Assignment 6
Original Answer and Rationale
My first response to the phrase "Save the rhino!!" was Option E: "We must save rhinos because
it is the right thing to do." This position was founded on virtue ethics, which emphasizes moral
responsibility to preserve biodiversity as an intrinsic value (Callicott 1989; Rolston 1986).
Philosophers such as Holmes Rolston believe that species have intrinsic value irrespective of
human benefit, presenting conservation as a moral obligation (Rolston 1986, p. 24). At the time,
I saw rhino conservation through this ethical lens, emphasizing intrinsic value—the premise
that rhinos need protection just because they exist (Curry, 2020). This viewpoint is consistent
with traditional environmental ethics, which criticize anthropocentric frameworks for reducing
nature to an instrumental value (Routley 1973).
Current Answer and Revised Perspective
I’ve moved to Option B “Let the people who want to use this resource pay to protect it”. This is
all about instrumental value, and the financial realities of conservation. Private landowners in
South Africa manage nearly a third of the rhino population but anti-poaching costs often
outweigh revenue from ecotourism or trophy hunting (Rubino & Pienaar 2017 p 90). For
example, security costs for rhinos on private reserves can be over $10,000 per animal per year,
making conservation unviable (Rubino & Pienaar 2017 p 94). Assigning costs to those who
benefit economically – like tourism operators or pharmaceutical companies (Tietenberg and
Lewis’ 2009) cost-benefit framework which prioritizes sustainable use. Instrumental strategies
must coexist with intrinsic values, while rhino horn trade bans (e.g. CITES) aim to protect
intrinsic worth they inadvertently inflate the black market and poaching (Rubino & Pienaar
2017 p 97). So, hybrid models that combine regulated trade (e.g. auctioning stockpiled horns)
can fund conservation and address ethical concerns (’t Sas-Rolfes et al. 2019).
Virtue Ethics and Personal Alignment
While my updated option focuses on instrumental value, virtue ethics remains fundamental.
Saving rhinos necessitates traits such as management, which represent Leopold's (1949) "land
ethic" that values ecosystem integrity. For example, private landowners that invest in anti-
poaching technologies show bravery by confronting criminal syndicates (Rubino & Pienaar
2017, p. 95). Virtue ethics alone cannot overcome financial limitations. A "pay-to-protect"
paradigm in which beneficiaries fund conservation promotes integrity by maintaining openness.
This hybrid approach reflects Norton's (1984) pragmatic environmentalism, which supports
combining intrinsic and instrumental principles. Namibia's community conservancies, for
example, earn $8.8 million per year from regulated hunting, which is reinvested in local
conservation—a combination of economic pragmatism and ethical stewardship ('t Sas-Rolfes et
al. 2019, p. 12).
Commentary on the Preferred Answer (Option A:
“Why?”)
The best approach—Option A: “Why?”—pushes people to rethink their assumptions and dig
into their reasons. When you ask, “Why save rhinos?” it highlights the clash between human-
centered and nature-centered values. If the response is just about benefits like “rhinos attract
tourists,” then conservation relies on changing human priorities (Justus et al. 2017, p. 487). On
the flip side, arguments based on intrinsic value, like “rhinos have rights,” often struggle to
influence policy, as shown by the unexpected fallout from CITES trade bans (Rubino & Pienaar
2017, p. 97). Still, focusing too much on the question “Why?” can lead to getting lost in abstract
ethics instead of finding practical solutions. For example, while Rolston (1986) champions the
intrinsic worth of species, his ideas don’t really help landowners who are facing financial ruin
because of poaching. Pragmatists like Norton (1984) suggest that involving stakeholders in
policymaking is more important than sticking to strict value categories. So, “Why?” should spark
conversation rather than create rigid beliefs, making sure conservation efforts consider both
ethical responsibilities and economic realities.
References
Callicott, J.B. (1989) In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Curry, P. (2020) Intrinsic vs. instrumental value. Ecological Citizen. Available at:
https://www.ecologicalcitizen.net (Accessed: 1 March 2025).
Justus, J. et al. (2017) ‘Buying into conservation: Intrinsic vs. instrumental value’,
Ecological Citizen, 1(2), pp. 485–497.
Leopold, A. (1949) A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press.
Norton, B.G. (1984) ‘Environmental ethics and weak anthropocentrism’, Environmental
Ethics, 6(2), pp. 131–148.
Rolston, H. (1986) Philosophy gone wild: Environmental ethics. Buffalo: Prometheus
Books.
Rubino, E.C. & Pienaar, E.F. (2017) ‘Applying a conceptual framework to rhinoceros
conservation on private lands’, Endangered Species Research, 34, pp. 89–102. Available
at: https://www.int-res.com/articles/esr2017/34/n034p089.pdf (Accessed: 1 March
2025).
Routley, R. (1973) ‘Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?’, Proceedings of
the XV World Congress of Philosophy, 1, pp. 205–210.
’t Sas-Rolfes, M., Emslie, R., Adcock, K. & Knight, M. (2019) Legal hunting for
conservation of highly threatened species. Available at:
http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/163/1633114717.pdf (Accessed: 1
March 2025).
Tietenberg, T. & Lewis, L. (2009) Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. 8th
edn. Boston: Pearson.
