SEVERINO P. JUSTO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-8611.

June 28, 1956

FACTS:
This case revolves around Severino P. Justo appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, finding him guilty of
assaulting a person in authority. Nemesio B. de la Cuesta, a district supervisor of the Bureau
of Public Schools stationed in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, visited the division office in Laoag to revise
the plantilla of his district covering the towns of Sarrat and Piddig. While leaving the office for
lunch, he observed Justo conversing with Severino Caridad, an academic supervisor. Justo
requested De la Cuesta to join him and Caridad in the latter's office, inquiring about the
possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in De la Cuesta's district. Caridad
informed them that the only available position was for a shop teacher. In response, Justo
sharply addressed De la Cuesta, grabbed a lead paperweight from Caridad's table, and
challenged him to step outside. The incident continued with Justo leaving Caridad's office,
followed by De la Cuesta. In front of Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta
requested Justo to put down the paperweight, but instead, Justo grabbed and tore the neck
and collar of De la Cuesta's polo shirt. The appeal challenges the assault conviction based on
these circumstances.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the complainant disrobed himself of the mantle of authority and waived the
privilege of protection as a person in authority when he accepted the challenge to fight?

RULING

NO. The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a
public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually
performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the
crime of assault upon a person in authority; so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the
performance of official duty. Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks
upon person in authority "while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of
such performance", the words "on occasion" signifying "because" or "by reason" of the past
performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being
discharged.

We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed.
Costs against appellant.

PRINCIPLE

The ruling emphasizes that even if a person in authority is not actively performing official
duties at the exact moment of an assault, the crime of assault upon a person in authority can
still be established. The crucial factor is the motivation behind the attack, which must be linked
to the past or ongoing performance of official duties. The court refers to Article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes attacks on persons in authority "while engaged in the
performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance," with the phrase "on
occasion" indicating a connection to past official duties.