UNIOR UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI NAPOLI “L’ORIENTALE”

DIPARTIMENTO ASIA, AFRICA E MEDITERRANEO

is for the most part little known to the vast majority of the Italian public, and this despite colonization,

first the promotion of the colonizers’ rationale, then the rhetoric of Qadhafi’s regime, and finally the S tu d i Af r i c a ni s ti c i
current representations closely related to terrorist emergencies, immigration, and war within and
outside the Islamic world, are all well-known and documented. Quaderni di Studi Berberi e Libico-berberi
brings together papers by the scholars (from both Italy and abroad) who took part in the 7
conference. The aim of this collection is to provide insights into a range of crucial issues that affected
and informed the uprisings of 2011; the volume
looks in particular at the role of the Berbers in Libya through the prism of the
and challenges that face them today and which were discussed during the three-day international

Libya between History and Revolution:

Language and Literature and Contemporary History of Berbers in North Africa. Since she got her PhD in

reference to the Berber Identity Movement. She is the author of several books and essays. Among her
Resilience, New Opportunities and
, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2017.
Challenges for the Berbers
, Studi Maġrebini, XV,

Valentina Schiattarella
Fulbright visiting scholar at the University of Colorado, Boulder. She earned her PhD at the École Pratique
des Hautes Études in Paris in 2015, with a dissertation on Siwi Berber. She has conducted fieldwork in Edited by
Siwa (Egypt), where she has collected a large corpus of texts, which are contributing to the documentation
of the Siwi language. Some folktales and narrations were published in her book Anna Maria Di Tolla - Valentina Schiattarella

Napoli
 Stu d i Afri ca n ist ic i
Quaderni di Studi Berberi e Libico-berberi
7

Direttrice:

Consiglio direttivo:
Direttrice
Anna Maria Di Tolla

Comitato direttivo Miloud Taïfi

Dahbia Abrous (Inalco - Parigi), Flavia Aiello (Università di Napoli
“L’Orientale”), Fabio Amato (Università di Napoli “L’Orientale”), Gian
Consiglio scientifico:
Claudio Batic (Università di Napoli “L’Orientale”), Mansour Ghaki
(Università di Napoli “L’Orientale” - INAA - Tunisi), Fouad Saa (Université
de Fès - Marocco), Miloud Taïfi (Université de Fès - Marocco), Tassadit
Yacine (EHESS - Parigi).

Comitato scientifico-editoriale
Flavia Aiello, Karima Arkaoui, Gian Claudio Batic, Anna Maria Di Tolla,
Ahmed Habouss, Sarah Pinto, Valentina Schiattarella.

The articles in
The articles in this
this book
book have
havebeen
beenpeer-reviewed
peer-reviewed
In quarta di copertina:
Iscrizione libico-berbera. Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale “Vittorio Emanuele III”
 UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI NAPOLI “L’ORIENTALE”
DIPARTIMENTO ASIA, AFRICA eE MEDITERRANEO

Stu d i Afri can ist ic i

Quaderni di Studi Berberi e Libico-berberi
7

Libya between History and Revolution:

Resilience,
Direttrice:
New Opportunities and
Challenges for the Berbers
Consiglio direttivo: Scritti in onore di Francesco Beguinot

Miloud Taïfi
Edited by

Anna Maria Anna

Di Tolla - Valentina
Maria Di TollaSchiattarella
Consiglio scientifico:

NAPOLI 2020

The articles in this book have been peer-reviewed

ISSN 2283-5636
ISBN 978-88-6719-189-5
 Table of contents

Introduction
Anna Maria DI TOLLA
Libya between Revitalisation, New Opportunities and Challenges for
the Berbers 9

The Conflict in Libya. Notes and Witnesses

Francesco P. TRUPIANO
Libya between History and Revolution. The Fall of Colonel Khadafy
and the Western Military Intervention in Libya 21
Fathi BEN KHALIFA
The Political Situation of the Imazighen in Libya Before and After 2011 29

Libya and the Construction of a Political Identity

Chiara PAGANO
Shall we Speak of an Arab-Berber Libya? Towards an Interconnected
History of Tripolitania’s Social Groups (1911-1918) 37
Federico CRESTI
Sulayman al-Baruni in Italy (1919-1920): From the Dream of the
Berber Principality to the Italo-Tripolitanian Brotherhood 67
Antonio M. MORONE
Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case
of the Bin Sha‛ban Family 99
Anna BALDINETTI
The Idea of a United Libya: Sulayman al-Baruni, Pan-Arabism and
National Identity 115

Libya and the Italian Colonisation

Maria Grazia NEGRO
La colonisation italienne : une narration impossible 133
Laura TROVELLESI CESANA
Journalisme, journaux et journalistes dans la construction du premier
discours public sur la Libye 141
Silvana PALMA
The Role of Libya in the Construction of Italy’s Collective Self-Portrait 159
6 Table of contents

History, Representations and Transition in Libya

Mansour GHAKI
L’évolution de la carte de l’Afrique du nord-ouest antique. Le poids
de l’histoire et de la géographie 185
Marisa FOIS
Les ennemis de la Nation arabe. Les Berbères en Libye entre histoire
et représentations 199
Ali BENSAÂD
Libye, les rentes d’une transition inaboutie 215

Socio-Political and Linguistic Aspects of Libyan Berber

Luca D’ANNA
nəḥne kull-na yad wāḥda: The Mobilization of Amazigh Libyans in
Revolutionary Rap 235
Lameen SOUAG
Linguistic Unity and Diversity in Libyan Berber (Amazigh) 255
Anna Maria DI TOLLA - Valentina SCHIATTARELLA
A Literary and Linguistic Analysis of Nafusi Berber Based on Past
Works 273

List of Contributors 293

 ANTONIO M. MORONE

Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence:

The case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

The independence of the Federal Monarchy of Libya was proclaimed on

December 24, 1951, after almost ten years of British military administration in
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and French occupation of Fezzan (1943-1951), and
after more than thirty years of Italian colonial rule (1911-1943). The period
following World War II was decisive and fundamental in defining the shape of the
new Libyan State and the country’s post-colonial power dynamics. In the available
literature, Libya’s independence has been analyzed and understood above all as, on
the one hand, a process of decolonization from above, mediated by the United
Nations and in the context of the retreat, if not collapse, of the Italian colonial
system, and, on the other hand, as a struggle between Libyan independentist forces
and the external interference of the old colonial powers (Italy, United Kingdom and
France) or of the new superpowers, especially the United States. 1 This paper
intends to underline the colonial attitude of Italy immediately after the fall of
Fascism and during the early years of the Republic, and the international
competition for the domination of Libya between the end of the Second World War
and 1949. In this year, the so-called Bevin-Sforza Compromise was rejected by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, leading to the failure of the attempt to
divide Libya among Italy, the United Kingdom, and France. Only as a consequence

1 J. Bessis, La Libye contemporaine, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1986; G. P. Calchi Novati, Mediterraneo

e questione araba nella politica estera italiana, in F. Barbagallo (ed.), Storia dell’Italia repubblicana,
vol. II, Einaudi, Torino, 1995; A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia, Vol. 2: Dal fascismo a Gheddafi,
Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1986; F. Cresti - M. Cricco, Storia della Libia contemporanea. Dal dominio
ottomano alla morte di Gheddafi, Carocci, Roma, 2012; N. Labanca, Oltremare. Storia
dell’espansione coloniale italiana, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002; M. Khadduri, Modern Libya. A Study in
Political Development, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963; M. Djaziri, État et société en
Libye, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1996; G. Rossi, La questione delle ex colonie italiane dopo il trattato di
pace: 1947-1949, Giuffrè, Milano, 1980; D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2006; R. B. St. John, Libya. From Colony to Revolution, Oneworld,
Oxford, 2008; J. Wright, The Emergence of Libya, Silphium Press, London, 2008.
100 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

of this event, we argue, did Italy for the first time declare itself favorable to the
independence of colonized countries. However, such colonialist plans for Libya
were not just an expression of external interference, but also involved the
intermediation of groups of notables who often moved within a regional rather than
a national horizon. Although after 1949 the projects for the re-colonization of
Libya were set aside and the legitimacy of the country’s independence ceased to be
questioned, the fact that the various elites who had intermediated at various
regional levels with the European colonial powers had become ensconced at the
head of the new independent state led to a fragmentation of political power in the
country. This encouraged considerable ongoing external interference in Libyan
affairs, and fostered the prevalence of conservative projects for the new
independent Libyan society.
Abroad in Africa, the former colonial intermediaries, the native authorities of
the British Empire and the chefs of the French Empire’s administrative districts,
tried to defend their positions of power in a political and social framework that was
undergoing rapid change. However, in most cases, it was the new political forces
inspired by nationalism that prevailed. In Libya, history took the opposite course:
the nationalists were the main losers in the decolonization process, while a
multifaceted alliance of conservative elites, led by Idris al-Sanusi in the name of
Islam and privileging a localist political agenda, was able to take control of the
newly independent State. The struggle between nationalists and conservative forces
in the country and their respective international supporters on the eve of Libyan
independence has been decidedly less studied compared to international
competition over the country. 2 This paper broadly discusses the paradigm of
Libyan intermediaries in relation to the country’s transition towards independence,
and points out a specific case study of political intermediation in Western
Tripolitania that is related to the Berber speaking Bin Sha‛ban family. The political
engagement of this group is analyzed from the perspective of intermediation (rather
than collaboration), arguing that colonial subjects that served under European rule
strategically acted in the interest of improving their authority and their own
personal welfare or social status.3 In this regard, the historical trajectory of the Bin
Sha‛ban proves their ability to encompass the changing political scenario and to

2
Regarding political competition in Libya, see L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation
in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986; A. Baldinetti, The
Origins of the Libyan Nation. Colonial legacy, exile and the emergence of a new nation-state,
Routledge, London, 2010; S. Hasan Sury, A New System for a New State. The Libyan Experiment in
Statehood, 1951-1969, in A. Baldinetti, A Modern and Contemporary Libya: Sources and
Historiographies, Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, Roma, 2003.
3 B. N. Lawrance - E. L. Osborn - R. L. Roberts, Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African

Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2006, 6.
Antonio M. Morone 101

secure (or improve) their status, relying upon the enhancement of their Berber
ethnicity.

The international struggle over Libya

Italy’s defeat in World War II and its loss of dominion over its African colonies,
instead of leading to a rapid settlement of the question of the status of the former
Italian colonies, gave rise to a long and complex political and diplomatic process
that lasted until the late 1940’s. Article 23 of the peace treaty signed in Paris on
February 10, 1947, forced Italy to give up its colonies and hand over all decisions
concerning them to the four victorious powers (the US, the USSR, France, and the
UK), which were given a year from the date of the treaty’s ratification to reach a
solution; otherwise the colonial dossier would pass to the UN, as in fact happened
in September 1948. Many factors played against the idea of a possible “return of
the colonies to Italy”, starting from “the hostility of the Arabs, the strenuous
opposition of Ethiopia and, above all, the lack of reliability of Italy until its
political orientation and its place in the international system were clarified”.4 Italy
had lost its status as a colonial power, experiencing this diminution of its
international role as a vexation, an injustice, which the new republican ruling class
tried to remedy throughout the post-war period, up to 1949. Italy’s defeat during
the Second World War did not mean the outright end of Italian colonialism, nor did
it bring about the independence of Libya, Eritrea and Somalia. On the contrary,
during the post-war period, there was an “overabundance and competition” of
different colonial policies that can be referred back to Italy, Great Britain and
France.5 Italy’s staunch efforts to regain its overseas possessions, including Libya,
were constantly opposed by Great Britain and France’s attempts to topple Italian
influence and transform their respective military administrations in civilian
trusteeship administrations. European colonial competition for Libya also
influenced the clash between the Libyan nationalists, which had grown rapidly
under the British Military Administration (BMA), and the various groups of
notables that were willing to broker with the different European powers.
The real turning point in the complex affair of the settlement of the status of the
former Italian colonies came on May 18, 1949, when the UN General Assembly
failed to approve the Bevin-Sforza Compromise, which would have divided Libya
into three different trusteeship administrations: an Italian mandate for Tripolitania,
an English mandate for Cyrenaica, and a French mandate for Fezzan. The negative
swing vote in the UN General Assembly was specifically that of the representative
of Haiti. More generally, the reasons for the lack of approval were due to an
4 G. P. Calchi Novati (ed.), L’Africa d’Italia. Una storia coloniale e postcoloniale, Carocci,
Rome, 2011, 360-361.
5 A. M. Morone, La fine del colonialismo italiano. Politica, società e memorie, Le Monnier,

Firenze, 2018, 5.
102 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

international system that was undergoing rapid and decisive change, in which
direct colonial rule was increasingly distant from the logic of indirect influence that
was beginning to characterize what developed into the Cold War. After the failure
of their last attempt to restore a colonial regime in Libya, Italy and Great Britain
then declared their readiness to support its independence. Minister Sforza spoke
before the UN’s Political Committee on October 1, 1949 to pledge Italy’s
commitment to immediate Libyan independence. Compared to the colonial
remonstrances of the immediate post-war period, it was a true diplomatic about-
face that however still pursued “a tactical aim”, under the belief that Italian
influence in Libya could still be furthered through (and not against) independence:6
Italy was now trying to secure its influence over the independent Libya by
supporting their closest intermediaries, such as the Qaramanli, the Muntasir and the
Bin Sha‛ban families.
The solution of an independent Libya organized as a federal State under the
kingship of Idris al-Sanusi promised to serve a conservative project which had been
realized through an unlikely alliance between the various sources of Western
influence and the interests of various regional notables. The grandson of the
founder of the Sanusi Order, Idris al-Sanusi, was born in 1890 and was educated in
al-Kufrah. In 1922, Idris escaped the Italian military campaign in Libya and took
refuge in British-ruled Egypt, while Sanusi resistance in Cyrenaica lasted until
1931. In 1947, Idris returned from exile and was suddenly acclaimed as leader of
Cyrenaica. Great Britain took advantage of its good relations with the Sanusi Order
and proclaimed the autonomy of Cyrenaica on July 1, 1949 under the rule of Emir
Idris al-Sanusi. In terms of international law, “Cyrenaica could not have either de
facto or de jure recognition as a State” since any decision about the former Italian
colonies necessarily had to pass through a UN vote.7 However, in political terms
Idris’s role was greatly strengthened, clearly to the detriment of the nationalists, but
above all also with regard to other local notables. For its part, the UK was able to
gain a leading role in relations with what would soon become the country’s new
ruling class. France, among the three European powers directly involved in Libya,
was certainly the one that manifested the greatest resistance to the political change
triggered by the failed approval of the Bevin-Sforza Compromise. This was also
due to the fact that it was suffering the consequences of this rejection without
having directly taken part in it. Like the colonialist plans of Italy and Great Britain,
France’s had hinged on the support of local notables, specifically the Saif al-Nasr

6 G. P. Calchi Novati, La sistemazione delle colonie italiane dell’Africa Orientale e i

condizionamenti della guerra fredda, in A. Del Boca (ed.), Le guerre coloniali del fascismo, Laterza,
Rome-Bari, 1991, 533.
7 Archivio Storico-Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter ASDMAE), Rome,

Affari Politici (hereafter AP), Uf. III, b. 742, note signed by Finzi, first President of the Appeals
Court, May 11, 1950.
Antonio M. Morone 103

family, and especially Ahmed Saif al-Nasr: France had relied on them to
administer the region and discourage the penetration of nationalist ideology. 8
However, the train of events forced France in Libya and elsewhere in Africa to
“negotiate formal domination in exchange for lasting influence”.9 By exploiting
their link with France and leveraging their historical collaboration with the
Sanusiyya, the Saif al-Nasr became the leaders of the new independent Fezzan.
The dynamics of settling the status of the former Italian colonies moved toward
a rapid solution when a two-stage agreement was reached at the UN General
Assembly. Resolution no. 289 of November 21, 1949 called for Libya’s
independence, officially proclaimed on December 24, 1951. It was, as stated, a
conservative independence, a “lively but contradictory compromise between
different foreign interests and national aspirations”, cobbled together through the
forms of a federal State.10 Such an institutional structure left ample powers to the
governments of the three federated regions, and by virtue of this, was a
compromise that managed to bring together the political interests of the various
local notables with the various European policies of interference in the country. It
was Idris himself who “used all his personal influence and authority to persuade
the Tripolitan leaders to support federalism, without which Libyan unity would
probably never have been achieved”.11
The center of gravity of the new state was to be found in the figure of Idris,
who, as must be remembered, before being King of the federal monarchy of Libya,
had been, and then continued to be, the head of the Sanusi Order. In fact, Islam was
the lowest common denominator on which to establish a conservative pact among
the different regional notable leaders: for this reason, the sense of identity provided
by Islam was much more important in Libya than it was for the States that
succeeded the Ottoman Empire in the Arab Orient.12 In the framework of Idris’s
conservative project, religion became his main tool for overcoming the
particularism of the country’s many regional affiliations or qabila ties in order to
build the new Libya: “Islam was institutionalized as a source of political legitimacy

8 F. Cresti, Il nazionalismo libico a Tripoli durante l’amministrazione militare britannica: note su

Ahmad e ‘Ali al-Faqih Hasan e sul Blocco nazionalista libero, al-Kutlah al-wataniyyah al-hurrah
(1945-1949), Oriente Moderno, XXIV, 2/3, 2005, 390.
9 P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence. A Comparative History, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,

2012, 49.
10 Y. Martin, La Libye de 1912 à 1969, in AA.VV., La Libye nouvelle. Rupture et continuité,

Éditions du centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1975, 45.

11 M. Khadduri, Modern Libya. A Study in Political Development, The Johns Hopkins Press,

Baltimore, 1963, 319.

12 L. Anderson, Religion and State in Libya: The Politics of Identity, Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science, 483, January, 1986, 65.

104 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

and the Constitution [...] sanctioned the sacredness of the monarchy”.13 At the time
of independence, the challenge was to transform into a shared political and cultural
reality what had been an artificial invention of colonialism, by bringing together in
the Libyan colony three regions with specific and partly divergent histories: while
for the nationalists this challenge was to be won by constructing a tightly-knit Arab
nation, for the conservatives it was a matter of preserving areas of local autonomy
and power within the broader framework of Islam and Idris’s recognized role as a
nodal point for the various regional notables.
Idris’s ascent to the throne therefore marked the defeat of the nationalists, and
for a section of the Libyan population Idris’s return to Libya, after his years of
exile in Egypt, was not experienced as an authentic liberation, but rather as a
conservative restoration. With the elections of March 1952, the first of the newly
independent Libya, the nationalists who opposed Idris had hoped, if not to
overturn, at least to restore a balance in the situation that might be favorable to
them. Tripolitania elected 35 seats out of 55 total deputies, while the rest were
divided between Cyrenaica (15) and Fezzan (5). The results delivered the
parliament and the country firmly into the hands of the conservative power system
linked to Idris. The 1952 elections had in fact confirmed the long-time fears of the
nationalists regarding the possibility that the electoral test might reveal itself to be
a democratic trap: “The majority of people who went to the polls voted for
individual personalities, and not for parties or policies at all”. 14 Although the
nationalist parties had made reference to the Arab League, and to ideas, passions
and slogans of the broader pan-Arab movement, the capacity for political and
social mobilization of modern nationalism remained limited among Libyans. The
vote was characterized by a political and often conceptual horizon that did not
supersede clans, reputations or bonds of patronage. In Tripoli, where the
nationalists could count on a greater following among the mobilized urban workers
who had demonstrated and gone on strike several times against foreign
interference, the election result was indeed different and marked a “resounding
victory”, 15 as the British documents of Bashir al-Sa‛dawi’s National Congress
define it. However, the nationalist victory in Tripoli was not enough to influence
the result at the national level, although it was, somewhat paradoxically, the
warning signal that persuaded Idris to ban political parties and expel Bashir al-
Sa‛dawi and other nationalist intellectuals and politicians from the country, using
the pretext of a few protests that followed the vote. Evidently, such an initiative

13 A. Baldinetti, Islam e Stato in Libia dal secondo periodo ottomano alla Jamahiriyya (1835-

1969), in A. Baldinetti - A. Pitassio (eds.), Dopo l’impero ottomano. Stati-nazione e comunità

religiose, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2006, 231.
14 The National Archives, Kew, London, Foreign Office, b. 371, f. 97269, secret report on the

elections signed by G. P. Cassels, March 17, 1952.

15 Ibidem.
Antonio M. Morone 105

immediately emphasized the conservative character of the regime, but also

underlined its need for self-defence and conservation, which perceived political
parties as an element of social change adverse to the classes on which it instead
based its consent.

The Bin Sha‛ban family’s case of intermediation

Italian colonial rule had forbidden its Libyan subjects from forming all kinds of
associations, especially of a political sort; the British Military Administration
(BMA), on the contrary, fostered the liberalization of Libyan society and allowed
the formation of the first political associations, with the aim of making them into
the British’ own referents and political interlocutors. At the same time, the Italians
also began to support and finance individual notables, families or associations
which were willing to support the idea of Italy’s return to Libya. The Ministry of
Italian Africa, Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (MAI) in Italian, which was only
closed down in 1953, played a prominent role in disseminating funds and building
up political allegiances. The creation of nationalist associations and parties marked
a significant political change in the relationship between Italy and Libya, even if it
was not a change genuinely inspired by the former, but rather a strategy
implemented in response to the political liberalization triggered by the British
occupants. The relative autonomy and freedom that Libyans experienced under
BMA rule soon became a contested space between different groups, associations
and parties and their respective plans for the future of Libya in partnership with
different foreign handlers.
The competition between the United Kingdom and Italy to win the support of
the most influential Libyan intermediaries (both in terms of individuals and of
groups) was mirrored not only by the eruption on the country’s political scene of
the Libyan nationalists, but also by the increasing competition between Libyan
intermediaries to hold on to the most important and valuable positions in a state
and society in transition. While the young nationalists were part of the broader
networks of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism and supported the independence and
strong unity of the Libyan nation-state, the different groups of notables who
intermediated with Italy, Great Britain or France favoured a parochial and
conservative vision of political power that could safeguard their position in society
on the basis of their ties with a qabila, family, or Islamic brotherhood, or of a
specific colonial relationship (as was the case for the askaris, the African soldiers
serving in the armies of many European colonial powers).
On the Libyan side, the struggle for independence was understood for the most
part in terms of the competition between two different ideas of State and society:
the unified and progressive plans of the nationalists on the one hand, and the
alliance among regional or local conservative hierarchies of notables on the other.
The claim to power and legitimacy of these notables was often due to historically
106 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

entrenched economic and political factors, such as the control of the trans-Saharan
trading routes, the agricultural production (olive growing and pastoralism in
particular), and commercial activities in the urban centers; but in other cases, they
also stemmed from connections to “noble” Muslim and Ottoman lineages or
familial links with important Islamic Orders, such as the Sanusiyya. It was
therefore not surprising that in the 1940s a point of convergence for the different
fractions and currents that existed among Libyan notables was found in Idris al-
Sanusi, who headed the Order first established in Cyrenaica in 1843 by
Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi.
In this complex scenario, the elements that fostered and facilitated intermediary
roles were many and varied. Among others, shared ethnicity was a powerful tool
through which to conduct negotiation. The case of the Bin Sha‛ban, a Berber-
speaking family from the city of Zwara. Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban was the son of
Sultan, who since the early stages of the colonial occupation of Western
Tripolitania had been a precious ally of Italy in the city.16 Ibrahim was one of the
most prominent members of the Bin Sha‛ban family; as such, after having served
as administrative chief (capo-cabila) during colonial rule, he was imprisoned in
1943 by the British for his closeness to Italy. After he was released following the
end of the Second World War, his political career was closely linked with that of
Salim al-Muntasir, who was one of the most prominent figures in another family
that had acted as intermediaries for Italy since the beginning of colonial rule, and
had undoubtedly help to facilitate Italian rooting in Tripolitania.17 In 1946, Ibrahim
Bin Sha‛ban was part of the leading group of the United National Front (UNF)
which, under the leadership of Salim al-Muntasir, aimed “to unite and create an
independent Libya under the constitutional rule of Idris al-Sanusi and with the
support of Great Britain”.18 The Front represented the more conservative bloc of
Tripolitanian society, and it gained its main followers from among notables,
shaykhs, traders, and some Jewish circles. The UNF simultaneously fostered
relations with Great Britain and Italy: from the Libyan perspective, the most
profitable position was to have relations with all the main players in the Libyan
game, the British Administration, Italy and Idris al-Sanusi.19
The situation changed rapidly during the spring of 1948, when the Four Power
Commission (FPC) landed in Tripoli on 6 March 1948. During its 40 days of
investigation in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, the FPC “recognized that

16 S. Berhe, Notabili libici e funzionari italiani: l’amministrazione coloniale in Tripolitania

(1912-1919), Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2015, 218-219.

17 L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation…, 126.
18 A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation…, 118.
19 F. Cresti, La rinascita dell’attività politica in Tripolitania nel secondo dopoguerra secondo

alcuni documenti britannici (dicembre 1945 gennaio 1949), in F. Cresti. (ed.), La Libia tra
Mediterraneo e mondo islamico, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, 233.
Antonio M. Morone 107

Libyans were virtually unanimous in their desire for freedom from foreign rule”; but
it also nevertheless concluded that Libya could not be reputed to be economically
“self-supporting” and was “thus not ready for independence”.20 Apart from the great
resentment that this decision produced in Libya, the perspective of a further period of
foreign rule over Libya, as well as the increasing rapprochement between Italy and
the United Kingdom, lead the various Libyan players to review their positions. The
UNF faced a “schism” inside its executive committee: president Salim al-Muntasir
and Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban were both accused of having been “bought by the
Italians”.21 According to Italian records, there is no doubt that the Italians invested
both propaganda and monetary support in trying to win over both Libyan notables;
on the other hand, however, their potential engagement with the Italians could have
been intended as an instrument through which to maintain a position of strength in a
constantly shifting scenario: faced with the close relations between the United
Kingdom and Idris al-Sunusi, Salim al-Muntasir and Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban could at
best aspire to come second in any relations with the British Administration, while
intermediation with Italy had the potential to be more fruitful. Relations with Italy
also appeared promising with a view to counteracting the rise of Libyan nationalists
in Tripolitania under the leadership of Bashir al-Sa‛dawi: the latter, after years of
exile in Syria and Egypt, in 1948, looking forward to the arrival in Libya of the FPC,
had transferred the offices of Libyan Liberation Committee from Cairo to Tripoli
with the support of the Egyptian government and the Arab League.
In 1949, the failure of the Bevin-Sforza Compromise and the consequent Italian
and British willingness to grant Libyan independence once again revolutionized the
scenario. According to Italian archival documents, Abdallah Bin Sha‛ban, son of
Ibrahim, had been sent to New York at the expense of the Italian government in
November 1949 to witness the final act of the long and complex diplomatic
negotiations over Libya at the General Assembly of the United Nations, and to
praise the Italian support of Libyan independence and its postcolonial commitment
to help (and influence) the new State. In fact, resolution no. 289 of November 21,
1949 put an end to the international dispute over Libya through arranging for its
independence by the end of 1951. Upon his return from New York, Abdallah
stopped off in Tunis where, according to Italian documents, he had a series of
discussions with the French authorities, from whom Abdallah presumably
requested aid “for the Berbers, who will always be mistreated as a minority no
longer protected by Italy, against a Tripolitan government made up mainly of
Arabs, who had always been traditionally hostile to the Berbers. In the past, the
Italians had protected loyal Berbers who had fought for them against the Arabs,
saving the Italians from potentially calamitous predicaments, especially during the

20 R. B. St. John, Libya. Continuity and Change, Routledge, London, 2011, 33.
21 A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation…, 131.
108 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

First World War, when Italian forces were about to be driven back into the sea by
the onslaught of the rebellious Arabs. However, following the end of the war, Italy
had showed no gratitude to the Berbers, and had in fact elevated into positions of
power the leaders of Arab factions that had not always been faithful to the Italian
cause, as in the case of a number of members of the treacherously pro-British al-
Muntasir family. Given these conditions of the Tripolitan Berber people, it is
advisable to rely on the Berber brothers of Tunisia and the French authorities in
order for the former to prepare themselves to resist the expected hostilities of the
Tripolitan and pro-English Arab government”.22
The author of the document, senior MAI official Gaetano Chapron, linked Bin
Sha‛ban’s attitude to a “resentment for the pre-eminence afforded by the Italians to
Salim al-Muntasir”, who had given a secondary role to the Bin Sha‛ban family. The
senior official also confirmed that what was reported in the document “were veiled
threats in the same vein as those spoken by Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban in a conversation he
had with me when he was in Rome”.23 According to an information report from 1950
(considered “reliable” by the Italian Ministry of Defence), it was even assumed that
the Bin Sha‛ban were in favour of “a French occupation of Zwara, Nalut, Jado and
Yefren [...] in their desire to unite with the Berbers of Tunisia”.24 In actuality, the
agreement on the settlement of the Tunisian-Tripolitan border in 1910 between
French rulers in Tunis and Ottoman authorities in Tripoli had already produced a
considerable enlargement of French-Tunisian space at the expense of Tripolitania.25
In this regard the Bin Sha‛ban’s strategy took for granted France’s long lasting
interest in increasing its influence across the border region.
The document clearly shows a representation of the Berber identity and its
history centred on ethnicity, in correspondence with the colonial astuteness that had
helped shape and construct it as part of its strategy of domination. Recourse to
ethnicity made it possible to create a minority discourse among the relevant
communities of Western Tripolitania, as was the case with the city of Zwara, where
the Berber language was spoken alongside Arabic. While in the pre-World War II
period Berber identity (and from the point of view of colonial power a possible
Berber policy) had been cultivated as a negotiating asset to broker in the context of
a war that opposed Libyans to Libyans and not only colonizers to colonized, in
1949 a similar bargaining logic re-emerged, in which the ethnic and minority
arguments were updated to suit the new political context and the competing

22
ASDMAE, AP, Uf. III, 1946-50, b. 52, secret note signed by Chapron, November 24, 1949.
23
Ibidem.
24 ASDMAE, AP, Uf. III, 1946-50, b. 52, anonymous report attached to the letter from General

Gian Carlo Re to the Defence Chief of Staff, February 15, 1950.

25 E. Rossi, Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista araba al 1911, Istituto per

l’Oriente, Roma 1968, 336. See also M. Abdelmoula, Jihad et colonialisme. La Tunisie et la
Tripolitaine (1914-1918), Éd. Tiers-Monde, Tunis, 1987, 78.
Antonio M. Morone 109

colonial hierarchies of the European powers - which, regarding Libya in general,

were Italy and England, but included French interference along the border with
Tunisia and Fezzan. In fact, another Italian document, dating from just over a year
later, reports that in the first months following Libya’s independence, France
(while doing everything in order not to give up its positions in Fezzan) “tried to
attract into its orbit the Berber group of Jebel [al-Nafusa] and the Ghibla
nomads”.26 This kind of policy was in direct contiguity with the French strategy in
Fezzan of exerting influence through close relations with the Saif al-Nasr family.27
Exercising influence on the population of Fezzan up to Nafusa and Zwara was
evidently a strategic aim for France in the context of controlling a border area with
Tunisia and Algeria through which contact was being made between the nationalist
movements in the French colonies and their Libyan, Egyptian and Arab
counterparts in the Middle East, and which later saw “the illegal passage of arms
destined for the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)”, which transformed
Libya into its rear line.28
From the Berber perspective, therefore, what this implied was the continuation
of a strategy of intermediation, which could hardly be understood as an objective in
itself, but rather ought to be seen as a means to achieve other objectives. Reading
the above document between the lines, it emerges clearly that the real competition
was between the Bin Sha‛ban and the Muntasir families, who were vying against
each other to occupy as many positions of power within the new State and its
institutions as they could. It was certainly no coincidence that the Bin Sha‛ban
came immediately after the UN’s final decision on the independence of Libya,
when the issue was no longer that of the colonial resurgence of Italy, Great Britain
and France, but rather that of the competition among Libyan notables scrambling to
define their respective roles, positions of power and institutional positions in the
new State. Turning to France was therefore a tactic to attract Italy’s attention in
away from the competing Muntasir family, and to try to mobilize part of the
material and symbolic resources that Italy was preparing to deploy to support
Libya’s post-independence “development”, and which evidently the Bin Sha‛ban
considered to be flowing towards the Muntasir family in alarming proportions.

26 ASDMAE, AP, uf. III, 1951-57, b.818, express telex no. 2981/784 from Conti to the MAE,

April 10, 1952.

27 M. Ouannes, L’administration française au Fezzan et la nature de ses rapports à la famille de

Seif-En-Nasr, in M. Ouannes - P. N. Denieuil (eds.), Une histoire méconnue. Les relations libyco-
françaises au Fezzan de 1943 à 1956, Cérès Éditions, Tunis, 2012, 123.
28 ASDMAE, AP, uf. III, 1959-62, b.40, f. 17, express telex no. 10/4 from Mondello to the MAE,

January 3 1959.
110 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

Conclusions
If the main goal of intermediation was to secure a position of power in a
changing society, the vicissitudes of the Bin Sha‛ban family and in particular those
of Ibrahim, testify to the success of this strategy, especially when contrasted with
the claims of the nationalists and, at the same time, the concurrent intermediation
of the Muntasir family. In 1951, Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban became the Minister of
Communications for the government led by Mahmoud al-Muntasir, grandson of
Selim. Then, in 1954, under the Bin Halim government, Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban
became Minister of Education, and then Minister of Defence following a
reshuffling of the cabinet at the end of the same year. In conclusion, the positioning
of Libyan actors with regard to the development and enforcement of Italian
colonial and post-colonial policies was not at all one of passive reception, but was
instead clearly marked by a spirit of intermediation, with which more than one
actor tried to cope with the changing situation in order to safeguard their positions
of political power. This was the case for the nationalists and the established
hierarchies of local notables. By shifting its attention to Libya, Italy, together with
Great Britain and France, contributed significantly in making sure that a
conservative regime took over independent Libya, and thus ensured the victory of
the older, conservative echelons of notables over the young pan-Arabic progressive
nationalists. Intermediation did not therefore only provide important levers through
which to exercise their influence over a newly independent Libya for Great Britain,
Italy and France alike, but it was in fact decisive in acquiring the economic and
symbolic resources that helped produce the definitive affirmation of the more
conservative groups of the country over the new progressives. It appears clear that
through their relations with Italy, the Bin Sha‛ban family were able to reinforce
their respective positions of power within the frame of a logic of self-preservation.
Furthermore, we have seen how Berber identity was invoked and framed in
terms of ethnicity and of a minority oppressed by the Arabs in relation to the
process of political bargaining. While colonial knowledge had produced ethnic
identities in order to divide and rule over its subjects, the case of the Bin Sha‛ban
family shows the ability of post-colonial subjects to reverse this logic and utilize
colonial ethnic labels to gain advantages in bargaining with foreign authorities. An
interpretation framing the anti-colonial struggle in Western Tripolitania in terms of
political and socio-economic interests that were beyond the agenda of Islamist
mobilization was first formulated by the Libyan historian Aghil al-Barbar.29 Libyan

29
A. M. Barbar, The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian invasion: 1911-1912, Ph.D.
Thesis University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980; A. M. Barbar, Economics of Colonialism: The Italian
Invasion of Libya and the Libyan resistance 1911-1920. A Socio-Economic Analysis, Markaz Jihad al-
Libyin, Tripoli, 1992.
Antonio M. Morone 111

resistance to Italian occupation did not form a “unique religious front”,30 but it
instead contributed to a rising process of territorial grounding of political agency
which – as Chiara Pagano has demonstrated in her work – combined with the
strategic use of discourses of ethnicity in order to mobilize people and bargain with
foreign counterparts.31 Similar dynamics emerged during the Libyan transition to
independence, thus demonstrating the Libyans’ ability to understand, manipulate
and reinterpret colonial categories to their advantage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdelmoula, Mahmoud, Jihad et colonialisme. La Tunisie et la Tripolitaine (1914-1918),

Éd. Tiers-Monde, Tunis, 1987.
Anderson, Lisa, Religion and State in Libya: The Politics of Identity, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 483, January, 1986.
Anderson, Lisa, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986.
Archivio Storico-Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Affari Politici, Roma.
Assan, Valérie - Heyberger, Bernard - Vogel, Jakob (eds.), Minorités en Méditerranée au
XIXe siècle. Identités, identifications, circulations, Presses Universitaires de Rennes,
Rennes, 2019.
Baldinetti, Anna, Islam e Stato in Libia dal secondo periodo ottomano alla Jamahiriyya
(1835-1969), in Anna Baldinetti - Armando Pitassio (eds.), Dopo l’impero ottomano.
Stati-nazione e comunità religiose, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2006.
Baldinetti, Anna, The Origins of the Libyan Nation. Colonial legacy, exile and the
emergence of a new nation-state, Routledge, London, 2010.
Barbar, Aghil M., The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian invasion: 1911-1912,
Ph.D. Thesis University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980.
Barbar, Aghil M., Economics of Colonialism: The Italian Invasion of Libya and the Libyan
resistance 1911-1920. A Socio-Economic Analysis, Markaz Jihad al-Libyin, Tripoli, 1992.

30 M. Lahmar, Libyens et Italiens en Tripolitanie (1911-1928). Quels territoires d’allégance

politique?, in Abdelhamid Hènia (ed.), Être notable au Maghreb. Dynamique des configurations
notabiliaires, Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris, 2006, 130.
31 C. Pagano, Emergere ed evoluzioni del discorso etnico nella Tripolitania coloniale: la

questione berbera (1911-1923), PhD thesis, Università degli studi di Roma Tre, 2016/2017 a. y. See
also F. Cresti, Les Ibadites du Djebel Nefusa dans la vision coloniale italienne. Les débuts de la
‘question berbère’ en Libye (1911-1913), in V. Assan, B. Heyberger and J. Vogel (éds.), Minorités en
Méditerranée au XIXe siècle. Identités, 2019, 85-104; F. Cresti, Il nazionalismo libico a Tripoli
durante l’amministrazione militare britannica: note su Ahmad e ‘Ali al-Faqih Hasan e sul Blocco
nazionalista libero, al-Kutlah al-wataniyyah al-hurrah (1945-1949), Oriente Moderno, XXIV, 2/3,
2005; V. Assan - B. Heyberger - J. Vogel (eds.), Minorités en Méditerranée au XIXe siècle. Identités,
identifications, circulations, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2019.
112 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family

Berhe, Simona, Notabili libici e funzionari italiani: l’amministrazione coloniale in

Tripolitania (1912-1919), Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2015, 218-219.
Bessis, Juliette, La Libye contemporaine, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1986.
Calchi Novati, Gian Paolo, La sistemazione delle colonie italiane dell’Africa Orientale e i
condizionamenti della guerra fredda, in Angelo Del Boca (ed.), Le guerre coloniali del
fascismo, Laterza, Roma / Bari, 1991.
Calchi Novati, Gian Paolo, Mediterraneo e questione araba nella politica estera italiana, in
Francesco Barbagallo (ed.), Storia dell’Italia repubblicana, vol. II, Einaudi, Torino,
1995.
Calchi Novati, Gian Paolo (ed.), L’Africa d’Italia. Una storia coloniale e postcoloniale,
Carocci, Roma, 2011.
Cresti, Federico - Cricco, Massimiliano, Storia della Libia contemporanea. Dal dominio
ottomano alla morte di Gheddafi, Carocci, Roma, 2012.
Cresti, Federico, Il nazionalismo libico a Tripoli durante l’amministrazione militare
britannica: note su Ahmad e ‘Ali al-Faqih Hasan e sul Blocco nazionalista libero, ‘al-
Kutlah al-wataniyyah al-hurrah’ (1945-1949), Oriente Moderno, XXIV, 2-3, 2005,
390.
Cresti, Federico, La rinascita dell’attività politica in Tripolitania nel secondo dopoguerra
secondo alcuni documenti britannici (dicembre 1945 – gennaio 1949), in Federico
Cresti (ed.), La Libia tra Mediterraneo e mondo islamico, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006.
Cresti, Federico, Les Ibadites du Djebel Nefusa dans la vision coloniale italienne. Les
débuts de la ‘question berbère’ en Libye (1911-1913), in Valérie Assan - Bernard
Heyberger - Jakob Vogel (eds.), Minorités en Méditerranée au XIXe siècle. Identités,
identifications, circulations, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2019, 85-103.
Del Boca, Angelo, Gli italiani in Libia. Dal fascismo a Gheddafi, Laterza, Roma / Bari,
1986.
Djaziri, Moncef, État et société en Libye, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1996.
Hasan Sury, Salaheddin, A New System for a New State. The Libyan Experiment in
Statehood, 1951-1969, in Anna Baldinetti, A Modern and Contemporary Libya: Sources
and Historiographies, Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, Roma, 2003.
Khadduri, Majid, Modern Libya. A Study in Political Development, The Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1963.
Labanca, Nicola, Oltremare. Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana, Il Mulino, Bologna,
2002.
Lahmar, Mouldi, Libyens et Italiens en Tripolitanie (1911-1928). Quels territoires
d’allégeance politique ?, in Abdelhamid Hènia (ed.), Être notable au Maghreb.
Dynamique des configurations notabiliaires, Maisonneuve & Larose, Paris, 2006, 130.
Lawrance, Benjamin, N. - Osborn, Emily L. - Roberts, Richard L., Intermediaries,
Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa,
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2006.
Martin, Yolande, La Libye de 1912 à 1969, in AA.VV., La Libye nouvelle. Rupture et
continuité, Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1975.
Morone, Antonio M., La fine del colonialismo italiano. Politica, società e memorie, Le
Monnier, Firenze, 2018.
Antonio M. Morone 113

The National Archives, Kew, London, Foreign Office, b. 371, f. 97269, secret report on the
elections signed by G.P. Cassels, March 17, 1952.
Nugent, Paul, Africa Since Independence. A Comparative History, Palgrave Macmillan,
New York, 2012.
Ouannes, Moncef, L’administration française au Fezzan et la nature de ses rapports à la
famille de Seif-En-Nasr, in Ouannes Moncef - Pierre Noel Denieuil (eds.), Une histoire
méconnue. Les relations libyo-françaises au Fezzan de 1943 à 1956, Cérès Éditions,
Tunis, 2012.
Pagano, Chiara, Emergere ed evoluzioni del discorso etnico nella Tripolitania coloniale: la
questione berbera (1911-1923), PhD thesis, Università degli studi di Roma Tre,
2016/2017.
Rossi, Ettore, Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista araba al 1911, Istituto
per l’Oriente, Roma, 1968.
Rossi, Gianfranco, La questione delle ex colonie italiane dopo il trattato di pace: 1947-
1949, Giuffrè, Milano, 1980.
St. John, Ronald B., Libya. From Colony to Revolution, Oneworld, Oxford, 2008.
Vandewalle, Dirk, A history of modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2006.
Wright, John, The Emergence of Libya, Silphium Press, London, 2008.

ABSTRACT

This paper broadly discusses the transition to the independence of Libya and points out
a specific case study of political biography in Western Tripolitania that is related to the
Berber speaking Bin Sha‛ban family. The political engagement of this group is analyzed
from the perspective of intermediation (rather than collaboration), arguing that colonial
subjects that served under European rule strategically acted in the interest of improving
their authority and their own personal welfare or social status. In this regard, the historical
trajectory of the Bin Sha‛ban proves their ability to encompass the changing political
scenario and to secure (or improve) their status, relying upon the enhancement of their
Berber ethnicity.