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Traversing the Ethical
Minefield
2
EDITORIAL ADVISORS
Rachel E. Barkow
Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy
Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law
New York University School of Law
Erwin Chemerinsky
Dean and Professor of Law
University of California, Berkeley School of Law
Richard A. Epstein
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law
New York University School of Law
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow
The Hoover Institution
Senior Lecturer in Law
The University of Chicago
Ronald J. Gilson
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business
Stanford University
Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business
Columbia Law School
James E. Krier
Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law
The University of Michigan Law School
Tracey L. Meares
Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law
Director, The Justice Collaboratory
Yale Law School
Robert H. Sitkoff
John L. Gray Professor of Law
Harvard Law School
3
David Alan Sklansky
Stanley Morrison Professor of Law
Faculty Co-Director, Stanford Criminal Justice Center
Stanford Law School
4
ASPEN CASEBOOK SERIES
Fourth Edition
Susan R. Martyn
Distinguished University Professor
Stoepler Professor of Law and Values Emeritus
University of Toledo College of Law
Lawrence J. Fox
Partner, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Gerber
George W. and Sadella D. Crawford
Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School
5
Copyright © 2018 CCH Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
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www.WKLegaledu.com, or a written request may be faxed to our permissions department at 212-771-0803.
Wolters Kluwer
Attn: Order Department
PO Box 990
Frederick, MD 21705
Names: Martyn, Susan R., 1947- author. | Fox, Lawrence J., 1943- author.
Title: Traversing the ethical minefield : problems, law, and professional responsibility / Susan R. Martyn, Distinguished
University Professor, Stoepler Professor of Law and Values Emeritus, University of Toledo College of Law; Lawrence
J. Fox., Partner, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Gerber, George W. and Sadella D. Crawford, Visiting Lecturer in
Law, Yale Law School.
Description: Fourth edition. | New York : Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., [2018] | Series: Aspen casebook
series | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017046471 | eISBN: 978-1-4548-9658-6
Subjects: LCSH: Legal ethics — United States. | Attorney and client — United States. | LCGFT: Casebooks.
Classification: LCC KF306 .M37 2018 | DDC 174/.30973 — dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017046471
6
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7
For Peter
and
Vivienne Reece
Juliet Maeve
William Henry
Roger Edward
Harrison Isaac
Alexandra Jean
Josiah James
8
Summary of Contents
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Part I: Introduction
Table of Cases
Table of Model Rules, Restatements, and Other Regulations
Index
9
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
PART I: INTRODUCTION
B. Bar Admission
In re Application of Converse
Problem
C. Professional Discipline
The Law Governing Lawyers: Professional Discipline
Kentucky Bar Association v. Helmers
Problems
A. Access to Justice
Lawyers and Clients: Service Pro Bono Publico
Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co.
10
Problems
B. Unpopular Clients
Problems
Chapter 4: Competence
C. Nonclient Duties
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud
Cruze v. Hudler
Problem
A. Abandonment
Maples v. Thomas
Lawyers and Clients: Criminal Defense
Problem
B. Control
1. Authority Between Client and Lawyer
2. Authority of Lawyer to Act for Client
Machado v. Statewide Grievance Committee
11
Problems
3. Authority in Representing Organizations
Problem
4. Authority in Representing Clients with Diminished Capacity
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Framm
Problem
C. Communication
dePape v. Trinity Health Systems, Inc.
Problems
Chapter 6: Confidentiality
A. Introduction
B. Fiduciary Duty
Matter of Anonymous
Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan
Lawyers’ Roles: The Directive Lawyer and Fiduciary Duty
Problems
12
Merits Incentives, LLC v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada
Problem
A. Physical Harm
1. Fiduciary Duty
Hawkins v. King County
Problems
Spaulding v. Zimmerman
Problems
2. Privilege and Work Product
Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
Problem
B. Financial Harm
1. Fiduciary Duty
In re American Continental Corporation/Lincoln Savings & Loan Securities
Litigation
ESG Capital Partners, LP v. Stratos
The Bounds of the Law: Fraud
Problems
The Opinion Letter
Problem
2. Privilege and Work Product: Client Crime or Fraud
United States v. Chen
Problems
Lawyers’ Roles: The Instrumental Lawyer and the Bounds of the Law
13
Problems
A. Introduction
Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
Problem
B. Joint Representations
1. Divorce and Dissolution
State Bar of Texas, Opinion No. 583
Problem
2. Litigation Co-Parties
The Law Governing Lawyers: Losing a Client by Disqualification or Injunction
Johnson v. Clark Gin Service, Inc.
Problem
3. Joint Criminal Defense
Problem
14
4. Employer and Employee
Sanford v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Problem
5. Real Estate Transactions
Anderson v. O’Brien
Problem
6. Business Planning
Problem
7. Estate Planning
A. v. B.
Problem
D. Positional Conflicts
Problem
A. Introduction
15
The Law Governing Lawyers: Loss of Fee or Other Benefits
6. Limiting Lawyer Liability
Problem
7. Lawyer Proprietary Interest in Litigation
Problem
8. Sexual Relationships with Clients
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Monroe
Problem
9. Close Personal Relationships
Problem
D. Insurance Defense
Lawyers and Clients: Insurance Defense
Paradigm Insurance Co. v. The Langerman Law Offices, P.A.
Problem
16
Problem
A. Hourly Fees
ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Billing for Professional Fees, Disbursements, and
Other Expenses
Matter of Fordham
End Billable Hour Goals . . . Now
Problems
B. Contingent Fees
ABA Formal Opinion 94-389: Contingent Fees
In re Everett E. Powell, II
Problems
C. Fixed Fees
In re Sather
Practice Pointers: Trust Fund Management
Problems
D. Fees on Termination
Malonis v. Harrington
Problem
E. Statutory Fees
Perdue v. Kenny A.
Problem
A. Voluntary Withdrawal
1. Unpaid Fees
Gilles v. Wiley, Malehorn & Sirota
Problem
2. Client Misconduct
In the Matter of Steven T. Potts
Problem
17
B. Wrongful Discharge
1. Inside Counsel
Wadler v. Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.
Problem
2. Law Firm Employees
Problem
Practice Pointers: Wrongful Discharge
A. Introduction
The Bounds of the Law: A Reprise
Problems
B. Frivolous Claims
Christian v. Mattel, Inc.
Problem
C. Discovery Abuse
Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc.
Problem
D. Bias
In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in Panel Case No. 15976
Problem
F. Lawyer as Witness
Neumann v. Tuccio
18
Problem
A. Self-Regulation
Kentucky Bar Association Opinion E-430: A Lawyer’s Duty to Report
Professional Misconduct of Other Lawyers and Judges
Problem
D. Referrals
Colorado Bar Association Opinion 122: The Applicability of Colorado RRC 7.2
to Internet-Based Lawyer Marketing Program
Problem
E. Multijurisdictional Practice
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank P.C. v. Superior Court
Problems
F. Multidisciplinary Practice
Practice Pointers: The Globalization of Law Practice
Problem
19
Chapter 16: Judicial Ethics
A. Introduction
1. The Judge’s Role
2. Sources of Law
3. Procedural Remedies
Problem
B. Judicial Behavior
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia
I Did Not Sleep with That Vice-President
Williams v. Pennsylvania
Problem
C. Judicial Selection
Problem
Table of Cases
Table of Model Rules, Restatements, and Other Regulations
Index
20
Preface
This book represents a unique collaboration between a law professor with extensive
academic experience (Susan Martyn) and a long-time practitioner who teaches law students
and has dealt with most of the issues in this book (Larry Fox). We begin your study by
introducing you to our pedagogical goals as well as several distinctive features of the book
you are about to use.
Overall, we intend these materials to (1) engage you in a fascinating and dynamic
subject, (2) teach you the rapidly expanding law governing lawyers, (3) remind you of the
need to pay careful attention to facts and context, and (4) invite you to recognize good
lawyering, or the need to develop practical ethical judgment. You should prepare for every
class by reading the assigned material and formulating an answer to the assigned problems.
The Rules
Each section of this book cites two sets of rules: the relevant Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (cited as “MR”), and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers (cited as “RLGL”). Courts rely on both of these resources, which you will find in
your rules supplement.
The Cases
Most people new to this subject are surprised at the vast array of cases that explain and
expand on the professional rule provisions and other legal and equitable remedies that make
up the law governing lawyers. We offer you a rich assortment of 70 of these cases in this
book. Each has been edited for clarity. We use ellipses or brackets to indicate omissions
from the court’s opinion, but omitted citations and footnotes are not identified.
The Problems
The short problems in each section of the book ask you to evaluate the actions of a
hypothetical law firm, Martyn & Fox. To answer each problem, refer to the citations and
other materials that precede them in each section. As you address the dilemmas faced by
Martyn & Fox, you will discover that the firm is capable of great inconsistency. At times,
the lawyers at Martyn & Fox may seem wise and capable. On other occasions, you will
wonder at their fallibility. In many situations, you may identify with their confusion and
angst. Most often, the firm can be rescued from disaster by sage advice.
We hope that these problems will engage you in interesting issues faced by modern
lawyers, as well as help you understand the significance of the rules, cases, and other
materials that explain and construe them. We anticipate that the relative brevity of each
problem will lead you to conclude that each answer “depends on” additional facts that
could change the advice you offer Martyn & Fox. We invite you to search for the relevant
facts that matter.
Finally, once you get into the law that governs the situation, you will discover occasions
21
when Martyn & Fox has a range of options. In these instances, you should identify the
discretion ceded to the lawyer’s individual moral conscience and articulate how you believe
that discretion should be exercised. Here, we hope to assist you in developing practical
ethical judgment as well as learning the law.
The second series of continuing notes, entitled The Law Governing Lawyers,
encompasses six notes, where we explore the fiduciary obligations lawyers assume when
they say “yes,” or agree to represent clients, and the variety of legal and equitable remedies
provided by the cases and materials when these obligations are ignored.
In the third group of notes, entitled The Bounds of the Law, five notes explain when
lawyers may or must say “no” to clients, because of other generally applicable law that
imposes a limit on the lawyer’s advocacy.
22
Chapter 7: Fraud
Chapter 8: Crime
Chapter 14: A Reprise
Chapter 15: The Constitution
The fourth series of five notes, entitled Practice Pointers, offers you practical advice
about how to avoid or mitigate the legal consequences raised by the problems, cases, and
other materials.
The final set of notes focuses on Lawyers and Clients in five common practice settings.
Here, we examine specialized legal regulation of the client’s rights and responsibilities,
which in turn shapes, enhances, and also can limit a lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of the
client.
The Combination
Overall, we intend the rules, cases, problems, stories, and continuing notes in this book
to serve as a guide to identifying, understanding, and avoiding the minefields and mistakes
that the lawyers in these materials have confronted. We also hope you enjoy this study as
much as we have enjoyed preparing it.
23
Acknowledgments
We could not have completed this casebook without the accumulated wisdom of hundreds
of lawyers who have taught and refined our understanding of these issues. In particular, we
thank our colleagues who served as reporters and advisors to the American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers and those who served with us on the
ABA Ethics 2000 Commission. We also are indebted to many at the ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility, who provided us with information about recent developments
exactly when we needed it.
The two of us first met in 1987 in a windowless conference room at the American Law
Institute during a meeting of the advisors to the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. These meetings clearly are an acquired taste. The Reporters to Restatement
projects circulate a draft weeks before each meeting, then sit on a raised dais facing a
semicircle of 25 or 30 judges, professors, and lawyers to defend each section, comment, and
example line by line, usually for several days at a time. Only the good will and good humor
of the participants can make such a process bearable, and we soon found that we were
providing large doses of both for each other. From our 13-year sojourn with the ALI, a
broad friendship developed that also took us into new adventures, including CLE programs
and the ABA’s Ethics 2000 project in which we both served as Commissioners to undertake
a stem-to-stern review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
For us, nothing has been quite like our work on this volume. After Larry returned from
a stay in Ithaca, Susan learned of the problems he had developed for his Professional
Responsibility course at Cornell Law School and decided they could form the backbone of
a casebook. Susan selected and edited the cases, organized the materials, and wrote the
continuing notes in the book while teaching the materials to students at the Toledo,
Marquette, and George Washington Law Schools. Larry contributed to the third and
fourth editions while teaching at Harvard and Yale Law School. In short, we could not have
completed this book without each other, and we both feel free to blame the other for the
flaws that remain.
The faculties and students at eight law schools — Cornell, George Washington,
Harvard, Marquette, Mitchell-Hamline, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of
Toledo, and Yale — contributed to these materials by consulting, arguing, and correcting
many of our mistakes. Others across the country also commented on and helped us
formulate our ideas. Our ideas never would have taken shape without the capable, cheerful,
and knowledgeable assistance of Bea Cucinotta and the flawless editing of Karin Kobel and
Lauren Carpenter.
Susan would not have had the time to devote to this project without a sabbatical leave
granted by the University of Toledo and the assistance of the Eugene N. Balk Fund, which
provided the funds to carry out most of the research in the continuing notes. Larry never
would have been able to develop the problems if it were not for the invitation from Charles
Wolfram to escape practice and teach at the Cornell Law School.
24
Finally, our thanks to the following for permission to reproduce all or portions of their
work:
Formal Opinion 93-379 © 1993 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with
permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar
Association.
Formal Opinion 94-389 © 1994 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with
permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar
Association.
Formal Opinion 10-457 © 2010 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with
permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar
Association.
Fox, Lawrence. Legal Tender: A Lawyer’s Guide to Handling Professional Dilemmas ©
1995 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any
form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without
the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
Fox, Lawrence. Raise the Bar: Real World Solutions for a Troubled Profession © 2007
by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. This
information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or
by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the
express written consent of the American Bar Association.
Colorado Bar Association Ethics Opinions 116 (2007) and 122 (2010). Reprinted by
permission.
Kentucky Bar Association, Ethics Opinion E-430 (2010)
Leo Cullum/The New Yorker Collection/The Cartoon Bank
Carolina Academic Press LLC. Reprinted from Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics Fifth Ed.
with permission. Copyright 2016. Carolina Academic Press LLC, All Rights Reserved.
Oxford University Press, In The Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession by
Deborah L. Rhode (2000). 2,411 words from pp. 49-79. By permission of Oxford
University Press, Inc.
Professional Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Texas, Opinion 583 (2008)
Tom Cheney/The New Yorker Collection/The Cartoon Bank
West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board, L.E.O. No. 2015-02 Social Media and
25
Attorneys (2015)
26
Part I
Introduction
Most other law school courses are designed to improve your ability to assist your clients in
achieving their goals by articulating their interests, asserting their rights, and defending
their positions. Only in this course are you provided with the tools to recognize your own
obligations and professional responsibilities, the limitations on your own conduct, and your
rights as a lawyer, an officer of the legal system, and a citizen. Our experience indicates that
many legally educated professionals (practicing lawyers and academics) are less than fully
aware of some of the most crucial concepts covered in this course. Our purpose is to ensure
that this will not be the case for you.
27
Chapter 1
Lawyers’ Roles:
The Client-Lawyer Relationship
Close your eyes and try to imagine yourself as a lawyer meeting a prospective client for the
first time. First, how do you envision your client? Will you be representing an individual?
An organization? A government? Second, how do you decide whether to undertake this
representation? Will you consider the nature of the matter? The client? Whether and how
much the client can pay? The effect of this legal representation upon society as a whole?
Third, assuming you decide to handle the matter, what will you do for the client? Do you
imagine yourself as a legal technician who will execute the client’s instructions? A guardian
of the rule of law whose job it is to explain the legal realities of the situation to the client?
How much will you interact with your client? Finally, imagine the place where this meeting
occurs and what it conveys about the answers to these questions.
In this series of notes entitled “Lawyer’s Roles,” we will examine these questions,
focusing on how lawyers articulate their own sense of role in relation both to clients and the
legal system. Professors Freedman, Smith, and Rhode all agree that the lawyer’s personal
sense of morality, as well as the lawyer’s rules of professional conduct, should foster a
distinct model of the client-lawyer relationship.1 They disagree, however, on what that
model should look like.
Lawyers as Instruments
Professors Freedman and Smith endorse what has been labeled the “adversary” ethic. This
view emphasizes that lawyers have fiduciary duties to represent clients zealously, motivated
by and focused on the client’s values and goals. Legal rights exist to protect human
autonomy, which is essential to human dignity.2 Lawyers do the right thing by serving
what is essentially human in others. Justice is defined in terms of the legal rights granted to
citizens. The legal system protects and reinforces decisions that people are able to make for
themselves, rather than promoting any particular outcome or version of social welfare.
To a philosopher, this view can be labeled “deontological” — that is, focused on the
duties of lawyers to clients, rather than on any particular outcome those relationships
create.3 The lawyer’s morality depends primarily on her role as an advocate, which requires
two primary virtues. The lawyer must be simultaneously neutral (because her client’s
28
interests should prevail) and partisan (to promote those interests). The lawyer should not be
held accountable for the client’s goals or conduct. Amoral advocacy becomes the guiding
norm of the adversary ethic.4
Commentators have characterized this view in a number of colorful ways.5 A lawyer
who adopts some form of this adversarial ethic has been labeled “client-centered,” but also
has been called an “amoral instrument,” “hired gun,” “plumber,” “puppet,” or “prostitute.”
This lawyer strongly advocates client interests but in doing so can overidentify with clients
and lose the independent judgment necessary to provide proper legal advice.
Instrumental lawyers tend to focus on providing adversarial advocacy in individual
client representations.6 Once they agree to take on a client, these lawyers rightly recognize
the importance of fiduciary duties to promote client loyalty.7 But their preference for client
autonomy might tempt them to suppress their own moral judgment and cede all authority
to the client in the process. Single-minded loyalty to a client then can become transformed
into a narrow-minded, unquestioning devotion to that client’s will. The client’s value
system controls the representation, and the lawyer escapes any moral accountability for
either the outcome or the means employed.
Lawyers who prefer an instrumental view of their role see only one limit to client
advocacy: the bounds of the law and the legal system itself. Yet these legal bounds can
become unclear to an instrumental lawyer because law itself might be viewed as a malleable
means to pursue the client’s desires. If the legal system exists to promote individual welfare,
then law can be envisioned primarily as a process that provides clients with a means to
challenge or take advantage of the existing order.
Instrumental lawyers view the social fabric as relatively strong, capable of withstanding
most challenges to the existing limits or bounds of the law or other majoritarian interests.
At the same time, however, focusing primarily or exclusively on client interests might cause
them to lose opportunities to explain a legal or moral boundary to clients or to discover a
client’s true intention. Worse, these lawyers can become blind to a clear legal limit that
could subject the client and the lawyer to severe sanctions. The result could be serious harm
to others as well as to the client and the lawyer.
Assuming such role-differentiated behavior also can transform a lawyer’s entire
personality. Lawyers who live an amoral professional life might be tempted to assume an
amoral personal existence as well. Such lawyers also could incorporate those qualities
deemed essential to accomplishing their task, such as competitive, aggressive, ruthless, and
pragmatic behavior rather than cooperative, accommodating, compassionate, and
principled action.8
Lawyers as Directors
Professor Rhode criticizes the neutral partisanship the adversary ethic seems to require. She
opts instead for a public-interest ethic that would hold lawyers morally accountable for the
consequences of their actions. She agrees with Professors Freedman and Smith that
deontological or rights-based justifications have special force in criminal cases, but she
29
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
lijmerig z’n pijp vullend, vingerdiep, den tabak met duwetjes bedaard
inplettend.—Vroolijk snaterde Guurt weer op.…
—Hep jullie hoort van die raike vent van Duinkaik.… die hep s’n aige
veur s’n kop skote.…
—En ikke hep hoort dat tie valle is, zei Piet, leuk-ontgoochelend ’t
nieuwtje van Guurt.
—Kees.…!
—Da lieg je Ouë.… da lieg je.… driftte Dirk met ’n slag op tafel.
—Daa’s puur klets maid, sarde Piet weer leuk.… hai hep skarrelt mit
Mie van de metselaar.… en da sit nou mit jonk.. en nou hep ie van
d’r broer op s’n ribbekast hat.… en nou durft ie nie meer op stroat
komme.…
—Jai hep main noodig, debies, neenet snurkert, da’ lapje main nie!
—Main kristus, ik hep nooit niks.… nooit, driftte Guurt gemaakt; heé
Piet.… toe.… wees d’r nou erais ’n oardige knoap!.… ik hep aêrs
soo’n dooie Sinterklòas.… se speule van moorde.… soo vreeselik.…
je weut wel daa’k ’r dol op bin.…
Maar Piet was niet te vermurwen. Van avond, strooiavond, nee, dan
most ie de ploats op, lollen met de meiden en zuipers.
Dirk zat lichtelijk te ronken, met kop tegen kachelpijp.… z’n ingezakt
lijf stonk van grondvuil.… z’n stomp-wreed gezicht stond grimmig als
van ’n slapenden bloed-dog en z’n vurige zeerende wimpers,
streepten pijnlijk-rood onder z’n in gelen lampschemer, duisterende
oogen. Hem vroeg ze niet eens. [81]
[Inhoud]
IV.
Blikjes gingen van hand tot hand als ’n smak over was.
—Wie hepp sàin, leste blikkie?.… tien cent, krijschte armelijk schorre
kerel achter de toonbank,—’n venter die op den dag met
afvalgroenten door de plaats ging, en nu, tot laat in den nacht, met
schreeuwen en smak-opgejaag voor de winkeliers, nog ’n extratje
verdienen wilde. Achter ’m stond deftig banketbakker-eigenaar met
witte baret, blufferig in ’t wit, vettig-grinnekend bij stormgeloop van
menschen, lacherig-kontroleerend, met z’n handen frommelend
onder z’n blank schort.
—Nou, is nou dààn, la moar beginne, riep ’n ongeduldig bochelig
kereltje.
—Seg Jans.… jai hep sain vast.… hoor.… t’met ses pond vraiers.…
wa mo je mit soo’n vracht.… puur ses pond.…
[Inhoud]
V.
Piet Hassel, sterke oproerige Wierelander, was kroeg in, kroeg uit
geloopen op de haven, waar wit-schimmig de spoordijk weg te
donkeren lag, achter het breeë watertje en vèr, ver, nevelig-blank
van alom polderland, waarin fantomig reservoirs van gasfabriekje
opdoemden.—Groote molen rechts, naar ’t [87]station, omkneld van
donkere huisjesgroep, vaagde sneeuw-schimmig in duistere lucht,
melancholiek over verren polder starend, den versneeuwenden
bleeken nacht in.
Piet had z’n vrienden opgevischt in een kroeg bij Schildert. Hendrik
Gelder, de Haas bijgenaamd, Jan Sik, Kees Slooter, Kol en nog wat
arme ploeter-schooiers, woelige, jolige losse tuinders en
bloemistknechten met ’n paar sigarenmakers. Naast hen
schuchterde bescheiden, ’n half-heerig klerk je van de fabriek van
ingelegde groenten, ’n Wierelandsch burgertje, dat zich ’t liefst bij
plebsche arme, schooiende herrieschoppers opdrong. Ieder in
Wiereland kende ’t zuipende stelletje, als gevaarlijke vechtersbazen,
nakende zwoegers en sjouwers, die in dronk-zwijmel opspogen
tegen alles, allereerst tegen elkaar ruzieden omdat Kol en Slooter,
katholiek, Sik en Gelder, protestanten, in hun hitte-buien, elkaar
moèsten afrossen. Want verborgen ingetoomden, plòts soms
uitziedenden schroei-haat sintelde en giftte er altijd tusschen
bevolking, katholiek en protestant. Onder alle standen dàt gebruis, al
wilde niemand ’t weten, omdat, gelijk verdeeld in aantal, men elkaar
te veel noodig had. Maar soms barstten de belhamels los en
helleveegden rond, braakten langgesmoorde driften uit van twee
kanten. Nuchter, kon ’t Wierelandsche stelletje elkaar wel luchten.
Iederen avond, in den naakten wintertijd, broeiden ze vast bijeen, in
’n kroeg. Eerste avondwerk was jacht op meiden, achter, op de
stikdonkere kronkel-weggetjes, tusschen tuinderij en wandelpaden.
Wellust-jacht van buurtmenschen waar geen simpel landelijke
vrijage òp kon leven, of doodgetrapt werd ze, door rauwe spot en
krijsch van verdierlijkte massa. Gewissel van meiden en jongens
was overal. Leefdrang en passie werd genomen of betaald.
Piet Hassel wou ruzie. Dat had ie met ’t stelletje afgesproken. Wat
zou ’t; gevochten most d’r worden. En Piet was in lol maar begonnen
met schijnherrie tegen ’n Duinkijker, dien ie heel goed kende.
Dadelijk erin, hakten anderen die partij trokken. Lach-barstend
drongen Piet en Duinkijker weg, de partijtrekkers tegen elkaar aan
den gang ziend. Achterhoeksche haatdragendheid en stupiede
kijfbotheid stond op dronken zwijmelkoppen uit te barsten. Loome
wrok, die langzaam maar schrikkelijk opboorde uit gesmoorde
gloeidriften. Grooter werd broeiing, rossig toortste walm rond,
vergroenend de zinne-koppen in grauwig brandlicht. ’n Kerkvaarter
en Wierelander waren vlak bijeen gedrongen, eigenlijk niet goed
wetend wat ze van elkaar wouen. Een had partij voor Piet getrokken
’n ander voor den Duinkijker. Die twee nou zaten te gieren op bank
bij de deur tegen de uithijgende meiden lollend, dat ze voor hùn
beidjes op elkaar inhakken gingen. Wierelander krijschte rauw.
—Bàrst jai.
—Blaif jai heel!.… en meteen trok Rink z’n jas uit, om in z’n
overhemd, meesliertend verkronkeld-oranjige halsdoek, nek-
ontbloot, de eerste striemen weg te patsen, ’n Meid, blond in
koniginne-statuur, slank en reuzig-forsch, was plots midden
ingedrongen en uitrazend met tartende gebaren, duim onder kin
woest wègstrijkend, gierde ze tegen Duinkijker kerel.…
—Jai? an main jassie.… sie ie main van veure.… kaik nou doàr’.…
En wild draaide furie om, met haar achterste hoog opwippend naar
’m toe, in dwazen hoonenden wellust-sprong.
—Vuile kwieb!.…
—Mô je se maid siene.… puur soo breed aa’s hai.… soo pot!.… soo
pan!.… gierde ’n kleine furie.
—Blaif jullie nou je fesoen houe.… toe nou.… kalm an.… kalm an.…
jai die weg uit.… en jai die.—Zacht begon ie den polderreus te
verduwen, die beenplakte, als ’n rots onwrikbaar, uitdagend, met z’n
moker-armen tegen muzikantenhekje bombardeerend, dat de kerels
trilden achter walmlicht. Rink’s groen-valsche oogen, lichtten als
fosfor, donker-woest diep in z’n ruwen kop verdoken. Ruzie was
geslabakt en wilde warrel joeg weer door de loods, die walm-zwaar
pafte, in stofpoeier boven het geschetter, dat rood-sferig brandde.
De koperen instrumenten van blazers flitsten in licht-glimsels.—
Toortsig-helsch en satanisch, dreunden donkere monden van
trombones, hun zwaarlijvige tonen den stankwalm in, dat wanden te
barsten dreigden; fel boorden de hoorn-stooten als priemend geluid
door de broeiing; schommelend gingen de lijven weer in rhytmisch
gehobbel, in koorts van draai en tolling, [95]geilde de zwijmeldans
weer door de loods, in rossigen rook, die meid-gezichten schroeide
en oranjerig-rood begloeide in zwelling van bezweete huid.
Piet zoende in ’n storm, tien meiden te gelijk, achter den arm van
hun dansers, waarin ze omschroefd pletten, en met Rink achter ’m
aan, wien hij iets in ’t oor schreeuwde, drong ie naar den uitgang.