1 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

CATHERINE A. CONWAY, SBN 98366

2 cconway@gibsondunn.com
KATHERINE V.A. SMITH, SBN 247866
3 ksmith@gibsondunn.com
TIFFANY PHAN, SBN 292266
4 tphan@gibsondunn.com
333 South Grand Avenue
5 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
Telephone: 213.229.7000
6 Facsimile: 213.229.7520
7 Attorneys for Defendants
RIOT GAMES, INC. and
8 NICOLO LAURENT
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
11
CENTRAL DISTRICT – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE
12
SHARON O’DONNELL, an individual, CASE NO. 21STCV00596
13
Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF CATHERINE A.
14 CONWAY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
vs. EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER
15 SETTING A STATUS CONFERENCE
RIOT GAMES, INC., a business entity exact
16 form unknown, NICHOLAS LAURENT, an ASSIGNED TO THE HON. ELIHU M. BERLE
individual and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive
17 Action Filed: January 7, 2021
Defendants. Trial Date: None set
18
HEARING:
19 Date: March 17, 2021
Time: 8:30 a.m.
20 Dept: 6
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DECLARATION OF CATHERINE A. CONWAY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR
AN ORDER SETTING A STATUS CONFERENCE
 1 DECLARATION OF CATHERINE A. CONWAY
2 I, Catherine A. Conway, certify and declare as follows:
3 1. I am an attorney admitted to practice law before all courts of the State of California. I
4 am a partner in the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and I am one of the attorneys primarily
5 responsible for the representation of Defendants in the above-entitled action. I make this declaration
6 in support of Defendants’ Ex Parte Application For An Order Setting a Status Conference. I have
7 personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration (unless otherwise noted), and, if called to
8 testify, I could and would competently testify to them.
9 2. Defendants have recently gained information that Plaintiff appears to have engaged in
10 harassing and threatening behavior toward potential witnesses in this action creating good cause for
11 the Court to set a status conference on an ex parte basis to address these concerns.
12 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a redacted declaration by one
13 of these individuals (“Doe 1 Declaration”), which sets forth the specific instances of Plaintiff’s behav-
14 ior on which Defendants’ ex parte application is based. This individual’s name has been redacted
15 because this individual has expressed concern about additional harassment from Plaintiff and the press.
16 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a redacted declaration by a
17 second individual (“Doe 2 Declaration”), which sets forth further specific instances of Plaintiff’s be-
18 havior on which Defendants’ ex parte application is based. This individual’s name has been redacted
19 because this individual has expressed concern about additional harassment from Plaintiff and the press.
20 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Defendant Riot Games, Inc.
21 and Defendant Nicolo Laurent’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which has not yet been filed with the
22 Court, pursuant to the Court’s stay on responsive pleadings entered into on March 5, 2021. Defendants
23 had prepared this Answer to file on March 11, 2021, prior to the case being designated complex.
24 6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Arbitration Agree-
25 ment that Plaintiff executed when she commenced her employment with Riot Games.
26 7. On Monday, March 15, 2021 at 9:47 am, my colleague, Tiffany Phan, provided notice
27 by email to Plaintiff Sharon O’Donnell’s counsel (Timothy B. Sottile, Michael F. Baltaxe, and Payam
28 I. Aframian) and Executive Legal Assistant for Counsel Rachna Arhi specifically alerting them that

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DECLARATION OF CATHERINE A. CONWAY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR
AN ORDER SETTING A STATUS CONFERENCE
 1 Defendants Riot Games, Inc. and Nicolo Laurent intended to file an ex parte application for an order
2 setting a status conference on March 17, 2021 in Department 6 and offering to meet and confer tele-
3 phonically. Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael F. Baltaxe, responded at 11:19 a.m. stating that Plaintiff will
4 oppose the Application. Later that same day, counsel for Defendants again offered to meet and confer
5 telephonically. A true and correct copy of this email exchange from March 15, 2021 is attached as
6 Exhibit E.
7 8. My colleagues, Katherine V.A. Smith, Lauren Fischer, and I met and conferred with
8 Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael F. Baltaxe, via telephone on March 15, 2021 at approximately 3:00 p.m.
9 and provided him further notice that Defendants would file an ex parte application for an order setting
10 a status conference on Tuesday, March 16, 2021, and the reason such a status conference is necessary.
11 Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Baltaxe, reiterated that Plaintiff will oppose the Application and indicated that
12 this is the first he had heard of any alleged harassing and threatening behavior by Plaintiff toward
13 potential witnesses in this action.
14

15 DATED: March 16, 2021

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
16

17
18 By:
Catherine A. Conway
19
Attorneys for Defendants RIOT GAMES, INC.
20 and NICOLO LAURENT
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DECLARATION OF CATHERINE A. CONWAY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR
AN ORDER SETTING A STATUS CONFERENCE
 1 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
CATHERINE A. CONWAY, SBN 98366
2 cconway@gibsondunn.com
KATHERINE V.A. SMITH, SBN 247866
3 ksmith@gibsondunn.com
TIFFANY PHAN, SBN 292266
4 tphan@gibsondunn.com
333 South Grand Avenue
5 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
Telephone: 213.229.7000
6 Facsimile: 213.229.7520
7 Attorneys for Defendants RIOT GAMES, INC. and
NICOLO LAURENT
8
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
10
CENTRAL DISTRICT
11
SHARON O’DONNELL, an individual, CASE NO. 21STCV00596
12
Plaintiff, DEFENDANT RIOT GAMES, INC. AND
13 DEFENDANT NICOLO LAURENT’S
vs. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
14
RIOT GAMES, INC., a business entity exact ASSIGNED TO THE HON. ELIHU M. BERLE
15 form unknown, NICHOLAS LAURENT, an DEPARTMENT 6
individual and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive
16 Action Filed: January 7, 2021
Defendants. Trial Date: None set
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 1 Defendants Riot Games, Inc. (“Riot”) and Nicolo Laurent (“Laurent”) (collectively, “Defend-
2 ants”), hereby answer the Complaint of Sharon “Shari” O’Donnell 1 (“Plaintiff”) as follows:
3 GENERAL DENIAL
4 1. Pursuant to Section 431.30 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Defendants
5 hereby generally deny each and every allegation in the Complaint and, further, deny that Plaintiff has
6 suffered damages or is entitled to any relief whatsoever.
7 2. Defendants provide this Answer without waiving their right to request that this action
8 be compelled to arbitration pursuant to the agreement entered into by Plaintiff at the commencement
9 of Plaintiff’s employment with Riot (“Arbitration Agreement”). (See Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle,
10 Inc. (2015) 237 Cal. App. 4th 651, 662 [“Answering a complaint does not result in waiver”].) Defend-
11 ants are filing concurrently herewith a motion to compel Plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration as
12 required by the Arbitration Agreement.
13 3. Plaintiff’s Complaint is fabricated and entirely without merit. Defendants vigorously
14 and generally deny the allegations therein.
15 DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
16 Without admitting any of the facts alleged in the Complaint, Defendants hereby assert and al-
17 lege the following:
18 Defendants Unequivocally Deny Allegations of Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation
19 1. Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment are false. At no point during Plaintiff’s employ-
20 ment did Laurent: compliment her appearance; tell her to be “more feminine”; look at her in a “sexual
21 fashion”; discuss “underwear” of any kind; tell her he liked a “tight fit” for his underwear; “put[] his
22 arm around her”; “yell[]” at her; “repeatedly ask[]” about her “personal life”; or look at her social
23 media.
24 2. Laurent further vigorously denies ever asking or telling Plaintiff to “cum” or come to
25 his home while he was alone, or asking Plaintiff whether she “could handle him when they were alone
26 at his house.” This type of language does not appear anywhere in the years’ worth of emails and texts
27
1
Plaintiff, at all times during her application process and employment with Riot, called herself by the
28 name Shari O’Donnell, which she has also used on public social media profiles (including Twitter,
IMDB, Wikipedia, etc.)
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Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 between Laurent and Plaintiff. Further, Laurent and Plaintiff infrequently worked together from his
2 residence, and when this occurred, Laurent’s family, his live-in nanny, and other household staff would
3 almost always be present.
4 3. Laurent likewise categorically denies instructing Plaintiff to “schedule his time so he
5 would not need to be with his wife.” On the contrary, Laurent instructed Plaintiff on multiple occasions
6 to ensure his professional obligations did not affect his ability to spend quality time with his wife and
7 children. Laurent also specifically requested that Plaintiff block out time for him to spend with his
8 family. Laurent’s concerted efforts to carve out specific time for his family are well-known across his
9 leadership team and stand in direct conflict with Plaintiff’s allegations.
10 4. Laurent also denies discussing his personal relationship with his wife with Plaintiff.
11 Laurent did not tell Plaintiff that his wife was “jealous of beautiful women,” or that she should not let
12 his wife know “how close” he was with Plaintiff. Laurent and Plaintiff were not “close.” Their rela-
13 tionship was strictly professional. As stated above, this type of discourse about Laurent’s wife does
14 not appear anywhere in the years’ worth of emails and texts between Laurent and Plaintiff. On the
15 contrary, to the extent that Laurent did discuss his wife with Plaintiff, it was to have Plaintiff assist
16 with coordinating her birthday and anniversary gifts, making dinner reservations, confirming blocked
17 appointments for family time, and confirming family travel arrangements.
18 5. Laurent further denies asking Plaintiff to “travel” with him for any reason other than to
19 perform her duties as his Executive Assistant. During the two and half years that Plaintiff worked for
20 Defendants, Laurent traveled to over 50 events. Plaintiff only traveled to three of those events. On
21 those few occasions that Laurent and Plaintiff both traveled for work events (specifically, an executive
22 team retreat in Park City, the League of Legends 10-Year Anniversary Event in London, and the 2019
23 League of Legends World Championships in Paris), Plaintiff traveled separately from Laurent and
24 stayed in different accommodations. Various other colleagues, including other executive assistants,
25 were also present at these events. Plaintiff often used these opportunities to personally travel after the
26 events concluded.
27 6. Plaintiff’s claim that Laurent told female employees to handle COVID-19 stress by hav-
28 ing kids is exaggerated. During an all-employee virtual townhall, a male Riot moderator relayed a

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 1 question from a female employee, a self-described extrovert, asking the leadership panel for “any sug-
2 gestions, tools, or ideas to help recharge [while working solo from home], when the recharge requires
3 humans and fellow co-workers.” Laurent, having spent the prior months working from home while
4 co-managing the household with his young children, joked that “if you have nine months, having kids
5 can really help on the human interactions a bit, from my experience.” Laurent promptly recognized
6 that his response could be misconstrued as suggesting that employees should have children, despite
7 only meaning to convey that he and his wife, like many parents, were constantly with their children
8 and at times felt overwhelmed during quarantine. Laurent personally apologized to the female Riot
9 employee who submitted the question that same day and acknowledged that his response was hurtful
10 to her. In a subsequent video message to all employees, Laurent addressed the comment again, apolo-
11 gized for the negative implication, and thanked Rioters for providing him with feedback.
12 7. In short, Defendants unequivocally deny that there is any merit to or proof of Plaintiff’s
13 allegations. As described further below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is nothing more than an attempted shake-
14 down of Defendants for purely personal gain.
15 Plaintiff is Not Credible
16 8. In response to Plaintiff filing this Complaint, Defendants’ counsel reviewed extensive
17 information, including thousands of emails and texts, and could not identify a single piece of evidence
18 supporting Plaintiff’s story. Plaintiff was not terminated for refusing to engage in sexual relations with
19 Laurent or for raising any concerns to Riot regarding her employment—nor could she have been, be-
20 cause at no point did Laurent ever behave inappropriately towards Plaintiff, and at no point did Plaintiff
21 ever raise a complaint to Human Resources or anyone at Riot like she now claims. In reality, Plaintiff’s
22 employment was terminated due to well-documented complaints about her unprofessional treatment of
23 others both inside and outside of Riot, as explained more fully below.
24 9. However, in reviewing Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendants did uncover a host of con-
25 cerning information that raises serious questions about Plaintiff and her motivation for filing this law-
26 suit. Defendants have found that Plaintiff is no stranger to exaggeration, and her willingness to mis-
27 represent the truth is far from new.
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Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 Plaintiff’s Litigation Tactics Include Blackmail and Paying for Testimony
2 10. For example, Defendants recently learned that this is not the first time a defendant has
3 reported that Plaintiff lodged false claims in court. In March 2018 (during her employment at Riot, but
4 unknown to many at the time), Plaintiff sued multiple international film producers to obtain a “finder’s
5 fee” for allegedly introducing them to Mel Gibson—something, according to the defendants in that
6 case, she did not (and likely could not) do. (See O’Donnell v. Hollywood International Film Exchange,
7 et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC698392.) The film producers counter-sued Plaintiff
8 for fraud, and accused her of using threats of “blackmail” and “libel” to extract the sum of money she
9 demanded. According to the counter claim, Plaintiff allegedly went so far as to threaten sending a
10 “mass email” to the “Chinese Government, China film group, all top personnel & financiers of [the
11 movie], all of [her] Hollywood acquaintances . . . and [Mel] Gibson” if the film producers did not pay
12 her within one business day. (See id., Aug. 24, 2018 Second Amended Cross-Complaint.)
13 11. Plaintiff’s own attorney in that case sought to be relieved as counsel, stating that Plain-
14 tiff: “adopted a position regarding the litigation which created an irreconcilable difference” between
15 them, which “rendered it unreasonably difficult” for him to carry out his representation “effectively”;
16 and “failed to comply with a material obligation” under their written fee agreement. (See id., Nov. 5,
17 2018 Motion to be Relieved as Counsel.)
18 12. In addition, with respect to this lawsuit against Riot and Laurent, Defendants have since
19 learned that before filing her Complaint, Plaintiff attempted to solicit an individual to join her in filing
20 a lawsuit against Laurent. Plaintiff told this individual that she was planning to accuse Laurent of
21 harassment, and said this individual should do the same. In response, the individual made clear that
22 they had never observed or experienced any wrongdoing by Laurent. Plaintiff has since approached
23 the individual again, suggesting Plaintiff would share profits from this lawsuit if the individual testified
24 against the Laurent, which this individual again declined.
25 13. Plaintiff has, on information and belief, created and deleted multiple social media ac-
26 counts specifically to disseminate and promote information about her Complaint. On one of these
27 accounts, Plaintiff posted text messages between her and another former Riot employee, without their
28 permission, and mischaracterized the selected texts as supporting her Complaint. Plaintiff also on her

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 1 own created a Gmail account, on which she occasionally managed personal assistant work for Laurent,
2 and over which she still maintains sole control, and has refused to surrender or provide access to upon
3 her termination, despite multiple requests.
4 14. In sum, Plaintiff has demonstrated a clear willingness to engage in and encourage false
5 claims, as well as a complete disregard for the privacy of other individuals who have no desire to
6 support her allegations.
7 Plaintiff Misrepresented Information to Riot During Her Employment
8 15. Further, in reviewing Plaintiff’s allegations, it became clear that she made similarly
9 questionable decisions while employed by Riot. For example, Defendants now understand that Plain-
10 tiff, while employed by Riot, created or was involved in at least two active corporate entities in the
11 entertainment industry, which she never disclosed to Riot. One entity, a purported film and television
12 production company, Nantosuelta Entertainment Films Ltd, was created in Ireland in November 2016,
13 and has been active for years. Nantosuelta’s website touts the company as “the worlds [sic] leading
14 production finance company,” says it was founded in 2017, and lists Plaintiff as CEO. This company
15 has reported increasing losses year over year. Another company, Nantosuelta Entertainment LLC, was
16 registered in California in June 2018 during Plaintiff’s employment at Riot, and has since been sus-
17 pended for failure to meet tax requirements.
18 16. Plaintiff’s public online profiles also tout her supposed status as a film producer, actress,
19 private equity broker, tax film incentive expert, and creative content strategist with offices in Los An-
20 geles and Dublin. These profiles describe various activities that purportedly occurred during her time
21 at Riot, and through at least January 2020, and may continue on today in 2021. Plaintiff never reported
22 any additional employment or side businesses to Riot, as would have been required to make sure the
23 Company could navigate any potential conflicts of interest and ensure that Plaintiff was able to satisfy
24 her work related responsibilities..
25 17. Defendants have also discovered that Plaintiff, one of only a select group of employees
26 entrusted with a Riot corporate credit card, used that card to make tens of thousands of dollars’ worth
27 of personal purchases, including, among others, non-work related travel costs, stays at hotels in Las
28 Vegas and other domestic and international locations, fine dining, and expenses relating to her personal

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 1 litigation. Plaintiff’s personal purchases on Riot’s corporate card sometimes exceeded $10,000 in a
2 month alone. While Plaintiff made some attempts to reimburse Defendants, to date, she has failed to
3 reimburse Defendants for thousands of dollars.
4 Plaintiff Deceived Defendants During The Hiring Process
5 18. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants have also now learned that Plaintiff likely
6 falsified her references, and potentially also her prior employment and educational background.
7 19. Defendants hired Plaintiff to be Laurent’s Executive Assistant—an exempt position re-
8 quiring significant discretion and independent judgment. For example, Plaintiff was tasked with man-
9 aging Laurent’s meetings and appearances, planning and arranging events for executives, and pre-re-
10 viewing and vetting important documents, like contracts and high-dollar expense requests, before pass-
11 ing them to Laurent for final approval. As noted through examples herein, Plaintiff was well aware of
12 the discretion and independence afforded to her, and used it to her personal advantage.
13 20. Central to the decision to hire Plaintiff for the role was the prior experience she de-
14 scribed on her resume, including the nearly eight years she claimed to have spent as the Executive
15 Assistant to Larry Ellison, the founder of Oracle. This prior experience also played a role in the com-
16 pensation package Plaintiff negotiated, which included a six figure annual salary and additional yearly
17 incentive pay.
18 21. In hindsight, Plaintiff’s credentials were likely too good to be true. Although Plaintiff
19 was referred to Riot by a reputable placement firm, on information and belief, Defendants now believe
20 that her prior work experience (including working for Mr. Ellison for eight years), and potentially even
21 her educational background, may have been overstated, misrepresented, or entirely fabricated. When
22 Defendants requested Plaintiff’s references, on information and belief, Plaintiff went so far as to create
23 fake identities for two of her friends, and listed them as Mr. Ellison’s “Property Manager” and “Chief
24 of Staff.”
25 22. This was not the only lie that Plaintiff told to get herself hired. Plaintiff, an Irish citizen,
26 claimed during the interview process to be immediately eligible to work in the United States. But this
27 was not true. Then, Plaintiff said she would obtain the necessary approvals in only a few weeks, then
28 another week, then another, and so on. Ultimately, Plaintiff did not receive her authorization for several

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 1 months. Had Plaintiff been honest about the state of her work authorization, Riot would not have
2 offered her the job, because the original opening was for an immediate need. Nonetheless, Riot ended
3 up waiting for Plaintiff throughout the immigration process and holding the role for her, in part on the
4 belief that she was a sought-after Executive Assistant who had worked for one of the world’s most
5 successful executives.
6 Plaintiff Was Ultimately Terminated After Numerous Complaints
7 23. Once she started working, Plaintiff and Laurent maintained a cordial working relation-
8 ship throughout her time at Riot. When Plaintiff was addressing Laurent, she was professional and
9 respectful. This is why, when complaints first came to Laurent about how she addressed others, he
10 attempted to manage the concerns with Plaintiff directly through coaching and in-the-moment feed-
11 back.
12 24. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Riot was not a “male dominated culture” during her
13 employment, and it was not only male employees who were offended by their interactions with her.
14 Employees of all genders, and in a variety of roles, came to Laurent with concerns about Plaintiff and
15 how Plaintiff might have negatively impacted Laurent’s ability to run the business.
16 25. For example, in October 2018 a senior female leader emailed Laurent directly with se-
17 rious concerns about Plaintiff’s handling of a scheduling situation and her interactions with other em-
18 ployees. The female executive complained that Plaintiff was “disrespectful” and “defensive” towards
19 her, and that in covering up her own mistake when scheduling an event, Plaintiff “misrepresent[ed] the
20 reality” and “basically threw [another female Riot employee] under the bus.” The executive noted that
21 this was the second time she raised concerns about Plaintiff to Laurent, and explained that “having an
22 EA that’s difficult to deal with, especially for a CEO, can be damaging to the CEO’s reputation, so I
23 wanted you to have awareness of how this is perceived.” Laurent addressed this feedback with Plaintiff
24 directly and provided suggestions for improvement moving forward.
25 26. But Plaintiff did not improve. In January 2019, Plaintiff’s unprofessionalism garnered
26 her yet another complaint. This time, a different senior female leader reached out to Laurent with
27 concerns. Plaintiff had again bulldozed a scheduling situation, left bad feelings in her wake, and im-
28 pacted Laurent’s abilities to lead. The female leader stated: “I hope that Shari is being coached to act

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 1 as respectful to all level of Rioters as she expects us to act toward the exec suite. If not, I believe it
2 could negatively impact the overall impression of your office.” Again, Laurent shared this feedback
3 directly to Plaintiff.
4 27. On information and belief, there were likely additional incidents that were not even
5 raised to Laurent at the time because other employees feared Plaintiff. After Plaintiff’s lawsuit became
6 public and Riot disclosed that she had been terminated, Laurent received over 20 unsolicited notes and
7 messages of support, many raising concerns with Plaintiff’s credibility or past work experiences with
8 her. At least two international employees have reached out to Laurent directly to express concerns they
9 never raised to him during Plaintiff’s employment, including one female employee who noted “I have
10 never encountered such a painful to deal with EA before… I was always pretty nervous when I needed
11 her to reach you for something as simple as a signature.” Individuals in Laurent’s personal sphere,
12 with whom Plaintiff interacted during the course of her work, also raised numerous concerns about
13 Plaintiff. These individuals, who ranged from home contractors to staff at the schools attended by
14 Laurent’s children, complained about negative interactions with Plaintiff. Plaintiff often unnecessarily
15 berated individuals, in direct contradiction to Laurent’s wishes and instructions.
16 28. When Laurent addressed these multiple, continuing concerns with Plaintiff, she always
17 had an excuse at the ready to explain why she, an “elite assistant,” was not responsible for any friction.
18 Contrary to Plaintiff’s public assertions, Plaintiff’s self-review demonstrated that she herself had re-
19 ceived feedback about such performance issues, and she had promised to improve. She acknowledged
20 her tendency to be “blunt,” which she noted impacted her “working relationship[s].” She also acknowl-
21 edged that she was “responsible for” creating a “misunderstanding” with Riot’s international team, and
22 that she needed “to work on being more friendly and understanding . . . when working with other
23 Rioters.” This feedback was also documented in Plaintiff’s review from peers. One female reviewer
24 bluntly described Plaintiff as “abrasive” and noted that her “missives” can come off as “passive-ag-
25 gressive, sarcastic, or combative.” This reviewer explained that multiple people described their inter-
26 actions with Plaintiff as “unpleasant,” and that Plaintiff’s “first instinct is to react harshly” when given
27 constructive feedback.
28 29. While some employees shared their complaints about Plaintiff with Laurent directly,

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 1 other employees raised complaints about Plaintiff to Riot’s Human Resources touch point for the rele-
2 vant business unit, referred to as a Human Resources Business Partner (“HRBP”). Between mid-2019
3 and early 2020, no less than a dozen employees complained to the HRBP about Plaintiff’s unprofes-
4 sional communications, either on behalf of themselves or on behalf of others. When the HRBP aggre-
5 gated these complaints and shared them with Laurent in early 2020, he was shocked by Plaintiff’s
6 conduct and that the issue was bigger and longer-standing than he had been aware of.
7 30. Laurent learned about the extent of complaints in early 2020, on the heels of a serious
8 error in judgement and communication that Plaintiff had made during preparations for the League of
9 Legends 2019 World Championships in Paris. The misstep reflected how Plaintiff would regularly
10 insert herself (and Laurent) into unnecessary entanglements, and misrepresent the CEO and his of-
11 fice. This was to the point of damaging relationships, not to mention taking unnecessary amounts of
12 Laurent’s time and attention.
13 31. Related to the World Championships in November 2019, Plaintiff, without Laurent’s
14 knowledge, attempted to steer ceremony planning to her own vision, causing unnecessary confusion
15 and hostility within the planning team. This included adding Laurent and the senior leaders of esports
16 and communications to an email with the planning team—again, without Laurent’s requesting she do
17 so—to demand explanations for why Laurent was not slated to present the World Championship trophy
18 because “as Nicolo is the French CEO in Paris [] this would be a cool moment for our company.”
19 Laurent had to respond to reaffirm to the group that “I personally don’t care. I want what’s best for the
20 show and someone who thinks day and night about making a great [show] should make that call[,]”
21 referring to the female show lead as being the one who should make these calls. Another leader in-
22 volved separately emailed Plaintiff (cc’ing Laurent), telling her that while the leader “underst[ood] the
23 logistics of these events can be frustrating,” “I would appreciate it if you would tone down your emails
24 to the team. Please just email me direct and copy [another individual] when you have concerns and
25 we’ll jump on it.” Plaintiff’s aggressiveness in her representation of his office did not match the CEO
26 that Laurent was, nor the CEO he wanted to be perceived as.
27 32. By early 2020, it became clear that Plaintiff was beyond coaching, and that termination
28 was necessary. However, recognizing the unprecedented challenges brought on by the COVID-19

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 1 crisis, Laurent and Riot decided to postpone Plaintiff’s termination for several months. In June 2020,
2 Defendants informed Plaintiff of their decision to terminate her employment. Far from surprised,
3 Plaintiff expressed relief, and claimed she was considering multiple other job offers out of state. One
4 alleged job offer was to be a Chief Operating Officer of a company in New York.
5 Plaintiff Would Have Been Safe To Raise Complaints to Riot, But Never Did
6 33. As noted before, despite having ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiff never made any
7 allegations about harassment, discrimination, retaliation, or her classification as an exempt employee
8 during the entire course of her employment or after her termination. Indeed, as further explained below,
9 the only time Plaintiff came even remotely close to a policy violation investigation during her employ-
10 ment was in 2018, when Plaintiff attempted to intervene on behalf of a male employee being termi-
11 nated because she was concerned that Riot was too quick to terminate men based on harassment
12 accusations.
13 34. Notably, it was well-known during Plaintiff’s employment that a Special Committee of
14 the Board of Directors directly managed complaints made against Riot’s most senior executives. Had
15 Plaintiff actually raised any of the allegations about Laurent to Human Resources, as she claims, they
16 would have been promptly investigated by an independent law firm retained by Riot to conduct an
17 investigation for review by the Special Committee.
18 35. During her termination meeting with Laurent and a member of Human Resources, Plain-
19 tiff was exceptionally cordial for an employee being terminated. At no point did she raise any concerns
20 related to her employment or alleged experiences with Laurent.
21 36. Riot also asked Plaintiff to participate in a separate exit interview with Human Re-
22 sources (without Laurent) on two occasions—but both times, Plaintiff failed to show up. There is
23 simply no basis to Plaintiff’s claim that she conveyed concerns of any type to anyone at Riot, let alone
24 about Laurent, despite having multiple opportunities to do so.
25 37. Plaintiff also knew that Riot took allegations seriously enough to terminate employees
26 when needed. Indeed, in late 2018, Plaintiff took it upon herself to interfere with the investigation and
27 subsequent termination of a male coworker. Plaintiff asked the female outside attorney who conducted
28 the privileged investigation for Riot to “kindly send a reply to Nicolo” with further information about

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 1 the male employee and the circumstances surrounding his termination, but Laurent never instructed
2 Plaintiff to investigate this complaint or to question the investigator’s independent judgment. Instead,
3 Laurent explicitly instructed Plaintiff not to interfere and said that Riot stood by the termination deci-
4 sion.
5 38. Plaintiff’s claim that “female employees are discriminated against, harassed, and treated
6 as second class citizens” is also meritless and irrelevant to Plaintiff’s case. Riot has always prided
7 itself on creating a positive and safe creative space for its employees and responding to feedback or
8 suggestions. For example, when video game blog Kotaku published articles on August 7, 2018 and
9 September 12, 2018 which claimed that women could not be hired or progress at Riot because its focus
10 on hiring “core gamers” advantaged men, and raised allegations of inappropriate behavior at Riot, Riot
11 immediately responded to the concerns with a review and enhancement of its then current policies and
12 wide-ranging, fundamental changes to the company.
13 39. Many of Riot’s efforts to address employee concerns have been documented by a num-
14 ber of independent publications. (See e.g., Cecilia D’Anastasio, Riot Employees Say Company Has
15 Made Real Progress Fixing Its Sexism Issues, Kotaku, August 7, 2019, https://kotaku.com/riot-games-
16 and-sexism-one-year-later-1837041215; Rebekah Valentine, One year later, Riot leadership, employ-
17 ees, say things are improving, gamesindustry.biz, August 8, 2019, https://www.gamesindustry.biz/ar-
18 ticles/2019-08-08-one-year-later-riot-leadership-employees-say-things-are-improving.) During the
19 last year of Plaintiff’s employment, Riot’s leadership team included multiple female leaders, including
20 a Chief People Officer and Chief Diversity Officer, who Plaintiff knew. Today, 40% of Riot’s most
21 senior leadership group are female. In addition, the leaders of two of Riot’s most important game
22 products (League of Legends and VALORANT), the Senior Vice President and Head of Global Corpo-
23 rate Affairs, and the President of Riot Entertainment are all female.
24 40. Importantly, when allegations of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation are brought
25 to Riot’s attention, Riot has worked diligently and expeditiously to investigate each and every claim.
26 After Kotaku’s reports in 2018, Riot immediately hired an outside law firm to perform investigations
27 and provided them with full discretion to define the scope of such investigations, and also implemented
28 and advertised a number of intake channels for complaints, including an anonymous tip line, a direct

Gibson, Dunn & 12

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 email to the outside law firm investigating internal complaints, and contacts within Riot’s employee
2 relations team—all of which Plaintiff had access to. Complaints emerging from 2018 were investigated
3 thoroughly, with nearly all the investigations completed within a year. Riot took disciplinary action
4 against complaints that were substantiated, up to and including termination, but also including less
5 visible changes like significant demotions in role and pay. On the other hand, a significant portion of
6 such claims brought during the time period were determined to be unsubstantiated or simply false. To
7 date, and contrary to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, there has been no evidence of widespread
8 systemic discrimination, retaliation, or harassment of female employees at Riot.
9 41. While Riot acknowledges that individuals, on isolated bases, have claimed to experience
10 conduct and treatment falling below the standards of professionalism and inclusiveness that Riot has
11 hoped to achieve, Plaintiff is not one of them. It is thus unsurprising that Plaintiff, given her history
12 of bullying and intimidation when she does not get her way, uses her Complaint to spread falsehoods
13 about Defendants.
14 SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSES
15 By alleging the Separate and Additional Defenses set forth below, Defendants in no way waive
16 their right to seek to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants also intend no alteration of
17 the burden of proof and/or burden of going forward with evidence that otherwise exists with respect to
18 any particular issue at law or in equity. Furthermore, all such defenses are pleaded in the alternative,
19 and do not constitute an admission of liability or that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief whatsoever or
20 that this action is properly pending before this court. Additionally, all defenses pleaded below are
21 based on Defendants’ current understanding of Plaintiff’s claims, and are intended, among other things,
22 to preserve all potential defenses upon further clarification of Plaintiff’s claims and assertions. Unless
23 specifically indicated otherwise, Defendants assert each defense to each claim in the Complaint.
24 FIRST SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
25 (Claims Subject to Arbitration)
26 The claims in the Complaint are barred to the extent they should be compelled to arbitration.
27 Defendants are filing concurrently a motion to compel Plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration as
28 required by the Arbitration Agreement.

Gibson, Dunn & 13

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 SECOND SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
2 (Bad Faith and Frivolous Claims)
3 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Plaintiff’s claims are not brought in good
4 faith and are frivolous. Many of Plaintiff’s allegations lack any basis in fact and are not alleged on any
5 information or reasonable belief. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to recover their reasonable ex-
6 penses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred herein as a matter of law pursuant to the Court’s inherent
7 authority and California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.
8 THIRD SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
9 (Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation)
10 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part to the extent Plaintiff obtained Defendants’ consent
11 to an employment relationship through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, such that the employment
12 relationship was never properly formed.
13 FOURTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
14 (Intentional Misrepresentation)
15 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part to the extent Plaintiff obtained Defendants’ consent
16 to an employment relationship through intentional misrepresentation of her prior work experience,
17 which Defendants relied on to their detriment, such that the employment relationship was never
18 properly formed.
19 FIFTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
20 (Abuse of Process)
21 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because of Plaintiff’s willful act of using civil legal
22 process against Defendants to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.
23 SIXTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
24 (Failure to State a Claim)
25 The Complaint, and each and every purported cause of action in the Complaint, fails to state
26 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants.
27
28

Gibson, Dunn & 14

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 SEVENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
2 (Good Faith)
3 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part on the basis that Defendants acted in good faith and
4 upon a reasonable belief that their actions did not violate the Government Code, including sections
5 12940 and 12946, or other applicable laws alleged in the Complaint and did not willfully or knowingly
6 and intentionally engage in any conduct that may have violated such laws.
7 EIGHTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
8 (Statute of Limitations)
9 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part by statutes of limitations as may be applicable,
10 including but not limited to those provided in California Government Code section 12965, California
11 Code of Civil Procedure sections 338 and 340, and California Business and Professions Code section
12 17208.
13 NINTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
14 (Laches, Unclean Hands, Estoppel, Waiver)
15 The Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine(s) of laches, unclean hands, estop-
16 pel and/or waiver.
17 TENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
18 (Failure to Mitigate Damages)
19 The Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, to the extent that the Plaintiff failed to mitigate
20 damages.
21 ELEVENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
22 (Due Process and Equal Protection)
23 The Complaint, to the extent it seeks exemplary penalties or damages, violates Defendants’
24 right to equal protection under the United States and California Constitutions, violates Defendants’
25 right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
26 and under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of California, and violates Defendants’
27
28

Gibson, Dunn & 15

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 right to substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
2 stitution and, therefore, fails to state a cause of action upon which exemplary penalties or damages may
3 be awarded.
4 TWELFTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
5 (Excessive Fines)
6 The Complaint, to the extent it seeks exemplary penalties, violates Defendants’ right to protec-
7 tion from “excessive fines” as provided in Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of the State of
8 California and, therefore, fails to state a cause of action supporting the exemplary penalties or damages
9 claimed.
10 THIRTEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
11 (Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies and Notice Requirements)
12 The Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, to the extent Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
13 notice and exhaustion requirements under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and any other appli-
14 cable statute or regulation, and to the extent she has otherwise failed to exhaust her administrative
15 remedies.
16 FOURTEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
17 (Release)
18 Plaintiff’s Complaint, and each purported cause of action asserted therein, is barred in whole or
19 in part by the doctrine of release.
20 FIFTEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
21 (Res Judicata / Collateral / Judicial Estoppel)
22 Plaintiff’s Complaint, and each purported cause of action asserted therein, is barred in whole or
23 in part by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral and/or judicial estoppel.
24 SIXTEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
25 (Damages Caused by Third Parties)
26 Plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred to the extent any damages alleged cannot be attributed
27 to Defendants to the extent they have been caused by the acts of those other than Defendants, or by
28 acts for which Defendants are not responsible.

Gibson, Dunn & 16

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 SEVENTEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
2 (No Proximate Cause)
3 Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails for the reason that any alleged action or failure to act on the part of
4 Defendants was not the proximate cause of any alleged injury to Plaintiff.
5 EIGHTEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
6 (After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine)
7 The claims and/or penalties and other relief sought by Plaintiff are barred in whole or in part
8 by the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
9 NINETEENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
10 (Mixed Motives)
11 Plaintiff’s claims and requests for relief are barred in whole or in part to the extent they are
12 subject to the mixed motive defense.
13 TWENTIETH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
14 (Offset)
15 Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, insofar as the amounts claimed are subject to
16 offset.
17 TWENTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
18 (Non-Harassing Reasons)
19 The claims of Plaintiff are meritless because all actions with respect to the employment of
20 Plaintiff were based upon legitimate factors unrelated to any alleged “quid pro quo” and free from
21 unlawful harassment.
22 TWENTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
23 (Compliance with the Law)
24 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Defendants at all times complied and/or
25 substantially complied with all applicable statutes, regulations, and laws.
26

27
28

Gibson, Dunn & 17

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 TWENTY-THIRD SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
2 (Exempt Employee)
3 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Plaintiff is exempt from coverage under
4 the provisions of the California Labor Code or Wage Orders referenced in the Complaint.
5 TWENTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
6 (Timely Demand for Wages Payable)
7 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Plaintiff has failed to timely make a demand
8 in writing for wages due and payable.
9 TWENTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
10 (No Knowledge)
11 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part to the extent that Defendants had no knowledge of
12 any purported unpaid overtime, off-the-clock work, or failure to be relieved from duty to take meal and
13 rest breaks.
14 TWENTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
15 (Business Necessity)
16 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Defendants’ employment decisions and
17 actions were job-related and consistent with business necessity, and not based in discriminatory ani-
18 mus.
19 TWENTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
20 (Decisions and Actions Justified)
21 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Defendants’ employment decisions and
22 actions were justified based on factors unrelated to sex or gender.
23 TWENTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
24 (Bona Fide Factors)
25 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Defendants’ employment decisions and
26 actions were based on bona fide factors other than sex or gender.
27
28

Gibson, Dunn & 18

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1 TWENTY-NINTH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
2 (Unjust Enrichment)
3 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part to the extent it results in an unjust enrichment to
4 Plaintiff.
5 THIRTIETH SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
6 (De Minimis Doctrine)
7 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the de minimis doctrine.
8 THIRTY-FIRST SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
9 (Conduct Not “Unlawful”)
10 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Defendants’ conduct, as alleged in the
11 Complaint, was not “unlawful” within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code section
12 17200 in that Defendants complied with all applicable statutes and regulations, if any.
13 THIRTY-SECOND SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENSE
14 (Conduct Not “Unfair”)
15 The Complaint is barred in whole or in part because Defendants’ conduct, as alleged in the
16 Complaint, was not “unfair” within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code section
17 17200 in that, among other things, Defendants did not provide any false or misleading information to
18 the public regarding their practices.
19 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
20 WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for relief as follows:
21 1. That Plaintiff take nothing by this action;
22 2. That the Complaint and all purported causes of action alleged therein be compelled to
23 arbitration;
24 3. That the Complaint and all purported causes of action alleged therein be dismissed;
25 4. That Defendants be awarded their costs of suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees, including
26 those permitted by California Labor Code § 218.5; and
27 5. That Defendants be awarded such further relief as this Court deems appropriate.
28

Gibson, Dunn & 19

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
 1
DATED: March 16, 2021 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
2
3 By
Catherine A. Conway
4 Katherine V.A. Smith
Tiffany Phan
5
Attorneys for Defendants
6
7
8

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15
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Gibson, Dunn & 20

Crutcher LLP ANSWER
DocuSign Envelope ID: 1764920D-4ADF-4289-B8DE-87AF0AF96080

EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

This employment arbitration agreement (this “Agreement”) is hereby entered into as of

___________________(date) between Riot Games, Inc., a Delaware corporation, ("Employer")
and __________________________ ("Employee"). For and in consideration of the mutual
promises set out below and the mutual benefits resulting from the agreement to arbitrate disputes
growing out of the employment relationship, and for other good and valuable consideration, the
adequacy of which is hereby acknowledged, Employer and Employee agree as follows:

(1) Arbitration of Disputes. Employer and Employee mutually consent to the final resolution by
binding arbitration of any and all claims or disputes one party may have against the other
arising our of or in any way related to the employment relationship (“Claims”). With the
exception of only those claims expressly excluded under Paragraph 2 of this Agreement,
Claims include, but are not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due; claims
for breach of an express or implied contract or covenant; tort claims; statutory or common
law claims for unlawful employment discrimination (including, but not limited to,
discrimination based on race, color, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, medical condition, handicap or disability); claims for sexual
harassment; claims for tortious breach of public policy; claims for violation of federal or state
constitutional rights; claims for benefits (except where the benefit plan specifies that its claim
procedure shall culminate in an arbitration procedure different from this one); and claims for
violation of any federal, state or other governmental law, statute, regulation, order, ordinance
or provision. The term “Employer” as used in this Agreement includes any and all parent
corporations, subsidiaries and affiliated entities, their predecessors and successors in interest,
and their respective current and former officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys or
representatives, in their capacity as such or otherwise. The arbitration will be administered
by JAMS pursuant to its Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures and subject to JAMS
Policy on Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness that are in
effect at the time the arbitration is initiated (the “JAMS Rules”). By signing below, the
parties signify that they understand and agree that the arbitration of any present or
future Claims under this Agreement shall be instead of a trial before a court or jury or
a hearing before a government agency and that they are expressly waiving any and all
right to a trial before a court or jury or before a government agency regarding any
disputes and claims which they now have or which they may in the future have that are
subject to arbitration under this Agreement.

(2) Claims Not Covered. Expressly excluded from the agreement to arbitrate Claims under
paragraph 1 of this Agreement are any claims Employee may have for workers’
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation or unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, nothing in this Agreement should be interpreted as restricting or prohibiting
either party from filing an injunctive or equitable action in state or federal court to protect
its trade secrets or confidential information, or prevent either party from filing a charge or
DocuSign Envelope ID: 1764920D-4ADF-4289-B8DE-87AF0AF96080

complaint with a federal, state or local administrative agency charged with investigating
and/or prosecuting complaints under any applicable federal, state or municipal law or
regulation. Any dispute or claim that is not resolved through the federal, state or local
agency must be submitted to arbitration in accordance with this Agreement.

(3) Notice of Claims. Each party agrees to give the other written notice of any Claims within
the applicable federal or state statute of limitations period. Written notice to Employer
shall be sent to its Legal Department at Riot Games: 12333 W. Olympic Blvd., Los
Angeles CA 90064. Written notice to Employee shall be sent to his or her address of
record with the Employer. The notice shall identify and describe the nature of the Claim
and state the facts upon which the Claim is based. The notice shall be sent by certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested.

(4) Single Party Arbitration (CLASS ACTION WAIVER). The parties agree that arbitration
of any Claims pursuant to this Agreement will proceed solely on an individual basis and
that any claims by a party in arbitration may not be joined or combined with the claims of
another party, such as a class action, or on the basis that one party stands as a
representative for a group of individuals or entities. Such a collective or joint action is
prohibited by this Agreement unless both parties expressly agree to such a collective or
joint action in writing.

(5) Selection and Authority of Arbitrator. The Arbitrator shall be selected by agreement of
the parties and in accordance with the JAMS Rules. The Arbitrator shall have the sole
and exclusive authority to resolve all Claims between Employer and Employee. In
resolving such Claims, the Arbitrator shall apply the applicable substantive law of the
United States and/or the laws of the state in which the Employee last worked and shall
have the authority to award any type of legal or equitable relief that would be available in
a court of competent jurisdiction, including punitive damages, when such damages are
awardable under applicable law. The Arbitrator shall have the authority to hear and rule
on: (i) pre-hearing disputes and is authorized to hold pre-hearing conferences by
telephone and/or in person as the Arbitrator deems necessary; and (ii) a motion to dismiss
and/or a motion for summary judgment by either party and shall apply the standards
governing such motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition to the
foregoing, the Arbitrator shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating
to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Agreement,
including, but not limited to, any Claim that all or any part of this Agreement is
unenforceable, void or voidable. The Arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding
upon the parties, except as provided in paragraph 18 of this Agreement.

(6) Arbitration Procedure. The arbitration hearing and any related proceedings shall be
conducted according to the rules of evidence applicable to civil actions in the federal
district courts in the state where the Employee last worked, and the same substantive law
(whether federal or state) shall apply in resolving the Claim. The arbitration hearing shall
take place in the city where the Employee was last employed. Resolution of the dispute
shall be based solely on the law governing the Claim set out in the notice given under
Paragraph 3 hereof, or, if the Claim was initially filed with a court or administrative
agency, in the pleadings or complaint so filed. In resolving the Claim, the Arbitrator
shall apply the substantive law of the United States (and/or the state in which the

2
DocuSign Envelope ID: 1764920D-4ADF-4289-B8DE-87AF0AF96080

employee last worked for the Company). Except as otherwise provided in this
Agreement, the Federal Arbitration Act shall govern the interpretation, enforcement and
all proceedings under this Agreement.

(7) Representation. Any party may be represented by an attorney or other representative of

his, hers or its choice in connection with the arbitration of Claims under this Agreement.
Each party is responsible for the cost of their own representation.

(8) Subpoenas and Discovery. Each party shall have the right to: (i) subpoena witnesses and
documents for the arbitration hearing; (ii) subpoena and take the depositions of up to
three (3) individual witnesses and all expert witnesses designated by the other party; and
(iii) propound interrogatories upon and/or make requests for production of documents to
the other party. The Arbitrator may order other or additional discovery upon written
request and a showing of need by either party.

(9) Designation of Witnesses and Exhibits. At least thirty (30) days before the arbitration
hearing, the parties shall exchange lists of witnesses for the hearing, including any
experts, and copies of all exhibits the parties intend to use at the hearing.

(10) Transcripts of Proceedings. Either party may arrange for and pay the cost of a court
reporter to provide a stenographic record of the arbitration hearing and/or any pre-hearing
or post-hearing proceedings. A copy of the transcript prepared by the court reporter shall
be provided to the Arbitrator.

(11) Briefs. Either party may file a pre-hearing and/or a post-hearing brief. The time for filing
pre-hearing brief(s) shall be set by the Arbitrator. The time for filing post-hearing
brief(s) shall be thirty (30) days following the completion of the hearing or thirty (30)
days following receipt of the transcript by the Arbitrator, whichever is later, unless an
extension is granted by the Arbitrator for good cause shown.

(12) Action to Compel Arbitration. Either party may bring an action or file a motion in any
court of competent jurisdiction to compel arbitration under this Agreement and/or to
confirm or enforce an arbitration award under this Agreement. Except as otherwise
provided in this Agreement, both Employer and Employee agree that neither party shall
initiate or prosecute any lawsuit or administrative action (other than an administrative
charge or complaint) in any way related to any Claim which is arbitrable under this
Agreement or which would have been arbitrable but for the party’s failure to comply with
the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Agreement.

(13) Award. Following the submission of the Claim, the Arbitrator shall render a written
decision and award in the form customarily rendered in labor arbitration. To the extent
that the Arbitrator’s decision and award involves findings of fact and/or conclusions of
law, such findings of fact and/or conclusions of law shall be set out in a written opinion
accompanying the decision and award.

(14) Fees and Costs. The fees and expenses of the Arbitrator in connection with the
proceedings under this Agreement shall be paid by the Company; provided, however that,
each party shall pay its own costs and attorneys’ fees, if any. However, if either party
prevails in arbitration on a Claim based on a statute or contract which provides that the
3
DocuSign Envelope ID: 1764920D-4ADF-4289-B8DE-87AF0AF96080

prevailing party may recover costs or attorneys’ fees, the Arbitrator may award costs
and/or reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party pursuant to the statute or
contract.

(15) Proceedings in Forma Pauperis. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 14 hereof

the Arbitrator may, upon a showing by Employee of his/her inability to pay his/her share
of the Arbitrator's fees and expenses under this Agreement, allocate a greater share of
such fees and expenses to Employer, up to the full amount thereof.

(16) Judicial Review. A party opposing enforcement of an award may not do so in an

enforcement proceeding, but must bring a timely separate action in a court of competent
jurisdiction to set aside the award. In the event that an action is brought by a party to set
aside the award, the standard of review to be applied in such action shall be the same as
that applied by a Court of Appeal of the State in which the Employee last worked for the
company when reviewing a decision of that state’s trial court sitting without a jury.

(17) Severability. If any term or provision of this Agreement is deemed to be void, invalid or
unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement shall not be affected, and each remaining
term or provision shall remain valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by
law.

(18) Effect of Agreement. This Agreement does not alter the at-will status of Employee's
employment. Such at-will status can be altered only in a writing signed by the Chief
Executive Officer or other duly authorized person of Employer.

(19) Revision, Amendment, Rescission. This Agreement may be revised, amended or

rescinded only by a subsequent written agreement which expressly references this
Agreement and is signed by the party to be charged.

(20) Acknowledgment by Signature. Employee acknowledges that, by signing the

acknowledgment, Employee is waiving his or her right to a civil trial by jury. Employer
acknowledges that by receiving a signed acknowledgment of receipt of this Agreement, it
has agreed to be bound by the provisions of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Employment Arbitration
Agreement to be duly executed as of the date herein.

DATED: FirstRepresentativeSignatureDate
10/2/2017 DATED:______________________

hereGoesCompanyName
Riot Games, Inc. Employee

FirstRepresentativeSignsHere
_______________________________ _____________________________
BY: hereGoesRepresentativeName
Marc Merrill
Position: Co-CEO
hereGoesRepresentativeTitle

4
From: Smith, Katherine V.A.
To: "Mike Baltaxe"
Cc: Conway, Catherine A.; Fischer, Lauren
Subject: RE: O"Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice
Date: Monday, March 15, 2021 3:02:39 PM

Mike, we’re on the line if you’re able to join.

From: Smith, Katherine V.A.

Sent: Monday, March 15, 2021 2:57 PM
To: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>
Cc: Conway, Catherine A. <CConway@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: RE: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice

Why don’t we talk at 3 at this dial-in:

866-747-5969
Passcode 213-229-7107

From: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>

Sent: Monday, March 15, 2021 2:49 PM
To: Smith, Katherine V.A. <KSmith@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: RE: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice

[External Email]
Just let me know i will call you also a phone #

Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S9+, an AT&T 5G Evolution capable smartphone

-------- Original message --------

From: "Smith, Katherine V.A." <KSmith@gibsondunn.com>
Date: 3/15/21 2:46 PM (GMT-08:00)
To: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>, "Phan, Tiffany" <TPhan@gibsondunn.com>,
Timothy Sottile <TSottile@SottileBaltaxe.com>, Payam Aframian <PAframian@SottileBaltaxe.com>,
Rachna Arhi <RArhi@SottileBaltaxe.com>
Cc: "Conway, Catherine A." <CConway@gibsondunn.com>, "Sessions, Matthew"
<MSessions@gibsondunn.com>, "Fischer, Lauren" <LFischer@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: RE: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice

Mike, what number should we try? Will call when we free up.

From: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>

Sent: Monday, March 15, 2021 2:42 PM
To: Phan, Tiffany <TPhan@gibsondunn.com>; Timothy Sottile <TSottile@SottileBaltaxe.com>; Payam
Aframian <PAframian@SottileBaltaxe.com>; Rachna Arhi <RArhi@SottileBaltaxe.com>
Cc: Conway, Catherine A. <CConway@gibsondunn.com>; Smith, Katherine V.A.
<KSmith@gibsondunn.com>; Sessions, Matthew <MSessions@gibsondunn.com>; Fischer, Lauren
<LFischer@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: RE: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice

[External Email]
Can talk now

Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S9+, an AT&T 5G Evolution capable smartphone

-------- Original message --------

From: "Phan, Tiffany" <TPhan@gibsondunn.com>
Date: 3/15/21 1:29 PM (GMT-08:00)
To: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>, Timothy Sottile <TSottile@SottileBaltaxe.com>,
Payam Aframian <PAframian@SottileBaltaxe.com>, Rachna Arhi <RArhi@SottileBaltaxe.com>
Cc: "Conway, Catherine A." <CConway@gibsondunn.com>, "Smith, Katherine V.A."
<KSmith@gibsondunn.com>, "Sessions, Matthew" <MSessions@gibsondunn.com>, "Fischer, Lauren"
<LFischer@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: RE: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice

We’re available to discuss these individuals with you today as we have concerns about their privacy
and well-being. Please let us know when you are available.
Tiffany Phan

GIBSON DUNN
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
Tel +1 213.229.7522 • Fax +1 213.229.6522
TPhan@gibsondunn.com • www.gibsondunn.com

From: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>

Sent: Monday, March 15, 2021 11:19 AM
To: Phan, Tiffany <TPhan@gibsondunn.com>; Timothy Sottile <TSottile@SottileBaltaxe.com>; Payam
Aframian <PAframian@SottileBaltaxe.com>; Rachna Arhi <RArhi@SottileBaltaxe.com>
Cc: Conway, Catherine A. <CConway@gibsondunn.com>; Smith, Katherine V.A.
<KSmith@gibsondunn.com>; Sessions, Matthew <MSessions@gibsondunn.com>; Fischer, Lauren
<LFischer@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: RE: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice
[External Email]
Yes we will oppose
Have no idea what individuals you are referring to

Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S9+, an AT&T 5G Evolution capable smartphone

-------- Original message --------

From: "Phan, Tiffany" <TPhan@gibsondunn.com>
Date: 3/15/21 9:47 AM (GMT-08:00)
To: Mike Baltaxe <MBaltaxe@SottileBaltaxe.com>, Timothy Sottile <TSottile@SottileBaltaxe.com>,
Payam Aframian <PAframian@SottileBaltaxe.com>, Rachna Arhi <RArhi@SottileBaltaxe.com>
Cc: "Conway, Catherine A." <CConway@gibsondunn.com>, "Smith, Katherine V.A."
<KSmith@gibsondunn.com>, "Sessions, Matthew" <MSessions@gibsondunn.com>, "Fischer, Lauren"
<LFischer@gibsondunn.com>
Subject: O'Donnell Ex Parte Application Notice

Counsel:
Please consider this email as Notice that on March 17, 2021, in Los Angeles County Superior Court,
located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012 in Department 6, Defendants Riot Games, Inc.
and Nicolas Laurent will be making an ex parte application for an order setting a status conference in
O’Donnell v. Riot Games, Inc., No. 21STCV00596. In accordance with the applicable rule, Riot will be
filing its ex parte papers tomorrow morning.
Defendants have legitimate concerns based upon recent information learned that Plaintiff Sharon
O’Donnell has engaged in and/or encouraged repeated actions of potential witness tampering and
harassment of third party witnesses. Defendants would like the Court to set a status conference so
that Defendants can receive guidance from the Court as to how to obtain relief without waiving their
rights to arbitration.
Please note the following from the Court Clerk in Department 6:
1. No appearance is necessary. Judge Berle does not hold hearings on ex parte applications and
will rule on the papers.
2. If you choose to oppose the application, any opposition must be made in writing and filed at
the Spring Street Courthouse by 12:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 17, 2021.
Please let us know if Plaintiff will oppose this application. We would invite a phone call to discuss
these matters later today. In the meantime, we would ask that you treat these individuals’ identities
with the utmost confidentiality, and caution your client to do the same.
Tiffany Phan

GIBSON DUNN
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
Tel +1 213.229.7522 • Fax +1 213.229.6522
TPhan@gibsondunn.com • www.gibsondunn.com

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and then immediately delete this message.

Please see our website at https://www.gibsondunn.com/ for information regarding the firm and/or
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This message may contain confidential and privileged information for the sole use of the intended
recipient. Any review, disclosure, distribution by others or forwarding without express permission is
strictly prohibited. If it has been sent to you in error, please reply to advise the sender of the error
and then immediately delete this message.

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