1. Pp. v. Olarte, G.R. No. 233309, March 11, 2019.
FACTS: the accused Herofil N. Olarte was separately charged for illegal or unauthorized possession of a
hand grenade and an unlicensed pistol (later found to be a replica). Police members of Task Force "Boy
Solo," a team formed in response to reports that a lone gunman was believed to be responsible for
several robbery incidents at Pabayo and Chavez Streets in Cagayan de Oro City. During their watch, they
noticed a man walking towards a branch of LBC Express, Inc. (LBC), a commercial establishment. His
features resembled "Boy Solo" whose image was shown in closed circuit television (CCTV) footages of
past robberies in the area. As "Boy Solo" was about to enter the establishment, he pulled out a firearm.
12 This prompted PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar to immediately run towards the suspect. 13 "Boy Solo,"
however, noticed the police officers running towards him so he ran away. Boy Solo's" companions –
Randy P. Tandoy, Dexter D. Caracho and Rodel B. Rubilla,15 acting as his lookouts, also fled from their
posts. They all boarded a Cugman Liner, a public utility jeepney heading towards the Cogon
Market.16 Eventually, accused-appellant was arrested near Ororama Superstore in Cogon after a chase
by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar. His three companions were caught in a follow-up operation.17 searched
accused-appellant's person and recovered a .25 caliber pistol replica, a fragmentation grenade with an
M204A2 fuse assembly, a flathead screwdriver, and a transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing
a white crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. RTC found the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a hand grenade, CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST IS VALID AND THE HAND GRENADE SEIZED FROM
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
RULING: Yes, the hand grenade seized from the accused is admissible in evidence. Object evidence is
classified into: (a) actual, physical or "autoptic"103 evidence: those which have a direct relation or part
in the fact or incident sought to be proven and those brought to the court for personal examination by
the presiding magistrate; and (b) demonstrative evidence: those which represent the actual or physical
object (or event in the case of pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an inference or to aid
in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness. 104 Further, actual
evidence is subdivided into three categories: (a) those that have readily identifiable marks (unique
objects); (b) those that are made readily identifiable (objects made unique) and (c) those with no
identifying marks (non-unique objects). In the case at hand, the chain of custody rule does not apply to
an undetonated grenade (an object made unique), for it is not amorphous and its form is relatively
resistant to change. A witness of the prosecution need only identify the hand grenade, a structured
object, based on personal knowledge that the same contraband or article is what it purports to be—that
it came from the person of accused-appellant. Even assuming arguendo that the chain of custody rule
applies to dispel supposed doubts as to the grenade's existence and source, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the explosive had been sufficiently established by the prosecution. As aptly observed by the CA:
The factual finding of the lower courts clearly shows that the source and existence of the subject
grenade were authenticated by the prosecution's witness to be the very same explosive recovered from
accused-appellant. SPO2 Radaza even testified that he saw PO2 Intud write his initials "RMI2" on the
masking tape used to wrap the grenade and that the same initials were covered by another masking
tape.119 This makes accused-appellant's claim, that the apparent absence of the masking tape wrapping
the hand grenade bearing the inscription "RMI2" makes "very doubtful" the corpus delicti,120 an
exercise in futility. The Court also deems noteworthy that accused-appellant never presented any
evidence which would effectively taint PO2 Intud's or any other prosecution witnesses' credibility with
reasonable doubt. Bare and unsubstantiated allegations of ill motive or impropriety 121 have no
probative value and cannot (and will not) take the place of evidence. 122 In this instance, the
presumption that the prosecution's witnesses have been regularly performing their official duty should
be upheld absent any clear and convincing evidence of ill motive. 123
the Court DISMISSES the appeal of Herofil N. Olarte and AFFIRMS the April 6, 2017 Decision of the Court
of Appeal.
Daayata, et al., v. People, G.R. No. 205745, March 8 2017
Facts:
On December 17, 1995, Rolando O. Bahian alleged that Capistano Daataya et al, conspiring
mutually, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, assaulted, box, kick and struck Bahian.
This incident happen a day after a commotion incident between the parties in the basketball
court. Bahian Farther alleged that a stone was thrown to his head by petitioners that causes
depress frontal fracture, open frontal bone, left, and advice for surgery. The petitioners pleaded
not guilty.
The defense, apart from the three petitioners, offered the testimonies of Delfin Yafiez (Delfin),
Rodolfo Yafiez (Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata (Danzon) and Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ).
Petitioners Salisi and Malacat claimed that they were having coffee at the house of Vicente
Daayata (Vicente), in the morning of December 17, 1995. Bahian arrived with Kagawad Abalde,
and called for Salisi to come out. When Salisi acceded, Bahian challenged him to a fight and
threw the first punch that started a scuffle. In the course of the melee, Bahian took a swing for
Salisi, who ducked, causing Bahian to lose his balance. Bahian then fell on the pavement and hit
his head. Kagawad Abalde then drew a gun, poked it at Salisi, and threatened to kill him. For his
part, petitioner Daayata claimed that he was in his house, some 50 meters away from Vicente's
house when the incident recalled by petitioners Salisi and Malacat transpired. He rushed to
Vicente's house upon hearing a commotion. Farther said the Barangay Captain Yafiez arrived
after an hour. They added however, that in the evening of December 16, while they were on
their way home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his house, where he challenged them to a
fight. Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.
Frustrated murder case was file against petitioners, the petitioners ordered guilty by Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners appealed in
the court of appeals but affirmed guilty. However, Bahian Medical Certificates showed no injury
other than that on fore head. Bahian during the questioning admitted that the injury on the
forehead was cause by accidentally he hit the edge of the concrete pavement.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond
reasonable doubt, a ground for acquittal of the petitioners?
Held:
Yes, the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, a
ground for acquittal of the petitioners.
The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is guaranteed under
Section 14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This fundamental
right of the accused is also embodied under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which
specifically states that "in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt
is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No.
27951 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Any amount they each paid by way of a bail bond is ordered RETURNED. SO
ORDERED.
Pp. v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 209342, Oct. 4, 2017
FACTS: In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales), Orly Nabia (Nabia), Paul Pobre
(Pobre), and acertain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were charged with robbery with homicide, under Article
294(1) of the RevisedPenal Code. Prosecution witness Cruz's testimony recounted that in the
evening of June 22, 2000, shewas working as an attendant at the Caltex gasoline station
mentioned in the Information. She was thensitting near the gasoline pumps with her co-
employees, the deceased Byron G. Dimatulac (Dimatulac)and prosecution witness Pierez. They
noticed that the station's office was being held up. There were two(2) persons poking guns at
and asking for money from the deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and Felix Regencia(Regencia).
Regencia handed the money to one (1) of the robbers while the other robber reached for acan
of oil. Regencia considered this as enough of a distraction to put up a fight. Regencia and
Diazgrappled with the robbers. In the scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two (2) men
ran to theoffice. The first was identified to be Marciales and the second, according to Cruz, was
Nunez. Dimatulacalso ran to the office to assist Regencia and Oiaz. Marciales then shot
Dimatulac while Nunez shot Diaz.Nuñez testified in his own defense and recalled the
circumstances of his apprehension. He statedthat when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006,
he was on his way to his aunt's fish store where he washelping since 1999 when a man
approached him. He was then dragged and mauled. With his facecovered, he was boarded on
a vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna. He further claimedthat on June 22, 2000,
he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with his aunt at her fish store until about 5:00 p.m.before going
home. At home, his aunt's son fetched him to get pails from the store and bring them to
hisaunt's house. On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding
Nunez guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Theoccurrence of the robbery occasioned by the killing of Regencia, Diaz, and
Dimatulac is no longer in issueas it has been established in the original proceedings which
resulted in the conviction of Marciales and Nabia.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, earlier
identifiedas Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with Marciales and Nabia.
identified Nuñez, roughly eight (8) years had passed since the robbery incident. Third, as the
People'sAppellee's Brief concedes, witnesses' identification of Nunez did not come until
after he had beenarrested. In fact, it was not until the occasion of his
arraigmnent, Nuñez was the sole object ofidentification, in an identification process
that had all but pinned him as the perpetrator. Nunez'sidentification, therefore, fails
to withstand the rigors of the totality of circumstances test. First, thewitnesses failed to
even give any prior description of him. Second, a prosecution witness failed to exhibiteven the
slightest degree of certainty when originally given the chance to identify him as the
supposedfourth robber. Third, a significantly long amount of time had lapsed since the
criminal incident; theoriginal witness' statement that none of his features were seen as to
enable his identification; and thepositive identification made of him when the case was
re-opened. And finally, his presentation foridentification before and during trial was
peculiarly, even worrisomely, suggestive as to practically inducein prosecution witnesses the
belief that he, to the exclusion of any other person, must have been thesupposed fourth
robber.These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and Perez's opportunity to peruse the
fourthrobber's features and their degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that
this case does notmanage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that impel
consideration under the totality ofcircumstances test
Northern Mindanao Power Corp. v. BIR, G.R. No. 185115, Feb. 18, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner filed an administrative claim for a refund on 20 June 2000 for the 3 rd and the
4th quarters of taxable year 1999, and on 25 July 2001 for taxable year 2000 in the sum of
P6,411,892.84.chanesvirtuallawlibrary
Thereafter, alleging inaction of respondent on these administrative claims, petitioner filed a
Petition with the CTA on 28 September 2001.
The CTA First Division denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit. The Court in Division found that the term “zero-rated” was not imprinted on the
receipts or invoices presented by petitioner in violation of Section 4.108-1 of Revenue
Regulations No. 7-95. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim for a refund and to strictly
comply with the invoicing requirements of the law and tax regulations. In his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, however, then Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta opined that the Tax Code
does not require that the word “zero-rated” be imprinted on the face of the receipt or invoice.
He further pointed out that the absence of that term did not affect the admissibility and
competence of the receipt or invoice as evidence to support the claim for a refund.
Issue:
Whether or not Company invoices are sufficient to establish the actual amount of sale of
electric power services to the National Power Corporation and therefore sufficient to
substantiate Petitioner’s claim for refund.
Held:
The Court held that this claim is without sufficient legal basis. Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997
provides that a VAT invoice is necessary for every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, while a VAT official receipt properly pertains to every lease of goods or properties;
as well as to every sale, barter or exchange of services.
A VAT invoice is the seller’s best proof of the sale of goods or services to the buyer, while a VAT
receipt is the buyer’s best evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the
seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused and made to refer to one and
the same thing. Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used alternatively.
Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. CA, 300 SCRA 565 (1998)
Facts:
On June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire records
of this case were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of the deed
of sale between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos dated July 14, 1971 covering 2/3
portion of the lot; the original copy of the deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and
spouses Tan covering the same portion dated September 17, 1986; the original copy of
the deed of assignment from spouses Palomo to spouses Tan covering 1/3 portion of the
same lot dated September 18, 1986; and the original copy of TCT No. 349788 in the
names of spouses Tan were all burned.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of
NBI handwriting expert Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question
and concluded that the signature thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa
Gregorio, is forged. They contend that, as borne out by the records, (1) on September
10, 1987, Albacea conducted an examination of the original copy of subject deed of sale
dated July 14, 1971 at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the
basis of such examination, he arrived at the conclusion that the signature appearing
thereon was forged; (3) unfortunately, as a result of the fire of June 11, 1988, which
destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the records of the case were all burned including the
original copy of the aforesaid deed of sale; and (4) the said original copy of the deed of
sale could not be produced in court thereby necessitating the presentation of a certified
true xerox copy thereof.
Issue:
Whether respondent court of appeals erred in not giving due weight to the testimony of
the nbi handwriting expert for the reason that what he testified on in court was a mere
xerox copy of the question deed of sale.
Held:
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in
the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. This is
especially true when the issue is that of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence 8 and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The
best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting
the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without
the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a
definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere
xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable
results.
Sison v. People. G.R. No. 108280-83, Nov. 16, 1995
Facts:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986
EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon
C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by
"Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and
animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it
resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons
identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-
47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-
47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case
No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against
Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y
Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano
and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of
Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution
presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support
of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
Issue:
Whether or not the photographs can be used as credible evidence.
Held:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified
by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they
were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can
identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of
the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
Pp. v. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505. Dec. 4, 1990
Facts:
Appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation for selling Marijuana in the streets of Makati.
RTC convicted the appellant. The appellant appeal to the CA arguing that the RTC erred in
admitting a xerox copy of the buy-bust money as evidence. The appellant alleged that the
admission of the said evidence is against the best evidence rule of the rules of court.
Issue:
Whether the Court erred in admitting in evidence against the accused which is merely a xerox
copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
Held:
No, This assigned error centers on the trial court’s admission of the P10.00 bill marked which,
according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox
copy. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary
document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the
introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the “buy-bust money” was not indispensable to the
conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately
proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money
itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel and Resort v. BF Corp. G.R. No. 145842, June 27, 2008
FACTS
The petition stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the
Execution of Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project4 that ESHRI and BF executed
for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the
contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished
as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a
monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and
prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing.
In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure
BF was to follow. BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period
from May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992. BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the
procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86, ccording
to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the work done, did
not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive
periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on
the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already
being processed.501,834.05.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the
RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.
the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the payment of its claim
covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention money corresponding to Progress
Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances, rendered judgment for BF.
ISSUE
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of law
raised by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs]
RULING
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in
evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and
the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the
photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies
as secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis
requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the
photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the
original of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand
them over to BF despite requests.
The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original
of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced17 and secondary evidence of its
contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis
added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in
the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence
other than the original instrument or document itself.18 A party may present secondary
evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however,
certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in
question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for
presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be
dismissed.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule
130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1)
there is proof of the original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause
of the original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.
