Group on Grand Strategy

Strategic Snapshot No. 5 12th March 2012

Syria: a responsibility to protect?

The just case versus the valid case
By Joachim A. Koops
In current debates on the applicability and implementation of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, there is frequently a dividing line between those arguing that there is a moral duty to intervene and protect and those warning about the feasibility of an intervention. Indeed, when deliberating and deciding on an external intervention, criteria of justness protecting civilians from death and serious harm inflicted by their own government and validity feasibility in terms of internal conditions, external conditions, regional consequences and balance of interests need to be taken into account in equal shares. For the European Union, the core challenge at present in Syria is not only the lack of knowledge about the conditions on the ground and, externally, a deadlocked Security Council, but also the more fundamental weaknesses of its military capacities and its Common Security and Defence Policy in general.

Group on Grand Strategy | Strategic Snapshot No. 5 | 12th March 2012

Just ca(u)se versus valid case

Even if causes for interventions may be equally just in specific cases (e.g. the moral responsibility to protect civilians in Syria is comparable to the responsibility of protecting civilians in Libya arguably generating equally just causes for intervention) it is unavoidable that specific internal, external and regional conditions and configurations fundamentally affect the likely success and overall justification of an intervention. A valid case for intervention thus requires additional context-driven conditions other than a just cause. A valid case for military intervention (as the most extreme measure of last resort under the responsibility to protect) would thus presuppose the following. Favourable internal conditions: Conditions inside the target country where an intervention is planned to take place must include first of all internal support. A clearly identifiable group inside the country actually needs to call for an external intervention. This might be an obvious point, but it also needs to be sufficiently clear who this group is and how it relates to other, competing factions of society. Since in almost every case an intervention changes power configurations and balances between different sections of society, interventions need to be informed by a basic knowledge of the different sections of society in the target country in the first place. Otherwise, interveners risk causing more harm than good. Furthermore, are internal conditions favourable enough to enable the intervening actors to easily assume their responsibility to rebuild?1 In other words, does an intervention promise long-term success by providing conditions for sustainable peace-building schemes across various sections of society (the current situation in Libya highlights the relative ease of the responsibility to protect through the Atlantic Alliances swift intervention on the one hand, but the protracted difficulties of external influence in longterm peace-building). Does an intervention risk the escalation of violence? Might it accelerate acts of killing? In situations that are difficult to assess, alternative options short of full-scale military action need to be considered (e.g., a no-fly zone, safe havens, reinforcement of humanitarian aid or the supply of medical equipment). Favourable external conditions: There are only a handful of countries at present that are both actually willing and capable to intervene militarily in other countries. 1. Political will and national interest: In order to facilitate a valid case for intervention, the external intervening parties need to be politically willing to launch an operation. Political will is rarely disassociated from core national interests (arguably the only post-cold war intervention to date that was not based
Group on Grand Strategy | Strategic Snapshot No. 5 | 12th March 2012 2

on the promotion of a clear national interest was the United States intervention in Somalia in 1992). Therefore, it is clear that differing national interests need to converge (particularly within the United Nations Security Council but also among regional coalitions) for a joint operation in another country. 2. Robust rapid reaction capacities: Swift and decisive military action requires technical and military capacities that are increasingly rare. The case of Libya highlighted the continued reliance of European countries on the United States armed forces. At the level of the United Nations, rapid reaction capabilities no longer exist. The most far-reaching attempt at creating capacities close to a United Nations Army was the Standby High-Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations founded in the wake of the massacres in Rwanda and Srebrenica in 1996. By 2009, it had conducted six United Nations operations on the African continent (Ivory Coast, twice in Sudan, Liberia, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Chad) and contributed to the build-up of the African Standby Force. Out of its twenty-three members and observers, sixteen were European Union Member States. In 2009, however, the United Nations brigade was closed down due to, amongst other factors shifting interests and priorities of the European Unions Member States. 2 One core shift was the move from United Nations-backed initiatives to Atlantic Alliance- and European Union-led ones, such as most notably the Atlantic Alliances Response Force and the European Unions Battlegroups. The fact that the Battlegroups have so far not even once been deployed aggravates the problematic decisions taken by the European Union (such as the Nordic countries) to withdraw from the United Nations Brigade. As an alternative follow-up scheme, the international coalition for promoting a United Nations Emergency Peace Service seeks to provide in time a valuable tool for operationalising the Responsibility to Protect in terms of rapid reaction capacities that unite both civilian and military means. 3 Yet, Europeans should not stand idle by. It is essential to revise the European Unions Battlegroups scheme it would be too costly to lose this tool, not only for the European Unions own credibility as a security actor, but also for global security governance as a whole. Close co-ordination between the European Union and the United Nations (including the envisaged Peace Service) would be desirable too. Favourable regional conditions: Finally, regional conditions clearly matter for a valid case of intervention. The support of regional organisations neighbouring the target country (such as the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union in

Group on Grand Strategy | Strategic Snapshot No. 5 | 12th March 2012

the case of Libya and Syria) is important for building legitimacy and capabilities for intervention, but increase the complexity of coalitions and diverging national interests. In the case of Libya, for example, the exact motivations and role played by Qatar are still unclear. Regional contexts also matter in terms of alliances, neighbouring countries interests and potentially uncontrollable chain reactions that might turn local and national acts of atrocities into a regional conflict. Careful deliberations of the likely regional consequences are part and parcel of building a valid case for intervention.

Just and valid case: a role for the European Union?

In case of large-scale atrocities and crimes against innocent civilians, asking for additional conditions and requirements in order to build up a valid case for interventions often seems inhumane and too reminiscent of Realpolitik. However, we should not forget that the original formulation of the Responsibility to Protect included further requirements than just a just cause. The overall chances for success and proportionality of means are firmly embedded elements in the Responsibility to Protects operationalisation. Furthermore, in the United Nations World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 all one hundred and ninety three states reaffirmed the responsibility to protect, but stressed that its implementation needs to be carefully advanced on a case-by-case basis and this depends both on making a just and feasible case for intervention. 4 That said, however, in situations today like in Syria, measures short of military intervention should be pursued with vigour. The European Union has a wide range of instruments at its disposal for alleviating suffering of the civilian population. The reinforcement of humanitarian aid and the possibility of a humanitarian corridor and safe havens should not be seen as an off-limit option. Unfortunately, as the situation stands at the moment, the European Union does not have the will nor the right multilateral incentives in place to take action beyond these options even in the case of a more unified position of the Security Council. In the long-run, however, serious questions need to be asked about the future and purpose of the European Unions Common Security and Defence Policy. If it is not for operations to alleviate human suffering, such as in the Libyan case, whats the purpose of it beyond merely being a tool of clever public diplomacy during the Solana Decade?

Joachim A. Koops is Director of the Global Governance Institute and Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vesalius College, Free University of Brussels.

Group on Grand Strategy | Strategic Snapshot No. 5 | 12th March 2012

Notes
It is often overlooked that the original formulation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty placed equal emphasis on the postintervention obligation of the responsibility to rebuild see the Responsibility to Protect Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, Chapter 5.
1

For a more in-depth analysis of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade and its relationship with the European Unions Battlegroups, see: Joachim A. Koops, The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EUs Effective Multilateralism towards NATO and the United Nations (Brussels: Free University of Brussels Press, 2011), pp. 393-428 and Joachim A. Koops, Effective Interorganisationalism? Lessons Learned from SHIRBRIG, in Studia Diplomatica, Vol. 62, No. 3, October 2009, pp. 81-90.
2

For more information on United Nations Emergency Peace Service, see the website of the Global Action to Prevent War and Conflict.
3 4

See the United Nations General Assemblys 2005 World Summit Outcome, para 139.

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The Group on Grand Strategy is a non-partisan and not-for-profit organisation dedicated to researching better foreign, security and military policies for the European Union in the twenty-first century. The Group on Grand Strategy publishes Strategic Snapshots periodically to stimulate fresh thinking on important contemporary strategic issues in the European Union, while offering new insights and ways for dealing with them.

Group on Grand Strategy | Strategic Snapshot No. 5 | 12th March 2012