic has truly run its course.
Pandemics are associated with a score of other psychosocial
stressors, including health threats to oneself and loved ones. There may
be severe disruptions of routines, separation from family and friends,
shortages of food and medicine, wage loss, social isolation due to
quarantine or other social distancing programs, and school closure
(Shultz, Espinel, Flynn, Hoffmann, & Cohen, 2008). Families may
become malnourished if no one in the house is well enough to shop or
cook (Schoch-Spana, 2004). Personal financial hardship can occur if a
family's primary wage earner is unable to work because of illness.
During the Spanish flu, for example, merchants suffered hardship
6 Chapter 1

because of staff absenteeism and because shoppers were either too ill
or too frightened to venture out to the stores (Pettigrew, 1983). The
personal financial impact of a pandemic can be as severe and stressful
as the infection itself, especially for people who are already
experiencing financial hardship. This is illustrated by the following
account of one American family during the Spanish flu pandemic.

In December 1918 influenza struck, infecting Mr. D. and then his wife
and five children. By late December he had been out of work for three
weeks due to his own illness and then that of his family. For the first few
weeks the family had managed on their meager savings and on money
sent from a relative. After that, the family became frantic and
approached the Society of the Friendless for aid. Mr. D. was unable to go
to work because he dared not leave his sick family unattended. The
situation became increasingly desperate. They had run out of coal for
heating and there was no food in the house. Having no money, Mr. D.
attempted to get credit at the grocery store but was declined.
Compounding his problems, Mr. D. lost his job because of his absence
from work. (Bristow, 2010, pp. 139-140)

During a pandemic, people may be exposed to the death of friends

and loved ones, including exposure to the death of children. The latter
can be especially traumatizing (Taylor, 2017). Caring for the sick can be
highly stressful, especially if this burden falls on children, as illustrated
by the following example from Britain, during the Spanish flu.

Writing from Coventry in 1973, Ethel Robson recalled how at the age of
nine she was suddenly thrust into the role of sole caretaker for her
family when her eight brothers and sisters, ranging in ages from 10
months to 15 years, contracted the flu together with her mother. For
some reason, Robson writes, "I was the only one out of all the family that
didn't have the virus." Although a doctor visited twice a day, no one else
was allowed into the house, "therefore I was doing my best to help the
others:· (Honigsbaum, 2009, p. 86)

Most of Robson's siblings recovered but her seven-year-old sister

and mother died. "It really was a terrible time not knowing who we
were going to lose next," she recalled (Honigsbaum, 2009, p. 86).
The following account from northern Labrador (Canada), during the
Spanish flu pandemic, was provided by the Reverend WaIter Perrett,
concerning an eight-year-old girl, whose parents and siblings had died
from influenza, leaving the young girl alone to fend for herself for five
weeks before being found.
 What is a pandemic? 7

The huskies (dogs) now began to eatthe dead bodies, and the child was
a spectator of this horrible incident. So mad did the beasts become,
upon taking human flesh, that they attacked the child herself, biting her
arm. ... It was thirty degrees below zero. The little girl had used the last
of the Christmas candles to melt snow for drinking water (Pettigrew,
1983, pp. 29-30).

A pandemic can impede a community's ability to bury the dead

according to accepted cultural and religious practices. During the
Spanish flu pandemic, there were shortages of coffins and insufficient
funeral staff to prepare and bury bodies (Johnson, 2006). Handling of
the deceased is an emotionally charged issue, and neglect of customary,
culturally prescribed, funerary practices can be experienced as
abhorrent and dehumanizing (Schoch-Spana, 2004).
Indirect exposure to trauma, such as graphic media depictions of
fatalities, can also contribute to distress (Neria & Sullivan, 2011). Other
stressors include the loss or destruction of possessions. When people
are forced to evacuate their homes, leaving their possessions behind,
looting can occur (Staino, 2008).
Cultural minorities residing within a larger mainstream culture,
such as new immigrants, may experience stressors that are not
encountered by people from the majority culture, such as unfamiliarity
with community support systems, difficulty accessing services due to
language difficulties, discrimination, and immigration status issues.
Thus, during times of pandemic, some ethnic minorities may
experience more adverse psychological consequences than members
from the majority culture (Shultz et aI., 2008).

Effects on the Healthcare System

Pandemics can exceed the capacities of healthcare systems to care

for the sick This is for various reasons including widespread infection,
lack of effective treatment, and breakdown of the healthcare system
due to healthcare workers (HeWs) becoming infected and unable to
care for the ill (National Academy of Medicine, 2016). Failure to manage
the surge of people into hospitals and clinics can create unnecessary
exposure to disease as infected and non-infected persons congregate to
seek services and treatments (Shultz et aI., 2008). Sick people may be
turned away from overcrowded, short-staffed hospitals, thereby
necessitating home care (Schoch-Spana, 2004). This can create a
financial burden in arranging home care for a sick family member.
8 Chapter 1

Economic Costs

Pandemics can have major effects on the broader economy and

societal infrastructure. As people become ill and unable to fulfill their
occupational roles, essential services may break down (Shultz,
Baingana, & Neria, 2015). In Baltimore during the Spanish flu, for
example, garbage piled up in the streets due to absenteeism of
sanitation personnel (Schoch-Spana, 2004). This created further public
health problems. Even with effective vaccines and antiviral medications,
it has been estimated that the next influenza pandemic could result in
economic losses of over US$34 billion in the United States (Prager, Wei,
& Rose, 2017). Worldwide, it has been estimated that the next
pandemic could cost over US$6 trillion in economic losses (National
Academy of Medicine, 2016).

How do Pandemics Spread?

Human networks are the major means of pandemic disease

transmission (Wald, 2008). Influenza is readily spread by inhaling
airborne cough or sneeze droplets, and by touching one's mouth, nose,
or eyes after touching fomites. The latter are contaminated surfaces in
public spaces, such as doors, railings, or tabletops, or contaminated
objects such as toys, doorknobs, and banknotes (Nicas & Jones, 2009;
Thomas et aI., 2008). Airborne transmission, combined with high
population densities in urban areas and the availability of modern
rapid transportation, makes it easy for influenza infection to spread
rapidly.
Some people disproportionately contribute to the spreading of
infection. These people are known as superspreaders (Galvani & May,
2005). In prototypic cases of superspreading as few as 20% of infected
people may be responsible for 80% of transmissions (Woolhouse et aI.,
1997). A superspreader is likely to be someone who (1) is not
immunized or is immunocompromised and therefore particularly
susceptible to infection, (2) does not engage in basic hygiene (e.g.,
covering coughs) and therefore likely to transmit influenza, (3) comes
into contact with a great many people, through some combination of
their social and occupational roles (e.g., a flight attendant, cafeteria
worker, or someone with a highly active social life), or comes into
regular contact with sick people that are particularly susceptible to
infection (e.g., a hospital worker that deals with patients but refuses to
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
1899:

"German economists are not exaggerating when they say this

Empire's people and capital are operating in every part of the
world. Not only Hamburg, Bremen, Stettin, Lübeck, and Kiel—i.
e., the seaport cities—but towns far inland, have invested
millions in foreign enterprises. In the Americas, North and
South, in Australia, in Asia, in a large part of Africa,
German settlements, German factories, German merchants, and
German industrial leaders are at work. Nor is it always in
settlements under the Empire's control that this influence is
strongest. In Senegambia, on the Gold Coast, the Slave Coast,
in Zanzibar and Mozambique, in Australia, Samoa, the Marshall
Islands, Tahiti, Sumatra, and South and Central America, there
are powerful commercial organizations aiding the Empire. From
Vladivostock to Singapore, on the mainland of Asia, and in
many of the world's most productive islands, the influence of
German money and thrift is felt. In Central America and the
West Indies, millions of German money are in the plantations;
so, too, in the plantations along the Gold Coast. In
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Venezuela, Brazil, etc., German capital
plays a very important part in helping to develop the
agricultural and in some cases the manufacturing and
commercial interests. A consequence of this development is
seen in the numerous banking institutions whose fields of
operation show that German commerce is working more and more
in foreign parts. These banks look after and aid foreign
investment as well as the Empire's other commercial relations.
They help the millions of Germans in all parts of the world to
carry on trade relations, not only with the Fatherland, but
with other countries.

"These are the links in a long and very strong chain of gold
uniting the colonies with the Mother Country. Quite recently,
large quantities of German capital have been invested in
various industries. The Empire's capital in United States
 railroads is put down at $180,000,000. In America, Germans
have undertaken manufacturing. They have used German money to
put up breweries, hat factories, spinning, weaving, and paper
mills, tanneries, soap-boiling establishments, candle mills,
dye houses, mineral-water works, iron foundries, machine
shops, dynamite mills, etc. Many of these mills use German
machinery, and not a few German help. The Liebig Company, the
Chilean saltpeter mines, the Chilean and Peruvian metal mines,
many of the mines of South Africa, etc., are in large part
controlled by German money and German forces. Two hundred
different kinds of foreign bonds or papers are on the Berlin,
Hamburg, and Frankfort exchanges. Germany has rapidly risen to
a very important place in the financial, industrial, and
mercantile world. Will she keep it? Much will depend on her
power to push herself on the sea."

United States Consular Reports,

September, 1899, page 127.

{248}

GERMANY: A. D. 1899.
Military statistics.

A report presented to the Reichstag showed the total number of

men liable for service in 1899, including the surplus from
previous years, was 1,696,760. Of these 716,998 were 20 years
of age, 486,978 of 21 years, 362,568 of 22 years, and 130,216
of more than 22 years. The whereabouts of 94,224 was unknown,
and 97,800 others failed to appear and sent no excuse; 427,586
had already undertaken military duties, 579,429 cases were
either adjourned or the men rejected (for physical reasons),
1,245 were excluded from the service, 43,196 were exempt,
112,839 were incorporated in the naval reserve, 226,957 were
called upon to join the colors, leaving a surplus of 5,187;
there were 23,266 volunteers for the army and 1,222 for the
navy. Of the 226,957 who joined the colors 216,880 joined the
 army as combatants and 4,591 as non-combatants, and 5,486
joined the navy. Of the 5,486 the maritime population
furnished 3,132 and the inland 2,354. There were 21,189 men
who entered the army before attaining the regulation age, and
1,480 under age who entered the navy; 33,652 of the inland
population and only 189 of the maritime were condemned for
emigrating without leave; while 14,150 inland and 150 maritime
cases were still under consideration at the end of the year.

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (February).

Chinese anti-missionary demonstrations in Shantung.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1899.

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (February).

Purchase of Caroline, Pelew and Marianne Islands from Spain.

See (in this volume)

CAROLINE AND MARIANNE ISLANDS.

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (May-July).

Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.

See (in this volume)

PEACE CONFERENCE.

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (May-August).

Advice to the South African Republic.

See (in this volume)

SOUTH AFRICA (THE TRANSVAAL):
A. D. 1899 (MAY-AUGUST).

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (June).

State of German colonies.
The following report on German colonies for the year ending
June 30, 1899, was made to the British Foreign Office by one
of the secretaries of the Embassy at Berlin:

"The number of Europeans resident in the German African

Protectorates, viz., Togoland, Cameroons, South-West Africa,
and East Africa, at the time of the issue of the latest
colonial reports in the course of 1899 is given as 4,522 men,
women, and children, of whom 3,228 were Germans. The expense
to the home government of the African colonies, together with
Kiao-chao in the Far East, the Caroline and Samoa Islands in
the South Seas, and German New Guinea and its dependencies, is
estimated at close upon £1,500,000 for 1900, the Imperial
Treasury being asked to grant in subsidies a sum nearly double
that required last year. Kiao-chao is included for the first
time in the Colonial Estimates, and Samoa is a new item. The
Imperial subsidy has been increased for each separate
Protectorate, with the single exception of the Caroline
Islands, which are to be granted £5,000 less than last year.
East Africa receives about £33,000 more; the Cameroons,
£10,000; South-West Africa, £14,000; Togoland, £800; New
Guinea, £10,000; and the new items are: £489,000 for Kiao-chao
(formerly included in the Naval Estimates), and £2,500 for
Samoa. A Supplementary Vote of £43,265 for the Protectorate
troops in the Cameroons is also now before the Budget
Committee. …

"Great efforts have been made to encourage German trade with

the African colonies, and it is shown that considerable
success has been attained in South-West Africa, where the
total value of goods imported from Germany amounted to
£244,187, as against £181,961 in the previous year, with an
appreciable falling-off in the value of imports from other
countries. In East Africa the greater part of the import trade
still comes from India and Zanzibar—about £450,000 worth of
goods out of the gross total of £592,630, having been imported
thence. The export trade is also largely carried on through
 Zanzibar."

Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command: Miscellaneous Series,
Number 528, 1900, pages 3-5).

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (August).

Defeat of the Rhine-Elbe Canal Bill.
Resentment of the Emperor.
An extraordinary edict.

Among several new canal projects in Germany, those of "the

Dortmund-Rhine Canal and the Great Midland Canal (joining from
the east to west the rivers Elbe, Weser, and Rhine) are the
most important. The first involves an expenditure of over
£8,000,000 altogether, and the second is variously estimated
at from £10,000,000 to £20,000,000, according to its eventual
scope. The latter is intended to amalgamate the eastern and
western waterways of the nation and to join the Dortmund-Ems
Canal to the Rhine system, in order to give the latter river
an outlet to the sea via a German port, instead of only
through ports in the Netherlands. It will also place the
Rhine-Main-Danube connection in direct communication with all
the streams of North Germany."

United States Bureau of Statistics,

Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance,
January, 1899.

The Rhine-Elbe canal project is one which the Emperor has

greatly at heart, and when, in August, 1899, a bill to promote
it was defeated in the Prussian Landtag by the Agrarians, who
feared that canal improvements would promote agricultural
competition, his resentment was expressed in an extraordinary
edict, which said: "The royal government, to its keen regret,
has been compelled to notice that a number of officials, whose
duty it is to support the policy of His Majesty the King, and to
 execute and advance the measures of His Majesty's government,
are not sufficiently conscious of this obligation. … Such
conduct is opposed to all the traditions of the Prussian
administration, and cannot be tolerated." This was followed by
an extensive dismissal of officials, and excited strong
feeling against the government in a class which is nothing if
not loyal to the monarchy.

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (November).

Railway concession in Asia Minor, to the Persian Gulf.

See (in this volume)

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (NOVEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1899 (November).

Re-arrangement of affairs in the Samoan Islands.
Partition of the islands with the United States.
Withdrawal of England, with compensations in the Tonga
and Solomon Islands and in Africa.

See (in this volume)

SAMOAN ISLANDS.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900.
Military and naval expenditure.

See (in this volume)

WAR BUDGETS.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900.
Naval strength.

See (in this volume)

NAVIES OF THE SEA POWERS.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (January).

Introduction of the Civil Code.
 On the first day of the year 1900 a great revolution was
effected in the laws of Germany, by putting into operation the
new German Civil Code. "Since the close of the fifteenth
century Germany has been the land of documentary right. The
Roman judicial code was recognized as common law; while all
legal procedure distinctly native in its origin was confined
to certain districts and municipalities, and was, therefore,
entirely devoid of Imperial signification in the wider sense.
The Civil Code of the land was represented by the Corpus Juris
Civilis, a Latin work entirely incomprehensible to the layman.
{249}
This very remarkable circumstance can be accounted for only by
the weakness of mediæval German Imperialism. In England and
France royalty itself had, since the fourteenth century,
assumed control of the laws in order that a homogeneous
national code might be developed. German Imperialism of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, was incapable of
such a task. …

"An incessant conflict has been waging in Germany between the

Roman Law of the Empire and the native law as perpetuated in
the special enactments of the separate provinces and
municipalities. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
the preponderance of power lay with the Roman system, which
was further supported by the German science of jurisprudence—
a science identified exclusively with the common law of Rome.
Science looked upon the native systems of legal procedure as
irrational and barbarous; and as Roman judicature exercised
complete dominion over all legislation, the consequence was
that it steadily advanced, while native and local law was
gradually destroyed. Only within the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries has the native law of Germany been aroused to the
defence of its interests, … the signal for the attack upon
Roman Law being given by King Frederick William I, of Prussia.
As early as 1713 this monarch decreed that Roman law was to be
abrogated in his dominions, and replaced by the native law of
Prussia. The movement became general; and the era of modern
legal codes was ushered in. The legal code of Bavaria was
established in 1756; Prussia followed in 1794; France, in 1804
(Code Civil); Baden, in 1809; Austria, in 1811 (Das
Oesterreichische Buergerliche Gesetzbuch); and finally Saxony,
in 1863 (the designation here being similar to that adopted by
Austria). Everywhere the motto was the same; viz.,
'Emancipation from the Latin Code of Rome.' The native code
was to supplant the foreign, obscure, and obsolete Corpus
Juris. But the success of these newly established codes was
limited; each being applicable to its own particular province
only. Moreover, many of the German states had retained the
Roman law; confining their reforms to a few modifications. …

"The reestablishment of the German Empire was, therefore,

essential also to the reestablishment of German law. As early
as 1874 the initial steps for the incorporation of a new
German Civil Code had already been taken; and this work has
now at last been completed. On August 18, 1896, the new
system, together with a 'Law of Introduction,' was promulgated
by Emperor William II. It will become effective on January 1,
1900, a day which will ever be memorable as marking the climax
of a development of four centuries. At the close of the
fifteenth century Roman law was accepted in Germany; and now,
at the end of the nineteenth, this entire system is to be
completely abolished throughout the Empire. As a means of
education, and solely for this purpose, the Roman Code will be
retained in the universities. As a work of art it is immortal;
as a system of laws, perishable. The last relic of that grand
fabric of laws, which once dominated the whole world, crumbles
to-day. The national idea is victorious; and German law for
the German Empire is at last secured."

R. Sohm,
The Civil Code of Germany
(Forum, October, 1800).
GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (January-March).
The outbreak of the "Boxers" in northern China.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JANUARY-MARCH).

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (February).

Adhesion to the arrangement of an "open door" commercial
policy in China.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1890-1900 (SEPTEMBER-FEBRUARY).

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (February-June).

Increased naval programme.

With much difficulty, and as the result of strenuous pressure,

the Emperor succeeded in carrying through the Reichstag, in
June, a bill which doubles the programme of naval increase
adopted in 1898.

See (in this volume)

GERMANY: A. D. 1898 (April).

"After the way had been prepared by a speech of the Emperor to

the officers of the Berlin garrison on January 7, 1900, and by
a vigorous Press agitation, this project was brought before
the Reichstag on February 8. In form it was an amendment of
the Sexennate, or Navy Law of 1898, which had laid down a six
years' programme of naval construction. By the new measure
this programme was revised and extended over a period of 20
years. Instead of the double squadron of 10 battleships, with
its complement of cruisers and other craft, it was demanded
that the Government should be authorized to build two double
squadrons, or 38 battleships and the corresponding number of
cruisers. The Bill also provided for a large increase in the
number of ships to be employed in the protection of German
 interests in foreign waters. The Centre party, both through
its speakers in the Reichstag and through its organs in the
Press, at first took up a very critical attitude towards the
Bill. Its spokesmen dwelt especially upon the breach of faith
involved in the extension of the programme of naval
construction so soon after the compromise of 1898 had been
accepted, and upon the difficulty of finding the money to pay
for a fleet of such magnitude. The Clerical leaders, however,
did not persist in their opposition, and finally agreed to
accept the main provisions of the Bill, with the exception of
the proposed increase in the number of ships employed in
foreign waters. They made it a condition that the Government
should incorporate with the Bill two financial projects
designed to provide the money required without burdening the
working classes. Both the Stamp Duties Bill and the Customs
Bill were adopted by the Government, and the Navy Bill was
carried with the aid of the Centre."

Berlin Correspondent, London Times.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (May).

The Lex Heinze.

The Socialists won a notable triumph in May, when they forced

the Reichstag to adopt their views in the shaping of a measure
known as the Lex Heinze. This Bill, as introduced by the
Government, gave the police increased powers in dealing with
immorality. The Clericals and the Conservatives sought to
extend its scope by amendments which were denounced by the
Radicals and Socialists as placing restrictions upon the
"liberty of art and literature." After a prolonged struggle,
in which the Socialists resorted to the use of obstruction,
the most obnoxious amendments were withdrawn.

{250}

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (May).

Passage of the Meat Inspection Bill.

A much discussed and sharply contested bill, providing for a

stringent inspection of imported meats, and aimed especially
at the obstructing of the American meat trade, was passed by
the Reichstag on the 23d of May. It prohibits the importation
of canned or sausage meat entirely, and imposes conditions on
the introduction of other meats which are thought to be, in
some cases, prohibitory. The measure was originally claimed to
be purely one of sanitary precaution. It "had been introduced
in the Reichstag early in 1899, but the sharp conflict of
interests about it kept it for more than a year in committee,
When the bill finally emerged for discussion in the Reichstag,
it was found that the Agrarian majority had distorted it from
a sanitary to a protective measure. Both in the new form they
gave the bill and in their discussions of it in the Reichstag,
the Agrarians showed that it was chiefly the exclusion of
foreign meats, rather than a system of sanitary inspection,
that they wanted. As finally passed in May the bill had lost
some of the harsh prohibitory features given it by the
Agrarians, the latter contenting themselves with the exclusion
of canned meats and sausages. To the foreign student of German
politics, the Meat Inspection Law is chiefly interesting as
illustrating the tendency of the general government to seize
upon functions which have hitherto been in the hands of the
individual states and municipalities, as well as of bringing
the private affairs of the people under the control of
governmental authority. It is another long step of the German
government away from the principle of 'laissez-faire.' The
task undertaken by the government here is itself a stupendous
one. There is certainly no other great government in the world
that would endeavor to organize the administrative machinery
for inspecting every pound of meat that comes upon the markets
of the country."

W. C. Dreher,
A Letter from Germany
 (Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901).

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (June).

Opening of the Elbe and Trave Canal.

"The new Elbe and Trave Canal, which has been building five
years and has been completed at a cost of 24,500,000 marks
($5,831,000)—of which Prussia contributed 7,500,000 marks
($1,785,000) and the old Hansa town of Lübeck, which is now
reviving, 17,000,000 marks ($4,046,000)—was formally opened by
the German Emperor on the 16th [of June]. The length of the
new canal-which is the second to join the North Sea and the
Baltic, following the Kaiser Wilhelm Ship Canal, or Kiel
Canal, which was finished five years ago at a cost of
156,000,000 marks ($37,128,000)-is about 41 miles. The
available breadth of the new canal is 72 feet; breadth of the
lock gates, 46 feet; length of the locks, 87 yards; depth of
the locks, 8 feet 2 inches. The canal is crossed by
twenty-nine bridges, erected at a cost of $1,000,000. The span
of the bridges is in all cases not less than 30 yards and
their height above water level about 15 feet. There are seven
locks, five being between Lübeck and the Möllner See—the
highest point of the canal—and two between Möllner See and
Lauenburg-on-the-Elbe."

United States, Consular Reports,

September, 1900, page 8.

A memorandum by the British Charge d'Affaires in Berlin on the

Elbe-Trave Canal says that the opening of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Canal injuriously affected the trade of Lübeck. This was
foreseen, and in 1894 a plan was sanctioned for the widening
of the existing canal, which only allowed of the passage of
vessels of about thirty tons. The direction of the old canal
was followed only to some extent, as it had immense curves,
while the new bed was fairly straight from Lübeck to
Lauenburg, on the Elbe above Hamburg. The memorandum states
 that the undertaking is of great importance to the States
along the Elbe, as well as to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and
Russia. It will to some extent divert traffic from Hamburg,
and possibly reduce somewhat the revenue of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Canal.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (June-December).

Co-operation with the Powers in China.

See (in this volume)

CHINA.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (September).

Government loan placed in America.

Great excitement and indignation was caused in September by

the action of the imperial government in placing a loan of
80,000,000 marks (about $20,000,000) in the American money
market. On the meeting of the Reichstag, the finance minister,
Dr. von Miquel, replying to attacks upon this measure,
explained that in September the state of the German market was
such that if they had raised the 80,000,000 marks at home the
bank discount rate would have risen above the present rate of
5 per cent. before the end of the year. In the previous winter
the bank rate had been at 6 per cent, for a period of 90 days,
and during three weeks it had stood at 7 per cent. The
government had been strongly urged to do everything in its
power to prevent the recurrence of such high rates of
discount. The London rate was rapidly approaching the German,
and there was reason to fear that there would be a serious
flow of gold from Germany. It was therefore urgently desirable
to attract gold from abroad, and there was no country where money
was so easy at the time as in the United States. This was due
to the extraordinarily favorable balance of American trade and
the remarkable increase in exports out of all proportion to
the development of imports. Another reason was the American
Currency Law, which enabled the national banks to issue as
 much as 100 per cent. of their capital in loans, whereas they
formerly issued only 90 per cent. There was no doubt that the
80,000,000 marks could have been obtained in Germany, but the
public must have been aware that other loans of much greater
extent were impending. There was going to be a loan of about
150,000,000 marks for the expedition to China, and it was
certain that before the end of the year 1901 considerable
demands would be made upon the public.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (September).

Proposal to require leaders of the Chinese attack
on foreigners to be given up.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (October).

Anglo-German agreement concerning policy in China.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

{251}

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (October 9).

Lèse-majesté in criticism of the Emperor's speech to soldiers
departing for China, enjoining no quarter and commending the
Huns as a military example.
Increasing prosecutions for Lèse-majesté.

On the 9th of October, a newspaper correspondent wrote from

Berlin: "The Berlin newspapers of yesterday and to-day
chronicle no fewer than five trials for 'lèse-majesté.' The
most important case was that of Herr Maximilian Harden, the
editor of the weekly magazine 'Zukunft.' Herr Harden, who
enjoyed the confidence of the late Prince Bismarck, wields a
very satirical pen, and has been designated 'The Junius of
modern Germany.' In 1898 Herr Harden was convicted of
lèse-majesté and was sentenced to six months' incarceration in
a fortress. In the present instance he was accused of having
committed lèse-majesté in an article, 'The Fight with the
Dragon,' published in the 'Zukunft' of August 11. The article
dealt with the speech delivered by the Emperor at Bremerhaven
on July 27, 'the telegraphic transmission of which, as was
asserted at the time, had been forbidden by Count von Bülow.'
The article noted as a fact that the Emperor had commanded the
troops who were leaving for China to give no quarter and to
make no prisoners, but, imitating the example of Attila and
the Huns, to excite a terror in East Asia which would last for
a thousand years. The Emperor had added, 'May the blessing of
God attend your flags and may this war have the blessed
result that Christianity shall make its way into China.' Herr
Harden in his comments on this speech had critically examined
the deeds of the historic Attila and had contrasted him with
the Attila of popular story in order to demonstrate that he
was not a proper model to set up for the imitation of German
soldiers. The article in the 'Zukunft' had also maintained
that it was not the mission of the German Empire to spread
Christianity in China, and, finally, had described a war of
revenge as a mistake." No publicity was allowed to be given to
the proceedings of the trial. "Herr Harden was found guilty
not only of having been wanting in the respect due to the
Emperor but of having actually attacked his Majesty in a way
that constituted lèse-majesté. The Court sentenced him to six
months' incarceration in a fortress and at the same time
directed that the incriminated number of the 'Zukunft' should
be destroyed.

"The 'Vossische Zeitung' remarks:—'We read in the newspapers

to-day that a street porter in Marburg has been sentenced to
six months' imprisonment for insulting the Empress, that in
Hamburg a workman has been sentenced to five months'
imprisonment for lèse-majesté, that in Beuthen a workman has
been sentenced to a year's imprisonment for lèse-majesté, and
 that in Dusseldorf a man who is deaf and dumb has been
sentenced to four months' imprisonment for the same offence.
The prosecutions for lèse-majesté are multiplying at an
alarming rate. We must emphatically repeat that such
proceedings appear to us to be in the last degree unsuited to
promote the principles of Monarchy. … The greater the number
of political prosecutions that are instituted the more
accustomed, under force of circumstances, does the Press
become to the practice of writing so that the reader may read
between the lines. And this attitude is to the advantage
neither of public morals nor of the Throne. … We regret in
particular that the case of yesterday (that of Herr Harden)
was tried 'in camera.' … It has justly been said that
publicity is more indispensable in political trials than in
prosecutions against thieves and murderers. … If there is no
prospect of an improvement in this respect the Reichstag will
have to devote its serious attention to the question how the
present administration of justice is to be dealt with, not
only in the interest of freedom of speech and of the Press,
but also for the good of the Crown and the well-being of the
State.'"

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (October 18).

Change in the Imperial Chancellorship.

On the 18th of October it was announced in the "Imperial

Gazette" that" His Majesty the Emperor and King has been
graciously pleased to accede to the request of the Imperial
Chancellor, the President of the Ministry and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Prince of
Ratibor and Corvey, to be relieved of his offices, and has at
the same time conferred upon him the high Order of the Black
Eagle with brilliants. His Majesty has further been graciously
pleased to appoint Count von Bülow, Minister of State and
Secretary of State to the Foreign Office, to be Imperial
Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs." Count von Bülow
is the third of the successors of Prince Bismarck in the high
 office of the Imperial Chancellor. The latter was followed by
Count von Caprivi, who gave way to Prince Hohenlohe in 1894.
Prince Hohenlohe had nearly reached the age of 82 when he is
said to have asked leave to retire from public life.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (November).

Withdrawal of legal tender silver coins.

"Germany has lately taken a step to clear off the haze from
her financial horizon by calling in the outstanding thalers
which are full legal tender, and turning them into subsidiary
coins of limited legal tender—a process which will extend
over ten years. At the end of that time, if no misfortune
intervenes, she will be on the gold standard as surely and
safely as England is. Her banks can now tender silver to their
customers when they ask for gold, as the Bank of France can
and does occasionally. When this last measure is carried into
effect the only full legal-tender money in Germany will be
gold, or Government notes redeemable in gold."

New York Nation,

November 29, 1900.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (November-December).

The Reichstag and the Kaiser.
His speeches and his system of personal government.

In the Reichstag, which reassembled on the 14th of November,

"the speeches of the Kaiser were discussed by men of all
parties, with a freedom that was new and refreshing in German
political debates. Apart from the Kaiser's speeches in
connection with the Chinese troubles, the debates brought out
some frank complaints from the more 'loyal' sections of German
politics, that the Kaiser is surrounded by advisers who
systematically misinform him as to the actual state of public
opinion. It has long been felt, and particularly during the
past few years, that the present system of two cabinets—one of
 which is nominally responsible to the Reichstag and public
opinion, while the other is merely a personal cabinet,
responsible to neither, and yet exercising an enormous
influence in shaping the monarch's policies—has been growing
more and more intolerable. This system of personal government
is becoming the subject of chronic disquietude in Germany, and
even the more loyal section of the press is growing restive
under it. Bismarck's wise maxim, 'A monarch should appear in
public only when attired in the clothing of a responsible
ministry,' is finding more and more supporters among
intelligent Germans."

W. C. Dreher,
A Letter from Germany
(Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901).

{252}

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (December).

Census of the Empire.
Growth of Berlin and other cities.
Urban population compared with that in the United States.

A despatch from Berlin, February 26, announced the results of

the census of December, 1900, made public that day. The
population of the German Empire is shown to have increased
from 52,279,901 in 1895 to 56,345,014. Of this population
27,731,067 are males and 28,613,947 females. Over 83 per cent.
of the whole population is contained in the four kingdoms; of
these Prussia comes first with (in round figures) 34,500,000
inhabitants, and Bavaria second with 6,200,000. The figures
for Saxony and Würtemberg are 4,200,000 and 2,300,000
respectively. More than 16 per cent. of the population is
resident in the 33 towns of over 100,000 inhabitants. Of these
33 towns the largest is Berlin, while the smallest is Cassel,
of which the inhabitants number 106,001.
The Prussian Statistical Office had already published the
results of the census, so far as they concern Berlin and its
suburbs. It appears that the population of the German capital
now amounts to 1,884,151 souls, as against 1,677,304 in 1895
and 826,3!1 in 1871. The population of the suburbs has
increased from 57,735 in 1871 and 435,236 in 1895, to 639,310
in 1900. The total population of the capital, including the
suburbs, is given as 2,523,461 souls, as against 2,112,540 in
1895, an increase of over 19 per cent. Some figures relating
to other cities had previously appeared, going to show "an
acceleration of the movement of population from the country
toward the great cities. The growth of the urban population in
five years has been astonishing. The population of Berlin, for
example, increased more than twice as much in the last five
years as in the preceding five. The fourteen German cities now
having a population of above 200,000 have increased more than
17 per cent since 1895. … No other European capital is growing
so fast in wealth and numbers as Berlin; and the city is rapidly
assuming a dominant position in all spheres of German life."

W. C. Dreher,
A Letter from Germany
(Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901).

The percentage of growth in Berlin "has been far outstripped

by many other cities, especially by Nuremberg; and so far as
our own census shows, no American city of over 50,000
inhabitants can match its increase. In five years it has grown
from 162,000 to 261,000—60 per cent increase. That would mean
120 per cent in a decade.

"But though Germany has only one city of more than one
million, and one more of more than half a million, and the
United States has three of each class, Germany has, in
proportion to its population rather more cities of from 50,000
to 100,000 inhabitants, and decidedly more of from 100,000 to
500,000, than the United States. In the United States
 8,000,000 people live in cities of over 500,000 inhabitants,
against some 3,000,000 in Germany; yet in the United States a
larger percentage of the population lives in places which have
under 50,000 inhabitants."

The World's Work,

March, 1901.

GERMANY: A. D. 1901 (January).

Celebration of the Prussian Bicentenary.

See (in this volume)

PRUSSIA: A. D. 1901.

GERMANY: A. D. 1901 (January).

Promised increase of protective duties.

In the Reichstag—the Parliament of the Empire—on the 26th of

January, the Agrarians brought in a resolution demanding that
the Prussian Government should "in the most resolute manner"
use its influence to secure a "considerable increase" in the
protective duties on agricultural produce at the approaching
revision of German commercial policy, and should take steps to
get the new Tariff Bill laid before the Reichstag as promptly
as possible. In response, the Imperial Chancellor, Count von
Bülow, made the following declaration of the policy of the
government, for which all parties had been anxiously waiting:
"Fully recognizing the difficult situation in which
agriculture is placed, and inspired by the desire effectively
to improve that situation, the Prussian Government is resolved
to exert its influence in order to obtain adequate protection
for agricultural produce by means of the Customs duties, which
must be raised to an extent calculated to attain that object."

GERMANY: A. D. 1901 (January).

The Prussian Canal scheme enlarged.