BUKIDNON

STATE UNIVERSITY

College of Law

Criminal Law II
JD-1B
2023-2024

CASE DIGEST

FINAL TERM

Arnie D. Andaya
Student

Judge Wilfredo G. Bibera, Jr.

Professor
 LIST OF CASES

 Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court | GR No. L-63559 | May 30, 1986
 Nanerico D. Santos v. The Court of Appeals | G.R. No. L-45031 | October 21, 1991
 Pedro S. Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court | G.R. No. 74907 | May 23, 1988
 People of the Philippines v. Motita | 59 OG 3020 | April 30, 1966
 Marcelo B. Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court | G.R. No. 72383 | November 9, 1988
 People of the Philippines v. Ambrocio P. Cano | G.R. No. L-19660 | May 24, 1966
 Leonardo Carillo v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 86890 | January 21, 1994
 People of the Philippines v. Glenn De los Santos | G.R. No. 131588 | March 27, 2001

***
 Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-63559 | May 30, 1986

FACTS:
 Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental filed a case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in
behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province against Newsweek Inc. and
two of their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry
Came.
 The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the
publication of the article “An Island of Fear” in their magazine. The article
allegedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big landowners or
sugarcane planters who exploited the impoverished sugarcane laborers and
brutalized and killed them with impunity.
 They claim that the article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted
presentation, and misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a bad light
 Newsweek filed a Motion to Dismiss for libel. CFI Bacolod denied
Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel. The Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC) affirmed CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss for libel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s
Motion to Dismiss for libel.

RULING:
YES. IAC erred in affirming CFI’s denial of Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss
for libel. Private respondent’s Complaint for libel against Newsweek is
dismissed.

In order to maintain a libel suit, the victim must be identifiable. Defamatory

remarks directed at a group or class of persons are not actionable unless the
statements are sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class.

In this case, the article did not specifically identify any individual planter
and the statements made were not sufficiently specific to apply to each
individual partner. The article falls within the realm of privilege and is
protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press freedom.
 Nanerico D. Santos v. The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-45031 | October 21, 1991

FACTS:
 Nanerico Santos was a columnist of the Manila Daily Bulletin. He wrote in
his column an article entitled “Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.”
which was quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 13, 1970.
 The column contained charges against CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.,
particularly its board chairman and controlling stockholder Carlos Moran
Sison and its president-general manager Luis Sison, of engaging in
fraudulent practices in the stock market.
 Carlos Moran Sison met with Santos so that he could submit to the
columnist his reply which he wanted published the next day and in the same
column but they agreed to publish the reply on February 25. The reply was
not published on February 25 as promised, so Carlos Sison called Santos not
to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle the talks. Sison also
informed Santos that he would be sued for libel and other persons of the
Manila Daily Bulletin.
 The trial court rendered the conviction for libel and the Court of Appeal
affirmed the conviction. According to the CA, the article in question is not a
privileged communication. At the time the complaint filed with SEC, it was
published in the column of the accused. There was yet no proceeding at
which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of a complaint filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission is privileged and thus not covered libel.

RULING:
YES. The Court held that the publication of the complaint was privileged
under Article 354(2) of the Revised Penal Code which states that a fair and
true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings is privileged.

The Court overturned previous rulings that held that the privilege only
applies once judicial action has been taken on the complaint. The Court
emphasized that the privilege extends to the publication of complaint as long
as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
without any comments or remarks.

Therefore, the SC acquitted Santos of the crime of libel.

 Pedro S. Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74907 | May 23, 1988

FACTS:
 Petitioner, a CPA, and a former member of the Board of Directors of
Philippine Columbian Association (PCA). He volunteered his services to
audit the PCA.
 During his audit he found out that PCA President Ponciano Marquez was a
mere associate member of the association and cannot hold position as
President. This prompted petitioner to write to the board and branded the
private complainant, Marquez as a "de facto president." The letter, which the
petitioner eventually caused to be published and circulated among the
members of the association. Not content, petitioner again caused the
publication in a newsletter circulated to the association's members, of an
item entitled "Doubt as To the Legitimacy of The Incumbent President."
 Marquez filed a criminal case of libel. Lacsa alleged the following defenses
(1) the term "de facto president," which he used to describe the private
complainant, is not libelous per se; and (2) even assuming that the said term
is indeed libelous, the letter and newsletter in which it appeared nevertheless
constitute privileged communication and cannot give rise to a libel
conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel.

RULING:
YES. Lacsa is guilty of the crime of libel. The Court applied the test for
libelous meaning, which states that words calculated to induce suspicion are
sometimes more effective in destroying reputation that false charges directly
made.

In this case, Lacsa’s use of the term “de facto president” to describe
Marquez was calculated to induce the readers to suppose and understand that
Marquez was guilty of certain offense and impeach his honesty, virtue, or
reputation. Lacsa’s act of immediately going public with his alleged
findings, without first reporting them to the Board of Directors, violated the
obligation to keep his findings in strict confidence.

Lacsa’s argument that the letter and newsletter constituted privileged

communication was rejected because for a communication to be privileged,
it must be absolutely free from any taint of malice, which was not the case
here.
 People of the Philippines v. Motita
59 OG 3020 | April 30, 1966

FACTS:
 Accused was seen in the public market holding a mirror between the legs of
the complainant Mrs. Pilar N. Letada and thus allowing people to see a
reflection of her private part.
 Sol-Gen agrees that what was committed was slander by deed but disagrees
on the gravity of the deed and says that it is not serious.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused was of guilty or unjust vexation or slander by deed.

RULING:
The facts of the case show that the act committed was slander by deed. The
crime committed could be unjust vexation or slander by deed. However,
though irritation or annoyance exists in both crimes, slander by deed is
committed when such annoyance is attended with publicity, dishonor, or
contempt. If the annoyance were attended by those circumstances mentioned
in rape, the crime would be acts of lasciviousness.

The Supreme Court disagree with the Sol-Gen regarding his comment on the
gravity of the slander by deed. In considering the seriousness of the act, we
are moved by considerations of public policy and morals, namely, the
degeneration of the respect accorded to Filipinas.
 Marcelo B. Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72383 | November 9, 1988

FACTS:
 Petitioner, Marcelo Soriano and six (6) others were accused of libel by
private respondent Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., the then Chairman of the
Commission on Audit (COA).
 The libelous article imputed Tantuico the tampering of election returns at his
residence in Tacloban City and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte
for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
 The information for libel was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte.
 The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of
improper venue as the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
because the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico
holds office and publishes the "Guardian".
 The Trial court ruled that since the article was printed and first published in
the City of Tacloban the venue was proper.
 Tantuico once again raised the same issues in his petition for certiorari. The
appellate court dismissed the petition in a decision dated September 12,
1985. It held that the Regional Trial Court of Leyte had jurisdiction over the
libel case. The appellate court also denied a motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Leyte may try the libel
case.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the libel case should be tried in Quezon
City. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1289 and Republic Act No. 4363 provides: “The criminal action and
civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission on of the offense.”

The lower courts applied the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try an
offense is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information;
since the information states that the articles were first published in Tacloban,
they ruled that the RTC of Leyte had Jurisdiction.

However, we follow the “Multiple Publication Rule” which makes it so each

and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. In
relation to Art 360 this means every time the same written matter is
communicated such communication is considered a distinct and separate
publication of the libel.
Since the offending newspaper is published in Quezon City; through
applying Art 360 of the RTC, the venue and jurisdiction over subject
criminal case for libel should be lodged not in Tacloban City but in Quezon
City. The case should be filed with a Quezon City court instead of the Leyte
RTC.

Therefore, instant petition was GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court of

Leyte, is DIRECTED TO DISMISS Criminal Case in so far its petitioner
Marcelo Soriano is concerned.
 People of the Philippines v. Ambrocio P. Cano
G.R. No. L-19660 | May 24, 1966

FACTS:
 Defendant Ambrocio Cano was the driver of La Mallorca Pambusco bus. He
was alleged to be driving with disregard to traffic rules and regulations,
causing damage to another bus and inflicting injuries to the passengers of
both buses. He is accused of the crime damage to property with multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
 Cano filed a motion to quash the information upon the ground that the crime
of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed
with damage to property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence.
 He also contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction of the crime
charged, slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The lower
court granted such motion. The prosecution then filed an appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not slight physical injuries can validly be complexed with grave
or less grave felonies.

RULING:
NO. The Court held that the information herein does not purport to complex
the offense of slight physical injuries with reckless negligence with that of
damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the information that, thru
reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus
causing upon some of its passengers’ serious physical injuries, upon others
less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in
addition to damage to property.

It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting from a single act, or one
which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by
prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead
of the penalties for each one of the aforesaid crimes which, put together,
may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense.
 Leonardo Carillo v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 86890 | January 21, 1994

FACTS:
 Yolanda Acosta (Yolanda), Catherine’s mother, filed a complaint against Dr.
Carillo and Dr. Madrid before the RTC of Paranaque.
 The RTC convicted Dr. Carillo of the crime of simple negligence resulting in
homicide.
 The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction, Dr. Carillo did not appeal the
decision of the CA and thus became final. Dr. Carillo then filed a petition to
question the factual soundness of the CA before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid acted negligently in their duties
which resulted to the death of their patient.

RULING:
YES. Both doctors acted negligently in providing the proper care to their
patient, during and post operation. The Court defined simple negligence,
penalized under what is now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as "a
mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm is not
immediate or the danger not openly visible."

The rule in such cases is that while the prosecution must prove the negative
ingredient of the offense, it needs only to present the best evidence
procurable under the circumstances, in order to shift the burden of
disproving or countering the proof of the negative ingredient to the accused,
provided that such initial evidence establishes at least on a prima facie basis
the guilt of the accused. This rule is particularly applicable where the
negative ingredient of the offense is of such a nature or character as, under
the circumstances, to be specially within the knowledge or control of the
accused.

In the instant case, the Court is bound to observe that the events which
occurred during the surgical procedure (including whether or not Nubain had
in fact been administered as an anesthesia immediately before or during the
surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and control of Dr. Carillo and
Dr. Madrid. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the two (2) accused to
overturn the prima facie case which the prosecution had established, by
reciting the measures which they had actually taken to prevent or to counter
the obviously serious condition of Catherine Acosta which was evident right
after surgery. This they failed or refused to do so.
 People of the Philippines v. Glenn De los Santos
G.R. No. 131588 | March 27, 2001

FACTS:
 The accused, Glenn de los Santos, driving an Isuzu Elf, hit and killed
members of the jogging PNP team. As a result, some PNP members were
killed on the spot while another trainee died a few days after the incident.
Eleven (11) other trainees were seriously wounded and some sustained
minor injuries. The accused escaped after the incident, leaving behind the
victims helpless.
 The trial court convicted Glenn de los Santos of the crime of multiple
murder, multiple frustrated murder, and multiple attempted murder, with use
of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an intent to kill or injure the jogging the trainees or it was
reckless imprudence.

RULING:
The incident was determined to be an accident caused by reckless
imprudence rather than intentional wrongdoing. There was no evidence to
suggest that Glenn had any malicious intent or motive to harm the trainees.

The incident occurred in a dark and foggy area with no moon or stars. The
police trainees were also wearing black clothing, making hard to see on dark
night.

Glenn was found guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence

resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries. He was also found guilty of ten counts of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

***