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Flight Data Monitoring vs Safety Reporting

Flight Data Monitoring and Safety Reporting as safety data sources
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
27 views3 pages

Flight Data Monitoring vs Safety Reporting

Flight Data Monitoring and Safety Reporting as safety data sources
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

MSc Air Safety Management Active Safety Management

Compare Flight Data Monitoring and Safety Reporting as safety data sources. Discuss their ability
to detect different types of operational safety issues, highlight especially areas where one of the
tools has a clear advantage over the other, and how these tools compliment each other.

The Safety Management System is now fully compulsory and it is here to stay. Airlines are
now adapting to this new regulation, but recognising the deeper value of the system and how they
can gain from it, they have actually starting to move even further than the mere compulsory
compliances for the regulators, as SMS can prove to be even an economic advantage in time. Having
identified that a proper SMS requires a big data bank of events, threats and hazards they established
Flight Data Monitoring as well as Safety Reporting schemes, in order to keep these data flowing.

Flight Data Monitoring was initially imposed by regulators in order to identify the variables
that lead to an accident. These variables are directly flight related issues and they relate to aircraft
performance, configuration, systems’ malfunctions and pilots’ actions and selections. However,
through the analysis of these data on a frequent basis, airlines were able to identify problems raised
in daily operations. These problems were usually a threat to an incident or accident and most of the
times they comprised of pilots not following the SOPs properly (i.e. improper selections, wrong
speeds, excessive manoeuvres etc). As such, it resulted being a surveillance technique to the pilots.
But recognizing the power of this system, analysts can now identify serious trends in the airlines that
would otherwise not be visible until they had lead to an accident. Events like unstable approaches,
long or hard landings, violation of minima, exceeding limitations etc can now be identified. The goal
of course is not to criticise the pilots and impose punishments or restrictions, but to prevent these
events from escalating further and finally leading to situation like a serious incident or an accident. It
can also give the opportunity to isolate specific events that deserve further investigation without
causing any disruptions in the operations.
FDM has a big advantage in that it outlines the facts without any changes or interventions. It
can record many parameters at the same time and it can give algebraically the results. It will show
both the amount and the duration that a parameter was exceeded. Having the ability to set your
own parameter limits, the FDM can prove a valuable tool towards increasing the operational safety
as well as the stability of the flights and keeping everything within prescribed limits. It is also helpful
in that is automatic and it doesn’t allow any discrepancies, i.e. the pilots or the analysts cannot
manipulate the data or hide any information.
FDM can be considered a tool for all three types of safety programme; reactive, proactive
and predictive. This depends on the operational use as established by the operator and the safety
team. If the FDM only examines past limits violations and then an action is taken to correct the event
or prevent it from happening again it is purely reactive use. However, identifying less serious events
in order to prevent other serious threats can be a proactive safety management. Taking the system
even further, with feeds from scientific methods and modelling it can predict trends by recording a
series of minor parameters that do not affect the flight itself, but if let uncontrolled can lead to a
serious event.
Even though very accurate and powerful, FDM is a limited tool towards an integrated safety
management system. FDM only records the parameters set by the operator. It cannot record if
something out of the established list was not performed properly or was mishandled. Further to this,
it shows the deviation, but it does not identify the root of the problem. It cannot provide any clues
how the error was developed in such a way that a parameter was exceeded. But the primarily
disadvantage is that the FDM only accounts for the flight parameters and events. It is vital to

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MSc Air Safety Management Active Safety Management

understand that safety is not just flying the aeroplane safely through pilot’s view. Cabin safety is
another area of serious concern for keeping the aeroplane within safe limits. Maintenance should
not be underestimated as a small maintenance error or deviation can have devastating results.
Ground handling and ramp operations have a serious role in the safety image of the company. It is
therefore important to understand that FDM is only one tool of the many to be used towards a safe
company.

Safety reports are maybe the most important part of the SMS principle. They can prove to
be the most effective tool in identifying threats and hazards throughout the operation. Either these
reports concern the flight operations or the ground operations and the maintenance; it is by far the
easiest way in identifying mistakes and potential problems and risks. Employees have the freedom to
report through a range of areas, from the biggest mistake they have made to their least concern or
even make a suggestion. If the reporting systems are made simple and easily available they can
reveal most of the problems of the company. Taking the opinions of the front line employees, the
people they actually operate the system, you can identify possible traps and potential situations that
no computer system could ever think of. Let’s not forget that all computer softwares are based on
human predictions and human perception. If the data entered in the system are not detailed
enough, or they don’t reflect the actual operational situation, the results will be poor. These correct
data can only be acquired through proper reports made by people who live the system and the
operations on a daily basis. Reporting of simple events can reveal potential situations that would not
under any other way be revealed. It is in other words the only way to know the root causes of an
event and how these causes escalated and evolved to create a threat or a hazard. The reporting
schemes are a proactive safety approach, which secures a reliable and continuous stream of data,
from a variety of sources.
As simple as it sound in theory, a reporting system needs a lot of effort to achieve the goals.
The reporting system is very complicated to formalise and manage in order to construct proper data
banks, as the freedom and sometimes the informality of the narration of events, can result in too
many options or too many categories being created. But the most difficult obstacle that the scheme
must overcome is that of the confidence that employees have to the managers; a basic principle of
reporting. People with no confidence they will not dare to report any problems, any mistakes, or any
non-compliances taken place. Not many people would self-incriminate themselves without a high
degree of confidence. Confidence can only arise through a just culture and the safety policy which
the company follows. A just culture means that people are not punished for human errors and they
are shown a proper understanding of their complicated job. However negligence should at no time
being accepted as normal! Even though on the written policy the company encourages the reporting
and the correct principles are outlined, the actions followed can sometimes not agree with the just
culture and the safety ideal. Confidentiality of the scheme is more than vital as without it people will
always fear of the consequences. If the operator does not correctly promote the reporting system,
give feedback and take the correct actions, the whole process will become useless with minimal data
gathered and will become a bureaucratic nuisance.

No organised SMS can rely on a single method of data acquiring. A variety of tools exist and
we should use every tool at our disposal as each one compliments the rest. The boundary of an
operation is unlimited and depending on how deep the system goes, more and more tools can be
implemented.
FDM and Safety Reports being of the two most usual and most effective tools; they can
cover a big area of the operations. Figure 1 shows the way an SMS with a variety of tools works. The

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MSc Air Safety Management Active Safety Management

huge area of operations is covered by implementing all these tools together. Each one covers a small
part and each one compliments another tool. The relation between the FDM and ASR though, is

Figure 1

slightly more important. As FDM is automatic and every parameter exceedance is recorded, pilots
are made obliged to make reports of these events. As a result, the area of ASR increases and more
reports are coming in. Therefore combining the two tools together, the result is bigger than the two
individual results. ASR can integrate the analysis of the FDM results as the reports will also outline
the causes of the FDM event.
One reason that the SMS has improved from reactive to proactive and predictive approaches
is the growth of availability of data. Through the fusion and the analysis of the various data sources
we can only enable hazard identification and monitoring of the future safety enhancements. SMS
principle can be outlined in the following statement: “The more we know, the more we know we
don’t know!”

References:
• Safety Management Systems in Aviation – A. Stolzer, C. Halford, J. Goglia – Ashagate
2010
• Implementing Safety Management Systems in Aviation - A. Stolzer, C. Halford
,[Link] - Ashagate 2011
• Just Culture – Sidney Dekler – Ashgate 2010
• Active Safety Management, Module Notes – S. Bond, J. Barrass – City University
2011

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