Keith Keydel Metaphysics PHIL 5360 'If I Were You': A Deflationary Account of Haecceity and the Transitivity of Identity

The transitivity of identity and de re modality create conceptual problems for modal actualists. In natural languages such as English, speakers often make counterfactual claims about individuals. Furthermore, we have strong intuitions regarding the truth or falsity (or at least the probability) of such claims. We also have very good reason to believe that identity is transitive. Not only is this highly intuitive, but is is very difficult, if not impossible, to construct a system of logic without transitive identity. This, as Chisholm demonstrates, creates a problem. It seems wildly implausible to suggest that Socrates could have been a turtle; most people would claim that if one is talking about a turtle, they are not talking about Socrates. Yet we are quite willing to accept that Socrates might have been a little different; we are generally willing to grant that his genome could have differed by a tenth of a percent. By making repeated small changes, 0.1% of the genome at a time, we can turn Socrates into a turtle. By transitivity, if we grant that Socrates could have been a little different, and if we allow possible possibilities (if Socrates had be a little different, he could have been a little more different, which seems plausible enough), we have to allow that Socrates could have been a turtle. Formally, from the premises that Socratesactual world = Socratesworld1, and Socratesworld1= Socratesworld2 it follows that Socratesactual world = Socratesworld2. Haecceities, or individual essences, which do not permit any change, could be used to ground trans-world identities. However, there are several difficulties with haecceities: they are empirically unverifiable, they are an additional element of our ontology (Occam's razor is often used to argue for minimalist ontologies), and these 'bare identities' suggest 'bare particulars,' objects without any qualitative properties. In this paper, I argue that by treating haecceity as merely a linguistic device for tagging an object in counterfactual discourse, we can avoid such problems (or at least deal with them) without resorting to modal realism. I will begin by giving a deflationary account of haecceity, and show how this can be used to make

sense of de re modality. I will give this account couched in a modal actualist framework which treats possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of propositions. However, a parallel argument could be made for those who prefer to think of possible worlds as maximal states of affairs or the like. With this framework established, I will show how this deflationary view can avoid some of the traditional problems with haecceity. The concept of haecceity, or thisness, is roughly that of self-identity; the particular self-identity unique to each individual, not the general property of being self-identical which is shared by all things. This is explained by Robert Adams, A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain particular individual not the property that we all share, of being identical with some individual or other, but my property of being identical to me, your property of being identical with you, etc. (Adams 1979). Haecceities, thus construed, are non-qualitative properties; they do not add anything to the description of the thing. They merely tag individuals; the 'this' in the statement if I dropped this vase, it would have shattered. While non-qualitative properties, such as haecceity, may seem 'spooky' to some, it need not be construed in this way. Adams explains that to deny that thisnesses are purely qualitative is not necessarily to postulate 'bare particulars,' substrata without qualities of their own, which would be what was left of the individual when all of its qualitative properties were subtracted. (Adams 172). Nor are we committing ourselves to a traditional doctrine of essentialism (we need only commit to a very minimalist sort of essentialism); we need not say that Socrates has any essential properties, other than the trivial property of being that thing which we call Socrates (this is not to say that he is necessarily called 'Socrates'). In this regard, thisness can be though of as merely a linguistic device which allows us to refer to a particular individual without the use of definite descriptions; akin to proper names, or pointing at the thing. Haecceities function as rigid designators, much like proper names in Kripke's account of reference. Rather than attempt to reinvent the wheel by coming up with a new account of rigid designation to use for haecceity, I will use Kripke's account: What do I mean by 'rigid designator'? I

mean a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds. (Kripke 1971) While such an assertion (that we can designate the same object is different worlds, when we are trying to show that one in the same object can 'exist' in different worlds) may seem to be question begging, Kripke's explanation shows that this is not the case. First, it is important to remember that on Kripke's account of meaning, the referent of a term is fixed by our use of the term (this can be causally traced to an 'initial baptism' of the thing). Hence, we should think of names, and haeccieties, as belonging to the actual object. Second, Kripke rejects the notion that possible worlds are separate places, where we have to somehow find the object we are talking about: All this talk seems to me to have taken the metaphor of possible worlds much too seriously in some way. It is as if a 'possible world' were like a foreign country, or some distant planet way out there. It is as if we see dimly through a telescope various actors on this distant planet. (Kripke 1971). Rather, he treats possible worlds as abstract, counterfactual situations which are useful to understand modal claims about actual things in our actual world. According to this account, the individuals mentioned in de re modal claims are actual individuals (in our actual world), we are merely placing these things in 'counterfactual situations'. These 'counterfactual situations' are merely linguistic, modal propositions or possible states of affairs; actual objects are 'in' them in the same way as I am 'in' the proposition Keith Keydel is the father of Theodore. That we can determine identity in possible worlds by stipulation may seem ad hoc, but Kripke argues that this is not problematic: Advocates of the other view take speaking of certain qualities as unobjectionable. They do not say 'How do we know that this quality (in another possible world) is that of redness?' But they do find speaking of certain people objectionable. But I see no more reason to object in the one case than in the other. I think it really comes from the idea of possible worlds as existing out there, but very far off, viewable only through a special telescope. (Kripke 1971) By equating 'possible worlds' (or 'counterfactual situations') with maximal consistent sets of propositions, the truth or falsity of counterfactual claims can be analyzed in terms of whether the modal proposition can be paraphrased into a non-modal proposition (I will not deal with nested modal operators

for the moment) which is part of some maximal consistent set of propositions. Further constraints on these sets of propositions are usually given by conversational context. For example, the statement Saul Kripke could have been a plumber, is true if and only if the proposition Saul Kripke is a plumber is part of a maximal consistent set of propositions. In all of these propositions, the name 'Saul Kripke' refers to the actual philosopher, Saul Kripke, to whom we can causally trace our use of the name. This is contrary to David Lewis' claim that modal actualists (or 'ersatzers' as he calls them) are stuck referring to some abstract whatnot (Lewis 1986). Now, to be consistent, any set of propositions which contains Saul Kripke is a plumber will have to exclude some propositions such as Saul Kripke is not a plumber and Saul Kripke has never been plumber. Furthermore, some additional 'peripheral' propositions must be included for consistency, such as Saul Kripke became a plumber in 1970 (or some other date). Furthermore, conversational context and other pragmatic issues will place further constraints on our sets of propositions. In our example, though it is does not follow by logic alone, we may expect the proposition Saul Kripke knows how to solder pipes to be included in the maximal set of propositions which is our 'possible world.' It may be objected at this point, that I have been helping myself to de re modality all too freely. Indeed, the very notion of modality de re is not without objections; Many contemporary philosophers who find the idea of modality de dicto tolerably clear, however, look utterly askance at that of modality de re, suspecting it a source of boundless confusion. Indeed, there is abroad the subtle suggestion that the very idea of modality de re is not so much confused as vaguely immoral or frivolous (Plantinga 1974). My reply to this objection is that de re modal claims our a large part of ordinary discourse, we need an account of it in order to make sense of such talk. Attempts to reduce de re modality into de dicto modality do not capture our everyday use of language. Furthermore, the objections to de re modality are not insurmountable, and many have been thoroughly addressed by philosophers such as Plantinga. With this framework in place, we can now address Chisholm's paradox. As Chisholm demonstrates in Identity through Possible Worlds, it is possible to obtain a possible world (Wn in

Chisholm's example) which is indistinguishable from the actual (W1 in the example) except that Adam and Noah have completely swapped places (and names by which they are known in their world) by making a series of small counterfactual changes. The problem, as he explains it, is that even if we accept this How is one to tell the difference between the two worlds W1 and Wn? Shall we say that, though they are diverse, they are yet indiscernible from each other? (Chisholm 1967) In response, I am willing to answer affirmatively; yes we may have distinct possible worlds which are indiscernible, but this is not a problem if we remember that these 'worlds' are merely abstract tools for understanding counterfactual claims in ordinary language. While counterfactual claims involving 'possible worlds' which are indistinguishable from the actual are rare in ordinary language, counterfactual claims involving individuals playing the roles of one another are, nonetheless, quite common. In particular, speakers often make counterfactual claims beginning with If I were you... . While some of these claims can be reasonably paraphrased into normative claims (e.g. If I were you, I would study more might be paraphrased as You ought to study more) it is not clear that all claims of this form can be. For instance, an admirer may say to a war hero You were so brave! If I were you I would have ran. Yet we would certainly not expect the admirer to say You should have ran. Nor can we always interpret such claims as merely involving swapping positions or roles. Even an immobile speaker may sensibly make a claim such as If I were you, I would have ran, indicating that the situation in mind is more akin to one in which the speaker has all (or at least a majority) of the properties of the other person, rather than his own. Formally, transitivity of identity across possible worlds is maintained in this account, because the identity is always that of the actual. We do not have Adam1 in one world, and Adam2 in another, and we are not deciding whether or not Adam1 = Adam2. Rather, we have Adam (no subscript) in our actual world and maximal consistent sets of propositions, which include propositions about Adam (these sets are unfortunately called 'possible worlds'), which help us understand counterfactual claims about Adam. The only true identity claim is the trivial one: Adam = Adam. Other counterfactual claims which seem to

involve identity, such as If Adam were Noah, then he would have built an ark, are not to be read as genuine identity claims (we are not asserting Adam = Noah), but rather can be paraphrased into counterfactual claims not involving the identity relation: If Adam had all and only the qualitative and relational properties of Noah, then he would have built an ark. Objections to saying that Adam could have all and only the qualitative and relational properties of Noah (we can't say all properties, since Adam, and Adam alone must have the non qualitative property of being identical with Adam, his haecceity) arise mainly from linguistic conventions (why not just say Noah built an ark instead of If Adam were just like Noah, he would have built an ark?), or from the principle of identity of indiscernible. The latter is a more serious philosophical objection; while there are independent reasons to reject this principle, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in detail. In conclusion, the problems of de re modality and transitivity of identity can be solved with only a very weak notion of haecceity. By treating haecceity as merely the property of each thing of being that thing, we can avoid committing to a strong version of essentialism. In this account, we can avoid ontological commitments to concrete possible worlds and make do with mere maximal consistent sets of propositions (or states of affairs). Furthermore, by remembering that these are merely linguistic devices for understanding counterfactual talk, we need not be concerned about the fact that they are empirically unverifiable. Stipulating that it is Socrates we are talking about in the counterfactual claim that Socrates could have been a king, is no more objectionable than stipulating that it is Socrates we are talking about in the non-modal claim Socrates was a philosopher. Our reluctance to assert more outlandish counterfactual claims, such as Socrates could have been a turtle is due to linguistic conventions and implicature, and not any deep metaphysical intuition. This allows us to resolve Chisholm's Paradox by biting the bullet as it were; but on this account it is not that tough of a bullet to bite.

Bibliography Adams, R. (1979) Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity in Kim, J. and Sosa, E. (1999)

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