Oil & Gas Fiscal Regimes, Oil Wealth Development Policy and Oil & Gas Exploration Policy

in Conflict Maritime Areas: Lessons for Oil and Gas Exploration in the South China Sea for the Philippines

Rommel C. Gavieta MA (URP), MSc (Eng)

Research Associate, York Center for Asian Research (Canada) Associate Professiorial Lecturer III (MBA Program) De La Salle University (Philippines) October 2011 South China Sea Panel Discussion 2011 Canadian Council for South East Asian Studies Munck Center, Toronto University Toronto, Canada

Introduction to the Philippine Energy Sector

Introduction to the Philippine Energy Sector

Philippines has 8% reliance on Natural Gas for Primary Energy and 29% reliance on NG for Power Generation Philippines is on the verge of developing substantial oil and gas deposits on its eastern and western offshore coast Needs to attract O&G Exploration Investors and needs to learn from the lessons from its squandered natural resources such as timber, gold and iron ore.

Prospective Oil and Gas Field Map of the Philippines

Malampaya O&G Field was developed by Shell Philippines Exploration BV (SPEX), which holds 45%; Texaco Philippines, which holds 45%; and the Philippine National Oil Company Exploration Corp. , which holds 10%. $4.5-billion project is expected to produce NG that would generate a total of 2,700 Mw for 20 years or 30% of the Philippines entire power generation requirements. Project revenues: $6.7billion for the O&G exploration investor $0.67billion for Philippine Oil company $10billion for the Philippine Government Estimated Oil and Gas reserves: 3.5 trillion cubic foot (2008): Existing Malampaya: 3.7 trillion cubic foot for 2,700 MW NG power plants in San San Lorenzo, Sta Rita and Ilijan. Near Future Development San Martin: 74 BCF in recoverable reserve. Sampaguita: estimated 3.5 to 5 Tcf of natural gas.

Fiscal Regimes Issues in Attracting Investment for Oil and Gas Exploration

Fiscal Contractual Structure

It is critical that the fiscal regime be designed to secure the maximum revenue for the government, while providing for the investors sufficient incentive to undertake exploration and development.
At present average global fiscal system is regressive and front-end-loaded in favour of the government in Oil & Gas exploration

Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes for On-Shore and Shallow Oil & Gas Exploration
Phases since 1974: 1974 1984: strong increases in government take: Due to increase sin oil prices and reduction in acreage through nationalizations 1984 2003: decreases in government take: Due to decrease in oil prices and Expansion of acreage (political and technological) 2003 2008: increases in government take: Due to Increase in oil prices and also greater volatility of oil and gas prices and No more new acreage 2009 - 2010: In the short term there is a downward pressure on government take due to the financial crisis. The main trends in the structure of the oil and gas government take are the following: Reduction of corporate income tax rates Globalization of VAT Possible wider introduction of carbon taxes Reduction of import duties and cost base taxes More emphasis on price sensitive fiscal features Less emphasis on taxation structures that overencourage capital investment Transition to fiscal structures designed for expensive oil and gas resources.

Fiscal Regime for Deep Sea Oil & Gas Exploration

Omorogbe, Yinka, Prof Department of Public & International law, University of Ibadan; Fiscal Regimes; Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) , Civil Society Capacity Building Workshop; Nigeria; July 2005 ; Unpublished

Daniel , P. , Goldsworthy, B., Maliszewski, W., Mesa Puyo, D. and Watson, A.; Evaluating Fiscal Regimes for Resource Projects: An Example from Oil Development; International Monetary Fund; September 2008; Unpublished

Comparative Fiscal Regimes for Offshore Oil & Gas Exploration in South East Asia

Fiscal Oil Regime Philippines

The Philippine Fiscal oil Regime has been describe to be one of the most attractive in South East Asia This is policy set under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 87 otherwise known as the " Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972, the following incentives are provided for petroleum service contractors: Income Sharing Service fee of up to 40% of net production FPIA grants of up to 7.5% of the gross proceeds for service contract with minimum Filipino company participation of 15% Cost reimbursement of up to 70% gross production with carry-forward of unrecovered costs Taxes Exemption from all taxes except income tax Exemption from all taxes and duties for importation of materials and equipment for petroleum operations Special income tax of 8% of gross Philippine income for subcontractors Special income tax of 15% of Philippine income for foreign employees of service contractors and subcontractors Income tax obligation paid out of government's share FDI Inflow and outflow Easy repatriation of investments and profits Free market determination of crude oil prices, i.e., prices realized in a transaction between independent persons dealing at arms-length

Oil Wealth Management Policy Issues

Linkage between Natural Resource and Economic Development

Converting Natural Capital Into Financial and Human Capital Long-term funds are especially important due to the nature of nonrenewable resources like oil and gas. Once this natural capital is used up, it is gone forever. Economic rent from this natural capital should be converted into financial and human capital to create long-term benefits. This means investing resource revenues into long-term funds and programs and infrastructure to benefit present and future generations.

Source: Taylor, A; Grant, J; Holroyd, P; Kennedy, M; Mackenzie, K; Achieving a Win-Win From Oil and Gas Developments in the Northwest Territories; The Pembina Institute Sustainable Energy Solutions; January 2010

Ineffective Oil Wealth Management

Poor or worsening governance. The number of tax payers contributing to government revenue is postulated to affect governments sense of accountability in pursuing policies that benefit society at large. When two or three very large tax payers contribute the majority of total government income, it is easier for government not to account for these revenues full.

Economic impact of oil boom on other sectors. Unless foreign earnings are kept offshore and not brought into the country (this is called sterilizing), a sudden increase in foreign exchange income results in currency appreciation (in Cambodia this would mean the riel becoming stronger relative to the U.S dollar)
Relaxing market discipline and slowing down economic reform. Large inflows of income during a boom eases pressure for reform and weaken fiscal discipline. Rather than using the extra income to implement reform, government uses the oil wealth to continue protectionist measures that are market-distorting. Misuse of oil revenues. Large oil revenues allow government to pursue misguided policies that benefit powerful and entrenched urban vested interests, enable overspending through job creation in a bloated public sector and investment in large and inefficient public-sector firms, and, in times of boom, they can also be used as collateral to increase borrowing. Intensified conflicts. Where there is already ethnic or fractional strife, competition for resource revenues exacerbates it, as past and present experience in Angola, Nigeria, and Iraq demonstrates. Resource abundance tends to be associated with greater frequency or duration of civil war. Competitive manufacturing versus protected industrialization. Resource-poor countries have tended to embark on competitive manufacturing earlier than resource-rich countries.

Source; Oil and Gas: A Blessing or A Curse? http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/cambodia_oil_gas_newsletter_2.pdf

Norways Oil Management Regime

Norways approach to oil wealth management deserves the attention it has received in other resourcerich countries around the world. Norways approach has several key features: Oil and gas reserves within Norwegian jurisdiction were defined by law as common property resources, thereby clearly establishing the legal rights of the Norwegian people to the resource rents. Government set aside 80% of the resource rent in a stare pension fund which is managed by the Norges Bank (around $400 billion or $85,000 per Norwegian) on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. This maintains a distance between politicians and the fund. The fund constitutes net government wealth. For all these reasons, Norway was able to avoid rent seeking and related problems that have afflicted other oil exporting countries Iran, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Venezuela, etc.

Source: Norways wealth: Not just oil, Thorvaldur Gylfason, 6 June 2008; http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1199

Netherlands Oil Management Regime

Dutch disease is a concept that purportedly explains the apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector. The claimed mechanism is that an increase in revenues from natural resources (or inflows of foreign aid) will make a given nation's currency stronger compared to that of other nations (manifest in an exchange rate), resulting in the nation's other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, making the manufacturing sector less competitive. While it most often refers to natural resource discovery, it can also refer to "any development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, including a sharp surge in natural resource prices, foreign assistance, and foreign direct investment".[1] The term was coined in 1977 by The Economist to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959

Malaysian Oil Wealth Management Regime

Oil and gas is a significant contributor to government revenue, comprising more than 40% of federal revenue annually. Due to Malaysias heavy dependence on oil and gas, some fear we may be subject to the resource curse. From 1960 to 1990, per capita incomes in resource-deficient countries grew two to three times faster than in resource-dependent countries. Pure subsidies for fuel will not be sustainable for much longer, especially in light of depleting oil and gas reserves. Worryingly, the National Trust Funds RM3.8 billion is unlikely to be enough to sustain current rates of government expenditure once current reserves are exhausted. Complicating matters is the governments opacity in the oil and gas industry; despite being completely state-owned, Petronas does not report to Parliament, and makes very limited information available about its operations and revenue. Regional states with oil and gas reserves have publicly raised the issue of royalties, saying they should be paid a larger share directly, rather than relying primarily on the National government to funnel revenue back into the state.

Types of Oil Wealth Generated Sovereign Wealth Funds

The International Monetary Fund identified five different types of sovereign wealth funds that could be used by governments. These funds include: stabilization funds, where the primary objective is to insulate the budget and the economy against commodity (usually oil) price swings; savings funds for future generations, which aim to convert non-renewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of assets; reserve investment corporations, whose assets are often still counted as reserve assets, and are established to increase the return on reserves; development funds, which typically help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial policies that might raise a countrys potential output growth; and contingent pension reserve funds, which provide (from sources other than individual pension contributions) for covering unspecified pension liabilities on the governments balance sheet. The same article provides a list of benefits associated with these funds, including: helps to avoid boom-bust cycles; facilitates inter-generational savings and wealth transfer; provides for greater portfolio diversification and a greater focus on returns relative to traditional reserve funds.

Taylor, A; Grant, J; Holroyd, P; Kennedy, M; Mackenzie, K; Achieving a Win-Win From Oil and Gas Developments in the Northwest Territories; The Pembina Institute Sustainable Energy Solutions; January 2010

Oil and Gas Exploration in Conflict Maritime Areas

Geopolitics and Lessons from the North Sea

The Atlantic Ocean is between Great Britain, Scandinavia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. An epeiric (or "shelf") sea on the European continental shelf, it connects to the ocean through the English Channel in the south and the Norwegian Sea in the north. In 1958, the Continental shelf convention and some disputes on the rights to natural resource exploitation the national limits of the exclusive economic zones were ratified. Five countries are involved in oil production in North Sea. All operate a tax and royalty licensing regime. The respective sectors are divided by median lines agreed in the late 1960s:

United Kingdom - The Department of Energy and Climate Change grants licenses. The UK government annually solicits new entrants to the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) thru licensing rounds with less demanding terms and the fallow acreage initiative, where non-active licenses have to be relinquished.
Norway - The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) grants licenses.

Denmark - The Danish Energy Authority (DEA) administers the Danish sector.
Netherlands - The Dutch sector is located in the Southern Gas Basin and shares a grid pattern with Germany. Germany - Germany shares Oil and gas basin with the Netherlands. Germany has the smallest sector in the North Sea.

Geopolitics and Lessons from the Artic Sea

Circumpolar in character reflecting the competing and complementary interests of the eight states that surround the Arctic Ocean: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. During the Cold War, arrangements frequently featured groupings of the states such as the grouping between Canada and the United States concerning the defense of North America, between northern member states of NATO (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States), or between Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). In 1996 the Arctic Council, a Canada-led intergovernmental forum, was launched with the eight circumpolar states. Since then it has functioned as the pre-eminent circumpolar association through which issues and concerns related to the environment, sustainable development, and social and economic matters are discussed. In May 2008, five of the circumpolar countries (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) met in Greenland and agreed to allow the procedures established by UNCLOS to determine the competing claims being made. However, the USA which has not ratified the UNCLOS may undermine the effectiveness of the Agreement. The Arctic Council values and promotes a division of interest and consider the multiplicity of organizations as advantageous. Hence, the success of the Arctic Council is not based on addressing issues such as security and defense that is highly divisive and undermine any well-placed intentions for establishment of the joint development zones.

Geopolitics and Lessons from the South China Sea

There are several reasons as to why the South China Sea is of strategic importance: Critical trade route: Much of the trade between Europe and the Middle East and East Asia passes from the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait , then up through the South China Sea to China, South Korea, and Japan. Japanese and South Korea defense planners in particular do not want this trade route dominated by China. Japan has shown a strong interest for guaranteeing the freedom of trade. Oil reserves and fishery resources: The surrounding seas are believed to contain significant hydrocarbon resources. On 24 December 1989, China made public that it estimated the Spratleys contained 25 billion cubic meters natural gas, 105 billions barrels of oil, and 370,000 ton of phosphor. Geo-political strategy: The strategic location of the South China Sea as an important sea-line-ofcommunications adjacent to choke points of Malacca and Singapore Straits is becoming a zone of competition between China and the United States. The Spratly area has military, economic, and strategic importance for all the parties in the conflict. Apart from that, China is seeking naval preponderance in the South China Sea. However, Beijing denies that it has a policy to fill the power vacuum that was created after the departure of the United States. The United States is clearly trying to get back into South East Asian geopolitics after a decade of neglect by the Bush administration which focused more on Afghanistan, Iraq, and the wider Middle East. During this time, China stepped up its influence in South East Asia through increased trade, investment, and use of soft power. The United States is weary of China's intentions and are taking steps to counter China's strategy.

Chinese Territorial Policy

Chinese Territorial Policy make concessions when It served Chinas broader and longer term strategic benefits . Conversely, China is non-compromising, heavy handedness and assertiveness when it served Chinas broader and longer term strategic benefit .

Chinas approach to the South China Sea dispute reflected a re-orientation of Beijings diplomacy in Southeast Asia, which is characterize as charm offensive or soft power. Tensions declined when China & ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002.
The DOC has been ineffective in managing the dispute in the South China Sea. Howerver, the DOC does seem to serve as a stepping stone for further discussion and policy deliberation among the claimant countries.

Source: Li Mingjiang, Chinas South China Sea Policy: Claims and Changing Contexts; Conference on the South China Sea : Towards a Region of Peace, Cooperation & Progress; Foreign Service Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the National Defense College; July 5-6, 2011, Manila; Unpublished http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/trung-tam-du-lieu-bien-dong/cat_view/168-the-south-china-sea-toward-a-region-of-peace-cooperation-and-progress

Variants in Chinese approaches China and Vietnam : Compartmentalization of the South China Sea Tension China and Philippines: Soft power and territorial defense China and Malaysia: bilateralism and multilateralism China and Taiwan: Joint development thru a Multilateralism mechanism China and ASEAN: Signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002.
Source: Thayer, C; Security Cooperation in the South China Sea: An Assessment of Recent Trends ; Conference on the South China Sea : Towards a Region of Peace, Cooperation & Progress; Foreign Service Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the National Defense College; July 5-6, 2011, Manila; Unpublished

Philippine Initiative: Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C)

A rules-based approach therefore provides the key to securing our claims and advancing the peaceful settlement of disputes for all in the SCS. The primacy of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is the cornerstone on which Philippine territory and maritime entitlement is defined in the SCS. It is this principle and the requirements of UNCLOS that governed the passage in 2009 of the Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law (R.A. 9522). International law is also the guidepost by which the Philippines engages parties -- claimants and non-claimants alike -- towards a peaceful and just resolution of disputes and the guarantee of freedom of navigation in the SCS. To reinforce this goal, a framework is proposed to transforms the SCS from an area of dispute to a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C) by a segregation of disputed relevant features from the undisputed waters of the SCS consistent with UNCLOS.

In the words of President Aquino, ZoPFF/C is a modality for ensuring that "what is ours is ours, and with what is disputed, we can work towards joint cooperation.
Source: A Rules-Based Regime in The South China Sea By: Albert F. Del Rosario, Secretary of Foreign Affairs; http://dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/3140-a-rules-based-regime-in-the-south-china-sea-by-albert-f-del-rosario-secretary-of-foreign-affairs

Territorial Claimants of the South China Sea

South China Sea Last Updated: March 2008

South China Sea Resources

Source: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80a04e/80A04E0a.htm

South East Asian Experience in Managing Territorial Disputes

The Cambodian dispute settlement have involved informal cocktail parties, involving relevant official personalities, later ends up informal agreement.
The Southern Philippines dispute settlement involved informal mediation efforts by Indonesia and Malaysia, Libya and by Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), The Straits of Malacca dispute settlement, which has been on the agenda for the last 40 years has been solved by the creation of Cooperative Mechanism that is supported by the littoral states around the Strait of Malacca and user states as assisted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

The South China Sea issues is being managed informally by the workshop process that has lasted for more than 20 years. The workshop on the South China Sea was not intended to solve territorial disputes among the various Claimants, but aimed to achieve: (1) devising cooperative programs, in which all participants can take part so that the parties learned the use of cooperation in view of heir habits of confrontation in the past, (2) promoting dialog among the directly interested parties, so that they could find out solution to their problems, and
(3) to develop confidence building process so that everyone will feel comfortable with one another. Experiences with regard to the South China Sea issues indicated that technical cooperation is relatively easier to achieve than resources distribution, and more difficult with regard to the territorial as well as sovereignty and jurisdictional issues.

Policy Recommendations

Proposals for an Effective Fiscal Regime in Attracting Oil & Gas Exploration Investments

An oil & gas exploration investor is more likely to invest in a country with a fiscal regime that provides a 90 percent government take while allowing a rate of return of 20 percent than a fiscal regime that provides a 50 percent government take while permitting only a 10 percent rate of return. The more appropriate measures of the attractiveness of a fiscal regime are: Rate of return permitted to the investor on development based n peer group Profit-to-investment ratio of development (a measure of the capital efficiency and therefore a guide to where a company should direct its capital) Exploration cover ratio (a guide to whether it is worth investing in trying to discover hydrocarbons in the first place)

Oil Wealth Management

Developing country like the Philippines to use surplus income to plug deficit spending in the short term. Multi-lateral Agencies like the IMF and the ADB should assume leadership in promoting long term benefits of oil wealth management, managing public fiscal policy and ensuring sustainability of oil wealth in the long term.

Learn from the Philippines experience in squandered natural resource wealth from forestry and mineral resources and from the Malaysian and Dutch Oil Wealth Management Policy.

Policy for Management Territorial Disputes

Two pronged policy approach in managing territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea)
Apply South East Asian lessons in Managing Territorial Disputes Push for the ASEAN to adopt the Philippine Initiative for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFF/C) for the formulation of the Joint Development Zones (JDZ)s in the use of the South China Sea Continue dialogues with the PROC on a direct bilateral basis Sustain military build-up of arms capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

Apply International Law in Managing Territorial Disputes without appearing to be siding with the US and or Japan Assert Philippine rights under the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on the applicability of the UNCLOS in the South China Sea Assert Philippine rights under the International Seabed Authority (ISBA) for rights to the ocean seabed beyond UNCLOS .

The End

Chinese Overseas Development Assistance in the Philippines

Chinese Foreign and ODA Policy Linkages

Major Sea-Lanes Transiting Southeast Asia Chinas GDP has grown four times since 1978, making China the worlds sixth largest economy by some measures. China is now the worlds second largest importer of oil. Ninety percent (90%) of Chinas imported oil is estimated to come by sea. In addition, China also consumes half the worlds cement, a third of the worlds steel, a quarter of the worlds copper, and a fifth of the worlds aluminum. South China Sea Dispute the South China Sea, this vast body of water is an abundant source of aquatic resources and is thought to hold extensive oil resources. Earlier reports have estimated reserves to hold 100 billion barrels of oil and 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the region around the Spratly Islands. (Vaughn, Bruce and Morrison, Wayne M; China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States; Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress; Order Code RL32688; Updated April 4, 2006) Soft Diplomacy Policy Approach with ODA Financing: The 15th Annual ODA Portfolio Review of the National Economic and Development Authority reported that China is funding three projects worth $459.99 million as of December 2006. While still far behind traditional leading donors, China is increasingly becoming one of the important foreign sources of development funds in the country. Last year it accounted for 5 % of total ODA loan commitments of $9.51 billion, ranking fifth behind Japan, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank and the United Kingdom.

Spratly Island Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking and the North Luzon Railways Project
The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) refers survey for oil in the Spratly Islands as signed last March 14, 2005 by the PNOC Exploration Corporation (PNOC-EC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (PetroVietnam). The JMSU covers an area of 142,886 kilometers west of Palawan. The first phase was between September 1 to November 16, 2005 covering 11,000 line kilometers. The Chinese seismic vessel M/V Nan Hai 502 conducted the survey. Data gathered from the first phase of the survey was processed in Vietnam. Data interpretation was done in Manila by the PNOC-EC. The second phase of seismic acquisition, covering 11,800 kilometers, started October 2007. It was supposed to be completed January 2008. A condition for the finalization of the North Luzon Railway Project is the finalization of the JMSU.

The Geology and Mineral Resources Ministry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the Spratly area holds oil and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons (1.60 1010 kg), as compared to the 13 billion tons (1.17 1010 kg) held by Kuwait, placing it as the fourth largest reserve bed in the world.

Chinese ODA administration Policy

Chinese ODA Tied Loan program is modeled after the old Japanese ODA Tied Loan Model where Japanese firms often came up with projects for Tied Loan financing, it takes the project to a Recipient Country which would then request it from the Japanese Govcernment as a Donor Country. If the Japanese government agreed, it would ask those same firms to implement the project. It is not clear that such a tight system yet exists in China but they may be moving toward such a system. In the first several decades of its aid-giving, the Japanese government used its assistance to secure needed raw materials imports, promote its exports, strengthen its business sector and ensure friendly relations with countries whose products and markets were potentially important to the Japanese economy. China appears to be moving in the same direction. However, the Japanese never actually located their aid program in their Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, although until recently, that ministry had a considerable say over Japans aid.

East Asia Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa and Philippines Statistics

Peoples Republic of China foreign policy is consistent with the theory of defensive realism. China is trying to secure its Asian sphere of influence and acquire what it sees fit as necessary to defend a developing nation. Freed from threatening Russian forces to the north and Soviet client Vietnam to the south, China is expanding its strategic reach by claiming rights over the whole South China Sea and increasing its influence in Southeast Asia. China is demanding a free hand in East Asia from other powers in South East Asia. Chinas foreign policy motives in Afraica: Oil, commercial outlet for Chinese goods and diplomatic support.
East Asia Pacific
Click on the indicator to view a definition P eople 2000 2005

Sub-Saharan Philippines Africa

2000 P eople 668.9 million 2.6 Economy 341 billion .7 3.5 51 0.84 2005 2000 P eople 75.8 million 2 75.9 billion 6 1 .32 ,001 2005

Population, total Population growth (annual %)

Economy

1 billion .8 0.9 1 trillion .7 7.6 944.44

1 billion .9 0.9 3.0 trillion 9 1 ,578.95

752.6 million 2.3 630.8 billion 5.7 838.1 6

83.1million 1 .7 98.4 billion 5 1 84.1 ,1 2

GDP (current US$) GDP growth (annual %) GDP per capita (current US$)
States and markets

Time required to start a business (days)

Global links

..

55

States and markets .. 61 .5

..

48

Foreign direct investment, net

45.1billion

96.9 billion

6.8 billion

1 billion 6.6

2.2 billion

1 billion .1

inflows (BoP, current US$) Long-term debt (DOD, current 418.7 billion 400.2 billion 172.7 billion US$) 1 .4 1 6.1 1 .4 1 Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income) 8.6 billion 9.5 billion 1 billion 3.2 Official development assistance and official aid (current US$) 1 billion 6.7 45.0 billion 4.6 billion Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (US$) Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2007
IMF Debt & Reserve Related Indicator of External Vulnerability (50% limit debt to GDP ratio)

1 billion 76.7 8.8

50.8 billion 1 4.3

54.7 billion 1 6.7

32.6 billion

575.2 million

561 million .8

8.8 billion

6.2 billion

1 billion 3.6

24.63%

13.34%

50.54%

28.01%

66.93%

55.59%