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Bipolar II Disorder
Bipolar II Disorder
Modelling, Measuring and Managing
Third Edition
Edited by
Gordon Parker
University of New South Wales
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108414111
DOI: 10.1017/9781108333252
© Cambridge University Press 2019
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant
collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published by Cambridge University Press 2008
Second Edition 2012
Third Edition 2019
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-108-41411-1 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for
external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee
that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Every effort has been made in preparing this book to provide accurate and up-to-date information
that is in accord with accepted standards and practice at the time of publication. Although case
histories are drawn from actual cases, every effort has been made to disguise the identities of the
individuals involved. Nevertheless, the authors, editors, and publishers can make no warranties
that the information contained herein is totally free from error, not least because clinical
standards are constantly changing through research and regulation. The authors, editors, and
publishers therefore disclaim all liability for direct or consequential damages resulting from the
use of material contained in this book. Readers are strongly advised to pay careful attention to
information provided by the manufacturer of any drugs or equipment that they plan to use.
Bipolar II Disorder
Bipolar II Disorder
Modelling, Measuring and Managing
Third Edition
Edited by
Gordon Parker
University of New South Wales
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108414111
DOI: 10.1017/9781108333252
© Cambridge University Press 2019
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant
collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published by Cambridge University Press 2008
Second Edition 2012
Third Edition 2019
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-108-41411-1 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for
external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee
that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Every effort has been made in preparing this book to provide accurate and up-to-date information
that is in accord with accepted standards and practice at the time of publication. Although case
histories are drawn from actual cases, every effort has been made to disguise the identities of the
individuals involved. Nevertheless, the authors, editors, and publishers can make no warranties
that the information contained herein is totally free from error, not least because clinical
standards are constantly changing through research and regulation. The authors, editors, and
publishers therefore disclaim all liability for direct or consequential damages resulting from the
use of material contained in this book. Readers are strongly advised to pay careful attention to
information provided by the manufacturer of any drugs or equipment that they plan to use.
To my wife Heather. Ever supportive and ever
generous of spirit.
Contents
List of Contributors ix
Preface to the Third Edition xi
Acknowledgements xiii
xi
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.001
xii Preface to the Third Edition
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.001
Acknowledgements
My sincere thanks to Gabriela Tavella and Tahlia Ricciardi who have assisted me with
addressing so many production tasks with great acumen and skill, to Kerrie Eyers
who again provided editorial wisdom, and to Jessica Papworth and Nigel Graves
from Cambridge University Press who thoughtfully and carefully steered this book to
production.
xiii
Section 1 Domain Chapters
1 II Disorder
Gordon Parker
Any consideration of bipolar II (BP II) disorder requires addressing a number of funda-
mental issues. Firstly, does such a bipolar condition exist – whether differing from bipolar
I (BP I) disorder dimensionally or categorically? As detailed earlier (Parker and Paterson,
2017) the concept of hypomania (a key BP II construct) was first defined by Mendel in
1881 – who essentially described a milder version of mania – while, in 1882, Kahlbaum
used the term ‘cyclothymia’ to describe alterations between elation without psychosis and
melancholic episodes. During the early twentieth century both cyclothymia and hypo-
mania were lumped together as milder forms of manic depressive psychosis. From the
1930s to the 1970s, the concept of hypomania’ or a ‘milder form’ of bipolar disorder all
but disappeared until Dunner identified a putative BP II category in his research studies.
Dunner (personal communication) identified a subset of bipolar patients who appeared
to be ‘in between’ those with unipolar depression and those who experienced mania, and
who reported less severe ‘hypomanic’ episodes.
BP II disorder has now been formally categorized for several decades with Shorter
(Chapter 2) detailing how it was accorded separate status in the final version of the RDC
(Research Diagnostic Criteria) in 1978. In 1980, DSM-III listed an ‘Atypical Bipolar
Disorder’ and positioned it as a ‘residual category’ (p. 223) for ‘individuals with manic
features that cannot be classified as Bipolar Disorder or as Cyclothymic Disorder’ – exem-
plified by individuals who have had a previous major depressive episode and who are
then presenting with ‘some manic features (hypomanic episode) but not of sufficient
severity and duration to meet the criteria for a manic episode. Such cases are referred to
as “Bipolar II’”. In 1987, DSM-III-R allowed those who had had one or more hypomanic
episodes (but ‘without Cyclothymia or a history of either a Manic or a Major Depressive
Episode’) to be listed in a category of ‘Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise Specified’. It
achieved formal DSM status (as Bipolar II Disorder) in the 1994 DSM-IV manual, where
its essential features were captured by a clinical course of one or more major depressive
episodes accompanied by at least one hypomanic episode, albeit with its seven symp-
tom criteria (p. 338) being identical to those defining a manic episode (p. 332). In the
2013 DSM-5 manual Bipolar II Disorder is clearly separated from Bipolar I disorder in
the introduction to the relevant chapter. In addition, BP II was formally classified in the
1994 ICD-10 system. Thus, it exists as a formalized psychiatric condition and has for an
extended period.
It is likely, however, that BP II long existed prior to its formal classification. Davidson
(2011) reviewed the mental health ‘afflictions’ of the first 51 British Prime Ministers, pro-
viding evidence suggestive of a BP II disorder in 16% (Canning, Churchill, Disraeli, Grey,
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.002
2 Section 1: Domain Chapters
Lloyd George and Macmillan). None received such a diagnosis (as the condition was not
then formally classified), and as Davidson details, none lost office as a consequence of
their mood swings and with most being judged as superior prime ministers than the oth-
ers who, if not experiencing depression, were commonly anxious and self-doubting. Most
of those with a putative BP II disorder were recognized as having depressive states but
their oscillating elevated mood states were either not observed or given differing inter-
pretations, consistent with the longstanding tendency to view those with the condition as
simply having mercurial states or a cyclothymic personality style.
Despite its formal categorization for several decades, a diagnostic category may
or may not have validity and psychiatry can provide many examples, both historical
(e.g. masturbatory madness) and current (e.g. DSM-5’s Disruptive Mood Dysregulation
Disorder – a formalised depressive disorder which is defined by irritability and temper
outbursts while lacking any depressive symptom criteria). Again, despite BP-II’s listing,
there are many who doubt its existence, most commonly positioning it simply as a milder
expression of a bipolar disorder spectrum or as a personality style marked by emotional
dysregulation or normative mood swings (qua cyclothymia).
A key objective of this book is to argue directly and indirectly for its existence. Simply
offering a ‘believing is seeing’ argument is scientifically unacceptable. Instead, any argu-
ment for its entity status requires BP II disorder to be defined by a number of clinical
symptoms (both in relation to hypomanic and depressive states) that, as a set, are dis-
tinctive and not able to be positioned as simply reflecting a personality style. Failure to
identify its status as a categorical mood disorder has contributed to its remaining under
the radar. For example, in a recent paper (Parker et al., 2017) we considered its coverage
in a large set of evidence-based guidelines for managing bipolar disorders. Most made
no reference to the condition. Of those making reference, few offered any specific recom-
mendations for managing bipolar II, and most offered an ‘extrapolation’ management
model (i.e. recommending the same medications as for those with a BP I condition). The
structuring of those guidelines again provides evidence suggesting that there is limited
recognition of the existence of BP II disorder and, secondly, if conceded, that the domi-
nant model is a dimensional one.
Separate chapters in this book allow authors to debate its status either as a dimen-
sional condition (reflecting a milder state lying on a spectrum that, at the more severe
end, captures BP I disorder) or as a categorical condition separate from bipolar I disorder.
Its ‘existence’ would be advanced if a substantive case can be made for its status as a cat-
egorical condition. Two chapters focus on offering arguments for each model. I favour a
categorical binary model as detailed in Chapter 4, albeit recognizing the limitations to
any simple binary model. For example, one wit stated that: ‘There are two classes of people
in the world: those who divide the people in the world into two classes and those who do not’.
Another wit (qua twit) observed ‘There are only ten types of people in the world. Those who
understand binary and those who don’t’.
There are major consequences to establishing whether BP II disorder differs dimen-
sionally or categorically from BP I disorder. If the two conditions lie along a dimension,
then it might be anticipated that the same management models would be relevant to each
condition (i.e. the extrapolation model). If BP II disorder differs categorically, then it may
respond quite differently to medications established as beneficial for those with a BP I
disorder subject to the studies employing rigorous methodologies.
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Chapter 1: Mapping the Terrain of Bipolar II Disorder 3
In relation to the last point, we have prepared a new chapter (Chapter 10) reviewing a
number of major limitations to the design of studies evaluating the efficacy of treatments
for the bipolar disorders, capturing key issues detailed in a recently published paper
(Parker and Tavella, 2018), and limitations that are particularly salient in relation to BP II
disorder. The short duration of many trials, the tendency to test mood stabilizers during
acute episodes as against testing their efficacy as maintenance treatments, the many limi-
tations to the measures most commonly applied and the frequency of their administra-
tion, all confound and limit our capacity to truly evaluate whether a treatment modifies
both the highs and lows of a bipolar condition. Such limitations are particularly salient
in evaluating interventions for BP II states when mood oscillations are more frequent in
terms of episode frequency, duration and severity, and in assessing the comparative effi-
cacy of differing management strategies.
There also remains a clear need to improve detection and diagnosis. BP II disorder
seemingly attracts two positions – ‘over-diagnosis’ (often by expanding the spectrum or
dimensional model into domains of personality and temperament) and ‘under-diagnosis’.
The latter concern is worthy of extension. As noted throughout the book, very high
percentages of individuals with a BP II disorder never receive that diagnosis over their
lifetime – and instead are most often diagnosed and managed as if they have a unipolar
depressive disorder or given a personality disorder diagnosis (most commonly ‘border-
line’). For those who experience a distinct delay to obtaining a BP II diagnosis, the risks
are of considerable ‘collateral damage’ from the condition (in terms of disruption to work
and relationships in particular), of ‘social suicide’ (from engaging in activities that per-
manently damage the individual’s reputation) and of actual suicide. Over the last decade
I continue to be surprised by the high rates of colleagues who have failed to diagnose a
seemingly characteristic BP II condition, either by neglecting to screen for the possibility
during routine consultations or, sadly, when a patient seeks confirmation of such a diag-
nosis from a professional who does not accept or concede the existence of a BP II disorder.
I suspect that one of the principal explanations for ‘failure to detect’ is training – or, in
this instance, the lack of it. Most psychiatrists train in facilities where they observe psy-
chotic BP I states. Few mental health professionals over the age of forty have ever received
a lecture on BP II disorder during their training course. Most professionals who have
developed an interest in this diagnostic condition over the last few decades have generally
‘learned on the job’, observing a condition that varies in so many ways from BP I disorder.
But perhaps the most common reason for failure to so diagnose is – as noted earlier – simply
not asking screening questions for all patients who present for assistance with ‘depres-
sion’. There is therefore a need for much greater professional and community awareness,
and this has proceeded to a reasonable degree in Australia over the last decade following
orthodox educational strategies and especially from prominent people in the community
detailing features of their BP II condition in the media, a process encouraged by Stephen
Fry’s 2006 BBC series ‘The Secret Life of the Manic-Depressive’. Such concerns argue for
readily available assessment tools and that health professionals screen all patients pre-
senting with signs and symptoms of ‘depression’ for the presence of a bipolar disorder.
Finally, there is the key issue of management. Evaluating management options is gen-
erally advanced by assessing ‘the evidence’. In psychiatry, as in medicine, there is a gen-
erally accepted hierarchy or clinical evidence pyramid. Low-level ‘evidence’ is provided
by ideas, opinions and case reports. At the next level lie case series, as well as both case
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.002
4 Section 1: Domain Chapters
control and cohort studies. At the next level lie randomised controlled studies. At the
highest level lie systematic reviews of the aggregated evidence and which are often sup-
ported by quantifying meta-analyses.
Low-level evidence is easy to criticize as, for example, it may simply reflect idiosyn-
cratic opinion (and which may be erroneously persuasive simply if ‘eminence-based’).
But high-level evidence also has its limitations. Such evidence can be skewed by a number
of factors. For example, medications (such as lithium) that have been prescribed for an
extended period have a theoretical advantage over newer medications, when the latter
may have been evaluated in few studies. Medications that have been evaluated in multiple
studies are likely to be recommended above those that have been minimally evaluated.
Efficacy studies tend to weigh evaluating benefit with less attention to ‘costs’ (i.e. side-
effects). Findings from efficacy studies (most commonly generated from randomized
controlled studies) may not cross-walk to real world clinical practice, most commonly
reflecting the composition of those who take part in clinical trials. Trial participants tend
to have milder disorders (with suicidal ideation being a representative exclusion crite-
rion), may sometimes only enter the trial to obtain medication for free, are judged to
have no history of drug or alcohol problems, no co-morbid symptom states or personal-
ity disorder, and are therefore quite pristine in comparison to those who attend clinical
psychiatrists. Thus, randomized controlled trials and meta-analyses provide some evi-
dence about the degree to which a medication works and may (subject to all potential
side-effects being inquired about) provide important information about rates of risks and
side-effects. But the actual ‘effectiveness’ of a medication in a clinical setting is generally
not able to be assessed from such studies.
A common approach by clinicians is therefore to prescribe a medication to a set num-
ber of their own patients. If the medication is likely to be effective, the clinician may only
require a dozen or so patients to obtain an effectiveness ‘signal’. If a signal is not obtained
until 20–50 patients have received the medication, then its real-world utility is likely to be
low. A second common approach by clinicians is to ask a small set of ‘experts’ (i.e. clini-
cian researchers who have prescribed the medication to a large number of patients) for
their evaluation of the particular medication. Subject to such experts not having a conflict
of interest, such information can be highly informative. Thus, rather than management
guidelines being derived only from randomized controlled trials, there is an advantage to
an iterative process whereby the trial efficacy data is melded with the opinions of unbi-
ased experts. This approach is addressed in several individual chapters, including a new
chapter addressing perinatal nuances in relation to the prescription of medication in
pregnant or breastfeeding women with a bipolar II disorder.
In the absence of clear prescriptive evidence-based guidelines for the management of
BP II the abhorred vacuum can best be filled by the views of practitioners who are clini-
cally skilled and observant until the evidence base is more definitive. This book there-
fore offers an iterative process for the reader. Separate chapters overview and evaluate
the efficacy data from clinical trials of differing medications, before offering a series of
commentaries and where the commentators offer their clinically weighted observations.
We encourage the reader to make their judgments on the basis of those two ‘worlds’ of
evidence.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.002
Chapter 1: Mapping the Terrain of Bipolar II Disorder 5
References
Davidson, J. (2011). Downing Street Blues. A Parker, G., Graham, R. and Tavella, G. (2017).
History of Depression and Other Mental Is there consensus across international
Afflictions in British Prime Ministers. evidence-based guidelines for the
Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc.. management of bipolar disorder? Acta
Parker, G. and Paterson, A. (2017). Should Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 135, 515–26,
the bipolar disorders be modelled Parker, G. and Tavella, G. (2018). Design
dimensionally or categorically? In A. F. limitations to bipolar II treatment efficacy
Carvalho and E. Vieta (Eds.), The Treatment studies: a challenge and a revisionist
of Bipolar Disorder: Integrative Clinical strategy. Journal of Affective Disorders, 229,
Strategies and Future Directions. Oxford, 334–41.
UK: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.002
Bipolar Disorder in Historical
Chapter
2 Perspective
Edward Shorter
Bipolar disorder is, in a sense, as old as the hills. Yet its diagnosis as a distinct disor-
der is quite recent. Physicians have always recognized alternating states of melancholia
and mania. It would be as idle to ask who was the first to describe this alternation as it
would be to ask who first described mumps. Aretaeus of Cappadocia, around 150 years
after the birth of Christ, wrote of the succession of the two illnesses. It is clear from the
context (Jackson, 1986, pp. 39–41) that he was using the two terms to describe what we
today would consider mania and melancholia. Yet Aretaeus did not consider the alterna-
tion of mania and melancholia to be a separate disease. Etienne Esquirol, director of the
Charenton asylum outside of Paris and one of the founders of modern psychiatry, noted
in 1819 (Esquirol, 1819, p. 169), ‘sometimes melancholia passes into mania; indeed it is
the ease with which this . . . transformation occurs that has led all the authors to confuse
melancholia with mania’. There is no hint in Esquirol’s writing that he considered the
alternation of melancholia and mania to constitute a separate disorder.
For these remote centuries I use ‘bipolar disorder’ to mean the succession of melan-
cholia and mania. A word of clarification: in the twentieth century, after the writing of
Kleist and Leonhard, ‘bipolar disorder’ implies that there is a separate unipolar depressive
disease. By contrast, the term ‘manic-depression’ suggests that there is only one depres-
sion, whether linked to mania or not. But the term ‘manic-depressive insanity’ itself did
not surface until 1899. To describe mania, melancholia, and their alternation in previous
centuries, I shall simply call it bipolar disorder and crave the reader’s indulgence.
So the big question is not who first described bipolar disorder, but rather if it is one
disease or two? The centuries of clinical experience that lie behind us constitute a moun-
tain of evidence of some weight. And in this tremendous accumulation of practical learn-
ing, has bipolar disorder been considered one disease? Or two: the alternation of two
separate diseases, mania and melancholia? A third possibility: is bipolar disorder an
alternation of several different kinds of mood disorders that includes episodes of catato-
nia, melancholia, psychotic depression, mania, and hypomania, each an independent ill-
ness entity in its own right? Conrad Swartz has suggested that, in this kind of alternation,
the term ‘multipolar disorder’ might be more appropriate than ‘bipolar disorder’ (Swartz,
personal communication, 24 October 2006). When we find these syndromes occurring
over the years in the same patient, is it one illness or several?
For psychiatrists of the past, it was quite common to see melancholia cede to mania.
Vincenzo Chiarugi, a psychiatrist at the Bonifazio mental hospital in Florence, Italy, at
the end of the eighteenth century, described a female patient, aged 35, who switched
from deep melancholia to mania. Chiarugi thought this a case of ‘true melancholy’ and
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.003
Chapter 2: Bipolar Disorder in Historical Perspective 7
by no means out of the ordinary. The clinicians of the day often used such terms as mania
and melancholia in a sense quite different from ours, yet, on the basis of the case report
(Chiarugi, 1794, pp. 95–6), Chiarugi was dealing with manic-depression.
In the world of patients as well, alternating mania and melancholia have been known
since time out of mind. As Thomas Penrose, the curate of Newbury in Berkshire, England,
penned (Penrose, 1775, p. 19) in the 1780s of a young woman disappointed in love:
Dim haggard looks, and clouded o’er with care,
Point out to Pity’s tears, the poor distracted fair.
Dead to the world – her fondest wishes crossed
She mourns herself thus early lost.
Now, sadly gay, of sorrows past she sings,
Now, pensive, ruminates unutterable things.
She starts – she flies – who dares so rude
On her sequester’d steps intrude?
In the Voitsberg district of Austria early in the nineteenth century, such alternations
of melancholia and mania were regarded by the valley dwellers as quite typical, and one
of the features that distinguished them from the hill dwellers. Said a Dr. Irschitzky in
1838, ‘We know from experience, that among the valley folk now and then melancholia
occurs, mostly for religious reasons, and frequently acute insanity (mania). These mental
illnesses follow in a quite natural manner from the constitution and the character of these
people . . . whereby frequently mania serves as an interlude’ (Irschitzky, 1838, p. 243).
These authors regarded mania and melancholia as two illnesses succeeding each
other. Among the first observers to see this alternation of mania and melancholia as parts
of the same disease was Spanish court physician Andrés Piquer Arrufat, who described
in 1759 the mentally ill king Fernando VI has having ‘el afecto mélancolico-maniaco’, and
penned a quite careful clinical description. Piquer regarded the illness as a unitary condi-
tion (‘son una misma enfermedad’) different from either melancholia or mania, in the
broad sense in which those diagnoses were then understood (Piquer, 1759/1846, pp. 6, 27).
Piquer’s manuscript account was, however, not published until 1846, which makes his
priority a bibliographic curiosity rather than a fundamental building stone in the his-
tory of psychiatric illness classification. Jésus Pérez and co-workers, who have studied
the Piquer account carefully, point out that Piquer apparently launched the diagnosis in
a 1764 textbook, yet without the careful characterization of it that we find in the memoir
published in 1846 (Pérez et al., 2011, p. 72), nor do they mention the 1846 publication.
In 1818, German psychiatrist Johann Christian August Heinroth in Leipzig pro-
posed four versions of ‘mixed mood disorders’ (gemischte Gemüthsstörungen), in each
of which some kind of insanity alternated with melancholia. One form, for example,
Heinroth described as the alternation of ‘madness’ (Wahnsinn) and melancholia. Calling
the disorder ‘quiet madness (ecstasis melancholica)’, Heinroth said that in the illness,
madness ‘loses its monstrousness’, and melancholia loses its ‘lifelessness, and the whole
illness proceeds in alternating exaltation and depression’. Heinroth also threw in a dollop
of German romanticism, and had the patient spending the melancholic phase ‘dragging
about the fields and woods or isolated mountain tops giving full expression to his still
sobs and sighs, or weaving in quiet contemplation wreaths of white flowers . . .’ (Heinroth,
1818, pp. 355–6).
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.003
8 Section 1: Domain Chapters
By the 1840s such accounts were numerous. In 1844, Carl Friedrich Flemming, direc-
tor of the Sachsenberg mental hospital in Germany, described ‘Dysthymia mutabilis’, the
kind of mood disorder that arises when Dysthymia atra (black depression) and Dysthymia
candida (low-level mania) alternate. ‘Between both of them (atra and candida) there is a
not infrequent connection, Dysthymia mutabilis, which sometimes shows the character of
one, sometimes the character of the other’. Flemming saw other kinds of depression too,
such as melancholia attonita, or stuporous melancholia (Flemming, 1844, pp. 114, 129).
Flemming’s proposed coinage, appearing in a then obscure German language journal,
was soon forgotten in an era when Paris was the centre of the enlightened world. And it
was in Paris that bipolar disorder as a separate entity was famously announced a few years
later. In 1850 Jean-Pierre Falret, a staff psychiatrist of the Salpêtrière Hospice in Paris
gave a lecture to the Psychiatric Society in which he briefly mentioned ‘circular insanity’
(la folie circulaire), thus giving the alternation of mania and melancholia a separate name.
He incorporated the idea into the clinical lectures he offered at the hospital in the early
1850s and published those lectures in 1854. Whatever Falret might have said in the early
lectures, by the 1854 book, the alternation of mania and melancholia in la folie circulaire
had become a disease of its own, not just the succession of two separate illnesses. Falret:
‘[La folie circulaire] is generally neither mania nor melancholia as such, with their cus-
tomary characteristics; it is, in some manner, the core of these two kinds of mental disease
without their depth [sans leur relief]’ (Falret, 1854a, pp. 249–50). He went on to explain
how bipolar mania and melancholia differed from the regular versions. There was in 1854
a vigorous exchange between Jules Baillarger, who claimed to have described the same
disease under another label (la folie à double forme), claiming priority, and Falret, who
insisted on his own priority of la folie circulaire (Baillarger, 1854a, 1854b; Falret, 1854b).
In 1864, Falret attempted to strangle the entire debate by insisting that neither mania
nor melancholia existed as separate diseases and the only natural entity was la folie
circulaire, in which these phases alternated, sometimes at prolonged intervals (Falret,
1864). The issue of which of these squabbling clinicians has priority is secondary. But
it would be fair to say that in Paris in the early 1850s bipolar disorder was born for
an international audience, yet without the careful apparatus of psychopathology and
nosology that came later.
The baton now passed to the Germans, and for the next hundred years the principal
contributions to bipolar disorder would be made by German professors. In 1878 Ludwig
Kirn, a psychiatry resident who had trained at the Illenau asylum, published a postdoc-
toral thesis on ‘the periodic psychoses’ in which he gave a detailed psychopathological
account of bipolar disorder, something the French clinicians had omitted in favour of
grand generalizations (Kirn, 1878). German nationalists, with their dislike of the French,
considered this the first description of the disorder tout court, but it in fact was not
(Kirchhoff, 1924, p. 167).
In these years many German psychiatrists such as Wilhelm Griesinger and Heinrich
Neumann described bipolar disorder in one form or another. For most, the usual course
was switching from melancholia into mania, and then into terminal dementia, more or
less as Falret had first described. But in 1882, Karl Kahlbaum, one of the great names
in the history of German psychiatry – because of his insistence on using the ‘clinical
method’ to study psychopathology – proposed the term ‘cyclothymia’ for recoverable
alternations of melancholia and mania. Yet these cases did not tip into dementia (as in
Heinrich Neumann’s ‘typical insanity’). Instead, the patients got better.
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Chapter 2: Bipolar Disorder in Historical Perspective 9
Another such cyclical episode might then occur, and so forth. Also, the ‘mania’ that
Kahlbaum described was not a full-blast onslaught affecting all mental functions but
a kind of exaggerated elation without psychosis (Kahlbaum, 1882). It corresponded
roughly to what Berlin psychiatrist Emanuel Ernst Mendel had a year previously called
‘hypomania’ (Mendel, 1881), and is – in essence – the ancestor of ‘bipolar II disorder’.
Then came the great earthquake in German nosology: Emil Kraepelin and his historic
classification of psychiatric illnesses, the basic outlines of which have endured more or
less intact until the present. The classification, based on course and outcome, became the
first real conceptualization of manic-depressive illness, a disease having an undulating
course rather than an irreversible downhill slide as in chronic psychosis (which Kraepelin
called ‘dementia praecox’). Building on the work of Kahlbaum in 1863 – who was the first
psychiatrist to have classified mental illnesses on the basis of clinical course (Kahlbaum,
1863) – Kraepelin spelled out the importance of illness course in detail for mania and
melancholia. Thomas Ban once observed, ‘Many people described what was to become
manic-depressive illness but it was Emil Kraepelin who conceptualised it as a class of
illness because of his adoption of temporality as an organizing principle of psychiatric
nosology’ (Ban, personal communication, 9 November 2006).
In 1899, in the sixth edition of his textbook, Kraepelin lumped together all depression
(except that beginning in middle age) and all mania under the category manic-depression
(Kraepelin, 1899). For him, it was the sole mood disorder. There was no ‘unipolar’ depres-
sion. Kraepelin thought it a matter of indifference whether the illnesses recurred peri-
odically, or whether mania and melancholia were linked together or not. Thus, with
Kraepelin’s work what we most emphatically call ‘bipolar disorder’ ceased to be a separate
disease. The concept of alternating mania and melancholia as a disease of its own became
lost from sight because Kraepelin considered all mood disorders to be part of ‘manic-
depressive insanity’ (das manisch-depressive Irresein). Although we commonly say that
bipolar disorder is the successor of Kraepelin’s manic-depressive insanity, this is errone-
ous: Kraepelin incorporated all cases of depression and mania, alternating or not, into
manic-depression. By contrast, our use of the term ‘bipolar disorder’ implies that there is
a separate class of unipolar depression.
Two further comments about Kraepelin’s manic-depressive illness should be made.
Firstly, in later editions, he popularized Wilhelm Weygandt’s concept of the existence
of ‘mixed psychoses’; that is, manic and depressive symptoms appearing simultaneously.
Weygandt had ventured the notion in a post-doctoral thesis, which was not an automatic
guarantee of international acceptance (Weygandt, 1899, 1904).
Secondly, Kraepelin doubted that Kahlbaum’s cyclothymia represented a separate ill-
ness but was rather just a form of manic-depressive insanity in which there might be
long lucid intervals between episodes. Today’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5)
positions cyclothymic disorder as separate from the main bipolar disorders (I and II)
because the hypomania and depression of cyclothymia both fall below the threshold of a
full episode of mania or of major depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The main problem with Kraepelin’s manic-depressive illness was not its nosologi-
cal adequacy – there is really no reason why the concept would not serve us quite well
today – but its prognostic desperateness: Kraepelin had a dim view of the prognosis of
most illnesses. He believed that dementia praecox went relentlessly downhill, but that
lifetime prospects for ‘MDI’ were those of unceasing recidivism. Oswald Bumke, soon to
succeed Kraepelin as Professor of Psychiatry in Munich, wrote in 1908, ‘Many physicians
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10 Section 1: Domain Chapters
today view the chances of recovery of a patient who once falls ill with mania or melan-
cholia as far too unfavourably – because a relapse is possible but certainly not necessary’
(Bumke, 1908, p. 39). Of treatment in those days there was, with the exception of opium
for melancholia, very little talk.
The next development was elaborating the ‘two depressions’, the depression of uni-
polar disorder and the depression of bipolar disorder. Kraepelin taught in Heidelberg
and Munich. But the charge back towards bipolar disorder as a disease of its own, à la
Française, began in a different academic fortress entirely: Karl Kleist’s university clinic in
Frankfurt. Kleist was not an adept of Kraepelin and his circle identified with the intensely
biological approach to psychiatry of Carl Wernicke. It was actually Wernicke (1900) who
adumbrated in part three of his textbook, published in 1900, the first of these new bipolar
entities: hyperkinetic and akinetic motility psychosis.
For Wernicke, bipolarity was not a major issue. But for Kleist it was. Kleist’s ambition
was to continue the series of independent disease entities between manic-depressive ill-
ness and dementia praecox, which were the two great diseases that Kraepelin had estab-
lished. Between these bookends, Kleist (1911) started to insert a number of diagnoses,
some unipolar and some bipolar. It is therefore Kleist who restored bipolar thinking to
psychiatry in 1911, without challenging the existence of Kraepelin’s manic-depressive ill-
ness (which was, of course, not a bipolar illness because Kraepelin did not conceptualize
a separate unipolar depression).
In the following years Kleist identified several other cyclical psychoses, including ‘con-
fusional psychoses’ that alternate between ‘agitated confusion’ and ‘stupor’ (Kleist, 1926,
1928). The point was, for Kleist and other investigators in these years, to open up space
in between Kraepelin’s two great diseases, which were manic-depression and dementia
praecox, to find room in the middle for diagnoses with prognoses that were perhaps more
benign than Kraepelin’s terrible dementia praecox. Yet, against the great Kraepelinian
‘two-disease’ tide, Kleist’s ideas made little headway at this point.
Kleist had two very productive students, Edda Neele and Karl Leonhard, who after the
Second World War carried forward Kleist’s teachings about bipolarity. In a 1948 textbook,
Leonhard said, ‘Manic-depressive or circular insanity demonstrates two poles, which are
characterized through the manic phase or mania and the depressive phase or melancho-
lia’. Leonhard used the term ‘bipolarity’ (Bipolarität) (Leonhard, 1948, p. 88). Then in a
1949 study of all ‘cyclical psychoses’ admitted to the Frankfurt university clinic between
1938 and 1942, Neele (1949, p. 6) reinforced the terms ‘unipolar disorder’ and ‘bipolar
disorder’ (einpolige und zweipolige Erkrankungen). Kleist must have used these previously
in a teaching setting but Neele’s post-doctoral thesis (Habilitation) is their first major
public airing.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Leonhard burrowed away at the periodic and the
cyclical psychoses – at Frankfurt until 1955, then at Erfurt and Berlin – trying to insert
them in the larger scheme of psychiatric illness. In 1957, Leonhard’s magisterial study –
The Classification of the Endogenous Psychoses – appeared and definitively separated what
we call bipolar affective disorder from ‘pure depression’. This separation of depressive
illness by polarity remains in force in most circles today. ‘Undoubtedly there is a manic-
depressive illness’, wrote Leonhard (1957, pp. 4–5) ‘having in its very nature the tendency
to mania and melancholia alike. But next to this there are also periodically appearing
euphoric and depressive states that show no disposition at all to change to the opposite
form. Thus, there exists this basic and very important distinction between bipolar and
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Chapter 2: Bipolar Disorder in Historical Perspective 11
monopolar psychoses’. This is the true birth, or rebirth if one will, of bipolar disorder in
contemporary psychiatry. This is the part of Leonhard’s work that went into the DSM
of the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 (see below) and, on such matters see
Shorter (2015, pp. 79–80).
Yet for the most part, Leonhard did not use the terms unipolar or bipolar in describ-
ing manic-depressive illness or the ‘pure’ depressions and manias, even though they cor-
respond nicely to our concepts of bipolar and unipolar today. Instead, in his detailed
discussions he reserved bipolar and unipolar for the ‘cyclic psychoses’, such as ‘anxiety-
euphoria psychosis’ and Wernicke’s ‘hyperkinetic-akinetic motility psychosis’. He stated
that the ‘cyclic psychoses are related to the phasic psychoses – indeed directly linked to
them. [These are] are the psychoses that Kleist brought together as cyclic. They are bipo-
lar and multiform and never result in lasting disability’ (Leonhard, 1957, p. 120).
Leonhard’s cyclic psychoses did not make it into the DSM system. He differentiated
them from the ‘periodic psychoses’ (phasic psychoses) such as manic-depressive illness
and pure depression and pure euphoria. Yet manic-depression is also cyclical, while pure
depression and pure euphoria are not. These refinements would be almost too trivial to
mention were it not for the fact that Leonhard’s schema as a whole deserves a well-informed
second look. The main point here is that Leonhard is the first author to separate depres-
sions by polarity (though generally he reserved the polarity terms for other illnesses).
Leonhard’s separation of manic-depressive illness from depression was taken up by a
handful of scholars outside of Germany, and 1966 became ‘a very good year’ for the study
of bipolar illness (for this phrase see Winokur, 1991, p. 28). In that year, three studies
appeared that distinguished among depressions by polarity, meaning the depression of
bipolar disorder (manic-depressive illness) versus the unipolar depression termed ‘mel-
ancholia’ at that time. All three studies found greater family histories of mood disorder in
bipolar patients than unipolar. However, as observed by Michael Alan Taylor: ‘they and
all others found that among the families of bipolar patients there was always more unipo-
lar than bipolar illness’ (Taylor, personal communication, 12 November 2006).
In one of these studies, Jules Angst in Zurich compared patients with bipolar disor-
der to those with endogenous depression, involutional melancholia and mixed affective-
schizophrenia. He ended up questioning ‘the nosological unity of the (Kraepelinian)
manic-depressive illness. The purely depressive monophasic and periodic psychoses are
statistically differentiated from those that have a cyclic course’ (Angst, 1966, p. 106).
Meanwhile, Carlo Perris in Sweden, adopting a specifically Leonhardian approach,
compared bipolar and unipolar depressive patients at the Sidsjon Mental Hospital in
Umea, arguing that ‘they are two different nosographic entities’ (Perris, 1966, p. 187).
It is worth noting that some feel that Angst and Perris created a monster by permitting
the use of terms such as bipolar depression and monopolar depression in suggesting the
existence of fundamentally different entities, albeit of great commercial use in registering
pharmaceutical agents for ‘bipolar depression’ and the like.
Finally, in 1966, Leonhard’s distinction between monopolar and bipolar depression
made its first American beachhead. In June 1966, at a meeting of the Society of Biological
Psychiatry in Washington DC, George Winokur and Paula Clayton of Washington
University in St. Louis, the then premier American institution for biological approaches
to psychiatry, showed that ‘the family background for manic-depressive patients differed
from that of patients who showed only depression’ (Winokur, 1991, p. 29; Winokur and
Clayton, 1967). Interestingly, despite Winokur’s presence on the team, manic-depressive
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12 Section 1: Domain Chapters
illness did not make it into the so-called ‘Feighner criteria’, the attempt to recast psychiatric
diagnosis launched at Washington University in the early 1970s, by Feighner et al. (1972).
In the 1970s, the evolution of bipolar disorder became a primarily American, rather
than a German, story. In a reaction to the diagnostic indifference of psychoanalysis, these
years saw a new fervour in nosological thinking in the United States. Led by Robert Spitzer,
a group of researchers at the New York State Psychiatric Institute – that also included Eli
Robins of Washington University – set about defining ‘Research Diagnostic Criteria’ (the
RDC) as a way of recasting American psychiatric diagnosis. A preliminary paper pro-
duced by the group in the mid-70s (Spitzer et al., 1975) included ‘major depressive illness’
(and ‘minor depressive illness’) but made no reference to bipolar disorder. Yet by the time
a final version of the RDC was published in 1978, ‘bipolar depression with mania (bipo-
lar I)’ and ‘bipolar depression with hypomania (bipolar II)’ had been added to the RDC,
alongside ‘major depressive disorder’. There were now two big depressions firmly fixed in
American psychiatric nosology, one linked to mania as bipolar disorder and the other a
unipolar depression called ‘major depression’, although the RDC system also included a
host of other depressive subtypes and atypical forms of depression (Spitzer et al., 1978).
The RDC became the template in 1978 for the dramatic reshaping of psychiatric diag-
nosis that took place two years later, also under the leadership of Robert Spitzer, in the
American Psychiatric Association’s third edition of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). DSM-III provided for a Leonhardian
division between unipolar depression (called Major Depression), and bipolar manic-
depression (called Bipolar Disorder). Although by this time everyone had forgotten who
Leonhard was, DSM-III represented the international triumph of one of the core con-
cepts of Leonhard’s system. The distinction between major depression and bipolar dis-
order was preserved in subsequent editions of the DSM series. Both depressions were
called ‘major depression’, but the latter was more severe in terms of chronicity and shorter
length of time between episodes.
In the following years, a large body of clinical and pharmacological opinion upheld
the distinction between bipolar and unipolar mood disorders; in other words, the dis-
tinction between two kinds of serious depression (Ban, 1990). Bernard Carroll called
bipolar disorder ‘the most extreme case of mood instability’ and said that any theory of
brain function would have to come to terms with, quoting Donald Klein, ‘this striking
phenomenon’. Carroll argued that there were fundamental biological differences between
bipolar and unipolar disorders, and although those with bipolar disorder had more life-
time episodes, the excess was: ‘entirely accounted for by the manias . . . in other words,
manic depressive patients are not just more unstable than unipolar patients in mood
regulation in both directions’ (Carroll, 1994, p. 304). Yet there must be a pendular move-
ment between the view that depression and mania are separate illnesses and the view
that linked depression-mania constitutes an illness of its own. In the 1990s, the pendu-
lum began to swing back from DSM-III and Leonhard to a more Kraepelinian view. This
movement was initiated as early as 1980 by Michael Taylor and Richard Abrams, then at
the Chicago Medical School, who wrote, after reviewing genetic and biological studies,
‘These data suggest that the separation of affective disorders by polarity may have been
premature’ (Taylor and Abrams, 1980, p. 195). Unlike previous investigators, Taylor and
Abrams based their work on well-defined rating scales and treatment response.
In 2006 Taylor, now at the University of Michigan, and Max Fink at SUNY’s Stony
Brook campus, in a major review of the diagnosis of melancholia, said of the bipolar
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Chapter 2: Bipolar Disorder in Historical Perspective 13
versus unipolar dichotomy, ‘The scientific evidence fails to distinguish unipolar and bipo-
lar depressive disorders . . . bipolarity as a separate psychiatric disorder is not supported
by psychopathology, family studies, laboratory tests, or treatment response’ (Taylor and
Fink, 2006, p. 24). What other people see as unipolar illness, Taylor and Fink consid-
ered to be non-melancholic depression and what is bipolar depression, they considered
melancholia.
Outside of the DSM sphere, other investigators, using pharmacological ‘torches’,
proposed forms of bipolar II not envisioned in the Manual. In 2016, Jay D. Amsterdam
and Janusz K. Rybakowski, in the Oxford Handbook of Mood Disorders, recognized ‘clas-
sical’, ‘atypical’, and ‘rapid cycling’ forms of bipolar II on the basis of differential phar-
macological response to lithium, valproate, lamotrigine, and so forth (Amsterdam and
Rybakowski, 2016).
David Dunner and associates, then at the Laboratory of Clinical Science of the
National Institute of Mental Health, had differentiated bipolar II from bipolar I early in
the 1970s, writing of the ‘bipolar II group’ (Dunner et al., 1972). It was, however, only
in 1976 that Dunner and associates, now at the New York State Psychiatric Institute,
reported a large-scale clinical study of differences among bipolar I, bipolar II and uni-
polar depressed patients. The group concluded, ‘The data from the Hamilton rating scale
suggest that the symptoms of depression in patients classified as bipolar II are more simi-
lar to unipolar than to bipolar I patients’ (Dunner et al., 1976).
As the DSM series evolved after 1980, bipolar II disorder became ever more elabo-
rated. DSM-III itself dilated simply upon ‘bipolar disorder’, yet added an ‘atypical bipolar
disorder’ among the ‘atypical affective disorders’. Of this atypical form, DSM-III com-
mented, ‘Such cases have been referred to as “Bipolar II.”’ Thus, bipolar II was born.
DSM-III-R in 1987 referred to these formerly ‘atypical’ forms as ‘bipolar disorder not
otherwise specified’. One ‘example’ of this ‘NOS’ diagnosis was ‘Bipolar II’: ‘at least one
Hypomanic Episode and at least one Major Depressive Episode . . . Such cases have been
referred to as “Bipolar II”’.
DSM-IV in 1994 opened the floodgates. ‘Bipolar II Disorder’ acquired its own mono-
graph and code (296.89). It acquired its own ‘specifiers’, or variants (without codes) and
its own discussion of ‘familial pattern’, ‘differential diagnosis’, and the other standard fea-
tures of a full-fledged DSM monograph. The frequency of the diagnosis now increased
immeasurably, especially in children.
Indeed, by the time of DSM-5 in 2013, the over-diagnosis of ‘bipolar II’ in children
had become an embarrassment to the manual’s sponsors and to child psychiatry. To take
the pressure off ‘bipolar II’, DSM-5 created a new paediatric diagnosis, ‘Disruptive Mood
Dysregulation Disorder’. The manual explained, ‘DSM-IV did not include a diagnosis
designed to capture youths whose hallmark symptoms consisted of very severe, non-
episodic irritability, whereas DSM-5 . . . provides a distinct category for such presentations’
(p. 157). This, of course, was a major change. The section ‘Highlights of Changes from
DSM-IV to DSM-5’ passed over it, in the paragraph on ‘Bipolar and Related Disorders’, in
silence (p. 810). The main discussion of bipolar II in DSM-5 was close to that of DSM-IV.
As a historian, it is not my place to comment on the scientific merits of the polarity
debates, both the initial one detailed earlier and the current debate as to whether bipolar
II is an entity differing dimensionally or categorically from bipolar I disorder. Subsequent
research may well establish that bipolar II disorder is an illness in its own right, requir-
ing a distinctive therapeutic approach involving mood stabilization. In the meantime,
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14 Section 1: Domain Chapters
however, the frequency of diagnosing the bipolar disorders seems to be growing by leaps
and bounds (Healy, 2006), and arguing for its proponents to provide rigorous diagnostic
criteria and validation data to redress such diagnostic boundary concerns.
Acknowledgements
For comments on an earlier draft I should like to thank Thomas Ban, Tom Bolwig,
Bernard Carroll, Max Fink and Michael Alan Taylor.
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The Bipolar Spectrum
Chapter
3 Chris B. Aiken
Introduction
Attempts to understand the margins of psychiatric disorders are almost as old as the
disorders themselves. Spectrum concepts have developed around schizophrenia, autism,
compulsivity, and bipolar disorder. Some of these concepts have become official classifi-
cations in their own right. The schizophrenia spectrum evolved into the Cluster A per-
sonality disorders, and the subject of this book, bipolar II (BP II) disorder, took its first
steps as part of a bipolar spectrum model.
The spectrum model differs from official nosology in taking a dimensional, rather
than a categorical, approach to diagnosis. In the categorical model, distinct disorders are
identified and clear diagnostic boundaries are presumed or proposed. In the spectrum
view, those boundaries are arbitrary markers along a continuum.
These two lenses are not incompatible, and their interplay has enriched our understand-
ing of psychiatric diagnoses. Angst (2006), who over his long career has furnished research
supporting both the categorical and dimensional models, wrote that ‘categorical classifica-
tion is fully compatible with the dimensional view.. .. The continuous distribution of both
depressive and hypomanic symptoms in the population makes the distinction between
normal and pathological difficult, just as with blood pressure and pulse rate’.
The spectrum approach has been used in several diagnostic models of mood disor-
ders. This chapter will focus on two versions of the bipolar spectrum construct:
The unipolar–bipolar spectrum, which proposes that signs, symptoms, and biologi-
cal markers of bipolar disorder range along a continuum between unipolar and bipolar
disorders.
The affective temperaments, which describes a spectrum of dimensional traits that
bridge manic-depressive illness with styles of temperament. These include dysthymic,
cyclothymic, hyperthymic, and irritable types.
Finally, this chapter will look at how concepts from the bipolar spectrum are being
applied in predictive tests of bipolar disorder, drawing from the field of evidence-based
diagnostics that has gained acceptance in general medicine. These tools, which include
the Bipolarity Index and Bipolar Risk Calculator, aim to improve the recognition of clas-
sic bipolar cases and identify those at risk for conversion to bipolar disorder.
16
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Chapter 3: The Bipolar Spectrum 17
throughout most of the twentieth century when the term manic-depressive illness was used
inclusively to describe ‘a single disorder of mood, either extreme depression or elation,
that dominates the mental life of the patient’ (DSM-II, 1968). Kraepelin had considered
separating the poles into two disorders, but concluded that ‘this classification, apparently
so simple, really encounters manifold difficulties’.
Such a division was later formulated by Leonhard (1957) and further validated in the
1960s when Angst, Perris and Winokur presented evidence that the distal ends of manic-
depressive illness were unique enough in their familial patterns and clinical course to
warrant separation into distinct disorders (Angst and Marneros, 2001). That led to the
separation of bipolar and unipolar disorders in DSM-III (1980). Almost as soon as DSM-III
was published, journal articles emerged arguing for a return to Kraepelin’s unitary
model. Taylor and Abrams (1980a, 1980b) contended that the separation was premature,
citing phenomenological, genetic, neuropsychological, electroencephalogram (EEG), and
treatment studies that suggested significant overlap within the unipolar–bipolar dichotomy.
Others began subtyping this unipolar–bipolar overlap, drawing from Kraepelin’s
observations to propose entities that had been left out of DSM-III. One of the first of
these entities was BP II, proposed by Dunner et al. (1976) while DSM-III was still being
drafted. Subsequently, Angst (1978) and Klerman (1981) presented various categories of
subthreshold bipolarity. Those models eventually culminated in a more detailed division
by Akiskal’s group (see Table 4.1) (Akiskal and Pinto, 1999; Ng et al., 2008).
Although these models divide the spectrum into categories, they view those categories as
points along a continuum that runs from depression to mania and, in some models, to psy-
chotic disorders. The propensity to mania determines where each category rests on the spec-
trum. For example, patients whose mania is unmasked only by a dementing illness are the
furthest removed from true bipolar disorder in Akiskal’s 2008 model – detailed in Box 3.1.
Akiskal’s model was followed by a proposal from Ghaemi et al. (2001) that used DSM-
style criteria to bring together the most widely accepted subtypes of the bipolar spectrum
into a single condition (see Box 3.2). Their criteria predicted conversion from unipolar
to bipolar status over a five-year period with high sensitivity (0.87) and specificity (0.92)
in a retrospective study (Woo et al., 2015), but it failed to predict non-response to anti-
depressant treatment in a secondary analysis of the Sequenced Treatment Alternatives to
Relieve Depression (STAR-D) trial (Perlis et al., 2011).
In a novel approach to defining the bipolar spectrum, Akiskal (2005) devised the ‘rule
of threes’ – effectively a list of biographical signs that were associated with bipolar disor-
der in series of 1,000 affective patients (Box 3.3). These signs appear soft, but their asso-
ciation with bipolar disorder was validated by a large internet survey of 71,247 Brazilians,
about a quarter of whom reported a history of mood disorders (Lara et al., 2015). The
Brazilian data identified further markers that differentiated those with a bipolar disorder
from those with a unipolar depressive condition, including: ≥3 provoked car accidents,
≥3 religion changes, ≥60 sexual partners, pathological love ≥2 times, reversed circadian
rhythm, high debts, frequent book reading, talent for poetry in men, and heavy cursing
and an extravagant style of dress in women. These behavioural signs can be informative
when queries of hypomanic symptoms yield ambiguous responses, but their predictive
value is limited to patients who have a history of recurrent depression.
In Akiskal’s list, the triad of trait ‘mood lability’, ‘energy activity’, and ‘daydream-
ing’ was derived from an 11-year prospective study of an National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) collaborative depression cohort. The presence of all three traits predicted
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18 Section 1: Domain Chapters
conversion from unipolar to bipolar disorder with a sensitivity of 91% and specificity of
45% (Akiskal et al., 1995).
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Chapter 3: The Bipolar Spectrum 19
DSM-III took a categorical approach to mixed states, requiring that they meet full cri-
teria for both a manic and depressive episode and allowing their diagnosis only in bipo-
lar I (BP I) disorder. When viewed through a dimensional lens, mixed symptoms occur
in unipolar as well as bipolar disorders. These are now recognized in DSM-5 as mixed
features, and a recent meta-analysis of 17 studies concluded that they are common in
both bipolar (35%) and unipolar depression (24%) when defined as three or more manic
symptoms during a depressive episode (Vázquez et al., 2018). These rates are two to three
times higher than the rates identified with DSM-5 criteria, due to the more restrictive
approach of excluding ‘overlapping’ symptoms of irritability, distractibility and psycho-
motor agitation from the mixed features specifier in DSM-5 (Perugi et al., 2015).
As suggested by the spectrum model, mixed symptoms rise dimensionally between
unipolar and bipolar disorders, without a clear cut-off separating the two (Benazzi, 2003;
Cassano et al., 2004; Kumar et al., 2017). The frequency of bipolar markers, includ-
ing family history, age of onset, course of illness, comorbid conditions, and treatment
response, also rises continuously along this spectrum, with unipolar-mixed depression
forming an intermediate zone between the extremes of pure unipolar and full bipolar
conditions (Akiskal and Benazzi, 2003; Cassano et al., 2004; Diler et al., 2017; Ferentinos
et al., 2017; Perugi et al., 2015). However, unipolar mixed states appear to be a stable
entity and convert to full bipolar disorder at a relatively low rate, which Stahl et al. (2017)
quantified at 13–16%.
Much as yellow and blue make green, the overlap of hypomanic and depressive symp-
toms creates a unique presentation that is more complex and severe than the purer mood
states (see Box 3.4 and ‘Dark Hypomania’ in Table 4.7). Treatment of mixed states is dif-
ficult, with higher rates of side-effects and lower rates of response. Compared to the purer
moods, these patients have more comorbid conditions, including anxiety, substance abuse,
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
20 Section 1: Domain Chapters
Box 3.4 Clinical presentation of depressive mixed states (from Koukopoulos et al., 1992)
Objective findings Mood lability from melancholic to dysphoric, despair, dramatic expressions
of suffering, bouts of weeping, vivacious facial expression, talkativeness,
psychic and/or motor agitation, emotional lability, impulsive suicidal
attempts, high diastolic blood pressure
Patient complaints Anxiety, inner tension, irritability, anger, despair, suicidal impulses, crowded
and/or racing thoughts, rumination, initial or middle insomnia
Family report Incessant complaints, irritability, occasional verbal outbursts, occasional
physical aggression, occasional hypersexuality
Episode of elevated mood, irritable mood, or increased activity with at least 3 of the DSM-IV criteria
B mania symptoms
At least one of the following consequences: (a) unequivocal and observed change in functioning
uncharacteristic of the person’s usual behaviour, (b) marked impairment in social or occupational
functioning observable by others, (c) requiring hospitalization or outpatient treatment
No minimum duration of symptoms, no exclusion criteria
personality disorders, trauma, head injury, and medical disorders (Vázquez et al., 2018).
Suicide rates are elevated in this population and have been associated with antidepressant
treatment (Stahl et al., 2017).
Pure hypomania also occurs on a spectrum between unipolar and bipolar disorders,
with short duration hypomanias bridging the two disorders. As with the unipolar mixed
states, patients with short duration hypomania also represent an intermediate phenotype
between unipolar and bipolar disorder, according to studies of associated illness markers
(e.g., family history, age of onset, recurrence of depression, comorbid conditions, and
treatment response) (Miller et al., 2016; Nusslock and Frank, 2011).
Manic symptoms also rise dimensionally between the normal and bipolar popula-
tions. This was explored in the Zurich study, which prospectively evaluated hypomanic
symptoms over 20 years in a community sample of 4,547 young adults. The Zurich study
offered a rare glimpse of hypomanic symptoms in the normal population. Though these
subjects lacked a history of clinical depression, they were not simply ‘the happier nor-
mals’ and had elevated rates of impulsivity, irritability, sleep disturbance, binge eating,
and substance abuse (Gamma et al., 2008). Validators of bipolarity, such as family history
and associated features, rose continuously as the number and duration of hypomanic
symptoms increased (Angst and Dobler-Mikola, 1984; Angst et al., 2003).
The Zurich study was designed to explore the optimal cut-off criteria for hypomania.
From that work Angst developed the Bipolar Specifier (2011), a simplified definition of
hypomania that removed the duration and exclusion criteria from DSM-IV and, at the
same time, tightened the definition by requiring an unequivocal change in functioning
(Box 3.5). The Bipolar Specifier was compared to the DSM-IV criteria in a multinational
study of 5,635 patients with depression. Although only one-third of the patients who met
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
Chapter 3: The Bipolar Spectrum 21
the Bipolar Specifier criteria also qualified for a DSM-IV bipolar diagnosis by their symp-
toms, markers of bipolarity were similar among both the DSM-IV and Bipolar Specifier
defined-group, such as age of onset, family history, course of illness, comorbid condi-
tions, and response to antidepressants (Angst et al., 2011).
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
22 Section 1: Domain Chapters
have observed it more frequently in those in the normal population (Evans et al., 2005;
Mendlowicz et al., 2005; Vázquez et al., 2008). As a predictor of conversion from unipolar
to bipolar disorder, its capacity is poor (Woo et al., 2015). Pharmacologic studies also
point toward significant heterogeneity. In bipolar populations, the hyperthymic trait is a
risk factor for antidepressant-induced hypo/mania (de Aguiar Ferreira et al., 2014; Henry
et al., 2001; Tondo et al., 2013), while in unipolar populations it predicts complete remis-
sion on antidepressants (de Aguiar Ferreira et al., 2014).
Temperament is a stable trait while mood disorders are episodic, but the two can
overlap in ways that influence the presentation of episodes. When superimposed on
dysthymic traits, hypomania may manifest through overwork rather than more pleasur-
able pursuits. Those with dysthymic, cyclothymic, and irritable temperaments are more
prone to mixed than pure presentations of mania (Röttig et al., 2007). Temperament also
influences predominant polarity, shifting the expression of bipolar disorder towards the
depressive pole among dysthymic types and the manic pole among hyperthymic types
(Henry et al., 1999).
Among the affective temperaments, cyclothymia has stronger associations with BP II,
while the others distribute more evenly between BP I and BP II (Gonda and Vázquez,
2014). The overlap of BP II and cyclothymia creates a constellation of symptoms of some
relevance to borderline personality disorder.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
Chapter 3: The Bipolar Spectrum 23
Other lines of research have identified shared personality traits in cyclothymic and
borderline personality disorders. Both are high in neuroticism and low in agreeableness
and conscientiousness (Kendler et al., 2011; Rózsa et al., 2008; Walsh et al., 2012). The two
disorders also share elevations in the seemingly opposing traits of harm avoidance and
novelty seeking (Fassino et al., 2009; Maremmani et al., 2005), a paradoxical constellation
that may explain the elevated rates of substance abuse, self-harm, and suicide attempts
described in both these groups (Apfelbaum et al., 2013; Guerreiro et al., 2013).
It is the overlap of these two disorders that has stirred much of the controversy around
the bipolar spectrum. There is a concern that viewing borderline personality disorder as
a mood disorder will steer clinicians towards pharmacotherapy in place of psychotherapy
(Paris, 2012). That is a valid concern, but it derives more from the DSM’s classification of
cyclothymia as a mood disorder than from the spectrum model, which recognizes it as a
temperament-based condition.
In reality, psychotherapy has the best evidence for the treatment of cyclothymic dis-
order, but there are no randomized, placebo-controlled pharmacotherapy trials for this
condition (Fava et al., 2011). Akiskal warns against ‘aggressive mood stabilization’ for
those with the affective temperaments, writing that ‘for the patient to trust a psychiatrist,
he or she must respect the patient’s temperament and individuality, that indeed his or her
aim is to bring out the optimum in what is positive and desirable in [the] patient’s tem-
perament’ (Akiskal and Akiskal, 2011).
An integrated view of cyclothymia and borderline personality disorder need not
favour pharmacotherapy of necessity and could lead instead to a helpful cross-fertilization
of psychotherapies. For example, both groups have irregular circadian rhythms (Fleischer
et al., 2012). Techniques to modulate those rhythms are well-established in bipolar disorder
and are beginning to be explored in borderline personality disorder (Bromundt et al., 2013).
The skill-building therapies commonly used for borderline personality disorder could
also be helpful for cyclothymia. The Systems Training for Emotional Predictability and
Problem Solving (STEPPS), which builds skills for impulsivity and anger, is currently
undergoing a controlled trial for patients with comorbid bipolar and borderline person-
ality disorder (Riemann et al., 2014), and a skill-building psychoeducational group has
recently been developed for cyclothymic disorder (Perugi et al., 2017).
Medication is sometimes used in those with a borderline personality disorder, and
an understanding of its relationship to bipolar disorder may also prove useful there. For
example, a recent Cochrane review of borderline personality disorder drew conclusions
similar to the guidelines for bipolar disorder. Second-generation antipsychotics, mood
stabilizers, and omega-3 fatty acids had the best support, and there was ‘inadequate evi-
dence’ for antidepressants (Stoffers et al., 2010). Such conclusions present a challenge to
current standards of practice, as antidepressants are often used in this population, but
the conclusion has been confirmed in two recent reviews (Hancock-Johnson et al., 2017;
Ripoll, 2012). Other studies have identified borderline personality disorder as a risk fac-
tor for antidepressant-induced mood destabilization (Barbuti et al., 2017), particularly
with the tricyclic class (Links et al., 1990; Soloff et al., 1986, 1987).
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
24 Section 1: Domain Chapters
including the addition of BP II in DSM-IV (1994). Although the current edition (DSM-5,
2013) maintains the separation of unipolar and bipolar disorders, its overall organization
bears a closer resemblance to Kraepelin’s unitary hypothesis than DSM-III had in 1980.
For practical reasons, DSM-5 remains a categorical system. Categories are useful for
controlled trials, and standardized boundaries, however arbitrary, allow the results of
those trials to be more readily translated into clinical practice. A closer look at the man-
ual, however, reveals the influence of a dimensional approach. Kupfer, the DSM-5 com-
mittee chair, wrote that depression and bipolar are part of ‘a continuum, with variable
expressions of vulnerability to hypomania or mania’ (Phillips and Kupfer, 2013).
Table 3.3 traces the evolution of spectrum concepts through the different editions of
DSM, with most of the shift occurring in DSM-5. More research is needed on the preva-
lence of these DSM-5 disorders, but initial studies suggest that their rates approach those
suggested by the bipolar spectrum concept. The Bipolar Disorders: Improving Diagnostic
Guidance and Education (BRIDGE) studies applied some of the DSM-5 criteria to two
large multi-national samples (total n = 8,446), and offer an approximation of their fre-
quencies in a sample of depressed patients (Angst et al., 2011; Perugi et al., 2015): 10%
having BP I by DSM-IV criteria, 6% having BP II by DSM-IV criteria, 18% being cases
of antidepressant-induced hypo/mania that were excluded by DSM-IV criteria but would
count towards a bipolar diagnosis in DSM-5, 7% having unipolar depression with mixed
features by DSM-5 criteria, and 59% having unipolar depression without mixed features.
Taken together, those figures suggest that 41% of depressed patients would be rec-
ognized in DSM-5 with a disorder previously considered part of the bipolar spectrum,
including BP I and II. This study needs replication as it may have been prone to selection
bias, but it does approach the rate of bipolar spectrum disorders reported before DSM-
5, which ranged from 40 to 50% of depressed patients (Angst et al., 2011; Nusslock and
Frank, 2011).
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
Chapter 3: The Bipolar Spectrum 25
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
26 Section 1: Domain Chapters
most of the individual items on the scale have been validated for that use (Kessing et al.,
2017; Serra et al., 2015; Takeshima and Oka, 2013; Woo et al., 2015).
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333252.004
Chapter 3: The Bipolar Spectrum 27
That caution extends to patients with short-duration hypomania. In the large, inter-
national BRIDGE study, the rate of mood destabilization with antidepressants rose in
concert with the length of hypomania: 0.7% for no hypomania, 8.7% for 1 day, 14% for
2–3 days, 27% for 4–6 days and 37.9% for ≥ 7 days (Angst et al., 2012).
Treatment is less clear for unipolar patients who lack mixed or manic symptoms but
have markers of bipolarity such as family history of bipolar disorder, early age of onset, or
a high recurrence of depression. Studies are mixed on whether those features predict anti-
depressant treatment-resistance (Correa et al., 2010; Perlis et al., 2011), although they do
appear predictive of antidepressant-induced hypo/mania (Barbuti et al., 2017). Outside
of antidepressants, treatments with efficacy in both unipolar and bipolar depression are
useful options for this group including lithium, pramipexole, and certain atypical antip-
sychotics; as well as light therapy, omega-3 fatty acids, and psychotherapy (Aiken, 2007;
Bromundt et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2017).
Long-term medication treatment may be necessary for highly recurrent cases, but
it should not be the default option for all patients on the spectrum as it is for BP I.
Lamotrigine and lithium have good data for long-term prevention, and their benefits
against the depressive pole make them good options for spectrum disorders (Phelps,
2016). Research also supports lamotrigine’s benefits in two of the most common sub-
types on the spectrum: depression with short-duration hypomania and the constellation
of cyclothymia and/or borderline personality disorder (Hancock-Johnson et al., 2017;
Manning et al., 2005; McCraw and Parker, 2016), but lamotrigine has not proven benefi-
cial in pure unipolar depression (Reid et al., 2013).
Some patients on the spectrum can be treated with psychotherapy alone. Controlled
trials support this approach for cyclothymia and, in the form of family therapy, for ado-
lescents with prodromal bipolarity (Fava et al., 2011, Schneck et al., 2017).
Weaknesses of the bipolar spectrum model relate to its potential for misuse, whether
through diagnostic or pharmaceutical expansion, or through stigmatization of those
identified with it. The bipolar spectrum should not be confused with a bipolar diagnosis,
and its treatment may diverge from standard bipolar therapies. The spectrum is not a
diagnosis at all, but a marker of risk and a guidepost in a zone of uncertainty.
Further Reading
For professionals: Phelps, J. (2016). A Spectrum For patients: Aiken, C. and Phelps, J. (2017).
Approach to Mood Disorders: Not Fully Bipolar, Not So Much: Understanding Your
Bipolar but Not Unipolar – Practical Mood Swings and Depression. New York:
Management. New York: W. W. Norton. W. W. Norton.
Online: www.psycheducation.org
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