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Full Chapter The Biopolitics of Gender in Science Fiction Feminism and Female Machines 1St Edition Emily Cox Palmer White PDF
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i
Emily Cox-Palmer-White
vi
Contents
Bibliography 143
Index 150
vi
Figures
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Suspending Gender and Becoming-Gynoid
in Science Fiction
Joanna Russ’s The Female Man contains one of the most nuanced and troub-
ling descriptions of the contradictory desires produced in women as a result of
patriarchal power and oppression. In the novel, Joanna is one of four women
drawn together across time and multiple dimensions, but who come from a
patriarchal world similar to our own. Joanna’s way of coping with her male-
dominated world is to think of herself as a man: “If we are all mankind, it
follows that I too am a man, and not at all a woman … I think I am a Man;
I think you had better call me a Man” (Russ 135–6). I believe this conceptual-
isation of herself as a “female man” represents, in part, a desire to not be treated
like a woman –this partly means to not be treated like an object unworthy of
respect but it also constitutes a wish to be acknowledged as something more
or perhaps other than one’s female gender. Yet, there is the sense that, in order
to not be understood as a woman, one must therefore be understood as the
binary opposite. Being respected, having one’s agency and authenticity as an
individual recognised, constitutes being understood culturally as a man.
Joanna’s desire in the novel to become a “female man” is a desire to divorce
herself from the female identity forced on women from birth –not necessarily
because all aspects of femininity are negative but because femininity and deg-
radation are so often and so deeply entwined that to reject one would seem to
free oneself from the other. Yet to reject femaleness can mean many things –for
some it can mean accessing a new level of authenticity. For others it can be a
symptom of internalised sexism: if one rejects femininity on the grounds that
femininity is not respected by a sexist society then one may be capitulating
to prejudice. Then again, the concept of the “female man” may also relate to
the desire to simply have one’s masculinity acknowledged in the same way
that society expects and accepts women’s femininity: a desire to be “seen” as
a “man” as much as one is seen as a woman. This might be characterised as a
non-binary experience, or perhaps simply a desire to not be pigeonholed –to
not be understood purely as one nebulous female figure emerging from the ill-
defined category of Woman.
I interpret Joanna’s desire to be treated “like a man” as a desire rooted in
the confusion inherent in gender itself. It is a symptom of the fact that gender
represents so many seemingly contradictory facets of culture, society, biology,
physicality, psychology and desire. Gender is at once a core part of one’s
2
However, this ideal of woman as a kind of nascent figure of the many and of
the universal marginal subject is not without its contradictions. The eman-
cipation of the marginalised individual is, within this model, to be achieved
through a politics of shared interest: a conflation of the specific and the gen-
eral. As some feminists, gender and queer theorists have since pointed out,
there is little room within this conceptualisation for the multitude of various
5
While the conception of the individual, unified subject as a tool for dismissing
that which is non-male (and often non-white and non-straight as well) should
be discredited, the implied dismissal of individual selfhood attached to this cri-
tique risks diminishing the individuality of women, recognised as self-determining
agents. The frequent portrayal of the self as a purely masculine and irredeemable
tool of patriarchy in some ways fails to acknowledge the multiplicity of persons
which feminist politics seeks to represent. Yet the implications of such a phil-
osophy are to deny women today many of the rights historically sought after by
women who were themselves denied the opportunity to be selves in their own
right, to paraphrase Toril Moi, “to be the author in relation to [her] text” (Moi 8).
In her work, Selfish Women, Lisa Downing similarly argues that “ ‘self-
interest,’ ‘self-
regard,’ ‘self-
actualisation’ –may be, not only tangentially
expedient for a feminist political project in the twenty-first century, but pro-
grammatically necessary to it.” Here she offers the term “ ‘self-fullness,’ as both
the direct antonym of what women are traditionally exhorted to be –‘selfless’ –
and as a value-judgement-free alternative to selfishness” (3). Downing’s book
delivers a deeply necessary argument for women and the feminist movement to
reclaim selfhood for the benefit of the individuals which make up the category
of women –acknowledging the multiplicity within the category of woman and
at the same time acknowledging the inclusivity of the word as describing both
sameness and difference. Where the sameness ends and the difference begins
is a matter which essentialist and constructionist feminists have debated hotly
for many years: which aspects of what we call “Woman” or “feminine” are
manufactured and/or imposed? And what can be seen as, in some way “essen-
tial,” and therefore, shared? Final answers to these questions are probably
beyond the scope of this work; however, I argue that we might come closer
to understanding the nature of man and woman by first acknowledging that
neither the masculine/feminine binary nor the collective/individual binary can
7
To render the people of Gethen intelligible, Genly turns them into men.
But he is never comfortable with this move, and it keeps sliding out of
his grasp because the Gethens are neither male nor female, and they will
not stay fixed as Genly would have them. He is forced to think about his
assumptions about male and female.
(99)
and the reader is forced to do the same. Anne Leckie’s Ancillary Justice trilogy
portrays a galactic empire whose language “does not mark gender in any way”
(3), and to account for this, Leckie uses the pronoun “she” to describe all
characters. Just as with The Left Hand of Darkness, this forces the reader to
question their various assumptions about gender –this is particularly effective
because the society described is not totally without gender but simply places
less emphasis on it. Thus, the reader is invited to imagine, not a genderless
or sexless society as such (as in the case of Venus Plus X or The Left Hand
of Darkness) but rather a kind of post- gender society where actions and
behaviours are not irrevocably marked by current, traditional associations.
Becoming-Woman, Becoming-Gynoid
It is important to recognise that the concept of indistinction, indifference or
inoperativity (words which I will use interchangeably throughout this book)
originated not in the work of Agamben but in an essay entitled “Bartleby; Or,
the Formula” by Deleuze. The essay relates to a short story, “Bartleby The
Scrivener,” by Herman Melville, in which a clerk declines to complete his work,
repeating the sentence: “I would prefer not to.” Deleuze argues that these words
create a linguistic zone of “indetermination”: “the formula is devastating
because it eliminates the preferable just as mercilessly as any non-preferred
… in fact, it renders them indistinct. It hollows out a zone of indiscernibility”
(“Bartleby” 71). Deleuze’s analysis would later be further developed by
Agamben in relation to his work on the nature of potentiality and inoperativity
in his own essay written on the same work: “Bartleby, or On Contingency.”
They both worked along very similar lines when theorising about the ‘gap’
between categories, though Agamben would go on to develop his concept into
a more extensive framework in which indistinction becomes part of a much
51
The book, the assemblage, can only be understood in relation to other assemblages,
and thus it is only within the wider context of our reality, composed of a vast
network of assemblages, that the individual ‘machine’ becomes intelligible. It is
only through our knowledge of other book machines –of the linguistic machine,
that constructs literary and linguistic conventions –that we can comprehend the
text of the book and come to form an interpretation and understand its purpose
as a machine. I think we can extrapolate that this applies not only to books, but
all ‘texts,’ including TV, film and video games –all of which are forms which
depend on a wider contextual understanding of format, genre and narrative in
order to be intelligible. The purpose of the text, and its interpretation, fluctuates
from person to person depending on the other texts or contextual assemblages
the reader has already encountered. Thus the text assemblage never contains a
single meaning; in fact, it means nothing when considered in isolation: “when
one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can
be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work” (Deleuze and Guattari,
Plateaus 3). It is this characteristic of the assemblage that relates to the other side
of this machine and that encourages change and resists homogeneity –a term
developed by Deleuze and Guattari called the BwO. This element of the assem-
blage faces away from “the strata, which doubtless make it a kind of organism,
or signifying totality” (Plateaus 2) and acts to “[dismantle] the organism, causing
asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate” (2). The BwO con-
tinually forces the assemblage to alter and reform such that all the ‘machines’
that make up our reality are constantly and repeatedly shifting, dismantling and
reforming to produce perpetual difference.
The BwO is the manifestation, the machinic functioning of desire the “plane
of consistency specific to desire,” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 178), the force
that Deleuze and Guattari describe as “a process of production without refer-
ence to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure
that fills it” (178). Contrary to the traditional psychoanalytic understanding of
desire, as based on oedipal lack, Deleuze and Guattari developed the concept of
the BwO as a way of viewing desire as a “productive machine” (Message 37),
capable of producing valuable and necessary disruption of existing institutions
as well as new methods of becoming: “the order of desire is the order of produc-
tion; all production is at once desiring-production and social production. We
71
It is unsurprising that this consumer culture formed the context out of which
Ira Levin’s The Stepford Wives emerged. A persistent image of woman as
assemblage, as machine entity for mass consumption exists in media and our
daily interactions with technology: from Maria in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis to
Alexa; from Siri to Westworld; from the Hanson Sophia robot to Gatebox’s
Azuma Hikari, the virtual assistant that doubles as a virtual girlfriend. While
these figures carry negative, sexist associations, the cyborg and, particularly,
the female cyborg figure have the capacity to reimagine these associations, to
“engage with and begin to rewire the circuits of desire” (Yaszek ch. 2) which
traditionally oppressively regulate the female body.
In line with this reasoning, a particular line of flight I will analyse is a phe-
nomenon that Deleuze and Guattari term becoming-woman. This process
originates with the figure of a “girl”: Deleuze and Guattari examine the dis-
ruptive and curious position of the girl/woman as an incongruous element
suspended in a patriarchal world:
Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip
in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular
sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross
right through.
(Plateaus 322–323)
81