The Convervatism of Antonin Scalia Author(s): Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
105, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), pp. 1-29 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151223 . Accessed: 12/11/2011 15:24
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The Conservatism Antonin Scalia of
RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR. During1981-1988 Reagan the administration consciously attempted to appoint federaljudges who agreedwith its policy agenda.The appointment of Antonin Scaliato the Courtof Appealsfor the Districtof Columbiaand his elevationto the Supreme Courtin August1986is the archetypical exampleof the 1 administration's judicialappointment practice.This articlewill examineScalia's and publicstatements, publications, judicialopinionsto the closeof the 1987term of the SupremeCourtto permitan evaluationof his politicaland constitutional values. Special attentionwill be devotedto identifyinghis place in the Reagan effort to insurea bench in tune with the conservative policy stanceand to indicating his place in modernconservative thought.
THE ALLEGIANCES OF A JUSTICE
Like a numberof Reaganadministration appointeesto the federalbench, Antonin Scaliataughtlawand servedin the executive branch.Duringthe Nixon and Fordadministrations servedas generalcounselin the Office of Telecommunihe cationsPolicyin the JusticeDepartment, chairman the Administrative of Conference of the UnitedStates,and assistantattorneygeneralin chargeof the Office of LegalCounsel.He held a positionwith the conservative AmericanEnterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research to (AEI) in 1977.Althoughhe returned the
I Sheldon Goldman, "Reagan'sSecond TermJudicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway," Judicature 70 (April-May 1987): 324-339; Jon Gottschall, "Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution," Judicature 70 (June-July 1986): 48-54; Debra Cassens Moss, "The Policy and Rhetoricof Ed Meese,"American Bar Association Journal 73 (1 February 1987): 64-69; Elder Witt, A Different Justice: Reagan and the Supreme Court (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986).
RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR. is assistant professor of political science at West Virginia University. He is currently working on a book on dispute resolution processes with Susan Hunter.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 105 Number 1 1990 1
TABLE 1 Published Opinionsof AntoninScalia for the Districtof ColumbiaCourtof Appeals
Topic Administrative law, including APA, FOIA, statutory powers of agencies and justiciability cases with agency party Foreign affairs, judicial powers abroad Exclusive power of Congress or president First Amendment issues Criminal procedure and due process Equal protection and civil rights statutes Other, including D.C. law, contracts, bankruptcy Total Number %
99 6 5 6 8 4 5 133
74.4 4.5 3.8 4.5 6.0 3.0 3.8 100.0
Universityof Chicago Law School in 1977,Scalia remainedthe editor of AEI's journal, Regulation,and a proponentof extensivederegulation.2 As a memberof the Districtof ColumbiaCourtof Appealsafterappointment by PresidentRonald Reaganin 1982,Scalia wrote 133 opinions that werepubAs lished in the FederalReporter.3 Table1 reveals,74.4 percentof the opinions statutesor the standingof pardealt with eitheragencypowersunderregulatory his ties to challengeagencyaction. The court en banc overruled decisionsthree and authorityin adpresidential congressional times.AlthoughScaliaaddressed law ministrative problemsin his manyopinions,priorto his SupremeCourtservice he neverwroteon manyaspectsof criminaldue process,school desegregaequalprotectionclaims,freedomof tion, stateactionproblems,abortion,"new" issues, clause,mostfederalism clause,the commerce religionandthe establishment and and most civil rights, bankruptcy, antitruststatutes. Upon appointmentto the SupremeCourt for the 1986term, Scalia began to writeand vote on a widerrangeof legal issues. Duringthe termhe emergedas an ally of justiceson the rightof the Court.Table2 containsa matrixof the interin agreements votingby the justiceson 152cases decidedwith signedopinion or by lengthyper curiamdecisionsby the Courtduringthe term.The matrixis conTo described John Sprague. identifybloc to by structedaccording the procedures voting within the Court, he applied a criterionthat measuresthe strengthof
For biographical information, see Almanac of the Federal Judiciary 2 (1985-1986): 14-15; Sidney Blumenthal, "A Well-Connected Conservative," Washington Post, 22 June 1986; Ruth Marcus and Susan Schmidt, "ScaliaTenacious after Staking out a Position," WashingtonPost, 22 June 1986;United States Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Hearings on the Confirmation of FederalJudges, Nomination of Antonin Scalia to the Court of Appeals, 97th Congress, 2nd sess., 4 August 1982, 90-92. 3 Of the opinions, there were fifteen dissents, seven concurrences, and seven "concurrenceand dissent in part" opinions. The figures on Scalia's opinion writing in Michael Patrick King, "Justice Antonin Scalia: The First Termin the Supreme Court," Rutgers Law Journal 20 (Fall 1988): 1, are in error.
Blocs of Scaliawith Kennedy and Rehnquist (cohesion = 86. 1986 Term
Justice Marshall Brennan Blackmun Stevens White Rehnquist Scalia O'Connor Powell Ma
Br 92. To permitexamination the influenceof Scaliaon the decisionsof the Court of duringthe term.9 percent). 54. Sprague Criterion = 81.. Note: The figures indicate the percentage of votes in which a pair of justices vote in an identical direction.and White(cohesion = 84.9 64.Sandra and O'Connor.whichcomparesthe peror centageof interagreement cohesionamongvariousgroupsof justicesincluded in the matrix.9 77.2percent)and White.4 percent).0 82. indicates as that Scaliaformeda bloc withJusticeAnthonyKennedy satisfiesthe Sprague that criteria(cohesion = 90.Rehnquist.5 79. O'Connor.5 80.2 percent)barelyfailed to satisfy the Spraguecriteria.6 77.
.4 The Spraguecriterion. Rehnquist.Scalia with Rehnquist(cohesion = 86.five-justice a bloc of ByronWhite.presented Table3.9 58.2 -
Sv 74. Voting Patterns of the United States Supreme Court: Cases in Federalism.verifiesthe existenceof severalblocs.4 47.7 46.6 45.7 percent. Scaliawith Kennedy White(cohesion = 85.3 53. Scalia(coand hesion = 81.0 53.0 57.8 percent).3 72. and Scalia(cohesion = 81.4 55.8 -
Bm 78. An interagreement matrixfor 148cases decidedby signedopinion or lengthy percuriamopinionfor the 1987termof the Court. Rehnquist. Sprague. Rehnquist.2 percent)all barelyfailed to satisfy the Spraguecriteria.2 37. and Scaliawith Kennedy.Again Scaliahad close associationsbut not intense loyaltyto the positions of the other justiceson the right of the Court.7 -
Rh 38. 1968).7 62. The evidencefor the 1986termindicatesthat Scaliawasthirdin majorityparticipation.O'Connor.7 47.Rehnquist. includingone composedof William Rehnquist Scalia(cohesion= 84. and O'Connor and (cohesion= 79.9 73.
agreement amongthe justices.8 58. nearerthe centerof gravityoccupiedby Powelland Whitethan the other
4 John D. and Scaliawith Kennedy.9 -
Po 52.1 76.4 82.ANTONIN
TABLE2 Supreme CourtInteragreement Percentages.1 -
Court Cohesion = 63.5percent).3 -
Wh 45.9 57.Scalia. LewisPowell(cohesion = 77.2 70. 1889-1959 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.1percent).2 percent). Scalia.and O'Connor(cohesion = 85.5 -
OC 46.5 76.9 84.8 percent).a four-justicebloc of White. and Interestingly.3 percent. three-justice blocsof Rehnquist. Table4 reportsthe majorityparticipation ratesof the justices.2 72. 21-50.3 percent).5 51.
6 67.5 75.2 85. Powell.8 63.3 75. Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe.8 89.
.8 70.9 Number 148 (73) (147) (147) (147) (146) (147) (147) (146) (147)
Justice Powell White Scalia Blackmun O'Connor Stevens Rehnquist Brennan Marshall
Justice Kennedy White Rehnquist Scalia Stevens Blackmun O'Connor Brennan Marshall
JusticesWhite. 1987 Term
Justice Brennan Marshall Blackmun Stevens White Kennedy Scalia Rehnquist O'Connor Br
Ma 95.and Scaliavoted for the adminisI The term is from Glendon Schubert.7 83.3 80.6 70.
TABLE4 Majority Participation Justices in Percentages Ranked by Majority by Participation in (numberof participations parentheses)
1986 Term Majority Participation 83.6 percent.4
TABLE3 Supreme CourtInteragreement Percentages.9 82.8 71.1 63. Ill.O'Connor.9
Court Cohesion = 75.1 83.1 61. 120-121. the participation trailing majorityparticipation ratesof Kennedyand White.2 Number 152 (152) (151) (148) (149) (151) (151) (152) (146) (147) 1987 Term Majority Participation 91.6 86.2 70.7 73. Table5 presentsthe supportof the justicesfor the policiesof the Reaganadin ministration casesadjudged duringthe 1986and 1987terms.9 -
Wh 70.3 -
OC 61.6 81.3 75.1 73.5 83.9 -
Bm 86.5 72.3 67.7 82.: The Free Press.9 90.2 83.6 81.4 -
Rh 62.3 82.4 61. Note: The figures indicate the percentage of votes in which a pair of justices vote in an identical direction.6 76.4 67.6 -
Sv 79.9 81.8 76.7 68.2 72.1 percent.5 During 1987Scaliawas tied for thirdin majority with Rehnquist.9 -
Kn 68.7 61.4 81. Sprague Criterion = 87.Thetableincludes
cases when the administrationwas a party to the case or participatedamicus curiae.0 78.3 84.5 65. 1959).2 86.1 -
Sc 63.O'Connorand Rehnquist.6 69.Rehnquist.
whilethe otherfourjusticesexhibited less supportfor the administration far (57.0 45.4 69.7 55.4 66.6 72. Scaliaedgedthemout for most supportfor the administration.ANTONIN SCALIA
Votes in Cases with Reagan Administration as Party or Intervenor.7 40.is democratic.7percent).7 (58) (59) (59) (59) (59) (57) (59) (57) (59) (59) Justice Scalia Rehnquist O'Connor Kennedy White Court average Blackmun Stevens Marshall Brennan 1987 Term Support 75.9 40.his Constitution does not require with any specificvalue action in accordance governmental or theory.4 70.an ideaor understanding the bestsocietyandthe politicalinstituof tions that could promotesuch a society.His poand liticalvision. becauseScaliabelieves that governmental policies involve"prudential" judgments amongcompeting valuesbyleaders.But duringthe 1987term.Thechoiceamongalternative choiceaboutwhat policiesis a pragmatic
6 The term political vision is used to describe a prescriptiveon the future because it avoids the narrow connotations of ideology or theory.
THE DEMOCRATIC VISION OF ANTONIN SCALIA
Fromhis votingrecordand from his opinionsfor the Courtof Appealsand the Scalia'sapSupreme Court.6 to percent 40. All togetherthe evidenceconfirmshis allegiance the policypositionsof the Reagan to presidency.0 78.2 44.9 71.Scaliasupported administration appointed the that himto the Supreme Court.9percentof the time duringthe 1986term.0 74.6 74. Thus.0 71.0percentand 71. Justices Ranked by Support for the Administration in Percentages (number of participations in parentheses)
1986 Term Justice White Rehnquist Powell O'Connor Court average Scalia Stevens Blackmun Brennan Marshall Support 81.6 believesin popular He controlof publicpolicythroughrepresentative institutionsand in respectfor the majority's policychoices.Also.8 73.it is possibleto discerna politicalvision underlying proachto constitutional problems legalissuesaffectingpublicpolicy.9 57.
.6 50.6 54.eventhoughthe administration slightlymoresupwon port from Whiteand Powell.3 (62) (63) (63) (27) (62) (63) (63) (63) (62) (61)
trationbetween81. Scalia provedto be the justicemostsupportive theadministration. of the Although fourReagan appointees or reappointees finishedthe term rankedas the top four supporters the adof ministration.
Cir. populistmodes of democratic Constitution.C. 700 F. also finds them capableof arbitrary capricious action. FCC. Cir.
Derivedfrom the centralpropositionof Scalia'sdemocratic vision area seriesof if standards that define how the Constitutionand statutesshouldbe interpreted his goal of capableleadershipof the people is to be achieved. and an undefinedmethodologyof "judicialcraftsmanship. 111-198.. "tradiIn tional"role." adhereto precedent.C. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. who bases it on judicial capabilities. 1983). See Antonin Scalia. Washington. Cir. 698 F. "The Francis Boyer Lecture on Public Policy. 10 The concept of passive virtues is defined in Alexander M. FERC. Skeptical aboutjudicialpolicymaking.but Scalia establishes its basis in separated powers more than Bickel."Suffolk University Law Review 17 (Winter 1983): 881-899. 1985).. Cir." Policy 9 (Winter 1986): 123-127. Block. NLRB. Cir.anddoes not call into play the distinctivefunctionof courtsas guardiansagainstthe opHe powersdepressionof the few by the many. Electrical Dist. political thanparticipavisionsimplychoosesto emphasize representative leadership rather or choice as a core value of the tory."10 a
Harvard Journal of Law and Public 7Antonin Scalia. 1986)."9 believesthe idea of separated a mandsthat courtsareto usethe "passive or virtues.a politicalposition valuedfor its own sake. of the Navy.2d 1072 (D. conc.C. 724 F. 1985). I v.One standardis that the Supreme Courtshouldavoidoverseeing alteringthe choicesof leaders or of In of of the otherbranches government. 783 F. C-SPAN.and it is a choice best left to executiveand legislative officials." The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.2d. "The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers.
.But he seemsconvincedthat the wisdomof these individuals his usuallygreater thanthat of judgesand the generalpublic.2d 768 (D. 9 Community Nutrition Institute v.2d 490 (D. Citizens for Jazz on WRVR v. No.C. For further insight of the high value he places on established legal rules. 1239.cooperative. 761 F. 8 Rainbow Navigation v. 1983) (Scalia J. 1962). 1256 (D. Maryland People's Counsel v. see Antonin Scalia.Although his opinions indicatea confidencein the expertiseand and he discretionof administrators. Cir.8Likewise. Drukker Communications v.he believesthat the executiveand legislatorscan make is errantdecisions. 1985). Bickel. Cir. 774 F.Therefore.2d 1127 (D.2d 392 (D. 775 F.C. "Morality. Dept.Scaliatruststhatexecutives.Thus the core of his politicalvision is a proposition. & dissenting).' legislatures.2d 724 (D. The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.C.Pragmatism.C. will andexecutive policy agencies serveas expertbodiesimplementing majoritarian choices. D. holdingthat Americanconstitutionalpolitics can continue to exist only if capableand expertleaderscan define and implementgood public policy.6
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
is best for the community. 5 December 1989 (author's notes of the broadcast).C. FERC. NRC. and the Legal Order. a case challenging procedures the the Agriculture Departmenthe wrotethat "Government mischiefwhose effects are widelydistributed morereadily is remedied throughthe politicalprocess. 1984).
5 59. As a first tactic.0 46.8 53.8 50. Scalia.) (40)
Justice Rehnquist White Powell O'Connor Scalia Court average Blackmun Stevens Brennan Marshall
Justice O'Connor Rehnquist Scalia Marshall Court average White Blackmun Stevens Kennedy Brennan
Justice Rehnquist O'Connor Scalia Powell White Court average Kennedy Blackmun Stevens Marshall Brennan
Court of Appeals case he offered additional confirmation of separated powers as a check on judicial powers.1 (27) (27) (27) (27) (27) (27) (27) (27) (12) (27) Percentage Number Remedies 65. not only in interpreting the Constitution but in controlling every aspect of executive actively bearing upon citizens' constitutional rights.724 F.2d 143. Despite the small number of cases for both terms. he provided judicial relief to citizens only when an "injury in fact" was caused by other persons or governRamirez de Arellano v.6 51.0 (13) (13) (13) (13) (12) (13) (12) (13) (13) (13) 1987 Term Number Remedies 66.2 53. "Doctrine of Standing.9 51. Weinberger.1 0. he was more reluctant to open the courts to cases involving plaintiffs challenging existing legislative and executive policies than any of the justices except Rehnquist and O'Connor.ANTONIN SCALIA |
TABLE6 Standing and JudicialRemedies Votes of Justices in Cases Involving Ranked in Refusal to GrantRemedies in Percentages in (numberof participations parentheses)
Both Terms 1986 Term Number Remedies 69. does not comport with Scalia champions the doctrine our understanding of the separation of powers."I2 Table6 contains information on cases raisingquestions of standingand the availability of judicial remedies from the 1986and 1987terms.5 52.5 50.5 (40) (40) (39) (13) (40) (40) (12) (39) (40) (40.0 63.3 23.0 48.2 42.0 percent of the cases.)
.3 55.8 53.9 51. Scalia voted for access for the challenger in 41.0 32.0 53. stating that "Such a vision of judicial supremacy.C.0 62. 156 (D.2 33.7 63." 894.0 0. Cir.0 59. Scalia'sopinions have applied a specific set of tactics to keep courts out of matters that he would assign to elected leaders.5 40. 1983).9 50.0 46. (Emphasis in original.8 52.""1 of standing as a way of restricting "courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority" and to exclude "them from the even more undemocratic rule of prescribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself. In these cases the original plaintiff sought to mobilize the law to effect changes in public policy.
2124. "The Appellate Jurisprudenceof Justice Antonin Scalia.20 narrowly conHe tion must be reasonable in accordance and Act FeesAwards of 1976to denyattorneyfees struedthe Civil RightsAttorney's of to a civil rightslitigantwho won a favorable interpretation law froma federal to fromthe court. Cir. 1502. 1984). 2722.. J. of America.Ct. 1985). 747 F.Ct.2d 1322. 108 S. Compare to Maryland People's Counsel v. 2409-10 (1988) (Scalia. 2742-51 (1988) (Scalia. Thomas. United Presbyterian Church in the US.C. Six Unknown NamedAgents. 2141-2147 (1987) (Scalia. 18 United States v. 108 S. denied a court the authorityto hirea privateattorneyto prosecutea contemptagainst task. 784 (D. National Rifle Assn. Cir.C..Ct.Ct.Romero v. Helms. J. 749 F.2d. Lack.he was cautiousin permitting challengegovernmental actionsand agencydecisions. Cir. Fausto.C. 714 F. 3054 (1987). FCC.2d 787 (D.. 1983)..C.grouplegalacwith court rules. American TruckingAssns. dissenting). had a qualified executiveimmunityfrom suits because of the objective in confrontinghim. 107 S.For Scalia. Cir. v.A. 17 Anderson v. NHTSA. who searchwhile actingin "good faith"that his searchwas conducteda warrantless legal. Massachusetts.. 950.Ct. FERC.). interestgroupsto As a thirdtactic of passivity. ICC. Carducci v. 108 S.A. 1511 (Scalia. conc.S. Transwestern Pipeline Co.C.2d 171 (D. againsthearingimproperly statedclaims. dissenting).2d 318 (D. 107 S. compare to Bivens v. 403 U. Cir. dissenting).2d 455 (D. vicemanwho was given LSD duringan experiment He also refusedrelief to the servicemanunderthe FederalTortClaimsAct. v. 894-895. Oakland Scavenger Co.21As a related a courtbutwho failedto go forward secure remedy means of controllingjudicial power. 108 S. v. United States v. or agencyrulesthat did not aggrieve havean impacton the dailyaffairsof firms. He refused extendthe abilityof parties suegovernfor mentfor infringements civil rightsin a case seekingdamagesfor a formerserof whilehe was on activeduty.. dissenting).Ct.Ct. 107 S. 396 (1988). Cir. 108 S.)."8 especiallyobjectedto judicialignorance 19 over of congressional court-created limiting and rules judicial jurisdiction disputes. becauseit was it. J. J.Ct. arguedagainstjudicial relief for a churchand its ashe against sociatedpartiessubjectedto indirectgovernment intelligence-gathering.2d 77 (D..). K Mart Corp. 2379.C. v. Reagan.1 to juarguments constrain Scalia. 760 F. 1984). 960-2 (1988) (Scalia. 801 F. 1985). J. FERC. 107 S. 2405. Inc. 21 Hewitt v.C.as a secondtactic. 1984). 793 F. S. Cir.C. 2385-9 (1988) (Scalia.2d 457 (D.Ct. 1984). 16 Young ex rel. Providence Journal. 2672 (1987). conc. Creighton. 1342-1345 (D. 747 F. Torresv. 19 Houston v...Relyingon a separated powersargument. see also United States v. Regan.and againsthearinga case of indirect 14 to to responsibility a crime.16Scalia held that a police officer. J."7 Scalia also arguedthat reasonableness the circumstances it the independent authorityof Congresspermitted to restrictjudicialreviewof He certainspecificprovisionsof law. 760 F.Ct.2d 1297 (D.8
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
ment. 1986)."3 Consequently. 443 (1971). Cir. He viewedthe prosecution contemptto be an executive of not affordedto the courts by Congress.
. Centerfor Auto Safety v. Cir.Scaliaconcededthat legislatorscan check
Ibid. See also Richard Nagareda. Bowen v.C. 108 S. Stanley. 738 F. J. Vuitton et Fils.. 20 National Black Media Coalition v. 15 United States v. 1986) (Scalia."Universityof Chicago Law Review 54 (Spring 1987):706-715.usedseparation-of-powers he dicialreliefof allegedharms. conc. Cartier. 3034 (1987). Natural Resources Defense Council v. (I).
C.C. 861-862 (D. US. J. Doe.).2d 445 (D. See also National Juvenile Law Center v. Cir. Quality Brands. 1342-1345 (D. 1986) (Scalia. Cir. US. 1985). 1984).or member to to challenges the rulesof the House of Representatives.756 F.2d 33 (D.22 As a fourth tactic. Mathes v. 768 F.. 24 Sanchez-Espinosa v.Ct.Scaliabannedjudicialintrusioninto the internal conflicts of the Congress.Consequently.as in a suitby aliensallegingdamagesbecauseof American violationsof international in Nicaragua. J. 702 F. Scalia also opposes private rights of action that allow private challenges of other private parties who fail to comply with agency rules.2d 1500. 26 Morgan v. 1984). Commissioner of Internal Revenue.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. Cir. Cir. 1985) (Scalia. Despiteprecedents allowingsuchrelief. 25 Ramirez de Arellano v. 614 (1988) (Scalia. 23 On preenforcement review.. US. Gott v. 759 F.ANTONIN
of judicialpowerby curtailing judicialreview the statutory powersof administrative agencies.He wrotethat courtsshouldnot reviewcongressional of decisionson the qualifications its members.). 726 F. 1985).2d 1322. 1133. 1144-5 (1988) (Scalia." interference executive of with its poliand acts of state. J. Walters. Cir.2d 1517(D. Cir. v. 777 F. 1986).Ct.2d 185 (D. Cir. suits on settledmattersundera sharperdoctrineof finality. 1986). 1984). Reagan. Cir.C..ASARCO v. Moore v.2d 855. Mayacamas Corp.C. 747 F. methodCongressuses to disthe tributeappropriations agencies.He deemedthe decisionto be an "unprecedented" extensionof judicialpowerbecauseof its "elegantagnosticism"in readinga statuteon such problems.23 Fifth. International Union. 793 F. 798 F.2d 764 (D.. 520-523 (1988) (Scalia. J.2d 1189(D. Weinberger... 27 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.25 As a sixth tacticof passivity.
.2d 946. 1985). House of Representatives. 108 S. dissenting). conc. conc.26 Seventh. 746 F. the of he respected traditional reluctance courtsto considerdisputesarisingoutsidethe UnitedStates. 756 F.2d 91 (D...2d 352.24 dissentedwhen the Court of law He Appealsgavestanding a UnitedStatescitizenwhoseproperty beendamaged to had in duringAmericanmilitarymaneuvers Honduras. see South Carolina Gas and Electric Co.its "incomprehensible of disregard traditional principles equitablediscretion. dissenting).moot issues.C. he affordedit onlywhentherewasa strongpossibility irreparable of injury. Air New Zealand v. Thompson. 592. an executiveagreement. dissenting).C. 770 F. Conafay by Conafay v. UAW v. suits againstgovernment variousinterestgroups by or citizensdependon Congress specifically establishing rightsor interests can that be subjectedto litigation.. 356-361 (D.. Compare FAIC Securities v. FERC. 1986). CAB. Cir. 1984) (Scalia.. Cir. dissenting).C. v. 733 F. ICC. Cir. Cir. Donovan.2d 902 (D. Cir. Cir. Weinberger.2d 1541 (D.C. 738 F. 962-965 (D. 108 S.and acof tions that resultedin a "squandering judicial resources. executive the "integrity of and fairness" the courts of a friendlynation. Honig v..C. Scalia reluctantly grantedpreenforcement relief to parties affectedby agencyrulesand regulations.C.C.C. J. Cir. 1985).2d 832 (D. 208 (D. Trakas v.2d 145 (D. 1984) (Scalia. 108 S.C. 1555-1564 (D. Wyeth Laboratories.C. 1984). 513. J.he assertedcourt rulesto preventfrivoloussuits. Cir. J. 1984) (Scalia. Beattie v.).Ct. dissenting). Thompson v.2d 202. 801 F. United Mexican States.C. conc.and its impugnment of cies.Dozier v. 747 F.C. J. US.C. Regnery. 788 F. Ford Motor Co. 1983).. See also Asociacidn de Reclamantes v. Cir. 1984). 735 F."27 to Scalia'suse of the passivevirtuesand his deference electedrepresentatives of does not prohibit courtsfromconsidering constitutional questions fundamental
22 Sharp v.
28 Antonin Scalia. Olson. 2640-1 (1988) (Scalia. 2059-63 (1988) (Scalia.. The public thus serves as a control on official or state power rather than as a participant in policy choice.28 However. 1984) (Scalia.Ct. 108 S. He stated.32 Besides calling for a legalized relationship between the branches. his opinion was also a polemic against any external interference in executive branch policy making. dissenting). the special prosecutorcase.S.. and proclaim policies in the community interest.Ct. J. Olson. dissenting). dissenting).30The agencies of the state thus are freed from close judicial and. these elected officials must educate the public about the expert's evaluation of the policy actions. 30 Websterv. The "Political" Branches Besides a restrained judicial role in constitutional politics.) 31 Morrison v. 32 Ibid. subject to public consent by electoral means.2d 946. Experts must determine what is best for the public and then communicate their views to executive and legislative officials.10 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
values. "Toconvert the sometimes inescapable necessity of considering the validity of statutes into a continuing mission to do so.Scalia claimed the balancing test let the majority tailor the law to its own policy predilections. Scalia has offered a second standardof constitutional governance:executives and legislatorsmust identify. 2641 (Scalia.. For example. indirectly. (Emphasis in original. In his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. J. House of Representatives. and hence is ungoverned by law. define. Cir.
. "The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload. especially at election time. and support or reject the agenda set by experts and refined by elected leaders. Doe. U.C. and then to convert standing into equitable discretion as though it makes no great difference. he believes that. "A government of laws means a government of rules. 964 (D.. Although he critiqued the chief justice's opinion upholding the scheme established by Congress for the appointment and removal of special prosecutors to inquire into executive branch violations of the law. and it should exclude those "colorable" constitutional claims patched onto claims on other issues. The public should respond to the leader's positions..)."29 be confined to "valid" claims."31In his opinion for the Court. Scalia's opinion rested upon a legalistic definition of the relations among the branches of the federal government. 29 Moore v. J. he strongly objected to Rehnquist's use of a balancing test and by implication a pragmatictheory of the relationsbetween the branches. conc. 108 S. Today's decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned by rule.interest-groupscrutinythrough Scalia's narrow interpretation of the scope of judicial power. Review on constitutional grounds must is to toy with the separation of powers." Regulation 3 (November-December 1979): 19-26. Scalia confirmed his belief in the value of policy direction by the executive. J. 733 F. he supported judicial consideration of the constitutionality of the legislative veto because the constitutional text appeared to be violated. 2047. 2597.
38 He also complained judgescouldinitiateunfair or unjustprosecutions executiveofficers. For a related objection to judicial interference in areas of exclusive executive power.2d 82 (D. United States. FERC.761 F.2d 746 (D.Ct. Humphrey's Executor v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co. dissenting). see Websterv..reducedpresidential authorityin an unconstitutional manner. FERC. J. Federal Reserve System. 42 Brock v. 41 Antonin Scalia. J. dissenting).ANTONIN
a definition the legalpowers the executive. Cir. Cir.Ct.. 723 F.C. for incremental fashion. at 2628-9 (Scalia. of Governors. ICC. Atlanta Gas Light Co.
Ibid. 728 F. 796 F. 1983). 2063 (Scalia. 38 Ibid.. United States. dissenting).Aluminum Co. dissenting).becausehe fears thatbureaucratic policymakingbyadjudication produces policyin a disorganized.Indeed.comprehensive rules..C.42 Scalia's opinionforthe Supreme first Court
33 34 35 36 37
Ibid.37 Scaliaoften driftedinto dicta in his dissentingopinion in Morrison.39 of Scaliawanteda presidency to free make policy and control the executivebranchwith as few checks and balances as possible.2d 677 (D. 1986). dissenting). 39 Ibid.
.Tobuttress contentionhe citedthe opinionof the Courtin Humphrey's this
Executor v. ICC.J. he argued. 1984). Dole... 1983). v. Ibid. 745 F.C.C."35 also contended He thatthe powerto prosecute crimeswas"aquintessentially executive function" and that restrictions its operationby the specialprosecutor interfered on law with an exclusiveexecutive All powerin violationof the Constitution. Through interference imagined theConthis that he gresscould inducestaff disloyaltyto the executiveor decreasepopularsupport for executive that policyefforts.
Morrisonv. thesediscussions clarifythe thrustof his visionof executive power.. at 2630-1.Ct. 723 F. J. J. City of Bedford v. Sea-Land Service v. v. J. 40 Morrison v. Cir. dissenting).2d 533 (D.2d 975 (D.S. 108 S. 756 F. J.. 2627-8 (Scalia. "Back to Basics: Making Law With Making Rules. FERC. 602 (1935). Kansas Cities v. 2640 (Scalia. 1984).C. definition of of The rested his reading on of the "plainmeaning" Article II of the Constitutionto be a grantof some of exclusivepowersto the executive. at 2059-60. 718 F.. Olson.2d 191 (D.36 of these powers. Cir. J.. wouldgrant of He the to agencies discretion formulate concise. 1985).He fearedthat in the approval this law permitted of legislativeinterference the president's commandof the executive branch.41His decisions the Courtof Appealsfrequently supported in suchagencydiscretion rulemaking.his opinionmentioned only electionsandthe exclusive powers of the otherbranches properconstitutional as checksand balancesagainstexecutive policy makingand policy implementation powers. Cir." Regulation 5 (July-August 1981): 25-26. dissenting).2d 543 (D. 2631-5 (Scalia. 295 U. 108 S. 1983).at 2627-37 (Scalia. ofAmerica v.however. Olson. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Port Norris Express Co..C. Cir. Bd.40 Scaliaalsohasindicated supportforexecutive his policyleadership expressing by a fundamental confidencein the expertise agencyrulemaking. Doe.C.34 which defined the executive removal powers of the
president the meaningof the term"executive and officers. Cir.2d 1164 (D... 108 S. Cir. 1985). at 2638-40 (Scalia. dissenting).C.33 readthe Articleas a statementallocating He exclusive powersoverappointment removal executive and of officersto the president.. at 2628 (Scalia.
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continuedthis recordas he uphelda readingof taxationlanguagein the Panama CanalTreaty.1336(D. 751 F.see "Remarks JusticeAntonin on of ScaliaBeforethe Fellows the American Foundation the NationalConference BarPresiof Bar and of dents.He madeit clear thatparties haveto exhaust administrative remedies unless agency arbitrarily the had and capriciously abusedits discretion. "RegulatoryReform-The GameHasChanged.2d855." in AntitrustLaw Journal55 (1986):193-195. conc.Antonin Scalia.50 Table7 reports votingduring the 1986and 1987Supreme Courttermsin caseson executive agenciesand issues withan administration position. UnitedStates."TheRole of Judiciary Deregulation.Ct. "hardlook"inquiryinto the wisdom or of administrative procedures and rules. alsoScalia. 1837(1988)(Scalia." Regulation (January-February 6 1982):19-21.Mississippi Power& Light Co."46 Courts. S. 46 International Union."Judicial Review Administrative of Decisions.347 (1986).).Ct. also see NationalLaborRelations Boardv.he argued. The reasonfor the modestsupportfor agencyclaimsduringthe 1986and 1987
O'Connorv.& dissenting)." Regulation1 (July-August 1977):38-41." in 197-198."44
Scaliadesiredto minimizejudicialcontrolof agencyactivity. Mississippi rel. UAWv. v."Responsibilities Regulatory of AgenciesunderEnvironmental Laws.J. 2442-5 (1988)(Scalia.La. 108S. 4S Interstate Commerce Commission Brotherhood Locomotive v.v. "Reagulation-TheFirstYear. Inc.48 of Althoughhe expressed someconcern about Office of Managementand Budget oversightof agency rulemaking underthe Reagan deregulation he program.Cir.Surprisingly.See also Scalia.
. 413..4'He refusedto allow courts to inquire intopresidential direction agencies.43 Scaliaalso affirmedagencyinterpretations the meaningof statof utes becauseof the agency's"expertknowledgeof the interpretation's practical
consequences. 862 (D. 107 S. ex 108 S.Theyshouldavoidinquiryinto the rationality congressional of action. 108S. of 107 Engineers... 49Antonin Scalia.2d 1336. Donovan. 1984).45He soughtto keepcourtsout of the consideration congressional of assignment dutiesand the expenditure fundsto of of agencies. statedthatthe executive shouldmake"vigorous use of the machinery government" controlthe contoursof policy making of to throughagencyrulemaking.8. 47 AntoninScalia." Houston LawReview (January 24 1987): 97-109."TWo Makea Right:The Judicialization Standardless Wrongs of Rulemaking.2360(1987).C. Scalia(67. Peck. 48 CenterforAuto Safety v. -1 DavidH.Ct. and "Back Basics.givingreason of to questionhis strongsupportfor agenciesin his writings.). 5 1981): Antonin Scalia.Local23.Cir."anarchetypical politicaltask. Moore. He also favorsrestrictions judicialreviewof agencydecisions..J.746 F. 426-427 (1987)(Scalia. conc.shouldact only to see if agencydiscretionis sanctionedby statutes.table 2. 1985). conc.Ct. 15 February 1987..2428."New Orleans.J.AntoninScalia. the creationof additionalprocedures for agenciesto follow (hybridrulemaking)." Regulation (January-February 13-15. KMart Corp." to 26-27. United Food andCommercial Workers Union.4percent for pro-agency both terms)was not the justicemost supportive agencychoices."Role of the Judiciary Deregulation.Ct." American PoliticsQuarterly 14 (October1986):321.C.1811.49 Scalia'svoting recordwhile on the Courtof Appealswas moresupportive of agencyactionthananyothermemberof his court.
).Local 340.7 (27) (26) (26) (27) (27) (27) (8) (27) (27) (26) Both Terms Support Agency 80. conc.0 76. 1207.Ct. 108 S.Ct. J.3 71.C.7 66." Supreme Court Review (1978): 386-387.6 72. 2413.0 75.0 55.4 63.beof causeCongressignoredprecisionand procedural uniformityin its statutorylanthe of guage. "Vermont Yankee.Thisloosenessof language abetted growth uncontrolled agencypower and made externaloversight the agencymoredifficult. Langley v. 396 (1987). 400-409.7 66.4 69.0 80. 52 Immigration and Naturalization Service v."407.Ct.51 a concurring In opinionin anotheradministrative he refusedto deferto the agencyinterprecase tation of a statutewhenthe agencyreliedon the legislative historyof the statute ratherthan its plain meaning. 2015-2017 (1987) (Scalia.
..8 62. "VermontYankee:The APA. conc. J. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. United States v.to that same extent is the agenciesareleft to determine substantial a The aspectof theirown power..0 65.Scaliabelievesthatthe community good is also best servedby clearand concisecongressional policymaking.0 60.ANTONIN
TABLE7 Votes of Justices in Cases InvolvingFederalAgencies Ranked by Supportof Agency in Percentages (numberof participationsin parentheses)
1986 Term Support Agency 85.He madethis clearin a concurringopinion chidingan agencyfor pushingthe languageof a statuteto extremesbecause of excessivejudicial deferenceto the agency.5 61. 53 Antonin Scalia.7 (26) (47) (47) (46) (47) (46) (47) (8) (47) (47) (46)
Justice O'Connor Rehnquist Powell White Court average Stevens Scalia Stevens Marshall Blackmun
Justice O'Connor White Scalia Rehnquist Court average Blackmun Kennedy Stevens Marshall Brennan
Justice Powell O'Connor Rehnquist White Court average Scalia Stevens Kennedy Blackmun Marshall Brennan
termsprobablywas his willingnessto criticizeagencyinterpretations statutes of whenthey ignoredthe plain meaningof the statute.0 75.0 (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) 1987 Term Support Agency 70.7 70.. Circuit.7 66.2 66.2 67.52 Althoughhe has admittedthat politicalleadershipof agenciesdeserves respectfromthe courts.2 69.0 63.Ct. 1223-1225 (1987) (Scalia.0 59. conc. 54 Scalia. the D. Taylor. 107 S. 108 S."54 of definedby agencieson theirown thus prohibited easy an diversity procedures
51 National Labor Relations Board v. J.53 Thus.).7 59. for "to the extentthat of the choice of procedures left to the agenciesthemselves. 2423-4 (1988) (Scalia.0 80.)..3 57. 107 S. he was criticalof the so-callednewregulation the past two decades.6 58. and the Supreme Court. Cardoza Fonseca. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 2002.7 63.0 65.
1983) (Scalia. FBI. Department of Health and Human Services. "Letterto Congressman John Dingell. wants he to revitalize doctrine. construedprovisionsallowingparticipation privateparties.. Cir. 1606. Bureau of Alcohol. See Nagareda.he viewsloose delegathe tion as a sourceof all sorts of discretionary bureaucratic choices that generate litigation allowjudicialintervention oversight executive and and of responsibilities. U. dissenting).He was reluctant by the to to interpret Freedom Information to openagencyrecords publicscruof Act tiny unless clear statutorylanguagepermittedit.C. 1986). 56 Scalia. 1986). 1983). J." Regulation 4 (July-August 1980): 25-28.however."Federal Communications Bar Journal 25 (1972): 118-119. "TheAPA: An AdministrativeConference Perspective.2d 1586. is on He recordas opposingfreepublicaccessto electronic media. "Appellate Jurisprudence.Ct. 792 F. Julian. 2d 1462 (D."388-400. Cir.14
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comprehension the propriety agencyactionby the legislature." 715-725.62 Therefore. 622-627 (D. of Justice v. 61 Antonin Scalia. "Two Wrongs. Senate. has often expressedhostilityto nontraditional forms of participation. Antonin Scalia. it threatof of and ened legislativepowerbecauseit introduceduncertainties statutorymeaning of resolvableonly in court. 1984). WashingtonPost v."VirginiaLaw Review 72 (March 1986):344-345. 712 F. 62 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. affd.2d 664 (D." Regulation 6 (March-April 1982): 14-19.S." 23 May 1974. Shaw v.C. 1614-9 (1988) (Scalia. 57.2d 58 (D.2d 146. 749 F. 1983).
. 59 Scalia. and Firearms. Cir.56 Despitehis emphasison political controlof agencyauthority.. 91.Scalia has not or in supporteddirectpublic participation interestrepresentation policy formaIn tion or implementation. Confirmation Hearing. 715 F. for a critique of this approach. "Don't Go Near the Water.. 795 F. Ryan v.C. Scalia. unvirtuous that of action. "A Note on the Benzene Case. Cir. and its surrogate..C..55 Scaliaalso arguedfor insuring carefulcongressional policymakingthroughthe application the nondelegation of doctrine.C. Arieff v. 153 (D.5"He encouragedreadingthe Freedomof InformationAct as a meansof informingthe publicabout agency into actionrather thanas a wayof insuring personalized inquiries officialaction.703 F. 60 Ibid."60 to Scalia Besidesrestricting publicopportunities challengeagencyrulemaking. Department of the Navy. Tobacco. "The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes. quoted in Marshall Breger.2d 205 (D. dissenting). press.Ct."59 rejects thesis is executive do-it-yourself overthat the "firstline of defenseagainstan arbitrary the sight by the public.LikeChiefJusticeRehnquist." 38-41.Instead. J. 1982. areprimarily productof institutionalized He the withinour systemof representative andbalances democracy. "The Freedom of Information Act. 5' Antonin Scalia. 58 United States Dept. "Vermont Yankee.C. IRS.61He wrotea significant freedomof speechto demondissentto a Courtof Appealsdecisionthatextended varieties pluralistic of strators conductinga sleep-inin a publicpark. 271 (1987). Cir. does not just see the doctrineas a wayof this he decreasing powersgivenbureausby Congress.and"themajor the checks exposesof recenttimes .
55Antonin Scalia. reading Administrative the Procedure he narrowly Act. Church of Scientology of California v. 108 S. 19.58 He contends discoveries officialmisdeeds." 19. 108 S. Watt. Cir.
See Nagareda. 849. and marketsteach people the virtuesof labor. 107 S.the principle holdsthatthe marketis not morallycorrupting.Scalia arguedthe practiceviolatedthe takingsclausebecauseof the lack of procedural of on of uniformityin the establishment restriction incomeand the penalization selectedlandlordswithout compensation. thrift. Scaliabelievesthat legislative ventionin marketsshould be limitedto coerciverules. "Economic Affairs as Human Affairs. "Rival Interpretations of Market Society.
. an governmental opinionon the takingsclauseduringthe 1986term." Cato Journal 4 (Winter 1985): 707-709.The numberof casesis verysmall." 715-720. 67 Antonin Scalia.The regulationof beach access was not deemeda valid exerciseof a state'spolice powerunlesscompensation offered. FifthAmendment the takingsclausecasesof the 1986and 1987 terms.Although the Constitution economiclibertyand althoughthere does not protectsubstantive is no widelyshared"constitutional ethos"favoringunregulated marketsand abintersolutefreedomin the use of privateproperty. Table8 reportsthe votes of the justiceson one aspectof economicregulation andredistribution. 3141 (1987). 859-864 (1988) (Scalia. regulation the market through dardsestablished constitutional Economicregulation acceptable is by lawmakers." Journal of Economic Literature 20 (December 1982): 1463-1484. he supportedthe claimsof landlordsin a disputeovera rentcontrolordinance. J. Hirschman.Ct.67 has not favoredthe He to market useof governmental and largess." Markets to be trusted.The easementdemanded inbecausea property compensation terestwas taken by the state. reHe fused to allow Californiato conditionthe grantingof a permitfor rebuilding a houseon privatelandupon a grantto the publicof accessacrossprivateproperty to a publicbeach. fully defines the moralizing concept. 66 Pennell v.DerivedfromAdam Smith.66 Scaliahasallowed of "reasonable" stanHowever.andeconomiclibertyis to be protected are againstarbitrary governmental action. grants. California Coastal Commission. City of San Jose. conc.ANTONIN SCALIA |
politicalconflict restricting policy makingby expertsand electedleadersdo not fit into his democraticvision.. to him whenit is the productof the operation representative of politics. 65 Nollan v. subsidies. "Appellate Jurisprudence. & dissenting).but Scaliawas the justiceleast supporIn tive of uncompensated or redistribution takingof property.65 was Also. 108 S.Ct. Theordinance permitted officialsto adjustrentcontrolsand keeprentsbelow city a reasonable of returnfor buildingsin which"hardship" rate renters lived. and fair dealing. Albert 0.Scaliasoughtto restrict public seizuresof privatepropertyas part of an effort to redistribute resources. anti-egalitarian its resultsarenatural.63
Thethirdstandard Scalia'sapproach constitutional of to interpretation a belief is in the moralizing effect of the market.
" 706-707.Just as he fearsadministrative he remainsskepticalof the judicial abilityboth to define the economicliberty in of marketparticipants a "sensible" fashionand to craft economicpolicythat is fair and reasonable.68 agencysupervision marketsshouldbe restricted Consequently. 69 Scalia. "Guadalajora: Case Study in Regulationby Munificence.Ct. the and processes.Because statuterequired reporting. Meese.he upheld a Department Justiceclassification threeCanadianfilms as politicalpropaof of be that gandaand a statutoryrequirement the department informedof showings of the films.For example."the government thus could promoteor disparage ideas for the communitygood if Government for approval. "Appellate Jurisprudence.16
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TABLE8 Votes of the Justices in TakingClause Cases. in precisestatutes.
. becauseit was desirable to informthe publicof the "scopeand effect of the agent'spropagandizing of could requireinformationon presentation the film. 1862 (1987).a legalformof community
68 A Antonin Scalia. Cir. 70 Block v. "Economic Affairs. 1986-87 Terms. discretion marketsupervision.70Scalia's it hada statutory basis. 1314-1318(D. that through legislative administrative can best define rights.C.Ranked by Approvalfor GovernmentalTakingin Numbersof Cases*
Justice Blackmun Stevens Brennan Marshall White Court average O'Connor Rehnquist Powell Scalia Kennedy * Number = 6.69
A fourthstandard constitutional is beliefthatthegoverninterpretation Scalia's of ment should supportthe majorityconsensuson what constitutesthe good life. He believes thecommunity. 1986). the becausetherewasno priorthe and restraint violationof freedomof the pressprecedents. affd. Meese v."Regulation2 (MarchApril 1978): 23-29." 737-738. 107 S. 793 F. 2d 1303. so doing. Favor Taking 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 Disapprove Taking 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 0 Non-Participating 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
of by behavior. Keene. effort.in a Court of Appeals decision. See also Nagareda.
but he evokedunhappiness to he Therefore. The Supreme Court reversedthe D.4 22.and mannerrulesestablishedby informedadministrators preventthe expressive to sleep-in. rightsas an impedimentof the regulatory powerof government.0 32.O'Connor.2d 586.criminaldue process.0 40.4 22. 1986-1987 Terms. and agreed with Scalia. "AppellateJurisprudence.eventhoughthe votesfor both indicationof the positionsof the justices. Cir.7 78.5 59.3 54.0 (25) (25) (25) (25) (25) (12) (24) (6) (25) (25)
commitmentto this conceptionof rightsappearsin his decisionson all rights issues-the First Amendment. Community 733-737.ANTONIN SCALIA |
TABLE9 Votes of Justices in Cases InvolvingRights Issues. the Courtof Appeals.Not only didScaliaindicate unwillingness apply an with this use of precedents a new formof protest. upheldthe applicationof uniformtime. See also Nagareda.2 50.0 41.C. place. 703 F.1 23.0 84. 468 U."
.and Rehnquist. for CreativeNon-Violence. Watt.2 48.0 79.Examples community parties' his dissentingopinion in the Connecticut electioncase.5 33.0 32.4 13. dissenting). Ranked by Supportfor Rights Claimin Percentages
(number of participations in parentheses)
Justice Brennan Marshall Blackmun Powell Stevens Kennedy Scalia White O'Connor Rehnquist Favor Free Expression 95. termsarecombinedto offer a stronger Nevertheless.0 88.The number casesis small.Scaliausuallywrotein supportof the regulaFor tion of expressive conductby the government.1 14.Scaliawas less supportive expressive rightsclaimsagainst the government than five of the justices.3 67. Wattcontaineda refusalto extend speech-plusFirst Amendmentdoctrineto allow a sleep-inby protesters to in a Washington. D. 622-7 (D.8 88. Cir.9 34. J.. 1983) (Scalia.C. In his FirstAmendment opinions.C.3 (76) (77) (77) (77) (18) (48) (77) (76) (77) (77) Justice Brennan Marshall Blackmun Stevens White Powell O'Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia Favor Claim of Equality 88.7 95.8 30.S.7 33. But his hostilityto these claims is not as extremeas that of White.3 27. Clark v. 288 (1984).park.Scalia's dissentin Community for Creative Non-Violence v.Forthe majority primary JusticeThurgoodMarshallheld that the state'sclosed primarylaw violatedthe
' Community for Creative Non-Violence v.7 37.5 52. is clear that the divisionwithinthe Court on FirstAmendment it of issueswas extreme.6 (23) (23) (23) (11) (23) (6) (22) (23) (23) (22) Justice Brennan Marshall Stevens Blackmun Kennedy Powell Scalia Whtie O'Connor Rehnquist Favor Rights of Defendent 90. Table9 presentsthe voting behaviorof the justiceson rightsissuesduringthe of 1986and 1987terms.and equal protection.7' His opinions for the SupremeCourtcontinuedhis Court of Appealspattern include of preferring interests challenging to claims.
2d 1563 (D. 2891. Cir..political.2d 1325 (D. Pope v. Republican Party of Connecticut. 79 See In re Reporters Comm.79 clausedecisionwasa dissenting Scalia's only establishment opinionthat favored
Tashjianv. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. "Appellate Jurisprudence."and extendedthe protectionof freedomof association to "fanciful" bonds and "casualcontacts. dissenting). 74 Riley v. 1985).C. 544.he rejected judicialinference moreextensive pressliberties.he indicated wouldallowprivate that violatenormsof truthtellingand that greaterabilityto curtailpublications of discussionof politicsin the interest the community.73 tailoredrestrictions speechduring Finally. dissenting).).77 Finally. Ragland.. 2901-2906 (1987) (Scalia.contendedthe rulingexceeded"thepermissable limit of FirstAmendmentrestrictions upon the state'sorderingof elections. ' Arkansas WritersProject v.Scalia defendednarrowly charitablesolicitationsif they preventedfraud. was not on a matterof public concern. His concurring opinion in a case involving the applicationof the Miller v.
. J.S.. 15 (1973).76 did not indicatethe content of a new approach."72 Scalia'srestricted interpretation of FirstAmendment protections appeared his dissentin Rankin v.Ct. with a bite often found in his dissents. 773 F. also in The majorityopinion by Marshallheld that a police administrator violatedthe expression rightsof a deputyconstableby firingthe officer afterthe officer suggesteda needto shoot President Reagan.Ct. Rankin v. 1918. Anderson. 107 S. to becausethe statementlacked political content. even if the statementhad been on a matterof publicconcern.C." 726-733.Ct. for Freedom of the Press."if indeedit [saw] the of one wherenone exists. 107 S. 1730-1732 (1987) (Scalia. Evans. Cir. J. artistic. J. McPherson. J.Ct.18
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First Amendmentfreedomof associationof independent voters.in citizens he a Courtof Appealsdissenton libellaw. 1923 (1987) (Scalia. 2667. Illinois. 413 U. conc. California obscenitytest containedlanguageindiMiller and eliminatethe prongof its test requiring cating a desireto reexamine judicial examinationof the "literary. See also Liberty Lobby v. 2681 (1988) (Scalia.he believedthe expression could be regulated because its irresponsible nature threatened reputation esprit-de-corpsof the departthe and on ment. 107 S. McPherson. conc. Scaliaarguedthat the dismissalwas proper. Nagareda. dissenting). 78 Ollman v.. Cir. or scientificvalue"of a He publication.). 1038-1039 (D.74 In freedomof the pressissuesScaliadissentedwhenthe majoritystruckdown an Arkansassales tax on selectedmagazinesas a violation of the FirstAmendment. 559-560 (1986) (Scalia.2d 970.and expressedapprovalof a seriouscrime.C. 76 Miller v. 108 S. 1984) (Scalia.Also. 746 F. 750 F. 1984). 1722.Scalia.Ct.78 the denigrate enlightened of In thiscase andotherfreepresscases.He foundthatthe speechwason a public concernand that the expressive right of the officer outweighedthe need of the department controlit.. California. J. dissenting). He believedthe lack of a tax on some magazineswas a reasonablestate similarto aid to nonprofitgroupsand one withouta coersubsidyof expression 5 cive effect on the taxed magazines. J." exaggerated importance the associationalinterestat issue. 107 S..
White."83 of Whenhe reachedthe Supreme Courthe some who envisionedhim to be a stronglypro-prosecution surprised justicewith an occasionalconfounding opinion.2d 1079.82 and Indeed. Cohen. 2573.80 did the majorityopinion of JusticeWilliamBrennan.wherehe wasnot willingto enhancethe rightsof criminal defendants.andO'Connor to support admissability a confessionconfirming codefendants' the of the criminal acts in a felony murderrule case whenthe circumstances the protected name of
Lemon v. 1149(1987). 733 F. determined somepotentialscientific had value.2d 179 (D.84 It was criticized in dissents by O'Connor and Powell.ANTONIN SCALIA | 19
the constitutionality a creationscienceeducationlawenactedby the Louisiana of statelegislature. 403 U. 1984).S.By reference the arguments counsel. 86 Murray v.6 percentof the cases.Ct. Hicks. dissenting).he did allow the searchof the home of a probationerundera Wisconsin establishing law to search" grounds conducta "reasonable forevidence probation of violations. 702 F.86 In confrontationclause cases involvingthe admissionof the confessionsof Scaliawrotefor Rehnquist.C.Yet.but to as a differentconclusion. 2510 (1988). he fearedfurtherrelieffor the defendantwouldcause the "erosion" "publicsafetyneeds. 107 S. Aguillard. v. v.He joined Powell.Ct.Ct.InArizona v. Cir. White. Richardson.2d 1104 (D. 84Arizonav.O'Connor.C. 443 (1971). 85 Griffin v. Cir. J.andRehnquist thejusticesmost as in opposition to rightsclaims by criminaldefendants. J..81 Table9 presents votingbehaviorof the justicesin cases involvingcriminal the due processclaimsandthe interpretation criminalstatutesduringthe 1986and of 1987terms. Kurtzman. 1094 (D.
. to especiallywithregard psychiatric treatment defenses. 740 F. Hicks his opinionon the necessity for probablecause for the movementof equjipment permitthe inspection to of the serialnumber an itemin plainviewclarifiedthe meaningof the Coolidge of
v.C. Wisconsin. Cir. 791 F.2d 138 (D. Scaliahad not writtenmanycriminaldue processopinionswhileon the Court of Appeals. Scalia found to of the act did not advancea religiousbelief and only accommodated theory of a whichthe statelegislature creation. 1984).
and joined by Rehnquist. 3164 (1987). Blackmun.85 a with a warrant Also.Ct. 82 In re Sealed Case. New Hampshire ruling.S. appliedthe establishment religion developed Lemon He of in test v.C. 107 S.He furtherarguedthat the FirstAmendmentallowedthe government sometimesto advancereligionas it accommodated diverse valuesin the school curriculum. codefendants. New Hampshire.Scaliafavoredthe government overthe defendantin 76. Powell. Edwards v. He also found the statutehad a secularpurposeby allowingstudentsto learnalternativetheoriesof creation. 107 S. Byers.in a dissent in a doublejeopardycase. 403 U.. 2591-2607 (1987) (Scalia. 108 S. v. he permitted searchof premises even though the premiseshad earlierbeen searchedillegallyby police. Kurtzman. US. US. Scaliaruledthatprobable causewasnot necesin saryto searchin circumstances whichthe statehaddetermined therewere"special needs"for searchinga probationer's home to insurethe effectiveoperation of the probationsystem. Compare Coolidge v. 1986). United States. 602 (1971). Cir. dissenting). 83 US. 1983) (Scalia.
Blackmun.94 launchedinto a disthe actionconcept. Oklahoma. Weber. 2529.He argued the condemning entireaffirmative sentingopinion discrimination" ignoring by supportfor"state-enforced majority opinioncontinued v. 92 Booth v. Despitethe broaddefinitionof equality. the exclusionof the statement Finally. 108 S. 107 S." WashingtonUniversity Law Quarterly(Winter 1979): 147-157.He believedthat to the statejury had givencarefulconsideration social and moralfactorsbefore imposingthe penalty..Ct..in for equalityclaims. J. 90 Coy v.92 from the Court'srefusalto impose the death penaltyon a juvenile. New York. Iowa. 193 (1979).the numberof cases still remainssmall. 1702 (1987). 2798 (1988).Ct.87 permittedthe introduction out-of-courtidenclausecasehe wrote But tificationsas evidenceat trial. 2541-2542 (1987) (Scalia. Scalia rankedlast among the justices. 93 Thompson v..contending that the majorityhad failedto providean historicalor rationalbasisfor claiming the penaltyviolated a nationalconsensusagainstthe penalty. 2687. jurorsopposedto the death penaltyto be seatedin a capitalcase.the tablecountsall voteson equalitymattersbeforethe Court. 107 S. 1714 (1987).S. v. Mississippi. U.Ct. TransportationAgency.89 also prohibited the screening a childwitnessfroman allegedsexoffenderduringa trialbecause of of confrontationclause standards. dissenting). Marsh.Ct.88 in anotherconfrontation for Brennan. dissenting). 95 United Steelworkers of America v. 91 Gray v. 2045.93 Courton equality the Table9 also presents votesof the justicesof the Supreme issuesduringthe 1986and 1987terms. 108 S. 2711-22 (1988) (Scalia. J.Scaliadissentedfrom a majorityrulingthat permitted Yet. J. 108 S. Drawing on the tenor of the lan-
he guageand the themesof one of his law reviewarticles. 107 S. 107 S. 94 Antonin Scalia. Maryland.Ct. Nevertheless. support ScaliadisIn his only Supreme actionprograms.20
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
of He the confessingdefendant. dissenting). Owens.90 In Grayv. "The Disease as the Cure. In concludinghis argumenthe lashed the majorityfor convertinga civil rightslaw into "a powerfulengineof racismand sexism"and for
Richardson v. 2059-2062 (1987) (Scalia. Mississippi. He contendedthat the exclusionof the statementhelpedthe jury determinethe degreeof harmas made and wellas the moralguilt of the defendant. and both the holdingof UnitedSteelworkers Weber95 the languageand intentions of Title VII.and Powellto insurethe defendantwouldbe confessionat theirjoint trial of protected againstthe introduction a codefendant's He if the confessionwasinadmissable againstthe codefendant.Ct.he dissented the penaltyphaseone-sidedand violativeof due process.443 IJ. 838 (1988). Courtopinionon affirmative
sented in Johnson v.Marshall.Becausethe issueof equalitynow includes cases arisingunderfederaland state civil rightslaws as well as underthe Equal ProtectionClause.
.91 he also arguedin dissentin anothercase that a statecould presenta victimimpactstatement as evidenceduringthe penaltyphase of a capitalcase.S. 89 Cruz v. in a tie with Rehnquist.Ct.
100 Table10reports votingof the Courtin casesinvolving the federalism issuesduring the 1986and 1987terms.2d 1225. Santa Clara County. Duncan-Huggins dissenturgedthe court not to find a his violationof civil rightslawsbeforetheyhad acquired evidenceof intentionalracial discrimination..Ct.in Carterv.especially decisionsadvancing and of by politicalequality. Compare to Toney v. 92. curtail To community discord.Scaliarankedsixthamongthe tenjusticesin his support for the claimsof the federalgovernment overthe stategovernments.Ct.108S. 9 U. 101 California Coastal Commission v. 107 S. City of New York. Inc. was not He as sympathetic the claimsof the statesin thesecasesas werethe otherappointees to of the Reaganadministration. South Dakota v. Transportation Agency. Senate. 2793 (1987).2d 1364 (D. 107 S. Granite Rock Co. Confirmation Hearing. 2225. The lessonof the rightsdecisionsis that Scaliadoes not wantrightsto threaten the traditions security the politicalorder.98 clearlywantedto keep the court out of the businessof He promotingequalityunless it had strongevidenceof a violation of statutes. Cir. J. 1983). dissenting). Block.. dissenting). 727 F. 1419(1987) (Scalia.C.ANTONIN SCALIA |
causingpersonslike Johnson. Dole.99 in his only lengthystatement Scaliaindicatedthat the federalgovernment be "alegitimateand can federalism. J. 100 Antonin Scalia. Duncan-Huggins. Cir. 98 Carter v. conc. "The Two Faces of Federalism. 1442. In his confirmationhearingshe made statementsin favorof an importantrole for the statesin constitutional Yet on government.C. to sufferinjustice"atthe handsof a Courtfond of thinkingitself the champion of the politicallyimpotent." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 6 (special issue.101 offer "solicitude" did of
96 Johnson v. usefulinstrument policy.He is unwillingto allow rightsto be used to induce diversity andfracture mislead or community sentiment. Scalia suggeststhat legislatures shouldact and courtsshouldmoderatetheirrolein the of to development legalstandards resolve The rightscontroversies. the Courtof On Appeals.. 1984) (Scalia. 9 New YorkClub Association.whose desireswereadversely affectedby the plan. J. boundsof rights are to be set primarilyby the majorityof the people'srepresentatives. v. Scalia did agreewith the SupremeCourtthat discrimination privateclubscan be regulated statelaws.favorable some exercises federalpoweras indicatedby his Granite Rock dissent and his vote in South Dakota v."96 Using a rationalbasis test. to of Scalia. 1465-1476 (1987) (Scalia.Ct. 1982.). 2238 (1988)(Scalia..
A finalstandard constitutional of is interpretation Scalia'sbeliefthatthe national the majorityshouldrespect choicesof leadersselectedby stateor local majorities. dissenting). 1982): 22." also notedan "unfortunate" of He of tendency conservativesto see federalpoweras somethingto be resistedor undone.S. Dole. J.97 has been critical by He by of at least one judicialeffort to eliminateracialdiscrimination. 705 F. 1244-1247 (D.Ct.
.. 107 S.
2510 (1988).3 (47) (47) (47) (32) (46) (47) (47) (8) (47) (47)
in stateprerogatives an opinionvalidatingstateincomeevaluationguidelinesap102 thus restson the federallyfundedwelfareprogram.Ct. Finally. & dissenting)..
.6 72.Ct. 1369 (1988) (Scalia.Ct. of in an interpretation the commerce 103 Forexample.S. He wrotea dis106 trucking.. 107 S.22 |
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TABLE 10 Votes of the Justices InvolvingFederalismand PreemptionIssues.. 1986-1987 in Terms.Ct. 2829. Inc. dissenting). Auth. v. sentingopinion favoringstatelegislativetaxingof interstate judicially-created than federal the he hassupported applicationof statelawrather standardson forum selection when federalstatutesweresilent on venue. encroachon all statepowers. conc.0 65. J. 1355.S.).2218.. J.2 63.).Ct. South Carolina v.2223-4 (1988)(Scalia. 108S.6 65. 2823-2829 (1987) (Scalia. conc. Dynamics Corp.Ct. San Antonio Municipal Trans. 456 U.8 61.3 66. 108 S.Ct.).. conc. dissenting). 468 U. Washington State Department of Revenue. Midwesco Enterprises. American TruckingAssociations v. 104 CTS Corp.7 60.3 55. v.his concurring dissenting on a did not prevent statefromimposingregulations the saleof stock merceclause whenthe statedid not discriminate it andthe merger corporations hadchartered of clarifica104 congressional interests. 108 S. 107 S. United Technologies Corp.0 55.Ranked by Preference of FederalAuthority Percentages (numberof participationsin parentheses)
Justice White Stevens Marshall Powell Blackmun Scalia Brennan Kennedy Rehnquist O'Connor Support Federal Authority 76. 106 Tyler Pipe Industries v. J. 742 (1982) and with the dissenters in Garcia v.. Reed. 107 S. Mississippi. 108 S. Scheiner. 2851-2852 (1987) (Scalia. 1652-1653 (1987) (Scalia. J. 2810.107
SCALIA AND APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
is What kind of conservative Antonin Scalia? His selection satisfiedthe desire of that conservative administration wanted judgessupportive changes of an avowed
Lukhard v. His federalism plied under should but he does not thinkfederalsupremacy the conceptof federalsupremacy. 1807 (1987). Baker.Ct. Compare his opinion in Boyle v. law and opinionarguedthat federal andthe comclause. Inc. Scaliaalso wantedgreater againstout-of-state 105 tion of the federaland staterolesin commerceclausematters. "Two Faces. He thus agrees with a narrow reading of the statements of the Court in FERC v. 2239. 107 Stewart Organization. 107 S. 1637. J.... 2245-9 (1988) (Scalia. compare Scalia. 528 (1985). Ricoh Corp. of America. J. 105 BendixAutolite Corp. v." 19-22.
1985)..Reynolds v.S. Bishop v. 360 U. A Matter of Principle (Cambridge. 533. Jr. Goldberg v. FTC v.S. US. Brennan. Ronald Dworkin. Lawrence H. 494 (1954). 9-20. 341. Mass. TakingRights Seriously (Cambridge.S. dissenting).Standards rejectsincludethe beliefthat the Supreme he Courthas to foster and of should relations cooperative amongequals111 thatall institutions government be open to equal and activepublicparticipation oversight. Constitutional Choices (Cambridge. Williams. NLRB. 113 Dworkin.S. 211-213. 121-208. See Martin Edelman. 254 (1970). Inc. Scalia. Matter of Principle. 1978).. Democratic Theories and the Constitution (Albany: State University of New York Press. Mass.Constitutional Choices. 1984). This theory has distinctive variants.Ronald Dworkin. 294 (1961).: Harvard University Press. J. v. McElroy. 12. Scaliawas a conservativein the eyesof most politicalcommentators becauseof his votesandopinions that contain a repudiationof the politicalvision of Warren Court liberalism. 205-213.moral. American Bar Association. See Warren'sviews in Fibreboard Paper Products v.
109 Warren Court
. dissenting). 886. This proposition. Tribe.S. Board of Education.remains balancer of communityneeds for orderand politicalstabilityagainsta narrowly defined the Courtliberalbeliefthatrightsserve purposefor rights. 426 U. Kelly. 165-187.Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy. dissenting). 131-149.S."12 rejectsthe and He Warren Courtliberals' skepticism markets. J. liberalism is an effort to provide a standard definition of the values of a group of like-minded judges and legal scholars.S. 436.S. dissenting). See also Dandridge v. 397 U.. 245-288.. in Originating JusticeHarlanStone'sCaroleneProductsfootnote. 1985). 458-466 (1966). 2. 379 U. 203 (1964). It is nowdefendedby JusticesBrennan Marand 109 shalland some legalscholars.388 U.: Harvard University Press.113 of he the Court Finally. 384 U. 110 Miranda v. 414-426 (1956) (Warren. J. "The Fourteenth Amendment. 471 (1970) (Marshall. visionmatured EarlWarren's proposition that Americanconstitutionalpoliticscould continueto exist only if there 108 is cooperation amongequals. assumes that politicalleadersshouldnot adoptpoliciesor practices failto treatpeople that withequaldignityand respector that prevent personsfromparticipating politin ical decision making. 377 U. Sims.Greene v. 565 (1964). 351 U.. Matter of Principle.110 Scalia also differswith the standardsof constitutional interpretation supporting centralpropositionofferedby Warren the Courtliberalism. J.Thushe rejects Warren
Brown v. 6-8. 8 August 1986.: Harvard University Press. Fred Meyer. du Pont and Co. 367 U. like the natural rights liberalism of Justice William Douglas.. William J. New York University Law School.. 341 (1968). rejects Warren liberals' beliefthatgovernment mustbe neutral definingrightsto choose modes in of political. Arizona. Great Dane Trailers. 474 (1959). 111 Ronald Dworkin. 390 U. 350-361 (1976) (Brennan. 206-208.in contrast. 377. It is distinctive from the historical positivism of Justice Hugo Black.S. Brown Shoe Co. 17.Thus. "Is Wealth a Value?"Journal of Legal Studies 9 (March 1980): 191-226. 112 Dworkin. 889-902 (1962) (Brennan. 347 U.S. 26 (1967).S.this vision or suggeststhat opportunistic factionalpoliticscan be prevented competition by The into amongdiversefactionsor interests. v. US.NLRB v. 397 U.S.andreligious a expression. Tribe.fardifferentfromScalia'scenof tralproposition aboutthe nature American constitutional government..ANTONIN
in administrative doctrineand that wasinclinedto avoidrightscontroversies law and the extensionof rightsopposingmajorityvalues." address to Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities. Wood. Mass. 370 U.S. 483.
10." Case Western ReserveLaw Review 37 (1986-7): 179. Giroux." Journal of Law. 536 (1965). and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution. Jr." 123-127. 1977). See also Dworkin. dissenting). Mass. 1981). Jr. See also Richard A.Scalia foundin the Reagan of of the otherbrands conservatism politicalproposirightwhoseprimary religious of is not a member the evangelical should rest on moral principlesidentical tion is that constitutionalgovernance by to those discernible a literalreadingof selectedbiblicalpassages. Jr. Posner. 424 U. Frank H..gives no evidenceof supporting viewof AttorneyGeneralEdwinMeeseIII who defends the basedon the beliefthatconinterpretation a historical to approach constitutional of restson loyaltyto a literalreading the originalintention stitutionalgovernance of the Constitutionand its amendments. and Public Policy 2 (Fall 1985): 85-105. Scalia's one use of economic analysis is an antitrust case. 1977)." Public Administration Review 45 (November 1985): 701."Suffolk Law Review 20 (Spring 1986): 1-54... J.He makes shouldbe basedon the governance to no reference theirbelief that constitutional of maximization the wealthof individualcitizens. effectively summarizes his principles."CriminalProcedureas a MarketSystem. "Originalism:The Lesser Evil. "The Root and Branch of Roe v.Pragmatism. Richard A. "Legal Formalism.374 U.S. Cox v." University of Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989): 856-864.. 152-167. Schempp. finally. Posner. Noonan." South
.Scaliadoes naturalrightstheor not appearto be a devoteeof neo-Aristotelian neo-Thomist ories. Posner. Easterbrook. 479." Marquette Law Review 70 (Spring 1987): 381. Compare to Scalia. England: Cambridge University Press. (Boston: Little. Pragmatism.Straus. conc.. 398 (1963). Sherbert v. 158-159." 123-127. Verner. "Morality.Althoughtheseideas haveinfluencedscholarslike JudgeJohn T."WealthMaximizationRevisited. 1515 (1988). Ethics.. Posner. 693. Griswold v. Davis. "Free Speech in an Economic Perspective. J. 374 U." Harvard Law Review 95 (February 1981):802-832. 266-278. of the Ninth Circuit. The Antelope (Berkeley: University of California Press. 379 U. Richard A. John T. Legal Realism. Edwin Meese III. J. v. "Morality. "Waysof Criticizing the Court. Edwin Meese III. "The Attorney General's View of the Supreme Court. Wade." 668-679. Brown.. Paul v.24
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
as a trumpcardagainstthe effortsof leadersor a majorityto enforcea definition of the good life.. 117 Antonin Scalia." 706. "Liberalism. Louisiana. 48-115. "Our Constitution's Design. Edwin Meese III. Sharp Electronics Corp. Noonan.Ct. 203 (1963) (Brennan. RichardA."in Stuart Hampshire.S.3. conc.neitherarehis valuesin tune withsome If Scaliais not a Warren politicalcoalition. Economic Analysis of Law. 2d ed.S. TakingRights Seriously. "Economic Affairs. 1976). Noonan. "The Supreme Court of the United States. little of their conceptsappearsin his writings. 714-735 (1976) (Brennan. 341-359. ed. "The Battle for the Constitution. Persons and Masks of the Law (New York:Farrar. 487-499 (1965) (Goldberg.: Harvard University Press. 381 U. Compare Edwin Meese III. 1978).S. 127-136. The Economics of Justice (Cambridge. best states the principle.117
114 Ronald Dworkin. 13. Connecticut.He does not should rest on the moral give voice to the belief that constitutionalgovernance 115 moralphilosophy. AlthoughScalia of law principles natural or anyotherabstract of of hadcontactat AEI and the University Chicagowiththe proponents the economic analysisof law. Public and Private Morality (Cambridge. Easterbrook.116Scalia. 108 S. on the natural worth of persons.1"4 Courtliberal.S.). See also John T. Scalia. Abington Township v. Posner. Noonan.theirlanguageis-absentin Scalia'swriting. Compare Scalia.Frank H. 116 Richard A. Business Electronic Corp." Journal of Legal Studies 12 (June 1983): 289-332. Nebraska Law Review 63 (1984): 115 John T."Policy Review 35 (Winter 1986): 34-35. Jr.).
Brisbin. 4 (1942). J. like Scalia does."Cumberland Law Review 19 (1988-1989): 497-537.
. 80 (1943). 30-31. OF LANDIS. and his student. long-range decisions. 119 James M. see also Edelman. of Frankfurter his associatesencouraged and in judicialrestraint constitutional interpretation. They do not know enough about the issues. Scripps Howard Radio v.S."' Bickel. 94. Sawyer.). "Economic Affairs" to Edward H. Thesemenbelieved experts that in and schooled science scientific managementshouldset the policyagendaalong a single. and see the discussion in Richard A. or about what those needs and wishes will appearto them to be two monthshence. desired leaders who induce political stability.S.bestcourseand thenimplement policy with the discretionto adjustit to new problems. 1975).C. Administrative Process. SEC v.'22 Scalia'spolicy choices confirmand extendthis standard constitutionalinterpretation attempting of by to freethe president fromexternalconstraints in the specialprosecutor (as case). conc. his former law clerk Alexander Bickel. Scalia is not an authoritarian centralist who would deny democratic participation to selected groups and use political institutions to enforce specific patterns of social behavior. 154-155. FCC. Crane. 114-20. v. J. Landis. 16. . 341 U. Morgan. James Landis. 122 US. D. 579. 1938). v.S. direction agencydiscretion. Bickel. 121 Landis. McGrath. 313 U. by defending disof by affirmingpresidential and the cretionof the agenciesin the interpretation statutes. and Steven Macedo. in the central proposition that constitutional government must be directed by expert leaders."Cato Policy Report 8 (November-December 1986): 2-3.: Cato Institute. Chenery Corp. 318 U. 165-174 (1951) (Frankfurter. The New Right and the Constitution (Washington." Tulane Law Review 61 (April 1987): 979. Democratic Theories.).S. Also... his deference to legislative economic policy making and his refusal to adopt a strong protective stance on both economic and personal rights sets him apart from libertarians. Besides not agreeing with Meese.. fearful of "unvarnishedpopulism" and unrestrainedmajorities. "The Law of the Constitution.AND BICKEL
Scalia'spolitical ideas and standardsfor constitutionalinterpretation actually
modify and extend the propositions about American government propounded by Felix Frankfurter.. Jr. 1986). 120 Alexander M. Compare Scalia. Frankfurter expounded on this view. 316 U. 343 U. 123. "Conservation Jurisprudencein the Reagan Era. "Judicial Activism and Economic Liberty. 74-5. 593 (1952) (Frankfurter. conc. 24.ANTONIN SCALIA 25 |
SCALIA AND THETRADITION FRANKFURTER.S. about
themselves. .their needs and wishes. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 118 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. for "masses of people do not make clear-cut. For of checkingand balancing the otherbranches by the Courtwas to be confinedto rareinstancesof the breachof specificconstituTexasLaw Review 27 (Fall 1986): 455. for an elaboration of this idea. TheAdministrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press. Frankfurter. These scholars believed. 409 (1941). The Morality of Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press.""'8Landis applauded the development of a professional administrative process with the hope "that policies . and Edwin Meese III. could most adequately be developed by men bred to the facts" rather than the "casual office"9 seeker."1120 Landiscontendedthat the administrativeprocesswould "fill the need for expertness" that legislatures and courts 121 lacked. stating: "Our scheme of society is more dependent than any other form of government on knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for the achievement of its aims.
" "Reliance the most preciousinterests civilizafor of tion . see also Rochin v..127 did not excludeparticipation They fromtheirvisionof the constitutional system.Y. 124 Colegrove v. Felix Frankfurter. 328 U. 68-69. J. v. Coleman v. 369 U. 99. 345 U. 472-477 (1953). Bickel. 128 Jacobsohn. 130 Baker v."126 Scaliais an ardentdefenderand elaborator the of judicial restraintand passivevirtuesdiscussedby Bickeland Frankfurter. Green.S.S. of Education v. 297-302 (1962) (Frankfurter. Gomillion v.
. Morgan. United Auto Workers. Baker v. 341 U.26
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
tionalrulesor clearstatutory and language123 to grievous misconduct offended that the sense of justice embodiedin constitutionalprovisions. Jacobsohn. 670-671 (1943) (Frankfurter. Idea of Progress. Lightfoot. Compare West Virginia State Bd. Carr. 186. Idea of Progress. demagoguery. Levinson.S. Carr.courtsdo not needto open administrative actionsto participation or legal interventionby groupsand privateparties.. 334."Courts 124 are not representative bodies.Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 175-181.S. 342 U. 307 U. 120-121.S. 556 (1946). McGrath. Ohio.). J.. corruptingfactionalinterests. 129 US. Ullman. J. 157. 525 (1950) (Frankfurter. Poe v. 81-88.129 Courts must refrain frompermitting interests questionexecutive to policypreferences. withinthe narrowlimits. dissenting). US... 549.S. 367 U.. 111-198. J. The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (New York: Harper and Row.S. 319 U.S.Theiressentialqualityis detachment.S. 593-614 (1952) (Frankfurter. 360 U. NLRB. Terryv. Colegrove v. 131-132.S.Onlya persisin tentpositivetranslation the faithof a freesocietyintotheconvictions habits of and andactionsof a communityis the ultimatereliance unabated against temptations to fetterthe humanspirit.. CBS v.128 and Becausethis traditionholds that the choices of expertsand leadersshouldnot be easilychallengedby groups or privateparties. 165. 497-509 (1961). 328 U."Stanford Law Review 25 (1973): 438-441. Idea of Progress. 144-148. He wrote.S. 643-648 (1944).S. US. Statesmanship. Burns v.S. 1970).. dissenting).. 125 Dennis v..S. 343 U. 126 West Virginia State Bd. Landis. California. dissenting).. 91-94 (1943).butFrankfurter feared civiclethargy. Landis. of Education v. The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Co. 433. "The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter. J. 175. See also Frankfurter's support for passivity in.S.. Barnette. dissenting). hardpolicy choicesare the provinceof electedleaders. 149-160 (1951) (Frankfurter. The Public and Its Government (New Haven: Yale University Press. 624. J.:Cornell University Press. 266-277 (1962) (Frankfurter. 1930). For the scholarsof this traditionof constitutionalinterpretation. 157-163. Sawyer. Bickel. dissenting). 407.Theirjudgmentis best informed. Miller.Bickel. 316 U. 342 U."125 insurethe courtsdid not act in a fashionthat threatened To the policy choices of virtuousleaders. dissenting).. They are not designedto be a good reflex of a democratic society. conc. Pragmatism. 429-446 (1942) (Frankfurter.S. 1962). v. dissenting). 460-470 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter.S. 364 U. 75. Adams. Bickel. 280-297 (1962) (Frankfurter..). 318 U. 369 U. 567-593 (1957).Frankfurter Bickelproposedthat courts and relyon the "passive virtues. Polish National Alliance v.352 U. mustbe foundoutsideof theirvindication courtsof law. Administrative Process.S. and the Supreme Court (Ithaca.).J. 186. See also SEC v. J. Pragmatism. 313 U. Administrative Process. 549-556 (1946). 579.). 322 U. conc.and therefore most defendable. 651-652 (1943) (Frankfurter.130 Scalia. 123. 80. 409.in his
123 YoungstownSheet and Tube Ca v. J.foundedon independence. 186.S.. J. 461.S. Chenery Corp. 127 See Bickel.S. Barnette. Carr. 369 U. and the discussion in Gary T. Alexander M. Green. Compare Alexander M. conc. Baker v. Sanford V. 172-173 (1952).S. 252. U. 494.J. 415-421 (1941). 624. N. 319 U.. 259-263 (1959) (Frankfurter. 1977). 346-348 (1960).
as Scalia now does.133 Frankfurter assumed. and Bickel. American Sash and Door Co.S. 494. 313.S. conc. dissenting). theybelievedthat 131 the courtsshould deferto agencyjudgmentsabout marketpolicingand that courts should avoidinterfering with the marketto achieveredistributive policyends. 586.Like Scalia they wantedto havethe policing of marketsby expertbodies to ensurethat unvirtuousforces did not corrupt moralteachingsof the marketplace. Morality of Consent.134Personalfreedomexists "whenit in is ingrained a people'shabits. Meadowmoor Dairies. SAMTA.American Federation of Labor v.just as Scalia does.. 134 Bickel.S. interpretative the standards Frankof furterand Landisencouraged competitivemarkets. 469 U. Democratic Theories.) in National League of Cities v..In this interpretative traditionthereis a recognition of the valueof free speech.. 199-200 (1941). 310 U. but note the exception at 582. 335 U. 177. 572 (1946). 284-285 (1962) (Frankfurter.. His support of exclusive presidentialpowers and agency discretionin rulemakingalso frees leadersfor policy action. 154-155. US. 287. 132 Osborn v. and his reluctance generalto in openthe courtsto claimsof individuals allegingharmsfrom agencypoliciesonly extendsto new topics the legal doctrinessupporting of this standard interpretation. Usery.136Instead. J. 555 (1951) (Frankfurter. used to justify the majority position of Court (Rehnquist.S. a But. 141-194 (1940).. 833 (1976) and the minority positions in Garcia v. dissenting) and Baker v. Also. Pragmatism. NLRB. American Sash and Door Co. 311 U. 323-324 (1939) (Frankfurter. Ozlin. "or whenit is partof the historyandcommon constitutionalstandardwas that experienceof a people. Barnette. 144-148. that the good life shouldbe defined by the majoritythroughthe politicalprocess.
. J. on Frankfurter generally of assumed.but free speechthat threatens democratic the Thereis to be criminaldue process.. Phelps Dodge Corp. Penney Co. Intheirinterpretation economic of liberties.. conc. 326 U. J. 624. 24.they serveas an instrument controloccasionaldefects to in the decisionsof electedleaders. 142.as Scalianow does.ANTONIN SCALIA |
oppositionto inquiryinto executiveactions underthe Freedomof Information Act. his oppositionto privaterights of action..S.S. NewarkFire Insurance Co. of Education v. 293-299 (1949).S.J.C. Milk WagonDrivers Union v. J. Hahn. he retained belief in the benefitsof some independence in state policy making. Gobitis. 435.132 In his constitutionalstandards the topic of federalism. 93-114. 545-557 (1949) (Frankfurter. 307 U.. 322 U. NLRB. 643. on Frankfurter see Tigner v. Morality of Consent. 186. 136 West VirginiaState Bd.S.).135 Thus. dissenting). 230-235 (1945).. 135 Minersville School District v.S.American Federation of Labor v.S. 53-67 (1940). 369 U.S. J.). J. 542-557 (1949) (Frankfurter. v.S. Compare to Polish National Alliance v. 426 U. 88. East New YorkSavings Bank v. see also Edelman. See also Dennis v. US. State Board. Frankfurter's rightswerenot a resourceto be used to permitdiversetheoriesof the good life to flourish. the'supremacy nationalinstitutionsover state and local governments.S. conc. J. 528 (1985). v.S. 335 U. 310 U.S. 667 (1943) (Frankfurter. 649-651 (1944) (Frankfurter.The good life is the community's sense of what is virtuousactivity. Jacobsohn. Texas.). Carr.and individualactionsshould not be allowed to threatenthe consensuson the good life. 341 U. 133 New Yorkv..
131 Landis. 599 (1940). 445 (1940) contains Frankfurter's position. Administrative Process.S. 326 U. 310 U.. Wisconsin v. 538. 538..).but due process consensuscan be restricted.S. 319 U. 312 U. J. 313 U.
US. I have never been able to isolate obligations of justice. Morality of Consent. and the Legal Order. rights are to be used by courts to reestablish a community consensus rather than foster diverse values. J. Board of Education. Meese permitsextensivemajority control of publications. 77. 596.28
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should not threaten the majority's sense of what constitutes a secure society.S. He gives greaterweight to majority values on topics like racial equal protection. Adamson v. J..S. 275-289 (1951) (Frankfurter. and Politics (Cambridge. As Bickel states the commitment: "Law is more than just another opinion. ." are when the enforcement of rights teaches the public to respect each other and the community's sense of right or when the enforcement preventsarbitraryactions detrimentalto constitutional governance.S.: Harvard University Press. Cooper. 318 U. his criminal justice case voting record favors the community over the rights of those who may have threatenedorder in the community. Shklar.). 203.138 Thus.S. 88-105. 141 Judith N. 343 U. 332 U.). writing.J..S. 760-762 (Frankfurter. dissenting). "Morality. 1. California. and his personal character.. 24-26 (1950) (Frankfurter.). or because the values it does embody tend from time to time to reflect those of a majority or a plurality. 214-220 (1948). conc.137 The only times that rights can be used to change the effect of "habits and the feelings they engender. his service for and connections to Republican administrations. 1. 546-556 (1951) (Frankfurter. 331 U..). J. see Kovacs v."'139 agrees with this proposition. Pragmatism. Updegraff. conc. 1964). McNabb v.S.
. Harris v. J.S. Subversive Activities Control Board. By his opposition to most rights claims and especially to efforts to promote the equality of individuals. Morality of Consent.S. J.). 341 U. . 138 See Bickel. 110-111.Cooper v.S.. 333 U.S. . conc. 183 (1952) (Frankfurter. 89-97 (1949) (Frankfurter.S. conc. 340 U. McCollum v.Haley v. 367 U. not because it embodies all right values.S. ". . Ohio. Communist Party v. 358 U. Morals. but because it is the value of values. 268. conc. conc.). 145. 332 U. Aaron. J.J. his views on religion permit legislative majorities to control religious values in education. Scalia carries this tradition of interpretation toward a far greater defense of values of the majority.and Niemotko v." 125. 140 Scalia. .). where Frankfurtervoted for minorityclaimants. except by defining them as those obligations that the law imAll poses. Mass. 494.. All of these men share a commitment to law as the primary social value. 344 U. 139 Bickel. Scalia'sopinion in Block v. and his equality decisions favor stability over changes in community social and economic relationships beneficial to minorities. 322-347 (1943). 59-68 (Frankfurter.Antonin Scalia is a typical product of the Reagan administra137 On speech. U. Dennis v. 747. 5. US.. 1.. 155-174 (1947)(Frankfurter. Maryland..S. Law Scalia is the principal institution through which a society can assert its values. Wyman v.. The description of the constitutional values of Frankfurterand his students bears remarkable similarity to the values of Scalia in one additional way.). 46. and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules."'140 of these men are legalists who hold "moral conduct to be a matter of rule following. 601-607 (1947)(Frankfurter."'141 Appointed to the Supreme Court because of his record of opinions and publications. Legalism: An Essay on Law. see On Lee v.. 336 U. J. On criminal due process. US.
. The author would like to thank Joseph Stewart. and subjects rights to definition by the majority in control of the government. Finally.*
* Portions of this article were delivered at the 1987 and 1988 annual meetings of the Western Political Science Associaton. In Scalia's democracy. Finally. He is a justice who agrees with a majority of the Reagan administration'spolicy positions in constitutional and statutory litigation. for his advice and Ken Knelly and Randy Moffett for research assistance. As a group of relatively young justices. they should remain central figures in American constitutional development into the twenty-first century and a barrier for political forces seeking the reinvigoration of Warren Court liberalism. Jr. a vision skeptical of Earl Warren'sfaith in a people governing themselves through a conflict encouraged by the existence of rights for minorities. and Kennedy share Scalia's majoritarianconstitutional philosophy. as the bloc analysis has revealed. Scalia possesses a judicial philosophy and political vision that extend far beyond simple allegiance to a few policy positions. it is a majoritarian vision. Additionally. Despite a few surprise votes or opinions in favor of First Amendment rights claimants. Akin to the tradition of constitutional interpretation of Felix Frankfurterand his students. leadership by the virtuous representativesof the majority and policy direction by the state remain the cardinal principles. O'Connor.ANTONIN SCALIA |
tion's judicial selection process. Rehnquist. enhances legislative and executive and agency power. Scalia's constitutional vision is close to but not identical to the views of the other Reagan administration appointees to the Supreme Court. criminal defendants. it is a vision that limits the checking function of the Court in constitutional politics.