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Methods in Bioethics
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Methods in Bioethics
The Way We Reason Now
John D. Arras
Edited by
James Childress and Matthew Adams
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1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
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To My Family:
My wife, Liz Emrey
My daughters, Melissa and Marina and their husbands, Mark and Jeff
My grandchildren, Luke, John, Grace, Gabriel and Alex
My brother, Dr. Ernest E. Arras, whose provocative and thoughtful discussions
about bioethics sparked this book
vi
“So I sat there and smoked my cigar until I fell into a reverie. Among others I
recall these thoughts. You are getting on, I said to myself, and are becoming
an old man without being anything, and without really taking on anything.
Wherever you look about you on the other hand, in literature or in life,
you see the names and figures of the celebrities, the prized and acclaimed
making their appearances or being talked about, the many benefactors of
the age who know how to do favours to mankind by making life more and
more easy, some with railways, others with omnibuses and steamships,
others with the telegraph … then suddenly this thought flashed through my
mind: You must do something, but since with your limited abilities it will be
impossible to make anything easier than it has become, you must, with the
same humanitarian enthusiasm as the others, take it upon yourself to make
something more difficult. This notion pleased me immensely …”
soren kierkegaard, trans. Alastair Hannay, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 156–7.
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Contents
Editorial Note ix
Preface xv
Index 213
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ix
Editorial Note
i
The late John d. arras was a rigorous scholar, brilliant teacher, remarkable col-
league, generous collaborator, eager and witty conversationalist, splendid human
being, and a great friend to many. At the height of his powers, unbowed by an
assortment of ailments, he died suddenly and unexpectedly on March 9, 2015, at
age sixty-nine. At the time of his death, he was the William and Linda Porterfield
Professor of Bioethics, Professor of Philosophy, Professor of Public Health Sciences,
and a core faculty member of the Center for Biomedical Ethics and Humanities in
the School of Medicine at the University of Virginia (UVA). He was also a long-time
fellow of the Hastings Center, a major research center in bioethics.
A native Californian, John completed his undergraduate studies in philoso-
phy and French at the University of San Francisco; his collegiate years included a
year at the Institute of European Studies and University of Paris. He received his
Ph.D. in philosophy from Northwestern University in 1972. While completing his
doctorate, he and his wife, Liz Emrey, served as Peace Corps volunteers in Sierra
Leone. After teaching philosophy at the University of Redlands for a decade, he
taught bioethics at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine-Montefiore Medical
Center in the Bronx for fourteen years.
In 1995, following a national search, John was appointed to the newly estab-
lished Porterfield Chair in Bioethics at UVA. Given a mandate to develop an under-
graduate program in bioethics, he did so with a flourish, involving faculty from
several departments in building a model interdisciplinary program that earned
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x i Editorial Note
the admiration of colleagues at UVA and elsewhere as well as the unstinting grati-
tude and devotion of legions of students.
John loved teaching and advising students, and he poured himself into these
activities, which brought him wide recognition and many awards, but which, for
him, were their own reward, a “kind of secular blessedness” and “as good as it gets.”
One student observed that “Professor Arras was willing to engage with students as
if they have something important to say. More importantly, he would argue with
you when he thought you were wrong.” John cared deeply about students and their
arguments, and they reciprocated.
This is also how he interacted with colleagues locally and beyond, in person, elec-
tronically, and in print. He thrived on vigorous and rigorous intellectual exchange,
always tempered by his wry, self-deprecating humor, as well as by his genuine care
and respect for fellow discussants.
John was a major contributor to public bioethics—that is, to the formulation of
bioethical policies through public bodies; for instance, he was a long-time member
of the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. In 2010, President Obama
appointed him to the newly formed Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues. The chair of this commission, Amy Gutmann, a political philos-
opher and president of the University of Pennsylvania, offered a moving postmor-
tem tribute:
[John] brought out the very best in everyone who had the privilege and
pleasure of working with and learning from him. For the past five years, we
were honored to have John as a thoroughly engaged and beloved member of
our [Commission]… .
Even as he contended with more than his fair share of health challenges,
John contributed far more than his share to our Commission’s painstak-
ing work. He had an unparalleled gift for bringing philosophical insight to
thorny medical and scientific conundrums. Even that gift paled in compar-
ison to John’s wry, perfectly timed humor. Due in no small part to his flair
for intellectual provocation—as feisty as it was friendly—our Commission
rapidly became … something more than a commission. We became a fondly
argumentative and loving extended family with John … “the lightning rod
for many discussions.”
Finally, John was a very productive and influential scholar. As the author of
more than fifty journal articles and book chapters, he preferred, as his preface
here indicates, “rumination over the adoption of hard and fast positions” and
thus chose the essay as his preferred and “primary mode of expression,” since it
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Editorial Note j xi
enabled him to keep “thinking … through new possibilities and foreseeing new
problems.” In addition, he edited or co-edited several books, including, most
recently, Emergency Ethics: Public Health Preparedness and Response, which Oxford
University Press published in 2016.
A few weeks before his death, John sent Peter Ohlin, his editor at Oxford
University Press, the manuscript of his long-awaited magnum opus, at the time tell-
ing his wife, “I can die now—I finished my book.” This is that book, a volume that
collects and integrates his finely wrought critical essays—his ruminations—on
methods in bioethics. While still at work on the book, he explored several different
working titles, one being The Way We Reason Now: Skeptical Reflections on Methods
in Bioethics. Although skeptical about methods and theories in bioethics—at least
about those claiming to be definitive and final—John never doubted the impor-
tance of thinking about and actively pursuing social justice, a commitment he
expressed in many different ways, including his stint in the Peace Corps.
After John’s death, independent reviewers of his manuscript recommended its
publication but, as is common, suggested a few revisions. After discussion with
the editor and with Liz Emrey, John’s widow, I agreed to take responsibility for
making editorial changes in response to those suggestions. Happily, Matthew
Adams, an outstanding graduate student in UVA’s Department of Philosophy, who
had been working with John on the manuscript when it was submitted, agreed to
join me as co-editor. For both of us, this was a way to remember and honor John.
The reader may be curious about the editorial changes we have made. They
include the reversing of John’s latest title and subtitle in order to indicate more
clearly the book’s major focus; combining three original chapters on pragmatism
and bioethics into two chapters (now chapters 5 and 6); reducing redundancy
across chapters, which resulted from their origin as separate, discrete essays;
inserting a few bridging and connecting devices among the chapters; revising the
language in places in order to remove potentially distracting temporal identifi-
ers (e.g., “five years ago,” when the time elapsed has actually been much longer);
completing footnotes and standardizing their form from chapter to chapter; and
so forth. Throughout, our goal as editors has been to be as faithful as possible to
John’s work. This has meant addressing the reviewers’ concerns, as well as any
questions that emerged for us, as we believe John would have done had he lived to
prepare the final manuscript for publication.
We made one major change that we had not anticipated: the deletion of two orig-
inal chapters, entitled “Bioethics and Human Rights: Curb Your Enthusiasm” and
“Philosophical Theory in Bioethics.” As we worked through the book, we concluded
that the volume would work better without these essays. The chapter on human rights
less clearly addressed methodological matters than did the others, while the chapter
xi
We direct interested readers to Arras and Elizabeth Fenton, “Bioethics and Human Rights: Curb Your
*
Enthusiasm,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19, no. 1 (2010): 127–133, 141–150; and to Arras,
“Theory and Bioethics,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published May 18, 2010; http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/theory-bioethics/.
xi
Preface
xv
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xvi i Preface
Reflective equilibrator? What? This is a good question, one for which I almost wish
I had a ready and pithy answer. Unlike many of my academic colleagues who take
an interest in such questions, I fancy myself to be more a ruminator than a com-
mitted defender of any given method. I tend to chew on various methodological
approaches for a long time, attempting to appreciate both what’s new, exciting,
and fruitful, and what’s potentially problematic or limiting in each of them. I think
that just about any ethical theory or methodological approach worth its salt both
expands and occludes our field of vision. The revival of casuistry by Jonsen and
Toulmin in the 1980s, for example, proved to be a welcome antidote to tiresome
and self-deluded top-down, deductivist modes of bioethical reasoning inspired by
the dominant “principlist” paradigm of Beauchamp and Childress. But casuistry’s
exclusive focus on analogical precursors of the case at hand could render it insen-
sitive or blind to possible bad policy consequences if deployed in the unjust world
that we inhabit.
My preference for rumination over the adoption of hard-and-fast positions
is echoed in my choice of the essay as my primary mode of expression. In this
I follow Michel de Montaigne, one of my intellectual heroes, who modestly titled
his monumental and deep reflections on the human condition essais. At the time
Montaigne was composing this masterpiece during the French Renaissance, the
word essai did not carry the established meaning that it has for us—i.e., any rela-
tively short piece of writing on a non-fictional topic. For him, and for me, it means
“an attempt,” not some sort of closed, definitive statement or system. The essayist
is trying something out. In my case, I’m trying out, or trying on for size, a wide
variety of methods applicable to practical ethics. The spirit hovering over these
essays is a kind of experimentalism, the tentative search for new and interest-
ing possibilities of ethical insight. Dogmatism, the tenacious and single-minded
defense of a way of interpreting the moral life, is the antithesis of my idea of the
essai. For me, for better and for worse, this intricate process of “trying on” various
modes of interpretation is where the real meat of this book lies. I am much less
interested in where I end up, and even less interested in slapping some label on
my tentative conclusions, than I am in the process of thinking itself, of working
through new possibilities and foreseeing new problems.
Before we get going, a word might be in order addressing the limits or short-
comings of this project. “Methods of ethical thought” encompass a vast territory
of normative and conceptual developments. As a finite human being with limited
time, energy, competence, and interests, I have generally tried to cover as many
bases as possible, but there are some salient lacunae. While I have always found
much of interest and importance in the feminist literature, I have never, apart
from a passing reference, felt compelled to contribute to it. Part of the problem
01
10 i Methods in Bioethics
From Principles to Cases: Deduction or Induction?
The relationship between these mid-level principles and cases within the meth-
odology of principlism has been somewhat ambiguous and subject to historical
fluctuation. During the early, heroic phase of bioethics, the principlists were par-
tisans of an arguably “top down” orientation devoted to applying principles to
the moral data of concrete cases. Evidence of this can be found in the very first
edition of PBE, which featured a chart tracing the various stages of moral justi-
fication.27 At the top of the chart, there are various ethical theories, which func-
tion as the ultimate sources of moral normativity. An arrow then connects these
theories with the four principles that can be derived from them. Another arrow
connects these moral principles to various moral rules derived from the princi-
ples. (For example, from the principle of autonomy flows the more specific rule to
always obtain the informed consent of subjects in biomedical research.) Finally,
the process of justification comes to rest with an arrow connecting the various
moral rules with concrete moral judgments about particular cases—judgments
based upon the rules at the previous level. Importantly, each level of judgments
receives whatever justification or legitimacy it possesses from the levels above it.
In other words, early on, the principlism of Beauchamp and Childress was decid-
edly deductivist.
A large part of the initial appeal of principlism lay in its promise of provid-
ing “principled” solutions to moral problems—solutions that could claim to be
more than the “merely subjective” biases of practitioners or consultants. As one
physician-graduate of the Georgetown University Kennedy Institute’s week-long
bioethics seminar explained to me, “This [method] is what our student-doctors
need. It’s really objective, based on principles, just like a science.” This promise of
objectivity appeared to be founded on the expectation that individual actions or
social policies could be justified by “applying” the enumerated principles.
In some very simple moral situations consisting, for example, of a clear and
uncontested moral rule and a fact pattern that contradicts it, this promise could be
vindicated. Suppose, for example, that a physician decides to lie to her patient in
order to improve his spirits and possibly facilitate his recovery. One could say that
this doctor’s act violates the principle of autonomy and the law of informed con-
sent. Indeed, one could deploy reasoning in this case as a deductive syllogism: “It
is wrong to lie to patients. Dr. Jones has told a lie. Therefore, Dr. Jones has done
something wrong.”
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