The Israeli Strike in Syria

A Sourcebook on the Israeli Strike in Syria,
6 September 2007
Version of 2008-05-29
2002-09-05
2003-09-16 2007-08-10 2007-10-24

Between 2007-10-10 2008-01-11
and 2007-10-24
Additional information would be welcome.
Please send it to thomsona@flash.net
Where possible, the material in this sourcebook is presented in chronological order.
The main body contains information concerning the strike from sources with some apparent credibility.
Appendix A contains commentary.
Readers are cautioned that in the present case the distinction
between information and commentary is often debatable.
Appendix B contains material related to satellite imagery and its interpretation.
Appendix C briefly discusses a facility 5 km east of the site of the strike.
Appendix D contains frames from the April 24, 2008 intelligence briefing to Congress
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL0679478220070906
Israel didn't attack Syria: Israel Radio
Thu Sep 6, 2007 6:46pm EDT

JERUSALEM (Reuters) - The Israeli military denied on Thursday a Syrian news agency report that
Israeli warplanes attacked targets in Syria, Israel Radio reported.
"This event never happened," the radio said, quoting an unidentiIied Israeli military spokesman.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/sep/91823.htm
Daily Press BrieIing
Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
September 6, 2007
[EXCERPT]
12:46 p.m. EDT
MR. CASEY: Okay. Well, good aIternoon, everybody. I don't have anything to open you up with, so
let's go right to your questions.
Matt.
QUESTION: Have you -- obviously, I was not at the gaggle this morning, but have you been able to
Iigure out what happened in -- over Syrian airspace?
MR. CASEY: Matt, I'm where we were on this, this morning, I've seen press reports. Those stories
conIlict with one another so really I just don't have anything Ior you on it.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/world/middleeast/07mideast.html
Israel Is Officially Silent on Syrian Report It Entered Airspace
By ISABEL KERSHNER
September 7, 2007
JERUSALEM, Sept. 6 Israeli oIIicials were tight-lipped on Thursday aIter Syria said that Israeli
planes had violated its airspace early that morning and that Syrian air deIenses had conIronted the
planes and repulsed them.
A Syrian military spokesman said that the Israeli planes had also dropped some munitions in
unpopulated areas in the northern part oI the country, according to the oIIicial Syrian news agency,
SANA. The spokesman said there were no casualties or damage.
Israeli Army oIIicials said only that they are not accustomed to comment on reports oI this nature. A
government spokesman said he had nothing to add. In a speech here Thursday evening, Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert made no mention oI the accusations Irom Syria. When asked about them by an
Israeli journalist, he said, I dont know what you are talking about.
The Iirst oIIicial reports oI Thursdays episode emerged, by Syrian accounts, more than 12 hours aIter
it took place. Syrian oIIicials were quoted in various media as saying that the Israeli aircraIt had
inIiltrated Syrian airspace around 1 a.m. They added that the Israeli planes were Ilying low, and broke
the sound barrier.
Syrias minister oI inIormation, Mohsen Bilal, told the satellite television network Al Jazeera, Syria
retains the right to determine the quality, type and nature oI its response.
Syrian oIIicials could not be reached directly Ior comment.
While the Israeli military would not comment, it seemed plausible that the Syrians had detected an
Israeli overIlight to test Syrian radar and reactions, and that the Syrian response caused the Israeli pilots
to drop their munitions to Ily higher and Iaster.
By late in the day, though, analysts and media on both sides seemed to be trying to scale down tensions
over the reports. Israels Channel 2 television reported that unnamed Syrian oIIicials had said they had
no intention oI being drawn into a war on Israels timetable or terms.
Samir Taqqi, a political analyst at the Orient Center Ior Studies, a research institute in Damascus, said
the Syrian response would probably be measured. I dont think youll see it lash out, he said. The
response will be through a political mechanism, not military.
Eyal Zisser, a Syria expert at Tel Aviv Universitys Moshe Dayan Center Ior Middle Eastern and
AIrican Studies, said that iI the Syrians had an interest in an escalation, he would have expected much
shriller statements out oI Damascus.
The Syrian announcements came aIter months oI increasing tension between Israel and Syria, with both
in a heightened state oI alert along their border.
Some Syrian analysts in Damascus interpreted the reported incident as an Israeli provocation, possibly
aimed at increasing the stakes between the two countries. Syrias president, Bashar al-Assad, has
suggested that iI Israel is not willing to resume negotiations Ior the return oI the Golan Heights, which
Israel captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the alternative would be to try to regain the territory by
Iorce.
Thabet Salem, a Syrian political commentator, said oI the days reports, Either this is in preparation
Ior pushing Syria to peace talks by raising the stakes, or its an attempt to abort any sort oI calls Ior
peace talks.
Formal peace talks between Israel and Syria broke down in 2000. Mr. Olmert has said he would be
willing to resume talks iI Syria showed its intentions were genuinely peaceIul, Ior example by stopping
its support Ior Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ior Palestinian militant Iactions based in Damascus.
Separately on Thursday, 10 Palestinian militants were killed in clashes with Israel in Gaza. Four were
killed in clashes with an Israeli Iorce in southern Gaza, Palestinian medical oIIicials and the Israeli
Army said.
In addition, six members oI Islamic Jihad were killed, the army said, when they approached the Gaza
perimeter Ience in two vehicles. Islamic Jihad said in a statement that it had intended to attack an
Israeli military post.
Hugh Naylor contributed reporting Irom Damascus.
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middleeast/article2938965.ece
Israeli jets 'drop ammunition' in sortie over Syria
By Anne Penketh, Diplomatic Editor
Published: 07 September 2007
Syria was considering its response last night aIter an Israeli warplane violated Syrian air space and was
accused oI dropping ammunition inside the country. The incident, near the Turkish border on
Wednesday, came just aIter midnight at a time when tensions are running high between the two
neighbours. It prompted Syrian air deIence units to open Iire on the Israeli jets, Syrian oIIicials said.
The Israeli aircraIt "inIiltrated Syrian air space through the northern border, coming Irom the direction
oI the Mediterranean, and headed towards northeastern territory, breaking the sound barrier," said the
oIIicial Syrian news agency, Sana. "The Syrian Arab Republic warns the government oI the Israeli
enemy and reserves the right to respond according to what it sees Iit."
A Syrian oIIicial added: "They dropped bombs on an empty area while our air deIences were Iiring
heavily at them." Residents said they heard the sound oI Iive planes or more above the Tal al-Abiad
area on Syria's border with Turkey, about 100 miles north oI the Syrian city oI Rakka.
The Israeli army reIused to comment on the incident but no casualties or damage were reported. "We
cannot discuss military operations," a spokesman said.
http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2007/09/07/syriaaccusesisraeloIviolatingitsairspacedroppingmunitions/
Syria accuses Israel of violating its air space, dropping 'munitions'
Details regarding encounter unclear
By Albert Aji, Associated Press
September 7, 2007
DAMASCUS - The Syrian government charged yesterday that Israeli aircraIt dropped "munitions"
inside Syria overnight and said its air deIenses opened Iire in a new escalation oI tensions between the
decades-old Ioes.
It was unclear what happened. Syria stopped short oI accusing Israel oI purposely bombing its territory,
and an Israeli spokesman said he could not comment on military operations.
Analysts speculated that such a Ioray could have been probing Syria's deIenses or monitoring long-
range missile bases. The reported path also would have taken the jets near Iran, whose growing power
and anti-Israel government worries leaders oI the Jewish state.
The incident came aIter a summer oI building tensions that have Ied worries oI a military conIlict
erupting between Syria and Israel. Syria accused Israel last month oI seeking a pretext Ior war, and the
Israeli government is keeping a close watch on Syrian troop movements.
Both sides have insisted they want no conIlict along the disputed Irontier. But Syria Iears it is being
squeezed out oI a US-brokered Mideast peace conIerence planned Ior November and will be leIt at a
disadvantage in the standoII with Israel.
Syria has grown more vocal in pressing its demand that Israel give back the Golan Heights. Israel, in
turn, seeks the return oI three Israeli soldiers held Ior more than a year by two Syrian-allied militant
groups, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territory.
The oIIicial Syrian Arab News Agency quoted a military oIIicial as saying Israeli jets broke the sound
barrier Ilying over northern Syria beIore dawn yesterday, then "dropped munitions" onto deserted areas
aIter being shot at by Syria's air deIenses.
Syria did not say the aircraIt bombed its territory, however. Asked whether Israel attacked Syria,
Buthaina Shaaban, a Cabinet minister, said only that the aircraIt violated Syrian air space.
Syrian oIIicials did not describe the "munitions" dropped. Pilots sometimes jettison extra Iuel tanks
when warplanes come under Iire to make the craIt lighter and easier to maneuver.
In Washington, the State Department had no speciIic comment on the incident, citing the lack oI details
about what happened.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2007/200709/news09/12.htm#1
Israel Condemned for Intrusion into Syria's Territorial Air
Pyongyang, September 11 [2007] (KCNA) -- A spokesman Ior the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the
Iollowing answer to a question put by KCNA Tuesday in connection with the Iact that Israeli warplanes
invaded Syria's territorial air space:
Early in the morning oI Sept. 6 Israel's warplanes illegally intruded into the territorial air above Syria
and dropped bombs in the desert in its northeastern area beIore Ileeing.
This is a very dangerous provocation little short oI wantonly violating the sovereignty oI Syria and
seriously harassing the regional peace and security.
The DPRK strongly denounces the above-said intrusion and extends Iull support and solidarity to the
Syrian people in their just cause to deIend the national security and the regional peace.
Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
September 11, 2007
[EXCERPT]
12:07 p.m. EDT
MR. MCCORMACK: Good aIternoon, everybody. I don't have anything to start oII with, so we can get
right into your questions. Who would like to begin? Sylvie?
QUESTION: Can you conIirm that Israel carried an airstrike inside Syria last week, targeting a
shipment oI arms?
MR. MCCORMACK: No, I think you should talk to the Syrian Government or the Israeli Government
about that.
QUESTION: Did -- the Israelis didn't inIorm you oI any operation in --
MR. MCCORMACK: II -- any questions -- any questions about this story you can talk to the Israeli
Government about.
Okay, good. We're done. (Laughter.) Ah, there you are.
http://www.theinsider.org/news/article.asp?id2605
11 September 2007
North Korea condemns Israel for sending fighter jets to violate Syria's airspace
N. Korea condemns Israeli 'provocation'
North Korea yesterday lashed out at Israel Ior invading Syrian airspace last Thursday, its oIIicial news
agency said.
"This is a very dangerous provocation little short oI wantonly violating the sovereignty oI Syria and
seriously harassing the regional peace and security," a spokesman Ior the DPRK Foreign Ministry was
quoted as saying by the Korean Central News Agency.
"The Democratic People's Republic oI Korea strongly denounces the above-said intrusion and extends
Iull support and solidarity to the Syrian people in their just cause to deIend the national security and the
regional peace," he added.
Syrian air deIenses opened Iire on Israeli aircraIt aIter they Ilew over northern Syria and dropped
ammunition on September 6, according to Syria's oIIicial media.
North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, also sent greetings yesterday to Syrian President Bashar Assad Ior
his 42nd birthday. Kim wished Assad good health, happiness and greater success in his responsibility-
heavy work.
The message stated: "Today the Syrian people under your leadership is striving to deIend the country's
sovereignty and honor and to build a modern society, while meeting all challenges and overcoming all
diIIiculties, and making a positive contribution to a Iair and comprehensive resolution oI the Middle
Eastern problem."
The message said with satisIaction that the Iriendship and cooperation between the two countries are
growing steadily stronger.
SOURCE
Haaretz, "N. Korea condemns Israeli 'provocation'", 11 September 2007.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/903376.html
Syrian FM: Israel dropped live ammo
By Yoav Stern and AssaI Uni Haaretz Correspondents and Agencies
Tue., September 11, 2007 Elul 28, 5767
The Israeli warplanes that violated Syria's airspace last week dropped live ammunition on Syrian soil,
Damascus' Ioreign minister said yesterday, adding that Israel's decision not to comment was
"appropriate."
"Israel used live ammunition in a deliberate and hostile attack," Minister Walid Moallem said at a news
conIerence during an oIIicial visit to Turkey.
His Turkish counterpart, Ali Babacan, demanded a quick explanation Irom Israel over Iuel tanks Iound
near the Syrian border in the incident last Thursday, which he said involved violation oI Turkish
airspace by Israeli jets. Israel is still not commenting on the incident.
"All countries in the region must show respect to all countries' sovereignty and avoid acts that lead to
tensions," Babacan said. "Otherwise, tensions would be Iueled, and peace and stability in the region
might be harmed."
European diplomats who met with Moallem on Sunday in Damascus quoted him as saying that Israel's
decision not to comment on the incident was appropriate, given the circumstances. Moallem reportedly
told the Europeans that he expected Israel to apologize "through the usual channels."
In Ankara, Moallem went on to reveal the details oI the alleged strike, which according to him resulted
in no casualties or damage to property. Moallem said that three Israeli planes Iired Iour missiles at
targets on the ground in the Dayr al-Zur district in eastern Syria, aIter entering Syrian airspace Irom the
Mediterranean.
The Syrian Ioreign minister said the Syrian anti-aircraIt radar system detected the planes when they
were deep inside Syrian territory. He added the planes released their missiles very shortly aIter they
were detected.
Despite the apparent outrage in Damascus over the incident, European diplomats who met with
Moallem told Haaretz that they had received the impression that Syria would not retaliate militarily.
"Moallem did not demand the European Union to condemn the Israeli action, nor did he indicate that
Syria would demand the United Nations Security Council hold a discussion on the matter," one
European diplomat told Haaretz. "We got the impression that Syria is not interested in seeing this
incident escalate."
The London-based daily Al-Hayyat reported yesterday that Israel had conveyed a calming message to
Damascus via European Union Ioreign policy chieI Javier Solana. The paper quoted Moallem as saying
that Solana inIormed him on Wednesday night during a meeting in Cairo that Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert told Solana that Israel will decrease its military presence in the Golan Heights.
Moallem reportedly said that Solana had inIormed him oI Israel's intention to withdraw most Israel
DeIense Forces troops stationed in the area to ease increasing tensions with Syria.
Moallem reportedly told the diplomats that the message was just a "preparation Ior the penetration oI
planes into Syrian skies, just hours later."
Haaretz has learned that Moallem told European diplomats that the calming message beIore the strike
proved that Israel was interested in war rather than peace.
The next day Moallem called Solana, reports Al-Hayyat, to inIorm him oI the incident, and told him
that it came in direct contrast to Olmert's message and to Israel's declarations that it has peaceIul
intentions.
Meanwhile, Iormer MK Azmi Bishara said he believes Israel carried out a military operation in Syria.
"Without getting carried away in speculation, this was an aerial operation, not an |airspace| violation
that's meant to send a message," he wrote in an article published on the Syrian Web site Sham-Fares.
Bishara wrote that the operation could have dire consequences, and that some oIIicials in Lebanon or
Syria could view it as a pretext to go to war.
The Iormer Balad chairman added that Israel's reIusal to comment on the issue was unusual. "Israel has
wrapped itselI in silence, imposing it on its most talkative politicians," he wrote. "Israel realizes the
quiet aIter the storm could become the quiet beIore the storm."
Bishara said the strike might have been directed against a number oI targets, such as people or units
involved with arms smuggling, anti-aircraIt systems or missile systems.
Alternatively, Bishara wrote, Israel may have been testing Syrian air deIenses in order to map out a
route Ior an air strike on Iran.
Barak Ravid adds: At a joint news conIerence in Jerusalem, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni asked her
Portuguese counterpart to reIrain Irom commenting on the incident. AIter Minister Luis Amado, whose
country currently holds the presidency oI the European Union, was asked Ior the EU's stance on the
incident, Livni interrupted the discussion and signaled to Amado not to answer.
"I do not believe any statement by any party could help matters," Livni explained beIore moving on to
the next question. "I Iind it ponderous that you should expect me to comment on this. You already
know our position on the subject."
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid1189411388088&pagenameJPost2FJPArticle2FShowFull
'IAF targeted Iranian weapons in Syria'
By YAAKOV KATZ, JPOST.COM STAFF, AND AP
The Jerusalem Post
Sep 11, 2007 18:31 , Updated Sep 12, 2007 23:38
Israeli warplanes targeted weapons destined Ior Hizbullah in a strike last week in northeastern Syria, a
US government oIIicial said Wednesday, even as Israel remained silent over the incident.
The oIIicial said the target in the strike last Thursday was a site where Israel believed Syria was storing
weapons Irom Iran heading Ior the Lebanese terrorist group.
The oIIicial spoke on condition oI anonymity because the inIormation involves intelligence gathering
and because oI the sensitivity oI the situation.
OIIicials in Washington declined Ior several days to say whether they were aware oI the strike, then on
Tuesday conIirmed they had intelligence indicating it had taken place.
A graphic showing the Syrian foreign minister's version of events.
Photo: Rendering by Jonathan Beck
Meanwhile, Syria's UN Ambassador, Bashar Ja'aIari, denied the reports on Wednesday, claiming the
Israeli jets escaped without hitting their target.
"This is, as we say in French, blah blah," Ja'aIari told reporters. "This is nonsense. This is unIounded
statement. It is not true because they have already violated the airspace oI a country, a member state oI
the United Nations."
"It's not up to the Israelis or anybody else to assess what we have in Syria and what we don't have," he
said.
Ja'aIari said it was also "totally wrong" because the Israelis could not Iind any target in Syria. That is
because they were "running away" aIter coming under Iire Irom Syrian air deIenses and dropped their
ammunition and extra Iuel tanks to lighten the load, he said.
The Syrian ambassador sent identical letters to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the president oI the
Security Council accusing Israel oI "Ilagrant deIiance oI international law," the UN Charter and council
resolutions.
While Syria has repeatedly aIIirmed its desire Ior "a just and comprehensive peace in the region,"
Ja'aIari accused Israel oI "choosing aggression and escalation instead oI espousing the option oI peace"
and committing "war crimes."
"In warning the Israeli government oI the consequences oI such blatant aggression, Syria emphasizes
that iI the international community persists in disregarding these Israeli actions in breach oI
international law, that is likely to subject the region and international peace and security to serious
consequences that may be diIIicult to control," he said in the letter, circulated Wednesday.
Ja'aIari told reporters Wednesday that Israel carried out the "provocative act ... in the middle oI the
huge momentum with regard to the peace process in the Middle East."
"We think the Israeli purpose behind doing such an aggressive act is to torpedo the peace process, to
torpedo the idea oI holding an international conIerence with the idea oI having a comprehensive
peace," he said. "So the issue in itselI might not be a pure military one, but having a very important
diplomatic and political background."
The letters did not ask the Security Council to take any action, but Ja'aIari said Syria expects both the
council and the secretary-general to react.
"What's happened is a violation oI the Charter, a violation oI the sovereignty oI a member state oI
United Nations, and bout the secretary-general and Security Council should assume their
responsibilities by reaction to such an aggressive act," he said. "They should react because this is their
duties, this is their job. It's not up to me to dictate to them what to say."
When Israeli aircraIt attacked a Syrian village in October 2003, Ja'aIari recalled that the secretary-
general denounced the attack and the Security Council condemned it.
"We are waiting Ior serious outcomes, equal, at least, to the gravity oI what happened," he said.
France's UN Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert said the letter was circulated to all 15 members but it
was not discussed at a meeting on Wednesday. Diplomats said this was because the Syrians did not ask
Ior any action.
On Tuesday, CNN reported that Israel Air Force jets that allegedly inIiltrated Syrian airspace early last
Thursday apparently bombed an Iranian arms shipment that was being transIerred to Hizbullah,
Tuesday.
A ground operation may also have been part oI the Ioray, according to the network. Jerusalem reIused
to conIirm or deny the report.
CNN said the operation involved ground Iorces and that the aerial strike leIt "a great hole in the
desert." Although it did not name a speciIic source, the network cited "US government oIIicials." The
jets have been identiIied by the Turkish authorities as IAF F15Is, Israel's long-range bomber, aIter Iuel
tanks were Iound in Turkish territory.
The CNN report said the IAF's targets were likely weaponry delivered to Syria that was possibly
intended Ior use by Hizbullah.
CNN's chieI international correspondent, Christiane Amanpour, delivered the report and quoted sources
saying that Israel was "very happy" with the results oI the operation.
A US military oIIicial described the Israeli incursion as an air strike "deep into Syria" that succeeded in
hitting a target. The oIIicial, who spoke on condition oI anonymity because it was an intelligence issue,
said he did not know what that target was.
Syria has called the incursion a "hostile act," but has been largely silent on the details oI what
happened. Israeli oIIicials have reIused to comment.
On Thursday, Syria said its air deIense systems had Iired on IAF aircraIt that had inIiltrated its airspace
near the coastal city oI Latakia.
The government, including the Prime Minister's OIIice and the IDF, maintained their policy oI reIusing
to comment on the incident Iollowing the CNN report.
Syria has been known to be transIerring weapons oI its own, as well as arms Irom Iran, to Hizbullah.
During the Second Lebanon War, the IDF discovered a wide range oI antitank missiles and short-range
rockets being used by Hizbullah that had originated in Syria. Several Iranian-made missiles were also
in Hizbullah hands beIore the war, but these were mostly destroyed by the IDF beIore being Iired at
Israel.
Over the upcoming holidays, the IDF will continue to maintain a high level oI alert along the Syrian
border amid Iears that Damascus will respond to the alleged Ilyover. DeIense oIIicials said earlier this
week that tensions between the countries had begun to subside, but that there was a need to maintain a
high alert "just in case."
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gM4eQSY4r2aqoKqeK3M8io5yc9zw
Israel keeps up blackout on mystery Syria air strike
Sep 12, 2007
JERUSALEM (AFP) Israel on Wednesday maintained an oIIicial blackout on an apparent strike by
its warplanes on Syria, amid reports that the mysterious attack targeted weapons Iinanced by arch-Ioe
Iran.
No oIIicial Israeli comment was issued on allegations that its military carried out an attack deep inside
Syria last Thursday, despite conIirmation oI a strike by a deIence oIIicial oI Israel's main ally the
United States.
Citing anonymous Israeli sources, an Arab Israeli newspaper, the Assennara, said on Wednesday that
the jets "bombed in northern Syria a Syrian-Iranian missile base Iinanced by Iran.... It appears that the
base was completely destroyed."
The previous day CNN reported that the strike, which could also have involved the use oI ground
Iorces, was believed to have targeted weapons either coming into Syria or moving through Syria Irom
Iran to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, Lebanon's Shiite militia that Israel Iought in a war last year.
The New York Times also reported on Wednesday that Israel thinks Syria and Iran are buying nuclear
material Irom North Korea and had recently carried out reconnaissance Ilights over Syria, taking
pictures oI possible nuclear installations.
A US administration oIIicial said Israeli oIIicials believe that North Korea might be unloading some oI
its nuclear material on Syria, the newspaper said.
"The Israelis think North Korea is selling to Iran and Syria what little they have leIt," the unidentiIied
oIIicial was quoted as saying.
Syria on Tuesday lodged a Iormal complaint with the United Nations over the "Ilagrant violation" oI its
airspace in the early hours oI September 6, when it said its air deIences opened Iire on Israeli warplanes
Ilying over the northeast oI the country.
Earlier a US deIence oIIicial said that Israel had carried out an air strike as a warning to Damascus.
"It wasn't big. It was a quick strike. They were engaged by the Syrians, they dropped their ordnance
and scooted out oI there," said the oIIicial who spoke on condition oI anonymity.
He said he did not know the target oI the strike, but said the US military believed it was aimed at
sending a message to the Syrians over their support Ior Hezbollah.
"The Israelis are trying to tell the Syrians: 'Don't support a resurgence oI Hezbollah in Lebanon'."
Israeli oIIicials have reIused to comment on the report, as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert "speciIically
instructed ministers not to talk about the incident related to Syria at all," a senior Israeli government
oIIicial told AFP earlier this week.
This silence -- uncharacteristic in a nation notorious Ior media leaks -- continued on Wednesday, with
even visiting French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner saying he was also being kept in the dark.
"I asked my hosts and they did not inIorm me," Kouchner told reporters in Jerusalem when asked about
the reported strike, as he wrapped up his Iirst visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories.
"II indeed... they have bombed a weapons convoy which was headed to Lebanon, we understand why
they would do it," he said. "Everybody in Lebanon knows that large quantities oI weapons arrive Irom
the Syrian border."
Olmert bypassed his traditional interviews with Israeli newspapers ahead oI the Jewish New Year that
starts at sundown on Wednesday, leaving President Shimon Peres to mention Syria in only general
terms.
"The central problem with Syria is Lebanon -- the question is to know whether Lebanon will be
Lebanese or Iranian," Peres told public television. "The Syrians support Hezbollah and provide them
with arms. As long as they continue on this route there will be tension in the air."
And Sylvan Shalom, a Iormer Ioreign minister, told army radio: "Syria should draw the lessons Irom
what happened and change its attitude to avoid being completely in the hands oI Iran."
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/world/middleeast/12syria.html
U.S. Confirms Israeli Strikes Hit Syrian Target Last Week
By MARK MAZZETTI and HELENE COOPER
September 12, 2007
WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 AIter days oI silence Irom the Israeli government, American oIIicials
conIirmed Tuesday that Israeli warplanes launched airstrikes inside Syria last week, the Iirst such
attack since 2003.
A DeIense Department oIIicial said Israeli jets had struck at least one target in northeastern Syria last
Thursday, but the oIIicial said it was still unclear exactly what the jets hit and the extent oI the bombing
damage.
Syria has lodged a protest at the United Nations in response to the airstrike, accusing Israel oI Ilagrant
violation oI its airspace. But Israels government has repeatedly declined to comment on the matter.
OIIicials in Washington said that the most likely targets oI the raid were weapons caches that Israels
government believes Iran has been sending the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah through Syria. Iran
and Syria are Hezbollahs primary beneIactors, and American intelligence oIIicials say a steady Ilow oI
munitions Irom Iran runs through Syria and into Lebanon.
In the summer oI 2006, during Iighting between Israeli and Hezbollah Iorces, the militant group Iired
hundreds oI missiles into Israel, surprising Israel with the extent and sophistication oI its arsenal. Israel
has tried repeatedly to get the United Nations to prevent the arms shipments across the Syria-Lebanon
border.
One Bush administration oIIicial said Israel had recently carried out reconnaissance Ilights over Syria,
taking pictures oI possible nuclear installations that Israeli oIIicials believed might have been supplied
with material Irom North Korea. The administration oIIicial said Israeli oIIicials believed that North
Korea might be unloading some oI its nuclear material on Syria.
The Israelis think North Korea is selling to Iran and Syria what little they have leIt, the oIIicial said.
He said it was unclear whether the Israeli strike had produced any evidence that might validate that
belieI.
The oIIicials spoke on condition oI anonymity because they were discussing a military action by
another government.
In a letter circulated to members oI the Security Council on Tuesday, Syrias ambassador to the United
Nations, Bashar JaaIari, said Israel dropped munitions though they did not cause any material
damage.
Syria made its protest via Qatar, the Arab representative on the Security Council, United Nations
oIIicials said. Security Council representatives discussed the issue on Tuesday, but did not come to any
conclusions.
Neither Israel nor the United States has spoken publicly on the airstrikes. The State Department
spokesman, Sean D. McCormack, reIerred all questions to Israel and Syria, and a spokesman Ior the
Israeli Embassy in Washington declined to comment.
Tensions between Israel and Syria have escalated over the past year, since the end oI the Israel-
Hezbollah war in Lebanon, and both countries remain in a heightened state oI alert along their common
border.
Syrias president, Bashar al-Assad, has said that iI Israel is not willing to resume negotiations Ior the
return oI the Golan Heights, which Israel captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the alternative would
be to try to regain the territory by Iorce.
Formal peace talks between Israel and Syria broke down in 2000.
Last update - 03:50 12/09/2007

CNN: Israeli gov't 'very happy with success' of IAF strike on Syria
By Yoav Stern and AssaI Uni, Haaretz Correspondents, Haaretz Service and News Agencies
The CNN television network reported Tuesday that Israel is happy with the results oI an alleged Israel
Air Force strike last week in Syrian territory.
Quoting sources in the United States and the region, CNN said, "The Israeli government is very happy
with the success oI the operation."
European diplomats quoted Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem as saying Monday [10 September
2007] that the IAF warplanes that violated Syria's airspace Iired missiles at targets on the ground, but
did not cause any damage.
According to the CNN report, the sources said the IAF indeed carried out a strike on a target in Syria,
adding that the operation "may have also involved Israeli ground Iorces who directed the air strike."
CNN quoted the sources as saying the strike, which possibly targeted an arms transIer Irom Iran to
Hezbollah through Syria, "leIt a big hole in the desert."
The CNN report said U.S. government and military sources have conIirmed the airstrike, and said that
"they are happy to have Israel carry the message to both Syria and Iran that they can get in and out and
strike when necessary."
Also Tuesday [11 September 2007], Syria lodged a Iormal complaint with the United Nations about an
"aggression and violation oI sovereignty" over the incident, the country's ambassador to the UN said
Tuesday.
Syria's UN ambassador, Bashar al-JaaIari, said Damascus made its complaint in two letters to the UN
secretary general and the president oI the Security Council. The letters said the IAF action was in
violation oI the 1974 disengagement agreement that was reached aIter the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Al-JaaIari also denied that Israel had landed troops on the ground inside Syria. "This is absolutely not
true," he said, adding the reports were an attempt to show that Israel could land troops wherever it
wants.
"Israel is seeking military escalation. We are exerting eIIorts so that we don't Iall into this trap. We are
dealing with the matter with utmost keenness, precision and responsibility," he added.
Meanwhile on Tuesday [11 September 2007], China's Xinhua news agency said North Korea had
issued a harsh condemnation oI the IAF incursion into Syrian airspace.
According to the report, the Korean Central News Agency quoted a spokesman Ior North Korea's
Foreign Ministry as saying, "This is a very dangerous provocation little short oI wantonly violating the
sovereignty oI Syria and seriously harassing the regional peace and security."
"The DPRK strongly denounces the above-said intrusion and extends Iull support and solidarity to the
Syrian people in their just cause to deIend the national security and the regional peace," the spokesman
reportedly added.
European diplomats who met with Moallem on Sunday in Damascus quoted him as saying that Israel's
decision not to comment on the incident was appropriate, given the circumstances. Moallem reportedly
told the Europeans that he expected Israel to apologize "through the usual channels."
In Ankara Ior an oIIicial visit, Moallem went on to reveal the details oI the alleged strike, which
according to him resulted in no casualties or damage to property. Moallem said that three Israeli planes
Iired Iour missiles at targets on the ground in the Dayr al-Zur district in eastern Syria, aIter entering
Syrian airspace Irom the Mediterranean.
The Syrian Ioreign minister said the Syrian anti-aircraIt radar system detected the planes when they
were deep inside Syrian territory. He added the planes released their missiles very shortly aIter they
were detected.
Despite the apparent outrage in Damascus over the incident, European diplomats who met with
Moallem told Haaretz that they had received the impression that Syria would not retaliate militarily.
"Moallem did not demand the European Union to condemn the Israeli action, nor did he indicate that
Syria would demand the United Nations Security Council hold a discussion on the matter," one
European diplomat told Haaretz. "We got the impression that Syria is not interested in seeing this
incident escalate."
http://www.Ioxnews.com/story/0,2933,296686,00.html
Syria Might Be Seeking Nuclear Weapons Technology Through North Korea,
Sources Say
Thursday, September 13, 2007
By James Rosen
WASHINGTON U.S. intelligence oIIicials have developed evidence showing that North Korea is
helping Syria to develop a nuclear program Ior weapons purposes, FOX News has learned in recent
interviews with sources who have knowledge oI the situation.
Syrians emphatically denied the claim on Thursday.
The details oI the claims are vague, but one source told FOX News in late August that the North
Koreans had sold the Syrians a nuclear Iacility, most likely related to uranium enrichment. Enriched
uranium is necessary both Ior nuclear power and nuclear weapons uses. The United States accuses
Syria oI assisting terrorist groups including Hezbollah.
A source said the case has been assigned the internal code name, "Orchard," and the evidence was
developed through Israeli channels, possibly with the assistance oI U.S. aerial photography.
Other sources, however, questioned Syria's ability to aIIord such a pricey venture. Those sources said
that in recent discussions with U.S. intelligence oIIicials, the oIIicials had spoken oI North Korea
having sent nuclear scientists, engineers, and other personnel with relevant expertise to Damascus.
"I've noticed more and more people |in the intelligence community| talking about people being sent
over |Irom North Korea to Syria|," one high-ranking Iormer National Security Council oIIicial said.
The Iormer NSC oIIicial also said North Korea is "deIinitely still procuring |equipment| Ior its HEU
|highly enriched uranium| program. It's not as iI they are viewing the talks as some kind oI 'time out' on
their HEU work." This would be in direct contrast with eIIorts in the Six-Party talks to denuclearize the
Korean peninsula .
Most oI two dozen sources spoken to over the past three weeks, including current and Iormer Bush
administration oIIicials, Ioreign diplomats, and nonproliIeration experts, also said they have heard
discussions about nuclear cooperation in one Iorm or another between Syria and North Korea.
A spokesman Ior the Syrian embassy on Thursday called the allegations "absurd."
"This is an incredibly absurd and ridiculously Iabricated story. Those who create such lies are
misleading the American public and end-up undermining US national interest in a way reminiscent oI
what happened in Iraq previously. In Iact, it is a shame that serious news outlets would waste time and
space on such a Iictitious idea," said embassy spokesman Ahmed Salkini.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2007/09/12 /AR2007091202430.html
N. Korea, Syria May Be at Work on Nuclear Facility
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post StaII Writer
Thursday, September 13, 2007; Page A12
North Korea may be cooperating with Syria on some sort oI nuclear Iacility in Syria, according to new
intelligence the United States has gathered over the past six months, sources said. The evidence, said to
come primarily Irom Israel, includes dramatic satellite imagery that led some U.S. oIIicials to believe
that the Iacility could be used to produce material Ior nuclear weapons.
The new inIormation, particularly images received in the past 30 days, has been restricted to a Iew
senior oIIicials under the instructions oI national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, leaving many in
the intelligence community unaware oI it or uncertain oI its signiIicance, said the sources, who spoke
on the condition oI anonymity. Some cautioned that initial reports oI suspicious activity are Irequently
reevaluated over time and were skeptical that North Korea and Syria, which have cooperated on missile
technology, would have a joint venture in the nuclear arena.
A White House spokesman and the Israeli Embassy declined to comment yesterday aIter several days
oI inquiries. A Syrian Embassy spokesman said he could not immediately provide a statement.
The new intelligence comes at an awkward moment Ior the Bush administration, which since the
beginning oI the year has pursued an agreement with North Korea on ending its nuclear weapons
programs. U.S. and North Korean oIIicials held talks last week in Geneva on the steps needed to
normalize relations, and this week a delegation oI U.S., Russian and Chinese experts visited North
Korea's Yongbyon nuclear Iacility to consider ways to disable it. The New York Times Iirst reported
on the intelligence linking North Korea and Syria yesterday.
At the Geneva talks, North Korea indicated a willingness to satisIy U.S. questions about an alleged
uranium-enrichment program that started the crisis over its nuclear ambitions, the sources said. U.S.
oIIicials have said that North Korean oIIicials acknowledged the program in 2002, but Pyongyang
subsequently denied doing so. In the meantime, it restarted a plutonium Iacility at Yongbyon and
harvested enough weapons-grade material Ior as many as 10 nuclear weapons. In October, it tested a
nuclear device.
In talks in Beijing in March 2003, a North Korean oIIicial pulled aside his American counterpart and
threatened to "transIer" nuclear material to other countries. President Bush has said that passing North
Korean nuclear technology to other parties would cross the line.
Israel conducted a mysterious raid last week against targets in Syria. The Israeli government has
reIused to divulge any details, but a Iormer Israeli oIIicial said he had been told that it was an attack
against a Iacility capable oI making unconventional weapons.
Others have speculated that Israel was testing Syria's air deIenses in preparation Ior a raid on Iran or
that Israel was targeting weapons destined Ior Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Bashar JaaIari, the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters that the idea oI a Hezbollah
connection was ridiculous.
Syria has signed the nuclear nonproliIeration treaty but has not agreed to an additional protocol that
would allow Ior enhanced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. GlobalSecurity.org,
which oIIers inIormation on weapons oI mass destruction, said that "although Syria has long been cited
as posing a nuclear proliIeration risk, the country seems to have been too strapped Ior cash to get Iar."
Syria has a Chinese-supplied "miniature" research reactor at Dayr al-Hajar, but has been unable to
obtain larger reactors because oI international pressure on potential sellers.
John R. Bolton, Iormer U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and a critic oI the administration's
dealings with North Korea, said that given North Korea's trade in missiles with Syria, it is "legitimate
to ask questions about whether that cooperation extends on the nuclear side as well."
http://www.newsweek.com/id/40932
Israel Will Pay a Price
Ambassador Imad Moustapha, Syria's envoy to Washington, gives his account oI a mysterious Israeli
air raid and discusses whether Syria will retaliate.
JeIIrey Bartholet
Newsweek Web Exclusive
Sep 14, 2007 , Updated: 2:00 p.m. ET Sep 17, 2007
Israel has imposed strict military censorship over news oI a recent air strike deep inside Syrian
territory. U.S. oIIicials have conIirmed that an air strike did take place on Sept. 6 but have not provided
Iurther details. Vaguely sourced reports, including accounts oI a Syrian-North Korean nuclear program
that have yet to be substantiated, are seeping into the media. What do the Syrians have to say about it?
NEWSWEEK's JeIIrey Bartholet sat down with Syria's ambassador to the United States, Imad
Moustapha, to get his version oI events.
NEWSWEEK: We're told the [Israeli] target was in a place called Dayr az Zawr.
Imad Moustapha: No, Dayr az Zawr is a major city; it was not targeted. The Israeli planes threw their
ammunition close to Dayr az Zawr, but outside Dayr az Zawr, and then they made a U-turn and threw
their reserve Iuel tanks. And because they were Ilying above the Syria-Turkish border, they threw those
on the Turkish side oI the border. Nothing was damaged.
What were they bombing?
They didn't bomb anything. Once they were spotted by our deIense systems and we started attacking
them, they threw their ammunition because this makes them lighter. And they threw their additional
Iuel tanks, which were not empty by the way, and they made a U-turn and they leIt. You've got to
understand, they were Ilying in the extreme northern part oI Syria, on the Syrian-Turkish border.
How many bombs fell and what did they fall on?
They didn't hit anything. They just Iell on wasteland.
So no casualties?
No, nothing.
No physical damage to structures?
No. Just on the ground. And Turkey protested about the two Iuel tanks that Iell on the Turkish side.
There have been reports, unsubstantiated at present, that what was targeted was some kind of
nuclear North Korean-Syrian cooperation project.
Those reports are absolutely, totally, fundamentally ridiculous and untrue. There are no nuclear
North Korean-Syrian facilities whatsoever in Syria We know the game. |AIter the Iall oI
Baghdad| some were claiming that Saddam's WMDs were being smuggled to Syria. This is not a new
story. Every now and then we hear about nuclear materials being transIerred to Syria.
What is the relationship between North Korea and Syria right now? It was noticed that North
Korea immediately issued a strong and public denunciation of the Israeli attack, which seemed a
bit unusual, given that North Korea is thousands of miles away.
People here can be very selective. The Lebanese government made such an announcement, Turkey
made such an announcement, Indonesia made such an announcement. North Korea has very Iew
Iriends around the world, and we have Iriendly relations with North Korea.
Do you have trade relations?
Very little actual relations |The relationship| is real. We're not denying it. There's nothing to hide.
Also a trade in missiles, in the past anyway. Scuds.
I'm not privy to military details. I leave that to military experts to discuss. What I am saying is the
Iollowing: There is nothing sinister. To talk about a Syrian-North Korean nuclear plant is really, really
sad, because it reminds me oI the sort oI stories that used to be Iabricated here in the United States
beIore the Iraq war, about Iraq's WMDs and such things. You would think America has learned its
lesson, that it won't buy such stories anymore. And then you are astonished when you see mainstream
|media| outlets publishing such stories. Such short-term memory Ior the American media.
There was an International Atomic Energy Commission inspection of Syria in 2003 that gave it a
clean
We cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Commission.
There was another unsubstantiated report that the target was a joint Iranian-Syrian missile
plant.
And there was a third report that that was a convoy taking arms to Hizbullah. All are ridiculous. In
northeastern Syria they'd spot a convoy taking arms to Hizbullah?
The reason some in the media have been speculating, I think, is because Israeli censors are
enforcing a strict clampdown and people who know something have suggested that this raid was
a big deal, that something was targeted and that what was targeted was hit.
Israel usually is very boastIul, very arrogant. Usually when they do something they boast about how
spectacular their operation was, how successIul they were. This time it's only linkages here and there
by people who claim this and that. Having said this, I'm not belittling the gravity oI the Israeli
provocation. It has changed dramatically the situation between us. They were sending us messages the
last three months that they don't want to Iurther escalate tensions between Syria and Israel, they do not
have plans oI hostile intent Ior Syria. They were saying this publicly, on the record. Then they send
their jet Iighters into Syrian sovereign airspace. I think this is a very serious provocation.
On that point, Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa told an Italian newspaper that Damascus
will retaliate.
Let us be honest with each other. Every action in the world creates a reaction. So Ior anyone to imagine
that Syria will look at what happened and say, 'Well, let's just let things pass by' is unrealistic. But this
doesn't mean that Syria will immediately retaliate in kind, exactly the same way. We have our own
national priorities Syria has been very, very clear about its desire to end the conIlict in the Middle
East through negotiations and the peaceIul approach, based on the land-Ior-peace principle. We are
committed to this. Having said this, until this happens we are in a state oI war with Israel. And there are
diIIerent ways to retaliate. It doesn't necessarily have to be the same |method|.
Can you give me a couple of examples?
I'm not a military expert. But anyone who has studied the situation in the Middle East will understand.
They want to occupy our territories, and they will pay a price Ior this.
Tell me about the diplomatic efforts that surrounded this. Did U.S. officials contact you; did you
contact U.S. Officials?
No, not at all. The United States continues to provide blanket support Ior Israel, no matter what Israel
does. In a way, they have expressed tacit approval. But we have launched an oIIicial complaint to the
United Nations Security Council. We have inIormed the Arab League, the Europeans, Russia, China
and we have publicly said that we reserve our right to retaliate in a way we choose.
Have you filed any complaint with Washington?
It would be a waste oI time. I don't think Washington today has a mindset that would allow it to
understand how such grave actions can lead to Iurther deterioration in the Middle East.
What is the situation with U.S.-Syrian relations at this point? There was a lot of intelligence
cooperation, then there was a long cold spell, and then there seemed to be a little bit of an
opening in the winter and spring this year.
Time and again, we have told the United States that we believe in cooperation. We can address the
issues, Iind common ground, brainstorm Ior creative solutions. But in a way, there is no dialogue today
between Syria and the United States. We are not happy about this. We believe we need good relations
with the United States. No resolution oI the |Arab-Israeli conIlict| can take place without the direct,
strong involvement oI the United States. Having said this, we have a problem in Iraq. It is in our own
national interest to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. It's such a dangerous situation. And we are
overrun with over 1.5 million Iraqi reIugees. The stakes are very high. Time and again we have told the
United States that it is better to stop this propaganda war with us and sit with us and see how we can
help toward stabilizing the situation.
The other problem between Syria and the United States is Lebanon.
Are you sure it's a problem between us and the United States? I think it's a problem over what Israel
wants in the Middle East.
One problem is that many opponents of Syrian policy in Lebanon have been assassinated.
[Former prime minister] Rafik Hariri and
Do you think RaIik Hariri was an opponent oI Syria in Lebanon? He was the prime minister oI
Lebanon when we were in Lebanon. All the people who badmouth us today used to be close allies oI
the so-called "evil occupation oI Syria in Lebanon." That is preposterous.
There have been a number of people who have been assassinated, including journalists.
Look, listen, these assassinations are terrible crimes. There is a United Nations commission that is
investigating this crime These are serious, grave issues. OI course we say "No, we didn't do this."
Try to understand. When an assassination takes place, within a minute we are accused oI it.
Tremendous political damage is inIlicted on us. And yet in an extremely stupid way we are supposed to
have assassinated one person aIter another? Why? Something is illogical about this. Let the U.N.
investigation decide who killed these guys.
During the recent tensions, was there a moment when the Syrian government considered military
retaliation [against Israel], firing missiles or
We have not IorIeited our right to retaliate. But as I have said, we don't necessarily have to retaliate in
the same way that Israel has attacked. I don't know exactly the nature oI this retaliation. It can happen
in various ways, sometimes in asymmetrical ways. What I'm trying to say is the Iollowing: We live in a
state oI war with Israel. This is not the Iirst act oI hostility between Syria and Israel The problem is
that sometimes a Ioolish action can provoke terrible consequences.
There was diplomacy [before the attack], when Israel was sending what were described as
"calming" signals. There was tension, then a calming period, then this happened. Can you
describe that period prior to the attack?
I can tell you that Israel was creating an atmosphere oI brinksmanship in the region. There were
unprecedentedly large maneuvers in the occupied Syrian Golan. And oI course the Syrians took note oI
this and were in a high state oI preparedness. And then the Israelis, and personally |Prime Minister|
Ehud Olmert, sent personal public messagesboth publicly and to European oIIicialsin which he
said Syria shouldn't be concerned, Israel doesn't intend to provoke Syria or attack Syria Having
noted this, Syria is not a gullible country. As long as there is no peace agreement, we have to always be
prepared.
Is it possible that Syria will decide that it's in its national interests not to respond?
That would not serve our national interests. That would be detrimental to our national interests, because
it would encourage Israel to repeat the same intrusions and operations. As I have said, every reaction
creates a reaction. II Israel calculates that they can do what they want, they're making a big mistake,
just as they made a mistake last summer |in 2006, by waging war against Hizbullah in Lebanon|.
So if the headline on this interview was "Syria Will Retaliate," that would not be inaccurate?
What I have said is that this is a long-term war. States have diIIerent approaches to things. What I'm
trying to say is that Israel will not be permitted to do whatever it does without paying a price Ior it.
So Israel will pay a price.
It will. And there will always be a price Ior everything.
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?idD8RLAJOG3&showarticle1&catnum2
U.S.: Syria on Nuclear Watch List
Sep 14 [2008] 10:31 AM US/Eastern
By NICOLE WINFIELD
Associated Press Writer

ROME (AP) - A senior U.S. nuclear oIIicial said Friday that North Koreans were in Syria and that the
government in Damascus may have had contacts with "secret suppliers" to obtain nuclear equipment.
Andrew Semmel, acting deputy assistant secretary oI state Ior nuclear nonproliIeration policy, did not
name the suppliers, but said there were North Koreans in Syria and that he could not exclude that the
network run by the disgraced Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan may have been involved.
Semmel was responding to questions about an Israeli airstrike in northern Syria last week. Neither side
has explained what exactly happened, but a U.S. government oIIicial conIirmed that Israeli warplanes
were targeting weapons Irom Iran and destined Ior Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.
The Washington Post reported Thursday that Israel had gathered satellite imagery showing possible
North Korean cooperation with Syria on a nuclear Iacility.
Semmel, who is in Italy Ior a meeting Saturday on the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty, said Syria was
certainly on the U.S. "watch list."
"There are indicators that they do have something going on there," he said. "We do know that there are
a number oI Ioreign technicians that have been in Syria. We do know that there may have been contact
between Syria and some secret suppliers Ior nuclear equipment. Whether anything transpired remains
to be seen."
"So good Ioreign policy, good national security policy, would suggest that we pay very close attention
to that," he said. "We're watching very closely. Obviously, the Israelis were watching very closely."
Asked iI the suppliers could have been North Koreans, he said: "There are North Korean people there.
There's no question about that. Just as there are a lot oI North Koreans in Iraq and Iran."
Asked iI the so-called Khan network, which supplied nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North
Korea, could have been involved, he said he "wouldn't exclude" it.
Washington, DC
September 14, 2007
[EXCERPTS]
12:06 p.m. EDT
[deletia]
QUESTION: Related to North Korea, are you aware oI these comments that were made by the DAS --
Acting DAS Ior a nuclear nonproliIeration policy, Mr. Semmel?
MR. MCCORMACK: You mentioned it to me. I don't know exactly what he said, but what I can tell
you is that every single year the intelligence community puts out a report concerning weapons oI mass
destruction, the status oI those programs oI countries around the world. I don't have that report in Iront
oI me. It is a publicly available document. But I can tell you that that is the deIinitive U.S. view or
assessment oI the intelligence community.
QUESTION: But that report came out some time ago, correct? I mean, what he's talking about here
when he says that there are North Koreans in Syria. There's no question about that.
MR. MCCORMACK: Like I said, Matt, I haven't had a chance to look at his remarks in any depth at
all, so I'm not sure what --
QUESTION: Okay. Are you aware oI there being a number oI Ioreign technicians in Syria and Syrians
being in contact with secret suppliers Ior nuclear equipment?
MR. MCCORMACK: This has been a topic that we've talked about Ior the past several days. And I can
tell you, Matt, that certainly over the past couple oI decades that we have held concerns about North
Korea's nuclear program. It's well known; it's why we have the six-party talks. And we have also
expressed over time our concerns about North Korea's activities in terms oI dealing with A.Q. Khan
and others around the globe. We've talked about that in quite some detail and some depth. Beyond that,
I wouldn't have any comment about our view oI North Korea, its nuclear program or any oI its
activities. But there's a pretty healthy public record, talking about that.
QUESTION: I understand that. But not really in relation to Syria and particularly, not in relation to
Syria and nuclear --
MR. MCCORMACK: Again, there's a public record out there, Matt. I don't have it in Iront oI me. I
can't tell you what the report is. The next time we talk, I'm happy to take a meander through that report
and we can talk about it in detail, but I don't have it here in Iront oI me.
Yes.
QUESTION: Still on the same topic, iI I may. I mean, you're aware oI these reports that have been out
this week, that are published drawing this very strong link between Syria and North Korea. Now, will
this issue be on the table in any Iorm next week, either bilaterally or amongst the six party talks?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, I've seen all the news stories that you're talking about. And you know,
we've talked about what our response to those news stories is and heard a little bit oI it there in
response to Matt's question. But completely separately, I would say that as part oI the six-party talks,
the core oI that is North Korea's nuclear program. That's the proximate issue that's beIore us right now.
What we want to get to is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We want to be able to get North Korea to
get rid oI its nuclear program in all its aspects. And that also would involve any other activities outside
oI North Korea. So that is the core oI the six-party talks. And we believe that this is the mechanism that
will actually get us to that point. And that we've learned Irom past experience with dealing with the
North Koreans and we think that having those six parties there, having that leverage, having the
Chinese actively involved in these negotiations, really is the way to get to everybody's desired
objective here or at least the publicly stated objective oI having a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
QUESTION: Well, also (inaudible) the delisting issue. And wouldn't these kinds oI reports, iI they
were true, or iI there was any question raised about it -- its a very serious allegation -- wouldn't this
complicate the delisting wishes oI the North Koreans?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that's an issue that takes place and is being looked at on the basis oI the
Iacts. You're talking about delisting as a state sponsor oI terrorism list?
QUESTION: Right.
MR. MCCORMACK: Chris Hill talked to the North Koreans a little bit about that, and again, we are
taking a look at that in the context oI any progress towards the goal that we are all talking about here:
denuclearization. We have a next phase coming up and we certainly hope and we think that by the end
oI the year we can have the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and the Iacilities disabled as
well as a Iull listing oI North Korea's nuclear program. That certainly would be progress. That would
be something that has gone beyond any agreement that the international community has been able to
arrive at with North Korea has gone beIore.
And in that context, certainly we are going to take a look at whether or not on the merits oI the case we
can do something about a couple issues that the North Koreans have raised: (1) the Trading with the
Enemy Act and (2) the state sponsor oI terrorism list. But again, we are going to take a look at that
based on laws, regulations, the Iacts, as well as discussions with our other colleagues in the six-party
talks and any progress that North Korea has made on that goal oI denuclearization.
QUESTION: But you haven't really answered my question. I mean, iI there's reports --
MR. MCCORMACK: What happened?
QUESTION: I don't really know. II there's any question --
MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know, take a poll. Have I answered the question? (Laughter.) I think I
don't want to know the answer to that.
QUESTION: But as with any questions in the air about this possible link --
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: Wouldn't that just throw a massive spanner in the works with this delisting?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, again, the whole point oI the six-party talks is to get at the issue oI
denuclearization, so there isn't a North Korean nuclear program. That's the source oI everybody's
concern with respect to North Korea's behavior in the neighborhood as well as North Korea's links with
others that have been involved in nuclear proliIeration, A.Q. Khan Ior example. So that is the Iocus oI
what we are trying to get at. We are going to take each oI these issues on their merits, we're going to
take these issues based on our consultations with other members oI the six-party talks and we're also
going to take this step by step.
Everybody understands the history oI agreements with North Korea and that is why we are taking the
approach that we are. And that is that good-Iaith actions on the part oI North Korea will be met in turn
by good Iaith. So that you have -- and that when you have this taking place in the context oI the six-
party talks, you have North Korea making this commitment to all the other Iive parties not just the
United States, and that any beneIits that might Ilow to North Korea will Ilow Irom the other Iive parties
not just the United States, and that iI North Korea reneges on any oI its commitments those beneIits
stop. And that the -- any consequences that might Ilow Irom that Iailure to live up to their commitments
is going to come Irom all the other Iive parties not just the United States.
QUESTION: Can I ask one last question on this?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.
QUESTION: In view oI these reports, have you had any inquiries Irom any other Ioreign governments
about it, about the reports?
MR. MCCORMACK: About?
QUESTION: About the link between Syria and North Korea.
MR. MCCORMACK: I'm not aware oI any.
QUESTION: Sean --
QUESTION: Go ahead, Jonathan.
QUESTION: So we've got U.S. oIIicials somewhere saying that there is a link with Syria -- between
Syria and North Korea and you will not -- I mean, you haven't addressed the question yet, is --
MR. MCCORMACK: Well --
QUESTION: What are you oIIicially saying?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think I just answered the question. Matt came at it Irom several diIIerent angles
here and --
QUESTION: Well, I didnt get an answer, but basically what happened was that I gave up when
realizing that I wasn't going to get an answer.
MR. MCCORMACK: Mr. Beale can take a lesson Irom this. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Well, maybe you could invite him. (Laughter.)
MR. MCCORMACK: I think I gave an answer. Look, I haven't looked at these comments in any depth,
but what I can tell you is that we do have plenty oI publicly available assessments and documents that
are out there that describe our views oI the state oI development oI the various programs -- weapons oI
mass destruction programs out there and North Korea's included. And you are Iree to take a look at
those and that can give you a deIinitive U.S. Government view oI those programs.
Yes, Arshad.
QUESTION: You said that you hoped and thought that by the end oI the year you could achieve North
Korea disabling its nuclear reactor and their Iacilities at Yongbyon, and that it was possible that you
could oIIer them some oI the incentives, Trading with the Enemy Act, et cetera.
MR. MCCORMACK: As well as -- part oI that is also they would have to provide a Iull declaration oI
--
QUESTION: Right, correct.
MR. MCCORMACK: -- their nuclear programs.
QUESTION: But the February 13th agreement doesn't say disable all the Iacilities at Yongbyon. It says
disable all its nuclear Iacilities. Does that mean that you believe that there are no other nuclear Iacilities
other than those at Yongbyon?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, part oI -- and you will see that in the declaration and we will see that in
the declaration. We'll take a close look at it. In terms oI -- and in terms oI any other Iacilities that they
may have, they haven't -- they have told us that they have an HEU program. They haven't told us that
they have any other -- haven't acknowledged any other Iacilities. I guess that is something we will have
to take a look at when we get the declaration.
But we would expect that as part oI this process their nuclear program would be disabled. So we are, at
this point, dealing with the only known that we have, and that is Yongbyon and all the Iacilities at
Yongbyon. II there are any others then, oI course, that would be part oI -- necessarily part oI an
agreement to disable those Iacilities or machinery in the context oI the six-party talks.
QUESTION: So you're going to take a look at the declaration iI you ever get one --
QUESTION: And iI you decide it's accurate and there are indeed additional Iacilities, they would have
to be disabled, too --
MR. MCCORMACK: Then we'd have to --
QUESTION: -- beIore the beneIits Ilowed?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think we -- since that is an unknown unknown at the moment, I think we would
have to deal with it when that arose. II you have that Iact in Iront oI you, then you're going to have to
deal with it. I think part oI the idea in terms oI the 950,000 tons oI Iuel oil or in-kind assistance, that is
going to be phased in. I think you're going to see that -- because part oI it is North Korea can't handle
all -- a whole 950,000 tons all at once, so it is something you have to deal with.
QUESTION: Right. But it's also Iuel oil, heavy Iuel oil, or its equivalent --
MR. MCCORMACK: In-kind assistance.
QUESTION: -- (inaudible) a whole bunch oI other stuII, too. It doesn't have to be Iuel oil.
MR. MCCORMACK: That's right.
QUESTION: And it doesn't have to be strung out --
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, but the thing that they're really looking Ior -- you're right -- but the thing
that they're really looking Ior is Iuel oil.
QUESTION: And you said that they've acknowledged having an HEU program.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
QUESTION: I thought that you -- and Secretary Hill did not Assistant Secretary Hill did not repeat
that when he brieIed us two weeks ago beIore the Geneva talks. And I thought that it was not now so
clear that you guys believed that they did, in Iact, acknowledge an HEU program back in October oI
'02.
MR. MCCORMACK: They did back in '02, yeah.
QUESTION: Can I just ask one more on the Syria (inaudible) oI this?
MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.
QUESTION: Mr. Semmel in his comments said good Ioreign policy -- basically, he said what you said
-- good Ioreign policy, national security policy, would suggest that we pay very close attention to that;
i.e., Syria and (inaudible). And then he said we're watching very closely, obviously the Israelis were
watching very closely. Can you explain what he means by that?
MR. MCCORMACK: No, I --
QUESTION: The Israelis were watching very closely?
MR. MCCORMACK: I'm sure the Israelis are watching very closely all oI their neighbors. I can't -- I
don't know what he has in mind when he says that.
[deletia]
(The brieIing was concluded at 12:25 p.m.)
http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/IstStory/index.php?storyid337222
Hill determined to push N. Korea nuke talks despite Syria reports
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 |2007| KYODO
Top U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill reiterated Friday [2007-09-14] that there is a need to
push Ior six-party talks on ending North Korea's atomic programs amid news reports Pyongyang may
be providing Syria with nuclear aid.
Hill, assistant secretary oI state Ior East Asian and PaciIic aIIairs, said the next plenary session oI
six-way discussions is likely to take place in Beijing Irom around next Wednesday and last Ior about
three days.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/14/AR2007091402207pI.html
Syria-N. Korea Reports Won't Stop Talks
By Glenn Kessler
Saturday, September 15, 2007; A12
Reports that North Korea may be assisting Syria with a possible nuclear program will not derail eIIorts
to implement a deal to end North Korea's nuclear programs, the chieI U.S. negotiator said yesterday,
arguing that the reports emphasized the need to complete the agreement.
U.S. sources reported this week that Israel had recently provided the United States with evidence --
known by the code name "Orchard" -- that North Korea has been cooperating with Syria on a nuclear
Iacility. But many outside nuclear experts have expressed skepticism that Syria, which has mostly
Iocused on chemical and biological weapons, would be conducting nuclear trade with North Korea.
"The reason we have the six-party process, and the reason we have put together a number oI pretty
serious countries in this process, is to make sure that the North Koreans get out oI the nuclear
business," Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill told reporters yesterday, in advance oI a new
round oI talks next week in Beijing. "At the end oI all this, we would expect to have a pretty clear idea
oI, you know, whether they have engaged in proliIeration in other countries."
To the dismay oI conservative critics, the Bush administration has pressed ahead with a deal that calls
Ior North Korea to disclose all oI its nuclear activities by the end oI the year. Some have argued the
administration is being snookered by Pyongyang to give up concessions without learning the Iull extent
oI its activities.
The White House and the State Department generally have declined to either conIirm or deny reports oI
the Syria-North Korea link, but one top oIIicial yesterday seemed to Ian the Ilames. Andrew Semmel,
acting deputy assistant secretary oI state Ior nuclear nonproliIeration policy, told the Associated Press
yesterday in Rome that North Koreans were in Syria and that Damascus may have had contacts with
"secret suppliers" to obtain nuclear equipment. "There are indicators that they do have something going
on there," he said.
State Department oIIicials declined to comment on Semmel's remarks.
Meanwhile, a prominent U.S. expert on the Middle East, who has interviewed Israeli participants in a
mysterious raid over Syria last week, reported that the attack appears to have been linked to the arrival
three days earlier oI a ship carrying material Irom North Korea labeled as cement.
The expert, who spoke on the condition oI anonymity to avoid compromising his sources, said the
target oI the attack appears to have been a northern Syrian Iacility that was labeled an agricultural
research center on the Euphrates River, close to the Turkish border. Israel has kept a close eye on the
Iacility, believing that Syria was using it to extract uranium Irom phosphates.
The expert said it is not clear what the ship was carrying, but the emerging consensus in Israel was that
it delivered nuclear equipment. The ship arrived Sept. 3 in the Syrian port oI Tartus; the attack occurred
Sept. 6 under such strict operational security that the pilots Ilying air cover Ior the attack aircraIt did
not know details oI the mission. The pilots who conducted the attack were brieIed only aIter they were
in the air, he said.
Israel has imposed heavy censorship on reporters regarding the raid, so Iew details have leaked. The
expert said that Israel appeared to have learned a lesson Irom its experience in destroying the Osiraq
nuclear reactor in Iraq -- that bragging about an operation only makes it easier Ior the world to
condemn it.
Adding to the mystery, Syria has made only muted protests about the raid, and North Korea, which
rarely comments on international matters, swiItly condemned it.
Bruce Reidel, a Iormer intelligence oIIicial at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center, said, "It was a
substantial Israeli operation, but I can't get a good Iix on whether the target was a nuclear thing." He
said there was "a great deal oI skepticism that there's any nuclear angle here" and instead the Iacility
could have been related to chemical or biological weapons.
But other sources who have been monitoring the Middle East said the attack was likely to be against a
transit point Ior Iranian weapons bound Ior Hezbollah in Lebanon.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/15/world/middleeast/15intel.html?Itay
September 15, 2007
U.S. Official Says Syria May Have Nuclear Ties
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 A State Department oIIicial said Friday that the United States had
concerns about Syrias involvement in illicit nuclear activities and suggested that North Korea might be
aiding the Syrians in their eIIorts.
Andrew Semmel, a top oIIicial on countering the spread oI nuclear weapons, said that Syria may have a
number oI secret suppliers Ior a covert nuclear program, and that North Korean technicians were
currently operating inside Syria.
His comments, in an interview with The Associated Press in Rome, came in response to questions
about an Israeli airstrike inside Syria last week. Neither Israel nor the United States has conIirmed what
targets the Israeli jets hit, and the government in Jerusalem has imposed a blanket restriction on the
Israeli news media Irom reporting details about the raid.
American oIIicials have been similarly tight-lipped, and oIIicials who ordinarily see intelligence
reports on such issues say their access has been restricted.
Mr. Semmel did not speciIy whether the technicians in Syria were specialists in nuclear technology;
North Korea has long supplied Syria with missile technology. Some weapons experts said they were
skeptical that Syria was in league with North Korea to build a secret program.
Damascus is not thought to have made serious eIIorts in the past to develop nuclear weapons, and those
experts said it was unlikely that the Syrians could aIIord such a program or had the technical expertise
to sustain it.
The speculation about possible North Korean activities inside Syria is heightening the Bush
administrations concern about the Iuture oI its diplomatic eIIorts to dismantle North Koreas nuclear
program. The Bush administrations top negotiator Ior North Korea, Christopher R. Hill, said that the
United States still planned to go ahead with an agreement Ior Iood and Iuel aid to North Korea in
exchange Ior its decision to dismantle its nuclear program.
Weve always been concerned about the issue oI proliIeration, Mr. Hill told reporters during a news
conIerence at the State Department. To me, this simply is an important reminder oI the need to
accelerate the process which weve already engaged in, to achieve denuclearization oI the Korean
Peninsula.
He declined to say whether the United States had sought a speciIic explanation Irom North Korean
oIIicials, and added that the issue does not change the goal oI what were aiming Ior.
A Bush administration oIIicial said earlier this week that over the past several weeks, Israel had
conducted several aerial surveillance Ilights over Syria to take pictures oI what Israeli oIIicials were
said to believe could be possible nuclear development installations.
North Koreas government took the unusual step oI publicly condemning the Israeli strike. The Chinese
state-run news agency Xinhua cited a North Korean Foreign Ministry oIIicial on Tuesday as calling the
Israeli strike a very dangerous provocation, little short oI wantonly violating the sovereignty oI Syria
and seriously harassing the regional peace and security.
Some who advocate a hard-line stance toward North Korea, including Iormer top Bush administration
oIIicials, said that possible intelligence about North Koreas eIIorts to aid Syria should halt diplomatic
talks with Pyongyang.
It would be a big mistake Ior the State Department to push ahead with the six-party process without
this being resolved, said John R. Bolton, a Iormer United States ambassador to the United Nations,
reIerring to the diplomatic talks with North Korea. They are rushing to Iinish this and declare victory,
which could be a catastrophe Ior the president.

Records on North Korean ship docked in Syria were altered
By Yossi Melman, Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 09:30 16/09/2007
Online databases tracking a ship reportedly Ilying a North Korean Ilag that docked in Syria have
changed their records Iollowing a report in The Washington Post linking the alleged Israeli air strike in
Syria to a North Korean shipment.
Ronen Solomon, who searches inIormation in the public domain Ior companies, told Haaretz he Iound
reIerences to a ship called Al Hamad on three diIIerent Web sites aIter the initial reports oI the Israeli
raid in Syria on September 6. These included the oIIicial sites oI Syria's Tartous Port and the Egyptian
Transportation Ministry.
Two oI the three sites said the ship was Ilying a North Korean Ilag, and the third site reported it was
Ilying a South Korean Ilag.
Haaretz conIirmed Solomon's report.
Saturday, the Washington Post published an article citing an American Mideast expert, who said a
shipment that arrived in Syria three days beIore the alleged Israel Air Forces strike was labeled as
cement, but that Israel believed it carried nuclear equipment.
Following the Washington Post report, Solomon returned to the three sites, and discovered that all
mentions oI the North Korean Ilag on Al Hamad had been deleted, and that the ship's Ilag was now
registered as 'unknown.'
The oIIicial site oI Syria's Tartous Port, www.tartousport.com, had reported that Al Hamad, Ilying a
North Korean Ilag and carrying cement, entered the port on September 3. Solomon stressed that several
North Korean ships docked at Tartous during August.
Syria said IAF planes entered its airspace on September 5.
According to the site, the ship had passed through Tripoli port in Lebanon, Solomon said.
He then Iound a site, www.e-ships.net, that said Al Hamad was registered as a 1,700-ton ship intended
Ior general cargo and Ilying a North Korean Ilag. The ship had been built in 1965 and had had several
owners, according to the site.
In addition, Solomon Iound on the Web site oI Egypt's Transportation Ministry, www.MTS.gov.eg, a
record that Al Hamad had docked in Damietta Port Said in the Nile Delta about a month earlier, on July
28. However, this site registered the ship as Ilying a South Korean Ilag.
Haaretz was able to access the Tartous Port Internet site until Saturday aIternoon, aIter which it went
oIIline Ior several hours
Transcript: Robert Gates on 'FOX News Sunday'
Sunday, September 16, 2007
[EXCERPTS]
WASHINGTON The Iollowing is a partial transcript oI the Sept. 16, 2007, edition oI "FOX News
Sunday With Chris Wallace":
"FOX NEWS SUNDAY" HOST CHRIS WALLACE: Well, with us now to discuss the way Iorward in
Iraq, Iran and other hot spots is the secretary oI deIense, Robert Gates.
[deletia]
WALLACE: Let's turn to another part oI the world. Is Syria involved in a covert nuclear program with
North Korean assistance?
GATES: Well, I'm not going to get into things that may involve intelligence matters, but all I will say is
we are watching the North Koreans very careIully. We watch the Syrians very careIully.
WALLACE: How would we regard that kind oI eIIort both by in terms oI the Syrians and the North
Koreans?
GATES: I think it would be a real problem.
WALLACE: Because?
GATES: II such an activity were taking place, it would be a matter oI great concern, you know,
because the president has put down a very strong marker with the North Koreans about Iurther
proliIeration eIIorts.
And obviously, any eIIort by the Syrians to pursue weapons oI mass destruction would be a concern Ior
us.
WALLACE: And you can give us no conIirmation that, in Iact, they are involved in that kind oI
program?
GATES: Will not address that.
WALLACE: Let me ask you one other question. Was there an Israeli air strike on Syria last week?
GATES: We don't talk about the military operations oI other countries. You'll have to ask the Israelis.
WALLACE: Well, they're not going to answer us, but you can't blame me Ior trying.
[deletia]
This is G o o g l e's cache oI http://www0.un.org/radio/news/html/12872.html as retrieved on Mar 16,
2008 21:02:31 GMT.
No Israeli Bombs Hit Syrian Targets - Syria's UN Ambassador
September 18 [2007]
# Published reports have indicated that Israel jets attacked an alleged nuclear related Iacility in Syria
back on September 6th. Syria's UN Ambassador Bashar JaaIari says the Israeli jets that violated Syrian
airspace retreated when targeted by Syrian air deIenses and did not attack any target in Syria.
Meanwhile, the Secretary-General has expressed concern about the incident and says he's awaiting
clariIication as to what exactly happened. The Syrian Ambassador says Israel has no intention oI
providing the S.G. with that inIormation. The press oIIice at the Israeli mission to the United Nations
says it has no comment on the incident. Two reports by Jerry Piasecki Report 1 - Syrian Ambassador
says Israeli planes did not bomb any target in Syria Report 2 - SG says he is awaiting clariIication on
the incident
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml/news/2007/09/17/wsyria117.xml
N Korean ship 'linked to Israel's strike on Syria'
By Tim Butcher in Jerusalem
Last Updated: 2:31am BST 18/09/2007
A suspicious North Korean Ireighter that re-Ilagged itselI as South Korean beIore oII-loading an
unknown cargo at the Syrian port oI Tartous is at the centre oI eIIorts today to investigate Israel's
recent airstrike on Syria.

An Israeli on-line data analyst, Ronen Solomon, Iound an internet trace Ior the 1,700-tonne cargo ship,
Al Hamed, which showed the vessel started to oII-load what Syrian oIIicials categorised as "cement"
on Sept 3.
This was three days beIore Israeli jets attacked a site in the north eastern desert oI Syria, not Iar Irom
its border with Iraq.
Since leaving Tartous, one oI Syria's main ports on the Mediterranean, the ship's trace has disappeared
and it is not known whether western intelligence agencies are tracking the vessel.
"I became suspicious aIter the Iirst reports Irom Syria about the attack so I traced all traIIic into Syrian
ports in the days prior to the incident," Mr Solomon said.
"There were Iive ships but the interesting one was the one with a connection to North Korea - the Al
Hamed."
He said he cross-reIerred to other maritime databases to establish the ship was not a regular visitor to
the Mediterranean but had come through the Suez Canal in late June.
It had registered itselI Ior the Suez transit as a South Korean vessel but Mr Solomon said this was
standard procedure Ior North Korean ships seeking to avoid international constraints on North Korea.
Records showed the vessel docked at Tartous on July 28 beIore going back to sea and then returning to
the port on Sept 3. "Since then there is no trace so I have no idea iI she has gone up into the Black Sea
or is still in the Mediterranean or whatever," Mr Solomon said.
Israel has not given any details on the operation.
Last week, US oIIicials suggested that North Korea had sought to export some oI its nuclear
technology and equipment to Syria but the Israelis had been tipped oII, so they arranged a pre-emptive
strike on a sensitive shipment.
Mr Solomon said the Al Hamed was owned by a North Korean business until a Iew months ago when
ownership changed hands to an as yet unidentiIied new owner.
Rumor about "Secret Nuclear Cooperation" between DPRK and Syria Dismissed
Pyongyang, September 18 |2007| (KCNA) -- A spokesman Ior the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the
Iollowing answer to a question put by KCNA today as regards the rumor about "secret nuclear
cooperation" between the DPRK and Syria spread by some media oI the United States:
Recently, the New York Times and some other media oI the United States spread the rumor about
the DPRK's secret nuclear cooperation with Syria. This is sheer misinIormation.
The DPRK solemnly declared in October 2006 that, being a responsible nuclear weapons state, it
would never allow nuclear transIer, and has stood by its words.
The DPRK never makes an empty talk but always tells truth.
The above-said story is nothing but a clumsy plot hatched by the dishonest Iorces who do not like to
see any progress at the six-party talks and in the DPRK-U.S. relations.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/7004209.stm
Netanyahu 'admits Israeli strike'
Last Updated: Thursday, 20 September 2007, 09:55 GMT 10:55 UK
The Israeli opposition leader, Binyamin Netanyahu, has made the Iirst apparent admission oI Israel's
involvement in an alleged air strike against Syria.
In a live interview on Israeli TV, Mr Netanyahu said he had congratulated Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
on the raid.
"I was a partner in the issue Irom the start, and I gave my backing," he said.
Mr Netanyahu was criticised Ior his remarks, aIter Israel had maintained an oIIicial policy oI silence on
the reported incident two weeks ago.
Speaking on Channel 1 news, Mr Netanyahu said: "When a prime minister does something that is
important in my view and necessary to Israel's security... I give my backing."
When asked iI he had personally congratulated Mr Olmert on the operation, Mr Netanyahu said: "Yes".
But the Likud party leader reIused to give details oI the attack.
Labour party secretary general Eitan Cabel told state radio: "I have no idea iI this was stupidity, Iolly or
a desire to steal credit.
"This is simply very dangerous conduct and the man is not worthy oI leading."
Likud MP Yuval Steinitz said the remarks "were not wise".
Rising tensions
Damascus says Israeli warplanes violated Syrian airspace in the north oI the country on 6 September,
and describe the incident as a "hostile act".
The Syrian authorities say that the aircraIt were Iorced away and that they Iired their weaponry into a
deserted area. Witnesses said the Israeli jets had been engaged by Syrian air deIences in Tall al-Abyad,
north oI Raqqa and near the border with Turkey.
The Syrian government has brieIed Western diplomats and complained to the United Nations.
US oIIicials have indicated that at least one target in northern Syria was hit.
Israel and Syria technically remain at war and tensions between them have been rising in recent
months.
The Syrian government has insisted that peace talks can be resumed only on the basis oI Israel
returning the Golan Heights, which it seized in 1967.
Israeli authorities, Ior their part, have demanded that Syria abandon its support Ior Palestinian and
Lebanese militant groups beIore talks can begin.
The last peace talks between the two countries broke down in 2000.
Story Irom BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/Ir/-/2/hi/middleeast/7004209.stm
Published: 2007/09/20 09:55:45 GMT
http://www.It.com/cms/s/0/4I50eeI6-67a3-11dc-8906-0000779Id2ac.html
US feared N Korea-Syria link before Israeli strike
By Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington
Published: September 20 2007 22:04 , Last updated: September 20 2007 22:04
The US had concerns about potential nuclear-related co-operation between North Korea and Syria
beIore recently receiving Israeli intelligence on the issue that Israel reportedly used to justiIy an air
strike inside Syria.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli opposition leader, on Thursday appeared to conIirm reports that Israeli
Iighter jets had earlier this month launched strikes inside Syria, which US and Israeli media reported
were due to concerns that North Korea was helping Syria develop a clandestine nuclear programme.
One senior US oIIicial said Washington had Ior some time possessed intelligence about potential
nuclear co-operation between the two countries.
While declining to outline the speciIic intelligence, the US oIIicial said North Korea would have to
address the concerns as part oI the declaration oI nuclear activities that Pyongyang is required to make
to complete the current stage oI the six-party talks aimed at denuclearising the Korean peninsula.
The US hopes to complete the stage this year and talks may resume in Beijing next week aIter North
Korea reIused to return to the table this week.
President George W. Bush on Thursday declined to make any comment on the Israeli attack.
But when asked whether North Korea was helping Syria with a nuclear programme, he said the US
would continue to make clear to North Korea that we expect them to honour their commitment to give
up weapons and weapons programs and, to the extent that they are proliIerating, we expect them to stop
their proliIeration iI they want the six-party talks to be successIul.
The US oIIicial said the administration had made a strategic decision not to raise the issue more
IorceIully early on in the six-party talks which include China, Japan, South Korea and Russia to
avoid scuppering the possibility oI a successIul outcome because oI a Kelly situation.
Negotiations between North Korea and the US broke down in late 2002 aIter James Kelly, the then top
State Department oIIicial Ior east Asian aIIairs, conIronted Pyongyang over its alleged uranium nuclear
programme. Three months later, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal Irom the nuclear non-
proliIeration treaty.
The scant inIormation provided by administration oIIicials about the alleged nuclear co-operation has
prompted scepticism by experts on the claims that Syria is developing a clandestine nuclear
programme, with or without the help oI North Korea.
It is highly unlikely that the Israeli attack had anything to do with signiIicant Syrian-North Korean
nuclear co-operation, said Joseph Cirincione, director Ior nuclear policy at the Center Ior American
Progress. The basic, well-documented Iact is that the 40-year-old Syrian nuclear research programme
is too basic to support any weapons capability.
Universities have larger nuclear programmes than Syria.Most experts have suggested that Israel was
much more likely to have targeted some a Iacility related toIor conventional weapons or missiles, over
which North Korea and Syria have co-operated in the past.
I would be very, very surprised iI the North Koreans were dumb enough to transIer Iissile material to
Syria or were trying to do work outside oI North Korea in a place like Syria, said Michael Green, a
Iormer senior Asia adviser to Mr Bush who is now at the Center Ior Strategic and International Studies.
The transIer oI Iissile material in the wake oI President Bushs public statement aIter the nuclear test
would be extremely dangerous Ior North Korea and not worth the risk.
Talks Held between WPK and Syrian Political Party
Pyongyang, September 21 |2007| (KCNA) -- Talks were held between Choe Thae Bok, secretary oI
the C.C., the Workers' Party oI Korea, and Saaeed Eleia Dawood, director oI the Organizational
Department oI Syria's Baath Arab Socialist Party, on September 21.
Present at the talks were oIIicials concerned Irom the DPRK side and the director's party and the
Syrian charge d'aIIaires ad interim here Irom the Syrian side.
At the talks both sides inIormed each other oI activities oI their parties and exchanged views on the
issue oI boosting the Iriendly and cooperative ties between the two parties and a series oI issues oI
bilateral interest.
The talks proceeded in a Iriendly atmosphere.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/20/AR2007092002701.html
Israel, U.S. Shared Data On Suspected Nuclear Site
Bush Was Told oI North Korean Presence in Syria, Sources Say
By Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright
Washington Post StaII Writers
Friday, September 21, 2007; A01
Israel's decision to attack Syria on Sept. 6, bombing a suspected nuclear site set up in apparent
collaboration with North Korea, came aIter Israel shared intelligence with President Bush this summer
indicating that North Korean nuclear personnel were in Syria, U.S. government sources said.
The Bush administration has not commented on the Israeli raid or the underlying intelligence. Although
the administration was deeply troubled by Israel's assertion that North Korea was assisting the nuclear
ambitions oI a country closely linked with Iran, sources said, the White House opted against an
immediate response because oI concerns it would undermine long-running negotiations aimed at
persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
Ultimately, however, the United States is believed to have provided Israel with some corroboration oI
the original intelligence beIore Israel proceeded with the raid, which hit the Syrian Iacility in the dead
oI night to minimize possible casualties, the sources said.
The target oI Israel's attack was said to be in northern Syria, near the Turkish border. A Middle East
expert who interviewed one oI the pilots involved said they operated under such strict operational
security that the airmen Ilying air cover Ior the attack aircraIt did not know the details oI the mission.
The pilots who conducted the attack were brieIed only aIter they were in the air, he said. Syrian
authorities said there were no casualties.
U.S. sources would discuss the Israeli intelligence, which included satellite imagery, only on condition
oI anonymity, and many details about the North Korean-Syrian connection remain unknown. The
quality oI the Israeli intelligence, the extent oI North Korean assistance and the seriousness oI the
Syrian eIIort are uncertain, raising the possibility that North Korea was merely unloading items it no
longer needed. Syria has actively pursued chemical weapons in the past but not nuclear arms -- leaving
some proliIeration experts skeptical oI the intelligence that prompted Israel's attack.
Syria and North Korea both denied this week that they were cooperating on a nuclear program. Bush
reIused to comment yesterday on the attack, but he issued a blunt warning to North Korea that "the
exportation oI inIormation and/or materials" would aIIect negotiations under which North Korea would
give up its nuclear programs in exchanges Ior energy aid and diplomatic recognition.
"To the extent that they are proliIerating, we expect them to stop that proliIeration, iI they want the six-
party talks to be successIul," he said at a news conIerence, reIerring to negotiations that also include
China, Japan, South Korea and Russia.
Unlike its destruction oI an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, Israel made no announcement oI the recent
raid and imposed strict censorship on reporting by the Israeli media. Syria made only muted protests,
and Arab leaders have remained silent. As a result, a daring and apparently successIul attack to
eliminate a potential nuclear threat has been shrouded in mystery.
"There is no question it was a major raid. It was an extremely important target," said Bruce Riedel, a
Iormer intelligence oIIicer at Brookings Institution's Saban Center Ior Middle East Policy. "It came at a
time the Israelis were very concerned about war with Syria and wanted to dampen down the prospects
oI war. The decision was taken despite their concerns it could produce a war. That decision reIlects
how important this target was to Israeli military planners."
Israel has long known about Syria's interest in chemical and even biological weapons, but "iI Syria
decided to go beyond that, Israel would think that was a real red line," Riedel said.
Edward Djerejian, a Iormer U.S. ambassador to Syria and Iounding director oI Rice University's Baker
Institute Ior Public Policy, said that when he was in Israel this summer he noticed "a great deal oI
concern in oIIicial Israeli circles about the situation in the north," in particular whether Syria's young
ruler, Bashar al-Assad, "had the same sensitivity to red lines that his Iather had." Bashar succeeded his
HaIez al-Assad as president oI Syria in 2000.
The Israeli attack came just three days aIter a North Korean ship docked at the Syrian port oI Tartus,
carrying a cargo that was oIIicially listed as cement.
The ship's role remains obscure. Israeli sources have suggested it carried nuclear equipment. Others
have maintained that it contained only missile parts, and some have said the ship's arrival and the attack
are merely coincidental. One source suggested that Israel's attack was prompted by a Iear oI media
leaks on the intelligence.
The Bush administration's wariness when presented with the Israeli intelligence contrasts with its
reaction in 2002, when U.S. oIIicials believed they had caught North Korea building a clandestine
nuclear program in violation oI a nuclear-Ireeze deal arranged by the Clinton administration.
AIter the Bush administration's accusation, the Clinton deal collapsed and North Korea restarted a
nuclear reactor, stockpiled plutonium and eventually conducted a nuclear test. Secretary oI State
Condoleezza Rice convinced Bush this year to accept a deal with North Korea to shut down the reactor,
inIuriating conservatives inside and outside the administration.
But Ior years, Bush has also warned North Korea against engaging in nuclear proliIeration, speciIically
making that a red line that could not be crossed aIter North Korea tested a nuclear device last year. The
Israeli intelligence thereIore suggested North Korea was both undermining the agreement and crossing
that line.
Conservative critics oI the administration's recent diplomacy with North Korea have seized on reports
oI the Israeli intelligence as evidence that the White House is misguided iI it thinks it can ever strike a
lasting deal with Pyongyang. "However bad it might be Ior the six-party talks, U.S. security requires
taking this sort oI thing seriously," said John R. Bolton, the Iormer U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations who was a top arms control oIIicial in Bush's Iirst term.
But advocates oI engagement have accused critics oI trying to sabotage the talks. China on Monday
abruptly postponed a round oI six-party talks scheduled to begin this week, but U.S. oIIicials now say
the talks should start again Thursday.
Some North Korean experts said they are puzzled why, iI the reports are true, Pyongyang would
jeopardize the hard-won deal with the United States and the other Iour countries. "It does not make any
sense at all in the context oI the last nine months," said Charles "Jack" Pritchard, a Iormer U.S.
negotiator with North Korea and now president oI the Korea Economic Institute.
http://wexler.house.gov/apps/list/press/Il19wexler/092107israelsyria.shtml
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 21, 2007
Contact: Josh Rogin
Phone: (202) 225-3001

Congressman Wexler Introduces Resolution Supporting
Israeli Air Strike on Syria
(Washington, DC) Today, Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman oI the Subcommittee on
Europe and a senior member oI the House Foreign AIIairs Committee, announced that he will
introduce a resolution on September 24 supporting Israels right to security and selI deIense and its
recent covert military operation on September 6 that appears to have successIully eliminated an alleged
nuclear weapons Iacility in Syria. The resolution also condemns the Syrian government Ior its
cooperation with North Korea in the development oI chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Finally, the resolution condemns Syria Ior continuing to provide military, logistical and political
assistance to the terrorist organization Hezbollah in violation oI United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1701. The Iull text oI the resolution is attached below.
Over the past several decades, Syria has acquired an advanced deadly arsenal oI chemical weapons and
surIace-to-surIace missiles, and has reportedly conducted research and development in biological
weapons. According to a September 20 Washington Institute Policy Watch Report, Syria has binary-
type and cluster-bomblet chemical warheads Ior all its major missile systems, as well as thousands oI
bombs Iilled with the nerve agents sarin and possibly VX. Additionally, it is reported that Syria
currently possesses about 200 Scud-Bs, 60-120 Scud-Cs, and a smaller number oI Scud-Ds as well as
the Soviet SS-21 missile with a 70-kilometer range, and large numbers oI domestically produced 220-
millimeter and 302-millimeter artillery rockets with ranges oI 70 and 100 kilometers, respectively.
A Syria with nuclear weapons is an unacceptable threat to the United States, Israel and international
community and would Iurther destabilize the Middle East, Congressman Wexler said. Israels recent
military action was eIIective and absolutely appropriate given the growing threat Irom Syria. Congress
should go on record supporting this justiIied operation. It is critical that the international community
immediately address Syrias massive buildup oI deadly weapons oI mass destruction and urge
Damascus to end its support Ior terrorist organizations such Hezbollah and Hamas
Congressman Wexler is Chairman oI the Europe Subcommittee, a senior member oI the House
Committee on Foreign AIIairs and the House Judiciary Committee, and he also sits on the Financial
Services Committee.
Expressing the unequivocal support oI the House oI Representatives Ior Israels right to selI deIense in
the Iace oI an imminent nuclear or military threat Irom Syria.
Whereas on September 6, 2007, the Government oI Israel justiIiably conducted covert military
operations in Syria, bombing a suspected nuclear Iacility;
Whereas in 1981, Israeli DeIense Forces attacked and destroyed the nuclear reactor at Osirak, Iraq,
preventing Saddam Hussein Irom developing nuclear weapons;
Whereas on September 6, 2007, it is reported that as many as 8 Israeli Air Force Iighter jets struck a
Syrian nuclear weapons Iacility; Whereas it has been reported that Syria is pursuing nuclear capabilities
in addition to its already dangerous biological and chemical weapons programs;
Whereas according to a 2004 unclassiIied Central Intelligence Agency report on Syria, Pakistani
investigators said that they had conIirmation oI an IAEA allegation that A.Q. Khan oIIered nuclear
technology and hardware to Syria.;
Whereas reports suggest that the Syrian Government is working closely with the North Korean
Government to develop a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Andrew Semmel, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary oI State Ior Nuclear NonproliIeration
Policy, said Syria may have had contacts with secret suppliers to obtain nuclear equipment Ior a
covert program and that North Korean technicians are currently operating in Syria;
Whereas the United States military and intelligence community have tracked several shipments oI
material they believe have leIt North Korea and are destined Ior Syria that may contain high-grade
metals that could be used in weapons such as missiles or solid-Iuel rocket technology;
Whereas it is reported that Syrian leaders have threatened Israel claiming that Syria has a big surprise
in store Ior Israel in 2007;
Whereas over the past three decades, Syria has acquired a deadly arsenal oI chemical weapons and
surIace-to-surIace missiles and has reportedly conducted research and development in biological
weapons;
Whereas according to the Department oI State, Syria has missiles capable oI striking anywhere in Israel
and may be seeking to place a nuclear warhead on Scud-C missiles it possesses;
Whereas the Government oI Syria has disclosed that an explosion occurred at a secret military Iacility
in Aleppo in July 2007, while attempting to weapon is a Scud-C missile with mustard gas, reportedly
killing 15 people and injuring 50;
Whereas Syria continues to provide logistical and political assistance to the terrorist organization
Hezbollah and is the main conduit Ior the transIer oI sophisticated rockets and other arms to Hezbollah
units in violation oI United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701;
Whereas Syria has been designated by the Department oI State as a sponsor oI international terrorism;
and
Whereas the Government oI Syrias continued support Ior international terrorist organizations and its
possession oI weapons oI mass destruction represent an imminent threat to the United States, Israel,
and United States allies in the Middle East:
Now, thereIore, be it Resolved, That the House oI Representatives
(1) expresses its unequivocal support Ior Israels right to selI deIense in the Iace oI an imminent
nuclear or military threat Irom Syria;
(2) reaIIirms Americas unbreakable bond with Israel and pledges to continue to work with Prime
Minister Olmert and his government to ensure that Israel continues to receive critical military and
economic assistance needed to address the growing security threat oI Syria and Iran;
(3) condemns the Government oI Syria Ior its continued support oI terrorism and its illicit chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons activities, including close cooperation with the Government oI North
Korea;
(4) condemns the Government oI North Korea Ior providing Syria with technology, expertise, and
materials to develop nuclear weapons;
(5) condemns Syria and Iran Ior continuing to provide military, logistical, and political support to
Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups;
(6) urges President George W. Bush to condemn the Government oI North Korea Ior providing Syria
with nuclear technology and expertise and to reexamine diplomatic discussions with North Korean
oIIicials in light oI nuclear cooperation between Damascus and Pyongyang; and
(7) urges President Bush and his Administration to support strengthening United States sanctions
against Syria.
###
Congressman Wexler is Chairman oI the Europe Subcommittee and a senior member oI the House
Committee on Foreign AIIairs and the House Judiciary Committee; and he also sits on the Financial
Services Committee.
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/hr674ih.xml
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 674
Expressing the unequivocal support oI the House oI Representatives Ior Israels right to selI
deIense in the Iace oI an imminent nuclear or military threat Irom Syria.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 24, 2007
Mr. Wexler (Ior himselI, Mr. Engel, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Burton oI Indiana, Mr. Linder, Mr. Brady oI
Pennsylvania, and Mr. Renzi) submitted the Iollowing resolution; which was reIerred to the Committee
on Foreign AIIairs
RESOLUTION
Expressing the unequivocal support oI the House oI Representatives Ior Israels right to selI
deIense in the Iace oI an imminent nuclear or military threat Irom Syria.
Whereas on September 6, 2007, the Government oI Israel justiIiably conducted covert military
operations in Syria, bombing a suspected nuclear Iacility;
Whereas in 1981, Israeli DeIense Forces attacked and destroyed the nuclear reactor at Osirak, Iraq,
preventing Saddam Hussein Irom developing nuclear weapons;
Whereas on September 6, 2007, it is reported that as many as 8 Israeli Air Force Iighter jets struck a
Syrian nuclear weapons Iacility;
Whereas it has been reported that Syria is pursuing nuclear capabilities in addition to its already
dangerous biological and chemical weapons programs;
Whereas according to a 2004 unclassiIied Central Intelligence Agency report on Syria, Pakistani
investigators said that they had conIirmation oI an IAEA allegation that A.Q. Khan oIIered nuclear
technology and hardware to Syria.;
Whereas reports suggest that the Syrian Government is working closely with the North Korean
Government to develop a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Andrew Semmel, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary oI State Ior Nuclear NonproliIeration
Policy, said Syria may have had contacts with secret suppliers to obtain nuclear equipment Ior a
covert program and that North Korean technicians are currently operating in Syria;
Whereas the United States military and intelligence community have tracked several shipments oI
material they believe have leIt North Korea and are destined Ior Syria that may contain high-grade
metals that could be used in weapons such as missiles or solid-Iuel rocket technology;
Whereas it is reported that Syrian leaders have threatened Israel claiming that Syria has a big
surprise in store Ior Israel in 2007;
Whereas over the past three decades, Syria has acquired a deadly arsenal oI chemical weapons and
surIace-to-surIace missiles and has reportedly conducted research and development in biological
weapons;
Whereas according to the Department oI State, Syria has missiles capable oI striking anywhere in
Israel and may be seeking to place a nuclear warhead on Scud-C missiles it possesses;
Whereas the Government oI Syria has disclosed that an explosion occurred at a secret military
Iacility in Aleppo in July 2007, while attempting to weaponize a Scud-C missile with mustard gas,
reportedly killing 15 people and injuring 50;
Whereas Syria continues to provide logistical and political assistance to the terrorist organization
Hezbollah and is the main conduit Ior the transIer oI sophisticated rockets and other arms to Hezbollah
units in violation oI United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701;
Whereas Syria has been designated by the Department oI State as a sponsor oI international
terrorism; and
Whereas the Government oI Syrias continued support Ior international terrorist organizations and
its possession oI weapons oI mass destruction represent an imminent threat to the United States, Israel,
and United States allies in the Middle East: Now, thereIore, be it
Resolved, That the House oI Representatives
(1) expresses its unequivocal support Ior Israels right to selI deIense in the Iace oI an imminent
nuclear or military threat Irom Syria;
(2) reaIIirms Americas unbreakable bond with Israel and pledges to continue to work with Prime
Minister Olmert and his government to ensure that Israel continues to receive critical military and
economic assistance needed to address the growing security threat oI Syria and Iran;
(3) condemns the Government oI Syria Ior its continued support oI terrorism and its illicit chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons activities, including close cooperation with the Government oI North
Korea;
(4) condemns the Government oI North Korea Ior providing Syria with technology, expertise, and
materials to develop nuclear weapons;
(5) condemns Syria and Iran Ior continuing to provide military, logistical, and political support to
Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups;
(6) urges President George W. Bush to condemn the Government oI North Korea Ior providing
Syria with nuclear technology and expertise and to reexamine diplomatic discussions with North
Korean oIIicials in light oI nuclear cooperation between Damascus and Pyongyang; and

(7) urges President Bush and his Administration to support strengthening United States sanctions
against Syria, including additional sanctions under the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act oI 2003 (Public Law 108175).
http://www.Iorward.com/articles/11715/
Congress Throws Covert Israeli Attack on Syria Out Into the Open
Florida Rep. Robert Wexler: This Is the Worlds Worst-Kept Secret
Nathan Guttman
Wed. Sep 26, 2007
Washington - As Israel and the United States struggle to maintain a veil oI ambiguity over Israels
alleged air strike against Syria earlier this month, Congress is bringing the issue out into the open and
giving American sanction to an event that now seems all but conIirmed.
Democrat Robert Wexler Irom Florida introduced a resolution this week supporting Israels covert
operation and backing the countrys right to deIend itselI in the Iace oI an imminent nuclear or
military threat Irom Syria.
This is the worlds worst-kept secret, Wexler told the Forward this week, stressing that his proposed
resolution did not reveal anything that wasnt already reported in the world press.
With the lack oI any oIIicial American or Israeli comment on the alleged air strike, Congress has
become the leading voice in debating and promoting public discussion on the issue. A congressional
source told the Forward that both the administration and Israel had expressed no opposition to having
Congress play this role and that they did not ask lawmakers to abide by the rule oI secrecy that both
governments imposed on themselves.
The congressional source said that oIIicials in the administration have conIirmed in private
conversations that the attack indeed took place. The source also said that in general terms, the reports
are right, reIerring to media reports describing Israels target in Syria.
Ranking minority member on the House Foreign AIIairs Committee Ileana Ros-Lehtinen also took on
the issue oI the Israeli attack on Syria, which according to reports was aimed at nuclear devices that
Syria received Irom North Korea. According to Ros-Lehtinens proposal, Pyongyang will not be
removed Irom Americas list oI countries sponsoring terror until it stops supplying Damascus with
nuclear technology. Both resolutions are now in the process oI collecting co-sponsors and are expected
to be reIerred to the Ioreign aIIairs committee.
According to Wexler, who is a strong backer oI Israel and a member oI the Ioreign aIIairs committee,
congressional support Ior the Israeli attack is needed, since it will pose an obvious contrast to the
lack oI action on behalI oI Congress when Israel attacked an Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad in
1981, eIIectively putting an end to the Iraqi nuclear program.
Wexler added that he is pushing Iorward the resolution, also, in order to make clear to Syria that it will
have no support iI it attempts to complain about Israel at the United Nations or any other international
Iorum.
According to Wexler, the Israeli operation has an important positive impact on America since Israel
has proactively negated what is seen as a Syrian nuclear eIIort.
Israel and the United States are in accord on issues relating to the covert action in Syria and on the need
to reIrain Irom any public aIIirmation oI the attack, diplomatic sources said. The Washington Post
reported last week that Israel had shared intelligence with the United States aIter Iirst learning about the
nuclear ties between Syria and North Korea.
Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, who is now with the Washington Institute Ior Near East
Policy, wrote this week in a New Republic op-ed that the attack not only took care oI a potential
nuclear threat but also restored Israels deterrence in the region.
In eIIect, Ross wrote, |the Israeli raid| tells President Assad that Syria has Iew secrets it can keep
Irom Israel. For a conspiratorial and paranoid regime, this is bound to keep its leaders preoccupied
internally trying to Iigure out what Israel knows and doesnt know.
While showing silent support Ior Israels action, the administration is also extending an olive branch to
Damascus by inviting its representatives to participate in the upcoming Middle East peace conIerence,
scheduled Ior mid-November in Washington. The invitation was not conveyed directly to Syria, but
rather to all countries that belong to an Arab League committee on advancing the Arab peace initiative.
The notion oI Syria attending the peace conIerence was shot down the next day, when Syrian oIIicials
said that their country will not take part in the event. Israeli sources said that Jerusalem has no say on
who attends the conIerence, as long as the basic ground rules oI recognizing Israel and renouncing
terror are kept.
Scott Lasensky, a Middle East scholar at the United States Institute oI Peace, said that the seemingly
contradictory signals Washington is sending Damascus are yet another sign oI the lack oI coherent
policy toward Syria.
There is no overall strategy regarding Syria, said Lasensky, who co-authored a study calling Ior a
reassessment oI the American approach to Syria. The study calls Ior a more robust policy that will
include not only coercion but also engagement, and that will, among other measures, reconsider the
Syrian peace oIIer to Israel based on its merits.
This peace oIIer, Iorwarded by President Bashar al-Assad several times in the past year, appears now to
be oII the table. Reuters news agency quoted an unnamed Syrian oIIicial this week as saying that the
Israeli Air Force attack on September 6 had ruined chances Ior peace.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo907662&contrassID1&subContrassID5
Hillary Clinton says she supports 'apparent' IAF action in Syria
By Haaretz Service
Last update - 07:18 28/09/2007
New York Senator Hillary Clinton said on Wednesday evening |26 September 2007| that she supports
what she said was the Israel Air Force's "apparent" action against a nuclear Iacility in Syria.
Clinton spoke during a televised debate Ior the leading candidates vying Ior the Democratic nomination
Ior U.S. president.
The candidates largely evaded questions on the incident, on which Ioreign media has speculated but
Israel remains quiet. The moderator oI the debate, Tim Russert oI NBC, raised the issue oI Syria when
asking whether the candidates would support an Israeli strike on Iran, should it acquire nuclear
capabilities.
Clinton called the question "hypothetical," and told Russert, "That's better not addressed at this time,"
despite Russert's repeated attempts to extract an answer on whether a nuclear Iran would warrant an
Israeli attack.
However, she went on to say, "We don't have as much inIormation as we wish we did. But what we
think we know is that with North Korean help, both Iinancial and technical and material, the Syrians
apparently were putting together, and perhaps over some period oI years, a nuclear Iacility, and the
Israelis took it out. I strongly support that."
The senator Irom New York also backed up reports, Iirst exposed by The Washington Post two weeks
ago, that that the IAF targeted a North Korean shipment oI nuclear material that arrived in Syria three
days beIore the strike.
"There was evidence oI a North Korea Ireighter coming in with supplies. There was intelligence and
other kinds oI veriIication," Clinton said.
She went on to emphasize that she had no other inIormation on the incident because oI its "highly
classiIied" nature.
Obama and Edwards were less Iorthcoming in their responses. On Syria, Obama said only, "We don't
know exactly what happened." He said that the United States is a "stalwart ally oI Israel," but added
only that diplomatic means must be pursued to prevent Iran Irom acquiring nuclear capability. Edwards
did not mention Israel, but spoke vehemently against authorizing U.S. President Bush to pursue nuclear
action in Iran
http://www.un.org/radio/story.asp?NewsID7859
Foreign Minister of Syria Says Tensions Are Escalating in Middle East
01/10/2007
Another country in the region, Syria, says that the Middle East continues to be an arena oI daunting
challenges and heightened tensions as a result oI the continued Israeli occupation oI Arab territories.
Addressing the General Assembly today, Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moualem, said this is not a
new development, but the challenges and tensions are escalating, threatening security and stability
throughout the region.
Foreign Minister Al-Moualem said the latest act oI Israeli aggression against Syria on September 6th
was prooI oI Israel's desire to escalate tension:
"We reiterate that the Iailure oI the international community, including the Security Council, to
condemn this act oI aggression would encourage Israel to persist in this hostile pursuit, and lead to an
exacerbation oI tensions in the region."
The Foreign Minister oI Syria said his country has repeatedly stressed that peace was its strategic
choice.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/7026003.stm
Analysis: Syria-Israel tensions
By Lyse Doucet
BBC News, Damascus
Last Updated: Wednesday, 3 October 2007, 13:18 GMT 14:18 UK
The secret is out. But the speculation has not ended. And the tension lingers dangerously.
Israel has suddenly broken its exceptional news blackout on a covert air raid against Syria, admitting
oIIicially its warplanes hit a "military installation" on 6 September.
This unexpected disclosure, aIter weeks oI mysterious silence, came hours aIter the Iirst public
comments Irom Syria's President Bashar al-Assad.
He ended his silence in a BBC interview, saying Israeli jets hit "a building under construction related to
the military but it's not used, it's under construction so there's no people in it, there's no army, there's
nothing in it".
Regional views on conference
So now it is oIIicial, on both sides. But speculation over exactly what was hit continues to create
ripples in capitals around the world.
Was it a suspected nuclear site established with North Korean help? Had Pyongang tried to dispose oI
some nuclear material to evade the inspectors? Maybe it was a Hezbollah arms cache? Or perhaps a test
oI Syria's new air deIences?
'Propaganda'
Why, I asked the president, would Israel carry out such a high-risk raid iI it was not such a high-value
target?
President Assad just batted the incongruity away. And, as always in the Middle East, history provided
the answers.
"The propaganda reminds us," he said, "oI what happened beIore the war in Iraq when they showed all
the concrete evidence that Iraq had nuclear weapons or weapons oI mass destruction which turned out
not to have existed at all."
But Israel clearly sent a message to Damascus. Did Damascus get it?
The Iact President Assad decided to give a rare interview suggested he had a message or two he also
wanted to pass on.
What did Israel's raid tell him? That Israel had "a Iundamental, visceral antipathy towards peace".
But Israel has also been sending messages to try to bring down the temperature.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert even went so Iar recently as to oIIer a rare compliment to Mr
Assad, saying "we have respect Ior the Syrian leader and the Syrian conduct".
President Assad seemed embarrassed by the personal praise.
Neither peace nor war
In his interview, he spoke oI a time oI "non-peace and non-war" in a region where it had to be "either
peace or war... there is no third option".
And yet, despite his Iirm assertion that Syria reserved the right to retaliate, Mr Assad's responses
underlined a recognition oI the dangers oI military escalation.
"Retaliate doesn't mean missile Ior missile and bomb Ior bomb... this is the last option," he said.
One source in Damascus said Israel had made it absolutely clear its riposte to any Syrian strike would
be "devastating".
But that has not stopped intense debate, in coIIee shops and the corridors oI power on both sides, about
a possible strike by Syria or Israel - or an accidental war, a miscalculation when mistrust and
misunderstanding run so deep.
Continuing strains
Ever since last year's punishing war in Lebanon both sides have spoken oI their readiness Ior peace but
they've also reinIorced their deIences along the occupied Golan Heights. Damascus wants this territory
back as part oI any peace deal.
Syria is known to have acquired better long-range missiles and upgraded its air deIences with Russian
and Iranian help.
So that leaves them in that sensitive "non-war, non-peace" situation.
Months ago, all talk was oI a summer war or a return to the peace talks broken oII in 2000.
But in June, US President George W Bush made it clear to Ehud Olmert that Israel did not need
Washington's approval to talk to Damascus.
That, said Mr Assad, conIirmed there was no point in talking.
"From our experience oI 16 years oI a peace process, the main Iactor is the US administration," he said.
Continuing strains between the US and Syria mean the Bush team has no interest in going down this
track.
Incomplete picture
On an earlier trip to Damascus, as the blistering seasonal heat began to ease, I commented to a Syrian
Iriend that the "summer war" had also not materialised.
"Oh," she answered, "but there could be an autumn war."
And then came the Israeli air strike.
So Mr Assad, like his Iather HaIez al-Assad, seems resigned to the "long game" because oI what he
calls "the realities".
He clearly Ieels he has his own cards to play, not least Syria's relationship with a range oI militant
Palestinian and other Arab groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon.
There are some signs Damascus has been trying to use its inIluence more positively to reduce tensions
but not enough to please most oI its critics.
"They can't isolate Syria," he insisted.
So this week, a Iew more pieces oI this latest Middle East puzzle were put in place.
But as long as there are big black holes in this jigsaw, people will continue to Iill them with their own
pieces, whether or not they really Iit. This means everyone will continue to see a diIIerent picture - and
that is dangerous.
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/story?id3695754
High Level Debate Stalled Syria Air Strike
U.S. Was Concerned Over Intelligence, Stability to Region, OIIicials Tell ABC News
Oct. 5, 2007
The September Israeli airstrike on a suspected nuclear site in Syria had been in the works Ior months,
ABC News has learned, and was delayed only at the strong urging oI the United States.
In early July the Israelis presented the United States with satellite imagery that they said showed a
nuclear Iacility in Syria. They had additional evidence that they said showed that some oI the
technology was supplied by North Korea.
One U.S. oIIicial told ABC's Martha Raddatz the material was "jaw dropping" because it raised
questions as to why U.S. intelligence had not previously picked up on the Iacility.
OIIicials said that the Iacility had likely been there Ior months iI not years.
"Israel tends to be very thorough about its intelligence coverage, particularly when it takes a major
military step, so they would not have acted without data Irom several sources," said ABC military
consultant Tony Cordesman.
U.S. Cautious After Flawed Iraq Intelligence
A senior U.S. oIIicial said the Israelis planned to strike during the week oI July 14 and in secret high-
level meetings American oIIicials argued over how to respond to the intelligence.
Some in the administration supported the Israeli action, but others, notably Sect. oI State Condoleeza
Rice did not. One senior oIIicial said the U.S. convinced the Israelis to "conIront Syria beIore
attacking."
OIIicials said they were concerned about the impact an attack on Syria would have on the region. And
given the proIound consequences oI the Ilawed intelligence in Iraq, the U.S. wanted to be absolutely
certain the intelligence was accurate.
Initially, administration oIIicials convinced the Israelis to call oII the July strike. But in September the
Israelis Ieared that news oI the site was about to leak and went ahead with the strike despite U.S.
concerns.
The airstrike was so highly classiIied, President Bush reIused to acknowledge it publicly even aIter the
bombs Iell.
ABC's Martha Raddatz Iiled this report Ior "World News With Charles Gibson."
North Korean Mystery
By Jim Hoagland
Sunday, October 7, 2007; B07
Two big questions hang over the new agreement to contain North Korea's nuclear weapons program at
its current level -- whatever that level is.
Why has a secretive government addicted to power politics and Ilexing its military muscles abruptly
turned to negotiations and peaceIul compromise?
And why is North Korea doing the same?
The Bush administration, oI course, cannot match Kim Jong Il's regime in paranoia, bellicosity and
inIormation control, although this White House seems at times to have been tempted to try. Other
countries know next to nothing about Pyongyang's motivations, intentions or even its ability to carry
out any agreement it makes.
This deepens the Washington end oI this great strategic mystery: Why is President Bush accepting the
promises oI a regime he has regularly excoriated -- at a time when oIIicials in his administration make
a credible case that North Korea has just been caught helping Syria with nuclear technology?
North Korea's desperation as its economy implodes and its people starve is clearly part oI the answer.
Pyongyang's plight has helped U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill get an agreement that he believes can
be veriIied and enIorced. Timing is also everything Ior Bush, who is reaching Ior diplomatic successes
beIore his presidency ends.
There are months oI quibbling ahead over the diIIerences between "disabling" and "dismantling" North
Korea's plutonium production Iacilities and other points in the agreement. But Hill appears to have
pulled the hermit nation oI North Korea into an international process that careIully calibrates risks and
rewards on both sides.
A crucial provision oI the six-nation accord announced in Beijing on Wednesday requires Pyongyang
to declare the extent oI its weapons-grade plutonium stockpile, including the amount it used in a
nuclear test last year.
U.S. oIIicials have estimated that North Korea could make 10 to 12 bombs Irom its existing stockpile.
But the actual number is smaller -- perhaps halI as many -- according to the intelligence service oI one
major Asian nation. A signiIicant revision downward in U.S. intelligence estimates oI North Korea's
nuclear threat could explain the Bush administration's more relaxed view oI Pyongyang in recent
months.
But the more signiIicant change in attitude has come Irom Pyongyang toward Washington, according
to diplomats involved in the talks, which also included China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.
A key moment came when North Korea agreed to an international inspection last month to determine
how its main nuclear complex at Yongbyon should be disabled -- and asked Hill to have the United
States rather than the United Nations carry out that intrusive inspection.
A U.S.-led inspection would have much more credibility in Washington, the North Koreans indicated.
They also want to move quickly -- that is, while Bush is still in oIIice and can presumably beat back
Republican opposition to the agreement.
At Hill's suggestion, the inspection team was broadened to include experts Irom China and Russia, the
other nuclear powers represented in the talks, to spread the mission's responsibilities and risks. The
inspectors' report cleared the way Ior the comprehensive package oI requirements and incentives
unveiled in Beijing.
In another bout oI tacit cooperation that indicates this deal may be serious enough to last, the United
States and North Korea have kept the agreement Irom being derailed by the mysterious airstrike that
Israel launched against Syria on Sept. 6. Israel and Syria have both thrown unusual secrecy around the
raid, reIusing to disclose what was hit.
But highly classiIied U.S. intelligence reports say that the Israelis destroyed a nuclear-related Iacility
and caused North Korean casualties at the site, which may have been intended to produce plutonium,
according to a senior oIIicial with access to those reports. The Israelis have provided the United States
with photographs, physical material and soil samples Irom the site -- taken both beIore and aIter the
raid -- according to two independent sources.
A last gasp oI North Korean international banditry beIore going straight on nuclear nonproliIeration? A
continuing conIidence by Pyongyang that it can say one thing in public and do another covertly? Or
simply the serendipity oI one branch oI a secretive government going about its skulduggery while
others go a diIIerent way?
With North Korea, it is oI course unclear. Winston Churchill's Iamous description oI Russia -- a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma -- would be mere understatement iI applied to Kim Jong Il's
regime. That is why it is both good and important that Christopher Hill has put such emphasis on
transparency in this agreement. Who knows? It may even catch on in Washington.
'A Way Out' for Iran
By David Ignatius
The Washington Post
Sunday, October 7, 2007; Page B07
[EXCERPT]
A powerIul, albeit silent, demonstration oI military power was Israel's Sept. 6 strike against a target in
Syria, Iran's key ally. An inIormed oIIicial told me it was an attack on nuclear materials supplied to
Syria by North Korea, and that the United States and Israel had shared inIormation beIore the raid. The
silence Irom all parties has been deaIening, but the message to Iran is clear: America and Israel can
identiIy nuclear targets and penetrate air deIenses to destroy them.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/world/middleeast/11syria.html?reIworld
Syria Tells Journalists Israeli Raid Did Not Occur
By HUGH NAYLOR
October 11, 2007
DEIR EZ ZOR, Syria, Oct. 9 Foreign journalists perused the rows oI corn and the groves oI date
palms pregnant with low-hanging Iruit here this week, while agents oI Syrias ever present security
services stood in the background, watching closely, almost nervously.
You see around us are Iarmers, corn, produce, nothing else, said Ahmed Mehdi, the Deir ez Zor
director oI the Arab Center Ior the Studies oI Arid Zones and Dry Lands, a government agricultural
research center, as he led two oI the journalists around the Iacilities.
It was here at this research center in this sleepy Bedouin city in eastern Syria that an Israeli journalist
reported that Israel had conducted an air raid in early September.
Ron Ben-Yishai, a writer Ior the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot, grabbed headlines when he suggested
that the government Iacility here was attacked during the raid, snapping photos oI himselI Ior his article
in Iront oI a sign Ior the agricultural center.
He said he was denied access to the research center, which sits on the outskirts oI the city, and he did
not show any photos oI the aItermath oI the raid, though he said he saw some pits that looked like part
oI a mine or quarry, implying that they could also be sites where bombs Iell.
His claims have compelled the Syrian government, already anxious over the rising tensions with Israel
and the United States, to try to vindicate itselI aIter a recent Ilurry oI news reports that it may have
ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.
President Bashar al-Assad, in a BBC interview, played down the Israeli raid, saying that Israeli jets
took aim at empty military buildings, but he did not give a speciIic location. His statement diIIered
Irom the initial Syrian claim that it had repulsed the air raid beIore an attack occurred.
Israel has been unusually quiet about the attack on Sept. 6 and has eIIectively imposed a news blackout
about it. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli opposition leader, on Sept. 19 became the Iirst public Iigure
in Israel to acknowledge that an attack had even taken place. Some Israeli oIIicials have said, though
not publicly, that the raid hit a nuclear-related Iacility that North Korea was helping to equip, but they
have not speciIied where.
On Monday, journalists toured the agricultural center at the governments invitation to prove, Mr.
Mehdi said, that no nuclear weapons program or Israeli attacks occurred there. The allegations are
completely groundless, and I dont really understand where all this W.M.D. talk came Irom, Mr.
Mehdi said, reIerring to weapons oI mass destruction.
There was no raid here we heard nothing, he added.
An entourage oI the centers employees lined up with him to greet the journalists. In a seemingly
choreographed display, they nodded in agreement and oIIered their guests recently picked dates as
tokens oI hospitality.
They showed oII a drab-colored laboratory that they said was used to conduct experiments on drought-
resistant crops and recently plowed Iields where vegetables and Iruits are grown.
Mr. Ben-Yishais news report rattled Syrians Ior another reason: he apparently was able to slip into
Syria, which bars Israelis Irom entering, and travel throughout the country.
I think he came in on a European passport, said Ghazi Bilto, who said he was a graphic designer Ior
the agricultural center.
Burhan Okko, who also said he was a graphic designer Ior the center, interrupted, saying, It was
deIinitely on a German passport. The international news media have speculated that the Israeli attack
was aimed at a Syrian eIIort to acquire nuclear weapons materials, possibly with the aid oI North
Korea. Syria rejects these claims.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/washington/10diplo.html?r1&oreIslogin
An Israeli Strike on Syria Kindles Debate in the U.S.
October 10, 2007
WASHINGTON, Oct. 9 A sharp debate is under way in the Bush administration about the
signiIicance oI the Israeli intelligence that led to last months Israeli strike inside Syria, according to
current and Iormer American government oIIicials.
At issue is whether intelligence that Israel presented months ago to the White House to support
claims that Syria had begun early work on what could become a nuclear weapons program with help
Irom North Korea was conclusive enough to justiIy military action by Israel and a possible
rethinking oI American policy toward the two nations.
The debate has Iractured along now-Iamiliar Iault lines, with Vice President Dick Cheney and
conservative hawks in the administration portraying the Israeli intelligence as credible and arguing that
it should cause the United States to reconsider its diplomatic overtures to Syria and North Korea.
By contrast, Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and her allies within the administration have said they
do not believe that the intelligence presented so Iar merits any change in the American diplomatic
approach.
Some people think that it means that the sky is Ialling, a senior administration oIIicial said. Others
say that theyre not convinced that the real intelligence poses a threat.
Several current and Iormer oIIicials, as well as outside experts, spoke on the condition oI anonymity
because the intelligence surrounding the Israeli strike remains highly classiIied.
Besides Ms. Rice, oIIicials said that DeIense Secretary Robert M. Gates was cautious about Iully
endorsing Israeli warnings that Syria was on a path that could lead to a nuclear weapon. Others in the
Bush administration remain unconvinced that a nascent Syrian nuclear program could pose an
immediate threat.
It has long been known that North Korean scientists have aided Damascus in developing sophisticated
ballistic missile technology, and there appears to be little debate that North Koreans Irequently visited a
site in the Syrian desert that Israeli jets attacked Sept. 6. Where oIIicials disagree is whether the
accumulated evidence points to a Syrian nuclear program that poses a signiIicant threat to the Middle
East.
Mr. Cheney and his allies have expressed unease at the decision last week by President Bush and Ms.
Rice to proceed with an agreement to supply North Korea with economic aid in return Ior the Norths
disabling its nuclear reactor. Those oIIicials argued that the Israeli intelligence demonstrates that North
Korea cannot be trusted. They also argue that the United States should be prepared to scuttle the
agreement unless North Korea admits to its dealing with the Syrians.
During a breakIast meeting on Oct. 2 at the White House, Ms. Rice and her chieI North Korea
negotiator, Christopher R. Hill, made the case to President Bush that the United States Iaced a choice:
to continue with the nuclear pact with North Korea as a way to bring the secretive country back into the
diplomatic Iold and give it the incentive to stop proliIerating nuclear material; or to return to the
administrations previous strategy oI isolation, which detractors say leIt North Korea to its own devices
and led it to test a nuclear device last October.
Mr. Cheney and Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, also attended the meeting,
administration oIIicials said.
The Israeli strike occurred at a particularly delicate time Ior American diplomatic eIIorts. In addition to
the North Korean nuclear negotiations, the White House is also trying to engineer a regional Middle
East peace conIerence that would work toward a comprehensive peace accord between Arabs and
Israelis.
The current and Iormer American oIIicials said Israel presented the United States with intelligence over
the summer about what it described as nuclear activity in Syria. OIIicials have said Israel told the
White House shortly in advance oI the September raid that it was prepared to carry it out, but it is not
clear whether the White House took a position then about whether the attack was justiIied.
One Iormer top Bush administration oIIicial said Israeli oIIicials were so concerned about the threat
posed by a potential Syrian nuclear program that they told the White House they could not wait past the
end oI the summer to strike the Iacility.
Last week, Turkish oIIicials traveled to Damascus to present the Syrian government with the Israeli
dossier on what was believed to be a Syrian nuclear program, according to a Middle East security
analyst in Washington. The analyst said that Syrian oIIicials vigorously denied the intelligence and said
that what the Israelis hit was a storage depot Ior strategic missiles.
That denial Iollowed a similar denial Irom North Korea. Mr. Hill, the State Departments assistant
secretary Ior East Asia and PaciIic aIIairs, raised the Syria issue with his North Korean counterparts in
talks in Beijing in late September. The North Koreans denied providing any nuclear material to Syria.
Publicly, Syrian oIIicials have said Israeli jets hit an empty warehouse.
Bruce Riedel, a veteran oI the C.I.A. and the National Security Council and now a Middle East expert
at the Brookings Institution, said that American intelligence agencies remained cautious in drawing
hard conclusions about the signiIicance oI the suspicious activity at the Syrian site.
Still, Mr. Riedel said Israel would not have launched the strike in Syria iI it believed Damascus was
merely developing more sophisticated ballistic missiles or chemical weapons.
Those red lines were crossed 20 years ago, he said. You dont risk general war in the Middle East
over an extra 100 kilometers range on a missile system.
Another Iormer intelligence oIIicial said Syria was attempting to develop so-called airburst capability
Ior its ballistic missiles. Such technology would allow Syria to detonate warheads in the air to disperse
the warheads material more widely.
Since North Korea detonated its nuclear device, Ms. Rice has prodded Mr. Bush toward a more
diplomatic approach with North Korea, through talks that also include Japan, Russia, South Korea and
China. Those talks led to the initial agreement last February Ior North Korea to shut down its nuclear
reactor in exchange Ior Iuel and Iood aid.
That deal angered conservatives who believed that the Bush administration had made diplomacy
toward North Korea too high a priority, at the expense oI eIIorts to combat the spread oI illicit weapons
in the Middle East.
Opposing the Israeli strike to protect the six-party talks would be a breathtaking repudiation oI the
administrations own national security strategy, said John R. Bolton, Iormer United States ambassador
to the United Nations.
But other current and Iormer oIIicials argue that the diplomatic approach is Americas best option Ior
dealing with the question oI North Korean proliIeration.
You cant just make these decisions using the top oI your spinal cord, you have to use the whole
brain, said Philip D. Zelikow, the Iormer counselor at the State Department. What other policy are
we going to pursue that we think would be better?
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3459379,00.html
Report: Top N. Korean official leaves for visit to Syria
Associated Press
Published: 10.13.07, 15:56 / Israel News
A high-level North Korean oIIicial leIt on Saturday[2007-10-13] Ior an overseas trip including a visit
to Syria, the North's state media reported, amid suspicions the two countries might be cooperating on a
secret nuclear program.

Choe Thae Bok, speaker oI the North's rubber-stamp parliament, will also visit Italy during the trip, the
North's Korean Central News Agency said in a brieI one-sentence dispatch that gave no Iurther details.

The trip comes amid lingering suspicions that North Korea may be providing nuclear assistance to
Syria.
North Korea provides missile technology to Syria, but has strongly denied accusations that it spreads
its nuclear expertise beyond its borders. Syria also has denied receiving any North Korean nuclear help.

The two countries accused US oIIicials oI spreading the allegations Ior political reasons.
Andrew Semmel, acting US deputy assistant secretary Ior nuclear nonproliIeration policy, said in
September that North Korean personnel were in Syria, and that Damascus may have had contacts with
"secret suppliers" to obtain nuclear equipment.
Last month, a high-level Syrian delegation visited Pyongyang.
North Korea, which conducted its Iirst-ever nuclear test last October, has been compliant in
international talks aimed at dismantling its nuclear program. In July, Pyongyang shut down its sole
operating nuclear reactor and pledged earlier this month to disable it by year's end.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html
Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say
By DAVID E. SANGER and MARK MAZZETTI
The New York Times
October 14, 2007
WASHINGTON, Oct. 13 Israels air attack on Syria last month was directed against a site that
Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently
modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile oI nuclear weapons Iuel, according to
American and Ioreign oIIicials with access to the intelligence reports.
The description oI the target addresses one oI the central mysteries surrounding the Sept. 6 attack, and
suggests that Israel carried out the raid to demonstrate its determination to snuII out even a nascent
nuclear project in a neighboring state. The Bush administration was divided at the time about the
wisdom oI Israels strike, American oIIicials said, and some senior policy makers still regard the attack
as premature.
The attack on the reactor project has echoes oI an Israeli raid more than a quarter century ago, in 1981,
when Israel destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq shortly beIore it was to have begun operating.
That attack was oIIicially condemned by the Reagan administration, though Israelis consider it among
their militarys Iinest moments. In the weeks beIore the Iraq war, Bush administration oIIicials said
they believed that the attack set back Iraqs nuclear ambitions by many years.
By contrast, the Iacility that the Israelis struck in Syria appears to have been much Iurther Irom
completion, the American and Ioreign oIIicials said. They said it would have been years beIore the
Syrians could have used the reactor to produce the spent nuclear Iuel that could, through a series oI
additional steps, be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium.
Many details remain unclear, most notably how much progress the Syrians had made in construction
beIore the Israelis struck, the role oI any assistance provided by North Korea, and whether the Syrians
could make a plausible case that the reactor was intended to produce electricity. In Washington and
Israel, inIormation about the raid has been wrapped in extraordinary secrecy and restricted to just a
handIul oI oIIicials, while the Israeli press has been prohibited Irom publishing inIormation about the
attack.
The New York Times reported this week that a debate had begun within the Bush administration about
whether the inIormation secretly cited by Israel to justiIy its attack should be interpreted by the United
States as reason to toughen its approach to Syria and North Korea. In later interviews, oIIicials made
clear that the disagreements within the administration began this summer, as a debate about whether an
Israeli attack on the incomplete reactor was warranted then.
The oIIicials did not say that the administration had ultimately opposed the Israeli strike, but that
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and DeIense Secretary Robert M. Gates were particularly
concerned about the ramiIications oI a pre-emptive strike in the absence oI an urgent threat.
There wasnt a lot oI debate about the evidence, said one American oIIicial Iamiliar with the intense
discussions over the summer between Washington and the government oI Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
oI Israel. There was a lot oI debate about how to respond to it.
Even though it has signed the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty, Syria would not have been obligated to
declare the existence oI a reactor during the early phases oI construction. It would have also had the
legal right to complete construction oI the reactor, as long as its purpose was to generate electricity.
In his only public comment on the raid, Syrias president, Bashar al-Assad, acknowledged this month
that Israeli jets dropped bombs on a building that he said was related to the military but which he
insisted was not used.
A senior Israeli oIIicial, while declining to speak about the speciIic nature oI the target, said the strike
was intended to re-establish the credibility oI our deterrent power, signaling that Israel meant to send
a message to the Syrians that even the potential Ior a nuclear weapons program would not be permitted.
But several American oIIicials said the strike may also have been intended by Israel as a signal to Iran
and its nuclear aspirations. Neither Iran nor any Arab government except Ior Syria has criticized the
Israeli raid, suggesting that Israel is not the only country that would be disturbed by a nuclear Syria.
North Korea did issue a protest.
The target oI the Israeli raid and the American debate about the Syrian project were described by
government oIIicials and nongovernment experts interviewed in recent weeks in the United States and
the Middle East. All insisted on anonymity because oI rules that prohibit discussing classiIied
inIormation. The oIIicials who described the target oI the attack included some on each side oI the
debate about whether a partly constructed Syrian nuclear reactor should be seen as an urgent concern,
as well as some who described themselves as neutral on the question.
The White House press secretary, Dana Perino, said Saturday that the administration would have no
comment on the intelligence issues surrounding the Israeli strike. Israel has also reIused to comment.
Nuclear reactors can be used Ior both peaceIul and non-peaceIul purposes. A reactors spent Iuel can be
reprocessed to extract plutonium, one oI two paths to building a nuclear weapon. The other path
enriching uranium in centriIuges is the method that Iran is accused oI pursuing with an intent to
build a weapon oI its own.
Syria is known to have only one nuclear reactor, a small one built Ior research purposes. But in the past
decade, Syria has several times sought unsuccessIully to buy one, Iirst Irom Argentina, then Irom
Russia. On those occasions, Israel reacted strongly but did not threaten military action. Earlier this
year, Mr. Assad spoke publicly in general terms about Syrias desire to develop nuclear power, but his
government did not announce a plan to build a new reactor.
The GulI Cooperation Council, a group oI Persian GulI states, has also called Ior an expansion oI
nuclear power in the Middle East Ior energy purposes, but many experts have interpreted that statement
as a response to Irans nuclear program. They have warned that the region may be poised Ior a wave oI
proliIeration. Israel is believed to be the only nuclear-armed nation in the region.
The partly constructed Syrian reactor was detected earlier this year [2007] by satellite photographs,
according to American oIIicials. They suggested that the Iacility had been brought to American
attention by the Israelis, but would not discuss why American spy agencies seemed to have missed the
early phases oI construction.
North Korea has long provided assistance to Syria on a ballistic missile program, but any assistance
toward the construction oI the reactor would have been the Iirst clear evidence oI ties between the two
countries on a nuclear program. North Korea has successIully used its Iive-megawatt reactor at the
Yongbyon nuclear complex to reprocess nuclear Iuel into bomb-grade material, a model that some
American and Israeli oIIicials believe Syria may have been trying to replicate.
The North conducted a partly successIul test oI a nuclear device a year ago, prompting renewed Iears
that the desperately poor country might seek to sell its nuclear technology. President Bush issued a
speciIic warning to the North on Oct. 9, 2006, just hours aIter the test, noting that it was leading
proliIerator oI missile technology, including transIers to Iran and Syria. He went on to warn that the
transIer oI nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be
considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea Iully accountable.
While Bush administration oIIicials have made clear in recent weeks that the target oI the Israeli raid
was linked to North Korea in some way, Mr. Bush has not repeated his warning since the attack. In
Iact, the administration has said very little about the countrys suspected role in the Syria case,
apparently Ior Iear oI upending negotiations now under way in which North Korea has pledged to begin
disabling its nuclear Iacilities.
While the partly constructed Syrian reactor appears to be based on North Koreas design, the American
and Ioreign oIIicials would not say whether they believed the North Koreans sold or gave the plans to
the Syrians, or whether the Norths own experts were there at the time oI the attack. It is possible, some
oIIicials said, that the transIer oI the technology occurred several years ago.
According to two senior administration oIIicials, the subject was raised when the United States, North
Korea and Iour other nations met in Beijing earlier this month.
Behind closed doors, however, Vice President Dick Cheney and other hawkish members oI the
administration have made the case that the same intelligence that prompted Israel to attack should lead
the United States to reconsider delicate negotiations with North Korea over ending its nuclear program,
as well as Americas diplomatic strategy toward Syria, which has been invited to join Middle East
peace talks in Annapolis, Md., next month.
Mr. Cheney in particular, oIIicials say, has also cited the indications that North Korea aided Syria to
question the Bush administrations agreement to supply the North with large amounts oI Iuel oil.
During Mr. Bushs Iirst term, Mr. Cheney was among the advocates oI a strategy to squeeze the North
Korean government in hopes that it would collapse, and the administration cut oII oil shipments set up
under an agreement between North Korea and the Clinton administration, saying the North had cheated
on that accord.
The new shipments, agreed to last February, are linked to North Koreas carrying through on its pledge
to disable its nuclear Iacilities by the end oI the year. Nonetheless, Mr. Bush has approved going ahead
with that agreement, even aIter he was aware oI the Syrian program.
Nuclear experts say that North Koreas main reactor, while small by international standards, is big
enough to produce roughly one bombs worth oI plutonium a year.
In an interview, Dr. SiegIried S. Hecker oI StanIord University, a Iormer director oI the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, said building a reactor based on North Koreas design might take Irom three to
six years.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2007/prn200718.html
IAEA Press Releases
Press Release 2007/18
Recent Media Reports Concerning Syria
15 October 2007 , Statement attributable to IAEA Spokesperson Melissa Fleming on recent media
reports concerning Syria:
1. The IAEA has no inIormation about any undeclared nuclear Iacility in Syria and no inIormation
about recent reports.
2. We would obviously investigate any relevant inIormation coming our way.
3. The IAEA Secretariat expects any country having inIormation about nuclear-related activities in
another country to provide that inIormation to the IAEA.
4. The IAEA is in contact with the Syrian authorities to veriIy the authenticity oI these reports.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/world/middleeast/15mideast.html
October 15, 2007
Israel Silent on Reports of Bombing Within Syria
By STEVEN ERLANGER
Correction Appended
JERUSALEM, Oct. 14 Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and Israeli oIIicials declined Sunday to
conIirm or deny a report that an Israeli Air Force strike against Syria last month had bombed a partly
constructed nuclear reactor apparently oI North Korean design.
The report, published in The New York Times on Saturday, was Ieatured prominently in the Israeli
news media on Sunday. But Israeli oIIicials continued their silence about the Sept. 6 airstrike, though
they have signaled they are proud oI the operation; a senior military oIIicial said it had restored
military deterrence in the region.
Former Israeli oIIicials and intelligence experts would not discuss whether Israel hit a nuclear reactor
that was under construction. But they said the report was plausible given their understanding oI Syrias
ambitions in the realm oI nonconventional weaponry and its longstanding quest Ior strategic parity with
Israel.
Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi Farkash, Israels Iormer chieI oI military intelligence, called the notion that
Israel had targeted a nuclear reactor in Syria logical.
Ms. Rice, Ilying here Irom Moscow Ior Iour days oI talks with Israeli and Palestinian leaders beIore a
regional peace conIerence in the United States this Iall, declined to discuss what she called news
reports oI the Israeli raid, though she did express concern about proliIeration.
Were very concerned about any evidence oI, any indication oI, proliIeration, she said. And were
handling those in appropriate diplomatic channels.
She also tried to draw a line between nuclear proliIeration and the peace process. The issues oI
proliIeration do not aIIect the Palestinian-Israeli peace eIIorts we are making, she said, warning sides
against actions that could derail the peace eIIort. This is the time to be extremely careIul, she said.
Ms. Rice met with various Israeli oIIicials, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and DeIense
Minister Ehud Barak, hours beIore Mr. Barak Ilew to Washington to discuss security cooperation and
rocket deIense systems. She also met with members oI the Olmert government who have been warning
the prime minister not to make too many concessions to Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, on
territory, the status oI Jerusalem or the Iate oI reIugees.
Ms. Rice played down the idea oI a breakthrough on this trip, calling the Israeli-Palestinian talks a
work in progress. She said she did not expect that there will be any particular outcome in the sense oI
breakthroughs on the document the two sides are trying to negotiate.
Asked about Israeli-Palestinian progress, a senior American oIIicial who brieIed reporters on Sunday
night said, Were not even into the second halI oI the ballgame. Speaking on the condition oI
anonymity according to standard diplomatic practice, he added, I do think this is going to require a lot
oI hands-on American diplomacy.
Regarding the Syria strike, General Zeevi Farkash said HaIez al-Assad, Syrias Iormer president and
the Iather oI President Bashar al-Assad, had long spoken oI Syrias weakness opposite Israel in the
realm oI air power, technology and ground Iorces, and the need Ior a nonconventional ability, which
in the past meant chemical weapons.
But he added that a constellation oI interests between North Korea and Syria could have led Syria to
go a stage Iurther in its quest Ior strategic parity and deterrence, by moving beyond its chemical
ability into the nuclear realm, as Iran is doing.
Noting the pressure on North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program, the general suggested that
smuggling some elements oI its program to Syria would have allowed the North to preserve the
knowledge it has accumulated and not just throw it away.
The Syrian president has acknowledged the Israeli airstrike but has said it was against an unused
military building. North Korea has denied any involvement in a nuclear program in Syria.
Uzi Arad, who once worked Ior Mossad, Israels intelligence agency, and was the national security
adviser under Iormer Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, said that he did not know what Israel
bombed in Syria but that a nuclear reactor was plausible.
North Koreas route to a nuclear weapon was based on plutonium, he said, adding that North Korea
has the technology, and its approach to liIe showed that technology was something to be traded.
Israeli analysts, meanwhile, expressed surprise at reports that some American oIIicials considered the
Israeli airstrike to have been premature. Several American and Ioreign oIIicials have said it would have
been years beIore the Syrians could have used the reactor to produce the spent nuclear Iuel that could,
through a series oI additional steps, be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium.
But Emily B. Landau, director oI the arms control and regional security program at the Institute Ior
National Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, said, The one lesson that Israel has learned Irom the
Iranian experience is that iI you dont take care oI something like this at the very initial stages, youre
going to have a bigger problem later on.
Correction: October 18, 2007
An article on Monday about the reIusal oI Israeli oIIicials to conIirm or deny a report in The Times that
the Israeli Air Force had bombed a Syrian Iacility on Sept. 6 overstated the conclusion Israeli and
American intelligence analysts had drawn about the target. While they judged the Iacility to be a partly
constructed nuclear reactor, they said it was oI apparent North Korean design; they did not say so
deIinitively. The article also misstated the background oI Uzi Arad, the national security adviser under
Iormer Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who said it was plausible that a nuclear reactor had been
bombed. Mr. Arad once worked Ior Mossad, Israels intelligence agency; he is not a Iormer head oI
Mossad.
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/DN-syrian18int.ART.State.Edition1.42ac4a2.html
Ambassador denies nuclear program in Syria
Envoy: Reports that Israeli attack targeted reactor are 'Iabrication'
08:50 AM CDT on Thursday, October 18, 2007
By TIM CONNOLLY / The Dallas Morning News
tconnollydallasnews.com
[EXCERPT]
Reports that an Israeli air strike in Syria was directed against a partly built nuclear reactor are "sheer
Iabrication," Syria's U.S. ambassador said Tuesday [October 16, 2007] in Dallas.
"This is an absolutely surrealistic story," Ambassador Imad Moustapha said. "There is no Syrian
nuclear program whatsoever, absolutely not. Syria has never tried to acquire nuclear technology."
Mr. Moustapha, addressing the World AIIairs Council oI Dallas/Fort Worth, noted that the Israeli
government did not claim to have bombed a nuclear Iacility and that reports that it may have done so
all emanated Irom Washington.
He compared those reports to pre-Iraq war assertions by the Bush administration about Iraq's weapons
oI mass destruction and the alleged ties between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda. Both claims were
later discredited.
The New York Times, citing unidentiIied U.S. and Ioreign oIIicials, reported Saturday that the targeted
site was apparently modeled aIter a North Korean Iacility used to produce Iuel Ior nuclear weapons.
U.S. and Israeli oIIicials have declined to conIirm or deny the report.
Mr. Moustapha described the target oI the Sept. 6 Israeli strike as a military Iacility oI "minor tactical
importance."

Syria denies it confirmed target of IAF strike was nuclear facility
By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent, and Haaretz Service
Last update - 15:24 18/10/2007
Syria denied Wednesday its representatives to the United Nations had conIirmed that an Israel Air
Force strike last month targeted nuclear Iacility, and added that such Iacilities do not exist in Syria,
state-run news agency said.
The Syrian Arab News Agency, SANA, quoting a Ioreign ministry source, said that Syria had made it
clear in the past that there are no such Iacilities in Syria.
On Tuesday, a UN press release sent aIter a meeting oI the First Committee, Disarmament and
International Security, in New York paraphrased Syria's UN ambassador, Bashar al-JaaIari, as saying
that a nuclear Iacility was hit.
"Israel was the Iourth largest exporter oI weapons oI mass destruction and a violator oI other nations'
airspace, and it had taken action against nuclear Iacilities, including the 6 July attack in Syria," the
release paraphrased al-JaaIari as saying, in an apparent error as to the date oI the September 6 air strike.
Syria has conIirmed that the target oI an IAF raid deep within its borders last month was a nuclear
Iacility, Israeli Foreign Ministry oIIicials said Wednesday.
The comments were Iirst reported to Israel by Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General Ior Strategic
AIIairs Miriam Ziv, who took part in the UN meeting.
In an oIIicial response, the Foreign Ministry conIirmed the content oI Ziv's report, but declined Iurther
comment.
The comments Iollow a Saturday New York Times account, which said that the attack targeted a
partially built nuclear reactor that was years away Irom completion.
Israeli oIIicials have been largely silent about the aIIair. The military only recently relaxed censorship
to allow Israel-based journalists to report that Israeli aircraIt attacked a military target deep inside
Syria.
Syrian President Bashar Assad has maintained that Israel bombed an "unused military building" in the
raid.
The Times said the nuclear reactor was modeled on one North Korea had used to create its stockpile oI
nuclear weapons Iuel. North Korea has denied involvement in any such activities in Syria.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/18/news/UN-GEN-UN-Syria-Israel.php
UN: Action to be taken against interpreter for false report that Syria has a nuclear
facility
The Associated Press
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations said Thursday action would be taken against the interpreter
responsible Ior an erroneous report that Syria has a nuclear Iacility.
Syria denied that one oI its representatives told the U.N. General Assembly's committee that deals with
disarmament on Tuesday that Israel had attacked a Syrian nuclear Iacility. It said the representative was
misquoted, demanded a correction, and insisted that "such Iacilities do not exist in Syria."
AIter more than seven hours oI investigation Wednesday, U.N. oIIicials agreed the Syrian delegate was
misquoted. "There was an interpretation error," U.N. associate spokesman Farhan Haq said. "There was
no use oI the word nuclear."
The U.N. expressed regret Ior the incident.
The mistake made headlines in the Middle East and heightened concerns over Damascus' nuclear
ambitions. Those ambitions were under scrutiny Iollowing a Sept. 6 Israeli airstrike on an unknown
target in northeastern Syria near the border with Turkey. Widespread reports say it may have been a
nascent nuclear Iacility, a claim Syria has denied.
The incident started Tuesday night with a U.N. press summary in English oI the disarmament
committee's proceedings that paraphrased the Syrian representative as saying, "Israel was the Iourth
largest exporter oI weapons oI mass destruction and a violator oI other nations' airspace, and it had
taken action against nuclear Iacilities, including the 6 July attack in Syria."
The Syrian representative spoke in Arabic, but Haq said Thursday the problem was not the translation
Irom Arabic. An interpreter who worked Irom Arabic into French was Iairly accurate, he said.
The problem occurred when interpreter translated the statement into English Irom French, Haq said.
"Action will be taken against that Ireelance interpreter to the Iullest extent oI the U.N. rules and
regulations," Haq said, reIusing to comment Iurther on what that action might be.
Other U.N. staIIers Iamiliar with the rules said the Ireelance interpreter likely works on some kind oI
contract with the U.N. translation service that will not be renewed. The staIIers spoke on condition oI
anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
Earlier Thursday, U.N. spokeswoman Michele Montas told reporters: "We regret the error and the
department that deals with General Assembly aIIairs is looking Iurther into the incident."
She conIirmed that the Syrian Mission had discussed the matter with the Department oI General
Assembly and ConIerence Management. She added that any reporter who spoke Arabic and listened to
the original tape recording oI the Syrian delegate would realize the mistake.
According to the corrected text, the Syrian representative said: "...the (entity) that is ranking number
Iour among the exporters oI lethal weapons in the world; that which violates the airspace oI sovereign
states and carries out military aggression against them, like what happened on Sept. 6 against my
country, such entity with all those characteristics and even more, has no right Ior its representative to
go on lying without shame..."
The Syrian representative was replying to a speech to the committee on Monday by Israeli Ambassador
Miriam Ziv, deputy director general Ior strategic aIIairs in the Foreign Ministry, who accused Syria oI
continuing to transIer weapons to Hezbollah Iighters in Lebanon.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071017.html
For Immediate Release
OIIice oI the Press Secretary
October 17, 2007
Press Conference by the President
James S. Brady BrieIing Room
10:45 A.M. EDT
[EXCERPT]
Q There's a report today Irom Israel Army Radio indicating that the Syrians have conIirmed that the
Israelis struck a nuclear site in their country. You wouldn't comment on that beIore, and I'm wondering
iI now, on the general question, you think it's appropriate Ior Israel to take such action iI it Ieels that
there is mortal danger being posed to the state?
THE PRESIDENT: David, my position hadn't changed. You can ask me another question.
Q Can I ask you whether -- did you support Israel's strike in 1981 on the Iraqi reactor outside Baghdad?
THE PRESIDENT: You know, Dave, I don't remember what I was doing in 1980 -- let's see, I was
living in Midland, Texas; I don't remember my reaction that Iar back.
Q Well, but as you look at it as President now --
THE PRESIDENT: -- private citizen back there in 1981 in Midland, Texas, trying to make a living Ior
my Iamily and --
Q But you're a careIul -- someone who studies history --
THE PRESIDENT: Student oI history? I do, yes. No, I don't remember my reaction, to be Irank with
you.
Q But I'm asking you now, as you look back at it, do you think it was the right action Ior Israel to take?
THE PRESIDENT: David, I'm not going to comment on the subject that you're trying to get me to
comment on.
Q Why won't you? But isn't it a Iair question to say, is it -- given all the talk about Iran and the
potential threat, whether it would be appropriate Ior Israel to act --
THE PRESIDENT: Hey, Dave -- Dave --
Q -- in selI-deIense --
THE PRESIDENT: I understand --
Q -- iI Iran were to --
THE PRESIDENT: -- I understand where you're trying to take --
Q -- develop nuclear weapons?
THE PRESIDENT: I understand where you're trying to take. It's a clever ruse to get me to comment on
it, but I'm not going to. Thank you.
Q Well, I'm just wondering why you think it's not appropriate to make that judgment, when it's a -- it is
a real-world scenario, as we know, since they apparently took this action against Syria --
THE PRESIDENT: Dave. Welcome back. (Laughter.)
|deletia|
Q Let's stay with the nuclear -- here. When North Korea tested a nuclear device, you said that any
proliIeration would be a grave threat to the U.S., and North Korea would be responsible Ior the
consequences. Are you denying that North Korea has any role in the suspected nuclear --
THE PRESIDENT: See, you're trying to pull a Gregory.
Q Yes, I am.
THE PRESIDENT: Okay, well, I'm not going to Iall Ior it. But I'd like to talk about --
Q Don't Americans have a right to know about who is proliIerating, especially when you're negotiating
with North Korea?
THE PRESIDENT: No, you have a right to know this, that when it comes to the six-party talks,
proliIeration -- the issue oI proliIeration has equal importance with the issue oI weaponry, and that
North Korea has said that they will stop proliIerating, just like they have said they will Iully disclose
and disable any weapons programs.
Step one oI that has been dealing with shuttering Pyongyang. Step two will be Iull declaration oI any
plutonium that has been manuIactured, and/or the construction oI bombs, along with a Iull declaration
oI any proliIeration activities. And in my judgment, the best way to solve this issue with North Korea
peaceIully is to put it in -- keep it in the context oI six-party talks. And the reason why is that
diplomacy only works iI there are consequences when diplomacy breaks down, and it makes sense Ior
there to be other people at the table so that iI North Korea were to have said to all oI us, we're doing to
do x, y, or z, and they don't, that we have other -- people other than the United States being
consequential.
There's a lot oI aid that goes on with -- between North Korea and China, or North Korea and South
Korea, and thereIore, iI they renege on their promises -- and they have said -- they have declared that
they will show us weapons and get rid oI the weapons programs, as well as stop proliIeration -- iI they
don't IulIill that which they've said, we are now in a position to make sure that they understand that
there will be consequences.
And I'm pleased with the progress we're making. Is there still work to be done? You bet there's work to
be done. Do I go into this thing saying, well, you know, gosh, the process is more important than
results? I don't. What matters most to me are whether or not we can achieve the results that I've said
we're hoping to achieve. And iI not, there will be consequences to the North Koreans.
Q Was Syria part oI those talks? Is Syria part oI the talks?
THE PRESIDENT: ProliIeration is a part oI the talks.
Q Including Syria?
THE PRESIDENT: Elaine.
Look, in all due respect to you and Gregory, this is not my Iirst rodeo. And I know where you're trying
to get me to comment. I'm not going to comment on it, one way or the other.
Elaine.
Q But, Mr. President, your administration has talked about --
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Martha. Martha, thank you. Elaine.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/oct/93623.htm
Washington, DC
October 17, 2007
[EXCERPT]
MR. CASEY: ...
Nicholas.
QUESTION: On North Korea, Tom, I know that you have not been willing to talk about any Syria
links or any programs and such, though you are aware, I am sure, oI reports, in addition to the Israeli
strike, oI a shipment that recently went to Syria that is reported to be Irom North Korea. But you
probably also know there have been suggestions Irom people whom some might describe as hardliners
that the reason you're not talking much about any North Korean help that Syria might have received is
because you do not want this to derail the deal with North Korea. Is there any truth to that?
MR. CASEY: I think that's where I started the brieIing about the answers the President gave. I think the
President made very clear, and you can go back and check the transcript, that nonproliIeration issues
have always been a part oI the six-party talks; that the North Koreans have committed to us to both
ceasing any support Ior proliIeration activities as well as providing a declaration that covers the Iull
range oI their nuclear programs, including what proliIeration activities they might have engaged in.
And that is where we believe we will be able to Iind the best answers to what exactly is the Iull scope
oI their program, and that's essential to being able to have conIidence that as we move Iorward with the
disablement and ultimately dismantling oI the Iull range oI their nuclear program that we have a
complete understanding oI what's there.
Beyond that, in terms oI the various press reports that have been out there, it's the same answer as
always. I just don't have anything Ior you on it.
QUESTION: So the declaration is not -- the deadline Ior the declaration is the end oI the year, right?
MR. CASEY: Yeah.
QUESTION: So between now and then, they're Iree to export anything they like?
MR. CASEY: Nicholas, again, they've committed to ceasing those activities. I'm not going to try and
parse it Ior you. They've made commitments; we expect them to live up to them.
QUESTION: A Iollow-up?
MR. CASEY: Yeah, Param.
QUESTION: I mean, despite Israels admission that they've had a strike on Syria, why is the
Administration reIusing to admit or deny that North Korean material has been -- nuclear material had
been Iound in Syria?
MR. CASEY: Look, I think the President reIused to comment on this about Iive times less than an hour
ago. I could probably go back and count the number oI times I have simply said I don't have anything
Ior you on it, and you could ask again, Param, but it's the same answer as beIore. Seriously, I just don't
have anything Ior you.
QUESTION: Tom, can you just --
MR. CASEY: Yeah.
QUESTION: You said you expect them to abide by the commitments they've made. They actually
haven't -- in these things they signed, they never said we're not going to export material --
MR. CASEY: Nicholas --
QUESTION: -- to anybody else. They haven't.
MR. CASEY: Nicholas, look, I think it's abundantly clear that we expect a Iull declaration Irom the
North Koreans about the extent oI their nuclear program. It's also abundantly clear -- and you've heard
it Irom the President, you've heard it Irom Chris, you've heard it Irom the Secretary, you've heard it
Irom every oIIicial involved in this policy -- that proliIeration issues have been part oI our discussion
with the North Koreans since the beginning.
The United States is not going to pretend that North Korea has given us a declaration or pretend that
they have ceased their activities. This is a serious process. It's designed to get us to the point where the
United States can be assured, the other members oI the six-party can be assured and the world can be
assured that North Korea is out oI the nuclear business.
Are we there yet? Nope, we sure aren't. There's still a Iacility at Yongbyon. It's been shut down, but it
hasn't been disabled. And ultimately, aIter it's disabled, it'll need to be dismantled.
They've promised to give us a declaration. Do we have it yet? No, but we've got a commitment to get
one. Can I tell you right now what's in that declaration or, you know, how it will look to us at the time?
No, we'll have to see. That's why this whole process is based on good Iaith actions Ior good Iaith
actions.
But I would note that we have now entered what is a really new phase in the ending oI North Korea's
nuclear program. We have in the past gotten to the point oI suspension oI activities. That's where the
February 13th agreement brought us. This latest agreement takes us to actual dismantlement, to moving
their Iacilities, the ones that are producing plutonium Ior nuclear bombs, out oI business not just in
terms oI temporary shuttering, which they could restart and have back to Iull operations in a Iew
weeks, but something where it's going to take a year or more Ior them to do so. And I think that's an
important step and it's one that hasn't been achieved beIore. The declaration oI their Iull length oI their
programs is also extremely signiIicant because it's something that we haven't had. And once we have
that, then we will be able to know and work speciIically on eliminating any and all other nuclear
programs or activities that may be out there.
But anyone asserting to you that the United States is turning a blind eye to proliIeration activities,
whether by North Korea or anyone else, simply isn't speaking in a way that marries up with the Iacts on
this issue.
QUESTION: Is it abundantly clear that North Korea is not (inaudible) proliIeration activities?
MR. CASEY: Nice try, Param. Look, as I said, we have had proliIeration as part oI our discussion with
them since the beginning oI the six-party talks. I think when we get a declaration we'll be able to talk in
more speciIic detail about what might or might not be there.
http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20071018/FOREIGN/110180044/1003
White House mum on Syrian nukes
October 18, 2007
By Nicholas Kralev -
Bush administration oIIicials said yesterday that they are determined to prevent current and Iormer
hard-liners Irom using reports oI North Korean nuclear-related transIers to Syria to derail negotiations
with Pyongyang.
President Bush repeatedly reIused at a press conIerence to disclose any inIormation about the suspected
exports to Syria or an Israeli air strike on a site thought to house those materials, saying any
proliIeration concerns that the United States has will be addressed in six-nation talks with the North.
Asked whether the American people have a right to know whether North Korea is secretly aiding the
nuclear ambitions oI a country hostile to the United States while negotiating the end oI its own
programs, Mr. Bush oIIered a terse answer.
No, he said. You have a right to know this that when it comes to the six-party talks, the issue oI
proliIeration has equal importance with the issue oI weaponry, and that North Korea has said that they
will stop proliIerating, just like they have said they will Iully disclose and disable any weapons
programs.
Current and Iormer hard-line members oI Mr. Bush's administration, who drove North Korea policy
during his Iirst term but have since lost his ear, have expressed dismay that the White House is not
making more oI the Syria reports.
Those policy-makers to whom Mr. Bush listens now Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and
Christopher R. Hill, the chieI negotiator with the North will not allow the hard-liners, who criticized
the recent nuclear agreement even beIore the Syria mystery, to stall the negotiations, administration
oIIicials said.
The president has decided that it's worth pursuing a deal with North Korea, and that's what matters,
one oIIicial said.
In February, Pyongyang agreed in principle to dismantle its nuclear programs, and to shut down its
main reactor at Yongbyon as a Iirst step, which it did in July. Earlier this month, it promised to disable
Yongbyon's three main Iacilities and to produce a Iull declaration oI its nuclear eIIorts and capabilities
by year's end.
But critics oI the deal whose other parties are China, Japan, South Korea and Russia said the text
was too vague and leIt much room Ior interpretation.
Some oI that vagueness became apparent yesterday, when Mr. Bush said the North Koreans had agreed
to something that analysts said is not technically part oI the deal.
Step two will be Iull declaration oI any plutonium that has been manuIactured and/or the construction
oI bombs, along with a Iull declaration oI any proliIeration activities, the president said.
The Oct. 3 document does say that the North committed not to transIer nuclear materials, technology
or know-how, but when it comes to the declaration, it says it will include all nuclear Iacilities,
materials and programs. There is no mention oI documenting proliIeration activities.
Nevertheless, such a disclosure is implied in their commitment, and we intend to hold them to it, said
Gordon Johndroe, spokesman Ior the National Security Council at the White House.
The agreement is also vague on whether North Korea is required to list any nuclear weapons it has
built. Kim Kye-gwan, the chieI North Korean negotiator, was reported as saying two weeks ago: We
can't declare nuclear weapons this year, because iI we do it at this stage, our nuclear-weapons
technology level will be revealed.
Bruce Klingner, senior Iellow at the Heritage Foundation, said the very vague document
demonstrates the need Ior speciIic treaty language prohibiting Iurther proliIeration and requiring a Iull
declaration oI past activities.
Congress is likely to ask questions about the Syria reports during Mr. Hill's next testimony on the deal,
Mr. Klingner said.
The administration needs to come clean on this story to the degree possible to garner more support Ior
the negotiations, he said.
Syrians Disassembling Ruins at Site Bombed by Israel, Officials Say
By Robin Wright and Joby Warrick
Friday, October 19, 2007; A18
Syria has begun dismantling the remains oI a site Israel bombed Sept. 6 in what may be an attempt to
prevent the location Irom coming under international scrutiny, said U.S. and Ioreign oIIicials Iamiliar
with the aItermath oI the attack.
Based on overhead photography, the oIIicials say the site in Syria's eastern desert near the Euphrates
River had a "signature" or characteristics oI a small but substantial nuclear reactor, one similar in
structure to North Korea's Iacilities.
The dismantling oI the damaged site, which appears to be still underway, could make it diIIicult Ior
weapons inspectors to determine the precise nature oI the Iacility and how Syria planned to use it.
Syria, which possesses a small reactor used Ior scientiIic research, has denied seeking to expand its
nuclear program. But U.S. oIIicials knowledgeable about the Israeli raid have described the target as a
nuclear Iacility being constructed with North Korean assistance.
The bombed Iacility is diIIerent Irom the one Syria displayed to journalists last week to back its
allegations that Israel had bombed an essentially an empty building, said the oIIicials, who insisted on
anonymity because details oI the Israeli attack are classiIied.
While U.S. oIIicials express increasing conIidence that the Syrian Iacility was nuclear-related,
divisions persist within the government and among weapons experts over the signiIicance oI the threat.
II the Iacility was a nuclear reactor, U.S. weapons experts said it would almost certainly have taken
Syria several years to complete the structure, and much longer to produce signiIicant quantities oI
plutonium Ior potential use in nuclear weapons. Nuclear reactors also are used to generate electricity.
"This isn't like a Road Runner cartoon where you call up Acme Reactors and they deliver a Iunctioning
reactor to your back yard. It takes years to build," said Joseph Cirincione, director Ior nuclear policy at
the Center Ior American Progress. "This is an extremely demanding technology, and I don't think Syria
has the technical, engineering or Iinancial base to really support such a reactor."
While expressing concern over the prospect that Syria may have decided to launch a nuclear program
in secret, some weapons experts question why neither Israel nor the United States made any eIIort
beIore the secret attack -- or in the six weeks since -- to oIIer evidence to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, a move that would trigger an inspection oI Syria by the nuclear watchdog.
"The reason we have an IAEA and a saIeguard system is that, iI there is evidence oI wrongdoing, it can
be presented by a neutral body to the international community so that a collective response can be
pursued," said Daryl Kimball, executive director oI the Arms Control Association. "It seems to me
highly risky and premature Ior another country to bomb such a Iacility."
But John R. Bolton, the Bush administration's Iormer ambassador to the United Nations, said Syria's
secrecy -- including its apparent move to clean up the site aIter the bombing -- suggests that Damascus
is pursuing a strategy similar to that oI Iran, which the Bush administration believes is pursuing a
nuclear weapons capability. Bolton said Iran once attempted to conceal nuclear activity Irom IAEA
inspectors by bulldozing nuclear-related buildings and even digging up nearby topsoil to remove all
traces oI nuclear material.
"The common practice Ior people with legitimate civilian nuclear power programs is to be transparent,
because they have nothing to hide," Bolton said.
The IAEA has not been provided any evidence about the Syrian Iacility and has been unable to obtain
any reliable details about the Sept. 6 strike, said a European diplomat Iamiliar with the agency's
internal discussions.
Syria is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty and has cooperated with IAEA inspections
oI the small, 27-kilowatt research Iacility it has run Ior decades, IAEA sources said.
Some experts speculate that Israeli and U.S. oIIicials may have calculated that reporting their
intelligence to the IAEA would have produced only limited repercussions, the equivalent oI a
diplomatic slap on the wrist to Syria, which might have decided to build the Iacility anyway.
Foreign sources Iamiliar with the attack say Israel wanted to send a strong message to Iran about the
price oI developing a secret nuclear program. Israel is increasingly alarmed about Iran's intentions and
Irustrated that the international community has not persuaded Tehran to suspend its uranium
enrichment program.
II North Korea is shown to have helped with the construction oI a Syrian reactor, it would suggest that
the Pyongyang government has been secretly hawking its nuclear know-how to the Syrians Ior years,
several experts said. But even iI North Korea's involvement is proved, it is unlikely that the Bush
administration would halt negotiations with Pyongyang over dismantling its nuclear program, the
experts said.
"The Bush administration has clearly decided not to let this incident deter them Irom trying to limit
North Korea's nuclear activity," said Gary Samore, a National Security Council member under
President Bill Clinton who is now with the Council on Foreign Relations.
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/story?id3752687&page1
EXCLUSIVE: The Case for Israel's Strike on Syria
OIIicial: Air Attack Targeted Nascent Nuclear Facility Built With North Korean 'Expertise'
By MARTHA RADDATZ
Oct. 19, 2007
Israeli oIIicials believed that a target their Iorces bombed inside Syria last month was a nuclear Iacility,
because they had detailed photographs taken by a possible spy inside the complex, ABC News has
learned.
The Bush administration has steadIastly reIused to say anything about the Israeli raid on Syria, or to
conIirm what was hit. But ABC News has learned oI the apparent mole and other dramatic and secret
details about the events leading up to the airstrike, plus the evidence that supported it.
A senior U.S. oIIicial told ABC News the Israelis Iirst discovered a suspected Syrian nuclear Iacility
early in the summer, and the Mossad (Israel's intelligence agency) managed to either co-opt one oI the
Iacility's workers or to insert a spy posing as an employee.
As a result, the Israelis obtained many detailed pictures oI the Iacility Irom the ground.
The oIIicial said the suspected nuclear Iacility was approximately 100 miles Irom the Iraqi border, deep
in the desert along the Euphrates River. It was a place, the oIIicial said, "where no one would ever go
unless you had a reason to go there."
But the hardest evidence oI all was the photographs.
The oIIicial described the pictures as showing a big cylindrical structure, with very thick walls all well
reinIorced.
The photos show rebar hanging out oI the cement used to reinIorce the structure, which was
still under construction.
There was also a secondary structure and a pump station, with trucks around it. But there was no
Iissionable material Iound because the Iacility was not yet operating.
The oIIicial said there was a larger structure just north oI a small pump station; a nuclear reactor would
need a constant source oI water to keep it cool.
The oIIicial said the Iacility was a North Korean design in its construction, the technology present and
the ability to put it all together.
It was North Korean "expertise," said the oIIicial, meaning the Syrians must have had "human" help
Irom North Korea.
A light water reactor designed by North Koreans could be constructed to speciIically produce
plutonium Ior nuclear weapons.
When the Israelis came to the CIA with the pictures, the U.S. then got the site's coordinates and backed
it up with very detailed satellite imagery oI its own, and pinpointed "drop points" to determine what
would be needed to target it.
The Israelis urged the U.S. government to destroy the complex, and the U.S. started looking at options
about how to destroy the Iacility: Targeters were assembled, and oIIicials contemplated a special Iorces
raid using helicopters, which would mean inserting Iorces to collect data and then blow the site up.
That option would have been very daring, the oIIicial says, because oI the distance Irom the border and
the amount oI explosives it would take to take down the Iacility.
The options were considered, but according to the oIIicial, word came back Irom the White House that
the United States was not interested in carrying out the raid.
But as ABC News reported in July, the Israelis made the decision to take the Iacility out themselves,
though the U.S. urged them not to. The Bush administration, with Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice
and DeIense Secretary Robert Gates leading the way, said the Israelis and the U.S. should "conIront not
attack."
The oIIicial said the Iacility had been there at least eight months beIore the strike, but because oI the
lack oI Iissionable material, the United States hesitated on the attack because it couldn't be absolutely
proved that it was a nuclear site.
But the oIIicial told ABC News, "It was unmistakable what it was going to be. There is no doubt in my
mind."
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories/DN-
moustapha20edi.ART.State.Edition1.4265669.html
Imad Moustapha: Give Syria a place at the table
U.S. and Israel are trying to marginalize Syria's role in the peace process
08:42 AM CDT on Saturday, October 20, 2007
Excerpts oI an editorial board interview with Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustapha, who addressed the
World AIIairs Council oI Dallas/Fort Worth on Tuesday.
[deletia]
We don't know why Israel launched an air strike on Syria on Sept. 6, but we assume they had
some justification. If you were in Israel's shoes, could you understand why they wouldn't want
you at the negotiating table?
We believe in Syria that the only way Iorward is to reach a peace agreement with the Israelis. We are
realists. We do understand that the Israelis enjoy military superiority compared to the Syrian
capabilities. ... We also understand that the Israelis know very well that, despite their sheer military
superiority, they cannot impose on us Iorever their policies oI occupation. ...
The Israelis know very well, and the United States knows absolutely well, that there is no Syrian
nuclear program whatsoever. It's an absolutely blatant lie. And it's not like they think we have but
they're not sure. They know. Let me be clear about it: Syria has never, ever contemplated acquiring
nuclear technology. We are not contemplating it today. We are not contemplating doing this in the
Iuture neither Ior military nor Ior civilian purposes.
Then what did Israel attack?
Israel attacked a military installation in Syria. This is not unprecedented in the history oI the Arab-
Israeli conIlict. ... It's easy Ior Syria right now to launch a missile against an Israeli target. But where
this will lead to another destructive war in our region similar to what happened last summer in
Lebanon? ... What did this |Lebanon| attack lead to? Nowhere. Israel attacked Syria a month ago. What
did this lead to? They did not destroy our military capability. It served domestic reasons in Israel, and it
served some special, narrow-minded agendas here in the United States.
How does it serve Israel's agenda to keep this quiet? Israel hasn't said a word about this attack.
Israel didn't say anything, but this suited Israel very well, because suddenly ... everybody in the United
States is discussing this "Syrian nuclear program." Everybody particularly The New York Times
every two or three days they have a new article about the Syrian nuclear program. And we are
Ilabbergasted in Syria. I have written three letters to The New York Times telling them: Have you
Iorgotten what you have done prior to the Iraq war, when you published all the Iallout stories about the
Iraqi WMDs? Don't you realize that you're being "Judith Millered" Ior the second time within Iive
years?
I'm trying to tell The New York Times: Look, be careIul. Can't you see that you are being led into
extremely dangerous territory? You are accusing a country oI doing something it has not even
contemplated doing based on nothing. Based on leaks Irom Israeli agents who are very happy playing
this game.
What was attacked, and what was the damage? Were there any deaths?
Minor damage. The military signiIicance oI it was minor. ... Nobody died. None. It was a military
warehouse. ... All I'm saying is that every story that has to do with a Syrian nuclear program is an
absolutely Ialse story, Iull stop. Nothing whatsoever that Syria is doing has to do with nuclear
technology Ior reasons that are simple Ior anyone to analyze: We are realists. We understand that iI
Syria even contemplated nuclear technology, then the gates oI hell would open on us.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119283814073665542.html?modgooglenewswsj
COMMENTARY

What Happened in Syria?
By PETER HOEKSTRA and ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN
October 20, 2007; Page A10
Over the last Iew weeks, State Department oIIicials have reported major diplomatic breakthroughs that
will roll back North Korea's nuclear weapons program, allow Pyongyang to be removed Irom the U.S.
state sponsors oI terror list, and normalize relations between our two countries.
North Korea reportedly has agreed to disable its nuclear Iacilities and has, as it has done many times
beIore, promised to give a Iull accounting oI its nuclear program. The latest deadline is Dec. 31, 2007.
Congress has been asked to support this agreement, which State Department oIIicials claim will beneIit
our nation and promote regional stability.
Then, early last month, Israel conducted an airstrike against a Iacility in northern Syria that press
reports have linked to nuclear programs by North Korea, Iran or other rogue states. II this event proves
that Syria acquired nuclear expertise or material Irom North Korea, Iran or other rogue states, it would
constitute a grave threat to international security Ior which Syria and any other involved parties must be
held accountable.
The Bush administration, however, has thrown an unprecedented veil oI secrecy around the Israeli
airstrike. It has brieIed only a handIul oI very senior members oI Congress, leaving the vast majority oI
Ioreign relations and intelligence committee members in the dark. We are among the very Iew who
were brieIed, but we have been sworn to secrecy on this matter. However, we are prepared to state,
based on what we have learned, that it is critical Ior every member oI Congress to be brieIed on this
incident, and as soon as possible.
We are concerned that, although the Bush administration reIuses to discuss the Israeli airstrike with the
American people or with the majority oI Congress, it has not hesitated to give inIormation on
background to the press to shape this story to its liking. New York Times writer David Sanger authored
and coauthored articles on Oct. 14 and 15 that appeared to reIlect extensive input Irom senior policy
makers. Washington Post writer Glenn Kessler coauthored an article on Sept. 21 that also cited inside
inIormation Irom the administration. We believe this is unacceptable.
We want to remind President Bush that the Constitution invests Congress with various powers and
authority over Ioreign policy. Not only does Congress have an obligation to conduct oversight over
these matters, but it is accountable to the people oI this country to ensure that their security and
interests are saIeguarded.
The proposed deals with North Korea will involve substantial expenditures oI U.S. Iunds to pay Ior
heavy Iuel oil deliveries. Congress will be asked to approve the authorization oI Iunds Ior this
expenditure. We cannot carry out our duties when we are being denied inIormation about these critical
national security matters.
We all want to secure agreements that address the proliIeration oI nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles
and unconventional weapons. However, Ior these agreements to have long-term viability, they must be
transparent, and based on close consultations and collaboration with the Congress.
II the Israeli airstrike last month is related to covert nuclear collaboration involving Syria and either
North Korea, Iran or other rogue states, this may or may not be an issue that can be easily addressed by
negotiations alone. It is certain, however, that such a serious international security issue will not stay
secret Iorever.
Congress, thereIore, needs to be Iully brieIed, not just on the details oI the airstrike, but on how to
address this matter and how, iI press reports are true, rogue states will be held accountable Ior what
could amount to a very serious case oI WMD proliIeration.
We regret that the administration has ignored numerous letters Irom Congress asking that all members
be brieIed on the Israeli airstrike. Failing to disclose the details oI this incident to the legislative branch,
preventing due diligence and oversight -- but talking to the press about it -- is not the way to win
support Ior complex and diIIicult diplomatic eIIorts to combat proliIeration by rogue nations.
Until Congress is Iully brieIed, it would be imprudent Ior the administration to move Iorward with
agreements with state proliIerators. Congress must be a Iull partner in this process and, Irom this point
Iorward, must be kept dutiIully and currently inIormed about this matter.
Mr. Hoekstra is the senior Republican member oI the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen is the senior Republican member oI the House Foreign AIIairs
Committee.
http://www.newsmax.com/insidecover/Israelattacksyria/2007/10/22/42934.html
Hoekstra, Ros-Lehtinen: Reveal Syria Attack Info
Monday, October 22, 2007 3:15 PM
By: Newsmax StaII
[EXCERPTS]
Two inIluential Republican members oI the U.S. House have castigated the Bush administration Ior
Iailing to brieI Congress on Israeli bombing oI a suspected nuclear Iacility in Syria last month.
In an op-ed piece in Saturdays Wall Street Journal, Rep. Peter Hoekstra oI Michigan, senior GOP
member oI the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen oI
Florida, the senior Republican member oI the House Foreign AIIairs Committee, wrote:
[deletia; full text of op-ed above]
The day aIter the op-ed piece was published, Hoekstra and Rep. Jane Harman oI CaliIornia who
chairs the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence appeared on CNNs Late
Edition with WolI Blitzer.
[See http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=ci_gFFXg8dY]
Hoekstra reiterated his call Ior the Bush administration to divulge to Congress details about the Israeli
strike and the alleged Syrian-North Korean program.
But when asked iI she had been brieIed, Harman said: I know what I know Irom the public media.
Blitzer said: But you're the chair oI this important intelligence subcommittee oI the House Homeland
Security Committee. Have they brieIed you?
Harman answered: No, they have not brieIed me on what went on in northern Syria I've had some
conversations with Peter, but he's not Iree to reveal classiIied inIormation even to me, although I have
the clearances. That's just how the thing works.
Asked by Blitzer iI the reported North Korean link to the Syrian Iacility raises alarm bells Ior him,
Hoekstra replied:
Absolutely. I mean what we've Iound through the '90s and what we have Iound through the Bush
administration is that the North Koreans, they'll always make deal, but the other thing that we'll see
consistently is that they will break those agreements.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/62321
A New Intelligence Failure?
By Mark Hosenball , NEWSWEEK
Nov 5, 2007 Issue

The Syrian desert Iacility that Israel apparently attacked in a shadowy Sept. 6 raidand that some
administration oIIicials believe was a secret nuclear reactormight be several years old. Israel bombed
the complex near the Euphrates River months aIter alerting the United States to the existence oI a
suspect Syrian Iacility, according to intelligence sources. But photographic evidence obtained by
NEWSWEEK shows the boxy main building already existed in 2003, and a European intelligence
source said the program might have begun years earlier. The source, who asked Ior anonymity when
discussing sensitive inIormation, said Iresh intelligence suggests the Syrians actually started a hush-
hush program under the regime oI late president HaIez Assad, who died in 2000, and that initially,
clandestine Iactions oI the government may have kept it secret Irom Bashar al-Assad, HaIez's son and
successor. II true, it could be a signiIicant intelligence Iailure by American and other Western spy
agencies. (The CIA declined to comment.)
The Iacility in the 2003 satellite photo, taken by the commercial remote-sensing company GeoEye,
appears identical to the one pictured in satellite images snapped weeks beIore the Israeli strike, with
one notable distinction: the recent photos include what analysts have described as a pumping station
along the Euphrates. Nuclear experts say Syria probably put in the pumping station to cool a reactor,
which many believe was based on a North Korean design and was years Irom completion. A post-raid
commercial satellite image taken last week showed the site had been Ilattened by bulldozersevidence
that most experts agree demonstrated Syria's desire to hide all traces oI the Iacility. Israel has kept quiet
about its attack, while Syria denied having a secret nuclear program.
Immediately aIter the bombing, many nuclear-proliIeration experts in the United States and Europe
expressed doubt that Syria had the money or the scientiIic capability Ior a secret atomic program. They
also questioned whether North Korea would be desperate and greedy enough to sell nuclear wares to
Syria. The new photos now have skeptics admitting they may have been mistaken.
The Bush administration has maintained a strict gag order on discussion oI the Israeli attack. But two
weeks aIter the incident, U.S. "intelligence czar" Mike McConnell began giving highly classiIied one-
on-one brieIings about the incident to a handIul oI congressional leaders. Republicans and Democrats
came away with opposing conclusions. According to a Iormer administration oIIicial, Republican
legislators began agitating Ior a halt, or at least an interruption, in ongoing U.S. disarmament talks with
North Korea. But House Foreign AIIairs chairman Tom Lantos told NEWSWEEK that even aIter the
brieIing, he remains "Iully in Iavor oI pursuing ongoing diplomatic discussions with North Korea."
Lantos said he also Iavors closer relations with both Pyongyang and Damascus, and that iI North Korea
disarmament talks succeed, the country should be dropped Irom a U.S. list oI states that sponsor
terrorism.
http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2007/11/congress-still-.html
Congress Still Largely Uninformed on Israeli Strike on Syria
Nick Schwellenbach
November 8, 2007
[EXCERPT]
Despite several congressional requests to the executive branch Ior brieIings on Israel's air strike on
Syria in September, Congress still remains largely in the dark, POGO learned yesterday. On October
20, Reps. Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), respectively the ranking members oI
the House intelligence and Ioreign relations committees, published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal
charging that:
We regret that the administration has ignored numerous letters Irom Congress asking that all
members be brieIed on the Israeli airstrike. Failing to disclose the details oI this incident to the
legislative branch, preventing due diligence and oversight -- but talking to the press about it -- is
not the way to win support Ior complex and diIIicult diplomatic eIIorts to combat proliIeration
by rogue nations. |emphasis added|
The Senate intelligence committee oIIicially told me "no comment" yesterday [November 7, 2007].
However, a congressional staIIer told me that "the issue has been closely held. The leadership oI the
deIense committees and Intel committees have been brieIed, but not the general membership oI the
Congress as you correctly noted in Ros-Lethinens OpEd." Other sources told me that they were not
aware oI their Iull committees being brieIed yet either.
Perhaps oI greater practical concern Ior congressional oversight is, though a Iew select members have
been brieIed, none oI their staII, which members depend upon Ior their expertise and knowledge, have
not been allowed to accompany them, POGO has been told.
http://www.lemonde.Ir/web/article/0,1-02-3218,36-96966551-677013,0.html
Mohamed ElBaradei pense que "l'Iran ne sera pas une menace ds demain"
LE MONDE , 22.10.07 , 14h56 Mis a jour le 22.10.07 , 15h01
VIENNE ENVOYEE SPECIALE
[EXCERPT]
Quel commentaire faites-vous propos des raids ariens mens le 6 septembre par Isral en Syrie
? Selon la presse amricaine, ces frappes visaient des sites o se construisait un racteur nuclaire
bas sur des lments en provenance de la Core du Nord. Ces informations sont-elles fondes ?
A l'Agence internationale de l'energie atomique (AIEA), nous avons reu zero, et je souligne "zero",
inIormation allant dans ce sens. Nous avons contacte les Syriens, ainsi que les agences de
renseignement etrangeres. Nous avons dit : si l'un d'entre vous a la moindre inIormation montrant qu'il
y avait des elements lies au nucleaire, evidemment, nous serions contents d'enquter la-dessus. J'ose
esperer, Iranchement, qu'avant que les gens en viennent a bombarder et a utiliser la Iorce, ils viennent
nous voir pour signaler leurs preoccupations. Nous serions alors alles sur place pour veriIier. Nous
n'avons pas d'indication montrant que c'est nucleaire. Tant que nous ne recevrons pas d'inIormation
allant dans ce sens, nous ne pourrons pas Iaire grand-chose.
Dans le suivi que vous avez fait jusqu' prsent des activits nuclaires de la Core du Nord,
avez-vous trouv la moindre indication d'un lien, ou de transferts, vers la Syrie ?
Nous ne disposons pas d'inIormations de cet ordre. Concernant la Coree du Nord, nous avons ete les
premiers a aller en 1992 au Conseil de securite de l'ONU pour dire que quelque chose etait
problematique dans ce pays. Nous ne cachons pas les Iaits. Mais pour pouvoir agir avec autorite, nous
devons disposer d'inIormations.
Comment cette action militaire isralienne en Syrie pse-t-elle, selon vous, sur le dossier nuclaire
iranien ?
Je dois vraiment savoir - bientt j'espere - ce qui s'est passe exactement en Syrie. Certains ont tendance
a parler un peu vite de l'usage de la Iorce, en brandissant cette idee de "guerre juste" ou de "guerre
preventive". La Charte de l'ONU edicte clairement les cas speciIiques dans lesquels la Iorce peut tre
autorisee : dans un cas d'autodeIense Iace a une attaque imminente, ou alors lorsqu'une decision
collective est prise par le Conseil de securite de l'ONU s'il juge que la paix et la securite internationales
sont menacees.
C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'il est question d'employer la Iorce sans explication, je deviens tres preoccupe.
J'espere obtenir une explication (sur le raid en Syrie), indiquant notamment en quoi il s'agirait d'un cas
d'autodeIense. Je ne le sais pas. Y a-t-il un rapport avec le nucleaire ? Y a-t-il un rapport avec l'Iran ?
Ce sont des questions importantes. J'ajoute une chose. Lorsque les Israeliens ont detruit le reacteur
nucleaire de recherche de Saddam Hussein en 1981 (Osirak), la consequence a ete que Saddam Hussein
a Iait basculer son programme dans la clandestinite. Il a commence a mettre en place un programme
nucleaire militaire massiI, "underground". L'usage de la Iorce peut repousser les echeances, mais il ne
traite pas les racines du probleme.
http://www.uIppc.org/content/view/6753/35/
|Translated Irom Le Monde (Paris)|
MOHAMED ELBARADEI THINKS "IRAN IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE THREAT"
By Natalie Nougayrede
Le Monde
October 23, 2007 (posted Oct. 22)
http://www.lemonde.Ir/web/article/0,1-0,36-969665,0.html
[EXCERPT]
* What comment do you have about the air raids Israel carried out in Syria on September 6?
According to the American press, these strikes were aimed at sites where a nuclear reactor was
being constructed with equipment that came from North Korea. Are these reports well-founded?
At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have received zero, and I emphasize "zero,"
inIormation that goes in that direction. We have contacted the Syrians, as well as Ioreign intelligence
agencies. We've said: iI one oI you has the slightest inIormation showing that there were elements tied
to nuclear matters, obviously, we would be happy to investigate it. I dare hope, Irankly, that beIore
people start bombing and using Iorce, they will come to see us to say what they're worried about. We
would then have made an on-site veriIication inspection. We have no indication showing that this is
nuclear. So long as we receive no inIormation going in this direction, we can't do much.
* In following North Korea's nuclear activities so far, have you found the slightest indication of a
link or of transfers in the direction of Syria?
We have no inIormation oI that kind. Concerning North Korea, we were the Iirst to go in 1992 to the
U.N. Security Council to say that there was something problematic about that country. We don't hide
Iacts. But in order to act with authority, we have to have inIormation.
* How has this Israeli military action in Syria affected, in your opinion, the Iranian nuclear
matter?
I should really know -- soon, I hope -- what exactly happened in Syria. Some have a tendency to talk a
little quickly about the use oI Iorce, waving around this idea oI "just war" or "preventive war." The
U.N. Charter pronounces clearly the speciIic cases in which Iorce can be authorized: in a case oI selI-
deIense when Iaced with an imminent attack, or when a collective decision is taken by the U.N.
Security Council iI it thinks that international peace and security are threatened.
That's why, when it's a question oI using Iorce without any explanation, I get very worried. I hope to
obtain an explanation |about the raid in Syria|, indicating in particular in what way it was a case oI selI-
deIense. I don't know. Is there a relation to nuclear matters? Is there a connection with Iran? These are
important questions. I'll add one more thing. When the Israelis destroyed Saddam Hussein's nuclear
research reactor in 1981 (Osirak), the consequence was that Saddam Hussein moved to a secret
program. He began to implement a massive military nuclear program, "underground." The use oI Iorce
can set back the clock, but it doesn't deal with the roots oI the problem.
Photographs Said to Show Israeli Target Inside Syria
Wednesday, October 24, 2007; A01
Independent experts have pinpointed what they believe to be the Euphrates River site in Syria that was
bombed by Israel last month, and satellite imagery oI the area shows buildings under construction
roughly similar in design to a North Korean reactor capable oI producing nuclear material Ior one
bomb a year, the experts say.
Photographs oI the site taken beIore the secret Sept. 6 airstrike depict an isolated compound that
includes a tall, boxy structure similar to the type oI building used to house a gas-graphite reactor. They
also show what could have been a pumping station used to supply cooling water Ior a reactor, say
experts David Albright and Paul Brannan oI the Institute Ior Science and International Security (ISIS).
U.S. and international experts and oIIicials Iamiliar with the site, who were shown the photographs
yesterday, said there was a strong and credible possibility that they depict the remote compound that
was attacked. Israeli oIIicials and the White House declined to comment.
II the Iacility is conIirmed as the site oI the attack, the photos provide a potential explanation Ior
Israel's middle-oI-the-night bombing raid.
The Iacility is located seven miles north oI the desert village oI At Tibnah, in the Dayr az Zawr region,
and about 90 miles Irom the Iraqi border, according to the ISIS report to be released today. Albright, a
Iormer U.N. weapons inspector, said the size oI the structures suggested that Syria might have been
building a gas-graphite reactor oI about 20 to 25 megawatts oI heat, similar to the reactor North Korea
built at Yongbyon.
"I'm pretty convinced that Syria was trying to build a nuclear reactor," Albright said in an interview. He
said the project would represent a signiIicant departure Irom past policies. ISIS, a nonproIit research
group, tracks nuclear weapons and stockpiles around the world.
Israel, which has nuclear weapons oI its own, has not said publicly what its warplanes hit or provided
justiIication Ior the raid. Syria has denied having a nuclear program. But beginning construction oI a
nuclear reactor in secret would violate Syria's obligations under the Non-ProliIeration Treaty, which
requires all signatories to declare their intent when such a decision is made, according to sources at the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.
The new report leaves many questions unanswered, such as what Syria intended to use the unIinished
structures Ior and the exact role, iI any, oI North Korea in their construction. Also unclear is why Israel
chose to use military Iorce rather than diplomatic pressure against a Iacility that could not have
produced signiIicant nuclear material Ior years. The new details could Iuel debate over whether Israel's
attack was warranted.
Albright acknowledged the diIIiculties oI proving what the site is, in part because the rooI was put on
at an early stage, blocking views oI the Ioundation and obscuring any potential reactor components. In
construction oI other types oI nuclear reactors, the rooI is leIt oII until the end so cranes can move
heavy equipment inside.
Some nuclear experts urged caution in interpreting the photos, noting that the type oI reactor Iavored
by North Korea has Iew distinguishing characteristics visible Irom the air. Unlike commercial nuclear
power reactors, Ior example, a North Korea-style reactor lacks the distinctive, dome-shaped
containment vessel that prevents the release oI radiation in the event oI a nuclear accident.
"You can look at North Korea's |reactor| buildings, and they look like nothing," said John E. Pike, a
nuclear expert and director oI GlobalSecurity.org. "They're just metal-skinned industrial buildings."
The proximity oI the building to a water source also is not signiIicant by itselI, Pike said.
But Brannan, oI ISIS, combed through a huge amount oI satellite imagery to Iind a site along the
Euphrates that matches a reactor's speciIications as well as descriptions oI the attack site. The
compound's distance Irom populated areas was a key detail, since reactors are usually isolated Irom
major urban populations.
The site is also close to an irrigated area, which would explain statements by some oIIicials privy to
details oI the attack that the Iacility was located near orchards. A small airstrip about two miles away
could have been used to transport personnel to the site.
U.S. and Ioreign oIIicials tracking the incident said that Syria is presently trying to remove remaining
structures at the site.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has acquired its own aerial photographs but has not Iinished
analyzing them, according to an IAEA source.
In an interview published yesterday, IAEA director and Nobel Peace laureate Mohamed ElBaradei
expressed anger at the Syrians, Israelis and Ioreign intelligence agencies Ior not providing inIormation
about a suspected nuclear program.
"We have said, 'II any oI you has the slightest inIormation showing that there was anything linked to
nuclear, we would oI course be happy to investigate it,' " he told the French newspaper Le Monde.
"Frankly, I venture to hope that beIore people decide to bombard and use Iorce, they will come and see
us to convey their concerns."
ElBaradei also said an airstrike could endanger eIIorts to contain nuclear proliIeration.
"When the Israelis destroyed Saddam Hussein's research nuclear reactor in 1981, the consequence was
that Saddam Hussein pursued his program secretly. He began to establish a huge military nuclear
program underground," he said. "The use oI Iorce can set things back, but it does not deal with the
roots oI the problem."
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/SuspectSite24October2007.pdI
Image Credit: Digital Globe - ISIS
[DigitalGlobe imagery of 2007-08-10]
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/26/aIrica/26syria.php
Photos show cleansing of suspect Syrian site
By William J. Broad and Mark Mazzetti
Thursday, October 25, 2007
New commercial satellite photos show that a Syrian site believed to have been attacked by Israel last
month no longer bears any obvious traces oI what some analysts said appeared to have been a partly
built nuclear reactor.
Two photos, taken Wednesday Irom space by rival companies, show the site near the Euphrates River
to have been wiped clean since August, when imagery showed a tall square building there measuring
about 150 Ieet on a side.
The Syrians reported an attack by Israel in early September; the Israelis have not conIirmed that. Senior
Syrian oIIicials continue to deny that a nuclear reactor was under construction, insisting that Israel hit a
largely empty military warehouse.
But the images, Iederal and private analysts say, suggest that the Syrian authorities rushed to dismantle
the Iacility aIter the strike, calling it a tacit admission oI guilt.
"It's a magic act here today, gone tomorrow," a senior intelligence oIIicial said. "It doesn't lower
suspicions; it raises them. This was not a long-term decommissioning oI a building, which can take a
year. It was speedy. It's incredible that they could have gone to that eIIort to make something go away."
Any attempt by Syrian authorities to clean up the site would make it diIIicult, iI not impossible, Ior
international weapons inspectors to determine the exact nature oI the activity there. OIIicials Irom the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna have said they hoped to analyze the satellite images
and ultimately inspect the site in person. David Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and
International Security, a private group in Washington that released a report on the Syrian site earlier
this week, said the expurgation oI the building was inherently suspicious.
"It looks like Syria is trying to hide something and destroy the evidence oI some activity," Albright said
in an interview. "But it won't work. Syria has got to answer questions about what it was doing."
The striking diIIerence in the satellite photos surprised even some outside experts who were skeptical
that Syria might be developing a nuclear program.
"It's clearly very suspicious," said Joseph Cirincione, an expert on nuclear proliIeration at the Center
Ior American Progress in Washington. "The Syrians were up to something that they clearly didn't want
the world to know about."
Cirincione said the photographic evidence "tilts toward a nuclear program" but does not prove that
Syria was building a reactor. Besides, he said, even iI it was developing a nuclear program, Syria
would be years away Irom being operational, and thus not an imminent threat.
Gordon Johndroe, a White House spokesman, declined to comment on the satellite pictures.
The new satellite images oI the Syrian site were taken by DigitalGlobe, in Longmont, Colorado, and
SPOT Image Corporation, in Chantilly, Virginia. They show just a smooth, unIurrowed area where the
large building once stood.
The desolate Syrian site is located on the eastern bank oI the Euphrates River some 90 miles north oI
the Iraqi border and 7 miles north oI the desert village oI At Tibnah. An airIield lies nearby. The new
images reveal that the tall building is gone but still show a secondary structure and a pumping station
on the Euphrates. Reactors need water Ior cooling.
The purported reactor at the site is believed to be modeled on a North Korean model, which uses
buildings a Iew Ieet longer on each side than the Syrian building that vanished.
Albright called the Syrian site "consistent with being a North Korean reactor design." Imad Moustapha,
the Syrian ambassador to the United States, denied in an interview last week with The Dallas Morning
News that his country was trying to build a reactor.
"There is no Syrian nuclear program whatsoever," he said. "It's an absolutely blatant lie."
Later in the interview, he said, "We understand that iI Syria even contemplated nuclear technology,
then the gates oI hell would open on us."
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gN-KBm9OPrmDDSMjAXJTEqEU2DKQ
Diplomat tries to reassure US lawmakers on NKorea talks
Oct 25, 2007
WASHINGTON (AFP) A senior US negotiator told lawmakers on Thursday Washington would
keep an eye on reports North Korea may be selling nuclear know-how, but declined to discuss
allegations Pyongyang had oIIered nuclear help to Syria.
Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill Iaced tough questioning by lawmakers at a committee
hearing on the six-nation talks, in which North Korea has promised to abandon its nuclear program.
The legislators questioned the US administration's diplomatic approach with North Korea citing reports
that Pyongyang may have assisted Syria to start building a nuclear reactor. Israel reportedly launched
an air strike against the suspected site in September.
Hill said he could not discuss North Korea's alleged role in Syria's nuclear program at an open
congressional hearing because that inIormation was "classiIied."
"I'm not in a position here to discuss intelligence matters, which is the level one would need to discuss
questions whether they did or did not," Hill said.
Asked by Democratic Representative David Scott oI Georgia iI the issue had been brought up in
disarmament talks with North Korea, Hill said: "Yes, I have raised this issue."
The US diplomat said the disarmament deal would not go ahead iI North Korea was Iound to be
smuggling nuclear arms, equipment or know-how abroad.
"I think throughout the process we have made it clear we cannot accept any agreement that has us
winking at proliIeration issues. So proliIeration, or non-proliIeration, has to be at the heart oI any
agreement," Hill said.
Republican Ted Poe charged the White House had Iailed to brieI lawmakers on intelligence related to
North Korea's activities in Syria.
"I'm concerned about what they're doing in Syria. And I would like you to tell me why you can't tell us
what they're doing in Syria?" said Poe.
Under the six-nation talks, North Korea has agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs in return
Ior a broad package oI economic and diplomatic incentives.
Hill's testimony at the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-ProliIeration and Trade came as
President George W. Bush Iaced criticism Irom Iellow Republicans and a Iormer administration oIIicial
over the deal with North Korea.
In a commentary published this week in the Wall Street Journal, two Republican members oI Congress
said the reports oI North Korean involvement raised serious concerns about the disarmament talks.
They complained that "only a handIul" oI lawmakers were given intelligence brieIings by the Bush
administration on the Israeli air strike.
Former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton, breaking ranks with the administration, has criticized
the six-party talks with North Korea and reportedly lobbied Republican lawmakers on the issue.
North Korea has angrily denied sharing atomic know-how with Damascus.
II conIirmed, the reports oI nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria would deal a blow to
Bush who has portrayed US policy towards Pyongyang as a a success story.
A satellite photo Irom Sept. 16, 2003, shows a large structure being built near a site in Syria that was
bombed last month by Israel.
Yet Another Photo of Site in Syria, Yet More Questions
By WILLIAM J. BROAD and MARK MAZZETTI
Published: October 27, 2007
The mystery surrounding the construction oI what might have been a nuclear reactor in Syria deepened
yesterday, when a company released a satellite photo showing that the main building was well under
way in September 2003 Iour years beIore Israeli jets bombed it.
The long genesis is likely to raise questions about whether the Bush administration overlooked a
nascent atomic threat in Syria while planning and executing a war in Iraq, which was later Iound to
have no active nuclear program.
A senior American intelligence oIIicial said yesterday that American analysts had looked careIully at
the site Irom its early days, but were unsure then whether it posed a nuclear threat.
In the time beIore the Iraq war, President Bush and his senior advisers sounded many alarms about
Baghdads reconstituting its nuclear program. But they have never publicly discussed what many
analysts say appears to have been a long-running nuclear eIIort next door.
Yesterday independent analysts, examining the latest satellite image, suggested that work on the site
might have begun around 2001, and the senior intelligence oIIicial agreed with that analysis. That early
date is potentially signiIicant in terms oI North Koreas suspected aid to Syria, suggesting that North
Korea could have begun its assistance in the late 1990s.
A dispute has broken out between conservatives and Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice over the
administrations pursuit oI diplomacy with North Korea in the Iace oI intelligence that North Korea
might have helped Syria design a nuclear reactor.
The new image may give ammunition to those in the administration, including Ms. Rice, who call Ior
diplomacy. II North Korea started its Syrian aid long ago, the oIIicials could argue that the assistance
was historical, not current, and that diplomacy should move ahead.
The progress oI the site in late 2003 also raises new questions about a disagreement at the time between
intelligence analysts and John R. Bolton, then the State Departments top arms control oIIicial.
In the summer oI 2003, Mr. Boltons testimony on Capitol Hill was delayed aIter a dispute erupted in
part over whether Syria was actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. Some intelligence oIIicials said Mr.
Bolton overstated the Syrian threat.
There was disagreement about what Syria was interested in and how much we should be monitoring
it, Mr. Bolton said in an interview yesterday. There was activity in Syria that I Ielt was evidence that
they were trying to develop a nuclear program.
Mr. Bolton declined to say whether he had knowledge at the time about the site that the Israelis struck
in September.
Spokesmen Ior the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council declined to
comment.
The new image oI the desolate Syrian site was released yesterday by GeoEye, in Dulles, Va. Mark
Brender, the companys vice president Ior communications and marketing, said the picture was taken
on Sept. 16, 2003. He added that the image had been collected as part oI the companys agenda oI
building a large archive oI global images.
Earlier this week, Iederal and private analysts identiIied the precise location oI the Syrian site, and
since then rival companies have raced to release images. The site is on the eastern bank oI the
Euphrates, 90 miles north oI the Iraqi border.
Images taken in August, beIore the Israeli raid, show a tall building about 150 Ieet wide on each side
that analysts suspect might have sheltered a halI-built nuclear reactor. Also visible is a pumping station
on the Euphrates, which may be signiIicant because reactors need water Ior cooling.
John E. Pike, director oI GlobalSecurity.org, a private group in Alexandria, Va., that analyzes satellite
images, said the 2003 picture showed the tall building in the midst oI early construction, surrounded by
churned earth. He put the groundbreaking in 2001.
Its uncommon to see such activity in the middle oI nowhere, he said, adding that it was suIIiciently
unusual to have worried American intelligence oIIicials. Id have put it on my suspect site list and
kept watching, he said.
The senior intelligence oIIicial said that American spy satellites and analysts had, in Iact, watched the
site Ior years.
It was noticed, without knowing what it was, the oIIicial said. You revisit every so oIten, but it was
not a high priority. You see things that raise the Ilag and you know you have to keep looking. It was a
case oI watching it evolve.
JeIIrey Lewis, an expert on nuclear proliIeration at the New America Foundation in Washington, said it
was surprising Irom the photos how little progress had been made at the site between 2003 and 2007.
But Mr. Lewis said it was ironic that Syria might have been trying to build a nuclear program just as
the United States was invading Iraq in the Iear that Iraq was developing nuclear arms.
Google Earth image of uncertain date , possibly from SPOT,
retrieved 2007-11-25 showing large building at 35.7079 N, 39.8331 E.
Note that the riverside building visible in imagery of August and October 2007 is not present.
Google Earth image retrieved 2007-11-25 showing location of building
relative to other features in the area.
Regional overview showing strike site
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/SyriaUpdate25October2007.pdI
Image Credit: Digital Globe - ISIS
DigitalGlobe imagery of 2007-10-24.
[Sourcebook note: Note that the shading caused by solar illumination on the cleared area where the
large building formerly stood matches that on the hill to the right, suggesting that the area is mounded.
Also note that the northwest corner of the hill was cut away between 2007-08-10 and the date of the
image. Together, these suggest that dirt was removed from the hill and used to cover remains of the
building.]
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21479058/
[The date of the left image should be September 16, 2003]
Images raise suspicions of Syria facility
Site oI a suspected nuclear reactor seems cleaned up aIter Israeli attack
By Robert Windrem and Andrea Mitchell
NBC News
updated 5:10 p.m. CT, Fri., Oct. 26, 2007
New satellite photos taken Wednesday show that Syria apparently cleaned up the site oI a suspected
nuclear reactor aIter it was bombed by Israeli aircraIt last month.
The imagery, taken by Digital Globe, a private satellite imagery company, shows a cleared area where
two months beIore the suspect Iacility stood. The boxy building is located at the end oI a dirt road just
oII the Euphrates River. The site is about 100 miles Irom the Iraqi border near the town oI At Tibnah in
northeastern Syria.
Although reports indicated the the reactor had been in the early stages oI construction, an earlier
satellite photo, taken by another commercial imaging company, GeoEye, raised questions about those
assertions. The imagery, taken on September 16, 2003, Iour year prior to the attack, shows the Iacility
looking just as it did prior to the attack The only diIIerence is the addition oI a pumping station on the
Euphrates River near the Iacility. Some U.S. oIIicials have suggested the reactor was based on a North
Korean design. The North has agreed to denuclearize, and iI it was shown that it had helped Syria, that
would complicate Iurther relations with the United States.
David Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and International Security, said the satellite
imagery "eIIectively conIirms that this site was indeed the target oI the Israeli raid." Albright's group
did its own analysis oI the imagery.
Beyond the suspected reactor, the imagery also shows the pumping station on the Euphrates, which
does not appear to have been bombed or cleaned up. The "beIore" picture was taken Aug. 10, the
"aIter" on Oct. 24 (Wednesday). The raid, which Syria has conIirmed but which Israel and the U.S.
have oIIicially declined to discuss, took place Sept. 6.
U.S. oIIicials have said on background that Iollowing the Israeli attack, Syria bulldozed the debris Irom
the site, apparently to avoid having the Iacility's purpose exposed. The International Atomic Energy
Agency has said it was studying satellite photos to determine iI it should investigate Syria's nuclear
activities and Israel's raid. The Syrian Ioreign ministry on Wednesday denied the Iacility was a reactor.
NBC News has learned that the Israelis used Iour F-16's in the attack, two acting as Iighter bombers,
two as jammers. The two bombers dropped six precision-guided thousand-pound bombs on the site.
The site was believed to be in the early stages oI construction and to not yet have been outIitted.
"Dismantling and removing the building at such a rapid pace dramatically complicates any inspection
oI the Iacilities and suggests that Syria may be trying to hide what was there," added Albright. "Iraq
Iollowed a similar strategy in 1991 aIter the Iirst GulI War, though eventually the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and U.N. inspectors pieced together a Iull picture oI Iraq's activities."
Albright said tractors or bulldozers can be seen in the Oct. 24 imagery where the suspected reactor
building once stood. Scrape marks can be seen around the razed part oI the site as well.
"There also appears to be a trench in the Oct. 24, 2007, imagery that is better deIined than in the Aug.
10, 2007, imagery," said Albright, a Iormer IAEA inspector in Iraq. "This trench may be more visible
as a result oI the Syrians digging up buried pipelines running Irom the pump station to the now-gone
suspected reactor construction building. Because oI a more prominent shadow in the Oct. 24, 2007,
imagery, there appears to be evidence oI an underground portion oI the suspect reactor building."
Asked Ior a comment on whether its imagery matches Digital Globe's, a spokesman Ior the Central
Intelligence Agency said, "Sorry, we can't help you on that."
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Israel-Syria.html
Olmert Hints at Israel Air Raid on Syria
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
October 28, 2007
Filed at 11:01 p.m. ET
JERUSALEM (AP) -- In the closest that Israel has come to conIirming a mysterious air raid in Syria,
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert acknowledged to his Cabinet on Sunday [October 28, 2007] that Turkish
airspace might have been violated during the operation.
Israel has not oIIicially commented on the raid or acknowledged carrying it out. But at Sunday's
Cabinet meeting, Olmert oIIered an ambiguous apology to Turkey, which has complained to Israel that
its aircraIt dropped Iuel tanks on Turkish territory during the incursion.
''II Israeli planes indeed penetrated Turkish airspace, then it was without prior intent or any intent to
inIringe upon or undermine Turkish sovereignty, which we respect,'' a statement Irom Olmert's oIIice
cited him as telling the Cabinet.
In a conversation with Turkey's prime minister last week, Olmert ''expressed Israel's apologies to the
Turkish government and the Turkish people Ior any harm that might have been caused,'' the statement
said.
The Sept. 6 air strike has been enveloped in secrecy. Syrian President Bashar Assad said the attack
targeted an unused military building.
But reports Iollowing the incident have contradicted that account, and commercial satellite images have
indicated a nuclear reactor site might have been destroyed. Syria has denied developing a nuclear
reactor.
Mohamed ElBaradei, director general oI the International Atomic Energy Agency, on Sunday criticized
the United States and Israel Ior Iailing to provide the U.N. watchdog with intelligence about Syria's
purported nuclear program.
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2007/11/03/56/0301000000AEN20071103001200315F.HTML

Roh says allegations of N.K.-Syria nuclear cooperation not backed by evidence
By Yoo Cheong-mo
2007/11/03 10:39 KST

SEOUL, Nov. 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he has never seen evidence
oI nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria, denying U.S. media reports alleging that the
communist North has helped Syria build nuclear Iacilities.
Roh asserted in an interview with Japan's Asahi Shimbun, published on Saturday, that "uncertain
and triIling matters" should not be obstacles to the ongoing international eIIorts to have North Korea
dismantle its nuclear weapons program by the end oI the year.
"I have never seen or heard oI evidence about North Korean transIer oI nuclear technologies to
Syria, as reported in the U.S. It is crucial to the settlement oI the six-party talks (on the
denuclearization oI North Korea). Uncertain issues and insigniIicant obstacles should not be allowed to
ruin the talks," said Roh.
"All disputes should eventually be resolved through dialogue. Mutual trust should be built in
order to create such an atmosphere (Ior dialogue). To that end, an aggressive act should be restrained
and Iriendly acts should be encouraged," said the president.
As the six-party negotiations involving the two Koreas, U.S., China, Russia and Japan were
gaining momentum, suspicions surIaced recently that North Korea might be providing Syria with
nuclear technology. An analysis oI U.S. satellite photos indicated that a Syrian site that Israel raided in
September appeared to have a building whose size and shape resembled those oI the North Korean
reactor.
Washington has since stressed that Ior North Korea to receive any Iurther beneIits, it must IulIill
its obligations, disabling the nuclear Iacilities and Iully accounting Ior its nuclear programs. The
controversy erupted as North Korea pledged in an Oct. 3 deal to disable its key nuclear installations and
declare its atomic stockpile by the end oI the year.
[deletia]
ycmyna.co.kr
(END)
http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/breaking/105120.html
Turkey puts Israeli sortie behind it
Published: 11/06/2007
Turkey said the controversy over Israel's penetration oI its airspace during a bombing run in Syria is
over.
The discovery oI jettisoned Iuel tanks in Turkey's Irontier with Syria aIter the mysterious Sept. 6 sortie
prompted protests Irom Ankara. AIter weeks oI silence, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert apologized
to Turkey, one oI the Iew Muslim powers to have good relations with the Jewish state.
"It is no easy thing to discover that combat jets Irom a Iriendly state have penetrated your skies
overnight. It is good that you apologized, even though the apology was late," Turkish President
Abdullah Gul said in a Maariv interview published Tuesday.
"As we see it, the matter is closed and we hope that it will not be repeated in the Iuture."
Jerusalem has not given details on the air strike, which Ioreign analysts believe targeted a nascent
nuclear Iacility. Syria complained about the incident to Turkey.
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?sectionlocal&id5747548
Syrian ambassador talks about nuclear site bombing
Blasted Vice President Cheney
KGO By Alan Wang
BERKELEY, CaliI. Nov. 6, 2007 (KGO) - Syria's ambassador to the United States spoke only to
ABC7 news on Tuesday. He accused Vice President Cheney oI Iueling the media with more rumors oI
weapons oI mass destruction.
"The whole story about this North Korean/Syrian cooperation on nuclear technology is a total, shear
[sic], absolute Iabrication," said Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Dr. Imad Moustapha.
In September, Israeli planes bombed a Syrian target reported to be a partly constructed nuclear reactor.
ABC7's Alan Wang: "II you could, what was the site bombed by Israel?"
"It was a military site and this is not the Iirst air raid the history oI the Syrian/Israeli conIlict," said Dr.
Moustapha.
ProIessor Michael Nacht, who is the dean oI UC Berkeley's Goldman School oI Public Policy says
everyone is keeping eerily quiet about the attack.
"The Syrian government didn't really say anything about it. Bush reIuses to talk about it. The Israeli
government reIuses to talk about it, and no Arab government has condemned Israel Ior it," said
Goldman School oI Public Policy Dean ProIessor Michael Nacht.
AIter the ambassador's speech we tried to press him more on the issue.
Dr. Imad Moustapha: "There are plenty oI military sites."
ABC7 Alan Wang: "Why was it so crucial Ior Israel to bomb it?"
Dr. Imad Moustapha: "It was not crucial. They could have bombarded it or another military target. The
problem is the sinister stories that are Iabricated in Washington D.C. alleging a nuclear program in
Syria which is absolutely categorically untrue.
Alan Wang: "But what was it? What do you mean what was it? What was the military site? Was it an
airbase?"
Dr. Imad Moustapha: "I'm not privy to military details. Usually countries do not reveal their military
installations publicly on TV. Everything else is a blatant terrible lie."
ABC7's Alan Wang: "Thank you very much."
Dr. Imad Moustapha: "Your [sic] welcome."
http://www.deIenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid4083
Presenter: Secretary oI DeIense Robert M. Gates and Republic oI Korea Minister oI National DeIense
Kim Jang-soo
November 07, 2007
Joint Press ConIerence with Secretary oI DeIense Robert M. Gates and Republic oI Korea Minister oI
National DeIense Kim Jang-soo in Seoul, Korea
|EXCERPT|
Q. Yokip Reason Irom the Wall Street Journal. You both indicated that North Korea appears to have
begun dismantling its known nuclear sites, at the same time, Israel, backed by many American and
European security analysis, contends that North Korea has been actively proliIerating nuclear
technology to Syria. I would like to ask you iI your two governments believe that North Korea
continues to share nuclear technology with nations like Syria despite dismantling oI its own program.
And Secretary Gates, do you believe that the Israeli strike on what Israel claims to be a nuclear site in
Syria was justiIied?

SEC GATES: With regard to whether the government oI Israel believes that North Korea is
proliIerating nuclear material to Syria and whether it continues that activity, I think that is a matter to
be addressed to the government oI Israel.

Q. I am sorry, Secretary Gates, I meant iI the U.S. Government believes that and not iI the Israeli
Government believes it.

SEC GATES: I think that involves intelligence matters that we dont discuss.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/14/aIrica/ME-GEN-Syria-Israel.php
After mystery raid, the prospect of Syrian-Israeli talks
Tuesday, November 13, 2007

DAMASCUS, Syria: Israel's reported new secret peace Ieelers to Syria have deepened the mystery over
the countries' relations and the reason why Israeli warplanes bombed a target inside Syria two months
ago.
The United States has unoIIicially said that Israel's target was a nascent Syrian nuclear program. But
outside analysts and the U.N. maintain there isn't prooI oI that, and suggest the Syrian site could well
have been something else, including possibly a radar station.
Syria also has disputed that the site contained anything oI signiIicance and drawn a parallel to satellite
imagery beIore the U.S.-led invasion oI Iraq, which proved unreliable.
In addition, Syria has publicly said the Sept. 6 bombing proves Israel is not interested in peace.
Yet on Tuesday, Israel's Yediot Ahronot newspaper said that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had
hinted in a brieIing to an inIluential parliamentary committee that he was holding secret peace contacts
with Syria.
Olmert also told parliament's Foreign AIIairs and DeIense Committee on Monday that he was "ready
Ior peace with Syria and prepared to conduct negotiations" as long as Syria abandoned any ties with
North Korea and Iran and did not support terror, according to participants.
In addition, Olmert and Israeli DeIense Minister Ehud Barak have both said publicly in recent days that
they hoped Syria would take part in a U.S.-sponsored peace conIerence in Annapolis, Maryland, later
this month.
The Iocus oI the conIerence will be on the Israeli-Palestinian conIlict, however. And Syria has said it
would not attend unless the issue oI the Golan Heights also is on the table. Israel captured the strategic
Golan Irom Syria in the 1967 Mideast war.
There was no immediate comment Wednesday Irom Syria on the latest Israeli report oI peace talks,
while state-run newspapers and the oIIicial news agency SANA ignored the report.
Damascus has in the past rejected claims that it was holding secret talks and has insisted on U.S.
participation in peace talks to improve the chances oI success.
Syria also might be loathe to give up ties to Iran, with whom it has economic and military relations.
Both Syria and Iran also support Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian militants, and Syrian President
Bashar Assad has said there is no conIlict between supporting militants and working Ior peace.
The reports oI talks are not the Iirst between the two staunch enemies, who have no diplomatic ties and
have Iought Iour times since Israel's 1948 creation three in Mideast wars and the latest in Lebanon
in 1982 during the Israeli invasion oI the neighboring country.
In 2000, Iormal U.S.-sponsored Israel-Syria talks neared agreement but broke down over Iinal border
and peace arrangements. Since then, reports oI talks have popped up occasionally most recently a
halI-year ago when Israeli media reported that Olmert had relayed messages to Assad through Turkey.
But those reported talks did not lead to a breakthrough, and over the summer, war talk between Syria
and Israel heated up capped by the September air strike by Israel into northern Syria.
Syria's slow move to provide any speciIic details oI the raid aIterward, and Israel's near-silence aIter
the raid, were seen by some as a sign the two countries were engaged in some secret dance outside the
public eye.
Likewise, the silence Irom other Arab countries, who did not condemn the raid, was seen as a sign oI
Syria's own poor relations with those countries. Syria, under pressure Irom the United States Ior
allegedly interIering in Lebanon and without many Arab Iriends, could Iind talks with Israel a relieI,
and a chance Ior some regional political leverage.
Meanwhile, many in the region and in Europe remain skeptical about what prooI the United States or
Israel have that the bombed Syrian site was nuclear-linked.
"There hasn't been anything that constitutes a deIinitive smoking gun prooI that this Iacility the Israelis
attacked was indeed a nuclear Iacility," said David Hartwell, Middle East and North AIrica editor Ior
Jane's Country Risk in London.
Syria has denied any nuclear ambitions and the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, has asked the United States and Israel to show prooI.
A diplomat Iamiliar with IAEA aIIairs, speaking on condition oI anonymity because oI the issue's
sensitivity, said one theory being considered within the agency is that the bombed site may have been a
Iorward radar system, and not a nuclear site.
But John Bolton, Iormer U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said last week that the site indicated
nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria, and perhaps also cooperation with Iran.
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/USIsraelreIusetocooperatewith1114.html
US, Israel refuse to cooperate with inquest into Syria strike
Larisa Alexandrovna
Published: Wednesday November 14, 2007
UN nuclear watchdog has no evidence Syria had nuclear Iacility
The International Atomic Energy Agency - the United Nations nuclear watchdog - has not been able to
conduct an investigation into the events surrounding the Sept. 6 Israeli bombing oI a Syrian military
installation because neither the Bush administration nor Israel are cooperating.
A diplomatic source close to the Vienna based IAEA told Raw Story that both the United States and
Israel have been approached by the organization requesting supporting evidence oI a nuclear reactor
which media sources have cited, based on anonymous sources in both governments, as the reason Ior
the Israeli strike.
The source also explained that the satellite Iootage, which the IAEA obtained through commercial
channels Ior lack oI any credible evidence, does not show a nuclear reactor in the early construction
phase.
Another source, close to the IAEA, who wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature oI the
topic, told RAW STORY last week that based on satellite imagery, evidence that "it was nuclear
related is shaky" and pointed out that even basic security Ior such a Iacility - such as "security Iences" -
is missing.
Some IAEA experts have privately opined that the Iacility - located between the cities oI Hama and
Dayr az-Zawr in the Northeastern part oI Syria - may have been "no more than a workshop Ior the
pumice mining industry along the banks oI the Euphrates."
Both individuals independently conIirmed that the IAEA cannot conduct a Iormal investigation without
the cooperation oI either Israel or the United States, although both conIirmed that the Syrian
government is cooperating.
An IAEA spokesman did not immediately respond to a request Ior comment.
Little is known about the attack
Little has been publicly revealed about the attack, which neither the US nor Israel has discussed. Israel
did conIirm in October that the bombing had taken place.
According to a report in the Guardian on Sept. 16, "Was Israeli raid a dry run Ior an attack on Iran?"
the Israeli air raid was substantial and was code-named Operation Orchard.
"Far Irom being a minor incursion, the Israeli overIlight oI Syrian airspace through its ally, Turkey,
was a Iar more major aIIair involving as many as eight aircraIt, including Israel's most ultra-modern
F-15s and F-16s equipped with Maverick missiles and 500lb bombs," the paper alleged. "Flying among
the Israeli Iighters at great height was an ELINT - an electronic intelligence gathering aircraIt."
Although the mystery surrounding exactly what Israel hit in Syria continues, US intelligence sources
have told RAW STORY it was not a nuclear armaments site. In late September, Vincent Cannistraro -
Director oI Intelligence Programs Ior the National Security Council under President Ronald Reagan
and ChieI oI Operations at the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorism Center under President
George H. W. Bush - told Raw Story that what the Israelis hit was "absolutely not a nuclear weapons
Iacility."
According to another intelligence oIIicial, US intelligence "Iound no radiation signatures aIter the
bombing, so there was no uranium or plutonium present."
"We don't have any independent intelligence that it was a nuclear Iacility - only the assertions by the
Israelis and some ambiguous satellite photography Irom them that shows a building, which the Syrians
admitted was a military Iacility," the source added.
The diplomat close to the IAEA also conIirmed the lack oI radiation signatures, but explained that a
reactor still under construction would not yet be Iully loaded with the necessary materials and would
not thereIore give oII any radiation. The diplomat, however, again pointed to the satellite images,
which do not show a nuclear reactor under construction in any case, explaining certain geometric
conIigurations are necessary Ior such a Iacility, including certain height indicators as well as the lack oI
security such as armed guards.
Lawrence Wilkerson, Iormer chieI oI staII to Secretary oI State Colin Powell, said he doesn't believe
claims that the site contained nuclear weapons.
"I've heard so many versions oI this story that I despair oI ever knowing the real story," Wilkerson said
in response to an email query. "However, I do not believe that the real story, iI it is ever known, will
have anything at all to do with nuclear weapons. In short, I believe that |Iormer Bush UN ambassador
John| Bolton, |Bush Deputy National Security Advisor Elliot| Abrams, et al. are lying again."
Media reports diverge
Some intelligence oIIicials have voiced strong criticism about alleged leaks to the press, which they say
have distorted actual US and Israeli intelligence surrounding the strike. One US intelligence oIIicial
identiIied the OIIice oI the Vice President and those close to Vice President Dick Cheney by name.
"The allegations that North Korea was helping to build a nuclear reactor have not been substantiated by
US intelligence," said this intelligence oIIicial, adding, "but that hasn't stopped Dick Cheney and his
minions at the NSC, Elliot Abrams and Steve Hadley, Irom leaking the inIormation, which appears to
be misleading in the extreme."
Claims oI a Syrian nuclear weapons program have gone Irom the strange to the bizarre.
In mid-September, the Sunday Times reported that the Israelis had been planning the operation since
the spring oI this year, aIter learning that Syria was attempting to buy a nuclear device Irom North
Korea, and that at the time oI the airstrike on Sept. 6, the Israelis had managed to blow apart a "Syrian
nuclear cache."
Former US ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton told the Times that he was worried about
"North Korea and Iran outsourcing their nuclear programmes."
In late September, the Times reported again that Israeli commandos had descended on the Iacility and
obtained samples oI nuclear materials.
Yet on Sept. 17, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made what appeared to be a bizarre statement,
considering the level oI nuclear hysteria surrounding the Syrian incident.
"We want to make peace with everyone," Olmert said. "II the conditions allow Ior it, we are ready to
make peace with Syria without preset conditions and without ultimatums."
An October report on the ABC News website alleged that Mossad - Israeli intelligence - had either
directly inIiltrated the nuclear Iacility or turned a Syrian agent, and were thus able to acquire detailed
photographs oI the building, although no samples oI nuclear materials were mentioned.
Also in October, the New York Times reported that a "partially constructed" nuclear reactor had been
hit, although details "remain unclear," and the veracity oI the intelligence, which was based entirely on
satellite imagery, was also uncertain. There was no mention oI spies inIiltrating the Iacility or
commandos obtaining samples oI nuclear materials.
By Nov. 2, the "partially constructed" nuclear reactor had morphed into a "suspected nuclear site"
bombed by the United States, not Israel, with tactical nuclear weapons. This was reported by Arabic
news agency, Al Jazeera, and then picked up by the Jerusalem Post.
Some have pointed to Syria's chemical weapons program as the likely target, and alleged attempts by
Syria to weaponize a chemical warhead as the likely reason Ior the air raid. Yet the secrecy and ever-
changing stories Irom all three governments continue to obscure what actually occurred on September
6. Coupled with the lack oI cooperation Irom the US and Israel with the IAEA, there is little chance the
mystery will soon be unraveled. What is known, however, is that no type oI nuclear reactor or nuclear
Iacility was hit, despite the many anonymous leaks to the press.
Larisa Alexandrovna is managing editor oI investigative news Ior Raw Story and regularly reports on
intelligence and national security stories. Contact her at larisarawstory.com.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hrU7JZIpakwvkH3N1ZerzBYI7MmAD8SUUAUO2
Text of Bush and Fukuda's Conference
By The Associated Press 20 hours ago
Text oI President Bush's news conIerence Friday [16 November 2007] with Japanese Prime Minister
Yasuo Fukuda in Washington, as provided by the White House.
BUSH: Mr. Prime Minister, welcome to the White House. I really appreciate the opportunity to get to
know you better. I'm looking Iorward to our lunch.
This is an important visit. It's the Iirst visit the prime minister has taken since he has assumed his
important oIIice. It's a recognition that our alliance is vital Ior peace and security. The alliance between
our two countries is rooted deeply in our strong commitments to Ireedom and democracy. The prime
minister and I are going to keep it that way. One oI the things we've decided to do is to continue to
make sure the U.S.-Japanese relationship is the cornerstone oI security and peace. And I appreciate you
being here.
We'll continue to work together to advance Ireedom, security and prosperity in our respective regions
and beyond. We discussed a lot oI ways that we can make the world a better place by working together.
We discussed North Korea and the six-party talks. I appreciate Japan's participation in the six-party
talks. Together with China, Russia and South Korea, our two nations are pressing North Korea to IulIill
its obligation to abandon all its nuclear weapons programs, as well as its proliIeration eIIorts. The six-
party talks have delivered measurable results. The plutonium production Iacilities at Yongbyon are now
being disabled, under six-party supervision.
Hard work still remains to be done. North Korea has agreed to provide a Iull declaration oI all its
nuclear programs and proliIeration activities by the end oI this year. Full declaration is one oI the next
steps North Korea must take to keep the six-party talks moving towards the goal oI a Korean peninsula
without nuclear weapons.
We also discussed the issue oI Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. I reminded the prime
minister oI one oI the most moving moments oI my presidency, when the mother oI a young girl who
had been abducted by the North Koreans came to visit me. I told her, and I'm going to tell the Japanese
people once again, we will not Iorget this issue.
I understand, Mr. Prime Minister, how important the issue is to the Japanese people, and we will not
Iorget the Japanese abductees, nor their Iamilies.
We discussed AIghanistan and Iraq. Japanese naval Iorces have made valued contributions to
Operation Enduring Freedom, which supports AIghanistan's young democracy. Over six years,
Japanese vessels reIueled ships Irom 11 coalition nations nearly 800 times.
Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate the great leadership that you are showing as you work to reauthorize
the Japanese reIueling mission. Japanese air deIense SelI-DeIense Forces continue to serve bravely
to support coalition eIIorts in Iraq. Japanese planes have Ilown more than 600 sorties, carrying more
than halI a million tons oI cargo Irom many nations. And, Mr. Prime Minister, like I told you in the
Oval OIIice, I appreciate the contribution that the Japanese people are making to help this young
democracy.
We discussed the realignment oI our military Iorces, and we'll continue to do so with Secretary
(Robert) Gates over lunch. Our two nations continue to implement changes in our Iorce posture that
will help our alliance meet the challenges oI the 21st century.
We discussed Iran. The prime minister and I agree that a nuclear-armed Iran would threaten the
security oI the Middle East and beyond. Our two nations are united in our eIIorts to change the regime's
behavior through diplomacy. We agreed that unless Iran commits to suspend enrichment, international
pressure must, and will, grow.
We discussed Burma. The prime minister and I condemned the regime's crackdown on democratic
activists. We call Ior the release oI Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners. We're Ior a
genuine dialogue between the regime and those who seek a democratic Iuture Ior Burma. U.S.
sanctions on the regime are in place. Japan has canceled an aid grant. The prime minister told me his
government is reviewing other aid projects to ensure that they directly beneIit the people oI Burma.
We discussed our strong economic relationship. Prime Minister Fukuda and I discussed his plans Ior
economic reIorm in Japan. We discussed Doha, and will continue our discussions over lunch.
I think we're going to serve the prime minister I hope we serve him some good U.S. beeI, which is a
good way to bring up the subject oI beeI. We hope we're able to have the Japanese market Iully open to
all U.S. beeI and beeI products, consistent with international guidelines.
We discussed climate change and energy security. Our two nations share a similar approach to
addressing the issues oI climate change and energy security. We see real promise in our ongoing eIIorts
to bring major developed and developing economies together around key elements oI a Iuture global
agreement on climate change and energy security. And the truth oI the matter is, we need to be in the
lead, Mr. Prime Minister, because it's going to be our economies and our nations that develop most oI
the new technologies that will enable us to be better stewards oI the environment.
And Iinally, we discussed the G8, and I want to thank you Ior taking the lead in the G8. I'm looking
Iorward to attending.
All in all, we had a great discussion that will be continued during lunch. Mr. Prime Minister, welcome
to the United States, and I thank you Ior your Iriendship.
FUKUDA: (As translated.) Well, on this Iirst overseas trip aIter taking oIIice, I have come to this one
and only ally Ior Japan, the United States oI America. And I had a very substantive meeting with
President Bush just now. And I look Iorward to a Iurther exchange oI views with the president aIter
this. But since this is a very good opportunity, I would like to express some oI my views on the basis oI
the discussions we had earlier.
First oI all, we agreed that Japan-U.S. alliance is playing an indispensable role in enabling Japan and
the United States to address global issues together, and also provides the basis Ior our active diplomacy
vis-a-vis Asia.
For over halI a century Japan and the United States at times have overcome diIIiculties together and
have built a solid and resilient alliance. And we today enjoy this relationship, thanks to the eIIorts made
by countless people in our two countries and exchanges among them.
To Iurther cement the Ioundation Ior our bilateral relations in the Iuture, without taking Ior granted our
current solid relations, I explained to the president my initiative to strengthen Japan-U.S. exchanges,
including intellectual exchanges. And I received heartIelt support Ior this idea Irom President Bush.
Secondly, we discussed synergies between our respective Asia policies and Japan-U.S. alliance. I
explained to the president that the solid Japan-U.S. alliance will provide the Ioundation Ior Asia's peace
and prosperity. And realizing a stable and open Asia that advances in prosperity by Iurther deepening
our relations with Asian countries on the basis oI Japan-U.S. alliance will be in our mutual interests.
And I told the president I'm convinced that such active diplomacy vis-a-vis Asia in turn will Iurther
strengthen our alliance.
Following this meeting here, I shall be attending a series oI ASEAN-related summit meetings in
Singapore, and I desired to visit Washington, D.C. and have discussions with President Bush because
oI my belieI regarding our alliance. And I'm extremely encouraged by the President's support.
We also discussed issues that Japan and U.S. need to address jointly, and particularly in particular,
North Korea and the Iight against terrorism. With regard to North Korean nuclear programs, we agreed
that Japan and U.S. need to maintain close coordination with each other, in order to achieve complete
abandonment oI all nuclear weapons and programs by North Korea, through the six-party talks.
President Bush stated that he will never Iorget the abduction issue, and on that basis he once again
expressed his commitment Ior unchanged support to the Japanese government.
We should never allow AIghanistan to once again become a hotbed Ior terrorism. And we agreed that
Japan and the United States should continue to work together with the international community in the
Iight against terrorism. And I communicated to President Bush that I shall do my level best to achieve
an early passage oI a bill Ior the early resumption oI the reIuel act oI (inaudible) in the Indian
Ocean by the Japanese Maritime SelI-DeIense Force. President Bush expressed his appreciation Ior
Japan's support Ior the international community's Iight against terrorism and the hope that reIueling
operations will be resumed soon.
With regard to Myanmar, I stated that I have been working on the government oI Myanmar Ior
democratization and improvement oI the human rights situation. And with regard to Iranian nuclear
development, we cannot never tolerate and we agreed that we shall together work to raise pressure
with the international community so that Iran will comply with the relevant U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
And in this age oI rapid changes, on the basis oI Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan intends to exercise more
active leadership in addressing the problems oI Asia and international community.
And Iurther, we shall have discussion with President Bush over lunch on new, important issues. Japan
shall be hosting two important national conIerences next year. One is the G8 summit at Lake Toya in
Hokkaido, in July. And the important theme Ior that meeting will be climate change. On this issue,
Japan and the United States, through close coordination over the past halI year or so, have led
international discussions. And through a new Iorum Ior negotiations at the U.N., we very much hope
that we will have discussions with President on closer cooperation on global warming measures so that
concrete results will be achieved Ior an eIIective Iramework Ior the Iuture.
And through Iurther coordination, we would like to achieve a successIul G8 summit on the global
climate change issue and other matters, as well, because I believe that we can have useIul discussions
that will allow science and technology to achieve continued economic growth, and also achieve global
warming measures and energy security.
The other important conIerence Japan will be hosting is the International ConIerence in AIrican
Development, because that is a matter that the international community together should address. And
this is the (inaudible) Iourth Tokyo International ConIerence on AIrican Development that will
be held in Japan in May. And we would like to tie the Iindings and results oI that meeting to the G8
summit. And again, we'd like to engage in cooperation with the United States. And there also is a
question oI health care in AIrica, and again we would like to work in cooperation with the United
States on that health care issue.
As the world economy Iaces numerous challenges, Japan and the United States, I believe, should work
together on a global scale in the economic area, including intellectual property protection and Ior the
sustainable development oI developing countries.
There was a reIerence to beeI. I hope that well, we are addressing the beeI issue on the basis oI
scientiIic Iindings. We are still in the process oI our bilateral meetings.
I wanted to take this opportunity to express my appreciation Ior the very warm welcome by President
Bush and the people oI the United States. And I look Iorward to addressing our common challenges
together, hand in hand with President Bush.
END
Informal U.S.-N.K. meeting turns tense as Washington raises Syria suspicions: sources
By Lee Dong-min
2007/11/19 14:21 KST
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (Yonhap) -- An oII-the-record meeting Friday [November 16, 2007]
between North Korean and U.S. oIIicials turned tense when American oIIicials pressed Pyongyang to
explain its suspected nuclear ties with Syria when the North declares is atomic stockpile and activities
in the coming weeks, sources who participated in the meeting said Sunday.
Kim Myong-gil, North Korea's deputy chieI oI mission to the United Nations who participated in
the meeting, did not give a particular response, but he and his aides seemed "clearly taken aback" at the
level oI pressure Irom U.S. participants, the sources told Yonhap in separate phone calls.
"I think that at Iirst, they thought the meeting was going to be more about sort oI going through
the motions," one source said.
"A lot oI us at the meeting were very clear to the North Koreans that iI their declaration doesn't
include what is going on in Syria, it's really going to be a problem," another source said.
The meeting was sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP),
called a "track two" channel maintained Ior private-level talks between the two countries that have yet
to establish Iormal relations.
The U.S. side included Iormer Secretary oI State Henry Kissinger and Iormer Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker, who added prestige to the delegation largely made up oI Democrat and
Republican congressional staIIers and State Department oIIicials, and spoke out strongly on the Syria
issue, according to the contacted sources.
"Once the Syria topic was raised, Mr. Kissinger was quite adamant," another source said. "He
said there has to be clarity on Syria."
The same concerns shown by Volcker and other Iinancial community leaders are also important, he
said, because oI another set oI talks beginning Monday to address Pyongyang's alleged illicit activities
such as counterIeiting American currency.
"The Iinancial representatives were reminded oI North Korea's proliIeration issues. They were
saying, 'That's right. We have to think about this as well," he said.
"We just kept coming back to the Syria issue.. and we were quite tough about it, including Mr.
Kissinger," the participant said.
The Iour-hour session started on a positive note as representatives oI the two governments, in
their opening comments, Iocused on progress being made at six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula.
In a series oI agreements reached since September 2005, North Korea agreed to eventually give
up all oI its nuclear weapons and programs and in return receive economic and political rewards Irom
the other Iive governments -- South Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan.
Under the latest deal struck last month, Pyongyang committed itselI to disabling its key nuclear
Iacilities, a process which it started this month, and declaring all oI its nuclear programs and activities.
The U.S. is hoping that Pyongyang's declaration will satisIactorily address the allegations
involving Damascus, which started Iollowing an air raid by Israel on a Syrian installation on Sept. 6.
Press reports said Israeli oIIicials believed the Iacility was a nuclear site being built with the assistance
oI the North, or was at least modeled aIter Pyongyang's nuclear reactor.
Both Pyongyang and Damascus have denied the allegations oI nuclear cooperation.
AIter the opening statements in Friday's talks, the U.S. participants raised the issue, calling on
North Korea to provide clarity on the country's proliIeration activities, and promise that it will not
continue them anymore.
U.S. President George W. Bush and Washington's top nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill "are so
over-extended on their policy" on North Korea, one source said, that "iI there is nothing on Syria or
nothing that explains it, the situation is going to very diIIicult Ior everybody."
ldmyna.co.kr
(END)
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5huUBnG1swmDpqMV6Kk7vOIuZ0dzAD8T2S8RG1
Israeli: Syrian Site Hit Not a Reactor
By STEVE WEIZMAN 1 hour ago
[accessed on Google News 2007-11-22T19:45Z]
JERUSALEM (AP) A Syrian site bombed by Israel in September was probably a plant Ior
assembling a nuclear bomb, an Israeli nuclear expert said Thursday, challenging other analysts'
conclusions that it housed a North Korean-style nuclear reactor.
Tel Aviv University chemistry proIessor Uzi Even, who worked in the past at Israel's Dimona nuclear
reactor, said satellite pictures oI the site taken beIore the Israeli strike on Sept. 6 showed no sign oI the
cooling towers and chimneys characteristic oI reactors.
Even said the absence oI telltale Ieatures oI a reactor convinced him the building must have housed
something else. And a rush by the Syrians aIter the attack to bury the site under tons oI soil suggests
the Iacility was a plutonium processing plant and they were trying to smother lethal doses oI radiation
leaking out.
Israel has maintained an almost total oIIicial silence over the strike, which Syria said hit an unused
military installation. But Ioreign media reports, some quoting unidentiIied U.S. oIIicials, have said the
strike hit a nuclear Iacility made with North Korean help and modeled on the North's Yongbyon
reactor.
Damascus denies it has an undeclared nuclear program, and North Korea has said it was not involved in
any Syrian nuclear project.
Last month, American analyst David Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and International
Security, said commercial satellite images taken beIore and aIter the Israeli raid supported suspicions
that the target was indeed a reactor and that the site was given a hasty cleanup by the Syrians to remove
incriminating evidence.
Albright saw a clue in the Iact that the structure was rooIed at an early stage in its construction.
Other analysts have said the satellite images are too grainy to make any conclusive judgment.
But in an interview Thursday with the Haaretz newspaper which Iirst reported his assessment
Even compared pictures oI a North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, in which a cooling tower with steam
rising Irom it can clearly be seen, with the Syrian images, where no such structure appears.
Even told The Associated Press that another piece oI evidence against the reactor theory was that
satellite pictures oI the Syrian installation taken since 2003 showed no sign oI a plutonium separation
Iacility, which prepares Iuel Ior a nuclear reactor typically a large structure with visible ventilation
openings.
"It's very diIIicult to hide a separation plant," he said. "It's more diIIicult to hide a separation plant than
to hide a nuclear reactor," Even added.
"In Yongbyon, the supposed sister Iacility in North Korea, you can see all those signs that I am
pointing out that are missing in the Syrian place," Even said. "You can see the chimneys, you can see
the ventilation, you can see the cooling towers, you can see the separation plant. All that is missing
Irom this building in Syria."
Even said he believes the Syrian cleanup, in which large quantities oI soil were bulldozed over the site,
was an attempt to smother lethal radiation Irom a plutonium processing plant.
"I have no inIormation, only an assessment, but I suspect that it was a plant Ior processing plutonium,
namely a Iactory Ior assembling the bomb," he told Haaretz.
"Somebody made a lot oI eIIort to bury deeply whatever remains oI this Iacility," he told The AP. "Not
just to hide it but to pile up a large mound oI dirt on top oI it."
Even said Syrian authorities might have taken similar cleanup action iI the site had held chemical or
biological weapons. But it would not have made sense Ior Israel to have taken the military and
diplomatic risk oI attacking such a Iacility, long a known element oI Syria's arsenal.
"We know already that the Syrians have in place armed missiles with chemical weapons," he said.
"They are already well-equipped in that department."
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?idnews/ISRA112107.xml&headlineU.S.20Electronic20Surveillance
20Monitored20Israeli20Attack20On20Syria&channeldeIense
U.S. Electronic Surveillance Monitored Israeli Attack On Syria
Nov 21, 2007
David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall
AviationWeek.com
The U.S. provided Israel with inIormation about Syrian air deIenses beIore Israel attacked a suspected
nuclear site in Syria, Aviation Week & Space Technology is reporting in its Nov. 26 edition.
The U.S. was monitoring the electronic emissions coming Irom Syria during Israel's Sept. 6 attack, and
while there was no active American engagement in the operation, there was advice provided, according
to military and aerospace industry oIIicials.
The Iirst event in the raid involved Israel's strike aircraIt Ilying into Syria without alerting Syrian air
deIenses. The ultimate target was a suspected nuclear reactor being developed at Dayr az-Zawr. But the
main attack was preceded by an engagement with a single Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the
Turkish border.
The radar site was struck with a combination oI electronic attack and precision bombs to allow the
Israeli Iorce to enter and exit Syrian airspace unobserved. Subsequently all oI Syria's air-deIense radar
system went oII the air Ior a period oI time that encompassed the raid, U.S. intelligence analysts told
Aviation Week.
However, there was "no U.S. active engagement other than consulting on potential target
vulnerabilities," a U.S. electronic warIare specialist says.
Elements oI the attack included some brute Iorce jamming, which is still an important element oI
attacking air deIenses, U.S. analysts say. Also, Syrian air deIenses are still centralized and dependent
on dedicated HF and VHF communications networks, which made them vulnerable.
The analysts don't believe that any part oI Syria's electrical grid was shut down. They do contend that
network penetration involved both remote air-to-ground electronic attack and penetration through
computer-to-computer links.
"There also were some higher-level, non-tactical penetrations, either direct or as diversions and spooIs
oI the Syrian command and control capability, done through network attack," one U.S. intelligence
specialist says.
These observations provide evidence that a sophisticated network attack and electronic hacking
capability is an operational part oI the Israeli DeIense Force's arsenal oI digital weapons.
Despite being hobbled by the restrictions oI secrecy and diplomacy, Israeli military and government
oIIicials also conIirm that network invasion, inIormation warIare and electronic attack are part oI
Israel's deIense capabilities.
These tools have been embraced operationally by key military units, but their development, use and the
techniques employed are still a mystery even to other deIense and government organizations. It remains
"a shadowy world," an Israeli Air Force general conIirms.
Israel is not alone in recent demonstrations oI network warIare. Syria and Hezbollah revealed some
basic expertise during the Lebanon conIlict last year.
"OIIensive and deIensive network warIare is one oI the most interesting new areas," says Pinchas
Buchris, the director general oI the Israeli Ministry oI DeIense. "I can only say we're Iollowing the
|network attack| technology with great care. I doubted this |technology| Iive years ago. But we did it.
Now everything has changed.
"You need this kind oI capability," he says. "You're not being responsible iI you're not dealing with it.
And, iI you can build this kind oI capability, the sky's the limit."
ARTICLE COMMENTS
nayouI wrote:
I have read all the reports that have been by Mr.David A. Fulghum about the Israeli raid. Im sorry to
tell him that all the inIormation he mentioned is but Ialse. I know the Syrian Air-deIense System as like
as I know my hands plate, and I was the Iirst person who published pictures oI the site bombed by the
Israeli Iighters , which was 3 weeks beIore David Albright (oI www.isis.org ) did on 24 October. In
Iact, there is no Syrian radar system near the Syrian-Turkish boarder. That is not mention the central
radar oI Shinshar ( mid-Syria) can survey up to 4000 km.
Nizar NAYOUF
nizarnayouIyahoo.com
Syrian journalist in exile
(Former missile-oIIicer)
11/22/2007 10:40:23 AM
Recommend (5)
nayouI wrote:
Sorry, a mistake was made in my Iormer comment. I meant the website:
www.isis-online.org , but not www.isis.org
11/22/2007 11:02:42 AM
nayouI wrote:
in order to see the pictures that we published 3 weeks beIore David Albright did, please click here:
http://syriatruth.org/Al-Hakikah/index.php?optioncomcontent&taskview&id1981
11/22/2007 11:06:16 AM
[Referenced URL follows]
http://syriatruth.org/Al-Hakikah/index.php?optioncomcontent&taskview&id1981
11/10/2007
-'-' +-' ,',--` -'=' --+-- -' -+' ,-= " -,-=' " ' --- --'=-- ,,- ,- '--
:
= - --' -,- _,,-'' '--- --+-- -'=' Scud-C Scud-D - ` ,-,'-- ,= ,-= '- -`-' ----
-+' -,-=- -' ,='=' , _'- ,-' ,-' -- =' ,=
' =-- _,,-' - -= _-- -,=- ,--- = -- ''
'+--- -' '' '+- ,`,- ,- ,,- '-- - " -,-=' " --'= : ('= ) -,-=' -- ( ,--'--) =- '-
" ,- " " - ,- " = - --' -,- _,,-'' '=,--- --+-- ,-' -' _'= -'-' +-' .,--
-' ,='=' , ,--'-- " -,-=' " ' - --- ' . ,-,'-- ,= ,-= - ,+=-'' --`- ,-' ----
,-' ' - -,= ,,-' '='-' - '-' -+- , '-,'- _'= .-= -'-' ,--` -- -' '= '-'- '=
,,--' '--,-' .--- .-- -=, ' -' " --' -,- _,,-'' '=,--- --+-- ,',--` -'=' " --` '--
-,=' _,=---' '-' -+- -,'- ,-' ,-' - -'= '= '-'- '= " ---' '- . _,,-' --+' ,=,---`
,-' - .- - _-= .,-- -=--' ',`,' .- - '++= '--' '`- ,= ,-' -,-' = '-' ,-'
-' ,='' '- ,'=-' " .
= - --' -,- _,,-'' '=,--- --+-- '' ,-' ,=' " _,'--' -, " =-'- - -,-' - _'=
',=- ' , - -' '--' _' ,' " ,-' ,-'= " -=-- --' -,- " ,- " " - ,- " 50 .
" '=-,- '- . " `=` _'= =' ,= - ` ,--' _,,-'' ,--- , -- '- - _,=-- " =-'-' '
-' ,'`` -=--' .-'-- -' +- - -,' --' _'= '- ,=,-' `-' ='- ,-=- --' '=,---'
'--`' '= _,,- -'=' -=-- - . ',-,- -'- -' -=--' - -' '--' _' _-- -' ,-' ,-'= -'-
= .-, ` '- ---' ,'-= 30 40 '--' = `- ',-= ',' - - -'= ','= '--,- '='-
-,-' '`` - " = -- " _,,-' - ,-' -+' ,-=' ' ,--- -'= ,--- -= , '---'' -,-'
' ,-,'-- ,= - +=- -'--' _,,-' --' '-= ',- -' . " -= -,-= -' ` - -=--' -
'+-'-=- - =-- ,-,'--' ,= ,-=' '+- ,- _,,-' -- ,=- ,= . ='- - ' '+- ==' -=' " ---'
-=--' ,-,- `' -'-= --'' ` -' .-- '+=-=- .--- '--` " .
--- ,-- =' " ,-' ,-'= " -=-- --+-- '' _' '- - --' " -,-=' " _' '-` _---
,, ',-- --- - -=--'' ,-'- ,-- =--=- " -,-=' " '- . -=--'' ,-- '-- -'-' +-' - -= _-'-'
,-' ) . .` _'= '= --- .,-- .- - -- --' '+- -, '- , -'-' '' _' '+=,'- 1 " --' . ( -'-
'+-= -- . '= - ` _' '+=,'- ,, -+---' '-'' ` _-= ,-- ,- _- _'= ,-,, .- -'-= " -,-='
'-,-' ) " -- .- -+---' '-'' '-'-- --'=- " '+- - ,--' =-'-' _'= 2 3 " -,-=' " ,-- ' . ( -'-
'-,= '--= = - ,-' ,=' " ,-',-,' =' " '+', -'= ,,- '-- = .-- - ,' '--'
,---' ---' =,-- -',-, ,'- ,-= '--= +=' ,=,- --' '=- -` -, '- , ---' -- -=--'' .

,- 1
Image 1

,- 2
Image 2

,- 3
Image 3
Above Arabic text automatically translated via
http://translate.google.com/translatet?langpairar,en

Turkish sources, Syria identical to reveal "the truth" nature of the goal which target Israeli aircraft last
month
:
Aircraft targeted the facility for long-range missiles of the type Scud-C and Scud-D designed to suit
non-conventional warheads and nothing but never, and the Syrian president told Turkish Foreign
Minister fact goal
The raid resulted in the destruction or vandalism few dozen missiles without warheads
Rare Matar (Istanbul), Damascus truth (special): learned "the truth" from the Turkish and Syrian
sources credible that the raid by Israel last month on the rear Syrian targeted repository of long- range
missiles of the type "Scud C", "Scud D" designed to be suitable for processing non-conventional
warheads. A source said Turki told "the truth" in Istanbul that the Turkish Foreign Minister to Papa
Khan, who visited Damascus last week received adequate information in this regard from the Syrian
authorities, which assured him of President Bashar al-Assad that "Israeli aircraft targeted a repository
of long-range missiles," but he did not identify the detailed specifications of tactical and strategic of
these rockets. The source added that "the Pope Khan asked the Syrian president assurances to that
effect to the Turkish government can defend the Syrian position when the problem arose in me by the
United States and Israel, and even by some internal forces, in a reference to the Turkish army."
At this level, the officer in a "militarization" of the Syrian army that the raid targeted a repository of
long-range missiles of the type "Scud C", "Scud D" in the long term "ignited Zlp" located to the north-
west of Deir Al-Zour about 50 km. The officer said "I can confirm that the bombing was the
repository of rocket and nothing but mentioned that at all." He added, saying that "that the
warehouses were dug in the subsoil of the hills there on the left bank of the Euphrates river against
the region known as Sensationalism ignited Zlp, which lies to the north-west of the area known as
Zenobia. Has Astkhaddt aircraft missiles extraordinary expenditure in the shelling, and what not less
than 30 40 rockets Moilla in special containers had been destroyed in whole or in part, as well as the
construction of the main plant, which is a unit of special technical reconstruction warheads of this
type of missile, "and revealed that" some implications near the region suffered harm, but harm very
little. " When asked whether the patient is equipped with missile warheads unconventional, the
source said "fortunately they were not as well. Storage When these rockets are non-conventional
warheads vicious cycle of shipments for reasons related to store it securely, and only got to the
environmental disaster in the region."
Keep noted that the "truth" was first pointed out that the raid targeted "ignited Zlp", in a report
published in the XVII of the facility last month in the region. The "truth" is a space reserved for the
region from the Israeli source dating back to last year, which means it was controlled by Israel since
at least. (Image 1 below). The "truth" obtained two days before the clearer images available so far to
the target location, dates back to more than a year. After the presentation to the officer in question, he
stressed that it was "fully correspond to the target before the bombing" (photographs 2 and 3 below).
The report "the truth" referred to was quoted Syrian sources as saying that a special "management
chemical warfare" in the Syrian army had conducted tests and examinations of the area after the
bombing, which meant that there were fears exist regarding the possibility of a chemical
contamination result of the bombing of the warehouse.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/storychannel.jsp?
channeldeIense&idnews/aw112607p2.xml&headlineIsrael20Shows20Electronic20Prowess
Israel Shows Electronic Prowess
Nov 25, 2007
By David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Amy Butler
The U.S. was monitoring the electronic emissions coming Irom Syria during Israels September attack;
andalthough there was no direct American help in destroying a nuclear reactorthere was some
advice provided beIorehand, military and aerospace industry oIIicials tell Aviation Week & Space
Technology.
That surveillance is providing clues about how Israeli aircraIt managed to slip past Syrian air deIenses
to bomb the site at Dayr az-Zawr. The main attack was preceded by an engagement with a single
Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the Turkish border. It was assaulted with what appears to be a
combination oI electronic attack and precision bombs to enable the Israeli Iorce to enter and exit Syrian
airspace. Almost immediately, the entire Syrian radar system went oII the air Ior a period oI time that
included the raid, say U.S. intelligence analysts.
There was no U.S. active engagement other than consulting on potential target vulnerabilities, says a
U.S. electronic warIare specialist.
Elements oI the attack included some brute-Iorce jamming, which is still an important element oI
attacking air deIenses, U.S. analysts say. Also, Syrian air deIenses are still centralized and dependent
on dedicated HF and VHF communications, which made them vulnerable. The analysts dont believe
any part oI Syrias electrical grid was shut down. They do contend that network penetration involved
both remote air-to-ground electronic attack and penetration through computer-to-computer links.
There also were some higher-level, nontactical penetrations, either direct or as diversions and spooIs,
oI the Syrian command-and-control capability, done through network attack, says an intelligence
specialist.
These observations provide evidence that a sophisticated network attack and electronic hacking
capability is an operational part oI the Israel DeIense Forces arsenal oI digital weapons.
Despite being hobbled by the restrictions oI secrecy and diplomacy, Israeli military and government
oIIicials conIirm that network invasion, inIormation warIare and electronic attack are part oI Israels
deIense capabilities.
Theyve been embraced operationally by key military units, but their development, use and the
techniques employed are still a mystery even to other deIense and government organizations. It remains
a shadowy world, says an Israeli air Iorce general. Israel is not alone in recent demonstrations oI
network warIare. Syria and Hezbollah showed some basic expertise during the Lebanon conIlict last
year.
OIIensive and deIensive network warIare is one oI the most interesting new areas, says Pinchas
Buchris, director general oI the Israeli deIense ministry. I can only say were Iollowing the |network
attack| technology with great care. I doubted this |technology| Iive years ago. But we did it. Now
everything has changed.
You need this kind oI capability, he says. Youre not being responsible iI youre not dealing with it.
And, iI you can build this kind oI capability, the skys the limit |Ior sophisticated intelligence gathering
and clandestine operations|.
So Iar, the most sophisticated example oI nonkinetic warIare is the penetration oI Syrian air deIenses
by Israeli aircraIt on Sept. 6 to bomb a siteanalyzed as a nascent nuclear Iacilitywithout being
engaged or even detected. Commercial satellite pictures oI the target on the Euphrates (about 90 mi.
Irom the Iraq border) taken beIore and aIter the raid show that a large building (the suspected reactor
building) in the center oI the site has disappeared and the ground has been bulldozed Ilat.
The incident is attracting attention because the Syrians have an extensive air deIense system that
theyve been building Ior decadessince the |1967| Six-Day War, says an Israeli deIense planning
oIIicial. It may be the largest in the world.
That ability oI nonstealthy Israeli aircraIt to penetrate without interIerence rests in part on technology,
carried on board modiIied aircraIt, that allowed specialists to hack into Syrias networked air deIense
system, said U.S. military and industry oIIicials in the attacks aItermath. Network raiders can conduct
their invasion Irom an aircraIt into a network and then jump Irom network to network until they are
into the targets communications loop. Whether the network is wireless or wired doesnt matter
anymore, says a U.S. industry specialist (AW&ST Nov. 5, p. 32; Oct. 8, p. 28; Feb. 19, p. 31). Now
development oI the technology in Israel is being conIirmed.
The raid on Syria was a strategic signal, not a threat, says a retired senior military oIIicial who Ilew
combat in the region Ior decades. This |raid| was about what we perceived are their capabilities |Ior
developing weapons oI mass destruction| and about deterrence more than creating damage.
He contends that Syrian procedures even contributed to the successIul bombing raid.
Part oI the vulnerability oI the Syrian Iacility was that they kept it so secret that there werent enough
air deIenses assigned to it, the oIIicial contends.
Israels capabilities are similar to the Suter network-invasion capability that was developed by the
U.S. using the EC-130 Compass Call electronic attack aircraIt to shoot data streams, laced with
sophisticated algorithms, into enemy antennas. The passive, RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic surveillance
aircraIt then monitored enemy signals to ensure the data streams were having the intended eIIect on the
target sensors. Israel duplicated the capability when it Iielded its two new GulIstream G550 special
missions aircraIt designs. Both were modiIied by Israel Aerospace Industries Elta Div. in time Ior the
2006 Lebanon war. The ground surveillance radar version can provide data streams Irom large active,
electronically scanned array radars, while the intelligence version provided the signals surveillance and
analyses.
Buchris contends that its not manpower and technology that limits development, but constructing
systems (that can put invasive data streams into enemy networks and then monitor the results) and
making them operational.
The new G550 radar and electronic surveillance aircraIt, Ior example, are still in the process oI being
integrated into the intelligence system, the planning oIIicial agrees. The name oI the game is balance
oI systems, intelligence, training, communications and Iorces. It has to be conducted like an orchestra.
II one instrument is out oI tune, it doesnt sound right.
The special mission aircraIt were used during the war with good results, but military oIIicials expect
better Iuture exploitation as they are plugged into the Israel DeIense Forces network. Another
handicap in developing Israels network attack capabilities is that they havent directly enlisted the
research potential oI their universities as the Pentagon has done in the U.S.
I know that in the U.S., universities are involved in these kinds oI issues, Buchris says. But in Israel,
we are not. Its totally diIIerent. How the Israeli system works, you cant share with anybody. I dont
want to go into the issues |oI technology development, personnel training and who runs the
organization|. Its very interesting. Its very sensitive. Any such capabilities are top secret.
That secrecy is causing Israel problems. Compartmentalization means that those who know about the
new capabilities arent allowed to tout their useIulness. Yet at least low-key publicity is needed to
ensure government Iunding Ior additional development and acceptance oI their operational use.
Now I have to Iind a way to explain these capabilities to other people so that they understand,
Buchris says.
Israeli oIIicials wont address the raid on Syria directly.
We want to ease Ieelings with Syria, says Tzachi Hanegbi, chairman oI the Israeli parliaments
Ioreign aIIairs and deIense committee. We dont want them to Ieel humiliated. Moreover, Israeli
analysts arent really sure who to blame. No one really knows whether President |Basher al-| Assad is
the one who calls the shots. It may be senior army generals or other Iigures with inIluence. We dont
want a conIrontation.
Its sensitive enough that the Army made an unprecedented decision to change an important exercise
in the Golan Heights to another site, Hanegbi says. And, it was equally unusual Ior them to announce
it. Thats a symptom oI the atmosphere.
Israeli oIIicials reject any suggestion that the Syrian and Iranian nuclear programs were or are linked in
any way.
I dont think Iran knew anything about what Syria was doing, says a long-serving member oI the
Israeli parliament with insight into military aIIairs. I dont think they would have told the Iranians.
They didnt need Iranian assistance because they had help Irom the North Koreans.
However, John Bolton, Iormer U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, disagrees. Id be very surprised
iI the Syrians were to engage at least without Iranian acquiescence, he says. And, it may be beyond
that, he tells Aviation Week. Since Syria alone lacks both the Iunding and expertise Ior a nuclear
weapons program, it would logically turn to Pyongyang Ior technology and oil-rich Tehran Ior Iunding,
he says.
Moreover, Bolton says the use oI network attack is a clever move by the Israelis. He contends that it
will serve as a deterrent Ior Iran. Or, at the very least, it sends a message that even the advanced,
Russian-built air deIense systems wont protect Irans nuclear activities.
I think it is very telling, obviously, in its potential impact on Iran since theyve been supplied by the
Russians with air deIense equipment as well, Bolton says. He describes the Syrian Iacility as a clone
oI North Koreas primary nuclear plant in Yongbyon, and it share the same dimensions. The rooI was
covered with materials to mask it, apparently unsuccessIully, Irom overhead collection. Prior to his
work at the U.N., Bolton was undersecretary oI State Ior arms control during 2002 when construction
oI the Syrian site was said to have begun.
An indication oI North Koreas involvement in the Syrian Iacility was a condemnation oI the raid
issued by the government there. This was an almost automatic response, he says. It is not because
North Korea and Syria share a common border. To me, it was an inadvertent tipoII Irom North Koreans
that they had involvement with that Iacility.
Israeli analysts closely watch Ioreign aid to Syria and that countrys support oI Hezbollah during last
years Iighting in Lebanon and Israel. OI key interest was a signals and communications intercept
operation that was run by the Syrian military. The intelligence products on location, makeup and intent
oI Israeli operationsmuch oI it obtained Irom cell phone interceptswere passed to Hezbollah.
In this case, they point to the involvement oI Chinese and Russian advisory groups operating in Syria.
When youre talking about selling high-tech systems, they need support and staIIing, says a senior
Israeli government oIIicial. You cant just talk about an air deIense system. You also have to talk
about communications, networking and intelligence gathering, which includes the skills oI
communications and signals intelligence gathering and analysis.
I can tell you that now, when I go into a |ministry| meeting, I have to take the battery out oI my cell
phone, the government oIIicial says. Were aware oI |traIIic intercept during the Lebanon Iighting|.
Theres also the issue that in the north oI Israel you have very large Arab communities. Most wouldnt
be involved, but youre talking about a halI-million people up on the border. That means there are
people with the ability to watch and pass on inIormation.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/28/america/NA-GEN-US-Koreas-Nuclear.php
Top US nuclear negotiator will make rare visit to
North Korea to inspect disarmament work
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
ANNAPOLIS, Maryland: The U.S. negotiator on North Korea's nuclear program is to become next
week the highest-level U.S. oIIicial to inspect work under way to disable that country's main nuclear
reactor.
A senior State Department oIIicial said Tuesday that Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill will
leave Monday Ior the communist-led state to check the disabling oI North Korea's Yongbyon reactor, a
crucial milestone in the international bargain that North Korea made to eliminate its weapons in
exchange Ior economic aid and other perquisites.
Hill was making the quick visit in between diplomatic meetings in neighboring Japan and South Korea,
said the oIIicial, who spoke on condition oI anonymity to describe the unannounced plans. North Korea
invited Hill Ior only his second visit as an end-oI-the-year deadline nears Ior Pyongyang to declare the
extent oI its once-secret nuclear program.
Hill and other envoys are expected to meet separately with the North Koreans next week in what will
likely be the six-nation international bargaining group's Iinal session beIore the deadline. The date oI
that session in Beijing also has not been announced.
The last previous round oI six-party talks was in Beijing in late September. The sides announced an
agreement in which North Korea promised to disable its closed Yongbyon nuclear reactor by the end oI
this year in exchange Ior economic aid and political concessions.
At the next meeting oI the six North and South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia
North Korea is to lay out elements oI a draIt declaration detailing its nuclear programs.
U.S. nuclear experts have been in North Korea since early this month to disable the reactor, which
produced plutonium Ior bombs.
"The process to disable the North's nuclear Iacilities is under way," South Korean Foreign Minister
Song Min-soon said. "The process is going well."
Hill became the Iirst high-level U.S. oIIicial to visit the impoverished, secretive North in more than
Iour years when he made a brieI, surprise stop there in June. That visit Iollowed resolution oI a banking
dispute that had held up progress toward disarmament Ior more than a year.
U.S. oIIicials have said North Korea is cooperating with visiting experts to disable the weapons-making
Iacilities, but there is skepticism in Congress and within the Bush administration that North Korea
really will drop out oI the nuclear club it joined last year with a successIul underground nuclear test.
South AIrica is the only nuclear power to end its weapons program voluntarily.
North Korea's test detonation in October 2006 culminated decades oI eIIorts to build the world's
deadliest weapons. Experts estimate it has enough weapons-grade plutonium to make about a dozen
bombs.
It is not clear how the North will deal with secret U.S. and Israeli intelligence Iindings that it was
supporting an illicit nuclear eIIort in Syria this year. Israel bombed a Iacility widely believed to have
housed the illicit program, but details oI the raid and the Syrian program have remained largely secret.
Washington hopes Iuture talks will yield an agreement Ior the North to dismantle the Iacility entirely
and also wants nuclear bombs Pyongyang is believed to have built to be conIiscated.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20071201TDY01306.htm
U.S. to set 3 more tasks for N. Korea / New hurdles for delisting as terror sponsor
Takashi Sakamoto / Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent
Dec. 1, 2007
WASHINGTON--The U.S. government has decided to impose three new conditions Ior removing
North Korea Irom Washington's list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, sources close to the six-party talks
said Friday.
Pyongyang must reveal the amount oI plutonium it has extracted; the reality oI its uranium enrichment
program; and the alleged transIer oI nuclear technology and materials to other countries such as Syria,
the sources said.
These points should be made clear when North Korea completes its declaration oI its nuclear programs
by the end oI this year, the sources added.
The new conditions will be in addition to the current U.S. requirement that North Korea complete the
disablement oI its nuclear Iacilities.
It is now likely that North Korea will not be removed Irom the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism
anytime soon, since it is unlikely that the country will accept all Iour conditions, the sources said.
It is believed that the United States and North Korea had agreed on the removal oI the reclusive state
Irom the terrorism sponsor list and punitive measures mandated by the U.S. Trading with the Enemy
Act in return Ior Pyongyang disabling its nuclear Iacilities and Iully declaring its nuclear programs by
year's end.
Although the background oI the new U.S. measures is unclear, the U.S. government is believed to have
taken into consideration Japan's strong demand to keep North Korea on the terrorism sponsor list.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, the chieI U.S. delegate Ior the six-party talks, said
Thursday in Seoul that North Korea "is required to list all oI their |nuclear| programs, Iacilities and all
oI the materials. That is what the declaration is Ior." Hill will travel to Pyongyang on Monday and stay
there until Wednesday.
However, North Korea has not submitted an initial draIt nuclear listing, even though only one month
remains beIore the the deadline to complete the declaration.
In relation to the three new conditions, North Korea has Ilatly denied the existence oI an uranium
enrichment program and oI providing nuclear technology and materials to other countries.
It is also believed that North Korea is reluctant to declare its current nuclear weaponry stockpile,
including plutonium, which is used to make nuclear bombs and warheads.
Hill is scheduled to meet North Korea's chieI nuclear envoy, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan.
However, negotiations on the declaration are likely to Iace rough going unless North Korea changes its
stance.
ChieI delegates to the six-party talks, scheduled to meet next week in Beijing, will highly likely Iace
diIIiculties while discussing the declaration.
'Aluminum pipes not Ior N-use'

Meanwhile, North Korea has denied it is using special aluminum pipes it imported Irom Russia Ior
nuclear development to produce rocket bombs, it has been learned. The pipes are usually used in the
process to develop highly enriched uranium.
The United States, which strongly suspects that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program, is not
convinced by the explanation, according to an inIormed source. The U.S. government is asking North
Korea to Iurther clariIy the matter, the source said.
ClariIying its uranium enrichment program is an important point oI the declaration oI North Korea's
nuclear programs, and is expected to be a major agenda in next week's six-party Beijing talks.
North Korea admitted earlier this year that it has purchased the high-strength aluminum pipes, to be
used in centriIuges necessary Ior uranium enrichment, according to sources close to the six-party talks.
http://www.mIa.gov.il/MFA/AbouttheMinistry/MFASpokesman/2007/FMLivnimeetswithSouthKoreanF
MSongMin-Soon2-Dec-2007.htm
FM Livni meets with South Korean FM Song Min-Soon
2 Dec 2007
In their meeting today, FM Livni and FM Song Min-Soon discussed issues relating to nuclear
proliIeration in the region and promoting closer relationans and economic ties between the two
countries
(Communicated by the Foreign Minister's Bureau)
Vice Prime Minister and Minister oI Foreign AIIairs Tzipi Livni met this aIternoon (Sunday, 2
December 2007) with South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-Soon. FM Livni congratulated her
counterpart on the strengthening oI direct relations between the two countries since her visit to South
Korea last year, and asked him to rescind restrictions imposed by the South Korean government on
travel to Israel.
FM Livni and FM Song Min-Soon also discussed issues relating to nuclear proliIeration in the region.
Regarding this, FM Livni stated: "The international community is concentrating eIIorts to sever
commercial and Iinancial relations with Iran, to increase pressure on that country, and we must not
allow Iran to evade these signiIicant actions by presenting Asian alternatives. When Europe takes
action against Iran - Iran turns to Asia. It is extremely important Ior Asian countries to avoid the
creation oI alternative relations with Iran, especially at this crucial point." The two Ioreign ministers
also discussed North Korea's decision to disable its nuclear program and the obligation oI preventing
proliIeration oI elements oI its nuclear program in countries in the Middle East.
FM Livni and FM Song Min-Soon agreed to renew the deliberations oI the Joint Israel-South Korea
Economic Commission, with the aim oI strengthening economic relations between the two countries on
issues such as tourism, hi-tech, trade and research & development.
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-30842120071205
North Korea moves to nuclear dismantling - U.S. envoy
By Chris Buckley
Wed Dec 5, 2007 8:41pm IST
BEIJING (Reuters) - North Korea is moving towards disabling its key nuclear complex, but has not yet
agreed with the United States what nuclear activities it must disclose, the chieI U.S. envoy to
disarmament talks said on Wednesday.
Speaking aIter a rare trip by a U.S. oIIicial to the old Cold War Ioe, Christopher Hill told reporters that
he had visited the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which contains the reactor at the heart oI Pyongyang's
atomic programme, and seen that dismantling was going Iorward at three key units oI the Iacility.
But Hill also said he had cautioned Pyongyang that a declaration oI the North's nuclear activities
promised by the end oI the year had to be "complete and correct" and contain no surprises.
"We wanted to make sure that they would include all the Iacilities, materials and programmes," Hill
told reporters in Beijing. "There are deIinitely some diIIerences there."
Hill said he still expected Yongbyon to be disabled by the end oI the year and Ior North Korea to issue
its disclosure.
But he was not sure there would be time Ior six-party talks involving the two Koreas, the United States,
Japan, Russia and host China on the issue to be held by year-end.
Hill's was the highest-level U.S. visit so Iar to the Yongbyon nuclear complex.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/05/content7206431.htm
U.S. top envoy says DPRK's nuclear disablement "going well"
www.chinaview.cn
2007-12-05 22:54:13
BEIJING, Dec. 5 (Xinhua) -- ChieI U.S. negotiator to the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula
nuclear issue Christopher Hill said on Wednesday the disablement oI DPRK's main nuclear Iacilities at
Yongbyon, scheduled to be completed by year end, is going well.
"The disablement is going Iine...there is disabling activity going on all three sections oI the Iacility
there: the Iuel Iabrication Iacilities, the reactor and the re-processing center, "Hill said aIter arriving in
Beijing Wednesday aIternoon Iollowing a three-day visit to the Democratic People's Republic oI Korea
(DPRK).
"They have done a lot oI work in preparation oI discharging the Iuel in the reactor...which will
enable the disabling to be oI real value," he said.
Hill noted that China has been very helpIul in assisting the disablement.
According to a six-party talks joint document released in Beijing on Oct. 3, the DPRK agreed to
disable all the existing nuclear Iacilities and provide a complete and correct declaration oI all its
nuclear programs by the end oI this year.
The document said the disablement oI the Iive-megawatt Experimental Reactor, the Reprocessing
Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility in Yongbyon would
be completed by Dec. 31.
Hill said the DPRK is "pretty close to providing a declaration" and the atmosphere oI the meeting
with his DPRK counterpart Kim Kye Gwan was very cooperative.
"The declaration should be complete and correct...It should include all the Iacilities, materials and
programs that the DPRK has had in the nuclear area," Hill said.
Hill said he will leave China early Friday, aIter meeting with Wu Dawei, head oI the Chinese
delegation to the six-party talks, on Thursday.
He dismissed chances Ior a six-party talk to convene by the end oI this year, citing holiday reasons.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hLVRV29PTZbF85wJq9-mIA1hlYQ
US envoy says NKorea disablement on schedule: report
1 hour ago [accessed 2007-12-05T16:15Z]
BEIJING (AFP) The US envoy on North Korean nuclear disarmament said Wednesday the regime's
disablement was on schedule but that more remained to be done to meet deadlines, Chinese state media
reported.
Christopher Hill was speaking as he leIt Pyongyang aIter what he called "good talks" with oIIicials in
North Korea, Xinhua news agency said.
He had arrived on Monday to witness the US-supervised disablement oI the country's main Yongbyon
nuclear Iacility.
"We had good talks and had a Iull tour oI Yongbyon. I would say the disablement activities are well on
schedule," the assistant US secretary oI state was quoted as saying.
Hill's visit was also aimed at keeping the North on track Ior a complete declaration oI all its atomic
programmes by a year-end deadline.
"We have to keep working because we have more to do to meet our deadlines," he said, summarising
talks on the issue with his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan.
Hill arrived later Wednesday in Beijing Ior talks with Chinese oIIicials, the US embassy in the Chinese
capital said.
The North said in October 2006 it had successIully tested its Iirst nuclear device, but in February it
agreed to a six-nation accord to disable such programmes in return Ior energy aid and various
diplomatic and security guarantees.
A new round oI six-nation talks was expected this week in Beijing but they appeared to have been put
oII, and the United States and China have not set a date Ior when the discussions restart.
The lack oI a date comes amid reports oI a delay in Pyongyang's nuclear declaration, considered a vital
part oI the multi-Iaceted six-nation deal.
The US wants Pyongyang to declare all material, including a plutonium stockpile and any warheads.
"We have to see what the DPRK does, but it has to give a Iull declaration and it has to be a complete
declaration," Xinhua quoted Hill as saying.
DPRK stands Ior the Democratic People's Republic oI Korea, North Korea's oIIicial name.
Cho Hee-Yong, spokesman Ior South Korea's Ioreign ministry, said Tuesday the North had not yet
handed over the list.
North Korea has a history oI striking deals on its nuclear programmes only to scupper them at the last
minute with new demands, but Hill said that the deadline still could be met.
"I think (North Korea) is working very hard Ior the declaration and we have some discussions about
that... so I'm assured they will be prepared to meet the deadline," he told Xinhua.
US State Department spokesman Tom Casey said Tuesday the talks delay was due to scheduling
problems and that they would take place in the "near Iuture".
Hill is expected to return to Washington on Friday.
The six-party negotiations involving the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China and Russia began
in August 2003.
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/96308.htm
Evening Walk-Through at Six-Party Talks
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary Ior East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs
Kerry Center Hotel
Beijing, China
December 5, 2007
QUESTION: How was the discussion with the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It was a good two and a halI day trip. The Iirst part oI it was, I
made a visit down to Yongbyon. And, indeed, there is a lot oI disabling activity going on. We went
through all three sections oI the Iacility there. That is, the Iuel Iabrication Iacility, the reactor, and then
Iinally the reprocessing center. There is disabling activity going on at all three. They have done a lot oI
work in preparation oI discharging the Iuel in the reactor, which I think will have a big eIIect -- because
that will mean they cant easily put it back. That will enable the disabling to be oI real value, so that we
have over a year worth oI disabling.
We have Americans there on the spot staying in the guest quarters there and working together with the
DPRK counterparts. Id say the work is proceeding rather well. We put on protective gear in order to
go inside some oI the Iacilities and see what they are doing. And it really involves taking apart
equipment and making it very diIIicult to get the Iacility started again. So that was mainly Mondays
activities. Then on Tuesday I had talks, Iirst oI all, starting with the Foreign Minister. Or -- I should say
-- on Monday, at the end oI that day at Yongbyon, I met with the head oI their nuclear energy agency,
Dr. Rhee.
Then on Tuesday, I met with the Foreign Minister and then had lengthy discussions with Kim Kye
Gwan. Now the discussions with Kim Kye Gwan centered on the activities leading to what we are
calling Phase II. That is, leading to the end oI the year. We talked about disabling, and I think we had a
good understanding oI what we are doing on disabling. But we also talked about the declaration that
they are preparing. And we wanted to make very clear that when they submit the declaration to the Six
Parties, it is important that the declaration, even as a Iirst draIt, should nonetheless be complete and
correct. And we emphasized that. And I discussed some oI the elements that I would want to see in the
declaration to ensure that when the declaration comes Iorward there are no surprises.
So that was mainly the Iocus with Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan. We also discussed the next phase,
although I think Mr. Kim preIerred to keep the discussion on Phase II -- because we have not yet
completed Phase II. But I raised the issue oI our strong view that we need to get through all oI these
phases and complete the process by 08. I saw the Vice President oI the Peoples Assembly, Mr. Yang.
Then I saw, the next day, I saw Kim Kye Gwan once again Ior additional discussions. We didnt really
have a lot oI time to get around Pyongyang. I did see -- We have a person who is working on the
disabling and working on the administrative arrangements Ior the disabling staying at the Koryo
Hotel, and I was able to see him. His name is Pat OBrien. In addition, I did see, I did one trip to go
down and have a look at their subway system. So that was about it.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill, on the declaration, what seems to be the hold-up on that? Youve been
expecting a draIt copy Ior quite a while now. What seems to be the hold up?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I hate to call it a hold-up -- except that our concern is, we dont
want a declaration that arrives and that immediately people see what is missing. So the DPRK is under
an obligation to provide a complete and correct declaration. So we wanted to discuss what we see as,
what we believe is necessary Ior complete and correct. So I think the DPRK is pretty close to providing
a declaration, but we want it to be as good as possible.
QUESTION: And did, while you were up there, you get a chance to talk about what is in the
declaration, or did you get a chance to see a draIt copy?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No. We discussed what they plan to have in the declaration, and
we wanted to make sure that they would also include all the Iacilities, materials, and programs that the
DPRK has had in the nuclear era in these many years that it has had these nuclear ambitions.
QUESTION: Is the problem with HEU?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Im not prepared to say it is a problem. But we need to make sure
that all programs need to be included.
QUESTION: South Korea has said that North Korea might not be able to dismantle by the end oI the
year. What is your take on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You mean disable by the end oI the year?
QUESTION: Disable.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the disabling has gone very well. You know, one oI the
issues has been the discharge oI Iuel -- which is very important, but we want it to be done saIely. It was
at our instigation that we slowed down the discharge to ensure that it would be done saIely. I think it is
Iair to say the disabling is going very well.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) by the end oI the year?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, we are not looking Ior some sort oI cliIIhanger, Iive
minutes oI twelve. What we want to see is that this is going on as quickly as possible and as saIely as
possible, and we are very much convinced that that is the case. So disabling is going Iine. And I
thought it was very signiIicant that all members oI the Six Parties came out and saw last week, and I
think they had that same impression.
QUESTION: Is there a diIIerence between what you think is necessary on the declaration and what the
North Koreans think is necessary?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I dont want to go into details, but there are deIinitely some
diIIerences there, yes. But I dont want to go into details. We are trying to work with them to make sure
we dont have diIIerences, and the atmosphere oI the meeting was very cooperative. So I dont want to
suggest that we are at some impasse or that we cant seem to solve something, because the atmosphere
was positive. But, yes indeed, there are some diIIerences.
QUESTION: Not so big diIIerences?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, again, I just told you I dont want to get into characterizing
those diIIerences.
QUESTION: But is this the reason why we can not have Six-Party Talks this week?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, I am not sure what is the reason we are not having Six-
Party Talks, because I think there are various things to talk about. But Ill be seeing the Chinese
tomorrow. But you should ask the Chinese, who are the ones who talk to all the parties. Im not sure
that this has anything to do with the declaration, because although iI we had had Six Parties we would
have wanted to talk about the declaration, I dont think that it has been the issue. I think its some other
things, probably having to do with scheduling.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) tomorrow?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think my plan is, Im going to stay here tomorrow. And then on
Friday morning I will go through Narita, and I hope I will have the opportunity to meet with Ken Sasae
and brieI him in a little more detail than I am brieIing you all.
QUESTION: Have you discussed with the North Koreans about the terrorism list issues, and also does
that have anything to do with them not coming up with a list yet?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Second question, no, I do not think so. It does not seem to. And,
yes, every time we talk to them weve talked about the terrorism list and the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
QUESTION: Would you say that you made progress in your discussion with Mr. Kim Kye Gwan on
the declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, I think we did actually.
QUESTION: Do you think youve narrowed your diIIerences?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I can see youre writing an article, and youre looking Ior ready-
made quotes to Iit your article. But look, I think we have had a very useIul exchange on the subject. In
that sense, I think we have made progress. I wont really know until I see a declaration though. So I
dont want to go too Iar in characterizing the progress, because I need to see what their declaration is
going to look like.
QUESTION: Did they give you an estimate oI when that declaration might be available?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Certainly in time to meet the December 31st deadline.
QUESTION: On the enrichment issue and the declaration, is your concern that North Korea is not
going to include that entire program in the declaration, (inaudible) certain elements oI the enrichment
program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, I indicated that I do not want to discuss the speciIics, but to
be sure we are looking Ior elements. As we discussed the declaration, as we discussed materials,
installations, and programs we Iound that items in each oI these three lists were not there that in our
view should be there. And so we discussed those items that we believe should be included in the
declaration. Again, I dont want to get into speciIics at this point.
QUESTION: Do you anticipate the heads oI delegation meeting in December?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think it might have been possible in December. But Ive just been
out here this week, and Im not sure I want to come around and turn back so soon beIore Christmas. So
we will have to see, but it may slip to the beginning oI January.
QUESTION: So you might not have a Iull declaration beIore the end oI the year?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, no, I think we will have it, and then there will be the question
oI how it is looked at by the Iive other members. And I think, Irom a holiday point oI view, it might be
diIIicult to get the Iive members around a table six all together, oI course, since the DPRK will have
to be there. So I am going to talk to the Chinese and see. This is their process, and lets see what they
want to do.
And, by the way, the Chinese have been very, very helpIul in terms oI assisting in getting the material
into the DPRK, because most oI it is being purchased in China and being brought to the DPRK. We are
talking about heavy earth-moving equipment, large lorries, Iront-end loaders, IorkliIts, large heaters Ior
use inside warehouse-sized places. We have a lot oI tanker trucks bringing Iuel. We have a lot oI major
items that are being brought in through China. It has not been done beIore, and were very pleased at
the cooperation were getting on that.
QUESTION: The original plan was to get the draIt and then go back-and-Iorth and get it Iinalized.
Since you will not have the heads oI delegation meeting, will |it| be more like a one-time declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I dont think were quite in a position to tell you. I think you
are quite right; the original idea was to get a draIt and start working it. But I think what we want to do
is make sure that the draIt we get is as complete and correct as possible, because we know there are a
lot oI people cheering on Irom the sidelines or not cheering on Irom the sidelines who would
perhaps leap at the opportunity to look at a draIt that is not complete and not correct. So, in short, I
think it is very important that whatever Iirst draIt gets out there is as complete and as correct as
possible.
Now you raise an important question. How are we going to do this in the Six Parties? Because we do at
some point need a meeting. Ideally, we should be doing this in time Ior December 31, because it is the
time we all laid out Ior us. But a lot oI members have problems trying to leave their Iamilies at
Christmas to go and look at some pieces oI paper because we want it to be done beIore the 31st and not
immediately aIter the 31st. So let me talk to the Chinese and see how they see this.
QUESTION: When you were in Pyongyang, did the light water reactor issue come up?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, it did not.
QUESTION: Did you suggest to the North Koreans that they not present the declaration because you
wanted a more complete draIt, or were they at this time prepared to present it?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the North Koreans are prepared to move very Iast. But I
think it was Mr. Kim Kye Gwan who also said, we dont want to rush this and cause problems. Haste
makes waste, I think is what he said. So I dont think we have any big disagreement on that. But they
were very interested in showing that they are meeting our timelines.
QUESTION: Do the North Koreans have any other issues that they want resolved, energy issues or
anything like that, beIore they present the declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, to be sure, weve been The various members oI the Six
Parties or, I should say, Iour oI the Six Parties have been organizing energy assistance, and weve been
kind oI rotating each month. So the North Koreans are very aware oI when the energy arrives. In Iact,
one oI the plants had to shut down because the energy hadnt arrived on time. So, yes, they are very
aware oI energy issues, but they are also very aware that we are doing everything we can do to work on
this and to keep it moving.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I am so looking Iorward to going up to my hotel room and
sleeping, and then Ill think about tomorrow. But, yes, I am seeing Wu Dawei. I think I also have some
bilateral meetings at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and Im sure there are some other meetings. Im
sure the Embassy can give you a read out on what they all are. But my plan is to be here through
tomorrow night, and then leave early Friday to get to Narita, and then see Ken Sasae.
QUESTION: And then continue on to Washington?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: And then continue on to Washington.
QUESTION: So what time are you leaving tomorrow morning?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Tomorrow morning? I think its -- Check with the Embassy. I want
to say it is a nine thirty meeting, but --
AIDE: Eight Iorty
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: So Im leaving here at 8:40?
AIDE: Yes.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: So iI you show up at 8:41 (Laughter)
All right. See you later.
Released on December 5, 2007
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gTZHujs4sXZNNAQ9doBJk84STbQ
Bush sends letter to NKorean leader on nuke talks: US
4 hours ago |accessed 2007-12-06T16:05Z|
SEOUL (AFP) US President George W. Bush has written to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il
urging Pyongyang to Iully disclose its atomic activities, oIIicials said Thursday, as doubts emerged
over whether a year-end deadline will be met.
He also sent letters to the Iour other parties involved in the six-party talks aimed at disabling the
communist state's atomic programmes, said US National Security Council spokesman Gordon
Johndroe.
"President Bush wrote letters to all the leaders involved in the six-party talks last Saturday, December
1," Johndroe said.
"In these letters, the president reiterated our commitment to the six-party talks and stressed the need Ior
North Korea to come Iorward with a Iull and complete declaration oI their nuclear programs, as called
Ior in the September 2005 six-party agreement."
US Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill delivered the letter to North Korean Foreign Minister
Pak Ui-Chun this week, the North's oIIicial Korean Central News Agency said Thursday.
Hill, the US chieI negotiator with Pyongyang, visited the North this week to observe the US-led
disabling oI its nuclear plants at Yongbyon.
Bush is not known to have communicated personally beIore with the hardline communist state, which
he termed part oI an "axis oI evil" in 2002. He once reportedly said he "loathes" Kim Jong-Il.
The North shocked the world with its Iirst nuclear test in October 2006.
But this year it agreed, under a six-nation pact which includes the US, to disable its plutonium-
producing plants and declare all nuclear programmes and Iacilities by year-end.
In return it would receive major energy aid.
The letter comes at a crucial time in international eIIorts to scrap North Korea's nuclear programmes.
South Korea's Foreign Minister Song Min-Soon said earlier Thursday that Pyongyang may miss the
deadline Ior the declaration.
"Currently the nuclear issue is at a crossroads where it may proceed towards a stable phase or to a
rough road," Song said.
"As to the declaration part, progress is not yet being made. We are aiming at the end oI the year as a
target date but iI we miss it, we will be Ilexible in readjusting it and doing it in a realistic way."
A South Korean oIIicial said later that a key problem is the North's reIusal to address its suspected
highly enriched uranium weapons (HEU) programme to US satisIaction.
The latest nuclear crisis began in late 2002 when the US accused North Korea oI having a secret HEU
programme in addition to its declared plutonium operation. Pyongyang has never admitted such a
programme.
The North is also demanding that it be removed Irom a US list oI state sponsors oI terrorism in return
Ior denuclearisation, as envisaged in the six-nation pact.
The designation prevents it receiving US economic aid and also blocks aid Irom multilateral bodies like
the World Bank. Bush must notiIy the US Congress iI he intends to remove the designation.
Song said such an action was conditional on getting a Iull declaration.
"The US is preparing to remove the North Irom the list oI terror-sponsoring states iI it (declaration) is
carried out to an acceptable degree," he said.
Hill is currently visiting Beijing, which hosts the six-party talks also grouping the two Koreas, Russia
and Japan. He stressed that the North must make credible declarations about all its programmes.
"We want to make sure that when they transIer (issue) even a Iirst draIt, that it is credible," Hill told
journalists. "We need them to step up and show some trust in us and trust in the process."
Hill has said Washington has "credible evidence" oI North Korea purchasing equipment and materials
that could be used in a HEU programme.
Pyongyang must account Ior these beIore Washington moves towards establishing diplomatic relations,
he said Thursday.
"We have had a lot oI discussion with them about uranium enrichment. It is a very delicate...
discussion," Hill said. "Being clear about what has happened in the past is the means Ior us to build a
Iuture relationship."
Following talks in Beijing, which will include discussions with the Russian ambassador, Hill said he
would meet his Japanese counterpart to the talks in Tokyo on Friday beIore returning to Washington.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-paciIic/7130528.stm
Bush sends letter to North Korea
Published: 2007/12/06 15:50:49 GMT
US President George W Bush has sent a personal letter to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the
White House has conIirmed.
The letter urged Pyongyang to honour its pledge to reveal all the details oI its nuclear programme.
The letter was delivered by US envoy Christopher Hill.
Mr Hill has just visited North Korea to assess progress on the disabling oI its main nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon as part oI an aid-Ior-disarmament deal.
US National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said that Mr Bush had written to all leaders
involved in the six-party talks about North Korea's nuclear programme.
"In these letters, the president reiterated our commitment to the six-party talks and stressed the need Ior
North Korea to come Iorward with a Iull and complete declaration oI their nuclear programmes, as
called Ior in the September 2005 six-party agreement," he said.
The letter was handed over during Mr Hill's meeting on Tuesday |4 December 2007| with North
Korea's Ioreign minister Pak Ui-chun.
Under an international deal, signed in February, Pyongyang pledged to declare all its nuclear
programmes and disable Yongbyon by the end oI the year.
Deal 'at a crossroads'
News oI the letter comes a day aIter Mr Hill and South Korean ministers expressed concern that North
Korea's declaration oI its nuclear programme might not be completed on time.
Mr Hill said this declaration had to include details oI the country's uranium enrichment programme.
"We want to make sure that when we do transIer, even the Iirst draIt, it is a credible eIIort," he said in
Beijing.
"We need them to step up and show some trust in us and trust in the process," he said.
South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon said on Thursday that the deal was "at a crossroads
where it may proceed towards a stable phase or to a rough road".
The US has said it would consider removing North Korea Irom a list oI countries it says sponsors
terrorism iI Pyongyang Iully complies with the deal.
Meanwhile negotiations are continuing over a date Ior the next round oI six-party talks, between the
Koreas, Russia, the US and China.
Talks were due to restart this week but were called oII because oI to "scheduling problems", according
to a US State Department spokesman.
Mr Bush once branded North Korea part oI the "axis oI evil", along with Iran and pre-war Iraq, and
said the country was "an oppressive regime |whose| people live in Iear and starvation".
North Korea's nuclear ambitions Iirst attracted international attention in 2002 and in October 2006
Pyongyang shocked the world by testing a nuclear missile.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7132359,00.html
Bush Writes Leaders in NK Nuclear Talks
Thursday December 6, 2007 5:46 PM
By DEB RIECHMANN
WASHINGTON (AP) - President Bush directly told North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in a letter that
the United States expects the secretive regime to keep its promise to Iully disclose all nuclear
programs, the White House said Thursday.
It was Bush's most personal intervention with Pyongyang since he called the country part oI an `àxis
oI evil.''
The letter to North Korea underscored Bush's desire to resolve the nuclear standoII with the communist
regime, and made plain that the North cannot skirt requirements to Iully explain the extent, use and
possible spread oI nuclear material and technology, a U.S. oIIicial told The Associated Press.
That is the message the North has already heard Irom Bush's nuclear envoy, Assistant Secretary oI
State Christopher Hill, but the Bush letter is a diplomatic exclamation point. It also serves a domestic
political purpose - signaling to conservative critics oI the North Korea deal that the United States will
not roll back its requirements or accept less than a Iull declaration oI the North's nuclear program.
The North agreed to Iully account Ior its nuclear activities by year's end, but U.S. oIIicials
acknowledged Thursday that the deadline is likely to slip.
Better to have the complete document in hand a couple oI weeks late than to have a halI-baked version
by the Dec. 31 deadline, one oIIicial said, in part because the latter scenario opens the Bush
administration to criticism that the North is still hiding things.
The North conducted a clandestine nuclear program Ior years and proved its entry into the world
nuclear club with an underground test explosion last year.
The oIIicial said that Hill discussed the likelihood oI a late declaration during meetings over the past
week with the North and the other Iour nations bargaining alongside the United States to eventually rid
the Korean peninsula oI nuclear weapons.
The oIIicial spoke on condition oI anonymity to describe closed-door diplomatic meetings.
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice expressed optimism, but also suggested the schedule is sliding.
`Ìt is going to take a monumental eIIort to get all oI this done by the end oI the year,'' she said,
speaking to reporters on Thursday as she Ilew to Brussels Ior NATO meetings. `Ànd I am not too
concerned about whether it's December 31st or not. They seem to be on track. Everybody believes the
cooperation is very good.''
Hill delivered Bush's letter, dated Dec. 1, to North Korea's Ioreign minister during Hill's visit to
Pyongyang earlier this week. Hill also gave similar letters Irom Bush to China and South Korea and
Japan, and another letter went to the IiIth partner, Russia.
Neither the White House nor the State Department would release the letters or describe their content in
detail.
``He sent a letter to Kim Jong Il that urged the North Koreans to Iully declare their nuclear programs,
as called Ior in the September 2005 six-party agreement,'' Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman Ior the
National Security Council, said Thursday.
The U.S. oIIicial, however, said the letter to the North makes reIerence to the need to resolve three
main sticking points: the exact amount oI weapons-grade nuclear material the North produced, the
number oI warheads it built and whether and how North Korea may have passed nuclear material or
knowledge to others.
Bush also called Chinese President Hu Jintao on Thursday to discuss several issues, including North
Korea, Johndroe said. The Xinhua News Agency reported that Hu pointed out that the starting action oI
the relevant joint declaration has been implemented, and the second phase has started. Hu said all
parties should keep the dialogue going to meet the target oI denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula,
Xinhua said.
The question oI proliIeration has taken on great signiIicance, and become a political hurdle Ior the
Bush administration, since Israel's air strike on a suspected Syrian nuclear site Sept. 6. Intelligence
reports suggested that Syria was cooperating in some Iashion with North Korea in building the site.
The news that North Korea may have been working with others as recently as this year, aIter it had
agreed to give up its weapons, reinvigorated U.S. domestic opposition to what some conservatives in
Congress see as an overly generous deal with an unreliable country.
White House press secretary Dana Perino said the president decided to send the letter to ``so that we
can keep it all on track.''
In comments early Thursday, South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon sounded a gloomy note,
saying: ``There has not been progress on the declaration yet.'' A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman
expressed disappointment that North Korea was likely to miss the year-end deadline, but that it is
unlikely to aIIect the overall agreement.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said the six countries were consulting on whether to
hold another round oI meetings beIore the end oI the year.
On Thursday, Hill suggested that negotiations had stalled on producing a draIt declaration oI North
Korea's nuclear programs by the end oI the year. The deadline was part oI an agreement the six nations
reached in February.
Under the deal, North Korea was promised 1 million tons oI Iuel oil or the equivalent, plus political
concessions such as its removal Irom a U.S. list oI terrorism-supporting nations, in return Ior disabling
its nuclear program and making other moves.
``The disablement activities are going well,'' Perino said. `Ì would characterize it as timely because we
are nearing the deadline by which they had to declare.''
North Korea began disabling its reactor, which was shut down in July, and two other Iacilities last
month under the watch oI U.S. experts. It has promised to complete the process by the end oI
December, but South Korean nuclear envoy Chun Yung-woo said last week it would take longer to
remove about 8,000 spent Iuel rods Irom the reactor.
Hill said investigators were seeking to clear up questions over North Korea's purchase in past years oI
gas centriIuges Ior its nuclear program.
On the declaration, Hill told reporters in Beijing, where he was meeting diplomats Iollowing his visit to
North Korea, that Washington and Pyongyang still had diIIerences to resolve on the issue.
Speaking in Seoul, Song called on the U.S. and North Korea to allow some wiggle room on the issue.
``The issue oI nuclear declaration is not easy,'' he told reporters. Each side ``should take a Ilexible
attitude.''
http://www.Ias.org/irp/congress/2007rpt/hrpt110-478.pdI
[EXCERPT]
SEC. 328. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.
Not more than 30 percent oI the Iunds authorized to be appropriated Ior the Expenditure Center
reIerred to on page 157 oI Volume VI, Book 1 oI the Fiscal Year 2008-Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional
Budget JustiIication, National Intelligence Program, may be obligated or expended until each member
oI the congressional intelligence committees has been Iully and currently inIormed with respect to
intelligence regarding a Iacility in Syria subject to reported military action by the State oI Israel on
September 6, 2007, including intelligence relating to any agent or citizen oI North Korea, Iran, or any
other Ioreign country present at the Iacility, and any intelligence provided to the Federal Government
by a Ioreign country regarding the Iacility (as available).
SEC. 329. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that is included in
the classiIied annex to this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in
law.
http://www.Ias.org/blog/secrecy/
December 12, 2007
White House Objects to FY2008 Intelligence Authorization Bill
Perhaps the clearest indication lately that intelligence oversight still matters is a new White House
Statement oI Administration Policy (pdI) expressing strong opposition to the FY2008 Intelligence
Authorization bill.
"II this bill were to pass the House and the Senate and be presented to the President Ior signature, the
President's senior advisors would recommend that he veto the bill," the Statement notes.
On issue aIter issue, Irom interrogation to congressional reporting, the White House indicates
disapproval oI the new legislation, which has already been accepted by a House-Senate conIerence and
awaits a Iinal vote in each house.
Among other things, "The Administration also objects to section 328, which attempts to use Congress'
power oI the purse to circumvent the authority oI the Executive Branch to control access to
extraordinarily sensitive inIormation."
This provision, which represents something oI a new milestone in intelligence oversight, would impose
a "Ience" on certain spending until the Administration brieIs the intelligence committees on the Israeli
strike on a Syrian Iacility. It was introduced by Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) and adopted on a bipartisan
basis.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-12-07-voa14.cIm
US Says More Talks Needed on North Korea Nuclear Issue
By Kurt Achin
Seoul
07 December 2007
The senior U.S. delegate to multinational talks aimed at dismantling North Korea's nuclear capabilities
says more discussions are needed beIore North Korea produces a Iormal declaration oI its nuclear
programs. VOA's Kurt Achin reports Irom Seoul, where South Korean oIIicials are praising an
unprecedented high-level outreach to North Korea by President Bush.
South Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman Cho Hui-young told reporters Friday that Seoul welcomes
President Bush's letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. He says the letter shows President Bush's
determination to support the process oI North Korea's denuclearization.
North Korean broadcasters have been conIirming Kim Jong Il's receipt oI the letter, aIter Iirst
announcing it Thursday night. Prior to the North Korean announcement, U.S. oIIicials and their
regional partners made no mention oI such a letter.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill delivered the letter last week in Pyongyang. Hill is
Washington's representative at multinational talks to end North Korea's nuclear arsenal by diplomatic
means.
He told reporters during a stop in Tokyo Friday North Korea is "quite on schedule" in disabling key
nuclear Iacilities, as it promised South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the United States it would do as
part oI a multi-stage agreement. He says the North will soon advance that process by removing spent
Iuel Irom its main reactor at Yongbyon.
However, Hill says more discussions are needed beIore North Korea IulIills another part oI the
agreement by producing a Iull declaration oI all its nuclear Iacilities, materials, and existing weapons.
The United States has insisted the North account Ior an alleged uranium enrichment program
Pyongyang has never publicly admitted. It also wants North Korea to address Washington's concerns
about the possible transIer oI nuclear equipment and technology to Syria.
White House oIIicials say Mr. Bush's letter urged Kim Jong Il to make a Iull and accurate declaration
oI its nuclear activities, and said the U.S. will know iI North Korea leaves the declaration incomplete.
Cheon Ho-seon, a spokesman Ior South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, says South Korea played a
signiIicant role in the White House decision to send the letter. He says U.S. envoy Hill did not have the
letter when he was in Seoul, shortly beIore leaving Ior North Korea. He says the idea to send the letter
arose during Hill's consultations with South Korean oIIicials.
The White House has not released the Iull contents oI Mr. Bush's letter to Kim Jong Il, but say it
underscores Washington's view that the six-nation negotiations are at a critical juncture.
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7009397913
Chinese Nuclear Negotiator To Visit North Korea
December 8, 2007 1:00 p.m. EST
John Concepcion - AHN News Writer
Tokyo, Japan (AHN) - China is apparently concerned about whether North Korea will keeps its pledge
to reveal the extent oI its nuclear programs.
In an attempt to Iind out how sincere North Korea is, China's vice Ioreign minister is reportedly
planning to visit that nation next week. His anticipated trip is in an eIIort to ensure that North Korea
does not renege on its promise oI a Iull disclosure oI all its nuclear programs by the end oI the year,
according to an article that appeared in Kyodo News.
The news agency quoted an unnamed source close to the United States-North Korea relations, who said
that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, also the chairman oI the six-party North Korea nuclear
talks, will be pressing Ior prooI on the promise when he meets with his North Korean counterpart Kim
Kye Gwan.
North Korea has agreed to a disclosure oI its nuclear programs and the dismantling oI its nuclear
Iacility by the end oI the year, according to a deal it signed with Iive other nations that include China
and the U.S, in exchange Ior energy aid.
The dismantling oI a key nuclear Iacility started in early November, but the North has yet to disclose its
nuclear program.
Wu is expected to talk to Kim and press Ior the disclosure in order to satisIy those who signed the deal.
Last week the Associated Press reported that the U.S. was conIident that North Korea would meet the
year-end deadline to disclose details oI its nuclear program.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.RES.399:
SRES 399 IS
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 399
Expressing the sense oI the Senate that certain benchmarks must be met beIore certain restrictions
against the Government oI North Korea are liIted, and that the United States Government should not
provide any Iinancial assistance to North Korea until the Secretary oI State makes certain certiIications
regarding the submission oI applications Ior reIugee status.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
December 10, 2007
Mr. BROWNBACK (Ior himselI, Mr. KYL, Mr. LIEBERMAN, and Mr. GRASSLEY) submitted the
Iollowing resolution; which was reIerred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense oI the Senate that certain benchmarks must be met beIore certain restrictions
against the Government oI North Korea are liIted, and that the United States Government should not
provide any Iinancial assistance to North Korea until the Secretary oI State makes certain certiIications
regarding the submission oI applications Ior reIugee status.
Whereas international press reports noted that Iranian oIIicials traveled to North Korea to observe the
long and short-range missile tests conducted by the North Korean regime on July 4, 2006, and this was
conIirmed by Ambassador Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary oI State Ior East Asia and the PaciIic,
during testimony beIore the Committee on Foreign Relations oI the Senate on July 20, 2006;
Whereas international press reports in the summer oI 2006 indicated that North Korea was involved in
training in guerrilla warIare oI Hezbollah cadres who subsequently were involved in operations against
Israeli Iorces in south Lebanon;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council, under the presidency oI Japan, unanimously adopted
Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, `condemning' the nuclear weapon test conducted by North
Korea on October 9, 2006, and imposing sanctions on North Korea;
Whereas President George W. Bush stated in November 2006 that: `The transIer oI nuclear weapons or
material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United
States, and we would hold North Korea Iully accountable Ior the consequences oI such action. ... It is
vital that the nations oI this region send a message to North Korea that the proliIeration oI nuclear
technology to hostile regimes or terrorist networks will not be tolerated.';
Whereas Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice stated in October 2006 that à North Korean decision to
try to transIer a nuclear weapon or technologies either to another state or to a non-state actor' would be
an èxtremely grave' action Ior which the United States would `hold North Korea accountable'; and
Whereas Congress authoritatively expressed its view, in section 202(b)(2) oI the North Korean Human
Rights Act oI 2004 (Public Law 108-333; 22 U.S.C. 7832(b)(2)), that Ùnited States nonhumanitarian
assistance to North Korea shall be contingent on North Korea's substantial progress' on human rights
improvements, release oI and accounting Ior abductees, Iamily reuniIication, reIorm oI North Korea's
labor camp system, and the decriminalization oI political expression, none oI which has occurred:
Now, thereIore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate--
(1) recognizes that restrictions against the Government oI North Korea were imposed by reason
oI a determination oI the Secretary oI State that the Government oI North Korea, Ior purposes oI
section 6(j) oI the Export Administration Act oI 1979 (as continued in eIIect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 40 oI the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A oI the Foreign Assistance Act oI 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2371), and other provisions oI law, was a government that has repeatedly provided support Ior acts oI
international terrorism;
(2) believes that this designation should remain in eIIect and should not be liIted unless it can
be demonstrated that the Government oI North Korea--
(A) is no longer engaged in the illegal transIer oI missile or nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons technology, particularly to the Governments oI Iran, Syria, or any other country, the
government oI which the Secretary oI State has determined, Ior purposes oI any oI the provisions oI
law speciIied in paragraph (1), is a government that has repeatedly provided support Ior acts oI
international terrorism;
(B) is no longer engaged in training, harboring, supplying, Iinancing, or supporting in any
way--
(i) Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Japanese Red Army, or any member oI such organizations;
(ii) any organization designated by the Secretary oI State as a Ioreign terrorist
organization in accordance with section 219(a) oI the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189(a)); and
(iii) any person included on the Annex to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001)
and any other person identiIied under section 1 oI that Executive Order whose property and interests in
property are blocked by that section (commonly known as a `specially designated global terrorist');
(C) is no longer engaged in the counterIeiting oI United States currency `supernotes';
(D) has made inoperable Bureau No. 39 under the North Korean Workers Party headed by
Kim Jong Il, which is charged with laundering illicit Iunds obtained by narcotics traIIicking and other
criminal activities;
(E) has released United States permanent resident Kim Dong-Shik who, according to the
Iindings oI a South Korean court, was abducted by North Korean agents on the Chinese border in
January 2000;
(F) has released or Iully accounted to the satisIaction oI the Government oI the United
States and the Government oI the Republic oI Korea Ior the whereabouts oI the 15 Japanese nationals
recognized as abduction victims by the National Police Agency (NPA) oI Japan;
(G) has released or Iully accounted to the satisIaction oI the Government oI the United
States and the Government oI the Republic oI Korea Ior the whereabouts oI an estimated 600 surviving
South Korean prisoners oI war, comrades-in-arms oI United States and Allied Iorces, who have been
held in North Korea against their will and in violation oI the Armistice Agreement since hostilities
ended in July 1953; and
(H) has ceased and desisted Irom engaging in Iurther terrorist activities subsequent to the
1987 bombing oI Korean Air Flight 858 over Burma, the 1996 murder in Vladivostok, Russia, oI South
Korean diplomat Choi Duck-keun, Iollowing Pyongyang's threats oI retaliation Ior the deaths oI North
Korean commandoes whose submarine ran aground in South Korea, and the 1997 assassination on the
streets oI Seoul oI North Korean deIector Lee Han Young; and
(3) believes that the United States Government should not provide any Iinancial assistance to
North Korea (except Ior adequately monitored humanitarian assistance in the Iorm oI Iood and
medicine) unless the Secretary oI State certiIies that--
(A) appropriate guidance has been provided to all Ioreign embassies and consular oIIices
regarding their responsibility under section 303 oI the North Korean Human Rights Act oI 2004 (22
U.S.C. 7843) to Iacilitate the submission oI applications by citizens oI North Korea seeking protection
as reIugees under section 207 oI the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157);
(B) such guidance has been published in the Federal Register; and
(C) the Iacilities described in subparagraph (A) are carrying out the responsibility described
in subparagraph (A) in good Iaith.
http://www.pr-inside.com/south-korean-prime-minister-arrives-Ior-r339652.htm
South Korean prime minister arrives for talks in Beijing
2007-12-10 09:26:30 -
BEIJING (AP) - South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-Soo arrived in China on Monday [10
December 2007] Ior talks with Premier Wen Jiabao concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons
programs and economic ties.
Han will also meet President Hu Jintao during his two-day visit, the oIIicial Xinhua News Agency
reported.
Han's oIIice in Seoul said he would hold talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, economic
cooperation and other bilateral issues.
China has played host to the six-party talks in which North Korea has agreed to dismantle and account
Ior its nuclear activities by the end oI the year. That deadline is unlikely to be met, but U.S. nuclear
envoy Christopher Hill said last week he was still pleased with the progress.
U.S. President George W. Bush sent a letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il last week urging his
government to Iully disclose its nuclear programs, the White House said.
Han's trip will also mark the 15th anniversary oI the establishment oI diplomatic relations between
China and South Korea.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/12/11615273.html
12-10-2007 17:20
Six-Party Talks' Energy Group to Meet in Beijing Tuesday
By Yoon Won-sup
StaII Reporter
The six-party talks' working group on economic and energy aid Ior North Korea will take place in
Beijing on Dec. 11-12, according to the Ministry oI Foreign AIIairs and Trade Monday.
The ministry said the group will discuss mainly the ways oI providing heavy Iuel oil and non-oil
economic aid to North Korea as promised.
The meeting will be chaired by Lim Sung-nam, deputy chieI oI South Korea's delegation to the North
Korea denuclearization talks that also involve North Korea, the United States, Japan, China and Russia.
Under the February accord, North Korea will receive 1 million tons oI oil or equivalent assistance in
return Ior shutting down and disabling its key nuclear Iacilities and disclosing all its nuclear programs.
http://www.nysun.com/article/67884
Hoekstra Sets His Sights on CIA Chief
BY ELI LAKE - StaII Reporter oI the Sun
December 12, 2007
[EXCERPTS]
WASHINGTON When the CIA director, Michael Hayden, testiIies today beIore the House
intelligence panel, he will Iace particular scrutiny Irom the committee's top-ranking Republican.
In an interview yesterday [December 11, 2007], Rep. Peter Hoekstra, a Republican Irom Michigan,
said Mr. Hayden's memo to CIA employees last week, claiming that oversight committees were
inIormed oI the agency's plans to destroy the interrogation videos, was inaccurate. Stopping just short
oI calling Mr. Hayden a liar, Mr. Hoekstra, who headed the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence in 2005 and 2006, said, "He says Congress was adequately and Iully inIormed. We were
never inIormed. He contends that brieIings in 2002 and 2003 are more than suIIicient Ior activities that
took place in 2005 when you had new leadership oI the community. That makes no sense."
[deletia]
Mr. Hoekstra has been a tough critic oI Mr. Hayden's since Mr. Hayden was the principal deputy
director oI national intelligence in 2005. Mr. Hoekstra at the time pressed the intelligence community
to re-open the inquiry into Iraq's weapons oI mass destruction, noting that even the Iinal report oI the
Iraq Survey Group concluded that key sites were modiIied and stripped clean beIore inspectors could
get to them.
Mr. Hayden and Mr. Hoekstra have also clashed on questions oI declassiIication. Mr. Hoekstra
sponsored an amendment yesterday to Iorce the executive branch to make public what it knows about
Israel's bombing oI an alleged nuclear Iacility in Syria in September. "It is so compelling and necessary
to get people brieIed in on what happened in Syria, that would give you insights into a lot oI this," Mr.
Hoekstra said. That said, Mr. Hoekstra's Irustration with the spy chieI now comes at a terrible time Ior
Mr. Hayden, who testiIied yesterday beIore the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about his
agency's decision to destroy videotapes oI interrogation oI at least two Al Qaeda suspects.
[deletia]
http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2007/12/13/news/local/znews01.txt
Straight talk: Syrian ambassador says Americans have been misled about his country
By MICHAEL MOORE oI the Missoulian
Thursday, December 13 2007
[EXCERPTS]
When Americans think about the war in Iraq, they mostly conIine their thoughts to American soldiers
there.
But the war has had a dramatic eIIect throughout the Middle East, creating tensions that reverberate
through American diplomatic relationships with other countries.
One oI those countries is Syria, which has seen 1.5 million Iraqis pour across its eastern border as the
war has progressed. Syria supported America against Saddam Hussein in the Desert Storm war in
Kuwait, but opposed the 2003 American war on Iraq.
The country did not, however, close its doors to the displaced.
We have 1.5 million Iraqi reIugees in Syria, and that has imposed a tremendous burden on our
country, the Syrian ambassador, Imad Moustapha, said in an interview Tuesday [December 11, 2007|.
That's the equivalent oI 30 million reIugees coming to the United States. How do you think your
country would deal with that?
That's pretty direct communication coming Irom a diplomat, but that is Imad Moustapha, a Renaissance
man who rose to diplomatic prominence along the unlikely path oI an academic.
Moustapha was in Missoula on Tuesday to directly address Americans in a speech at the University
oI Montana. The ambassador's speech was sponsored by the World AIIairs Council oI Montana.
In the interview, Moustapha said Americans, to the extent that they know anything at all about Syria,
have a mistaken view oI his country.
[deletia]
Syria, oI course, has a Iractious relationship with Israel, epitomized most recently by the Israeli
bombing oI a military site in Syria in September.
Although inIormation about the attack has been murky at best, Israel suspected that Syria was
attempting to develop some sort oI nuclear capability through its relationship with North Korea.
Moustapha said that was a lie.
There are no nuclear projects in Syria, he said. Anything else is ... a lie, totally, no truthIulness
whatsoever.
China's chief nuclear envoy to visit DPRK next week
www.chinaview.cn
2007-12-11 18:59:15
BEIJING, Dec.11 (Xinhua) -- China's Foreign Ministry announced here on Tuesday [December 11,
2007] that Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei would visit the Democratic People's Republic oI Korea
(DPRK) next week to discuss the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.
Wu, top negotiator oI the Chinese delegation to the six-party talks, would meet with his DPRK
counterpart, Kim Kye Gwan, Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a regular press conIerence.
Also on Tuesday, a meeting oI the working group on economic and energy cooperation, one oI the
Iive working groups under the Iramework oI the six-party talks, was held in Beijing.
The two-day meeting was led by the Republic oI Korea, Qin said, adding that the main topic was to
discuss relevant issues oI economic and energy assistance to the DPRK.
Qin said he hoped the six parties could have a Iull exchange oI views at the meeting.
Qin also urged the parties concerned to take advantage oI the current positive momentum oI the
nuclear talks, express their own concerns and respect others' reasonable concerns as well, so as to
promote mutual trust and produce a positive outcome Irom the negotiations.
The six-party talks include China, the DPRK, the United State, the Republic oI Korea, Russia and
Japan.
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-cia13dec13,1,1615643.story
CIA failed to fully inform Congress on tapes, director says
Michael Hayden said the agency should have kept lawmakers better apprised on videotaped
interrogations.
By Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times StaII Writer
December 13, 2007
[EXCERPT]
WASHINGTON -- CIA Director Michael V. Hayden acknowledged Wednesday [December 12, 2007]
that the agency Iailed to keep key congressional committees adequately inIormed oI the CIA's decision
to destroy videotapes oI secret interrogations.
"I think that it's Iair to say that, particularly at the time oI the destruction, we could have done an awIul
lot better in keeping the committee alerted and inIormed as to that activity," Hayden said in brieI
remarks aIter a three-hour meeting with the House Intelligence Committee on the tapes controversy.
|deletia|
Rep. Peter Hoekstra oI Michigan, the top Republican on the committee, said the case is part oI a pattern
that prompted him to write to President Bush last year expressing concern about the CIA and other
agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community.
"I didn't believe the administration and the community was Iully keeping Congress inIormed on all oI
the diIIerent types oI programs and issues that the intelligence community might be working on," he
said.
Hoekstra noted that many lawmakers still are seeking more inIormation Irom U.S. intelligence agencies
on the Israeli military strike on a suspected nuclear Iacility in Syria earlier this year.
Hoekstra suggested that Hayden didn't deserve to be the Iocus oI the criticism, saying that the
committee knew less about the tapes "than maybe what Gen. Hayden had been led to believe" by his
staII.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKN1242861120071212
UPDATE 1
US envoy hopes for N. Korea nuclear disclosure soon
Wed Dec 12, 2007 7:55pm GMT
By Susan Cornwell
(Adds detail, quotes, background)
WASHINGTON, Dec 12 (Reuters) - The United States hopes that North Korea will keep its promise
and disclose all its nuclear activities by the end oI this year, Washington's envoy to nuclear talks on
North Korea said on Wednesday.
"We are hopeIul that we will have the complete declaration provided by around the year end,"
Assistant Secretary oI State Chris Hill told reporters on Capitol Hill.
He spoke aIter brieIing senators on eIIorts to get North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons
program -- and winning rare Democratic praise Ior Bush administration Ioreign policy.
"This is real," CaliIornia Democratic Sen. Barbara Boxer, who presided at the closed-door brieIing oI
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said oI the progress Hill described. She is a big critic oI some
other White House undertakings, such as the war in Iraq.
"We support the president in his request to the North Koreans that this be Iull disclosure," said Boxer,
who chairs the Ioreign relations subcommittee on East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs.
President George W. Bush, in his Iirst direct communication with North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il,
wrote to him last week urging Pyongyang to reveal all nuclear programs.
Under an agreement in six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear program, Pyongyang has pledged to
disable its main nuclear complex and declare all oI its nuclear activities in exchange Ior economic and
diplomatic incentives.
Hill, who handed Bush's letter to the reclusive state's Ioreign minister last week while on a visit to
Pyongyang, said progress was being made on disabling North Korean nuclear Iacilities.
Boxer thought Congress would approve "reasonable sums oI money" needed to support the process,
including $106 million that Hill requested as the U.S. contribution toward Iuel oil that is being
provided to North Korea as an incentive.
Hill described more diplomatic activity directly ahead, including a trip soon by chairman oI the six-
party talks, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, to North Korea.
North Korea is "very interested" in being removed Irom the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, Hill
noted. "We will Iollow the letter oI the law in that regard," he said, but added: "We are making
progress on the issue."
Asked about concerns North Korea had nuclear ties with Syria, another country on the terrorism
blacklist, Boxer said, "I came away (Irom the brieIing) with the sense that whatever, iI anything ever
had occurred in the past, it is not occurring now. And I think our negotiators Ieel that with good
conIidence."
Hill, standing next to Boxer, did not contradict her. He said the United States must "ensure that as we
make progress on this, that proliIeration issues, whether they've existed in the past or not, certainly
don't exist in the present or in the Iuture."
Boxer said White House policy on North Korea had evolved and such progress demonstrated "we must
never take diplomacy oII the table. ... Talking to your enemies is hard work, but it's important work."
(Editing by Cynthia Osterman)
(2nd LD) Senator supports funding for N.K. Denuclearization,
says Syria connection likely in past
By Lee Dong-min
2007/12/13 04:52 KST
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. senator said Wednesday [December 12, 2007] she and
her colleagues would support American Iunding Ior North Korea's denuclearization as a senior U.S.
envoy expressed hope that the communist state will meet the benchmark deadline in disclosing its
nuclear activities.
"Things can change at any point, but we want to be very supportive," Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-
CaliIornia) told reporters.
She also said she "came away with a sense" that the alleged North Korean nuclear cooperation
with Syria, iI it ever took place, was in the past and "not occurring now."
On approving Iunding Ior North Korea, Boxer said, "I can imagine no scenario where the (George W.)
Bush administration comes to the Congress now and says, 'We have an opportunity to work with North
Korea, to make sure that North Korea is no longer an isolated nation and thereIore a threat to the
world'" and not receive a positive response.
"The point is, we think the answer will be yes to the reasonable sums oI money that are needed to
avoid a disaster," she said.
Drawing parallel with the war in Iraq, she said, "II we can avoid such an end, I think the
American people will embrace it."
Boxer, chair oI the Senate subcommittee on East Asia and PaciIic aIIairs, received a closed-door
brieIing Irom Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, who represents the U.S. at what is known
as the six-party talks.
Also involving South and North Korea, China, Russia and Japan, the Iorum aims at
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. In a series oI agreements dating back to September 2005,
Pyongyang agreed to eventually give up its nuclear weapons and programs. As interim steps, it pledged
to disable its core nuclear Iacilities and submit a declaration oI all its nuclear stockpile by the end oI
this year.
In return, North Korea would receive wide-ranging political and economic incentives, including a
total oI 1 million tons oI heavy Iuel oil or its equivalent. The Bush administration has asked Ior $106
million to participate in the heavy Iuel oil delivery.
The U.S. has said it will Ioot the initial cost oI North Korea's nuclear disablement, as well as
provide economic assistance as denuclearization progresses. Once in the Iinal dismantlement phase, the
U.S. is considering the Nunn-Lugar Iormula that was applied to the Iormer Soviet Union and which
required massive international Iunding to disassemble and discard its atomic weapons and to retrain
and employ nuclear scientists.
But as a Dec. 31 deadline was nearing, the nuclear declaration has not yet been presented. Hill
was in Pyongyang last week to remind the North Koreans that the disclosure has to be complete and
correct, but ensuing reports indicated that the initial draIt did not meet Washington's expectations.
China's top nuclear envoy, Wu Dawei, is expected to travel to Pyongyang next week, also with
the same message Ior the North to make a complete declaration.
Speaking side by side with Boxer, Hill said the North Koreans are continuing to work on their
declaration.
"We envision some additional discussions with the North Koreans later this month, so we are
hopeIul that we will have the complete declaration provided by around the year end," he said.
The push Ior an honest disclosure took on urgency aIter new allegations that Pyongyang may
have transIerred its nuclear technology or parts to Damascus, a proliIeration issue that the U.S.
considers a red line.
Israeli air Iorces raided a Syrian Iacility early September, claiming it was a nuclear installation
being equipped with the help oI North Korea. But inIormation surrounding the incident remains closely
held, and no evidence has been provided in the open to either prove or disprove the allegations.
Boxer and Hill said the issue did come up at the brieIing.
"We need to continue to be vigilant on this point as we go Iorward," said the envoy, "to ensure
that...the proliIeration issues, whether they've existed in the past or not, certainly don't exist in the
present or in the Iuture."
The senator said although she and her colleagues are asking questions, "we don't really know the
answer at this point."
"I came away with a sense that iI anything ever had occurred in the past, it is not occurring now," she
said.
"And I think our negotiators Ieel that with good conIidence."
But iI North Korea is engaged in proliIeration, "that's a deal breaker Irom my perspective," she said.
ldmyna.co.kr
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20071214TDY01302.htm
Hill: North Korea refused nuclear declaration
Takashi Sakamoto and Takeo Miyazaki / Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondents
(Dec. 14, 2007)
Christopher Hill, the chieI U.S. envoy at the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear programs, told the
U.S. Congress on Wednesday [December 12, 2007] that North Korea had reIused to declare its past
uranium enrichment programs and nuclear technology transIers, according to sources close to
Congress.
Speaking during a closed-door hearing at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on North Korea's
nuclear program and U.S.-North Korea ties, Hill made clear that negotiations at the six-party talks have
degenerated into a standoII, the sources said.
Hill previously said North Korea's complete declaration oI its nuclear programs and disablement oI
nuclear Iacilities in Yongbyon are "political conditions" to remove North Korea Irom the list oI nations
supporting terrorism.
There was speculation Irom the start that the United States would not delist North Korea by the end oI
the year. With the latest development, it is likely to become even more diIIicult Ior the United States to
start the procedure.
Hill told the closed-door meeting that among steps to be taken in the second phase oI North Korea's
denuclearization, disablement oI the Pyongyang's key nuclear Iacilities is in progress, according to the
sources.
As Ior a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs, however, Hill reportedly said that
North Korea Iailed to meet any U.S. requests. The United States had demanded that Pyongyang make
declarations on all:
-- Nuclear-related materials, Iacilities and plans.
-- Uranium enrichment programs.
-- TransIer oI nuclear technology.
More speciIically, North Korea reIused to elaborate on its use oI plutonium, which can be used to
develop nuclear warheads.
As Ior uranium enrichment programs and nuclear technology transIers, North Korea is reluctant to
disclose what it had done in the past, while insisting that it is currently not engaged in such activities.
Hill also indicated that North Korea has Iailed to meet political conditions to be removed Irom the list
oI countries sponsoring terrorism at this stage, according to the sources.
To achieve the goal, North Korea should cooperate with the United States through denuclearization,
apart Irom legal procedures, Hill reportedly told the meeting.
The Iact that North Korea is showing a negative attitude on the declaration oI its nuclear programs may
signiIicantly impact on the Iuture prospects oI the six-party talks, observers say.
Because denuclearization will be carried out based on North Korea's declaration oI its nuclear
programs, the declaration is considered a key step in the negotiations.
With a meeting oI the heads oI the six delegations originally scheduled Ior early December having been
postponed, the resumption oI the ministerial meeting is expected to be signiIicantly delayed.
Hill, who has been making a series oI concessions to keep North Korea at the negotiating table, is
taking a selI-assured approach toward Pyongyang's declaration oI its nuclear programs.
ThereIore, the Iuture oI the six-party talks is seen to largely depend on how North Korea will respond
Irom now, according to the observers.
According to sources close to the nuclear negotiators, U.S. President George W. Bush asked North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il to make a Iull declaration oI North Korea's nuclear programs in a personal
letter to Kim early this month.
The sources expressed expectations that Kim would take a Iorward-looking step, saying that iI there is
a will on the North Korean side to develop negotiations, it would be possible to bridge the gap between
Washington and Pyongyang.
N.K. acknowledges Bush's letter but stays mum on future intentions
2007/12/14 14:36 KST
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea, in its Iirst Iormal response to a letter sent by
U.S. President George W. Bush, said it appreciated the missive but did not mention its intentions on the
denuclearization steps mentioned in the letter, diplomatic sources here said Thursday.
"It was a verbal message," one oI the sources said, speaking on condition oI anonymity. The
message was delivered through New York where North Korea has a representative mission to the
United Nations, he said.
The response was brieI, acknowledging the receipt oI the letter and expressing appreciation, the
sources said. On U.S. calls Ior the North to implement its immediate denuclearization commitment, the
message was basically that "you do your part, we will do our part," they said.
President Bush last week sent letters to all other members oI the so-called six-party talks, a
multinational process aimed at removing all nuclear weapons and programs Irom the Korean Peninsula.
South and North Korea, China, Russia and Japan are participants in the talks.
The letter to Pyongyang emphasized that the negotiations were at a critical juncture and
"reminded" North Korea oI its commitments under the six-party agreements, the White House said.
The letter also reaIIirmed that should the North IulIill its commitments, the U.S. would reciprocate with
its own pledges, including diplomatic normalization with Pyongyang.
The six-party talks are approaching an important year-end deadline, when the North is required to
submit a declaration disclosing all oI its nuclear programs. The U.S. and others have been pressing Ior
a complete and correct declaration, considering it a test oI North Korea's sincerity.
As an initial incentive, the U.S. would reciprocate by removing the North Irom its list oI
terrorism-sponsoring states, a designation that eIIectively prohibits any meaningIul political and
economic exchanges with the North.
ldmyna.co.kr
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5huSr2cto6oXklRH0nXdM8i7PEQ0wD8THDJQO1
Bush to N. Korea: Disclose Nuclear Plans
By DEB RIECHMANN 2 hours ago
[Accessed 2007-12-14T21:45Z]
WASHINGTON (AP) President Bush said Friday that he got Kim Jong Il's attention by writing the
North Korean leader a letter and that Kim can get his attention by Iully disclosing his nuclear programs
and proliIeration activities.
The White House said Kim verbally responded through a diplomatic channel on Tuesday to a letter
Bush sent to him earlier this month. The letter, the president's Iirst to the leader oI the communist
regime, was viewed as a personal gesture Irom Bush, who once branded North Korea as part oI an
"axis oI evil."
"I got his attention with a letter and he can get my attention by Iully disclosing his programs, including
any plutonium he may have processed and converted some oI that into whatever he's used it Ior. We
just need to know," Bush said in the Rose Garden aIter a meeting with his Cabinet. "As well, he can get
our attention by Iully disclosing his proliIeration activities."
"An important step is a Iull declaration oI programs, materials that may have been developed to create
weapons, as well as the proliIeration activities oI the regime."
A senior U.S. oIIicial with knowledge oI the contents oI North Korea's message said it contained what
appeared to be a pledge Irom Pyongyang to Iollow through on its denuclearization deal as long as the
United States held to its end oI the bargain.
North Korea began disabling its plutonium-producing reactor last month under watch oI U.S. experts.
In exchange, the U.S. agreed to seek normalizing ties with North Korea and remove the country Irom
terrorism and trade sanctions blacklists.
"We'll live up to our side, we hope you'll live up to yours," the oIIicial paraphrased Kim's message as
saying. The oIIicial spoke on condition oI anonymity to describe the private diplomatic exchange.
The message was the country's Iirst oIIicial response to the letter Irom Bush.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said the message was delivered through channels in
New York, where North Korea has its only diplomatic mission in the United States at the United
Nations.
"We heard it via the New York channel," he said. "It was an oral message and it was on Tuesday [11
December 2007]."
He declined to comment on the details oI the message and reIerred questions about it to the White
House.
(This version CORRECTS that North Korea responded to Bush's letter on Tuesday, instead oI
Wednesday.) )
December 14, 2007
President Bush Meets with Cabinet
Rose Garden
10:32 A.M. EST
[EXCERPTS]
THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. I just Iinished meeting with members oI my Cabinet. I am proud oI
this team; I appreciate their service to the country. We discussed the priorities that we're working on to
meet Ior the needs oI the American people; we're talking about the business that remains on Capitol
Hill.
[deletia]
|THE PRESIDENT:| Toby.
Q Mr. President, what was Kim Jong-il's message to you in response to your letter to him? And what
was -- what is your response to him?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Iirst I'm -- you know, I got his attention with a letter, and he can get my
attention by Iully disclosing his programs, including any plutonium he may have processed and
converted -- into whatever he's used it Ior; we just need to know.
As well, he can get our attention by Iully disclosing his proliIeration activities. We have laid out a way
Iorward -- and I say "we" -- there's Iour other countries that have joined us; we've got what's called the
six-party talks. And the Iive oI us agree that there's a way Iorward Ior the -- Kim Jong-il, and an
important step is a Iull declaration oI programs, materials that may have been developed to create
weapons, as well as the proliIeration activities oI the regime.
Thank you very much.
Q Oh, don't stop now.
THE PRESIDENT: I had a -- well, I've got Ireezing Cabinet members out here. (Laughter.) They're
whispering; you can't hear their whispers. (Laughter.) I can just Ieel their vibe saying, I'm envious,
they're all wearing these expensive coats, and here we are. (Laughter.)
I hope you enjoyed the holiday bash as much as I did. I noticed some oI the silverware is missing.
(Laughter.) We'll be taking a Iull inventory. (Laughter.) Happy holidays.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/14/AR2007121401841.html?
Progress Is Reported on Nuclear Pact
N. Korea Is Disabling Plant but Holding Back on Data, U.S. Aides Say
By Glenn Kessler
Saturday, December 15, 2007; A16
North Korea has made signiIicant progress in disabling its nuclear Iacility in Yongbyon but has
hesitated at providing key details about the extent oI its nuclear programs, including whether it has
weaponized the plutonium harvested Irom the reactor, according to U.S. oIIicials.
Under a six-nation agreement, North Korea is supposed to Iinish disabling the Iacility and to provide a
detailed declaration oI its nuclear activities by Dec. 31, but oIIicials acknowledge both deadlines will
slip.
Technicians disabling the plant have completed or nearly completed seven oI the 11 key tasks expected
under the agreement. A key Iactor in the delay is that oIIicials discovered that water in a cooling pond
Ior spent Iuel rods is contaminated, a potentially dangerous situation that North Korea was willing to
ignore to meet the deadline. But U.S. oIIicials objected and insisted that the water must Iirst be Iiltered.
In the case oI the declaration, large gaps exist between what Washington expects and what Pyongyang
wants to deliver, oIIicials said. "You are dealing with a country that is not instinctively given to
handing out inIormation," one oIIicial said, speaking on the condition oI anonymity because oI
diplomatic sensitivities.
President Bush last week sent a private letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, urging him to
provide a complete declaration and laying out the elements the United States needs to see to keep the
delicate process going. North Korea, via its ambassador at the United Nations, told the State
Department on Wednesday that North Korea wants to stick to the agreement as long as the United
States IulIills its commitments.
"I got his attention with a letter," Bush told reporters yesterday. "And he can get my attention by Iully
disclosing his program, including any plutonium he may have processed and converted into whatever
he's used it Ior. We just need to know. As well, he can get our attention by Iully disclosing his
proliIeration activities."
The Yongbyon Iacility includes a Iive-megawatt reactor, a Iuel Iabrication Iacility and a reprocessing
laboratory Ior making bomb-grade material. Yesterday, North Korean oIIicials began removing
irradiated Iuel rods Irom the reactor, a major step that continues a process that experts say will go well
beyond the "Ireezing" oI the reactor negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1994.
When that agreement collapsed in 2002, aIter the Bush administration accused Pyongyang oI having a
clandestine uranium-enrichment program, North Korea was able to restart the plutonium Iacility within
three months. Under the current agreement, experts say, it could take as long as a year Ior North Korea
to restart the Iacility.
Four key steps in disabling the plant have been completed, and three are nearly completed,
administration oIIicials said, citing reports Irom U.S. observers at the site.
At the reactor, the concrete bottom oI its cooling tower has been broken through, rendering it unusable.
A secondary cooling loop has also been severed. At the reprocessing plant, workers have removed
machinery that helped transIer spent Iuel rods into hot cells and have severed steam-line valves used to
heat the reprocessing areas oI the building. In the Iuel Iabrication Iacility, workers are close to
removing casting Iurnaces and uranium metal reduction Iurnaces necessary to shape the Iuel rods.
David Albright, president oI the nonpartisan Institute Ior Science and International Security, said that
during the negotiations, North Korea was anxious that there be no language suggesting that
disablement would make the Iacility completely unusable, but he said the steps taken so Iar are
impressive. Albright, who co-wrote a paper earlier this year outlining possible options Ior disabling the
Iacilities, said removing the machinery needed to transIer Iuel rods into hot cells is important because
the cells are necessary to prevent exposure to radiation.
Albright said that bursting through the concrete oI the cooling tower was visually symbolic -- wisps oI
vapor Irom the cooling tower appear in most satellite photographs oI Yongbyon -- but the hot water
could still be dumped directly in a nearby river iI North Korea were unconcerned about possible
ecological damage.
One lingering question is what should be done with Iuel rods prepared Ior a never-completed 50-
megawatt Iacility. Although those rods do not Iit in the Iive-megawatt reactor, they could be reshaped
unless they were bent.
U.S. oIIicials outlined several key gaps in the declaration. First, the United States is seeking
inIormation on North Korea's past proliIeration activities, especially any help it may have provided to
Syria Ior a Iacility attacked by Israel in September. North Korea has indicated that it would assure that
it is not currently exporting its expertise, but does not want to dwell on past practices.
Second, the United States wants to know whether any plutonium has been weaponized. North Korea
simply wants to say how much plutonium it has produced.
Third, U.S. oIIicials want a complete list oI nuclear-related Iacilities but suspect that North Korea will
provide an incomplete list.
Finally, the United States is seeking clarity on North Korea's uranium enrichment activities. The United
States tracked purchases oI material and equipment that could be used in such a program, but North
Korea wants to say only what happened to the materials and how they are being used or whether they
were smelted. It does not want to disclose its reasons Ior purchasing the equipment.
"To say what they were purchased Ior in the Iirst place would involve acknowledging something they
are not quite prepared to acknowledge," the oIIicial said. "We need to know what's been going on
there."
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/washington/15korea.html?reIworld
North Korea Replies to Bush With an Offer and a Condition
By HELENE COOPER
Published: December 15, 2007
WASHINGTON Responding to a recent letter Irom President Bush, North Korea agreed on Friday
to Iollow through on its pledge to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, provided the United States
reciprocates by normalizing relations between the countries.
President Bush said Friday that his initial letter, which was delivered by Assistant Secretary oI State
Christopher R. Hill to the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, on Dec. 5, achieved its purpose.
I got his attention with a letter and he can get my attention by Iully disclosing his programs, including
any plutonium he may have processed and converted some oI that into whatever hes used it Ior. We
just need to know, Mr. Bush told reporters in the Rose Garden aIter a cabinet meeting. As well, he
can get our attention by Iully disclosing his proliIeration activities.
North Korea agreed in October to dismantle all oI its nuclear Iacilities and to disclose all oI its past and
present nuclear programs by the end oI the year in return Ior 950,000 metric tons oI Iuel oil or its
equivalent in economic aid.
That agreement has come under Iierce criticism Irom national security hawks, in part because it does
not require North Korea to turn over its existing stockpiles oI weapons-grade plutonium and any
nuclear warheads it may already have produced. But many Ioreign policy experts point to it as a rare
diplomatic success Ior President Bush in a period that has been dominated by Irustration in Iran,
AIghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East.
An important step is a Iull declaration oI programs, materials that may have been developed to create
weapons, as well as the proliIeration activities oI the regime, Mr. Bush said.
A White House oIIicial said that Mr. Kims response was delivered to State Department oIIicials
through an intermediary, North Koreas representative to the United Nations. The oIIicial said that the
reply contained a pledge that the North would Iollow through on its promise as long as the United
States held to its end oI the bargain.
The proliIeration issue has taken on new importance aIter an Israeli strike in Syria in September, which
administration and Israeli oIIicials say was conducted against a nuclear-related Iacility near the
Euphrates River that was supplied with material Irom North Korea. Administration oIIicials want North
Korea to disclose whatever help it may have given Syria, although they note that the help Ior Syria
predated the Norths agreement to dismantle its nuclear reactor and disclose its nuclear programs.
The exchange between Mr. Bush and Mr. Kim is a huge leap Irom the veritable cold war that prevailed
throughout most oI the Bush administration. In 2002, during a meeting with Republican senators, Mr.
Bush compared Mr. Kim to a spoiled child at a dinner table, according to news reports at the time.
Syrian envoy denies nuclear cooperation with North Korea
2007/12/18 06:43 KST
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- The top Syrian envoy to the United States denied on
Monday allegations oI nuclear cooperation with North Korea, brushing it oII as "silly, absurd,
ridiculous hype."
Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center, a think tank in Washington, Amb. Imad Moustapha said
Syria was "never told" that its relations with North Korea were an issue with the U.S.
"Now, iI you are reIerring to the hype in the U.S. media -- not by even the Israeli government or
the American government -- about the alleged Syrian-Korean nuclear link or cooperation or problem,
well, I think nobody is discussing this anymore," the envoy said.
Syria, whose relations with the U.S. are strained, was brought into the North Korean nuclear
debate in early September. Israel struck a site in Syria its intelligence agencies say was a nuclear
Iacility being equipped in part by North Korea.
The site has since been razed, and inIormation surrounding the strike or the Iacility has been
closely held, leaving the allegations unconIirmed. Some satellite photos, released and analyzed by the
Institute oI Science and International Security, indicated the installation may have been a reactor
closely resembling a North Korean reactor in size and construction.
Pyongyang is known to have sold and passed on missile parts and technology to Damascus in the
past. But both countries have denied any nuclear cooperation, an issue that touches on proliIeration by
North Korea, which the U.S. has set as a red line not to be crossed.
A six-nation Iorum, involving South and North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, is in the
middle oI implementing a deal intended to eventually denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Under the
agreement, North Korea is required to declare its nuclear stockpile and any proliIeration activities.
Moustapha claimed U.S. oIIicials quietly have said they do not believe Syria is collaborating with
North Korea on the nuclear Iront.
"Even here at the United States, at a highly classiIied hearing that was presented at the U.S.
conIerence a couple oI weeks ago, key oIIicials Irom the U.S. administration had to say behind closed
doors that there are no Syrian nuclear projects, no Syrian-Korean nuclear cooperation," the envoy said.
"So this is, you know, the sort oI silly, absurd, ridiculous hype" reminiscent oI pre-war claims
that Iraq had weapons oI mass destruction, he said.
"It's so easy to Iabricate stories iI you are ideologically motivated, and iI you have a gullible
audience that does not critically read and analyze the sort oI inIormation they are being Ied or told," the
envoy said.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jAH1tUJ568ATWbh3wOjU9YsDSO2Q
China's top nuclear envoy inspects NKorea nuke disablement process
18 hours ago [accessed 2007-12-18T22:50Z]
BEIJING (AFP) China's top nuclear envoy inspected the atomic disarmament process in North
Korea Tuesday, as part oI eIIorts to push the reclusive country to meet a key agreement, state media
and oIIicials said.
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei was also to meet North Korean leaders, including top nuclear envoy
Kim Kye-Gwan, during his visit that began Tuesday, ministry spokesman Qin Gang told journalists.
"The purpose oI his visit is to exchange ideas with the DPRK (North Korean) side... on the current
situation in the six-party talks and the work Ior the next phase," Qin said, without saying how long Wu
would stay in Pyongyang.
"We believe that the six-party talks have made positive progress and that the good momentum should
be maintained and pushed Iorward."
Xinhua news agency said Wu inspected the disablement process at the Yongbyon atomic power plant,
while North Korea's state media said the Chinese envoy had also met with North Korean Foreign
Minister Pak Ui-Chun.
Qin reIused to discuss recent concerns over whether North Korea would declare and disable all oI its
nuclear programmes by the end oI this month, as agreed in a six-nation pact, but said all sides should
make eIIorts Ior more progress.
"Relevant parties should overcome diIIiculties, deepen mutual trust and cooperation so as to implement
the (denuclearisation) agreement in a comprehensive way," Qin said.
The six-party pact calls on Pyongyang to disable its plutonium-producing plants and declare all nuclear
programmes and Iacilities by December 31, in return Ior energy aid and the promise oI Iuture major
diplomatic concessions.
But the process has reportedly hit a key problem -- the North's reIusal to address its suspected highly
enriched uranium weapons programme to the satisIaction oI the United States.
US President George W. Bush this month wrote to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, urging him to
Iully disclose his country's nuclear programmes.
On Friday Bush reiterated the demand aIter Kim gave what US oIIicials said was a "verbal reply" to the
unprecedented letter.
Bush called Ior a Iull declaration oI "programmes, materials that may have been developed to create
weapons, as well as the proliIeration activities oI the regime".
The latest nuclear crisis began in late 2002, when the United States accused North Korea oI having a
secret highly enriched uranium weapons programme in addition to its declared plutonium operation.
Pyongyang has never publicly admitted having a highly enriched uranium programme.
The crisis escalated last year when North Korea tested a nuclear bomb.
The six-party talks group the two Koreas, host China, the United States, Russia and Japan.
Syrian Leader Reportedly Says His Country Was Approached
by Head of Nuclear Black Market
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Associated Press
VIENNA, Austria Syria received a letter purportedly written by the head oI the same nuclear black
market that supplied Iran and Libya with its atomic technology but did not respond, the country's
president said in comments published Wednesday.
President Bashar Assad's comments appeared to be the Iirst time that a senior Syrian oIIicial linked the
country to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the top Pakistani scientist who was exposed in 2004 as the head oI an
international black market in nuclear technology.
Assad also told the Austrian daily "Die Presse" that the target hit by Israeli combat jets in September
was not a nuclear site, describing it only as a "military Iacility in the process oI being built."
Israel has kept silent on what it thought it was targeting in the September air strike, but media reports
have cited unnamed U.S. oIIicials and analysts that it was a North Korean-style nuclear reactor.
Former U.N. nuclear inspector David Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and International
Security, subsequently circulated commercial satellite images taken beIore and aIter the Israeli raid that
he said supported suspicions that the target was indeed a reactor and that the site was given a hasty
cleanup by the Syrians to remove incriminating evidence.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, which looked at its own set oI images, has said nothing
publicly about them, but diplomats linked to the agency have told the AP that they were too grainy to
draw concrete conclusions. On Wednesday, one oI the diplomats who demanded anonymity because
he was not authorized to discuss the issue said the Syrians have not reacted to agency requests Ior
more inIormation.
Khan's black market network was the key supplier oI both Iran and Libya.
In the interview, Assad said that in early 2001, "someone brought a letter Irom a certain Khan," adding,
"we didn't know whether the letter was real or a Iake Irom the Israelis who wanted to entice us into a
trap.
"In any case, we turned it down," he was quoted as saying. "We had no interest in nuclear weapons or a
nuclear reactor. We never met with Khan."
Libya has voluntarily scrapped its nuclear arms program since acknowledging its existence in 2003.
Iran has admitted to being a Khan customer oI know-how and equipment that included the basis oI its
present uranium enrichment program which can be used to create the Iissile core oI nuclear
warheads but insists it wants to perIect the technology only Ior its other use, generating reactor Iuel.
Its reIusal to cease enrichment has resulted in two sets oI U.N. Security Council sanctions.
http://diepresse.com/text/home/politik/aussenpolitik/349740
Assad: Ohne die USA geht gar nichts
18.12.2007 , 18:15 ,
CHRISTIAN ULTSCH (Die Presse)
[EXCERPTS]
Syriens Prsident Assad signalisiert FriedensbereitschaIt, glaubt aber nicht an einen Durchbruch im
kommenden Jahr. Und er denkt nicht daran, seine Allianz mit dem Iran auIzugeben.
[deletia]
Am 6. September haben israelische Kampfflugzeug eine Einrichtung In Syrien angegriffen.
Welche?
Assad: Es war eine im Bau beIindliche Militranlage. Und weil es eine Militranlage war, kann ich
Ihnen keine Details geben. Das heit aber nicht, dass es eine Nuklearanlage war, wie die Israelis
behauptet haben.
Warum hat Syrien so zurckhaltend reagiert?
Assad: Wir haben das Recht, jederzeit zurckzuschlagen. Das haben wir auch gesagt. Aber es geht
nicht nur um Rache. Man kann eine Rakete auI Israel abIeuern. Aber was erreicht man damit? Man
wrde den Israelis helIen, einen neuen Krieg anzuzetteln. Und wohin wrde ein neuer Krieg Ihren?
Hat Syrien Kontakte zu pakistanischen Atomingenieuren?
Assad: Tatschlich war es so: AnIang 2001 brachte jemand einen BrieI von einem gewissen Khan
(dem Vater der pakistanischen Atombombe; Anm.). Wir wussten nicht, ob der BrieI echt war oder eine
Flschung der Israelis, die uns in eine Falle locken wollten. Wir lehnten jedenIalls ab. Wir waren nicht
interessiert daran, KernwaIIen oder einen Nuklearreaktor zu haben. Wir traIen Khan nie.

Das Interview wurde gemeinsam mit dem Kurier geIhrt.
("Die Presse", Print-Ausgabe, 19.12.2007)
http://www.newsmax.com/timmerman/boltonstatedepartment/2007/12/25/59694.html
Bolton: State Department Leftists Have Defeated Bush
Tuesday, December 25, 2007 6:41 PM
By: Kenneth R. Timmerman
|EXCERPTS|
Resistance by partisan shadow warriors at the Department oI State has limited the presidents options
and is bringing us dangerously close to a military showdown with Iran, Iormer Bush administration
oIIicial John Bolton told Newsmax in an exclusive interview.
[deletia]
Excerpts Irom the interview:
[deletia]
NEWSMAX: How is this Administrations track record on hiring and keeping conservatives in key
positions?
BOLTON: I think it is unIortunately not very good. I talk about this in my book, about what happens
when Presidential personnel doesnt Iocus on the very diIIicult circumstances appointees Iace within
the State department, which is one oI the savviest bureaucracies in Washington experts in co-opting,
seducing or subverting political appointees who try to pursue policies it disagrees with. And I think in
this Administration, it has had considerable success. I use the example oI North Korea, and whats
happened to our policy there. What has happened since I wrote the book is an even more graphic
example oI the bureaucracy in eIIect turning the Presidents policy in eIIect in a 180 degree U-turn.
NEWSMAX: Do you think the North Korean have agreed to talk and to shut down the reactor because
they have sold oII the critical elements?
BOLTON: I think they are doing the same thing they did under the |1994| Agreed Framework. I think
they have been planning to cheat on their declaration and their program and hope they get away with it,
which they will iI we dont have an adequate veriIication program.
And I think this Iacility |in Syria| that the Israelis bombed on September 6 is an indication oI yet
another alternative, which is either to clone the Yongbyon reactor or outsource some oI the nuclear
weapons program. How better to hide your North Korean program than to build it in Syria where
nobody is looking!
Just this morning there was a story that it may be harder to shut done Yongbyon than people thought.
Now this will extend into the next year, which I think is part oI North Koreas pattern oI slow-rolling
the program. But which also shows something which I and others have been saying Ior some time,
which is that Yongbyon is at or beyond its useIul liIe. Part oI the reason they have diIIiculties
extracting the Iuel rods that are in there now is that the whole Iacility is in terrible repair, which means
they agreeing to Ireeze it or even to dismantle it is not such a big concession Irom the North Koreans.
They may already have been able to extract as much plutonium as they were going to be able to.
Shutting down a broken Iacility is hardly a sign oI good Iaith.
NEWSMAX: There is a lot oI dispute about North Koreas uranium program. You write in your book
that the North Koreans talked to our delegation in 2002 about the uranium enrichment program. Do you
think that is what they transIerred to Syria?
BOLTON: Its hard to say what theyve transIerred. There was no sign oI radiation escaping aIter the
Israeli attack |on Syria|, which seems to indicate that they proceeded beIore there was any actual
enriched uranium or even unenriched uranium there. Otherwise you would see likely release oI
radiation.
[deletia]
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/dec/98018.htm
Washington, DC
December 27, 2007
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: The latest out oI Seoul was that North Korea has cited delays in aid Ior -- as a reason why
it will not be able to make its declaration or may not be able to make its declaration. Have you
conIirmed these North Korean statements and what is the state oI play as Iar as the aid pipeline that you
know oI, as well as North Korea's progress ahead oI December 31st?
MR. CASEY: Well, a couple things. First oI all, the agreement that the six parties reached called Ior
North Korea to provide a Iull and complete declaration by December 31st. And we certainly think that
they are capable oI meeting that deadline. We encourage them to do so and we'll see what happens over
the next Iew days.
In terms oI questions about aid shipments, as you know, there's been sort oI a rotating schedule oI
heavy Iuel oil equivalent that's been provided. I am not certain, to be honest with you, what the exact
status oI the last -- you know, latest shipment is, whether there have been any delays or not. Certainly,
there's been no policy decision on the part oI our government or any oI the other six parties to change
our basic approach to that, so I'm not aware that there is any substantive problem with those deliveries.
As to what the North Koreans will or will not do, it's the obligation oI all parties to honor their
commitments and we intend to honor ours and we certainly hope they'd honor theirs as well.
Glenn.
QUESTION: Yeah. The South Korean Foreign Minister was actually quoted today as saying that the
big hitch in this was North Korea admitting to the uranium enrichment program that the U.S. has said
that they have maintained. Would you agree with that assessment? Is that your understanding as well
that this is really the thing holding up the declaration?
MR. CASEY: Certainly, don't want to try and get myselI into a public argument with the South Korean
Foreign Minister, but I'll let him speak to his understanding oI it.
QUESTION: Well, what is your understanding oI it?
MR. CASEY: Well, my understanding oI it is they have an obligation to provide us with a Iull and
complete declaration by the 31st. Wed hope they'd honor it. We've had numerous discussions with
them about what such a declaration should include. You've heard Irom Chris Hill repeatedly that that
does need to include any accounting Ior the highly enriched uranium activities that they've pursued in
the past and may be pursuing currently. It certainly also includes dealing with things like proliIeration
and the other concerns that we've raised. Full and complete is probably the best way to describe it.
There can't be Iudging around the edges here. We need to really understand the Iull extent oI the
program and the Iull extent oI the activities because that's the only way that you can guarantee that
when we get to the end oI this process, we've actually achieved our goal, which is Iull denuclearization
oI the Korean Peninsula.
QUESTION: And do you have any readout oI Sung Kim's visit last week to Pyongyang?
MR. CASEY: I don't, but let's see iI we can get you something.
QUESTION: There's only three days leIt Ior this year. How are you going to guarantee Ior the -- by the
end oI this year Ior the declaration?
MR. CASEY: Well, look, I'm not going to guarantee the North Korean Government's going to do
anything. That's up Ior them -- up to them to do. What I did say and what I will repeat is that we
believe they're certainly capable oI meeting the deadline and providing the declaration by the 31st. We
encourage them to do so and we'll see what happens in the next couple oI days.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/dec/98147.htm
Press Statement
Washington, DC
December 30, 2007
North Korea Declaration
In September 2005, the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea agreed on a Joint
Statement with North Korea that charted the way Iorward toward achieving a nuclear weapons Iree
Korean peninsula. Under the terms oI the Initial Actions Agreement oI February 2007, North Korea
shut down operations at the Yongbyon nuclear Iacility where it had produced weapons-grade
plutonium and international inspectors returned to North Korea to veriIy and monitor this process. In
October 2007, North Korea committed to declare all its nuclear programs and to disable the three key
nuclear Iacilities at Yongbyon by the end oI December 2007 as an initial step toward eventually
abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. The other parties, in turn, agreed to
cooperate in economic and energy assistance to North Korea. Such assistance has been provided under
a Iormula oI "actions Ior actions" as the North carried out its commitments to disable its nuclear
Iacilities.
It is unIortunate that North Korea has not yet met its commitments by providing a complete and correct
declaration oI its nuclear programs and slowing down the process oI disablement. We will continue to
work with our close allies Japan and South Korea, and partners China and Russia, as we urge North
Korea to deliver a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear weapons programs and nuclear
weapons and proliIeration activities and complete the agreed disablement. The United States is
committed to IulIilling our obligations under the Six Party agreements as North Korea IulIills all its
obligations.
2007/1170
Released on December 30, 2007
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071231-3.html
December 31, 2007
Press Gaggle by Scott Stanzel
CrawIord Middle School
CrawIord, Texas
11:15 A.M. CST
[EXCERPT]
Q Scott, on North Korea -- North Korea has missed the deadline Ior the disablement oI the reactor and
the declaration on the programs. What's the President's reaction to this?
MR. STANZEL: Well, you saw the statement last night Irom the administration. Tom Casey, Irom the
State Department, did issue a statement. You've also seen statements Irom the Japanese and the South
Koreans. It has been clear that the North Koreans would not provide a declaration by the deadline, and
a Iull and complete declaration we believe is critical in order to move to the next phase.
So it is our view that that process should move Iorward. There is an opportunity to do that. Good
progress has been made at Yongbyon. The United States has been working with North Korea in terms
oI the removal oI the Iuel rods and making sure that that's done saIely and securely. But there does
have to be a complete and Iull declaration, and this cannot be a situation where the North Koreans
pretend to give a complete declaration. So we want that process to move Iorward and we will be
pressing and working with all oI the parties in the six-party talks to make sure that happens. Secretary
oI State Rice, Deputy Secretary Negroponte, Ambassador Chris Hill all have open lines oI
communication with members oI the six-party talks and we hope and expect that that process will move
Iorward.
Q Do you envision the United States pushing Ior sanctions or any sort oI action like that?
MR. STANZEL: Well, those conversations about moving the process Iorward are ongoing. I think we
think it's possible Ior the North Koreans to provide a Iull and complete declaration, and we hope that
they will do that as soon as possible. I'm not going to speculate beyond that about other actions that
could occur.
Q Are you surprised that North Korea didn't meet the deadline?
MR. STANZEL: I think that we had all hoped that North Korea would meet the December 31st
deadline. We think that there is an opportunity to move Iorward. You saw the statement last night Irom
the State Department that it is unIortunate that they didn't meet the deadline, but we'll be working with
all the parties to make sure that this process moves Iorward.
Q Do you believe they are committed to the deadline?
MR. STANZEL: Well, they did not meet --
Q Or the talks, rather?
MR. STANZEL: I think there is reason to believe that all oI the members oI the six-party talks think
that this process should move Iorward, and we expect a Iull and complete declaration. So we hope that
it will move Iorward.
Q North Korea -- have you gotten any indications that they will be Iiling a report or providing this
inIormation in the near term?
MR. STANZEL: It was our understanding, based on recent conversations, that obviously they were not
going to make the December 31st deadline. You know, the United States actually slowed down part oI
the disablement process, and that is not something that we blamed the North Koreans Ior, but we
wanted that to be done in a saIe and secure manner. So we are not blaming the North Koreans Ior the
slowdown in that disablement process.
However, we believe that the Iull and complete declaration is key to this process and we think there is
an opportunity Ior them to do that.
Q Do you expect it soon?
MR. STANZEL: I'm not going to put a timeline on it, but we'll be working with all the parties in
pressing North Korea to make sure that that does happen.
Q I hear you saying that there are no consequences, though, Ior missing a deadline.
MR. STANZEL: Well, as you know, this is an action-Ior-action process, where at each point iI North
Korea meets certain deadlines they can move Iorward with the process and there is aid that can be
provided. I would reIer you to the State Department about all oI the speciIics on that, but it is an action-
Ior-action process, and in order to have action on one side, we have to have action on the other side as
well.
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcI/12/31/nkorea.us/
Experts differ on significance of N. Korea missing nuclear deadline
December 31, 2007 --
Updated 0136 GMT (0936 HKT) [2008-01-01]
From State Department Producer Charley Keyes
CNN
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The Bush administration was hoping to spend the early hours oI 2008
poring over a new document Irom the North Koreans: a Iull list oI its nuclear secrets. No such luck.
The North Koreans let the New Year's Eve deadline come and go without revealing anything.
The United States is now hoping the delay will only be temporary and that the oIIicial declaration will
be sent along in the coming days. The U.S. goal is to press ahead with negotiations and achieve Iull
denuclearization oI the Korean peninsula by the end oI the new year.
State Department spokesman Tom Casey told reporters in his oIIice Monday morning that the delay in
the declaration is unIortunate. "We want to see it provided as soon as possible," he said. "The important
thing is not whether we have the declaration today. It is that it needs to be Iull and complete."
Meanwhile, an international team remains in North Korea overseeing the "disabling" oI the country's
reactor at Yongbyon. This will be Iollowed by the "dismantling" phase, in which buildings will be
destroyed and key Iacilities Iilled with cement or cut apart and shipped out oI the country.
In exchange Ior its cooperation so Iar, North Korea has received Iood and Iuel oil aid. It also wants to
be removed Irom the list oI terrorism-sponsoring countries.
President Bush, who once labeled North Korea as part oI "the axis oI evil," took the extremely rare step
oI writing to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in early December, urging him to meet the December 31
deadline. The "Dear Mr. Chairman" letter, signed by hand by Bush, said continued progress would be
tied to a Iull declaration.
Bruce Klingner, senior research Iellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, said
delays can now be traced back to negotiations earlier this year, and what he called "vague texts" about
what North Korea is required to do. Klingner is a long-time observer oI North Korea and a 20-year
veteran oI the CIA and intelligence community.
"I think the North Koreans are going to try to drag it out," he said by telephone Irom his Washington
oIIice. "Even more important is what's going to be in the declaration. Does it comply with what North
Korea is required to do or is it just what North Korea wants to declare?"
Still unknown is just how much plutonium, the raw material oI nuclear bombs, the North Koreans have.
There are also big question marks over how much enriched uranium they have and how they shared or
sold nuclear technology and expertise to other countries.
The still-mysterious bombing by Israel oI an industrial installation in Syria raised questions about
whether North Korea's proliIeration activities have extended even Iurther than realized. The Bush
administration has ducked any questions about what the Syrians may have been doing, and whether
North Korea was involved.
Joe Cirincione oI the Center Ior American Progress downplayed the importance oI North Korea
missing the deadline Ior the declaration.
"This is not a big deal," Cirincione said in an e-mail to CNN. "The momentum is still very positive, the
reactor has been shut down and disabled; the disablement will proceed over the next 100 days and
could then move into permanent dismantlement." He is the author oI "Bomb Scare: The History and
Future oI Nuclear Weapons."
And Cirincione predicts some hard bargaining ahead Ior the United States -- as well as its partners in
the talks, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea -- to get North Korea to spill all its secrets. "The North
Koreans see everything as negotiations. So the declaration itselI will likely not be complete," he said in
his e-mail. "They will see it as something else to negotiate over as we point out that it does not include,
Ior example, a Iull description oI the gas centriIuge equipment they bought Irom Pakistan, or details on
whether or not they Iashioned their plutonium into weapons."
And the Heritage Foundation's Klingner said the Bush administration may be tempted to ease up on
North Korea, realizing the clock is running out on Bush and Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and
their international policy team.
"The Bush administration is perhaps becoming increasingly desperate to secure a Ioreign policy legacy
to counter the concern over the situation in Iraq," he said, "so may be more willing to accept a lower
level oI compliance by North Korea as to its data reporting as well as a veriIication regimen later."
January 2, 2008
12:34 P.M. EST
Press BrieIing by Dana Perino
James S. Brady Press BrieIing Room
[EXCERPT]
[MS. PERINO:] James.
Q Dana, earlier today I asked you iI there was any reason to believe that North Korea was actually
going to provide a complete and correct declaration oI all oI its nuclear programs and materiel, and
your reply was that "We are skeptical oI that." And so I wonder why the administration is proceeding
Iorward with the entire agreement iI it has such skepticism.
MS. PERINO: We -- as we've dealt with North Korea over the past several years, it is only appropriate
that we would be skeptical. This is a very closed society that has had a secret program that's been
ongoing. But North Korea did agree with the other members oI the Iive -- oI the six-party talks to
disable and to provide a complete and accurate declaration. We don't have any indication that they will
not provide one, but we -- they missed the deadline, and we are waiting to hear Irom them. And I
would remind you that the State Department continues to be in regular contact with all the members oI
the six-party talks, and Deputy Secretary Negroponte will be in the region, in Beijing, middle oI
January, a couple weeks Irom now.
Q And you also said this morning that you imagine that this topic will be very high on Deputy
Secretary Negroponte's agenda in Beijing, and he's going there in mid-month. Should we inIer Irom
that that you don't expect to receive this declaration by at least the middle oI this month?
MS. PERINO: No, I really don't have any time Irame as to when we would get the declaration. We
would like it as soon as possible, but we do want it to be complete and accurate, because that's what
they agreed to. And we'll continue to help them with the disablement. We have people on the ground
now who are making sure it's done in a saIe and proper manner.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/jan/98170.htm
Washington, DC
January 2, 2008
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: North Korea; we know what happened on January 1st and didn't happen.
QUESTION: Can you sketch out Ior us what Chris Hill has -- maybe has already done or will be doing
this week?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, he's going to be headed out to the region to do his Northeast Asia tour,
leaving at the end oI this week. I can't tell you whether that's Thursday or Friday. We'll try to get you
some details on that. I don't know his stops, but I would anticipate that he's going to do the usual tour. I
will see iI he has any planned interactions with North Korean oIIicials at this point. I don't have the
details oI the Chris Hill January 2008 Northeast Asia tour yet, but we'll get them to you.
QUESTION: On the same note, do you have any more details about the itinerary and agenda Ior
Deputy Secretary Negroponte's trip to China in the middle oI the month?
MR. MCCORMACK: Not yet. We'll -- more to Iollow on that.
Yeah, Gollust.
QUESTION: Would you say you're becoming increasingly --
MR. MCCORMACK: Sorry about the Browns, man.
QUESTION: No, it was a good season.
MR. MCCORMACK: It was a good season, (inaudible) since.
QUESTION: Would you say that you're becoming increasingly apprehensive about the lack oI a
declaration?
MR. MCCORMACK: No, I think everybody knows that -- a healthy appreciation Ior the pace at which
this process moves. Sometimes it moves according to schedule, sometimes it moves in what some
might consider tectonic or glacial Iashion, but it does move Iorward. But the Iact that it doesn't progress
at the pace that we would perhaps desire doesn't mean that people aren't working hard to try to make it
work. Sometimes, the reason why it moves a little bit more slowly than we would have hoped is
because we're doing new things and we're doing hard things.
The Iact that the North Koreans have agreed to provide a Iull and complete declaration is something
new. This is groundbreaking, just as it is new that they are disabling these Iacilities at Yongbyon. And
that process continues. The reports we get back Irom the team are that that process is continuing. Now
there are some technical questions about the cooling oI the Iuel rods. We want to make sure that that
happens, it happens in an appropriate way. So that was the reason behind the delay in terms oI the
disablement that it is not completed by December 31st.
In terms oI the declaration, we're going to keep hammering away on it. And we're not lowering the bar.
North Korea has to come out with a Iull and complete declaration. Nobody is holding them to an unIair
statement. They set out to provide a Iull and complete declaration, not to the United States but to the
other Iive members oI the six-party talks. And the other members oI the six-party talks are going to
hold them -- hold them to that. No standard, no higher, no lower, but just what they said that they were
going to do.
QUESTION: Is the Deputy Secretary heading to the region as well?
MR. MCCORMACK: Excuse me?
QUESTION: Deputy Secretary Negroponte --
MR. MCCORMACK: He's going to -- that's what Kirit was talking about. He's going to be headed out
there. I don't have a date Ior you, but he will be headed out to China, I believe. I think there was some
discussion oI that.
QUESTION: BeIore the bell rings --
MR. MCCORMACK: No, no, we got plenty oI time.
QUESTION: Are you guys still encouraged, though? Are you still encouraged by the North Koreans? I
mean, is -- though they haven't Iinished the declaration, are you still seeing a positive trend towards
one?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, yeah, you still have the continuation oI the disablement process. The
teams on the ground there who are engaged in the disablement process helping with technical
assistance. The disablement process -- that's continuing. That continues to move Iorward and that's --
and that's good. That's a good sign.
We're trending in the right direction. I mean, remember where we were, what, not quite a year ago with
the Banco Delta Asia. Well, that took a lot longer than everybody would have hoped, but it did get
resolved. And again, we're trying to do new things here, new things in a positive sense and a
responsible way. It's not as though we're -- we are adhering to the pathway that was laid out back in
September '05. And you know, would we have hoped that we could have been Iurther along in this
process? Yeah. We do. We do.
QUESTION: Without a declaration itselI?
MR. MCCORMACK: A declaration itselI? Well, again, we'll see. You know, we'll see what the Iinal
declaration says. That's what really matters. And we'll make a judgment once the North Koreans say
this is our Iinal declaration. We'll see what gets handed over to, I would expect, the Chinese as the
chair oI the six-party talks and we'll make an assessment at that point -- a Iinal public assessment, at
least.
QUESTION: Are there any U.S. -- any measures the U.S. is considering in response to the Iailure to
meet the deadline on the declaration, or are there any corresponding measures such as the Iuel
shipments that you would sort oI hold back on at this point till they produce something?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it's going to be action Ior action. And they are doing things. They are
making positive steps in some areas, as I noted with the disablement. There are some areas where
they're still working on it.
I didn't -- I'll check Ior you what exactly -- check Ior you where exactly we stand in terms oI our
obligations as well as the other parties providing Iuel, heavy Iuel oil or in-kind assistance. I haven't
read up on that recently. So we'll -- you know, we'll check Ior that. But we are still committed to
IulIilling our obligations under the agreement, under the idea oI action Ior action. So, but we'll check
Ior you where we stand on that.
DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreement
Pyongyang, January 4 [2008] (KCNA) -- A spokesman Ior the Foreign Ministry oI the DPRK
released the Iollowing statement Friday as regards the delay in the implementation oI the October 3
agreement made at the six-party talks:
It is beyond Dec. 31, 2007, the deadline set in the Oct. 3 agreement.
It is regrettable that points agreed there remain unimplemented except the disablement oI the
DPRK's nuclear Iacilities.
The disablement started early in November last year and all the operations were completed within
the "technologically possible scope" as oI Dec. 31.
At present, the unloading oI spent Iuel rods scheduled to be completed in about 100 days is
underway as the last process.
However, the delivery oI heavy Iuel oil and energy-related equipment and materials to the DPRK,
commitments oI other participating nations, has not been done even 50 per cent.
The schedule Ior the monthly delivery oI heavy Iuel oil as well as the delivery oI energy-related
equipment and materials and relevant technical processes are being steadily delayed.
The U.S. has not honored its commitments to cross the DPRK oII the list oI "sponsors oI terrorism"
and stop applying the "Trading with the Enemy Act" against it.
Looking back on what has been done, one may say that the DPRK is going ahead oI others in
IulIilling its commitment.
As Iar as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some quarters is
concerned, the DPRK has done what it should do.
The DPRK worked out a report on the nuclear declaration in November last year and notiIied the
U.S. side oI its contents.
It had a suIIicient consultation with the U.S. side aIter receiving a request Irom it to have Iurther
discussion on the contents oI the report.
When the U.S. side raised "suspicion" about uranium enrichment, the DPRK allowed it to visit some
military Iacilities in which imported aluminum tubes were used as an exception and oIIered its samples
as requested by it, clariIying with sincerity that the controversial aluminum tubes had nothing to do
with the uranium enrichment.
As Iar as the Iiction about nuclear cooperation with Syria is concerned, the DPRK stipulated in the
October 3 agreement that "it does not transIer nuclear weapons, technology and knowledge". This is
our answer to this question.
This was also done in line with the prior discussion with the U.S. Side.
All Iacts go to clearly show what is the reason behind the delayed process oI the implementation oI
the October 3 agreement.
Consistent in all agreements reached at the six-party talks including the September 19 joint statement
is the principle oI "action Ior action".
Now that other participating nations delay the IulIillment oI their commitments, the DPRK is
compelled to adjust the tempo oI the disablement oI some nuclear Iacilities on the principle oI "action
Ior action."
The DPRK still hopes that the October 3 agreement can be smoothly implemented should all the
participating nations make concerted sincere eIIorts on the principle oI simultaneous action.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jDsrn5qmVUANHrmtASIggyXIhI9gD8TV4K7G0
NKorea Says It Gave US Nuclear List
By JAE-SOON CHANG
26 minutes ago [Accessed 2008-01-04T15:25Z]
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) North Korea said Friday [2008-01-04] it gave a list oI its nuclear
programs to the United States in November, claiming it tried to meet commitments under an
international disarmament agreement and accusing the U.S. oI not doing its part to deliver aid.
North Korea also said that because oI the delays by the U.S. and other parties to the six-nation talks, it
was slowing the pace oI disabling its nuclear Iacilities.
The North's Foreign Ministry did not list the contents oI what it gave Washington, but stressed it had
Iollow-up consultations with U.S. oIIicials and tried its best to deIuse allegations that Pyongyang had a
uranium-based nuclear weapons program.
U.S. oIIicials have voiced skepticism about the North's commitment to a February aid-Ior-
disaramement deal worked out in the talks aIter Pyongyang Iailed to meet a year-end deadline on the
nuclear declaration. The six nations are the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea.
"As Iar as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some quarters is
concerned, (North Korea) has done what it should do," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement carried
by the country's oIIicial Korean Central News Agency.
The North accused the U.S. and other parties in the six-nation talks oI delays in carrying out their
commitments, such as shipping energy aid and removing the North Irom U.S. terrorism and trade
blacklists. That Iorced Pyongyang to "adjust the tempo oI the disablement oI some nuclear Iacilities on
the principle oI action Ior action," it said.
North Korea last year promised to abandon its nuclear ambitions in return Ior the equivalent oI 1
million tons oI oil and political concessions. In October, it pledged to disable its nuclear Iacilities and
issue a declaration on its atomic programs by the end oI 2007.
The North began disabling the Iacilities under the watch oI U.S. experts in November. On Friday, the
North said the last process in the disablement work removing spent Iuel rods Irom its sole
operational reactor was continuing, and that work was expected to be completed in 100 days.
But the real hurdle was the nuclear declaration, as Pyongyang and Washington remain Iar apart over
North Korea's suspected uranium enrichment program an allegation that touched oII the latest
nuclear standoII in late 2002, and that the North has long denied.
U.S. oIIicials have charged that the North's purchase oI suspicious material and equipment including
aluminum tubes that could be used in the process oI converting hot uranium gas into Iuel Ior nuclear
weapons showed it pursued a uranium enrichment program.
On Friday, the North's Foreign Ministry said it oIIered an explanation to the U.S. about the uranium
program, showing American oIIicials military Iacilities where the aluminum tubes were used, and
providing samples to clariIy "the controversial aluminum tubes had nothing to do with the uranium
enrichment."
Regarding suspicions about its nuclear connection with Syria, the North's ministry repeated its earlier
stance that it had already pledged in the Oct. 3 agreement that it would never transIer any nuclear
material, technology or know-how out oI the country.
The North said the aid-Ior-disarmement deal could still be implemented smoothly "should all the
participating nations make concerted sincere eIIorts on the principle oI simultaneous action."
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.war.nuclear/browsethread/thread/71bc47e344d80638
Newsgroups: alt.war.nuclear
From: Allen Thomson thoms...Ilash.net~
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2008 15:02:14 -0800 (PST)
Local: Thurs, Jan 3 2008 5:02 pm
Subject: Weirdness in Syria
In a probably vain attempt to Iigure out the Israeli strike in Syria on 6 Sep 2007, I've been keeping an
eye on the available commercial satellite imagery oI the area. There's now a GeoEye IKONOS image
oI 23 November that's, well, strange.
I don't have the disposable cash to get the 1-meter resolution image itselI, but just the browse image on
the geoeye.com site is very interesting. What it shows is an apparently new, or at least seriously
reIurbished, road between the bombed building and a previously noted Iacility Iive kilometers to the
east. This road is not apparent in any earlier image, including the DigitalGlobe one oI 24 October.
And, more weirdly, there is deIinitely a square structure on the site oI the Iormer building. In the 24
October image there was nothing there but a low mound oI dirt.
I have no clue what this means, but it is interesting...
[Sourcebook note: The 23 November IKONOS browse image is at
http://archive.spaceimaging.com/ikonos/2/kpms/2007/11/browse.23487.crss_sat.0.0.jpg]
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/politics/5428038.html
US, NKorea, differ on nuke issue
By FOSTER KLUG Associated Press Writer
Jan. 4, 2008, 10:04AM
WASHINGTON The United States on Friday disputed North Korean claims that Pyongyang had
handed over a list oI its nuclear programs ahead oI a year-end disarmament deadline. Despite the
North's charges oI U.S. obstruction, the State Department expressed conIidence that the process was
moving ahead.
Spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters that North Korea has yet to provide a complete nuclear
declaration, a key part oI a February aid-Ior-disarmament deal worked out in six-nation talks.
"They're engaging the international media, in their own way," McCormack said oI the North Korean
Foreign Ministry's statements. "It is an important point that in none oI this have any oI the parties been
backing away at all Irom their commitment to the process."
North Korea said Friday it gave the U.S. a list oI its nuclear programs in November and accused the
U.S. oI not doing its part to move the process Iorward.
The North's Foreign Ministry did not elaborate on the contents oI what it gave Washington but stressed
it had Iollow-up consultations with U.S. oIIicials and tried its best to clear their suspicions that
Pyongyang had a secret uranium-based nuclear weapons program.
The North's claims came as the chieI U.S. envoy at disarmament talks, Christopher Hill, headed to Asia
to discuss the disarmament accord.
U.S. oIIicials have voiced skepticism about the North's commitment to the deal aIter saying that
Pyongyang Iailed to deliver the declaration by the end oI the year. The six nations involved in the talks
are the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea.
The North's producing what the U.S. calls a "complete and accurate" declaration is seen as key to the
process moving Iorward. Washington is especially keen Ior the declaration to address the suspected
uranium enrichment program an important sticking point that touched oII a nuclear standoII in late
2002.
North Korean and U.S. oIIicials have had ongoing talks on the declaration, McCormack said. But, he
said, the U.S. is still waiting Ior a Iinal declaration. He would not elaborate on the discussions.
McCormack also would not discuss the North's claim that it had oIIered an explanation to U.S. oIIicials
about its alleged uranium program.
Hill told reporters in December, aIter visiting North Korea, that he had not seen a draIt oI the
declaration but that U.S. and North Korean negotiators had had extensive talks about what the U.S.
expects to see in the list oI nuclear programs.
When asked at the time iI the North was prepared to present a draIt oI the declaration, he said his North
Korean counterpart, Kim Kye Gwan, told him, "We don't want to rush this and cause problems. Haste
makes waste, I think is what he said."
North Korea has promised to abandon its nuclear ambitions in return Ior energy aid and political
concessions. In October, it pledged to disable its nuclear Iacilities and declare its programs by the end
oI the year in return Ior the equivalent oI 1 million tons oI oil.
The North shut down its sole Iunctioning atomic reactor in July and began to disable it and other
Iacilities under watch oI U.S. experts in November; that process, though slowed by technical
diIIiculties, continues.
Washington, DC
January 4, 2008
[EXCERPT]
|MR. MCCORMACK:| Yeah, Nina.
QUESTION: On North Korea, the -- I just watched a response to their Ioreign ministry saying that
they've already made this -- about (inaudible)?
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, the Iirst thing I'll note about what they said is that they are
committed to the six-party process. That is, I think, the kicker line in their statement and there is every
evidence that they are still committed to the six-party process and are moving Iorward with the
implementation oI this phase oI the agreement as was outlined back in October.
So disablement continues. They have yet to produce a declaration. Would we have wished they had
produced a declaration by now? Absolutely, and when I say "we," all the other Iive members oI the six-
party talks. Chris Hill, when he was in Pyongyang and Sung Kim, when he was in North Korea, talked
to them about the importance oI producing a Iull and complete declaration. The Chinese have and I
know others have as well. We're going to continue doing that. We want to see this as soon as possible,
but we're not going to sacriIice Iullness and completeness in the interest oI time.
But the North Koreans need to get about the business oI completing this declaration. It's important to
the process. It is another data point that will indicate that they are, in Iact, serious about denuclearizing
the Korean Peninsula, which is, oI course, the objective oI the six-party talks. So it proceeds. It is not --
would we have wished that it had gone Iaster? Yes. Part oI what Chris Hill is going to do in his tour in
Northeast Asia as well as to Moscow is talk about this, talk about it with the other members oI the six-
party talks and urge them to do what they can to encourage the North Koreans to produce a Iull and
complete declaration.
QUESTION: Is he in Tokyo today or is he en route?
MR. MCCORMACK: He leIt today. He leIt the United States today, so -- I don't have his schedule in
Iront oI me right now. I went through it yesterday.
QUESTION: Are you suggesting that there's something about Hawaii that has changed?
MR. MCCORMACK: No, no.
QUESTION: Is it no longer a part oI the United States?
MR. MCCORMACK: All right, I leIt that (inaudible) there.
QUESTION: He leIt Washington today?
MR. MCCORMACK: He leIt Washington today. I think -- what did I say, he leIt here today?
QUESTION: You said he leIt the United States today.
MR. MCCORMACK: Touche, Matt. There we are.
QUESTION: Sean, is the Bush Administration emphasis on this complete and correct declaration,
because what they showed you originally wasn't complete and correct? I mean, it's -- you keep saying it
has to be complete and correct --
QUESTION: -- leads one to assume, well, maybe what they originally showed you wasn't complete and
correct.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, look, I know Chris talked to them about this when he was up there and we
have had several conversations, as have others about the declaration and I'm not going to get into the
speciIics oI the back and Iorth, but the Iact is they haven't turned in a Iinal declaration yet. They're
going to turn that in to the Chinese as chair, conveners oI the six-party meetings and we don't have that
yet. We look Iorward to a Iull and complete declaration. We also look Iorward to their completing the
disablement phase up at Yongbyon. That is moving Iorward and there is good progress on that.
I just have to emphasize to everybody, when you're looking at this process, iI -- while we all wish that
these diplomatic processes would unIold as we had planned them, sometimes they don't. And part oI
the reasons why they are not right now is we are breaking new ground in terms oI what we're doing, in
terms oI disabling Yongbyon and in terms oI working with North Korea in the six-party talks to get a
Iull, complete picture oI their nuclear program, not something that has ever been done beIore.
So that is why, when you say, "Well, it hasn't been done by December 31st, what are you going to do,"
and we say, well, we're going to keep working on it within a reasonable period oI time, that's the reason
why, because we're breaking new ground here. This hasn't been done beIore. But all oI that said, none
oI what we're doing is lowering the bar. The North Koreans made certain commitments. We expect
them to live up to those commitments. We as well as the other members oI the six-party talks made
commitments and we are going to IulIill those commitments. It's going to be action in return Ior action.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Is Mr. Hill going to meet with President Lee in Seoul? Is that on the agenda?
MR. MCCORMACK: I don't have his list oI meetings Ior you. We'll try to detail those Ior you iI we
can.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/world/asia/05korea.html
North Korea Says Earlier Disclosure Was Enough
By CHOE SANG-HUN and STEVEN LEE MYERS
January 5, 2008
SEOUL, South Korea North Korea said Friday that it had already explained enough about its
nuclear programs to meet a deadline Ior declaring its nuclear activities, saying the inIormation was in a
nuclear declaration it prepared in November and gave to the United States.
The statement Irom the North Korean Foreign Ministry on Friday was carried by the Korean Central
News Agency, North Koreas voice to the outside world. It was the countrys Iirst oIIicial
pronouncement aIter it missed a Dec. 31 deadline to disable its main nuclear complex at Yongbyon,
north oI Pyongyang, and, according to other nations involved in six-nation talks, Iailed to provide a Iull
list oI its nuclear activities, including weapons, Iacilities and Iissile material.
The statement said that North Korea had already conducted enough discussions with the United
States oIIicials aIter they demanded more negotiations on its November draIt declaration. Using the
abbreviation oI the Norths oIIicial name, the Democratic Peoples Republic oI Korea, the Foreign
Ministry said, As Iar as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some
quarters is concerned, the D.P.R.K. has done what it should do.
In Washington, oIIicials disputed North Koreas claims, saying the government in Pyongyang had not
yet provided a declaration. They muted their criticism, however, and said that issue had not reached an
impasse.
The North Koreans know whats expected oI them and what the rest oI the parties are looking Ior, and
that is a Iull and complete and accurate declaration oI their nuclear activity, said Tony Fratto, a White
House spokesman. They know that.
The chieI American negotiator, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill, leIt Washington on
Friday en route to China, where the status oI North Koreas adherence to its commitments to dismantle
its nuclear weapons program will be the Iocus oI a new round oI negotiations. An administration
oIIicial, speaking on condition oI anonymity because oI the delicacy oI the situation, played down the
North Korean statement, saying it Iollowed a pattern oI public posturing in advance oI new talks.
Since the passing oI the deadline, agreed on in October, the United States, South Korea and Japan have
criticized the North and called Ior details on how much plutonium it had produced at Yongbyon,
whether it had provided nuclear assistance to Syria and what it had done with tons oI aluminum tubes it
had bought Irom Russia, the type that could be used to build centriIuges to enrich uranium.
The State Departments spokesman, Sean McCormack, said that the United States and the other
countries involved in the talks had not reacted more strongly to the missed deadline because Ioreign
nuclear experts were continuing their work to dismantle the Yongbyon plant, hoping through that work
to learn more about aspects oI North Koreas nuclear program.
Were breaking new ground here, Mr. McCormack said. This hasnt been done beIore.
Earlier in the day, North Korea also renewed its threat to bolster its war deterrent, a phrase it uses Ior
its nuclear arsenal. The North, with one oI the worlds largest standing armies, usually threatens to
bolster its deterrent when it Ieels international pressure in crucial negotiations.
North Korea has acknowledged building bombs with plutonium, but has denied pursuing an alternative
weapons program using enriched uranium.
In the October deal that North Korea struck with the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and
Russia, it promised to disable its nuclear Iacilities and give a Iull list oI its nuclear programs in
exchange Ior one million tons oI heavy Iuel oil, or its economic equivalent, and diplomatic
concessions.
It has so Iar received 150,000 tons oI oil and 5,010 tons oI steel products to renovate its aging power
plants.
On Friday, North Korea accused the United States and other countries oI delaying the IulIillment oI
their commitments to provide the aid and remove the North Irom American terrorism and trade
blacklists.
We still hold hope that the Oct. 3 agreement will be implemented smoothly iI all countries
participating in the six-party talks make sincere eIIorts based on the principle oI action Ior action, the
statement said.
North Korea said the disablement work at Yongbyon was completed within the technologically
possible scope as oI Dec. 31.
But since the aid delivery has not been done even 50 percent, the North had to adjust the speed oI
the nuclear disablement process, it said. The work oI unloading spent Iuel rods Irom the Norths
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, a crucial part oI the disablement, will take an additional 100 days, it said.
Choe Sang-hun reported Irom Seoul, and Steven Lee Myers Irom Washington.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-Ig-usnorkor5jan05,0,4497143.story
N. Korea says it fulfilled nuclear deal
By Paul Richter
Los Angeles Times StaII Writer
January 5, 2008
WASHINGTON American and North Korean oIIicials traded charges Friday over the lagging eIIort
to shut down Pyongyang's nuclear program, raising new doubts about an initiative that the Bush
administration has hoped would yield a rare diplomatic success.
North Korea's Foreign Ministry declared that it had IulIilled a commitment to provide U.S. oIIicials
with a Iull list oI its nuclear activities beIore a Dec. 31 deadline, and intended to do no more.
"As Iar as the nuclear declaration on which wrong opinion is being built up by some quarters is
concerned, |North Korea| has done what it should do," the ministry said in a statement carried by the
oIIicial Korean Central News Agency.
U.S. oIIicials insisted that Pyongyang had not yet provided the declaration that it promised on two
occasions last year.
"The North Koreans need to get about the business oI completing the declaration," said Sean
McCormack, the chieI State Department spokesman. "It is another data point that will indicate that they
are serious about denuclearizing the Korean peninsula."
The North Korean government last year pledged a step-by-step program oI disabling and then
dismantling its nuclear complex in return Ior various rewards, including Iuel oil, steel products and
normalization oI diplomatic relations.
By the end oI last year, North Korea was to have dismantled a decrepit reactor at Yongbyon and
disclosed all nuclear assets and activities, including its inventory oI bombs and Iissile materials and a
uranium enrichment program that Pyongyang has so Iar denied.
But as the year-end deadline passed without completion oI the nuclear inventory or Iull disabling oI the
reactor, criticism has grown in the United States that Kim Jong Il's government is Iollowing a Iamiliar
pattern oI probing to see what it can obtain without giving up the nuclear program it considers a
precious asset.
U.S. oIIicials, who have clung to optimism despite a series oI snags, said it was important not to
overlook that North Korea said in its statement that it remained committed to the eIIort.
"I think we're seeing progress on parts oI this agreement," said Tony Fratto, a White House spokesman.
But Robert Einhorn, a Iormer senior U.S. oIIicial on nonproliIeration, said North Korea's statement
may be more than just bluster aimed at improving its bargaining position in talks with the United
States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. Pyongyang regards secrecy about its nuclear program as
a "strategic asset," and may be unwilling to come clean, said Einhorn, who is at the Center Ior Strategic
and International Studies in Washington.
"Obviously, a Iailure to make a Iull and accurate declaration will cast real doubt on whether they are
willing to get rid oI their nuclear capability completely," he said. For that reason, he said, it is
"potentially a showstopper" Ior the six-nation denuclearization talks.
North Korean oIIicials and the U.S. negotiating team, headed by Assistant Secretary oI State
Christopher Hill, had discussed what the nuclear inventory declaration would include, American
oIIicials have said. U.S. oIIicials hoped those discussions would avoid a later conIrontation over an
inadequate declaration.
But North Korea said Friday that it had oIIered the United States a document in November, which the
Americans apparently Iound insuIIicient. The North Koreans said that although the U.S. oIIicials
wanted more talks, Pyongyang had had "enough discussions."
The ministry's statement again denied that the North Koreans had aided Syria in a nuclear weapons
program, calling that allegation "a Iiction." U.S. oIIicials have demanded to know whether North Korea
had a hand in building an alleged Syrian nuclear Iacility that reportedly was bombed by Israel in early
September.
The North Koreans said that in response to American suspicions that Pyongyang had imported
aluminum tubes Ior uranium enrichment, they had shown U.S. oIIicials a military site at which
aluminum tubes were used Ior other purposes.
The North Koreans accused the United States oI Iailing to honor its commitment to take North Korea
oII the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and to liIt sanctions under American trade laws.
The ministry asserted that North Korea had done more than other countries as part oI the
denuclearization deal. But it said it reIused to go Iurther because the deal provided that each side would
move ahead "action Ior action."
Charles L. Pritchard, a Iormer Bush administration envoy who is president oI the Korea Economic
Institute, said the North Korean statements were aimed at rebutting accusations Irom several countries
that Pyongyang had Iailed to meet its commitments by the year-end deadline. He said he did not view
them as a threat to the denuclearization eIIort.
The countries are "signaling each other in a PR kind oI way," he said.
The Bush administration, aIter taking a hard line on North Korea Ior its Iirst six years, has made a
series oI concessions in the last year to keep negotiations going. Einhorn said the administration might
change its tune iI the latest statement proves to be a signal oI intransigence.
The administration "has already taken a lot oI hits Irom the right wing," he said. "I think the
administration will Ieel it's under pressure to do something to show that it doesn't have inIinite
patience."
paul.richterlatimes.com

IAEA: We hope to visit site of IAF strike on Syria
By Yoav Stern, Haaretz Correspondent, and Reuters
Last update - 17:18 07/01/2008
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has no inIormation on any Syrian nuclear plans, but
does hope to pay a visit soon to the Syrian site bombed by the Israel Air Force in September, IAEA
chieI Mohamed ElBaradei told the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al-Hayat on Monday
[2008-01-07].
ElBaradei said the IAF strike three months ago, which Ioreign media has reported targeted a nascent
nuclear Iacility, "set a bad precedent."
ElBaradei also said that an inIormation network established by the Pakistani scientist Abd al-Qadir,
which reportedly stretched over 30 countries, aided Libya, Iran and possibly North Korea with
obtaining nuclear technologies.
However, he did not mention Syria in this context.
In the interview, ElBaradei also expressed his concern over attempts made by terrorist organizations to
produce a radioactive or "dirty" bomb that would potentially explode in a crowded city, spreading
radioactive radiation.
"Hundreds or even thousands could die |Irom the radioactive bomb|," ElBaradei said, adding that "it
would have severe long-term economic ramiIications."
ElBaradei warned that such a scenario would be Iar worse than the attack oI September 11, and that it
was "in the interest oI extremist groups," who are "more likely to execute such an attack than obtain
nuclear weapons."
ElBaradei to visit Tehran
The IAEA will visit Iran on January 11-12 to help resolve outstanding questions about Iran's disputed
atomic program, an spokeswoman Irom the agency said on Monday.
ElBaradei would be making the rare trip at the invitation oI the Islamic Republic, Iollowing diplomatic
reports late last month that Iran's staged plan Ior transparency agreed with the UN watchdog agency
was getting bogged down.
"The Director-General will visit Tehran on Friday and Saturday. During the visit he will meet with a
number oI high oIIicials," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said.
"|ElBaradei| hopes that the visit will develop ways and means to enhance and accelerate
implementation oI (nuclear) saIeguards in Iran, with a view oI resolving all remaining outstanding
issues and enabling the agency to provide assurance about Iran's past and present nuclear activities,"
she said in an emailed statement.
US Nuclear Envoy Says Completeness More Important than Speed in North Korean
Nuclear
By Kurt Achin
Seoul
08 January 2008
[EXCERPT]
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill's stop here Tuesday is the second on his latest
attempt to push the North Korean nuclear disarmament proces
He continues to express concern over Pyongyang's Iailure to meet a deadline Ior issuing a Iull list oI its
nuclear activities.
North Korea promised its Iive partners in the six-nation nuclear talks last year that it would declare all
oI its nuclear weapons, programs and stockpiles by December 31. That date passed, to silence Irom
Pyongyang.
But Hill says accuracy in Pyongyang's report is more important than speed.
"I'm not too concerned about them being a little late. The main concern is that when they do give a
declaration, that it be complete," Hill said.
Last week, the North Korean Foreign Ministry said a declaration provided to U.S. oIIicials in
November was suIIicient. Hill says it was not.
"They can make as many declarations as they want. The issue is, have they made a complete one?
And the answer is no," Hill said.
Hill Ilew here Irom Japan Tuesday, and aIter his stop in South Korea he plans to head to China and
Russia - all participants in the six-nation talks, which are aimed at ending the North's nuclear weapons
programs Ior good.
On his arrival in Seoul, he called Ior patience with Pyongyang - up to a point.
"I think we need to kind oI stick with it, be a little patient with it - but be tough, and try to get through,"
Hill said.
He says North Korea's reticence can be understood, to the extent that the country is "not automatically
inclined toward transparency." However, he says providing a complete declaration is something that
"needs to be done."
He also says China, as the host nation oI the talks, has a special responsibility to push North Korea to
honor its nuclear obligations.
http://www.domain-b.com/deIence/general/20080110nukes.html
IAEA chief, el Baradei, voices concern over safety of Pakistani nukes news
10 January 2008
[EXCERPTS]
Beirut: The head oI the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN atomic watchdog,
Mohamed el Baradei, has added his voice to mounting concerns over the saIety oI Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal. In an interview to Arabic daily Al-Hayat on Tuesday [2008-01-08], Baradei expressed his Iear
that it could Iall into extremist hands.
[deletia]
With regard to Syria, the United Nations nuclear chieI also told Al-Hayat that authorities in that
country did not authorise international inspectors to visit a site bombed by Israel last September.
Speculation Ied into international media aIter the September 6 attack by Israeli jets suggested that the
site may have been used to store nuclear materials Irom North Korea.
Syria had denied these allegations.
[deletia]
http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/01-2008/Article-20080111-696004c1-c0a8-10ed-01ae-81ab74b33e8c/story.html
Al Baradei To Al-Hayat (2/2): Old And Renewed Nuclear Fears Abdul-Qadeer Khan
aided Libya and IranNo information on Syria's nuclear program
By Ghassan Charbel
Al-Hayat
11/01/08//
Syria and North Korea
> Israel launched a strike against a target on Syrian territories claiming that it was linked to
North Korea. Is there any information about a Syrian nuclear program?
- We have no inIormation about a Syrian nuclear program. I was surprised by this step. II anything had
to do with a nuclear program, the Israelis and the Americans must inIorm us Iirst so we can conduct
inspections. The solution cannot be by striking Iirst and then asking questions. Any state that has
inIormation about the nuclear program oI another state must inIorm the Agency. So Iar, we have not
received any inIormation about any nuclear programs in Syria. When I spoke to the Syrian brothers,
they said that the target was a military Iacility. I asked Ior their permission to allow the Agency to visit
the Iacility and to veriIy that it was not nuclear.
> The Syrians said the target was a military facility?
-Yes, they said it was a military Iacility, but I am not concerned with the nature oI the military Iacility
targeted as long as it is not within my jurisdiction. Yet, the Syrian brothers did not allow us to visit and
inspect the location.
>It is said that they have flattened the facility?
- The location was razed down according to our inIormation. Yet, even iI this is the case, we have
technologies to assure that the location did not host a nuclear Iacility. Based on satellite photographs,
experts believe it is unlikely that the targeted construction was a nuclear Iacility. I consider the Israeli
strike to be a negative precedent.
> Have you demanded information and evidence from the Israelis?
- We made requests but they oIIered us no inIormation, neither they nor any other intelligence
agencies. I deal with the issue on the basis that the target was a military but not a nuclear Iacility. I still
hope that the brothers in Syria will permit us to visit the targeted location to veriIy that it was not a
nuclear Iacility.
U.S. sets new deadline for N. Korea's declaration of nuclear programs
By Lee Chi-dong
2008/01/10 13:56 KST
INCHEON, Jan. 10 (Yonhap) -- The United States wants North Korea to disclose all oI its nuclear
programs beIore the launch oI South Korea's new government late next month, Washington's chieI
nuclear envoy said Thursday.
Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill presented the Iresh deadline Ior recalcitrant North
Korea aIter his meeting with South Korea's incoming leader Lee Myung-bak.
The United States accuses North Korea oI Iailing to meet the year-end deadline to provide a
"complete and correct" declaration on the North's nuclear activity, a key part oI the second phase oI the
denuclearization process. But Pyongyang insists that it already explained enough about its nuclear
programs. North Korea criticizes the U.S. and other dialogue partners over delays in their provision oI
Iurther energy aid and political incentives.
It is very desirable to complete phase two even beIore Lee takes oIIice so negotiators can Iocus
on the last phase by the time his government begins its term, Hill told reporters at Incheon International
Airport beIore heading to Beijing.
The envoy said he had a "very good discussion" with Lee about the need to work closely together
Ior denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula.
Hill cited North Korea's lack oI transparency as a reason Ior its Iailure to meet the deadline.
"We can't have a situation where we pretend programs didn't exist Ior we both know that they
existed," he said. "We can't have a program, a process that goes Iorward on the basis oI not being
honest with each other."
His remarks were understood to reIer to the North's alleged uranium enrichment program and nuclear
black-market connection with Syria.
"It is a tougher issue than maybe it should be. I mean tougher Irom a psychological point oI
view," he said. "That is why I think we need to show a little patience with the situation."
Asked about the timing Ior a new round oI six-way talks on the nuclear crisis, Hill said it depends on
consultations with host China.
He said he will discuss the issue with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei later Thursday. The
other participants in the talks are Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas.
During his hectic three-day schedule in Seoul, he had a series oI meetings with President Roh
Moo-hyun, Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, and Seoul's top nuclear envoy Chun Yung-woo.
Hill and Chun agreed to push Ior a quick resumption oI the six-way talks.
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id91cIcI8e-86b1-427I-8d3b-b655bd46ceb2&k59499
U.S. tells N.Korea to fully declare nuclear activities
Guy Faulconbridge , Reuters
Published: Friday, January 11, 2008
MOSCOW (Reuters) - The United States urged North Korea on Friday to give a Iull declaration oI its
nuclear activities aIter Pyongyang missed an end-2007 deadline Ior presenting the inventory under a
disarmament-Ior-aid deal.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill held talks with Russia's chieI negotiator in Moscow
aIter a tour oI Asia to discuss the deal, which would award Iuel oil or aid Ior making the declaration
and dismantling its nuclear Iacilities.
"They are obliged to give a complete and correct declaration, a declaration which would cover all their
nuclear materials, all their nuclear Iacilities and all their nuclear programs and any nuclear cooperation
they have with anyone," Hill told reporters aIter talks.
"That is what we are expecting," he said, declining to give any new deadlines Ior the declaration.
North Korea says it has accounted Ior its nuclear programs as required.
The United States says none oI the countries party to the deal -- a result oI six-party talks between the
two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia -- has seen the Iinal declaration.
Russia's chieI negotiator on North Korea, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, expressed
Irustration with the speed oI the process.
"We are unanimous in our regret at the slow movement we have within the process, but at the same
time we recognize that this is a very diIIicult and bumpy road which we have to go along," he told
reporters at a joint brieIing with Hill.
DISARMING
II North Korea lives up to the deal, the energy starved state would get 1 million tons oI heavy Iuel oil
or equivalent aid, and Washington would take it oII its terrorism black list.
North Korea has been cooperating in disabling its three main nuclear Iacilities -- an ageing reactor, a
plant that makes nuclear Iuel and another that turns spent Iuel into arms-grade plutonium -- U.S. and
South Korean oIIicials have said.
The disabling oI North Korea's nuclear reactor is a key part oI a complex nuclear deal struck aIter years
oI diplomatic wrangling and Pyongyang's test oI a nuclear bomb in late 2006.
Hill said the next round oI talks would take place soon but declined to give a date: "I think the Chinese
will be looking to call a six-party meeting."
China is the host oI the six party talks. Earlier, Itar-Tass news agency quoted Hill as saying the next
round oI the could take place in the next Iew weeks.
Russia will complete a delivery oI 50,000 tons oI Iuel oil to North Korea this month under an
agreement reached at the six-party negotiations, Losyukov told reporters.
"I think that around January 20-21 we will complete the delivery oI our portion to North Korea oI the
oil which was envisaged by the six-party talks," Losyukov said. "So it can not be used as a pretext to
slow the process down."
Syria Rebuilds on Site Destroyed by Israeli Bombs
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: January 12, 2008
The puzzling site in Syria that Israeli jets bombed in September grew more curious on Friday with the
release oI a satellite photograph showing new construction there that resembles the site's Iormer main
building.

DigitalGlobe
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/01/11/world/12syria-450.jpg
New construction at a disputed Syrian site that Israeli and American analysts
judged to be a partially built nuclear reactor.
Israel's air attack was directed against what Israeli and American intelligence analysts had judged to be
a partly constructed nuclear reactor. The Syrians vigorously denied the atomic claim.
BeIore the attack, satellite imagery showed a tall, square building there measuring about 150 Ieet long
per side.
AIter the attack, the Syrians wiped the area clean, with some analysis calling the speed oI the cleanup a
tacit admission oI guilt. The barren site is on the eastern bank oI the Euphrates, 90 miles north oI the
Iraqi border.
The image released Friday came Irom a private company, DigitalGlobe, in Longmont, Colo. It shows a
tall, square building under construction that appears to closely resemble the original structure, with the
exception that the rooI is vaulted instead oI Ilat. The photo was taken Irom space on Wednesday
[2008-01-09].
Given the international uproar that unIolded aIter the bombing, "we can assume it's not a reactor," said
David Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and International Security, a private group in
Washington that has analyzed the Syrian site.
II international inspectors eventually get to the site, he added, they will have a more diIIicult time
looking Ior nuclear evidence. "The new building," he noted, "covers whatever remained oI the
destroyed one."
Skeptics have criticized the nuclear accusation, saying the public evidence that has so Iar come to light
was ambiguous at best. They noted, Ior instance, that at the time oI the attack the site had no
obvious barbed wire or air deIenses that would normally ring a sensitive military Iacility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna recently became aware oI the new construction, a
European diplomat said Friday.
"Obviously, they're keeping an eye on the site," he said, speaking on the condition oI anonymity
because oI the issue's diplomatic delicacy.
As a signer to an agreement with the atomic agency, Syria is obligated to report the construction oI a
nuclear reactor to international inspectors. Nuclear reactors can make plutonium Ior the core oI atom
bombs, and thereIore secretive work on reactors is usually interpreted as military in nature.
Senior Syrian oIIicials continue to deny that a nuclear reactor was under construction, insisting that
what Israel destroyed was a largely empty military warehouse.
Mohamed ElBaradei, who directs the atomic agency, this week told Al-Hayat, an Arabic-language
newspaper based in London, that his agency wanted to inspect the site.
"So Iar, we have not received any inIormation about any nuclear programs in Syria," he said, according
to a transcript posted on the newspaper's Web site. Dr. ElBaradei said he had asked Ior the Syrians'
permission "to allow the agency to visit the Iacility nd to veriIy that it was not nuclear."
He added: "The Syrian brothers did not allow us to visit and inspect the location."
While some analysts have suggested that the new building might slow down international inspectors,
Dr. ElBaradei said in the interview that his agency had sensitive "technologies to assure that the
location did not host a nuclear Iacility."
The satellite photographs, he added, led experts to doubt "that the targeted construction" was in Iact a
nuclear reactor.
Syria Builds at Ruined Site of Israeli Airstrike
Saturday, January 12, 2008; Page A11
U.S. officials said this Syrian site, now under construction, may have housed a partially
constructed nuclear reactor. (Digital Globe-institute For Science And International Security)

Syria has begun new construction on the ruined site oI a mysterious Iacility where some U.S. oIIicials
believe a secret nuclear reactor was being built.
However, nuclear experts played down the possibility that the new building has a nuclear purpose.
The Iacility, visible in images taken by a commercial satellite, is being built directly over the building
that was destroyed Sept. 6 in an airstrike by Israeli warplanes. Syria has denied allegations that a
partially constructed nuclear reactor was the target oI the raid. North Korea had been helping Syria
build the Iacility, U.S. oIIicials said.
"It would be very unlikely Ior this to be a reactor, and we would be very surprised iI they tried to put a
reactor inside this building," said David Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and
International Security, who analyzed the images and provided a copy to The Washington Post.
Albright said the new Iacility appears signiIicantly diIIerent Irom the earlier one, having slightly larger
dimensions and a vaulted rooI. There are no visible signs suggesting a nuclear purpose, he said.
The new construction could complicate Iuture eIIorts by outsiders to determine the purpose oI the
original building, Albright said. He added that it is possible that Syria might have constructed the
Iacility to allow the country to secretly excavate all traces oI the original building out oI the view oI
spy satellites.
-- Joby Warrick
Washington, DC
January 14, 2008
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: Sean, another IAEA question. There were reports over the weekend that the agency has
expressed interest in visiting, inspecting the site in Syria that was bombed by Israel in September
because there was some new activity being detected there. Do you think that would be a good idea?
MR. MCCORMACK: It's up to the IAEA to make those requests. Certainly, we support the
proIessionals oI the IAEA in making these kinds oI requests oI a member state. I think it's up to those
proIessionals to make those kinds oI requests.
http://www.deIensenews.com/story.php?F3298844&Cmideast
Bush Privately Lauds Israeli Attack on Syria
By BARBARA OPALL-ROME
And VAGO MURADIAN
Posted 01/14/08 16:02
TEL AVIV and WASHINGTON In one oI the most extensive, Iace-to-Iace security discussions
since an Israel Air Force attack on a Syrian nuclear reactor last autumn, U.S. President George W.
Bush privately commended his Israeli host on what was described as an important preventive action,
according to an Israeli oIIicial brieIed on the high-level exchange.
Bushs private endorsement oI the Sept. 6 attack oIIered in the context oI Jan. 9 discussions in
Jerusalem on the Iranian threat and Israels cardinal opposition to nuclear weapon development
programs in the region was disputed by Olmert spokesman Mark Regev. I dont know that to be
true, Regev said.
Nevertheless, the Israeli oIIicial brieIed on the Bush-Olmert talks said he understood the U.S.
presidents comments as endorsement oI the pre-emptive necessity oI the Syrian strike. II true, such a
reIerence to the Syrian operation during talks devoted to denial options vis a vis Iran appears to support
contentions that the Syrian reactor was very close to becoming operational prior to its destruction.
In a late December interview, a participant in Israeli security cabinet discussions in the months leading
up to the Sept. 6 attack said inIormation gathered on the Syrian Iacility was unequivocal. There was
no doubt about the time-critical need to act as we did, he said.
Israeli intelligence agencies concluded that Iran had no connection to the Syrian nuclear program and
probably was not even aware oI the clandestine site in eastern Syria along the Euphrates River, the
oIIicial said.
According to U.S. oIIicials and analysts, the challenge in attacking nuclear Iacilities is to attack them
beIore they are Iueled to minimize the chance oI radioactive contamination that could be released in the
strike. Achieving that level oI precision, they said, requires pinpoint intelligence through external
persistent aerial surveillance and human intelligence inside the Iacilities themselves.
Despite intense eIIorts by Tel Aviv to determine linkage between the Iranian and Syrian nuclear drives,
multiple examinations by various means determined just the opposite, the oIIicial said. He added that
Israeli political oIIicials had hoped to use incriminating evidence oI Iranian proliIeration to ratchet up
international pressure to halt Tehrans enrichment program.
It was certainly disappointing to discover no connection between the two programs, the oIIicial said.
Apparently, this was an independent, high-priority Syrian-Iunded national project sustained and
supported through bilateral ties with the North Korean regime.
That Israeli determination coincided with a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in which American
intelligence agencies concluded that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 while continuing
to seek a civilian nuclear capability.
Bush, at a Jan. 9 joint news conIerence with Olmert, sought to clariIy misperceptions stemming Irom
the NIE.
Iran is a threat towards peace. There was a recent intelligence report that came out that I think sent the
signal to some that said perhaps the United States does not view an Iran with a nuclear weapon as
serious problem, Bush said. Now I want to remind people that Iran was a threat. Iran is a threat,
and Iran will be a threat, iI the international community does not come together and prevent that nation
Irom the development oI the know-how to build a nuclear weapon.
A country which once had a secret program can easily restart a secret program; a country which can
enrich Ior civilian purposes can easily transIer that knowledge to a military program; a country which
has made statements that it has made about the security oI our Iriend Israel is a country that needs to be
taken seriously, and the international community must understand with clarity the threat that Iran
provides to world peace. And we will continue to work with European countries, Russia and China, as
well as nations in this neighborhood, to make it abundantly clear the threat that Iran poses Ior world
peace.
But with the Israeli government intent on using the occasion oI the Iirst American presidential visit
here in more than a decade to showcase the Iranian threat, that Iindings absolving Iranian involvement
in the Syrian program were presented to Bush or his considerable entourage.
According to the Israeli oIIicial present at most oI the Olmert-Bush events, the two sides were adhering
to a coordinated policy oI discretion regarding the disabled Syrian nuclear program, in large part as a
means oI maintaining regional and international Iocus on the Iranian nuclear threat.
The oIIicial reIused all additional comment on the Syrian nuclear program and its connection or lack
thereoI to Iran.
That problem appears to be solved Ior the time being, the oIIicial said oI the Syrian nuclear threat.
Now more than ever, we need to keep Iocused on the problem oI Iran.
Indeed, neither leader mentioned the Syrian nuclear threat during a Jan. 9 joint news conIerence or in
multiple public addresses oIIered during the Iirst day oI Bushs three-day visit here.
In contrast, both leaders repeatedly aired their respective concerns and grievances regarding Iran,
including the prospective threat that a nuclear-capable Islamic Republic would pose to Israel and others
throughout the region.
It seems |Syrian President| Bashar al-Assad distrusted A.Q. Khan and his agents in Dubai, the
oIIicial added. He suspected they may be agents oI the West preparing Ior him a trap.
In a Dec. 19 interview with the Austrian newspaper Die Press, Assad was quoted as saying Syria
rejected overtures thought to have come Irom Khan back in 2001. Someone brought us a letter Irom a
certain Khan. We did not know iI the letter was genuine or a Iorgery by Israel to lure us into a trap. In
any case ... we never met Khan, Assad was quoted as saying.
In the Austrian report, Assad acknowledged that the site bombed by the Israel Air Force was a
military Iacility under construction, but insisted, That does not mean this was a nuclear Iacility.
John Bolton, a Iormer U.S. State Department oIIicial and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was
one oI the Iirst to publicly shed light on the target oI Israels Sept. 6 air operation, all details oI which
remain heavily classiIied by Israels military censor.
In a Dec. 25 interview with political analyst Kenneth Timmerman, Bolton restated contentions that the
site was a North Korean-supplied nuclear reactor and went Iurther by suggesting the Syrian project
provided a convenient vehicle through which Pyongyang could renege on international inspection and
veriIication agreements.
I think this Iacility |in Syria| that the Israelis bombed on Sept. 6 is an indication oI yet another
alternative |Ior cheating on international commitments|. How better to hide your North Korean
program than to build it in Syria where nobody is looking! Bolton was quoted as saying in an
interview published by Newsmax.com.
Prior to conclusions Irom the Israeli investigations clearing Iran oI proliIeration links with Syria,
Tehran was widely presumed to have provided Iunding, or at the very least indirect support, Ior the
reactor project.
A strategic update by analyst Emily Landau, published in November by Tel Aviv Universitys Institute
Ior National Security Studies, reIlected prevailing conventional wisdom: Considering the nature oI
relations between the two countries, it is hard to believe that Iran had no involvement in the decision
|to pursue an elevated regional standing through nuclear capabilities|.
She wrote that Iran was the likely source oI Iunding Ior the project and that Its possible that Iran and
North Korea hoped to use Syria as a shelter Ior their respective technologies and nuclear components
at a time when they would be subject to more intrusive international inspections.
E-mail: bopallromedeIensenews.com, vmuradiandeIensenews.com.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-Ig-syria17jan17,1,1225988.story
West says N. Korea, Syria had nuclear link
A European diplomat says the consensus is that a site in the Mideast nation bombed by Israel
was part of an atomic program.
By Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times StaII Writer
January 17, 2008
WASHINGTON -- Western governments have concluded that Syria and North Korea were
collaborating on a nuclear weapons program at a mysterious site in the Syrian desert that was bombed
by Israel last year, a senior European diplomat said Wednesday in a rare comment about the episode by
a high-ranking oIIicial.
The diplomat said that aIter a review oI available intelligence, Western governments have reached
"some sort oI common ground . . . that there seems to have been cooperation between Syria and North
Korea" at the site. The oIIicial's remarks were made on condition oI anonymity because oI the
sensitivity oI the subject.
Since the Israeli bombing in September, U.S. and allied oIIicials have said little about the attack, the
site or the possible existence oI a Syrian nuclear weapons program, which could Iurther destabilize the
turbulent Middle East. OIIicials at the CIA and the State Department declined comment again
Wednesday.
But the European oIIicial's remarks represented both an acknowledgment oI the attack and the
conclusion oI Western governments that the site was a nuclear installation. BeIore Wednesday, leading
Americans, Israelis and Western allies had avoided addressing either issue.
An international consensus that the governments in Pyongyang and Damascus have collaborated on
nuclear weapons would mark a new setback to U.S. eIIorts to entice North Korea to scrap its nuclear
armament program. It also could blunt eIIorts to pursue engagement with Syria, aIter apparent U.S.
overtures beIore November's Mideast peace conIerence in Annapolis, Md.
Yet some observers have remained skeptical that the Syrian structure was part oI any nuclear program.
Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general oI the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear
watchdog, has said that on the basis oI satellite photos, IAEA experts believe it unlikely the site housed
a nuclear reactor. ElBaradei's comments came in a Jan. 8 interview with the Arabic-language
newspaper Al Hayat.
Syrian oIIicials have said repeatedly that the building was not a nuclear installation but an empty
military structure. Israeli oIIicials have acknowledged the attack in vague terms but have provided no
detailed inIormation concerning the site.
U.S. allies acknowledge that the evidence oI weapons activity could be stronger.
The European diplomat acknowledged that the available intelligence is "not as much as we would love
to have about that."
He also said it was not clear how Iar along the Syrian eIIort was, or what the Syrian government is
doing now at the site.
There have been some signs oI rebuilding at the site, on the banks oI the Euphrates in eastern Syria.
Recent satellite photos by a private Colorado Iirm, DigitalGlobe, show a new building on part oI the
site, based on photos kept on the Iirm's website. However, private analysts said it was unlikely the
Syrians would try to duplicate Iacilities destroyed in the Israeli attack.
The European diplomat said it was "possible" that the structure that seems to be under construction at
the site was being built simply to conceal the nature oI past activities.
David Schenker, a Iormer Pentagon specialist on Syria now at the Washington Institute Ior Near East
Policy, said a general agreement among Western governments that North Korea and Syria collaborated
at a nuclear site would be "a pretty signiIicant development."
There has been wide agreement that North Korea has helped Syria on its arms program. Pyongyang
helped Damascus build Scud missiles, the crude, short-range weapons used by Iraq in the 1991 Persian
GulI War, as well as more advanced designs, Schenker noted.
Syria has sought to buy nuclear reactors in years past Irom several countries, including Russia, analysts
say. International oIIicials know oI only one small reactor operating in Syria, a 30-kilowatt Chinese-
supplied plant at Dayr Al Hajar. .
ElBaradei, in his Al Hayat interview, said IAEA oIIicials would like to examine the Syrian site but
have so Iar been barred by Damascus. Syria is a signatory to the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty,
which allows Ior periodic inspections oI declared nuclear materials and activities.
U.S. oIIicials have asked North Korea whether it has worked with Syria on a nuclear program; the
North Koreans have denied it.
As part oI the ongoing denuclearization talks between North Korea and Iive international powers, U.S.
oIIicials are awaiting a Iormal declaration oI Pyongyang's nuclear activities, including any nuclear
collaboration with Damascus. North Korea, however, has said it plans no Iurther disclosures,
jeopardizing what had been considered a promising deal.
The potential warming between U.S. and Syrian oIIicials already had begun to encounter strains.
AIter hints oI progress last Iall, Iriction has developed recently over Lebanon's selection oI a new
government. U.S. oIIicials are unhappy with what they consider Syrian meddling in the process.
On Tuesday, as President Bush toured the Middle East, a bomb exploded near a U.S. Embassy convoy
in Beirut, killing three people and injuring more than 20, including two U.S. Embassy employees who
are Lebanese.
Schenker said the bomb may have been intended as a warning Irom Syrian-supported militants to U.S.
oIIicials.
http://www.state.gov/g/senk/99467.htm
[As of 2008-01-19T16:30Z this page appears to have been removed from www.state.gov.]
North Korean Human Rights and U.S. National Security
Jay LeIkowitz, U.S. Special Envoy Ior Human Rights in North Korea
Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute
Washington, DC
January 17, 2008
[EXCERPT]
Thank you Nick Ior that introduction. Im pleased to be back here at the American Enterprise Institute.
I would like to thank AEI Ior holding this conIerence, and Ior its ongoing commitment to Ireedom Ior
people around the world, including, oI course, North Koreans.
RECENT EVENTS
Quite a lot has happened in regard to North Korea since I last spoke at AEI nearly two years ago. That
was not long aIter a joint statement had been issued six-party talks in September 2005, in which North
Korea promised anew to abandon its nuclear weapons and rejoin the nuclear Non ProliIeration Treaty.
Talks had begun two years earlier aIter it became clear that North Korea had not ended its nuclear
program as required under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Not long aIter the speech, I was making plans
to visit the Kaesong Industrial Complex inside North Korea to assess human rights conditions, when
the regime tested ballistic missiles on July 4, 2006.
I was again considering a trip when the regime conducted a nuclear test that October. Economists teach
us that correlation does not prove causality, but I have remained wary oI announcing Iuture travel to
North Korea Ior Iear oI what might happen next!
About this time last year, the North Korean regime and the other Iive negotiating parties reached the
February 13 agreement, under which North Korea promised the abandonment oI one oI its known
nuclear Iacilities and the Iull disclosure oI all nuclear activities in return Ior economic and energy
assistance and other inducements, including the normalization oI relations. An initial requirement that
North Korea discuss all its nuclear activities within 60 days oI the agreement was not met, and it has
since missed a December 31 deadline to disclose Iully its activities. Recently, the regime said it will
strengthen its war deterrent.
This is rather unIortunate as it signals that North Korea is not serious about disarming in a timely
manner. It is a regrettable development Ior our security, but it is also bad Ior North Korea. It is unlikely
the regime will get Irom the international community a better deal than the current one.
In other recent developments, the Congressional Research Service noted in a study last month that there
are reports Irom reputable sources that North Korea has provided arms and possibly training to
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka two oI the most active terrorist groups
This comes on the heels oI widespread reports that North Korea may have been engaging in nuclear
proliIeration to Syria, which likely prompted the preemptive air strike by Israel Iour months ago.
Taken together, these developments should remind us that North Korea remains one oI the hardest
Ioreign policy problems Ior the U.S. to solve. Its conduct does not appear to be that oI a government
that is willing to come in Irom the cold. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that North Korea will remain
in its present nuclear status when the Administration leaves oIIice in one year.
[deletia]
http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1635,Iilter.all/eventdetail.asp
Washington, DC
January 18, 2008
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: Have you been able to Iigure out what Mr. LeIkowitz was talking about yesterday when
he did his --
QUESTION: Or why he was --
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, I don't know. You can talk to Jay. I don't know iI he'll want to, but let me
make it very clear. He is the envoy Ior issues related to human rights in North Korea. I know Jay is a
very bright, dedicated person, a public servant who has taken on this responsibility on behalI oI the
Secretary oI State. He is not, however, somebody who speaks authoritatively about the six-party talks.
He -- his comments certainly don't represent the views oI the Administration. We believe that the six-
party talks provides a Iorum, a mechanism and an opportunity to realize the goal oI a denuclearized
Korean Peninsula. So I can only say that he must have been expressing his own opinions when he was
speaking about his assessment oI the six-party talks.
QUESTION: Well, he was -- you know, he was asked directly iI he was representing the
Administration position and he kind oI waIIled on that answer.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I can tell you he was not.
QUESTION: But -- well --
MR. MCCORMACK: I can tell you categorically --
QUESTION: You know, considering the --
MR. MCCORMACK: You'll hear the same thing Irom the White House.
QUESTION: Okay. But considering the sensitivity oI this issue and the Iact that the North Koreans
oIten take comments Irom U.S. oIIicials, whether they are speaking authoritatively Ior the
Administration or not, they take them seriously. Is it -- are you worried that this is going to complicate
the whole process?
MR. MCCORMACK: It shouldn't. It shouldn't iI North Korea truly intends to Iollow through on all oI
its commitments to a --
QUESTION: But how do they know what to believe?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, they -- as you would --
QUESTION: You (inaudible) speak about the opaque nature --
QUESTION: -- oI their regime. Well, they don't have anyone here who is looking in you know, they
could say the same thing about you guys.
MR. MCCORMACK: I hear you, Matt, but they read the AP, they tune into CNN and they read reports
Irom your news organizations. So iI you IaithIully report my comments here and accurately reIlect
them, I think they'll get the message.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, so did Mr. LeIkowitz get a little talking-to about --
MR. MCCORMACK: I'm not going to talk about any internal --
QUESTION: Would you expect him to be making comments --
MR. MCCORMACK: (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Would you expect him to make similar -- be making similar comments in the Iuture?
MR. MCCORMACK: I'd be surprised, but again, this is -- there is a Iirst amendment here and one can
express one's own opinion and I have to emphasize that those were his own opinions and not the views
oI the Administration.
QUESTION: Did he make that clear to people in this building today or last evening?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think he understands where we stand on the matter.
QUESTION: Did he seek authorization beIore speaking out like this?
MR. MCCORMACK: Not that I'm -- not that I'm aware oI. Again, let me repeat the only thing that I
can say --
QUESTION: Is he going to in the Iuture?
MR. MCCORMACK: What's that?
QUESTION: Is he going to in the Iuture iI he didn't this time?
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, Arshad, I don't know. You know, I don't know. Look, he has a job to
do and with respect to being the envoy on the issue oI North Korea and human rights. That's his lane.
His lane is not talking about the six-party talks, the status thereoI, his assessment Ior the prospects oI
success. I don't know iI I can make it any more clear than that.
QUESTION: Well, except that he did speak about the six-party talks. So he was out oI his lane?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yes. He was expressing his own opinions.
QUESTION: And can you tell us, has he been told that he was out oI his lane?
MR. MCCORMACK: I'm not going to -- I'm not going to get into that.
QUESTION: Why is that such a sensitive question? I mean, iI you're really trying to convince the
North Koreans that this Administration isn't split down the middle --
QUESTION: -- that there are some hawks who agree with the kind oI John Boltons oI the world who
are Iighting against what Chris Hill is trying to do or arguing against it.
MR. MCCORMACK: All I can tell you is --
QUESTION: You should say -- this guy has been told he was speaking out oI turn.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, Matt, you know, we dont inquire every time your editors yell at you.
(Laughter.) So --
QUESTION: I'd be happy to give you the details oI all --
MR. MCCORMACK: I (inaudible) we would be quite busy, I know.
QUESTION: Well, I'm willing to --
MR. MCCORMACK: (inaudible)
QUESTION: I'd like to share those, iI you're willing to tell me -- (Laughter.)
MR. MCCORMACK: Perhaps we can have a Iuture discussion about that. But let me tell you that iI
you listened to what the President oI the United States says, the Secretary oI State says, and
Ambassador Hill said, those are the people who are involved in the policy process who speak
authoritatively. OI course, you hear Irom people like me as well. Im speaking on behalI oI Secretary
Rice. Those are the people who have -- are sitting at the table making decisions about the policy. And
at the end oI the day, the only voice that matters is that oI the President oI the United States and this is
his policy and I think youll hear that Irom the White House. Yeah.
QUESTION: Well, does Mr. LeIkowitz -- does he still have his job?
MR. MCCORMACK: (Laughter.) He is still the envoy, yes.
QUESTION: For the moment.
MR. MCCORMACK: (Laughter.) Hes still the envoy.
Yeah, Elise.
QUESTION: I mean, were these ideas that hes tried to advance in the Department? Or is this like the
Iirst --
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah. Elise, I dont know. I mean, it doesnt really matter because its --
QUESTION: I mean, are these views that shared that he shared with you?
MR. MCCORMACK: Its irrelevant. Thats not his job. His job is to work on issues related to human
rights in North Korea, not the six-party talks.
QUESTION: Well, part oI his comments are saying that -- listen, were not getting any -- we're not
really going to get anywhere on the nuclear issue. I understand thats not part oI his portIolio. But hes
saying that the issue oI human rights is not in the six-party talks. It should be and this needs to be more
oI a comprehensive dialogue with North Korea on the issue oI human rights. I mean, speciIically on his
portIolio, hes saying that theres not enough attention put to human rights.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. But yeah, I dont think youre going to Iind anybody else who is more
adamant in speaking out about the issue oI human rights in North Korea than the President oI the
United States, Iollowed by a close second by the Secretary oI State. The Iact oI the matter is iI you are
successIul in the six-party talks in reaching a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, you have a much
diIIerent relationship between North Korea and the rest oI the world. And certainly that opens up many,
many diIIerent potential possibilities Ior North Korea as well as the North Korean people, on top oI the
Iact, you have a much more stable security situation in the region. So any idea that somehow this
President and this Secretary oI State are not concerned about human rights in North Korea just couldnt
be Iurther Irom the truth.
QUESTION: So you would reject the idea that in an eIIort to rush to "yes" -- to get a "yes" on the
agreement on security, youre not, you know, kind oI giving them a pass at least Ior the Ioreseeable
Iuture on human rights?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, this is the Iirst time that weve been accused oI rushing the six-party talks.
I think most oI the questions that Ive gotten over the past year in this room have talked about, well,
why is this thing going so slowly. Well, were going through this in a very deliberate way. Were not
lowering the bar Ior anybody and we have made a lot oI progress. We are now to a point where were
breaking new policy ground. You have the North Koreans. They are disabling the Yongbyon Iacility --
never happened beIore. We are working with them on a declaration. They havent yet come Iorward
with a complete declaration, but its still our hope that they will and were going to keep working with
them on that. Once we have that, that is completely a new policy ground. And Irom that point on, you
can think about a lot oI other elements oI that September 2005 agreement that you can implement,
including getting to work on dismantling the entire North Korean nuclear program.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/washington/19korea.html
U.S. Sees Stalling by North Korea on Nuclear Pact
By HELENE COOPER
January 19, 2008
WASHINGTON A debate is under way within the Bush administration over how long it can
exercise patience with North Korea without jeopardizing the IulIillment oI a nuclear agreement that
President Bush has claimed as a Ioreign policy victory.
With North Korea sending signals that it may be trying to wait out Mr. Bushs time in oIIice beIore
making any more concessions, administration oIIicials are grappling with how the United States should
react.
The debate has Iractured along Iamiliar lines, with a handIul oI national security hawks in Vice
President Dick Cheneys oIIice and at the State Department arguing Ior a more conIrontational
approach with Pyongyang.
On the other side, Mr. Bushs lead North Korea nuclear negotiator, Christopher R. Hill, has argued that
the United States should continue a more restrained approach, one that is widely credited with bringing
about an agreement last year that is intended eventually to lead to the denuclearization oI the Korean
peninsula.
While the restrained stance still appears to have support Irom Mr. Bush and Secretary oI State
Condoleezza Rice, it is coming under Iire Irom conservative critics, both in and out oI the
administration.
In a public departure Irom administration policy, Jay LeIkowitz, a conservative lawyer who is Mr.
Bushs envoy on North Korean human rights, said this week the North would likely remain in its
present nuclear status when the next president took over in January 2009.
North Korea is not serious about disarming in a timely manner, Mr. LeIkowitz told an audience at the
American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank. We should consider a new approach to North
Korea.
At issue is a declaration that North Korea was supposed to make by the end oI last year Iormally stating
everything in its nuclear inventory. When the North missed that deadline, administration oIIicials
initially sought to minimize the signiIicance oI the lapse, but they have expressed increasing concern in
the wake oI a North Korean statement on Jan. 4, in which the North insisted that it had already
disclosed everything that it needed to.
The North has cited a list oI nuclear programs that it provided in November, but the United States has
rejected the list as incomplete.
Some people make the argument that were just pursuing a policy oI talks that go nowhere, said one
administration oIIicial with knowledge oI the debate within the administration.
John R. Bolton, the Iormer United States ambassador to the United Nations, argued in a Wall Street
Journal op-ed article last week that the Bush administration should dump the nuclear pact with North
Korea because, he said, Pyongyang was not interested in giving up its nuclear program. Theyre in the
classic North Korean role oI deception, Mr. Bolton said in an interview. Its like groundhog day;
weve lived through this beIore.
Mr. Bush said the two countries needed to resolve three sticking points: the number oI warheads that
North Korea has built; the amount oI weapons-grade nuclear material produced by North Korea; and
the need Ior North Korea to disclose that it has passed nuclear material to others.
The proliIeration issue has taken on new importance aIter an Israeli strike in Syria in September, which
American and Israeli oIIicials said was conducted against a nuclear Iacility near the Euphrates River
that was supplied with material Irom North Korea. Administration oIIicials want North Korea to
disclose what help it may have given Syria, although they also say that the help came beIore the North
agreed to dismantle its nuclear reactor and disclose its nuclear programs.
Mr. Bolton and other critics oI the agreement, including the oIIicials in Mr. Cheneys oIIice, never
liked the pact to begin with, and advocates oI the deal with North Korea say their second-guessing is
expected.
They argue that the Bush administrations previous conIrontational strategy with North Korea is part oI
what led to the Norths detonation oI a nuclear device in October 2006.
Besides the United States and North Korea, the other parties to the nuclear pact include China, South
Korea, Japan and Russia.
People lambaste the six-party process, and sure, it oIIers no reIuge Ior those in need oI instant
gratiIication, Mr. Hill, the negotiator, said in an interview. But when asked Ior alternatives to the
nuclear pact, Mr. Hill said, even the noisiest critics Iall silent.
Administration oIIicials say that the North has remained true to one part oI the October agreement: It
has made great strides in disabling and dismantling its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Bush can say,
with credit, that he has achieved more than any other administration as Iar as dismantlement, said
Gary Samore, a vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations who helped negotiate the Clinton
administrations 1994 agreement with North Korea. He can say that he managed to Ireeze Iurther
production, and handed the next administration a diplomatic process.
But Bush administration oIIicials say that they want more than just dismantlement on their record, and
insist that they have not written oII their chances oI getting North Korea to make a complete
declaration oI its nuclear programs beIore the end oI the administration.
Bush oIIicials say they will not ultimately be able to veriIy that North Korea has got rid oI its nuclear
weapons program unless they Iirst know what is in the program.
The issue oI the declaration is important because that which they declare must later be abandoned, a
senior administration oIIicial said.
The oIIicial, who asked that his name not be used because he was not authorized to speak publicly on
the issue, said that the administration really wanted North Korea to provide an explanation Ior
purchasing aluminum tubes that could be used to convert uranium gas into nuclear Iuel.
In its Jan. 4 statement, North Korea accused the United States and the other countries in the six-party
talks oI reneging on promises made under an October deal, including the shipment oI one million tons
oI Iuel and the removal oI North Korea Irom the United States list oI states that sponsored terrorism.
So Iar, North Korea has received about 150,000 tons oI Iuel, and Bush administration oIIicials say the
removal oI the North Irom the terrorism list will depend on whether it meets the requirements oI the
October deal.
North Korea agreed in October to dismantle its nuclear Iacilities and to disclose all oI its past and
present nuclear programs by the end oI 2007 in return Ior 950,000 metric tons oI Iuel oil or its
equivalent in economic aid. Last month, Mr. Bush reached out directly Ior the Iirst time to the North
Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, holding out the prospect oI normalized relations with the United States iI
North Korea Iully disclosed all nuclear programs and got rid oI its nuclear weapons.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/01/99527.htm
BrieIing En route Berlin, Germany
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
En route Berlin, Germany
January 22, 2008
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: Can I ask about bilats (inaudible)? Do you get the sense that the Chinese and the Russians
are conIused at all about (inaudible) the Administration's position on North Korea aIter Mr. LeIkowitz's
comments?
SECRETARY RICE: Since Jay LeIkowitz has nothing to do with the six-party talks and I would doubt
very seriously that they would recognize the name, no, I don't think they're conIused.
QUESTION: You don't think the Chinese (inaudible)?
SECRETARY RICE: No.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) a Boston Journal editorial page doesn't (inaudible) suggested that he was
(inaudible) the Administration.
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can tell you in no uncertain terms that he wasn't. He's the human rights
envoy. That's what he knows. That's what he does. He doesn't work on the six-party talks. He doesn't
know what's going on in the six-party talks and he certainly has no say in what American policy will be
in the six-party talks.
QUESTION: (OII-mike.)
SECRETARY RICE: And by the way, the President has spoken as to what our policy is in the six-party
talks. I think that's what --
QUESTION: (OII-mike.)
SECRETARY RICE: I know where the President stands and I know where I stand and those are the
people who speak Ior American policy.

Ex-U.S. envoy Bolton: Chance Bush will strike Iran near 'zero'
By Yuval Azoulay and Haaretz Service
Last update - 20:03 22/01/2008

Former U.S. ambassador to the UN John Bolton said on Tuesday that there is almost no chance that
U.S. President George W. Bush will approve a military strike on Iran beIore he leaves oIIice in January
2009.
"It's close to zero percent chance that the Bush Administration will authorize military action against
Iran beIore leaving oIIice," he said.
Bolton addressed the Herzliya ConIerence oI the Institute Ior Policy and Strategy, as part oI a panel
discussion on Iran's nuclear program.
He said the recent American intelligence assessment, according to which Iran halted its nuclear
program in 2003, was a politically-motivated report intended to restrict the Bush Administration's room
to maneuver.
"It seems that Ior the next Iew years the United States will be a bystander to the process," Bolton said.
Bolton also said that Israel's "stunningly successIul" military strike on Syria last September could
constitute a precedent Ior a similar attack on Iran in the Iuture.
The Israel Air Force attacked a structure in northeast Syria that Ioreign media reports said was a
nuclear Iacility built with North Korean assistance. Syria and North Korea both denied the reports, and
Israel has remained silent. Bolton had warned oI nuclear cooperation between the two countries beIore
the strike.
"Why wouldn't the government oI Israel want to take the credit Ior a stunningly successIul military
strike?" Bolton asked.
Bolton said Israel and the United States know very well that Syria's close relations with North Korea
have not been severed, but reIused to elaborate. He said North Korea might sell nuclear know-how and
a ready-to-use nuclear bomb to the highest bidder.
"The proliIeration oI nuclear weapons in the middle east will start with North Korea. It counterIeits
money, sells narcotics, and it will do anything Ior hard money," he said.
He insisted that Syria's nuclear eIIorts should be taken with the utmost seriousness, as North Korean
expertise and Iranian willingness to Iund are more available than ever.
He insisted that it be made known to the public that the Iacility that was hit was an oIIshoot oI a joint
Syrian, North Korean, and Iranian cooperation.
http://www.israelenews.com/view.asp?ID779
Bolton: Israel May Have to Strike Iran Soon
On: Thursday, January 24, 2008 - By: Israel e News
[EXCERPT]
Former US ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said on Monday [2008-01-21] that Israel
may have to take military action to prevent its archIoe Iran Irom acquiring an atomic bomb.
Bolton also said that Iurther UN sanctions against the Islamic republic will be ineIIective in stopping
Iran's controversial nuclear programme which Israel and the US believe is aimed at developing a bomb
-- a claim denied by Tehran.

"One can say with some assurance that in the next year the use oI Iorce by the United States is highly
unlikely," Bolton told AFP on the sidelines oI the Herzliya conIerence on the balance oI Israel's
national security.

"That increases the pressure on Israel in that period oI time... iI it Ieels Iran is on the verge oI acquiring
that capability, it brings the decision point home to use Iorce," he said.
The hawkish Iormer diplomat said that aIter a US intelligence report published late last year that
claimed Iran had suspended a nuclear weapons programme in 2003, the US was unlikely to take
military action against it.

"The pressure is on Israel now aIter the National Intelligence Estimate because, I think, the likelihood
oI American use oI Iorce has been dramatically reduced," he said.

Ambassador Bolton devoted the Iirst part oI his speech to an attempt to push the Israeli press into
revealing details oI the strike against the suspected Syrian nuclear Iacility Iour months ago. "There is a
lot that we don't know about the Iacility because oI the veil oI secrecy that the Israel government and
the American government have tried to throw over it," he said.

"We don't know Ior example exactly what the Iacility was whether it was a clone oI the Yongbyon
reactor; whether it was a uranium enrichment Iacility; whether it was a storage location Ior North
Korean plutonium or plutonium based weapons," he added, and explained that he could speak Ireely at
the conIerence because the American Constitution's First Amendment applied to him even when he
was abroad (this elicited laughter Irom the audience).

Bolton calls Israeli press 'timid'

Bolton went on to list his conjectures: "We don't know iI it was North Korea in eIIect renting space in
Syria to recreate the North Korean program. We don't know iI it was a sale oI technology or equipment
Irom North Korea directly to Syria and we don't know whether it was a joint venture perhaps between
Syria and North Korea working together," he said. "Our governments, however, do know the answers
to some oI these questions."

He continued with a jab at Israel's media: "What I don't understand really is the timid nature oI the
Israeli press which I know knows a lot more about this strike than it's been willing to talk about. I am
sure somewhere in the Israeli press there is a John Peter Zengler who is willing to risk something in
order to give the public more inIormation about this."

John Peter Zengler was an 18th century publisher who was arrested Ior libelous sedition aIter printing
criticism oI the governor oI New York and then acquitted, in what is considered a landmark trial in the
development oI the Ireedom oI the press in the U.S.

Bolton explained that this inIormation is being withheld Ior Iear that iI it came out that North Korea
once again, Iollowing its game plan, was engaged in nuclear proliIeration contrary to its obligations, it
would embarrass the U.S. which is seeking ways to back oII oI North Korea.

Iran 'noticed' IAF raid

Regarding the IAF Syria raid, Bolton said: "The daring and successIul Israeli military strike has
obvious signiIicance Ior the potential oI a military strike against Iran's nuclear program. I think, given
the debacle caused by our National Intelligence Estimate, that it's close to zero likelihood that President
Bush will authorize use oI military Iorce against Iran's program beIore he leaves oIIice, absent some
dramatic new development."

He concluded: "Certainly in Teheran you can bet that they took careIul notice oI what the Israeli
DeIense Force did. Penetrating Russian supplied radars very similar to the air deIenses that Teheran
has; using techniques that could be very useIul Ior a long range strike against Iran; this is the kind oI
operation that the Iranians need to continue to worry about. Because I think with the collapse oI
American policy, the Israeli strike against the Syrian / North Korea Iacility is the harbinger oI what
may be absent regime change in Teheran the last resort Unless you are prepared to see Iran
proceed unmolested toward a nuclear weapons capability, which this NIE has given them Iree rein to
do in my judgment, you are coming very close to a decision point in this country oI whether you will
use military Iorce to stop Iran."
[deletia]
Gonzalo R. Gallegos, Director, OIIice oI Press Relations
Washington, DC
January 22, 2008
|EXCERPT|
QUESTION: Do you on North Korea, theyre saying in a newspaper commentary that the U.S. is
dragging its Ieet on its commitments to the nuclear deal and saying the U.S. is slowing progress on the
deal.
MR. GALLEGOS: Yeah. Well, I have something on that. The U.S. has met and is meeting its
commitments. As part oI the February 13 agreement, the United States agreed to begin the process oI
removing the designation oI North Korea as a state sponsor oI terrorism. We also agreed to advance the
process oI terminating the application oI the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea. Criteria Ior
removing a countrys designation as a state sponsor oI terrorism and liIting the application oI the Trade
with the Enemy Act Trading with the Enemy Act are set Iorth in U.S. law. The U.S. action related to
the terrorism designation and the Trading with the Enemy Act application are dependent on the on
North Koreas IulIillment oI the requirements
oI U.S. law and its progress on addressing concerns on the nuclear issue and meeting its
denuclearization commitments.
QUESTION: Is there any risk to this turning into a riIt?
MR. GALLEGOS: Were going to continue working with our close allies, Japan and South Korea, and
our partners China and Russia, as well as North Korea, to deliver a complete and correct declaration oI
all its nuclear programs, including its nuclear weapons and programs, Iacilities and proliIeration
activities and to complete the agreed disablement activities at the three core Iacilities at Yongbyon.
Were going to make --
QUESTION: Is there any
MR. GALLEGOS: Weve been very clear in the past where we stand on this. Our policy has not
changed. Were going to continue.
January 23, 2008
1:49 P.M. EST
[EXCERPT]
Q Regarding the removal in North Korea Irom the list oI terrorist states, what is the United States
government -- (inaudible) --
MS. PERINO: Well, regarding whether or not North Korea will be removed Irom the State Sponsor oI
Terrorism list, Iirst and Ioremost, the ball is in North Korea's court right now. The agreement that we
made with them is that there would be actions Ior actions. And right now, we are waiting on North
Korea to release -- or to give to us their complete and accurate declaration oI all oI their nuclear
activities, including proliIeration activities. We don't have that yet Irom them; thereIore, there's not any
movement on any oI the other parts oI the agreement. So that's where we are right now. The ball is in
their court. We are waiting Ior them.
Q That answer suggests, Dana, that the decision about whether to remove North Korea Irom the terror
list is contingent on a quid pro quo, rather than on the merits oI whether they should be on the list or
not.
MS. PERINO: That's not what I was suggesting. So -- oI course, there's a lot oI Iactors that go into the
President's decision as to whether or not to remove a country Irom the State Sponsor oI Terrorism list.
But where we are right now at this moment is waiting Ior North Korea to give to us their complete and
accurate declaration that they said they would give to us last February.
Q So you're not concerned, Ior example, about the prospect that North Korea was proliIerating with
Syria --
MS. PERINO: I said that all oI those activities -- nuclear activities, proliIeration, et cetera, and I'm not
commenting on anything speciIic, but all oI those activities have to be disclosed.
Q They're not anywhere close to being removed, then?
MS. PERINO: I would say it's deIinitely not imminent. And so we need to have that declaration beIore
we could even talk about any next steps.
Q Thank you.
END 2:11 P.M. EST
Syria strike invoked in Olmert's defense
One oI Ehud Olmert's conIidants invoked last year's Israeli air strike in Syria as prooI oI the prime
minister's military mettle.
Vice Premier Haim Ramon was asked in a Channel Ten television interview broadcast Wednesday
[2008-01-23] about the government's decision-making on security issues, a topic oI pressing public
interest ahead oI next week's publication oI an inquiry's Iinal report on the setbacks oI the Second
Lebanon War.
"You all heard, Irom Ioreign sources, what happened at the beginning oI September in Syria," Ramon
said.
"The process oI decision-making ahead oI the event was, according to everyone involved in it,
extraordinary - in terms oI deliberations, organization, preparation, and considering the alternatives."
Israel issued a blanket gag on descriptions oI the Sept. 6 bombing run, Iorcing local media to rely on
Ioreign reports that suggested the target was a nascent Syrian nuclear reactor.
Though he stopped short oI conIirming this, Ramon's remarks - the most expansive by any Israeli
oIIicial - drew charges that he was exploiting classiIied inIormation in a bid to boost popular support
Ior Olmert and oII-set the criticism oI the Winograd Commission oI inquiry.

Olmert expresses surprise over Ramon's Syria remarks
Published: 01.24.08, 17:21 / Israel News
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says he was surprised about Vice Premier Haim Ramon's remarks
regarding Israel's strike on a Syrian site last year. In an interview to Channel 10 Wednesday, Ramon
praised the decision-making process that led to the operation.

"I was surprised by Ramon's words. They were not coordinated with me," Olmert said Iollowing a tour
oI the Arava region. (Roni SoIer)
http://www.cIr.org/publication/15340/samore.html?
Samore: North Korea May Delay Nuclear Treaty Implementation Until 2009
Interviewee:
Gary Samore, Vice President, Director oI Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair
Interviewer:
Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor
January 25, 2008
Gary Samore, an arms control oIIicial in the Clinton administration, says the prevailing view in the
Bush administration is that North Korea is unlikely to carry out the terms oI the international nuclear
disarmament agreement it signed in February 2007 until there is a new president in the White House.
He says U.S. oIIicials believe that the North Koreans are certainly not, in the remainder oI this year,
going to give up their nuclear weapons.
Theres been a certain amount of public confusion over whether North Korea is complying with
the agreement it made at the Six-Party Talks last year, to close down the Yongbyon reactor and
also provide full declaration of its past nuclear activities by last December 31 and eventually to
close down all these activities. Whats causing this confusion?
You have to separate the two steps that North Korea was required to take. The Iirst step was to disable
the nuclear Iacilities at Yongbyon. North Korea, in Iact, has taken most oI the steps required to disable
the Iive-megawatt reactor. So it would not be easy Ior North Korea to resume production oI plutonium.
At the same time it appears that the reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon Iacility is still intact, so in
theory, iI the North Koreans wanted to play hardball, iI they wanted to create a crisis, they could
reprocess the spent Iuel they already have on hand to recover enough plutonium Ior a weapon or two.
They still have a threat in their arsenal even though the Iive-megawatt reactor has been pretty much
disabled.
Werent they supposed to close down the reprocessing plant too?
Yes, part oI the agreement is to disable both the reactor and the reprocessing Iacility. But the North
Koreans have slowed down the disablement, in part because they are complaining that the heavy Iuel
oil, which they are getting paid in return Ior disabling the Iacilities, has been slow in coming. In part,
this is because the second step oI the process, the nuclear declaration, has completely gone oII the
rail. When Christopher Hill, the assistant secretary oI state Ior East Asian and PaciIic aIIairs, was in
Pyongyang in November, he was shown a draIt declaration by the North Koreans. Hill told them that
the declaration was completely inadequate in terms oI the amount oI plutonium that it declared, in
terms oI its explanation oI North Koreas secret uranium enrichment, and in terms oI what the North
said about possible nuclear exports to Syria. Hill told the North Koreans that unless they gave him a
more credible, plausible declaration he would not be able to sell it back in Washington. In return Ior a
plausible declaration, the United States has promised to take North Korea oII the list oI state sponsors
oI terrorism. The process is stuck now because North Korea has not given Hill a plausible declaration.
Is there a new deadline?
I dont think the administration wants to set a deadline. It is hoping that when the new South Korean
government takes oIIice in Februarythe new president-elect, Lee Myung-bak, has campaigned on a
platIorm oI being tougher with North Koreathat this might inIluence the North Koreans to make a
more Iorthcoming declaration. That remains to be seen. It may be that the North Koreans have decided
they are just going to Ireeze the process and wait until the next U.S.president takes oIIice and then
resume the negotiations. They may come Iorward with a more Iorthcoming declaration in the hopes oI
getting oII the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism. Or they might, iI they want to escalate, threaten to stop
the disablement process and to actually separate plutonium Irom the spent Iuel they have on hand. They
have options in Iront oI them.
In an article by nuclear experts David Albright and Jacqueline Shire that appeared in the
Washington Post on Thursday [January 24, 2008], they said that North Korea had revealed that
it had a separated plutonium stockpile of thirty kilograms and denied that it had a uranium
enrichment program. Were the North Koreans that specific?
Thats my understanding. The problem is that |chieI U.S. negotiator| Chris Hill was expecting a much
bigger number. Privately he has been saying the number would be closer to sixty. The natural question
is why did the North Koreans come in with a very low number? David Albright is right; thirty
kilograms is still within the range, because we dont know oI course how much plutonium they actually
have, but its at the lower end oI the range. The natural suspicion is that North Korea has deliberately
given us a low number so they can hide the other twenty or thirty kilograms that they have. Chris Hill
just thought that thirty kilograms wasnt credible enough to take back to Washington. On the uranium-
enrichment side, we know that we have extremely good inIormation that the North Koreans were out
trying to buy large quantities oI specialized materials oI components Ior enrichment programs.
Some oI their eIIorts to buy this specialty material were intercepted and stopped mid-shipment. We
know that they were trying to buy very large quantities; enough Ior thousands oI centriIuges. For the
North Koreans to come back and say we didnt really have an enrichment program just is not
plausible.
This is the issue which halted the North Korea-U.S. talks in 2002, wasnt it?
Absolutely. The CIA |Central Intelligence Agency| concluded that North Korea was cheating on the
Agreed Framework, signed by the Clinton administration in 1994, by pursuing the secret enrichment
program. That judgment was correct. What we dont know is how Iar that program went. We know that
North Korea got a small quantity oI centriIuge machines Irom Pakistan. We know that they were out
trying to buy much larger quantities oI raw material, which would allow them to reverse engineer and
build thousands oI centriIuge machines. But how Iar that program proceeded and what the status is
now, we just dont know. Unless North Korea comes Iorward with a more plausible explanation rather
than just denying everything, then the whole process oI an accurate declaration is at a standstill.
If they dont comply then they dont get the oil?
No, theres a separation Ior disablement oI Yongbyon, Ior which they are getting the oil, and the
declaration, Ior which they would be taken oII the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism. In theory, the
process could be on hold Ior the rest oI this year. As long as they dont reverse disablement, they would
continue to get paid the heavy Iuel oil.
What do they still have to do on disablement?
My understanding is they have done most oI what needs to be done on the Iive-megawatt reactor.
Theres still a question oI how to dispose oI the existing spent Iuel, which has to be removed Irom the
reactor and stored in a cooling pond right on site. As I understand it, they still have to take some steps
to disable the reprocessing Iacility but thats on the very end oI the list. My guess is that the North
Koreans are holding that in reserve as it allows them to threaten to resume reprocessing.
Lets talk about Jay Lefkowitz, who is a human rights ambassador on North Korea. He says the
North Koreans are not going to comply and its all a failure by the Bush administration. What do
you make of his comments?
He said publicly what a lot oI administration oIIicials believe privatelythat the North Koreans are
certainly not, in the remainder oI this year, going to give up their nuclear weapons. And it looks like
they may not even submit a credible declaration, in which case the whole process would stop. In that
case, the next administration would have to pick the whole issue up.
Do you think the North Koreans now figure they should wait for the next administration?
Everybody in Asia is beginning to think beyond the Bush administration, and in the view oI all the
important playersChina, South Korea, Japan and North Koreathe Bush administration has very
little time leIt in order to make much more progress with the North Koreans. That doesnt mean it is all
over. It is still possible that the North Koreans would make a credible declaration, in which case, the
United States would remove them Irom the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, and the next steps in the
process would begin, which would include negotiations Ior a peace treaty, and negotiations Ior the
dismantlement and removal oI North Koreas nuclear weapons. But the longer this stalemate goes on,
the more and more it looks like the North Koreans might have decided they would be better oII trying
to make a deal with the next administration.
Thats one subject that most candidates seem to have avoided speaking about. I know they all
have prepared statements.
Its true. What is interesting is that the Democrats are more sympathetic and supportive oI the new
approach the Bush administration has taken than the Republican candidates. At least in the past,
Senator John McCain |R-AZ| has been very critical oI this kind oI approach which the Clinton
administration began in trying to negotiate these kinds oI incremental arms-control agreements with
North Korea. So my guess is that Senator McCain is not very sympathetic with what President Bush
has done, but there is very little value in raising this issue as long as the situation seems to be under
control. It is certainly not a crisis that any oI the candidates have to address.
Do we know for sure how many nuclear weapons North Korea possesses?
We can guesstimate based on our estimates oI how much plutonium they have and how much would be
required Ior each weapon. Those are the two variables. It is reasonable to say that they have something
on the order oI less than a dozen weapons unless they have some sources oI plutonium that we dont
know about.
What kinds of weapons are these?
These would be simple weapons.
Missile warheads?
It is another uncertainty. We dont know iI the North Koreans can build warheads small enough to be
delivered by the No-dong missile. Thats an interesting issue because we know that the Pakistani bomb
will Iit on the No-dong missile. Thats why Pakistan bought the No-dong missile. The question which
has never been Iully answered is whether in addition to providing centriIuge technology, the Pakistanis
might have provided nuclear-warhead technology to North Korea, in which case the North Koreans
would have in their possession the nuclear design that is capable oI being delivered by missile. Thats
just speculation. We dont know the answer.
What about the Syrian connectionthe secret Israeli bombing of a facility in Syria, said to have
been put together with North Korean help?
I still hear diIIerent things. The Israelis are absolutely convinced that they bombed a nuclear reactor
under construction and that the North Koreans were providing technical assistance and material Ior that
project. Some people in the U.S. administration accept that. Others are more skeptical and say it was a
kind oI military Iacility but whether it was nuclear is really in doubt. Amazingly enough, unlike most
situations, not enough has come out in the public domain to make an independent judgment. The
people who are reviewing the actual evidence are not talking.
White House Mulls Giving North Korea Some Wiggle Room on Nuke Declaration
Friday, January 25, 2008
By James Rosen
WASHINGTON With North Korea almost a month overdue on its obligation to provide a complete
and correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs and materiel, the Bush administration under
increasing pressure Irom American conservatives to take a harder line with Pyongyang, or abandon the
talks altogether is now considering accepting a declaration that would be less than complete, carving
out the two most contentious issues Ior later resolution, sources told FOX News.
The Ioreign diplomatic sources, representing countries involved in the six-party nuclear disarmament
talks with North Korea a group oI nations that includes the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and South
Korea told FOX News that the U.S. envoy to the talks, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill,
has Iloated the idea oI allowing the North Koreans to exclude Irom their declaration both their highly
enriched uranium (HEU) program and their nuclear collaboration with Syria, with the understanding
that these issues would be revisited later.
However, Hill said the idea he is considering accepting a less-than-complete declaration Irom
Pyongyang is "completely inaccurate." Such an option, Hill told FOX News in an e-mail message, "has
never been under consideration."
The sources said such a less-than-complete declaration would mirror the very proposal made by the
North Koreans in November, at which U.S. negotiators scoIIed, dismissing the incomplete submission
as mere "research" instead oI a real declaration. But the North Koreans have since "put their Ioot
down," said an American analyst Iamiliar with the Bush administration's internal deliberations, and
made clear their intention to withhold the declaration unless and until the U.S. capitulates swiItly on
one oI North Korea's key demands: that the country be removed, or "de-listed," Irom the State
Department's list oI nations that sponsor terrorism, where North Korea has had a spot since 1988. As
another sign oI Pyongyang's hardening position, analysts point to its recent and abrupt cancellation oI a
planned working group meeting between North and South Korean oIIicials on the establishment oI a
rail line between the two Koreas.
In private talks, FOX News has learned, the North Koreans have also claimed that none oI the three
written agreements negotiated in the six-party process neither the landmark September 19, 2005
agreement nor the implementation accords oI February 13 and October 3, 2007 requires the North to
declare any activities with regard to proliIeration with countries like Syria. The text oI the September
19 agreement committed the North only to "returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-
ProliIeration oI Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA saIeguards," nuclear accords Irom which the North has
Iormally withdrawn but which, iI observed, would bar the North Irom covertly exporting nuclear
technology. Likewise, in the text oI the October 3 implementation accord, North Korea committed not
to "transIer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how beyond its borders." However, by that point,
the suspected nuclear Iacility in Syria that was allegedly built with North Korean assistance had already
been targeted by the Israeli Air Force and apparently destroyed.
"This is a matter oI interpretation," said one Ioreign diplomat. But American conservatives,
predictably, do not see it this way, and have Iorecast a "wild" eruption on Capitol Hill iI North Korea is
taken oII the terrorism list despite having covertly exported nuclear technology to Syria, another
country on the State Department's terror list. These critics oI Assistant Secretary Hill's approach
which sources say has the Iull backing oI Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice cite the post-9/11
Bush Doctrine, which was perhaps most succinctly articulated by President Bush on September 25,
2001, during a joint appearance at the White House with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi:
"|I|I you harbor a terrorist, iI you aid a terrorist, iI you hide terrorists, you're just as guilty as the
terrorists." Thus North Korea cannot have earned the right to be de-listed, these critics argue, iI it has
"aided" a Iellow terror-sponsoring state like Syria, let alone by providing it with nuclear technology.
A Ioreign diplomat suggested that the idea oI carving out the HEU program and Syrian issue Ior later
resolution will not Ily because oI the strong opposition it will encounter among American
conservatives. "These two issues got too much publicity here," the diplomat said.
As recently as January 7, when he was visiting Tokyo, Assistant Secretary Hill appeared utterly
unwilling to accept an incomplete declaration Irom North Korea, saying "complete means complete
We can't go with something that's 80 percent or 90 percent. We really need to go with something that's
complete." The Japanese, whose top priority in the six-party Talks has been to determine the status oI
roughly two-dozen Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea over the past two decades, typically take
the hardest line with Pyongyang, and are keen to see the North remain on the U.S. terror list until the
abductions issue is Iully resolved.
Yet on the same trip, just three days later, during a stop in Beijing, China the North's chieI patron
and ally in the talks Hill hinted at a sudden willingness to accept an incomplete declaration, iI only
to restore momentum to the stalemated six-party process. Because the North Koreans' original
submission contained "some glaring omissions," Hill told reporters on January 10, the U.S. considered
whether to "invite them to submit an incorrect and incomplete declaration and then start haggling over
that. But instead we chose to continue the discussion with the idea that when they do produce a
declaration, it ought to be pretty close to being Iinal."
Besides the expected backlash Irom domestic conservatives within the Bush administration and on
Capitol Hill, secretaries Rice and Hill Iace three major problems in their eIIorts to move beyond the
impasse over the North Korean declaration. First, according to one Ioreign diplomat, is that the North
"does not trust the U.S. promises," particularly on the de-listing issue.
Second is the clock: A number oI sources contacted by FOX News suggested North Korea is
determined to wait out the end oI the Bush administration, in the hope, as one American analyst put it,
that "another Madeleine Albright will come to Pyongyang and start toasting champagne glasses" with
the regime oI Kim Jong Il. This notion was most IorceIully expressed in recent days by Jay LeIkowitz,
the State Department human rights envoy who told the American Enterprise Institute on January 17
that North Korea is "not serious about disarming in a timely manner" remarks that earned swiIt and
unusually severe repudiation Irom State Department spokesmen and Secretary Rice herselI.
A third problem, and perhaps the most serious, is that Washington's allies in the six-party process have
grown openly skeptical about the reliability oI American intelligence on the North's HEU program and
its collaboration with Syria and other rogue states. This skepticism is borne oI the celebrated
intelligence Iailure with regard to Iraq's WMD programs, and, too, the seeming about-Iace, on the issue
oI Iran's nuclear program, contained in the National Intelligence Estimate released December 2. "II the
U.S. shared its inIormation regarding the North Korean nuclear programs with the other parties |in the
six-party process|," said one Ioreign diplomat, "and all agree it is really strong evidence, then it would
be much easier to get the North to conIess."
This diplomat also pointed to the public acknowledgment by senior Bush administration oIIicials in
early 2007 that their conIidence in the U.S. intelligence data showing that North Korea was pursuing an
HEU program had been downgraded Irom "high" to "at least moderate."
A Conversation With Ehud Barak
By Lally Weymouth
Saturday, January 26, 2008; A17
[EXCERPTS]
Newsweek-The Post's Lally Weymouth interviewed Israeli DeIense Minister Ehud Barak in Davos,
Switzerland, this week. Excerpts:
Can you say anything about the raid that Israel waged into Syria, supposedly against a nuclear
facility, last September?
No.
Do you think that the Syrian track should be pursued?
I think that we have shown . . . a respect Ior Syria, its interests and its leaders. We expect Irom them to
do the same regarding Israel. II this basic kind oI element will be there, I think a Syrian track is . . .
potentially positive.
I thought the U.S. has opposed Israel negotiating with Syria.
I think they realized in recent years that we understand the Syrian issue better.
KCNA Ridicules U.S. Mandarin's Reckless Remarks
Pyongyang, January 28 (KCNA) -- Some days ago, LeIkowitz, special envoy Ior North Korean
human rights issue oI the U.S., was impudent enough to poke his nose into the nuclear issue, only to
bring shame to himselI.
What he uttered is nothing but rubbish which admits oI no argument as it only provoked wry
laughter.
But what merits attention here is that some American guys who do not know even where they stand,
to say nothing oI the way the world goes, are watching Ior a chance to scuttle the processes to settle the
nuclear issue and improve the DPRK-U.S. relations, displeased with them.
According to the International Herald Tribune, a Iew hard-line oIIicials in charge oI national security
at the oIIice oI the vice-president and the State Department were reported to have asserted a more
conIrontational approach towards the DPRK.
It was in this context that LeIkowitz underlined the need to include the human rights issue in the
agenda items oI the six-party talks and complained that China and south Korea are not pressurizing
north Korea at the American Enterprise Institute, a center oI conservatives.
This assertion was, in every respect, prompted by a dangerous attempt to sacriIice the process Ior the
denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula directly related to the interests oI the U.S. and other countries
concerned and the peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia Ior meeting their selIish purpose as it is a
revelation oI their extreme uneasiness created by their impending political bankruptcy.
As well known, the U.S. conservative hardliners led by neo-conservatives are now seized with
extreme uneasiness and anxiety, marginalized in the political arena Ior the catastrophic consequences
entailed by their extreme and subjective way oI thinking.
They have neither anything new nor Iuture.
LeIkowitz, Bolton and others are keen to misuse the process Ior the denuclearization oI the Korean
Peninsula Ior achieving their political ambition under the slogan oI hard-line and conservative policy
which has already proven bankrupt inside the U.S. Nothing is graver mistake and crime against history
than this.
The hackneyed methods used by the U.S. during the Cold War will never work on the DPRK
although they may work on others. The six-party talks cannot be treated the same as the "Helsinki
process" under any circumstances.

The agreements reached at the six-party talks on the principle oI simultaneous action and progress
made in this course are welcomed by all countries. LeIkowitz and others who seek to scuttle them
cannot escape public censure and jeer.
The reality goes to prove that the negotiated settlement oI the nuclear issue remains the general will
oI the international community and the trend oI the times.
We would like to question them what they really seek by turning back the clock.
Such nonsensical remarks would never help stem the trend oI the times.
Now that the denuclearization process has reached an important phase the U.S. should reIrain Irom
irresponsible remarks that may deIlect it Irom its Iocus and countries concerned should thoroughly
abide by the principle oI "action Ior action."
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/11/080211IaIacthersh
ILLUSTRATION: GUY BILLOUT
Israel and the U.S. have avoided comment on
press reports about a nuclear facility.
Annals oI National Security
A Strike in the Dark
What did Israel bomb in Syria?
by Seymour M. Hersh
February 11, 2008
[Accessed 2008-02-04T15:40Z]
Sometime aIter midnight on September 6, 2007, at least Iour low-Ilying Israeli Air Force Iighters
crossed into Syrian airspace and carried out a secret bombing mission on the banks oI the Euphrates
River, about ninety miles north oI the Iraq border. The seemingly unprovoked bombing, which came
aIter months oI heightened tension between Israel and Syria over military exercises and troop buildups
by both sides along the Golan Heights, was, by almost any deIinition, an act oI war. But in the
immediate aItermath nothing was heard Irom the government oI Israel. In contrast, in 1981, when the
Israeli Air Force destroyed Iraqs Osirak nuclear reactor, near Baghdad, the Israeli government was
triumphant, releasing reconnaissance photographs oI the strike and permitting the pilots to be widely
interviewed.
Within hours oI the attack, Syria denounced Israel Ior invading its airspace, but its public statements
were incomplete and contradictorythus adding to the mystery. A Syrian military spokesman said
only that Israeli planes had dropped some munitions in an unpopulated area aIter being challenged by
Syrian air deIenses, which Iorced them to Ilee. Four days later, Walid Moallem, the Syrian Ioreign
minister, said during a state visit to Turkey that the Israeli aircraIt had used live ammunition in the
attack, but insisted that there were no casualties or property damage. It was not until October 1st that
Syrian President Bashar Assad, in an interview with the BBC, acknowledged that the Israeli warplanes
had hit their target, which he described as an unused military building. Assad added that Syria
reserved the right to retaliate, but his comments were muted.
Despite oIIicial silence in Tel Aviv (and in Washington), in the days aIter the bombing the American
and European media were Ilooded with reports, primarily based on inIormation Irom anonymous
government sources, claiming that Israel had destroyed a nascent nuclear reactor that was secretly
being assembled in Syria, with the help oI North Korea. Beginning construction oI a nuclear reactor in
secret would be a violation oI Syrias obligations under the Nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty, and
could potentially yield material Ior a nuclear weapon.
The evidence was circumstantial but seemingly damning. The Iirst reports oI Syrian and North Korean
nuclear coperation came on September 12th in the Times and elsewhere. By the end oI October, the
various media accounts generally agreed on Iour points: the Israeli intelligence community had learned
oI a North Korean connection to a construction site in an agricultural area in eastern Syria; three days
beIore the bombing, a North Korean ship, identiIied as the Al Hamed, had arrived at the Syrian port
oI Tartus, on the Mediterranean; satellite imagery strongly suggested that the building under
construction was designed to hold a nuclear reactor when completed; as such, Syria had crossed what
the Israelis regarded as the red line on the path to building a bomb, and had to be stopped. There
were also reportsby ABC News and othersthat some oI the Israeli intelligence had been shared in
advance with the United States, which had raised no objection to the bombing.
The Israeli government still declined to make any statement about the incident. Military censorship on
dispatches about the raid was imposed Ior several weeks, and the Israeli press resorted to recycling the
disclosures in the Ioreign press. In the Iirst days aIter the attack, there had been many critical stories in
the Israeli press speculating about the bombing, and the possibility that it could lead to a conIlict with
Syria. Larry DerIner, a columnist writing in the Jerusalem Post, described the raid as the sort oI thing
that starts wars. But, once reports about the nuclear issue and other details circulated, the domestic
criticism subsided.
At a news conIerence on September 20th, President George W. Bush was asked about the incident Iour
times but said, Im not going to comment on the matter. The lack oI oIIicial statements became part
oI the story. The silence Irom all parties has been deaIening, David Ignatius wrote in the Washington
Post, but the message to Iranwhich the Administration had long suspected oI pursuing a nuclear
weaponis clear: America and Israel can identiIy nuclear targets and penetrate air deIenses to destroy
them.
It was evident that oIIicials in Israel and the United States, although unwilling to be quoted, were eager
Ior the news media to write about the bombing. Early on, a Iormer oIIicer in the Israel DeIense Forces
with close contacts in Israeli intelligence approached me, with a version oI the standard story, including
colorIul but, as it turned out, unconIirmable details: Israeli intelligence tracking the ship Irom the
moment it leIt a North Korean port; Syrian soldiers wearing protective gear as they oII-loaded the
cargo; Israeli intelligence monitoring trucks Irom the docks to the target site. On October 3rd, the
London Spectator, citing much oI the same inIormation, published an overheated account oI the
September 6th raid, claiming that it may have saved the world Irom a devastating threat, and that a
very senior British ministerial source had warned, II people had known how close we came to World
War Three that day thered have been mass panic.
However, in three months oI reporting Ior this article, I was repeatedly told by current and Iormer
intelligence, diplomatic, and congressional oIIicials that they were not aware oI any solid evidence oI
ongoing nuclear-weapons programs in Syria. It is possible that Israel conveyed intelligence directly to
senior members oI the Bush Administration, without it being vetted by intelligence agencies. (This
process, known as stovepiping, overwhelmed U.S. intelligence beIore the war in Iraq.) But Mohamed
ElBaradei, the director-general oI the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations group
responsible Ior monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty, said, Our experts
who have careIully analyzed the satellite imagery say it is unlikely that this building was a nuclear
Iacility.
Joseph Cirincione, the director Ior nuclear policy at the Center Ior American Progress, a Washington,
D.C., think tank, told me, Syria does not have the technical, industrial, or Iinancial ability to support a
nuclear-weapons program. Ive been Iollowing this issue Ior IiIteen years, and every once in a while a
suspicion arises and we investigate and theres nothing. There was and is no nuclear-weapons threat
Irom Syria. This is all political. Cirincione castigated the press corps Ior its handling oI the story. I
think some oI our best journalists were used, he said.
A similar message emerged at brieIings given to select members oI Congress within weeks oI the
attack. The brieIings, conducted by intelligence agencies, Iocussed on what Washington knew about
the September 6th raid. One concern was whether North Korea had done anything that might cause the
U.S. to back away Irom ongoing six-nation talks about its nuclear program. A legislator who took part
in one such brieIing said aIterward, according to a member oI his staII, that he had heard nothing that
caused him to have any doubts about the North Korean negotiationsnothing that should cause a
pause. The legislators conclusion, the staII member said, was Theres nothing that proves any
perIidy involving the North Koreans.
Morton Abramowitz, a Iormer Assistant Secretary oI State Ior intelligence and research, told me that he
was astonished by the lack oI response. Anytime you bomb another state, thats a big deal, he said.
But wheres the outcry, particularly Irom the concerned states and the U.N.? Somethings amiss.
Israel could, oI course, have damning evidence that it reIuses to disclose. But there are serious and
unexamined contradictions in the various published accounts oI the September 6th bombing.
The main piece oI evidence to emerge publicly that Syria was building a reactor arrived on October
23rd, when David Albright, oI the Institute Ior Science and International Security, a highly respected
nonproIit research group, released a satellite image oI the target. The photograph had been taken by a
commercial satellite company, DigitalGlobe, oI Longmont, Colorado, on August 10th, Iour weeks
beIore the bombing, and showed a square building and a nearby water-pumping station. In an analysis
released at the same time, Albright, a physicist who served as a weapons inspector in Iraq, concluded
that the building, as viewed Irom space, had roughly the same length and width as a reactor building at
Yongbyon, North Koreas main nuclear Iacility. The tall building in the image may house a reactor
under construction and the pump station along the river may have been intended to supply cooling
water to the reactor, Albright said. He concluded his analysis by posing a series oI rhetorical questions
that assumed that the target was a nuclear Iacility:
How Iar along was the reactor construction project when it was bombed? What was the extent oI
nuclear assistance Irom North Korea? Which reactor components did Syria obtain Irom North Korea or
elsewhere, and where are they now?
He was later quoted in the Washington Post saying, Im pretty convinced that Syria was trying to
build a nuclear reactor.
When I asked Albright how he had pinpointed the target, he told me that he and a colleague, Paul
Brannan, did a lot oI hard workculling press reports and poring over DigitalGlobe imagery
beIore coming up with the site. Albright then shared his Iindings with Robin Wright and other
journalists at the Post, who, aIter checking with Administration oIIicials, told him that the building
was, indeed, the one targeted by the Israelis. We did not release the inIormation until we got direct
conIirmation Irom the Washington Post, he told me. The Posts sources in the Administration, he
understood, had access to Iar more detailed images obtained by U.S. intelligence satellites. The Post
ran a story, without printing the imagery, on October 19th, reporting that U.S. and Ioreign oIIicials
Iamiliar with the aItermath oI the attack had concluded that the site had the signature, or
characteristics, oI a reactor similar in structure to North Koreas Iacilitiesa conclusion with which
Albright then agreed. In other words, the Albright and the Post reports, which appeared to
independently reinIorce each other, stemmed in part Irom the same sources.
Albright told me that beIore going public he had met privately with Israeli oIIicials. I wanted to be
sure in my own mind that the Israelis thought it was a reactor, and I was, he said. They never
explicitly said it was nuclear, but they ruled out the possibility that it was a missile, chemical-warIare,
or radar site. By a process oI elimination, I was leIt with nuclear.
Two days aIter his Iirst report, Albright released a satellite image oI the bombed site, taken by
DigitalGlobe on October 24th, seven weeks aIter the bombing. The new image showed that the target
area had been levelled and the ground scraped. Albright said that it hinted oI a coverupcleansing the
bombing site could make it diIIicult Ior weapons inspectors to determine its precise nature. It looks
like Syria is trying to hide something and destroy the evidence oI some activity, he told the Times.
But it wont work. Syria has got to answer questions about what it was doing. This assessment was
widely shared in the press. (In mid-January, the Times reported that recent imagery Irom DigitalGlobe
showed that a storage Iacility, or something similar, had been constructed, in an obvious rush, at the
bombing site.)
ProliIeration experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency and others in the arms-control
community disputed Albrights interpretation oI the images. People here were baIIled by this, and
thought that Albright had stuck his neck out, a diplomat in Vienna, where the I.A.E.A. is
headquartered, told me. The I.A.E.A. has been consistently telling journalists that it is skeptical about
the Syrian nuclear story, but the reporters are so convinced.
A second diplomat in Vienna acidly commented on the images: A square building is a square
building. The diplomat, who is Iamiliar with the use oI satellite imagery Ior nuclear veriIication,
added that the I.A.E.A. does not have enough inIormation to conclude anything about the exact nature
oI the Iacility. They see a building with some geometry near a river that could be identiIied as nuclear-
related. But they cannot credibly conclude that is so. As Iar as inIormation coming Irom open sources
beyond imagery, its a struggle to extract inIormation Irom all oI the noise that comes Irom political
agendas.
Much oI what one would expect to see around a secret nuclear site was lacking at the target, a Iormer
State Department intelligence expert who now deals with proliIeration issues Ior the Congress said.
There is no security around the building, he said. No barracks Ior the Army or the workers. No
associated complex. JeIIrey Lewis, who heads the non-proliIeration program at the New America
Foundation, a think tank in Washington, told me that, even iI the width and the length oI the building
were similar to the Korean site, its height was simply not suIIicient to contain a Yongbyon-size reactor
and also have enough room to extract the control rods, an essential step in the operation oI the reactor;
nor was there evidence in the published imagery oI major underground construction. All you could see
was a box, Lewis said. You couldnt see enough to know how big it will be or what it will do. Its
just a box.
A Iormer senior U.S. intelligence oIIicial, who has access to current intelligence, said, We dont have
any prooI oI a reactorno signals intelligence, no human intelligence, no satellite intelligence. Some
well-inIormed deIense consultants and Iormer intelligence oIIicials asked why, iI there was compelling
evidence oI nuclear cheating involving North Korea, a member oI the Presidents axis oI evil, and
Syria, which the U.S. considers a state sponsor oI terrorism, the Bush Administration would not insist
on making it public.
When I went to Israel in late December, the government was still maintaining secrecy about the raid,
but some current and Iormer oIIicials and military oIIicers were willing to speak without attribution.
Most were adamant that Israels intelligence had been accurate. Dont you write that there was
nothing there! a senior Israeli oIIicial, who is in a position to know the details oI the raid on Syria,
said, shaking a Iinger at me. The thing in Syria was real.
Retired Brigadier General Shlomo Brom, who served as deputy national-security adviser under Prime
Minister Ehud Barak, told me that Israel wouldnt have acted iI it hadnt been convinced that there was
a threat. It may have been a perception oI a conviction, but there was something there, Brom said. It
was the beginning oI a nuclear project. However, by the date oI our talk, Brom told me, The question
oI whether it was there or not is not that relevant anymore.
Albright, when I spoke to him in December, was Iar more circumspect than he had been in October.
We never said we know it was a reactor, based on the image, Albright said. We wanted to make
sure that the image was consistent with a reactor, and, Irom my point oI view, it was. But that doesnt
conIirm its a reactor.
The journey oI the Al Hamed, a small coastal trader, became a centerpiece in accounts oI the
September 6th bombing. On September 15th, the Washington Post reported that a prominent U.S.
expert on the Middle East said that the attack appears to have been linked to the arrival . . . oI a ship
carrying material Irom North Korea labeled as cement. The article went on to cite the experts belieI
that the emerging consensus in Israel was that it delivered nuclear equipment. Other press reports
identiIied the Al Hamed as a suspicious North Korean ship.
But there is evidence that the Al Hamed could not have been carrying sensitive cargoor any cargo
Irom North Korea. International shipping is careIully monitored by Lloyds Marine Intelligence Unit,
which relies on a network oI agents as well as on port logs and other records. In addition, most
merchant ships are now required to operate a transponder device called an A.I.S., Ior automatic
identiIication system. This device, which was on board the Al Hamed, works in a manner similar to a
transponder on a commercial aircraItbeaming a constant, very high-Irequency position report. (The
U.S. Navy monitors international sea traIIic with the aid oI dedicated satellites, at a secret Iacility in
suburban Washington.)
According to Marine Intelligence Unit records, the Al Hamed, which was built in 1965, had been
operating Ior years in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with no indication oI any recent
visits to North Korea. The records show that the Al Hamed arrived at Tartus on September 3rdthe
ships IiIth visit to Syria in Iive months. (It was one oI eight ships that arrived that day; although it is
possible that one oI the others was carrying illicit materials, only the Al Hamed has been named in the
media.) The ships registry was constantly changing. The Al Hamed Ilew the South Korean Ilag beIore
switching to North Korea in November oI 2005, and then to Comoros. (Ships oIten Ily Ilags oI
convenience, registering with diIIerent countries, in many cases to avoid taxes or onerous regulations.)
At the time oI the bombing, according to Lloyds, it was Ilying a Comoran Ilag and was owned by Iour
Syrian nationals. In earlier years, under other owners, the ship seems to have operated under Russian,
Estonian, Turkish, and Honduran Ilags. Lloyds records show that the ship had apparently not passed
through the Suez Canalthe main route Irom the Mediterranean to the Far Eastsince at least 1998.
Among the groups that keep track oI international shipping is Greenpeace. Martini Gotje, who monitors
illegal Iishing Ior the organization and was among the Iirst to raise questions about the Al Hamed, told
me, Ive been at sea Ior Iorty-one years, and I can tell you, as a captain, that the Al Hamed was
nothingin rotten shape. You wouldnt be able to load heavy cargo on it, as the Iloorboards wouldnt
be that strong.
II the Israelis target in Syria was not a nuclear site, why didnt the Syrians respond more IorceIully?
Syria complained at the United Nations but did little to press the issue. And, iI the site wasnt a
partially built reactor, what was it?
During two trips to Damascus aIter the Israeli raid, I interviewed many senior government and
intelligence oIIicials. None oI President Assads close advisers told me the same story, though some oI
the stories were more revealingand more plausiblethan others. In general, Syrian oIIicials seemed
more eager to analyze Israels motives than to discuss what had been attacked. I hesitate to answer any
journalists questions about it, Faruq al-Shara, the Syrian Vice-President, told me. Israel bombed to
restore its credibility, and their objective is Ior us to keep talking about it. And by answering your
questions I serve their objective. Why should I volunteer to do that? Shara denied that his nation has a
nuclear-weapons program. The volume oI articles about the bombing is incredible, and its not
important that its a lie, he said.
One top Ioreign-ministry oIIicial in Damascus told me that the target was an old military building that
had been abandoned by the Syrian military years ago. But a senior Syrian intelligence general gave
me a diIIerent account. What they targeted was a building used Ior Iertilizer and water pumps, he
saidpart oI a government eIIort to revitalize Iarming. There is a large city Dayr az ZawrIiIty
kilometres away. Why would Syria put nuclear material near a city? I interviewed the intelligence
general again on my second visit to Damascus, and he reiterated that the targeted building was at no
time a military Iacility. As to why Syria had not had a more aggressive response, iI the target was so
benign, the general said, It was not Iearthats all Ill say. As I leIt, I asked the general why Syria
had not invited representatives oI the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the bombing site and
declare that no nuclear activity was taking place there. They did not ask to come, he said, and Syria
had no reason to ask them to come.
An I.A.E.A. oIIicial dismissed that assertion when we spoke in Vienna a Iew days later. The I.A.E.A.
asked the Syrians to allow the agency to visit the site to veriIy its nature, the I.A.E.A. oIIicial said.
Syrias reply was that it was a military, not a nuclear, installation, and there would be no reason Ior
the I.A.E.A. to go there. It would be in their and everyones interest to have the I.A.E.A. visit the site.
II it was nuclear, it would leave Iingerprints.
In a subsequent interview, Imad Moustapha, the Syrian Ambassador to Washington, deIended Syrias
decision not to invite the I.A.E.A. inspectors. We will not get into the game oI inviting Ioreign experts
to visit every site that Israel claims is a nuclear Iacility, Moustapha told me. II we bring them in and
they say there is nothing there, then Israel will say it made a mistake and bomb another site two weeks
later. And iI we then dont let the I.A.E.A. in, Israel will say, You see? This is nonsense. Why should
we have to do this?
Even iI the site was not a nuclear installation, it is possible that the Syrians Ieared that an I.A.E.A.
inquiry would uncover the presence oI North Koreans there. In Syria, I was able to get some
conIirmation that North Koreans were at the target. A senior oIIicer in Damascus with Iirsthand
knowledge oI the incident agreed to see me alone, at his home; my other interviews in Damascus took
place in government oIIices. According to his account, North Koreans were present at the site, but only
as paid construction workers. The senior oIIicer said that the targeted building, when completed, would
most likely have been used as a chemical-warIare Iacility. (Syria is not a signatory to the Chemical
Weapons Convention and has been believed, Ior decades, to have a substantial chemical-weapons
arsenal.)
The building contract with North Korea was a routine business deal, the senior oIIicer saidIrom
design to construction. (North Korea may, oI course, have sent skilled technicians capable oI doing less
routine work.) Syria and North Korea have a long-standing partnership on military matters. The
contract between Syria and North Korea was old, Irom 2002, and it was running late, the senior oIIicer
told me. It was initially to be Iinished in 2005, and the Israelis might have expected it was Iurther
along.
The North Korean laborers had been coming and going Ior maybe six months beIore the September
bombing, the senior oIIicer said, and his government concluded that the Israelis had picked up North
Korean telephone chatter at the site. (This Iit the timeline that Israeli oIIicials had given me.) The
Israelis may have their own spies and watched the laborers being driven to the area, the senior oIIicer
said. The Koreans were not there at night, but slept in their quarters and were driven to the site in the
morning. The building was in an isolated area, and the Israelis may have concluded that even iI there
was a slight chanceoI it being a nuclear Iacilitywell take that risk.
On the days beIore the bombing, the Koreans had been working on the second Iloor, and were using a
tarp on top oI the building to shield the site Irom rain and sun. It was just the North Korean way oI
working, the Syrian senior oIIicer said, adding that the possibility that the Israelis could not see what
was underneath the tarp might have added to their determination.
The attack was especially dramatic, the Syrian senior oIIicer said, because the Israelis used bright
magnesium illumination Ilares to light up the target beIore the bombing. Night suddenly turned into
day, he told me. When the people in the area saw the lights and the bombing, they thought there would
be a commando raid, the senior oIIicer said. The building was destroyed, and his government
eventually concluded that there were no Israeli ground Iorces in the area. But iI Israelis had been on the
ground seeking contaminated soil samples, the senior oIIicer said, they Iound only cement.
A senior Syrian oIIicial conIirmed that a group oI North Koreans had been at work at the site, but he
denied that the structure was related to chemical warIare. Syria had concluded, he said, that chemical
warIare had little deterrent value against Israel, given its nuclear capability. The Iacility that was
attacked, the oIIicial said, was to be one oI a string oI missile-manuIacturing plants scattered
throughout Syriaall low tech. Not strategic. (North Korea has been a major exporter oI missile
technology and expertise to Syria Ior decades.) He added, Weve gone asymmetrical, and have been
improving our capability to build low-tech missiles that will enable us to inIlict as much damage as
possible without conIronting the Israeli Army. We now can hit all oI Israel, and not just the north.
Whatever was under construction, with North Korean help, it apparently had little to do with
agricultureor with nuclear reactorsbut much to do with Syrias deIense posture, and its military
relationship with North Korea. And that, perhaps, was enough to silence the Syrian government aIter
the September 6th bombing.
It is unclear to what extent the Bush Administration was involved in the Israeli attack. The most
detailed report oI coperation was made in mid-October by ABC News. Citing a senior U.S. oIIicial,
the network reported that Israel had shared intelligence with the United States and received satellite
help and targeting inIormation in response. At one point, it was reported, the Bush Administration
considered attacking Syria itselI, but rejected that option. The implication was that the Israeli
intelligence about the nuclear threat had been vetted by the U.S., and had been Iound to be convincing.
Yet oIIicials I spoke to in Israel heatedly denied the notion that they had extensive help Irom
Washington in planning the attack. When I told the senior Israeli oIIicial that I Iound little support in
Washington Ior Israels claim that it had bombed a nuclear Iacility in Syria, he responded with an
expletive, and then said, angrily, Nobody helped us. We did it on our own. He added, What Im
saying is that nobody discovered it Ior us. (The White House declined to comment on this story.)
There is evidence to support this view. The satellite operated by DigitalGlobe, the Colorado Iirm that
supplied Albrights images, is Ior hire; anyone can order the satellite to photograph speciIic
cordinates, a process that can cost anywhere Irom several hundred to hundreds oI thousands oI
dollars. The company displays the results oI these requests on its Web page, but not the identity oI the
customer. On Iive occasions between August 5th and August 27th oI last yearbeIore the Israeli
bombingDigitalGlobe was paid to take a tight image oI the targeted building in Syria.
Clearly, whoever ordered the images likely had some involvement in plans Ior the attack. DigitalGlobe
does about sixty per cent oI its business with the U.S. government, but those contracts are Ior
unclassiIied work, such as mapping. The governments own military and intelligence satellite system,
with an unmatched ability to achieve what analysts call highly granular images, could have supplied
superior versions oI the target sites. Israel has at least two military satellite systems, but, according to
Allen Thomson, a Iormer C.I.A. analyst, DigitalGlobes satellite has advantages Ior reconnaissance,
making Israel a logical customer. (Customer anonymity is crucial to us, Chuck Herring, a spokesman
Ior DigitalGlobe, said. I dont know who placed the order and couldnt disclose it iI I did.) It is also
possible that Israel or the United States ordered the imagery in order to have something unclassiIied to
pass to the press iI needed. II the Bush Administration had been aggressively coperating with Israel
beIore the attack, why would Israel have to turn to a commercial Iirm?
Last Iall, aerospace industry and military sources told Aviation Week & Space Technology, an
authoritative trade journal, that the United States had provided Israel with advice about potential target
vulnerabilities beIore the September 6th attack, and monitored the radar as the mission took place.
The magazine reported that the Israeli Iighters, prior to bombing the target on the Euphrates, struck a
Syrian radar Iacility near the Turkish border, knocking the radar out oI commission and permitting
them to complete their mission without interIerence.
The Iormer U.S. senior intelligence oIIicial told me that, as he understood it, Americas involvement in
the Israeli raid dated back months earlier, and was linked to the Administrations planning Ior a
possible air war against Iran. Last summer, the DeIense Intelligence Agency came to believe that Syria
was installing a new Russian-supplied radar-and-air-deIense system that was similar to the radar
complexes in Iran. Entering Syrian airspace would trigger those deIenses and expose them to Israeli
and American exploitation, yielding valuable inIormation about their capabilities. Vice-President Dick
Cheney supported the idea oI overIlights, the Iormer senior intelligence oIIicial said, because it would
stick it to Syria and show that were serious about Iran. (The Vice-Presidents oIIice declined to
comment.) The Iormer senior intelligence oIIicial said that Israeli military jets have Ilown over Syria
repeatedly, without retaliation Irom Syria. At the time, the Iormer senior intelligence oIIicial said, the
Iocus was on radar and air deIenses, and not on any real or suspected nuclear Iacility. Israels claims
about the target, which emerged later, caught many in the military and intelligence communityiI not
in the White Houseby surprise.
The senior Israeli oIIicial, asked whether the attack was rooted in his countrys interest in Syrias radar
installations, told me, Bullshit. Whatever the Administrations initial agenda, Israel seems to have
been aIter something more.
The story oI the Israeli bombing oI Syria, with its mixture oI satellite intelligence, intercepts,
newspaper leaks, and shared assumptions, reminded some American diplomats and intelligence
oIIicials oI an incident, ten years ago, involving North Korea. In mid-1998, American reconnaissance
satellites photographed imagery oI a major underground construction project at Kumchang-ri, twenty-
Iive miles northwest oI Yongbyon. We were brieIed that, without a doubt, this was a nuclear-related
Iacility, and there was signals intelligence linking the construction brigade at Kumchang-ri to the
nuclear complex at Yongbyon, the Iormer State Department intelligence expert recalled.
Charles Kartman, who was President Bill Clintons special envoy Ior peace talks with Korea, told me
that the intelligence was considered a slam dunk by analysts in the DeIense Intelligence Agency, even
though other agencies disagreed. We had a debate going on inside the community, but the D.I.A.
unilaterally took it to Capitol Hill, Kartman said, Iorcing the issue and leading to a Iront-page Times
story.
AIter months oI negotiations, Kartman recalled, the North Koreans agreed, under diplomatic pressure,
to grant access to Kumchang-ri. In return, they received aid, including assistance with a new potato-
production program. Inspectors Iound little besides a series oI empty tunnels. Robert Carlin, an expert
on North Korea who retired in 2005 aIter serving more than thirty years with the C.I.A. and the State
Departments intelligence bureau, told me that the Kumchang-ri incident highlighted an endemic
weakness in the American intelligence community. People think they know the ending and then they
go back and Iind the evidence that Iits their story, he said. And then you get groupthinkand people
reinIorce each other.
It seems that, as with Kumchang-ri, there was a genuine, iI not unanimous, belieI by Israeli intelligence
that the Syrians were constructing something that could have serious national-security consequences.
But why would the Israelis take the risk oI provoking a military response, and perhaps a war, iI there
was, as it seems, no smoking gun? Mohamed ElBaradei, expressing his Irustration, said, II a country
has any inIormation about a nuclear activity in another country, it should inIorm the I.A.E.A.not
bomb Iirst and ask questions later.
One answer, suggested by David Albright, is that Israel did not trust the international arms-control
community. I can understand the Israeli point oI view, given the history with Iran and Algeria,
Albright said. Both nations had nuclear-weapons programs and, aIter being caught cheating, declared
their reactors to be civil reactors, Ior peacetime use. The international groups, like the U.N. and the
I.A.E.A, never shut them down. Also, Israel may have calculated that risk oI a counterattack was low:
President Assad would undoubtedly conclude that the attack had the support oI the Bush
Administration and, thereIore, that any response by Syria would also engage the U.S. (My
conversations with oIIicials in Syria bore out this assumption.)
In Tel Aviv, the senior Israeli oIIicial pointedly told me, Syria still thinks Hezbollah won the war in
LebanonreIerring to the summer, 2006, Iight between Israel and the Shiite organization headed by
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah knows how much that war costone-third oI his Iighters were
killed, inIrastructure was bombed, and ninety-Iive per cent oI his strategic weapons were wiped out,
the Israeli oIIicial said. But Assad has a Nasrallah complex and thinks Hezbollah won. And, II he did
it, I can do it. This led to an adventurous mood in Damascus. Today, they are more sober.
That notion was echoed by the ambassador oI an Israeli ally who is posted in Tel Aviv. The truth is
not important, the ambassador told me. Israel was able to restore its credibility as a deterrent. That is
the whole thing. No one will know what the real story is.
There is evidence that the preemptive raid on Syria was also meant as a warning aboutand a model
Iora preemptive attack on Iran. When I visited Israel this winter, Iran was the overriding concern
among political and deIense oIIicials I spoke tonot Syria. There was palpable anger toward
Washington, in the wake oI a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded, on behalI oI the American
intelligence community, that Iran is not now constructing a nuclear weapon. Many in Israel view Irans
nuclear ambitions as an existential threat; they believe that military action against Iran may be
inevitable, and worry that America may not be there when needed. The N.I.E. was published in
November, aIter a yearlong standoII involving Cheneys oIIice, which resisted the reports Iindings. At
the time oI the raid, reports about the Iorthcoming N.I.E. and its general conclusion had already
appeared.
Retired Major General Giora Eiland, who served as the national-security adviser to Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon, told me, The Israeli military takes it as an assumption that one day we will need to have
a military campaign against Iran, to slow and eliminate the nuclear option. He added, Whether the
political situation will allow this is another question.
In the weeks aIter the N.I.E.s release, Bush insisted that the Iranian nuclear-weapons threat was as
acute as ever, a theme he ampliIied during his nine-day Middle East trip aIter the New Year. A lot oI
people heard that N.I.E. out here and said that George Bush and the Americans dont take the Iranian
threat seriously, he told Greta Van Susteren, oI Fox News. And so this trip has been successIul Irom
the perspective oI saying . . . we will keep the pressure on.
Shortly aIter the bombing, a Chinese envoy and one oI the Bush Administrations senior national-
security oIIicials met in Washington. The Chinese envoy had just returned Irom a visit to Tehran, a
person Iamiliar with the discussion told me, and he wanted the White House to know that there were
moderates there who were interested in talks. The national-security oIIicial rejected that possibility and
told the envoy, as the person Iamiliar with the discussion recalled, You are aware oI the recent Israeli
statements about Syria. The Israelis are extremely serious about Iran and its nuclear program, and I
believe that, iI the United States government is unsuccessIul in its diplomatic dealings with Iran, the
Israelis will take it out militarily. He then told the envoy that he wanted him to convey this to his
governmentthat the Israelis were serious.
He was telling the Chinese leadership that theyd better warn Iran that we cant hold back Israel, and
that the Iranians should look at Syria and see whats coming next iI diplomacy Iails, the person
Iamiliar with the discussion said. His message was that the Syrian attack was in part aimed at Iran.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ISISStatementonNewYorker.pdI
ISIS STATEMENT REGARDING "A SHOT IN THE DARK" IN THE
FEBRUARY 11 ISSUE OF THE NEW YORKER, BY SEYMOUR HERSH
THE INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (ISIS)
FEBRUARY 6, 2008
Seymour Hersh recently published an article Ior the New Yorker magazine in which he seeks to Iind
reasons behind the September 6, 2007 Israeli strike against a Iacility in eastern Syria. Mr. Hersh took
one quote Irom David Albright out oI its original context and used it to imply that ISIS had earlier
concluded that the site attacked was a reactor and had since backed away Irom that conclusion. In Iact,
ISIS's analysis oI the suspect site has been consistent since October 2007. Our continuing assessment is
that the building is consistent with reactor construction, and thus consistent with credible reports in the
media that U.S. and Israeli oIIicials have concluded that the site represents a reactor under construction.
Mr. Hersh met with David Albright and Paul Brannan in January at ISIS's oIIice to discuss the Israeli
strike and ISIS's analysis oI the imagery oI the site. On the third page oI his article, Hersh writes,
"Albright, when I spoke with him in December, was Iar more circumspect than he had been in
October." Hersh then quotes Albright as saying, "We never said we know it was a reactor, based on
the image. We wanted to make sure that the image was consistent with a reactor, and, Irom my point oI
view, it was. But that doesn't conIirm that it was a reactor."
This quote was drawn Irom a point in our discussion related to the process by which ISIS conIirmed the
location oI the attacked site in October by providing the imagery to the Washington Post. We did this
by Iirst analyzing a large, 2000 square kilometer area oI Syria and identiIying a site that was consistent
with a nuclear reactor. The goal was also to show that the site was consistent with earlier reporting by
the Washington Post and The New York Times that U.S. and Israeli oIIicials had concluded the site
was a reactor under construction. The Iact that we independently Iound this site by searching Ior a
reactor either is one oI the worlds most remarkable coincidences or is Iurther evidence that the site
could be a reactor.
Hersh, who we at ISIS greatly respect, is correct to raise the issue oI whether Israeli and U.S.
intelligence are right about the purpose oI the site. We are committed to developing that inIormation
publicly. Moreover, the bombing oI the site raises troubling questions that require public answers.
Hersh has added interesting and important inIormation to this critical debate. He clearly believes that
the site did not house a reactor, and he is entitled to his opinion. But much oI his argument hinges on
Albrights statement that was taken out oI context. His other evidence is Irom people who do not have
direct knowledge oI the case, or are limited to analyzing satellite imagery oI the site, which we know
cannot on its own answer the question oI whether or not the site is a reactor
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid20601080&sidavqqqinzE8g&reIerasia
North Korea Maintains Uranium Enrichment Program, U.S. Says
By Ed Johnson
[EXCERPTS]
Feb. 5 [2008](Bloomberg) -- North Korea maintains its uranium enrichment program and remains a
nuclear proliIeration risk, the top U.S. intelligence oIIicial said in his annual threat assessment to
Congress.
``We remain uncertain about Kim Jong Il's commitment to Iull denuclearization as he promised in the
six-party agreement,'' Director oI National Intelligence Michael McConnell told the Senate Intelligence
Committee today.
[deletia]
``While Pyongyang denies a program Ior uranium enrichment, and they deny their proliIeration
activities, we believe North Korea continues to engage in both,'' McConnell said.
In the annual assessment oI the global threats Iacing the U.S., McConnell noted North Korea has
already sold ballistic missiles to ``several Middle Eastern countries'' including Iran.
``We remain concerned North Korea could proliIerate nuclear weapons abroad,'' he said in the
assessment.
Sourcebook note: The underlined quotes above do not appear in the following document; they may
have been made during Q&A:
http://intelligence.senate.gov/080205/mcconnell.pdf
Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National
Intelligence
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
5 February 2008
J. Michael McConnell
Director of National Intelligence
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5huSr2cto6oXklRH0nXdM8i7PEQ0wD8UKV1OG0
US Envoy Urges NKorea to Hand Over List
By FOSTER KLUG 59 minutes ago
[Accessed at 2008-02-06T18:35Z]
WASHINGTON (AP) The chieI U.S. envoy at North Korean nuclear talks urged leader Kim Jong Il
to hand over a promised list oI his country's nuclear eIIorts, saying Wednesday that nuclear negotiators
are working to make sure "Pyongyang lives up to its word."
Christopher Hill told lawmakers that six-nation disarmament talks are at a "critical, challenging" point,
noting "there is some sense oI urgency."
The United States says the North has balked at providing a "complete and correct" disclosure oI nuclear
programs to eventually be dismantled; Washington has reIused to take the North oII a U.S. terrorism
blacklist, a coveted goal oI Pyongyang, until negotiators have the list.
"Let me be clear," Hill said at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. "'Complete and correct'
means complete and correct. This declaration must include all nuclear weapons, programs, materials
and Iacilities, including clariIication oI any proliIeration activities."
His comments came a day aIter the director oI U.S. intelligence, Mike McConnell, questioned North
Korea's commitment to the stalled talks. McConnell also said the U.S. intelligence community believes
North Korea continues to work on a secret uranium enrichment program and to sell its weapons around
the world.
Conservatives have recently expressed worry that President Bush, seeking a Ioreign policy success
beIore he leaves oIIice in January, is ignoring North Korean abuse.
North Korea has begun disabling its main nuclear Iacilities under an agreement with the other countries
at the international arms talks: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the U.S. Most oI the tasks oI
disabling those Iacilities have been completed, Hill said, with American experts working to ensure the
plutonium-making Iacility would require at least a year to become operational again.
But the talks have Iaced an impasse since the North missed a Dec. 31 deadline on the declaration.
North Korea accuses the United States oI Iailing to meet its commitments and claims it gave the U.S. a
nuclear list in November. Washington says Pyongyang never produced a complete list.
The North's declaration, Hill said, must also address its alleged uranium enrichment program. The U.S.
accused North Korea in 2002 oI seeking to secretly enrich uranium in violation oI an earlier
disarmament deal, sparking the latest nuclear standoII.
North Korea has insisted it does not have an active uranium program, but Hill has said Pyongyang
oIIicials have promised they would address the issue to Washington's satisIaction.
While the United States cannot accept an incomplete declaration, Hill testiIied, there is reason to
believe that progress can still be made.
Still, he said, the U.S. is "very concerned about nuclear proliIeration" and noted that the North has
promised not to transIer nuclear materials to other countries. "We intend to hold North Korea to its
word," he said.
U.S. lawmakers have expressed worry that North Korea may have helped Syria pursue a nuclear
weapons program. Such cooperation would raise the specter oI a country that conducted a nuclear test
in 2006 North Korea providing atomic assistance to Syria, a nation Washington considers hostile
and a sponsor oI terrorism.
Syria has repeatedly denied that it is building a nuclear Iacility. North Korea denies accusations it
spreads its nuclear expertise beyond its borders. Hill reIused to publicly discuss speciIics oI the
allegations.
A lawmaker at the hearing, Republican Sen. Dick Lugar, said that a U.S. program Ior dismantling Cold
War-era weapons oI mass destruction could be applied to North Korea. He said oIIicials in Pyongyang
have expressed interest in getting inIormation on the program, which Lugar co-Iounded.
http://www.senate.gov/~Ioreign/testimony/2008/BidenStatement080206a.pdI
Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing
Status of the Six Party Talks for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
February 6, 2008
Opening Remarks
As Prepared for Delivery
Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will examine the eIIorts oI the United States and
the other participants in the Six Party Talks to remove the threat oI nuclear weapons Irom the
Korean Peninsula and build a permanent peace there.
I want to welcome Ambassador Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary oI State Ior East
Asian and PaciIic AIIairs, back to the committee today. I thank you, Mr. Ambassador, Ior your
tireless eIIorts over the past three years to try to resolve this diIIicult problem.
I also want to take note oI the Iact that the Foreign Relations Committee was originally
scheduled to have Assistant Secretary Hill up here today to testiIy on a diIIerent subject
Vietnam at a hearing to be chaired by my Iriend Senator Boxer.
I want to thank Senator Boxer, the chairwoman oI our East Asia Subcommittee, Ior
agreeing to reschedule her hearing Ior early March, at which time we look Iorward to seeing
Ambassador Hill again.
No Alternative to Patient Diplomacy
I look Iorward to the day that we can close the book on the nuclear issue and turn to other
challenges, like how the United States and North Korea might cooperate to expand trade and
cultural and educational exchanges between our two nations.
But we are not there yet.
The New York Philharmonic will be playing a concert in North Korea at the end oI the
month, the Iirst ever visit by a U.S. orchestra to North Korea.
I understand they will perIorm the New World Symphony, by Dvorak. That is Iitting.
But Ior now we have to keep our eye on the ball and deal with the old world we still inhabit.
Our goal and the stated objective oI the Six Party Talks is to peaceIully dismantle
North Koreas nuclear weapons program in exchange Ior energy assistance, sanctions relieI, and
the creation oI a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.
This objective is consistent, in my view, with the vital national security interests oI all six
nations joined in the Six Party Talks. Nuclear weapons oIIer only a Ialse sense oI security to
North Korea. The Democratic Peoples Republic oI Korea, or DPRK as it is called, will Iind true
security only when it has jettisoned its nuclear weapons program, rejoined the Nuclear
NonproliIeration Treaty, and Iully normalized relations not only with the United States, but even
more importantly, with its neighbors to the south.
South Korea is Americas close Iriend and ally. Last December, South Koreans went to
the polls and elected a new president, Lee Myung-bak. Today, Senator Murkowski and I plan to
introduce a resolution congratulating President-elect Lee and the people oI the Republic oI Korea
on their nations vibrant democracy and aIIirming our desire to strengthen and deepen our
alliance in the years ahead. There is much we can accomplish together both on and oII the
Korean Peninsula.
Some say we should never negotiate with North Korea because they cant be trusted.
This view oIIers no viable solution to a problem a problem that got much worse when the Bush
Administration disengaged Irom the eIIort.
We wasted a lot oI time; time that North Korea used to acquire uranium enrichment
equipment and to more than double its stockpile oI plutonium, leading ultimately to an actual test
oI a nuclear device on October 9, 2006.
There is still no substitute Ior patient, principled, sustained, high level diplomacy.
Moreover, our eIIorts are more likely to succeed when we enlist our allies South Korea and
Japan and other Iriends to help us.
That is what this committee has been calling Ior on a bipartisan basis Ior six years.
The Iormula Ior success is clear, and I am glad that President Bush Iinally embraced it
and chose Ambassador Hill to undertake it.
The Iormula is validated by history. President George Herbert Walker Bush in 1991
agreed to remove U.S. tactical nuclear weapons Irom the Korean Peninsula weapons we no
longer needed to station in Korea given advances in technology and thereby convinced North
Korea to remain inside the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty and to accept inspections.
Inspections by the IAEA yielded evidence late in 1992 that North Korea was violating its NPT
commitments as well as the terms oI the 1991 South-North Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula.
Without the Iirst Bushs diplomatic eIIorts, we might have remained in the dark, giving
North Korea a Iree path to pursue its nuclear ambitions unchecked.
Under President Clinton, the United States negotiated the October 1994 Agreed Framework.
The North agreed to Ireeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear Iacilities under
international monitoring. In exchange, Pyongyang was to receive two proliIeration-resistant
Light Water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments oI heavy Iuel oil during construction
oI the reactors. The LWRs were to be Iinanced and constructed through the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational consortium including South Korea,
Japan, and the European Union.
The Agreed Framework Iailed to eliminate the Norths nuclear programs. But it
prevented the North Irom producing even one ounce oI plutonium Irom 1994-2003. That is no
small accomplishment.
And the creation oI KEDO established a useIul precedent namely, that the United
States should reach out to other nations that share our interest in a nuclear-Iree Korean Peninsula
to help shoulder the Iinancial and diplomatic burdens.
Under the terms oI a February 17, 2007 agreement hammered out by our witness today
and North Koreas lead nuclear negotiator, North Korea promised Iirst to Ireeze and then to
disable its key nuclear Iacilities and to provide a complete and accurate declaration oI all oI its
nuclear programs, Iacilities, and materials. In exchange, the North is to receive energy assistance
and sanctions relieI. The ultimate goal remains the same: the complete dismantlement oI the
Norths nuclear Iacilities in exchange Ior normalization oI relations with the United States and
the establishment oI a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
The Ireeze was implemented without a hitch, and North Korean workers under the direct
supervision oI U.S. technicians are today in the process oI disabling the three key nuclear
Iacilities at Yongbyon the reactor, the spent Iuel reprocessing plant, and the Iuel Iabrication
plant.
North Korea is no longer in the plutonium production business.
But as we will hear Irom our witness, we still have a long way to go.
The North has not yet submitted a complete and accurate declaration oI its nuclear
programs, as called Ior under the agreement. The original December 31, 2007 deadline has come
and gone.
North Koreas preIerred outcome still appears to be having both a limited nuclear
deterrent and good relations with the United States. They must choose one or the other. The
United States will never acquiesce to a nuclear-armed North Korea.
I hope Assistant Secretary Hill will share with us the administrations game plan going
Iorward. How does the Administration plan to convince North Korea to submit a declaration oI
its nuclear activities, including any proliIeration oI nuclear know-how, promptly so that we can
get on with the business oI dismantling the Norths nuclear Iacilities, removing Iissile material
Irom the country, and ultimately normalizing our bilateral relations and integrating North Korea
into the community oI nations? What do we want South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia as
equal members oI the Six Party Talks to do to help us?
I also hope that Ambassador Hill will share with us some thoughts on how the
Administration plans to actually implement the next phase oI the agreement. SpeciIically, I hope
he will address the concern that Senator Lugar and I have expressed about the Glenn
Amendment, which currently prohibits the Department oI Energy Irom providing more than
token assistance to the denuclearization eIIort. Senator Lugar and I have draIted legislation that
would provide the Department oI Energy and the Department oI State with the necessary
authority to implement a robust denuclearization plan, and I hope the Administration will
endorse it.
Mr. Ambassador, I look Iorward to your testimony. Let me now turn to my Iriend Senator
Lugar.
http://www.senate.gov/~Ioreign/testimony/2008/HillTestimony080206a.pdI
Statement of Christopher R. Hill
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
February 6, 2008
Status of the Six-Party Talks
for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
Introduction
Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished Members Ior inviting me to
discuss with your committee recent developments in our eIIorts to achieve the veriIiable
denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party process.
I have had the opportunity to brieI many oI you on the Six-Party Talks over the last Iew months. Since
that time, we have made progress on implementation oI the October 3, 2007 agreement on Second
Phase Actions Ior the Implementation oI the Joint Statement, particularly on the disablement oI the
Yongbyon nuclear Iacility. We continue to have good cooperation with the DPRK on implementation
oI agreed disablement tasks. These advances notwithstanding, we are again at a critical, challenging
point in the Six-Party process, as we and our Six-Party partners work towards the completion oI the
Second Phase. SpeciIically, we are working to ensure that North Korea Iollows through on its
commitment to provide a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs, including its
nuclear weapons.
Implementation of the October 3 Agreement
The October 3 agreement builds on the February 13, 2007, agreement on Initial Actions Ior the
Implementation oI the Joint Statement, under which the DPRK shut down and sealed the core nuclear
Iacilities at Yongbyon and invited back the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct
monitoring and veriIication activities, as provided Ior in the February 13 agreement. Under the October
3 agreement on Second-Phase actions, the DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear Iacilities subject
to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and February 13 Agreement, beginning by
disabling the three core Iacilities at Yongbyon by the end oI the year. The DPRK also agreed to provide
a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs by the end oI the year.
Disablement
Disablement oI the three core Iacilities at Yongbyon the 5-MW(e) nuclear reactor, reprocessing plant,
and Iuel rod Iabrication Iacility is proceeding well. A rotating team oI U.S. experts has been on the
ground overseeing the disablement oI these Iacilities since early November and will remain in place
throughout the completion oI the agreed disablement activities. Upon completion, the speciIic
disablement actions should ensure that the DPRK would have to expend signiIicant eIIort and time
(upwards oI 12 months) to reconstitute all oI the disabled Iacilities. This would curtail their ability to
produce new weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon. Our experts report continued good cooperation
with DPRK experts at the site, and most oI the agreed disablement tasks at the three core Iacilities have
been completed.
SpeciIically, all agreed disablement tasks at the reprocessing plant were completed prior to December
31, 2007, including the removal oI several key pieces oI equipment necessary Ior the separation oI
plutonium Irom spent Iuel rods. Similarly, major pieces oI equipment at the Iuel Iabrication plant were
disabled and removed prior to December 31. One oI the primary disablement tasks at the 5-MW(e)
reactor the discharge oI spent Iuel is now underway. Due to health/saIety and veriIication concerns,
the parties understood that the Iuel discharge (consisting oI approximately 8,000 rods in the reactor
core) would continue beyond December 31, 2007. In the meantime, other disablement tasks, including
the destruction and removal oI the interior structure oI the cooling tower, were completed prior to
December 31, 2007.
At the request oI the Six Parties, in addition to leading the disablement activities, the United States is
also providing initial Iunding Ior these activities. As we look to the tasks ahead in the next phase,
dismantlement, we will request additional authorities in order to ensure that the United States is
prepared to take timely action to Iacilitate completion oI these important tasks. We are in active
discussions within the administration on dismantlement costs and will consult with Congress.
Declaration
The other key element oI Phase II provision by the DPRK oI a complete and correct declaration oI all
its nuclear programs remains to be implemented. Let me be clear complete and correct means
complete and correct. This declaration must include all nuclear weapons, programs, materials, and
Iacilities, including clariIication oI any proliIeration activities. The DPRK must also address concerns
related to any uranium enrichment programs and activities. While we have had discussions oI a
declaration with the DPRK, the DPRK did not meet the December 31, 2007 deadline Ior this
commitment, and we have still not received such a declaration. We and the other parties continue to
press the DPRK Ior completion oI this important commitment. A U.S. team was recently in Pyongyang
to continue these discussions, and the other parties have also continued to engage with the DPRK to
press Ior it to live up to its commitments. The DPRK, including leader Kim Jong-il, maintains that it is
committed to the Six-Party process and to IulIilling all its obligations. Working closely with our Six-
Party partners, we intend to ensure that Pyongyang lives up to its word by submitting to the Chinese
chair as soon as possible a declaration that is in Iact complete and correct.
As the DPRK IulIills its commitments, the United States remains committed to IulIilling ours. The
other Parties agreed to provide the DPRK with one million tons oI Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) or equivalent
in return Ior its actions in the Initial and Second phases. To date, the DPRK has received almost
200,000 tons oI HFO, including one shipment each Irom South Korea, China, Russia and the United
States. The Six Party Talks Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation has inIormally
agreed to provide halI oI the energy assistance in HFO and the remaining halI in HFO-equivalent,
namely materials and equipment related to reIurbishing coal mines and thermal and hydro power
plants. The United States has thus Iar only provided HFO, and we are in the process oI preparing
another shipment. We have also cooperated with the other Parties in ensuring that HFO-equivalent
materials and equipment are consistent with U.S. laws controlling exports to the DPRK.
Under the October 3 agreement, the United States also reaIIirmed its intent to IulIill its commitments
regarding rescinding the designation oI the DPRK as a state sponsor oI terrorism and the termination oI
the application oI the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) with respect to the DPRK. U.S. action
related to the terrorism designation and TWEA application will depend on the DPRKs IulIillment oI
its Second-Phase commitments on providing a complete and correct declaration and disabling its
nuclear Iacilities, as well as on satisIaction oI legal requirements. The legal criteria Ior rescinding the
designation oI a country as a state sponsor oI terrorism are set Iorth in U.S. law, and the Administration
intends to consult closely with Congress and Iollow appropriate procedures on any decision to take
action on the terrorism designation or TWEA.
At the same time, the United States will also continue to press the DPRK to address other important
issues, including questions about Japanese abductees. We will continue to urge the DPRK at every
opportunity to address Japans concerns. Japan is an important Iriend and ally oI the United States, and
we will continue to consult closely with the Japanese government as we move Iorward.
We also remain very concerned about nuclear proliIeration the potential Ior such proliIeration has
always been one oI our major concerns about the DPRKs nuclear weapons programs. In the October 3
agreement the DPRK reaIIirmed its commitment not to transIer nuclear materials, technology, or
know-how, and we intend to hold North Korea to its word. We have discussed this issue with the
North Koreans many times and will remain vigilant about proliIeration concerns. The North Koreans
are cognizant oI the Iact that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 remains in eIIect.
Offering the DPRK A Better Future
While we are in a diIIicult period, we remain conIident that the Six-Party process is the best
mechanism to address the danger to the United States and the international community posed by the
DPRKs nuclear programs. We continue to urge the DPRK to provide a complete and correct
declaration and complete the agreed disablement actions. Even once we have completed this phase,
however, signiIicant work remains. Following completion oI the Second Phase, we hope to move
quickly into a Iinal Phase, which will be aimed at abandonment oI North Koreas nuclear weapons
and existing nuclear programs, dismantlement oI all North Koreas nuclear Iacilities, capture oI all
Iissile material the DPRK has produced, and veriIication oI North Koreas denuclearization.
In exchange, the United States is prepared to transIorm our relations with the DPRK into a more
normal relationship. The United States and DPRK have committed to improving bilateral relations and
working toward Iull diplomatic relations. One way we will seek to do this is by increasing bilateral
exchanges between the United States and DPRK aimed at enhancing mutual trust. Our goal through
this process will remain improving the lives oI the people oI North Korea.
On a separate track, to address humanitarian assistance needs, the United States is aware oI and
concerned about possible Iood shortages in the DPRK in 2008. We are prepared to help respond to such
shortages, subject to appropriate program management consistent with international standards. We
assisted U.S. NGOs in providing aid to Iight the outbreak oI inIectious diseases Iollowing Iloods in
North Korea last summer. The United States is also working with U.S. NGOs to carry out a plan to
improve the supply oI electricity at provincial hospitals in North Korea.
We have also made clear to the DPRK how much we value the advancement oI human rights in all
societies and that discussion oI important outstanding issues oI concern, including the DPRKs human
rights record, would be part oI the normalization process.
Full implementation oI the September 2005 Joint Statement could also provide a way Iorward Ior the
transIormation oI overall security relations in Northeast Asia. We remain committed to replacing the
1953 Armistice with a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. The United States
believes that discussions oI a Korean Peninsula peace regime could begin among the directly related
parties once the DPRK has disabled its existing nuclear Iacilities, has provided a complete and
correct declaration oI all oI its nuclear programs, and is on the road to complete denuclearization. We
can achieve a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula once the DPRK Iully discloses
and abandons its nuclear weapons programs. We also hope to explore the development oI a Northeast
Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, which could help Iurther solidiIy the cooperative relationships
built through the Six-Party process.
The Road Ahead
While we have made important progress toward the Iull implementation oI the September 2005 Joint
Statement, much work remains on the road to veriIiable denuclearization oI the DPRK. We must
continue to move Iorward in the Six-Party process to realize the DPRKs abandonment oI all Iissile
material and nuclear weapons in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement, as well as its
return to the Treaty on Non-ProliIeration oI Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA saIeguards. We will
continue to work closely with our Six-Party partners as we move Iorward on the tough tasks that lie
ahead.
Thank you Ior the opportunity to appear beIore you today. I am happy to answer your questions.
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5hA5B68KuThmYMGkB8F5tHltemsNg
North Korea warns U.S. pressure could aggravate nuclear standoff
9 hours ago
[Accessed 2008-02-08T15:40Z]
SEOUL, South Korea - North Korea warned the United States on Friday [2008-02-08] pressure over its
nuclear weapons programs will only aggravate the standoII and could lead to an "explosive crisis."
North Korea's Rodong Sinmun newspaper issued the warning, accusing what it called "hardline
conservative Iorces in the U.S." oI seeking to increase pressure on Pyongyang in an attempt to disrupt
eIIorts to end the nuclear dispute through dialogue.
"As shown in the previous nuclear crises on the Korean peninsula, pursuing a policy oI Iorce would
only bring about an explosive crisis, not a resolution oI the problem," the paper said in a commentary,
carried by the country's Korean Central News Agency.
"Everything achieved through dialogue so Iar would evaporate into the air," it said, warning oI an
unspeciIied "corresponding response iI bellicose U.S. Iorces" continue to put pressure on North Korea.
The paper accused hardline U.S. oIIicials oI calling Ior an end to negotiations with North Korea on the
nuclear dispute, raising the North's human rights record and seeking to build a missile-deIence system
in the region.
The warning came as six-country talks on the nuclear dispute, which made progress in shutting down
and disabling the North's nuclear reactor, are now at a deadlock over Pyongyang's reIusal to provide a
complete list oI its nuclear programs.
North Korea says it gave the U.S. a declaration in November as it promised to do by the end oI 2007
but Washington says Pyongyang never produced "complete and correct" documentation.
The U.S. Embassy in Seoul was not immediately available Ior comment on the Lunar New Year
holiday.
Meanwhile, an aide to U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and two U.S. experts on North Korea plan to visit
the North next week to tour its main nuclear reactor and meet with oIIicials, Lugar's spokesman Andy
Fisher said.
A Iocus oI the visit by Keith Luse, the Lugar aide, and North Korea specialists Joel Wit and SiegIried
Hecker, will be Pyongyang's interest in a U.S. program Ior dismantling Cold War-era weapons oI mass
destruction, Fisher said.
Lugar said Wednesday the program, which he co-Iounded, could be applied to North Korea.
U.S. One-sided Hardline Policy Denounced
Pyongyang, February 8 (KCNA) -- The U.S. hardline conservative Iorces are nowadays making
outcries that the U.S. should show its "will" through the one-sided hardline policy and put the "human
rights" issue on the table oI negotiations Ior the settlement oI the nuclear issue to intensiIy pressure
upon the DPRK.
In the meantime they call Ior providing dialogues at all levels to establish the missile deIence system
involving the U.S., Japan and Australia and closely cooperate with one another.
In this regard Rodong Sinmun today in a signed commentary terms their ill-minded remarks an act oI
going against dialogue and peace aimed to strengthen the pressure upon the DPRK through the high-
handed policy and destroy the process oI denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula and thus drive the
situation back to that beIore the six-party talks, instead oI seeking a negotiated solution to the issue.
The attitude oI the U.S. hardline conservative Iorces against dialogue and negotiation is a
maniIestation oI their way oI thinking in the Cold War era, the commentary says, and goes on:
The U.S. hardline conservative Iorces are playing a tacit trick, turning aside Irom the reality with the
wrong viewpoint. Lurking behind such actions is a sinister purpose to extremely sharpen the DPRK-
U.S. relations and create an international environment Iavorable Ior the realization oI their hostile
policy toward the DPRK.
It can be typically evidenced by the Iact that they are scheming to expand the sphere oI MD by
enlisting not only Japan but Australia in it. The high-handed attitude oI the U.S. hardline conservatives,
who attach more importance to the military tough policy than to dialogue, is an expression oI their
unilateralism and supremacy.
II they continue to persist in one-sided hardline policy, the DPRK will be compelled to take due
countermeasures. The DPRK has no debt to the U.S. The one-Ior-one principle is the DPRK's way oI
counteraction and it is its stand that iI one do a thing Ior the other, latter would do the same. The DPRK
never allows anything oI deIaming its selI-conIidence and dignity to be done. The U.S. hardline
conservative Iorces should give up their one-sided tough policy, well aware oI the DPRK's unshakable
principle and will. The one-sided hardline policy will bring no good but only harm.
II the U.S. hardline conservative Iorces drive the situation oI the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK-
U.S. relations to the worst phase, persistently reIusing to Iind a negotiated solution to the issue, the
eIIorts made so Iar will come to naught and the U.S. would be chieIly to blame Ior the results.
U.S. Pact With North Korea May Hinge on Syria
By JAY SOLOMON
February 8, 2008; Page A5
WASHINGTON -- As the Bush administration seeks to cinch a disarmament deal with North Korea,
questions about Pyongyang's past deIense cooperation with Syria have emerged as perhaps the
principal stumbling block to a successIul completion oI the pact.
North Korea missed a Dec. 31 deadline to Iully declare the extent oI its nuclear activities, as called Ior
under a six-country negotiating process. But U.S. negotiators are voicing guarded conIidence that they
will eventually gain disclosure Irom Pyongyang on two key elements oI its nuclear program: the
number oI atomic weapons and North Korea's believed attempt to develop a uranium-enrichment
capacity to produce nuclear Iuel.
It is the issue oI North Korea's believed assistance to third countries, particularly Syria, where U.S.
oIIicials say there remains signiIicant distance between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea
continues to deny it has given any nuclear assistance to Syrian President Bashar Assad's government,
though it hasn't denied conventional military support. And the international community itselI remains
divided over what they believe was the Iull extent oI Pyongyang's military assistance to Damascus in
recent years.
"The Syria issue is where we really need to push," said a U.S. oIIicial involved in the six-party
negotiations, which also include Russia, China, Japan and South Korea. "It's the one where we haven't
made any headway."
Media disclosure oI an Israeli missile strike inside Syria last September brought to international
attention the issue oI North Korea's possible nuclear assistance to Damascus. The Israeli government
declined to comment on its raid along Syria's Euphrates River, and Damascus has denied it has been
attempting to develop a nuclear capacity, either Ior civilian or military use. But a number oI U.S. and
European oIIicials Iamiliar with the intelligence have said in recent weeks that they believe Israel
destroyed a nascent nuclear reactor Syria was developing in cooperation with North Korea.
These oIIicials said spy satellites detected North Korean workers regularly appearing at the Euphrates
site. And photographs taken oI the Iacility showed its dimensions and structure bore numerous
similarities to the Yongbyon nuclear reactor North Korea is currently disabling as part oI its
disarmament agreement with the U.S. Satellite photos also showed Syrian bulldozers had cleared the
site days aIter the Israeli strike, a sign to some counterproliIeration experts that Damascus was
attempting to cover up its activities. A senior European diplomat working on Middle East issues said
Western governments, aIter reviewing intelligence on the Israeli strike, have reached "some sort oI
common ground...that there seems to have been cooperation between Syria and North Korea" on
nuclear development.
Still, seeking to clariIy the extent oI North Korea's activities inside Syria remains a major obstacle Ior
the U.S. and other countries attempting to Iinalize the nuclear agreement with Pyongyang, say U.S.
oIIicials. Neither Syria nor Israel has been willing to provide inIormation to inspectors Irom the United
Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, about the activities oI the site the
Israelis destroyed. And, even inside the U.S. government, intelligence inIormation concerning the
Israeli action has been tightly controlled by just a Iew senior oIIicials.
The result is that there remains a lack oI consensus among the Iive nations negotiating with North
Korea over what exactly Pyongyang is supposed to divulge. "Some actors believe that what's been
disclosed |about Syria| is serious and it's nuclear. But it's not universally accepted," said the oIIicial
close to the six-party talks.
Write to Jay Solomon at jay.solomonwsj.com
Report: Syria has built 3 facilities at site of IAF strike
By JPOST.COM STAFF
Feb 10, 2008 20:24
Three more installations near the location bombed by IAF planes in Syria have been built, Channel 2
reported on Sunday evening.
It was unclear what purpose the Iacilities were to serve but satellite images taken by DigitalGlobe, a
private company in Longmont, Colorado, clearly showed three new compounds circling an installation
which was built in place oI the old one, destroyed by Israel in September 2007.
Foreign media reports, some quoting unidentiIied US oIIicials, have said the strike hit a nuclear
installation linked to North Korea. Damascus denies it has an undeclared atomic program, and North
Korea has said it was not involved in any such project.
US Intel Links Iran With Nuke Bomb Bid
By GEORGE JAHN
Thursday, February 14, 2008; 8:38 AM
|EXCERPT|
VIENNA, Austria -- The U.S. has recently shared sensitive inIormation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency on key aspects oI Iran's nuclear program that Washington says shows Tehran was
directly engaged in trying to make an atomic weapon, diplomats told The Associated Press on
Thursday.
The diplomats said Washington also gave the IAEA permission to conIront Iran with at least some oI
the evidence in an attempt to pry details out oI the Islamic republic on the activities, as part oI the U.N.
nuclear watchdog's attempts to investigate Iran's suspicious nuclear past.
The decision by the U.S. administration to declassiIy its intelligence and indirectly share it with Iran
through the IAEA was a clear reIlection oI Washington's' drive to pressure Iran into admitting that it
had Iocused part oI its nuclear eIIorts toward developing a weapons program.
While the Americans have previously declassiIied and then Iorwarded intelligence to the IAEA to help
its investigations, they do so on a selective basis.
Following Israel's bombing oI a Syrian site late last year, and media reports citing unidentiIied U.S.
oIIicials as saying the target was a nuclear installation, IAEA chieI Mohamed ElBaradei turned, in vain
to the U.S. in asking Ior details on what was struck, said a diplomat who like others asked Ior
anonymity in exchange Ior divulging conIidential inIormation.
Shared in the past two weeks was material on a laptop computer reportedly smuggled out oI Iran, said
another diplomat, accredited to the IAEA. In 2005, U.S. intelligence assessed that inIormation as
indicating that Tehran had been working on details oI nuclear weapons, including missile trajectories
and ideal altitudes Ior exploding warheads.
He said that aIter declassiIication, U.S. intelligence also was Iorwarded on two other issues the
"Green Salt Project" a plan the U.S. alleges links diverse components oI a nuclear weapons program,
including uranium enrichment, high explosives testing and a missile re-entry vehicle, and material in
Iran's possession showing how to mold uranium metal into warhead Iorm.
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataIdnk00100&num3248
North Korean Newspaper Denies North Korea's Alleged Nuclear Connection with Syria
By Jeong Jae Sung
|2008-02-14 15:49 |
Chosun Shinbo once again denied North Koreas alleged nuclear connection with Syria, saying the
allegation was unIounded.
North Korea clearly stipulated its commitment not to transIer nuclear materials, technology, or know-
how in the October 3 Agreement. That alone should dismiss the allegation, said Chosun Shinbo in the
article published in its internet edition under the title, The U.S. maneuver against North Korea (Part
II)- Arbitrary stigmatization against North Korea as one responsible Ior nuclear proliIeration. Chosun
Shinbo is a pro-Pyongyang newspaper published by Chongryon (the General Association oI Korean
Residents in Japan).
The Foreign Ministry spokesman oI North Korea also said on January 4, The North Korea has already
stipulated its commitment not to transIer nuclear materials, technology or know-how under the October
3 Agreement. That Iact itselI is enough to dismiss the allegation against North Korea.
Chonsun Shinbo denounced those neoconservative Iorces oI the U.S. saying, American hard-line
conservatives are arguing that North Korea should include an explanation about the allegation when it
submits a declaration oI nuclear programs. By doing so, they are trying to sway the media to their side
and putting an obstacle to the eIIorts to settle the current nuclear dispute.
The allegation oI North Koreas nuclear collaboration with Syria began circulating in the U.S. media
in September last year. However, the Six Party Talks meeting that took place shortly aIter did not make
a big issue out oI the allegation, Chosun Shinbo said.
The newspaper stressed that U.S. envoy Christopher Hill also dismissed the allegation at the closed
session meeting oI U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian PaciIic AIIairs that took
place on December 12 last year.
At that time, South Korean media reported that Hill had said at the meeting that whether or not North
Korea collaborated with Syria on a nuclear program in the past would not have any inIluence on the
current nuclear negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. as long as North Korea has no nuclear
connection with Syria at the present time. However, Hill was also reported to have said that North
Korea must prove that North Korea did and will not pose a nuclear threat regardless oI whether or not
North Korea engaged in any nuclear proliIeration activities in the past
In addition, Chosun Shinbo contended that it is unIair to demand North Korea to provide an
explanation about the allegation oI UEP (Uranium Enrichment Program). The newspaper quoted David
Albright, president oI the Institute Ior Science and International Security (ISIS) as saying, No one
believes that North Korea has technology to use a uranium enrichment program to develop nuclear
weapons.
On February 10, David Albright said in his interview with Radio Free Asia that what needs to be
declared by North Korea is plutonium and the U.S. should not lower the bar Ior declaration standards.
However, the U.S. needs to extend the deadline Ior declaration and makes sure North Korea declares its
plutonium stockpile, said David Albright.
David Albright said that he conIirmed Irom a high rank oIIicial that North Korea declared to have
produced a total oI 30 kg oI plutonium in its Iirst declaration draIt. He added that although the issues oI
UEP and nuclear proliIeration can be discussed later, North Korea must provide a Iull and complete
declaration oI its nuclear Iacilities.
Envoy urges not to dwell on past N.K. nuclear acts
2008/02/14 06:03 KST
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (Yonhap) -- A Chinese diplomat on Wednesday urged negotiators at
the North Korean denuclearization talks not to dwell on Pyongyang's past conduct, the main sticking
point between North Korea and the United States.
"The point is, we should not just go back in the past to say what you have done. The most
important thing is what we should do in the Iuture," Ruan Zongze, minister counselor at the Chinese
embassy in Washington, said at a Iorum.
The diplomat said North Korea was making eIIorts to implement the six-party agreements by
disabling its nuclear reactor and Iacilities. The accords call Ior action Ior action, requiring other
countries to provide economic assistance and other incentives, he said, and the North Korea-U.S.
arguments over removing Pyongyang Irom the U.S. list oI terrorist-sponsoring states, one oI the
incentives most coveted by Pyongyang, "play a part in handicapping" progress, the diplomat said.
But he described the current impasse as a tactical one rather than strategic.
China is the host oI the six-party talks, also involving South and North Korea, the U.S., Russia
and Japan, aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Wednesday marks the anniversary oI the
Feb. 13, 2007, agreement in which Pyongyang agreed to eventually give up its nuclear weapons and
programs, in return Ior Iinancial and political beneIits.
As interim steps, Pyongyang was required by the end oI 2007 to disable its reactor and auxiliary
Iacilities that were churning out weapons-grade plutonium, and submit a declaration detailing its
nuclear activities and any proliIeration overseas.
But North Korea missed the deadline, and while disablement was proceeding, Pyongyang's initial
oIIer on the declaration Iell short oI U.S. expectations. Washington wants a "complete and correct"
disclosure that addresses nuclear Iacilities, material and any transIer to other countries.
Christopher Hill, the top U.S. nuclear negotiator, told a Senate hearing last week the six-party
members need to know about the history oI Pyongyang's nuclear activities, speciIically proliIeration.
"We believe that, as we go Iorward, we need more transparency Irom the North Koreans on this,"
he said. "We need to know what they were up to in the past. We need to have a clear picture oI that so
that we can go Iorward."
Critics oIten cite Pyongyang's previous conduct to argue the communist regime cannot be trusted.
North Korea is accused oI running a secret nuclear weapons program, violating a 1994 bilateral
agreement with Washington to suspend all atomic activities. The deal, known as the Geneva Agreed
Framework, collapsed as a result.
Ruan, speaking at a Iorum sponsored by the Institute oI Corean (Korean)-American Studies,
talked about "speculation oI some disagreement" between North Korea and the U.S., apparently
reIerring to the dispute over Pyongyang's past activities, and hoped Ior a "creative" resolution.
He repeatedly emphasized that the six-party agreements clearly require action Ior action. "What
does action Ior action mean? That means once DPRK is moving towards, is taking some measures Ior
disablement or Ior declaration, at some time that requires economic assistance, not only Irom the U.S.,
but Irom other countries," he said. DPRK stands Ior the Democratic People's Republic oI Korea, North
Korea's oIIicial name.
"At the same time, there are some very critical issues," the diplomat said, citing the removal oI
Pyongyang Irom the U.S. terrorism list.
The issue is under discussion, "but certainly they play a part in handicapping the progress," he
said.
On China's relations with North Korea, Ruan said economic relations were growing, but it was
"really hard" to say how much leverage Beijing has over its neighbor and ideological ally.
"It is not China's way, or China's philosophy, to urge another country to do something it doesn't
want," he said. "So everything should be conducted through political dialogue."
http://www.cIr.org/publication/15514/
U.S. Envoy Says North Korean Uranium Program Remains Stumbling Block
Interviewee:
Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary oI State Ior East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs
Interviewer:
Robert McMahon, Deputy Editor
February 15, 2008
The denuclearization deal signed by North Korea on February 13, 2007, marked its Iirst anniversary
stalled over Pyongyangs lack oI a Iull declaration oI its programs. The envoy leading the U.S. eIIort in
the Six-Party Talks, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill, says the dismantling oI the
Yongbyon reactor remains a positive sign oI cooperation. But he says a chieI problem at this stage is
getting North Korea to admit to any past uranium-enrichment eIIorts as well as to dealings with third
parties like Syria. North Korean oIIicials are prepared to say they have no enrichment or export
programs under way, but that is not suIIicient, Hill says. We really do need to know what all went on
beIore, iI it stopped, when did it stop. In response to criticism oI the negotiating process by the U.S.
human rights envoy, Hill said rights issues will eventually become central to the talks.
Were about six weeks past the deadline for North Korea to declare its nuclear activities and at
the one-year anniversary of the denuclearization deal. In some circles its seen as stopped in its
tracks or even off the rails. Should we expect to see a declaration from North Korea in the near
future?
In order to go Iorward, were going to need to get a declaration. A declaration is part oI what is called
Phase Two, and its called Ior very explicitly in the agreement, including in the October |2007|
agreement. So the North Koreans know they have to provide a declaration. The problem is not that
theyre not willing to provide a declaration. The problem is they dont want to give us a complete and
correct one. And we dont want to accept something thats less than complete, less than correct. So
were continuing to go back and Iorth with them on this. And we certainly made it clear to our other
partners in the process that we need a complete, correct |declaration|. So I dont want to talk about the
process being oII the rails. In many respects some good things have happened, including the disabling
oI the nuclear Iacility, which is something they had never done beIore. So were going to stick with it
and see iI we can get something.
The weapons-grade plutoniumapparently toward the end of last year the North Koreans came
in with an estimate that was seen as not realistic. Can you talk about that? And then separate
from that, the uranium-enrichment program?
Let me break the declaration down into three major components. First, nuclear materials. Second,
nuclear Iacilities. Third, nuclear programs. Under nuclear materials, they are prepared to give us a
Iigure Ior the separated plutonium. The plutonium they produced Irom this Iacility is presumably
sitting in a bunker somewhere. From my way oI thinking, it is not so important what the Iigure is. What
is important is that we be able to veriIy it. So people who say its too small really are in no position to
say that until we can veriIy it. Now, iI it comes in at IiIty kilos and the veriIication process turns out it
should be sixty, then we have a gap oI ten. Thats a problem. II it comes in at thirty and the veriIication
shows that thirty is correct, then we dont have a problem. Under the Iacilities, we kind oI know what
kind oI Iacilities they have. They know what kind oI Iacilities they have. They know what we know
about their Iacilities. Well probably be okay on Iacilities.
The third area is the big problem: thats programs. And here theyre prepared to tell us all about the
plutonium program, but we already know about the plutonium program. We have U.S. technicians
crawling around Yongbyon as we speak dealing with that. The real thing we need to know about is the
uranium enrichment and any export programs that theyve had. Now theyre prepared to say, in the
category oI uranium enrichment and the export programs, that they dont have anything going now, and
they wont in the Iuture. And some oI our partners are saying, Well, two out oI three is not bad. But
we really do need to know what all went on beIore, iI it stopped, when did it stop, etc. We really need
clarity on this. Again, some people say, Why do you worry so much about the past? Well, Irankly we
need to know what theyve been up to. And I dont think we can really go Iorward with some oI our
obligations until we have a complete picture.
Another stumbling block mentioned is the issue of third-state assistance, in this case Syria. Thats
generating a lot of concern. What is the extent of dialogue on that issue, on assistance to Syria,
the site that was targeted by the Israelis [in September 2007]? And will the Six-Party Talks get
into that issue?
Weve made it abundantly clear to the North Koreans that the issue oI nuclear cooperation with abroad,
whether its Syria or other stateswe need to know all about that. And its not enough to do as theyre
doing now which is to say, We dont have any, we wont in the Iuture. We need to know what
theyve done in the past. We do know some inIormation about some oI their programs Irom the past.
Some oI this came out only recently, and some oI the issues you are alluding to in Syria are Iairly new
issues. So we need to know what theyve been up to. And I would say that in order to go Iorward, we
need to get some clarity on that.
Theres been some calls within the United States from the human rights community, human
rights envoys, for making human rights part of the dialogue, and maybe even raising the issue of
a Helsinki-type process [of engagement]. Could that work at this stage?
Well, people who are well inIormed on this issue understand that as we get through this declaration, we
will then go to something called the Third Phase. Now what we would like in the Third Phase is Ior
North Korea to not only dismantle all oI their programs, but also to give up, to abandon, pursuant to the
September 2005 agreement, to abandon their separated plutonium, and any other Iissile material they
have. Now, in order to get that, were going to put a Iew things on the table. And one oI them is
normalization with the United States, a bilateral normalization process. As part oI normalization, we
will oI course be discussing human rights, and we have been discussing human rights. And I dont
think we should ever be aIraid to discuss human rights.
The problem is not that theyre not willing to provide a declaration. The problem is they dont want to
give us a complete and correct one. And we dont want to accept something thats less than complete,
less than correct.
Human rights needs to be understood by the North Koreans as really the price oI admission to the
international community. So as we discuss our normalization, oI course this subject will be discussed.
But what we would like the North Koreans to come to understand is that human rights is something that
they dont have a choice on, that iI they want to join the international community, they have to start
living up to some human rights standards. This is not just some desiderata on the part oI the United
States. This has to do with international obligations. And so, to the extent that we can convey this, oI
course well convey it through this bilateral process oI leading to normalization.
So in Phase Three, that focus comes more into sharper relief?
Yes, because in Phase Three, we would put several things on the table. One is the normalization path
with the United States. Obviously human rights would be a part oI that as we go Iorward. But we will
also be putting on the table an eIIort to get North Korea access to international Iinancial institutions and
to international organizations, generally, that theyre not a part oI. And here, too, human rights will be a
part oI that.
Very soon South Korea will have a new president taking office, President Lee [Myung-bak] . Do
you see that as possibly a move that will create some sort of catalyst for momentum?
First oI all weve worked well with the South Koreans throughout the Six-Party process. And this new
administration is indicating it will have a somewhat diIIerent approach on some oI the issues, namely
North-South |relations|. The president-elect, President Lee Myung-bak, has talked about having more
reciprocity involved in the assistance that South Korea gives to North Korea directly. So we can
probably expect some change, but it will obviously be up to the new administration as it takes oII to
survey the situation and see what it wants, and what it wants to do.
South Korea and China, there are concerns that their sort of unconditional aid to North Korea
has in some ways undermined the leverage that could be brought to bear in really forcing the
North Koreans to accept more readily some of the conditions of the agreement. What is your
view on that?
Well, its important that what South Korea and what China does directly with North Korea gets
somehow coordinated with the Six-Party process because we cant have a situation where the things we
give North Korea through the Six-Party process become sort oI to the right oI the decimal point
compared to whats going in directly.
But I do want to caution American audiences, in particular, to understand that in Korea, there is a real
Ieeling that what happened in Korea in the middle oI the twentieth century that resulted in the division
oI the Korean peninsula came about through no Iault oI Korean people, but rather through sort oI
international big powers arrangements. And indeed, the division oI the Korean peninsula came about
by happenstance, where U.S. troops took surrendered Japanese troops south oI the 38th parallel, and
Soviet troops took their surrender north oI the 38th parallel. In short, this division is a great tragedy in
Korea. And we as Americans need to be sensitive to the Iact that many Koreanseven Koreans who
are not so anxious to reunite, or who see all the impediments oI uniIication, the economic challenges
involvedeven to those Koreans, there is a great deal oI anxiety about what happened in the mid-
twentieth century. And iI we end up wagging our Iinger at Koreans and telling them how to deal with
North Korea, we could be doing that at some peril to the relationship.
At this stage whats the concern that theres this lame-duck feeling, that people are waiting for
this process to play out, and then a new U.S. administration to come in? Has this been a
hindrance at this point, this perception? Are you getting this from Asian diplomats?
Im certainly not getting it Irom the North Koreans, who indicated a desire to try to wrap this up in
2008. But it is Iair to say that as the days and weeks roll by, where we havent got through Phase Two,
obviously it becomes a greater challenge to try to wrap everything up on the timescale that we want it
wrapped up. So we do need to pick up the pace iI were going to succeed here. But whats been very
important Ior the North Koreans to understand is this issue oI dealing with North Koreas nuclear
ambitions has not been politicized in the United States. We have both parties, Democrats and
Republicans, very much wanting to see this resolved, and pretty much wanting to see it resolved on
similar terms. So Im hopeIul that the North Koreans understand that, and Irankly the sooner the better.
II we can get this resolved, the sooner North Korea can begin to address the very acute needs oI their
people.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/18/asia/AS-GEN-NKorea-Syria-Nuclear.php
Report: North Korea provided technological assistance to Syria to build nuclear reactor
Monday, February 18, 2008
SEOUL, South Korea: North Korea helped Syria build an underground nuclear reactor in the Middle
East country, a South Korean news report said Monday.
"The U.S. government has circumstantial (evidence) that the North provided technology assistance to
build an underground reactor in Syria," South Korea's Hankook Ilbo newspaper reported, citing an
unidentiIied diplomatic channel.
U.S. Embassy oIIicials in Seoul were not immediately available Ior comment on the report.
North Korea has repeatedly dismissed its alleged nuclear connection with Syria, saying that it had
already pledged it would never transIer any nuclear material or technology out oI the country.
Monday's report came as the international process aimed at stripping North Korea oI its nuclear
weapons programs was at a deadlock over Pyongyang's reIusal to give a complete list oI its nuclear
programs as required by a landmark agreement.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill arrived in Beijing earlier Monday Ior talks with
Chinese oIIicials on how to jump-start the stalled disarmament deal with North Korea.
The U.S. nuclear envoy was scheduled to visit Seoul and Tokyo this week Ior similar consultations.
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/02/100979.htm
Evening Walk-Through at Six-Party Talks
Kerry Center Hotel
Beijing, China
February 18, 2008
[EXCERPT]
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hello. Its nice to be back in Beijing. Are there any questions?
QUESTION: Did you have any meetings today? And, what are your plans Ior tomorrow?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I was over at the Foreign Ministry today, and we had a lengthy
meeting on bilateral issues, in particular on preparation Ior Secretary Rices trip here next week. And
then tomorrow morning I have meeting also at the MFA with He YaIei.
QUESTION: So did you meet with Mr. Wu Dawei today?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, he is not here today. So Im going to meet him later in the trip
-- probably in Tokyo.
QUESTION: Are you going to meet with the North Koreans here? Is there still that possibility?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, as is always our practice, we always let them know that I am
here, and we dont have anything set up yet. But iI its possible, I am here tomorrow. But we dont
have any meetings scheduled just yet.
QUESTION: But you would like to have a meeting?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: II the DPRK is interested, I am here.
QUESTION: What would you say is the purpose oI your trip? Because it seems like the Six-Party
Talks are kind oI stalled right now, is it to sort oI revive the talks?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, the purpose is that we have Secretary Rice coming out here Ior
her Iirst trip in a quite a while actually. So I am here to discuss some oI the elements oI that visit. And
also to talk to Six-Party members about how we are perceiving the situation. Just to sort oI be in touch.
QUESTION: Can you tell us how the U.S. side is perceiving the Six-Party situation right now?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think that everyone knows we are trying to get through phase
two, which involves a declaration on the part oI the DPRK. We dont have that declaration yet. And so
we are a little stuck on the need Ior a complete and correct declaration.
QUESTION: There seems to be a stalemate over a couple oI |inaudible| regarding the declaration and
taking North Korea oII the terrorism list. How do you plan to resolve that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First oI all, I dont know iI things are in stalemate, because
stalemate implies they cannot change. I think the issue is, the DPRK needs to be prepared to make a
complete and correct declaration. Im not too concerned about the sequencing oI their obligations and
our obligations. I think there are ways to deal with the sequencing. I think the real problem is they have
not yet been willing to provide a complete and correct declaration.
QUESTION: So are you willing to move simultaneously?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, I dont think sequencing is the problem. I think the problem
is, as yet, they have not been prepared to provide a complete and correct declaration. So to talk about
sequencing at this point is a little premature.
QUESTION: Do you plan to go to Pyongyang |inaudible| --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No
QUESTION: -- with the New York Philharmonic Orchestra?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, because I will be in Seoul Ior the inauguration oI the new
president. It happens to be on the same day.
[deletia]
.
Released on February 18, 2008
Airport Departure From Six-Party Talks
Beijing, China
February 19, 2008
4 pm
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I had a good meeting this morning at the Chinese Ministry oI
Foreign AIIairs with Mr. He YaIei, who deals with Asia-wide issues. So we discussed various issues in
Asia. In addition, beginning at around 11:30 and concluding just a Iew minutes ago, I met with our
DPRK counterpart Kim Kye-gwan at the DPRK Embassy, and we reviewed the overall situation in
Phase II with particular attention paid to the issue oI the declaration. And I think we had good,
substantial discussions -- a good exchange oI views on that. We agreed we will stay in contact, and
now Im oII to Seoul.
QUESTION: Did you have any new ideas oI how to move things Iorward?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We discussed ideas that China has had and how things could be
moved. So it was a good, substantial discussion.
QUESTION: Was that concerning the declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It was mainly on the declaration, but we also had a look at what the
next phase might look like -- that is, so-called Phase III. But oI course we cant get to Phase III until we
get through Phase II.
QUESTION: Were they prepared to submit Iull and complete declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we had a discussion oI what we Ielt, what we believe needs
to be included in that. I think they understand our point oI view. But we wont have a complete and
correct declaration until we have a complete and correct declaration. So Im not sure iI we yet have an
understanding on that. But it was a good exchange oI views on it.
QUESTION: So how long do you think you have to wait to get this?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I want to report on my conversations. I want to give a report
on that conversation to Secretary Rice, and obviously we will be discussing it in the next week. And oI
course shell be in the region next week, and Ill be back in the region. So well see iI we can get
through this issue. We are going to work very hard on it on the coming weeks, and I think the Chinese
are also very interested in doing that. Ill be seeing Wu Dawei in Tokyo, and Ill be able to report to
him on my discussions with the DPRK.
QUESTION: Any change |inaudible|? Whats the indication Irom North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I dont want to say that, except to say that it was a good and
substantial discussion. We really went through all oI the elements that we would expect to see in the
declaration. And we also discussed the overall IulIillment oI Phase II and what we can look ahead to in
Phase III. So it was a very complete review oI where we are and what we need to do in order to make
progress.
QUESTION: Does |inaudible| the Syria project?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, we discussed all oI the elements that we believe need to be
included, including the Syrian matter and uranium enrichment. So all oI the elements.
QUESTION: Sir, youve been involved in negotiations with Milosevic Ior a long time. Do you have
any comments on the current situation in Kosovo?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I am not in the position really to comment on the ongoing
situation in Kosovo. OI course, I spent some years there working on what was at the time a broad
autonomy deal, in Rambouillet. As I emphasized to the Chinese interlocutors today, it is quite a unique
situation in Kosovo -- really very unique. There is nothing like it in the world. Secretary Rice made
clear in her statement we are pleased at the declaration oI independence, and we also Ieel very strongly
that we want to have a good and substantial relationship with Serbia and ultimately with a Balkans that
is ultimately at peace and one that is integrated into a European-Atlantic system. OK, well see you
later.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jDsrn5qmVUANHrmtASIggyXIhI9gD8UTEFRO0
US, North Korean Envoys in Beijing Talks
By HENRY SANDERSON 42 minutes ago
[Accessed 2008-02-19T15:10Z]
BEIJING (AP) Senior U.S. and North Korean negotiators met Tuesday Ior hurriedly arranged talks
on salvaging a sputtering process to eliminate the North's nuclear programs.
The meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice
Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan was their Iirst since December.
In the two months since, IitIul progress in ending North Korea's nuclear programs has coem to a virtual
stop over diIIerences on whether the North has made a Iull accounting oI its nuclear Iacilities.
North Korea wants Washington to remove it Irom terrorism and other blacklists beIore making the
disclosures.
Hill said he had "a good substantial discussion" with Kim inside North Korea's embassy in Beijing, but
indicated no breakthroughs had been made.
Hill said he again urged North Korea to make a Iull disclosure oI its nuclear programs to keep alive a
year-old disarmament agreement.
"We had a discussion about what we think needs to be included in that. I think they understand our
point oI view, but we won't have a complete and correct declaration until we have a complete and
correct declaration," he said at the Beijing airport beIore Ilying to Seoul.
"So I am not sure we yet have an understanding on that," Hill said.
Hill said a Iull declaration should include uranium enrichment and Pyongyang's relations with Syria, to
which it has been accused oI providing nuclear assistance. Damascus denies it has an undeclared
atomic program, and North Korea has said it was not involved in any such project.
The wrangling is the latest in nearly Iive years oI tortuous diplomacy over North Korea's nuclear
programs, during which it exploded a nuclear device only to later agree to abandon the programs.
A February 2007 agreement and a Iollow-up pact in October endorsed by China, Japan, Russia and
South Korea as well as the United States and North Korea promised the North energy and other
assistance in return Ior relinquishing its nuclear programs. It also committed Washington to begin
removing trade sanctions and the terrorism designation.
South Korea said Tuesday that 2,830 tons oI steel will be shipped to North Korea on Friday as part oI
promised aid under the disarmament agreements. The shipment is about a 10th oI what the South
Korean government will send to North Korea beIore June, the South's UniIication Ministry said.
While it has shut and begun dismantling its main nuclear Iacility as the agreement called Ior, North
Korea missed a year-end deadline Ior disclosing all its nuclear programs. In recent weeks, it has shown
signs oI slowing down its disarmament. At the same time, with President George W. Bush leaving
oIIice in a year, Washington has shown added urgency about North Korea.
"This administration is running out oI time," said Jonathan Pollack, a Korea watcher at the U.S. Naval
War College. "This was one oI the Iew things we could say that the Bush administration could cite as a
possible accomplishment oI one kind or another by the end oI the year. But it's looking tough, barring a
sudden breakthrough."
Adding urgency to Hill's mission, Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice is to visit the region next week,
stopping in Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul, where she is to attend the inauguration oI South Korean
President-elect Lee Myung-bak.
Hill said he would also meet China's nuclear envoy in Tokyo later this week in a bid to push the
process Iorward.
"We're going to work very hard on it in the coming days and week. I think the Chinese are also very
interested in doing that."
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20080220/FOREIGN/435014368/1001
U.S. presses N. Korea on Syria
By Nicholas Kralev
February 20, 2008
The United States, alarmed by mounting evidence that North Korea gave nuclear assistance to Syria,
has rejected pressure Irom some oI its partners in six-nation talks to compromise on an overdue
declaration oI Pyongyang's nuclear activities, U.S. oIIicials said yesterday.
The declaration, which was due at the end oI December, would complete the second phase oI an
October deal aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and clear the way Ior promised political
and economic beneIits to the communist state.
"We won't have a complete and correct declaration until we have a complete and correct declaration,"
Christopher R. Hill, the chieI U.S. negotiator, said yesterday aIter meeting with his North Korean
counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, in Beijing. "So I'm not sure iI we yet have an understanding on that."
The Syrian connection has become a major problem Ior the United States since an Israeli air strike in
Syria in September. The target was widely reported to be a nuclear Iacility under construction with help
Irom North Korea. Current and Iormer U.S. oIIicials said yesterday that intelligence points to a
plutonium-related Iacility.
Yesterday, Mr. Hill said the North's declaration must account Ior the Syrian connection. "We discussed
all oI the elements that we believe need to be included, including the Syrian matter and uranium
enrichment," he said oI his talks with Mr. Kim.
U.S. and Israeli oIIicials have reIused to talk about the September strike, but diplomats and analysts
said even the administration's strongest advocates oI engagement with Pyongyang are worried by what
they have learned Irom intelligence sources.
Only days aIter the bombing, the North's oIIicial KCNA news agency reported that a high-level
meeting between Syria and North Korea had taken place in Pyongyang.
"We've made it abundantly clear to the North Koreans that the issue oI nuclear cooperation abroad,
whether it's with Syria or other states we need to know all about that," Mr. Hill said in a little
noticed interview on Friday.
North Korea currently is saying, " 'We don't have any |nuclear programs|, we won't in the Iuture,' " said
Mr. Hill. But that "is not good enough. ... We need to know what they've done in the past."
He said in the interview on the Council on Foreign Relations Web site that "some oI our partners" in
the six-party talks have told him, "Well, two out oI three is not bad," and "Why do you worry so much
about the past?"
He did not name those countries, and U.S. oIIicials yesterday declined to do so either. But analysts said
it was unlikely that Japan was one oI them. The other participants in the negotiations are China, South
Korea and Russia.
Bruce Klingner, senior research Iellow at the Heritage Foundation, said there has been "a mood shiIt in
Washington" since the air attack in Syria.
"The administration has taken a Iirmer line with North Korea," he said.
At times over the past year, Mr. Klingner said, Mr. Hill has given the impression that he was "lowering
the bar" on the requirements Irom the North, particularly on veriIication oI Pyongyang's claims in the
declaration.
But since the Israeli strike, which was Iollowed by criticism oI the administration's policy by some
Republicans, there has been no room Ior trusting the North Koreans blindly, Mr. Klingner said.
The administration is also insisting that Pyongyang come clean about a uranium enrichment program,
which the United States Iirst accused it oI having in 2002.
In their draIt declaration, the North Koreans say they currently do not have any such program and will
not have one in the Iuture, U.S. oIIicials said. There is no mention, however, oI a past program.
"The real thing we need to know about is the uranium-enrichment and any export programs that they've
had," Mr. Hill said. "I don't think we can really go Iorward with some oI our obligations until we have
a complete picture."
Mr. Hill, who is in the region to prepare Ior Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice's visit to Seoul,
Beijing and Tokyo next week, yesterday denied reports that he had tried to separate the Syrian and the
uranium issues Irom the declaration to help the North Koreans save Iace.
"We are not talking about breaking apart the declaration," he said.
Briefing on Recent Africa Trip and Upcoming Asia Trip
Washington, DC
February 22, 2008
(3:35 p.m. EST)
[EXCERPTS]
SECRETARY RICE: Good aIternoon. I thought I would stop oII in Washington on my way Irom
AIrica to Asia and pick up those oI you who will be going on with me to Asia. Let me just make a Iew
opening remarks and then Im happy to take your questions.
[deletia]
SECRETARY RICE: [deletia] Moving on, I, oI course, tomorrow will travel to Asia, Iirst to South
Korea to attend the inauguration oI the new South Korean President. Ill then go on to China and Japan.
Asia is a place where we have put a lot oI eIIort into strengthening our relationships, particularly our
bilateral relationships, and I really look Iorward to meeting the new South Korean leadership. Weve
had an extensive period now oI strengthening our bilateral security arrangements. Weve had a period
oI negotiating an FTA, a Iree trade agreement and, oI course, working together in the six-party talks to
address the North Korean nuclear challenge. I will also meet, Ior the Iirst time, my new Japanese
counterpart and I look Iorward to that. And I look Iorward to going on to China.
Now obviously, we will have a broad range oI discussions, but I do expect that there will be
considerable discussion oI the six-party talks and how we move Iorward. There has been progress,
particularly on the disabling side. There is more work to do. We need a complete declaration Irom the
North Koreans about both their proliIeration activities, their current program plutonium program,
which they are in the process oI disabling, but also the HEU program, that they need to make clear
what has happened there. So well talk about how to do that.
Let me just note that weve been concerned, oI course, about the proliIeration issue Ior quite a long
time and I will talk to our six-party partners about how we use the six-party Iramework to address
proliIeration issues. Because I am oI the mind that we have the right group oI countries at that table
with the right set oI incentives and disincentives to address not just denuclearization, which obviously
is extremely important, but also proliIeration. And Ill be carrying that message and discussing that
with our partners.
[deletia]
QUESTION: Yes, Madame Secretary, on your Iorthcoming trip, when youre in Beijing, do you --
would you hope to meet with any North Korean delegate? II so -- since theyre a part oI the process,
obviously? And did you plan to? And iI you dont plan to, why dont you plan to?
SECRETARY RICE: I dont plan to. And I just dont think that its something thats useIul at this time
or that is warranted. Chris Hill has recently had those contacts and hell continue to have them. I think
everybody knows what needs to happen here. North Korea is quite aware oI what it needs to do. And I
do look Iorward to talking to the Chinese, the Japanese, the South Koreans about how we can move this
Iorward.
I want to say I do think that the progress that has been made on disabling is something that already
moves us Iurther along than weve really ever been with the North Korean nuclear program. But there
is surely a lot oI work to do in terms oI next stages oI really not just disabling but dismantling. There is
work to be done on, oI course, the accounting Ior various programs. But I dont see any purpose at this
point in meeting with North Koreans.
[deletia]
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN2151989120080222?pageNumber2&virtualBrandChannel0
Rice seeks North Korea solution before window closes
Fri Feb 22, 2008 3:53am EST
By Arshad Mohammed
[EXCERPTS]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice visits South Korea, China and Japan next
week to seek ways to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programs beIore the window closes on the
Bush administration.
[deletia]
At the top oI her agenda will be reviving the six-party agreement under which North Korea has begun to
dismantle key nuclear Iacilities at Yongbyon but has balked at providing a complete declaration oI all oI its
nuclear programs.
[deletia]
According to U.S. oIIicials and analysts, the declaration's sticking point has been Pyongyang's reluctance to
discuss any transIers oI nuclear technology to other nations, notably Syria, as well as its suspected pursuit oI
uranium enrichment.
North Korea has produced plutonium, which can be used to make atomic bombs, at Yongbyon. Uranium
enrichment would give it a second pathway to Iissile material Ior nuclear weapons.
The United States has questions about any possible North Korean role in a suspected Syrian covert nuclear site
that was bombed by Israel in September. Syria has denied having a nuclear program but the case remains murky.
A senior U.S. oIIicial said Washington has begun exploring whether Pyongyang might disclose any proliIeration
and uranium enrichment in a separate document to be kept secret.
"We are Ilexible on this issue. We are open to ideas on how to do that," said the oIIicial, who spoke on condition
that he not be named because oI the sensitivity oI the negotiations.
He said China and South Korea had Iloated ideas to North Korea on what it might say in such a separate
document but the United States had not.
However, he insisted that North Korea must disclose all oI its nuclear programs at the same time to be relieved
oI sanctions under the U.S. state sponsors oI terrorism list and the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
He ruled out the idea oI North Korea making a sequential declaration -- oIIering some inIormation up Iront and
disclosing the proliIeration and uranium enrichment later.
"The diIIiculty with that is that the North is quite clear that ... their expectation is that they would be removed
Irom the terrorism list and TWEA. And those things really are impossible to consider without this issue settled,"
he said.
[deletia]
Scholar: N. Korea denies link to alleged Syria nuke facility hit by IAF
By The Associated Press
Last update - 08:36 23/02/2008
North Korea denies any involvement with a suspected nuclear Iacility in Syria reportedly bombed by
Israel Air Force planes in September, an American researcher who met with oIIicials in Pyongyang
said.
Four years aIter Pakistan's top nuclear scientist conIessed to leaking weapons technology to North
Korea, the North Koreans have denied receiving any such help, SiegIried Hecker, the StanIord
University scientist who met with the oIIicials, said.
The North Koreans dismissed the conIessions Irom Pakistan, saying, "That's your story," Hecker said.
The North Koreans also told Hecker they had nothing to do with a suspected Syrian nuclear site
destroyed by Israeli Iighters in September, he said. News media reports, some quoting unidentiIied
U.S. oIIicials, have said the strike hit a nuclear installation linked to North Korea.
Hecker, a StanIord University proIessor and a Iormer director oI the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
said he questioned North Korean oIIicials on the two issues during a trip to that country Irom Feb.
12-16. Hecker also visited the country's Yongbyon nuclear Iacility on Feb. 14.
Pyongyang's past actions are sticking points in disarmament eIIorts under way now, because under
recent agreements, North Korea is supposed to provide a Iull accounting - "a declaration" - oI its
nuclear programs and activities.
Hecker has visited the North annually Ior the past Iive years, and last week's trip was unoIIicial.
Nevertheless, he pressed North Korean oIIicials, whom he would not identiIy, on issues oI concern to
the United States, he said.
He told a small group oI reporters on Wednesday that he had made plain that the issue oI the Syrian site
destroyed in September was "high on the list oI American concerns." And U.S. oIIicials are still
awaiting North Korea's account oI nuclear ties to Pakistan Iollowing Islamabad's acknowledgments
years ago oI the transIers, he said.
In early 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's top nuclear expert, admitted that he transIerred nuclear
weapons technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Pakistani President Pervez MusharraI wrote in a
memoir in late 2006 that he believed the equipment sent to North Korea included some oI Pakistan's
most technologically advanced nuclear centriIuges.
Enriching uranium, a step toward producing nuclear Iuel Ior weapons, requires centriIuge technology.
Hecker said he told the North Koreans that "one oI the reasons the Americans want a Iull accounting is
because oI those statements."
"When I bring up the Pakistan connection, they say, 'That's your story, we haven't dealt with the
Pakistanis on uranium enrichment," Hecker said.
Asked whether the North Koreans meant they had never done so, Hecker said, "They're talking about
all times: They have not done this with the Pakistanis now or in the past, meaning, have cooperated in
uranium enrichment.
"Since I speciIically posed the question in terms oI having bought the uranium centriIuges, they said,
'We have not, that's your story.'"
As part oI its push Ior a complete declaration Irom North Korea, the U.S. is asking it to address its
suspected uranium enrichment program - an issue that touched oII a nuclear standoII in late 2002.
North Korea denies ever having such a program, and reiterated its denials to Hecker.
Earlier this week, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill said North Korea's declaration must
cover both uranium enrichment and Pyongyang's relations with Syria, to which it has been accused oI
providing nuclear assistance. Hecker said he believed it was possible there were North Korean
connections to the site bombed in September, whose true purpose remains oIIicially unknown.
Damascus has denied having a secret atomic program.
"II you look at potential connections, North Korea has the capabilities in the nuclear arena, so one at
least has to consider that as a possibility," Hecker said.
When he asked the North Korean oIIicials about it, "their comment was, we don't have anything to do
with Syria in the nuclear arena." An October agreement Iorbids North Korea to export nuclear
materials and technology in the Iuture.
Asked whether the North Koreans had denied any involvement with the site bombed by the Israelis,
Hecker said: "No, they were not that speciIic, but then I didn't ask the questions in such a Iashion to try
to pin them down exactly to that site. I should add that I made it very clear that that's the site I was
talking about in terms oI a Syrian connection."
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid20601080&sidacCZxnzyetrc&reIerasia
South Korea, Japan, U.S. May Resume North Korea Preview Talks
By Viola Gienger
Last Updated: February 25, 2008 08:45 EST
Feb. 25 (Bloomberg) -- South Korea, Japan and the U.S. may resume meetings that preceded Iormal
six-nation negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill
said.
The meetings ended under previous administrations in Seoul and Tokyo because they ``didn't go very
well,'' Hill told reporters today in the South Korean capital, where he joined Secretary oI State
Condoleezza Rice at the start oI a three- nation tour oI East Asia.
`Ì would expect that that kind oI trilateral process would be starting up again,'' said Hill, who is
returning to East Asia aIter meetings there earlier this month. ``There seems to be a political will to do
that.'' He didn't say when they might resume.
Rice and Hill are visiting South Korea, China and Japan to conIer on improving cooperation to salvage
the so-called six- party talks. The stalled negotiations, which also involve North Korea and Russia, are
aimed at persuading leader Kim Jong Il to reveal the extent oI his nuclear activities in exchange Ior Iuel
aid and better relations with the U.S. and his neighbors.
`Ì'm not sure she'll have any breakthrough on this particular visit,'' said Wendy Sherman, a policy
coordinator on North Korea when Bill Clinton was president and now a principal at the Albright Group
consulting Iirm in Washington.
Rice, 53, led a U.S. delegation to Seoul Ior the inauguration oI Lee Myung Bak as the new president oI
South Korea, also known as the Republic oI Korea, beIore an outdoor audience oI 50,000 people. The
two met later in the day at the presidential Blue House, greeting each other with hugs.
Stronger Ties
Lee, 66, pledged during the 45-minute meeting to boost relations with the U.S. and demand more
cooperation Irom North Korea Ior the diplomatic and other beneIits its partners in the nuclear
negotiations have provided, Hill said.
``President Lee said he would do all he could to strengthen'' cooperation with the U.S. on the six-party
talks, Hill said. Lee asserted that, rather than increasing tensions with Pyongyang, stronger ties with the
U.S. would bolster discussions between the peninsular neighbors.
Lee's designated Ioreign minister, Yu Myung Hwan, also reiterated in a meeting with Rice earlier in the
day the new president's campaign promises to hold North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to greater
accountability, Hill said.
Yu said the new administration in Seoul would ``continue an overall policy oI engagement with North
Korea,'' Hill told reporters. ``But they would be looking Ior greater reciprocity.''
Compliance
The U.S. also is looking Ior ways to more eIIectively ensure compliance with agreements, such as an
October joint statement signed by the six nations that required North Korea to take certain steps,
including outlining the extent oI its atomic programs. Pyongyang missed a Dec. 31 deadline Ior making
that declaration, Iailing to Iully account Ior its arms programs and its nuclear trade, including possible
ties to Syria.
`Ì thing the sentiment is that the six parties need to be responsible Ior making sure that agreements
reached are agreements that are IulIilled,'' Hill said.
Ensuring compliance with provisions such as ending the spread oI nuclear technology by North Korea
might involve steps such as sharing inIormation, he said. Hill declined to elaborate, saying it requires
more discussion with others involved.
Such a process also might beneIit North Korea, which has complained that its partners in the talks
aren't IulIilling pledges to provide Iuel aid in return Ior Pyongyang's cooperation on nuclear issues.
`Right Group oI Countries'
Rice said on Feb. 22 in Washington that she wants to use the six-party process to `àddress proliIeration
issues.''
``We have the right group oI countries at that table with the right set oI incentives and disincentives to
address not just denuclearization, which obviously is extremely important, but also proliIeration,'' Rice
told reporters beIore her Asia trip. `Ì'll be carrying that message and discussing that with our partners.''
Rice and Hill are headed next to Beijing tomorrow and then on to Tokyo.
To contact the reporter on this story: Viola Gienger in Seoul via Washington at
vgiengerbloomberg.net .
U.S. urges monitoring flow of nuclear materials
By Nicholas Kralev
February 26, 2008
SEOUL The United States wants six-nation talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear programs
to begin monitoring transIers oI nuclear materials and technology Irom the North to other countries,
U.S. oIIicials said yesterday.
The anti-proliIeration Iocus, Ior which Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice is trying to gather support
during an East Asian tour this week, is a response to mounting evidence that the North gave nuclear
assistance to Syria.
"The North Koreans promised not to engage in nuclear proliIeration," said Christopher R. Hill, the
chieI U.S. envoy to the six-nation talks. "We want to make sure they Iollow through on their pledge."
Mr. Hill was reIerring to an October agreement in which the North "reaIIirmed its commitment not to
transIer nuclear materials, technology or know-how."
All Iive countries negotiating with the communist state the United States, China, Japan, South Korea
and Russia have said that they expect Pyongyang to honor its promise.
The Oct. 3 deal, however, did not speciIy how the nonproliIeration pledge would be veriIied.
Now the Bush administration, alarmed by the Syrian connection, is pushing Ior "monitoring" the
implementation oI North Korea's pledge.
In September, an Israeli air strike targeted what was widely reported to be a nuclear Iacility in Syria
under construction with help Irom North Korea.
Miss Rice told reporters on Friday that she will discuss during her trip to South Korea, China and Japan
"how we use the six-party Iramework to address proliIeration issues."
"I'm oI the mind that we have the right group oI countries at that table, with the right set oI incentives
and disincentives to address not just denuclearization, which obviously is extremely important, but also
proliIeration," she said.
Japan and Russia are already members oI the U.S.-sponsored "ProliIeration Security Initiative," a
voluntary agreement to share intelligence on illicit trade in deadly weapons. China, South Korea and
North Korea the primary target oI the eIIort have reIused to join.
The U.S. initiated the program to avoid the repeat oI a 2002 incident, in which it allowed 15 North
Korean scud missiles to reach Yemen.
The missiles had been seized by a Spanish ship acting on U.S. intelligence, but the Bush administration
decided it lacked authority under international law to block the sale.
Mr. Hill, brieIing reporters traveling with Miss Rice yesterday, said the new proposal would involve
monitoring the implementation oI the entire Oct. 3 agreement, not just North Korea's obligations.
It would include seeking accountability Ior the heavy Iuel oil the United States must deliver to the
North at various stages oI the process that would dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear programs in exchange
Ior political and economic incentives, Mr. Hill said.
In October, North Korea also "agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear
programs" by Dec. 31, but it missed the deadline.
Although it has almost completed the required disablement oI its Yongbyon reactor, the declaration
remains a major problem.
Ms. Rice will seek to break the impasse when she visits Beijing today by enlisting Chinese help in
persuading the North to explain the Syrian issue, a uranium-enrichment program that U.S. intelligence
says it discovered in 2002 and other past activities.
Washington has rejected pressure Irom some oI its partners in the six-party talks to compromise on the
overdue declaration.
Mr. Hill said earlier this month that those countries had told him, "Well, two out oI three is not bad,"
and "Why do you worry so much about the past?"
China, eager Ior progress in the negotiations, is said to be one oI those countries. It is also expected to
be cool to the new U.S. anti-proliIeration proposal.
Japan appears to be on the same page with the United States, as does South Korean President Lee
Myung-bak, who took oIIice yesterday.
"We understand that the proliIeration element is an important part oI a complete and accurate
declaration. In our view, it is already included in what we expect on the part oI |North Korea| as part oI
the six-party Iramework," said Hiroshi Suzuki, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j0v2Yiv48q45zwlUErUCEoS8j1yg
Kim should not wait to declare nukes: former Clinton advisor
17 minutes ago
|Accessed 2008-02-26T15:40Z|
SEOUL (AFP) A Iormer senior US policymaker on North Korea urged the communist state
Tuesday not to put oII declaring its nuclear programmes until a new president takes oIIice in
Washington.
Wendy Sherman, who was Iormer president Bill Clinton's North Korea policy coordinator, said Kim
Jong-Il -- whom she called a "smart man" -- should take advantage oI US President George W. Bush's
shiIt to a more conciliatory policy.
"It (the situation) might get worse, not better," she told Yonhap news agency in an interview.
"II you (North Koreans) take too long to make the decision, even a Democratic president will have a
hard time making rapid progress because there will be even less trust iI you don't take action."
Under a six-nation accord, the North was supposed by last December to have disabled its main
plutonium-producing atomic plants and to have declared all nuclear programmes.
But the declaration is being delayed by disagreements over what it should include. The United States
says the North must Iully answer suspicions that it bought equipment Ior a covert uranium enrichment
bomb-making programme.
Sherman said US oIIicials "believe very strongly" that North Korea has or had an uranium enrichment
programme and had engaged in nuclear cooperation with Syria, allegations which Pyongyang Ilatly
denies.
"People that I know, who are in the administration, do believe that they have evidence oI a highly
enriched uranium programme and that they do have evidence oI cooperation between North Korea and
Syria Ior reasons other than just regular cooperation," she told Yonhap.
"It is a proliIeration concern. So those have to be addressed."
Americans, whether Republicans or Democrats, want the problem solved since it is not about domestic
politics but national security, said Sherman.
Sherman had 12 hours oI meetings with Kim in 2000 when she accompanied then-secretary oI state
Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang.
Current Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice was in Beijing Tuesday as part oI a regional tour aimed at
ending the impasse in the six-party talks, which group the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia
and Japan.
Iran and North Korea a threat to Asia stability: Olmert
By Tova Cohen
Reuters
Tuesday, February 26, 2008; 10:03 AM
[EXCERPTS]
TOKYO (Reuters) - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert discussed in Japan on Tuesday North Korea's
missile cooperation with Iran, cautioning that both countries posed threats to the stability oI Asia and
the Middle East, an Israeli oIIicial said.
[deletia]
Olmert, on a Iour-day oIIicial visit to Japan, provided Japanese oIIicials with inIormation regarding the
sale oI long-range missiles by North Korea to Iran, said the oIIicial, who spoke on condition oI
anonymity.
[deletia]
According to Japan's Nikkei newspaper, Olmert will provide Fukuda with inIormation on North
Korea's alleged military cooperation with Syria and Iran.
An Israeli oIIicial declined to comment on the report.
Last September, Israel carried out an air strike inside Syrian territory. Some U.S. oIIicials have linked
the raid to suspicions oI secret nuclear cooperation between Damascus and North Korea. Syria and
North Korea have denied any nuclear ties.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/02/11619748.html
Can NY Phil Concert in NK Resolve Denuclearization?
By Yoon Won-sup
02-27-2008 18:22
Will the New York Philharmonic concert usher in the beginning oI new era oI diplomacy in
Washington-Pyongyang relations amid North Korea's nuclear weapons standoII?
The concert could play at least a starting point Ior the two countries to reconsider their ties by this
cultural gesture.
The musical diplomacy is reminiscent oI the ping-pong diplomacy in which table tennis players went to
Beijing to play in contests to help the United States soIten its relations with China in the 1970s.
Among other things, U.S. President George W. Bush didn't exclude the possibility oI Iurther cultural
exchange with North Korea on condition that the communist country makes progress toward
denuclearization.
Plus, through the Pyongyang concert, the United States delivered a message that it hopes to resolve the
nuclear problem during Bush's presidency, according to a report.
The U.S.-Iunded Voice oI America (VOA) said Iormer U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Donald Gregg and
Iormer U.S. DeIense Secretary William Perry conveyed such a message to Kim Kye-gwan, top North
Korean nuclear envoy.
``We explained that it would be easier Ior North Korea to deal with the nuclear issue with the Bush
administration than with the next administration,'' Gregg was quoted as saying. ``The North's uranium
enrichment program and alleged nuclear technology transIer to Syria should be cleared.''
Now all eyes are turning to the stalled six-party talks, aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear ambition.
The talks Iailed to make any progress Ior the North's denclearization since North Korea reIused to
submit a Iull list oI nuclear weapons' programs by the end oI 2007.
Yu Myung-hwan, nominee Ior Ioreign minister, also said the Lee Myung-bak government will
maintain the six-party Iramework to resolve North Korea's nuclear stance.
`Ìt is true that the six-party talks made some achievements on the nuclear issue,'' Yu said during a
parliamentary conIirmation hearing, Wednesday. ``We will do our best to encourage North Korea to
Iollow the denuclearization process as quickly as possible.''
Yu added the nuclear issue is the most important agenda Ior the new government to tackle.
http://voanews.com/english/2008-02-28-voa12.cIm
North Korean Concert Organizers Seek Momentum on Nuclear Issue
By Kurt Achin
Seoul
28 February 2008
This week's New York Philharmonic performance in the North Korean capital was more than
just a night at the symphony. It was also a chance for several unofficial U.S. envoys to talk
extensively with senior North Korean officials. VOA Seoul Correspondent Kurt Achin reports
on what two of the concert's main organizers heard from Pyongyang about the stalled nuclear
weapons talks.
Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg and Evans Revere, president oI the New York-
based Korea Society, said in Seoul Thursday they sensed an "overwhelming" Ieeling oI good will at
this week's Pyongyang concert.
The two Iormer U.S. diplomats say the event, broadcast live across North Korea, may have created the
right atmosphere Ior a breakthrough on stalled nuclear weapons diplomacy. North Korea promised
early last year to declare all oI its nuclear activities beIore the start oI 2008, but has still Iailed to do so.
During their Pyongyang visit, Gregg and Revere held several hours oI talks with senior North Korean
nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Kwan. Ambassador Gregg says he asked Kim why the North's declaration
was stalled, but received an incomplete answer.
"He Iought that question oII by saying, 'you Americans have been too slow in the delivery oI heavy oil
Iuels and so he said you're not living up to the Iormula oI action to action, and that explains why we are
stalled,'" he said.
The declaration is part oI a broader, multi-phase agreement, which rewards North Korea with energy
aid, Iinancial assistance, and the prospect oI better relations in exchange Ior gradual steps toward
completely abandoning nuclear weapons.
Gregg says a deeper reason Ior the declaration's delay is that North Korea Iears possible embarrassment
over its contents. Washington has insisted the North account Ior uranium enrichment Pyongyang has
never publicly admitted, and also that it address U.S. suspicions the North may have provided nuclear
Gregg says Iormer DeIense Secretary William Perry told Kim Kye Kwan the best time to act is now,
while President Bush is in oIIice, rather than aIter one oI the Iront-running candidates to replace him is
sworn in next January.
"When we shiIted to why it was imperative to move quickly, by describing what would happen under a
McCain administration or an Obama administration - which would very clearly be a more diIIicult
situation than the one today - he made no response," Ambassador Gregg said.
Gregg says he interpreted that silence as acceptance. Experts say a McCain administration would
likely take a much harder line on North Korea, while a Democratic party president may Iind their
options limited by Republican opponents in the U.S. Congress.
Revere says he remains convinced North Korea is serious about the negotiations.
"I came away Irom all oI these discussions over several hours with the very clear sense that the North
Koreans are prepared to engage in exploratory diplomacy, and creative diplomacy, designed at getting
around the current obstacles," he said.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, Washington's chieI envoy to the nuclear talks, leIt
Beijing Thursday aIter looking Ior ways to renew the process. No new date has been set Ior the
multinational talks to resume.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20080228/FOREIGN/862488585/1003&templatenextpage
U.S. suggests secret disclosure of nuclear past
By Nicholas Kralev
February 28, 2008
BEIJING The United States is urging North Korea to end a deadlock in six-nation nuclear talks by
completing an overdue account oI its nuclear past with a document that might remain secret.
In November, Pyongyang disclosed details oI its eIIorts to make atomic bombs Irom plutonium. But
the United States says it Iailed to explain a parallel program to make highly enriched uranium, an
equally potent Iuel Ior nuclear weapons.
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice publicly raised the prospect oI an additional disclosure yesterday
in Tokyo, her last stop on a three-nation visit to East Asia.
"I really have less concern about what Iorm it takes or how many diIIerent pieces oI paper there may
have to be or how many times it may have to go back and Iorth," Miss Rice said.
U.S. oIIicials said privately last month that North Korea could submit a second list to account Ior
uranium-enrichment eIIorts, which are thought to have led to transIers oI equipment and technology to
Syria.
At a private dinner in Washington late last month, Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to South
Korea, said the Bush administration is looking Ior a way to persuade North Koreans to cooperate
without "rubbing it on their noses."
A separate document would give the United States the inIormation it demands about dangerous North
Korean activities and save Pyongyang public embarrassment by keeping part oI the list secret,
diplomats said.
The declaration, which was due at the end oI December, would complete the second phase oI an
October deal aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and would clear the way Ior promised
political and economic beneIits to the communist state.
A Syrian Iacility targeted by an Israeli air strike in September has become a major issue Ior the United
States because it was widely reported to be a nuclear site under construction with help Irom North
Korea.
The matter was expected to be raised during a meeting between Miss Rice and Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert today in Tokyo.
Mr. Olmert was in Tokyo to explain intelligence on North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria.
The Bush administration Iirst accused North Korea oI running a secret uranium-enrichment program in
2002.
Chinese negotiators have urged the United States to accept North Korea's November declaration and
leave uranium enrichment and transIers to Syria Ior Iuture negotiations.
Christopher R. Hill, the chieI U.S. negotiator with North Korea, remained in Beijing to continue talks
with the Chinese yesterday while Miss Rice Ilew to Tokyo Irom Beijing. She visited Seoul on Monday.
South Korea, China and Japan, along with the U.S., Russia and North Korea, are in talks to
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
North Korean cooperation would bring energy aid and other assistance Irom the United States and
South Korea, including a supply oI 1 million tons oI Iuel oil Ior conventional power plants.
"The third phase is going to be really hard, which is where you have to really talk about dismantling
|the North"s programs| and you have to account Ior the material and you have to Iigure out what to do
with the material," Miss Rice said.
Diplomats and analysts said Washington must Iind a way to break the impasse while holding to its
demands that North Korea explain any secret programs and proliIeration activities.
http://campaignspot.nationalreview.com/post/?qOTYzMjIzM2RkMmM4YzY0NmFiNGQxNDdhMWQxNGMyZjg
The Campaign Spot
Jim Garaghty Reporting
Thursday, February 28, 2008
JOHN MCCAIN
John McCain, in between Iund-raisers and events in Texas, held another conIerence call with bloggers.
Selected highlights:
[deletia]
Michael GoldIarb oI the Weekly Standard: Any thoughts on the NY Philharmonic going to North
Korea?
McCain: The shipments to Syria had marks oI North Korean involvement. I hope the starving people in
the worlds largest remaining gulag get a chance to see the philharmonic perIorm. Only a chosen 1400
got to see them perIorm. Its okay, but lets not delude ourselves. The Dear Leader didnt show up and
hes going to do whatever it takes to remain in power. Im disappointed in the Chinese on not bringing
more pressure to bear.
[deletia]
[Sourcebook note: As ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senator
McCain was presumably briefed on the available intelligence concerning the 6 September 2007 strike.
See http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2007/11/congress-still-.html above.]
Press Roundtable in Hanoi, Vietnam
Hanoi, Vietnam
March 3, 2008
Released on March 4, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
QUESTION: During your 16-day trip you spent more time than scheduled in Beijing.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes.
QUESTION: And this weekend Kim Jong-il visited the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang. It seems
unusual. Are Washington and Beijing working together to ramp up the pressure a little bit?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Youre quite correct, I spent a lot oI time in Beijing. Actually, I
made three separate trips to Beijing during this overall trip. Rather than talk about ramping up pressure,
Id rather ramp up the eIIort to Iind a solution. We are hopeIul that we can Iind the Iormula Ior moving
Iorward, but what we need Irom the North Koreans is a willingness to give us a complete and correct
declaration. We look Iorward to meeting with the North Koreans and working toward that end. OI
course, iI we can get through this complete and correct declaration we will be able to move on to the
third phase, which Ior us will be a very decisive phase -- because thats when we look Iorward to
seeing iI we can have the North Koreans IulIill the requirements oI the September 05 joint statement
and to try to get to the end oI this very long process.
I met with the North Koreans about a week ago. We had looked Iorward to another meeting. I assume
we will get that organized at some point in the near Iuture and see iI we can get through this phase two
and on to phase three.
QUESTION: The meeting with Kim Jong-il at the Chinese Embassy, do you think its signiIicant?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think hes gone to the Chinese Embassy beIore. In Iact, I think
hes also visited the Russian embassy in the past. So I really am not in a position to weigh its
signiIicance. I dont think it was related to the talks I was having in Beijing.
QUESTION: Im Irom NHK. When do you expect to resume the Six-Party Talks on North Korean
nuclear issues?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We Iirst need to get through this problem oI getting a complete and
correct declaration. When were through that, we will take our obligations in the so-called second
phase and then try to move on to the third phase. So iI we can resolve these matters in the next Iew
weeks, lets say -- which I think is possible -- I think we could perhaps, depending on the views oI the
Chinese host, we could maybe get together Ior a Six-Party meeting to plan out the third phase. So time
is short, and I would hope we can get on with that this month.
QUESTION: Complete and correct declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Complete and correct.
QUESTION: Complete and correct declaration is about plutonium or uranium or --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Its the overall declaration oI all oI their nuclear programs so that
we will be able to identiIy all the programs that need to be abandoned pursuant to their requirements
under the September 05 statement. Weve had a number oI discussions with the North Koreans on
what is meant by complete and correct. We have to resolve this in order to move on to the next stage.
North Korea needs to understand that its security will be guaranteed when it has good relations with its
neighbors. And it will have good relations with its neighbors when it gives up the nuclear ambition.
QUESTION: Do you think Vietnam shares some similar history with North Korea? Are you asking the
Vietnamese to act as go-betweens or to deliver messages to Pyongyang?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, were not asking Vietnam to be a mediator or a go-between
with North Korea. Thats not a role were asking them to play nor a role that they would be particularly
interested in playing. Nor are we asking the North Koreans to ask the Vietnamese what the Vietnamese
experience has been in getting their economy moving the way they have. But I wish the North Koreans
would ask that question, and I wish the Vietnamese would answer it in as detailed as way as possible --
because what has happened in Vietnam in the last halI decade is nothing short oI extraordinary. I think
every country, even North Korea, should be very inspired by the progress made by the Vietnamese
people in bringing this economy up. So I do hope North Korea asks that question. Thank you very
much. Ive got a Iull program here thanks to Ambassador Michalak and the Embassy. Theyre kind oI
pulling me around to one meeting aIter the other. So its great to see you all
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2008/03/05/24/0401000000AEN20080305004800315F.HTML

N.K. wants more cultural exchanges with UK: envoy
2008/03/05 15:14 KST

LONDON, March 5 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is exploring ways to expand cultural exchange
with Britain Iollowing the New York Philharmonic's unprecedented perIormance in Pyongyang, the
communist state's envoy to Britain said Tuesday [2008-03-04].
Amb. Ja Song-nam delivered an address in a joint session oI the British House oI Lords and
House oI Commons Ior the Iirst time as a North Korean diplomat.
North Korea invited the legendary British rock guitarist Eric Clapton to perIorm in Pyongyang
early next year in exchange Ior a perIormance in London by the North's State Symphony Orchestra
scheduled Ior September, Ja said.
"We haven't yet heard Irom Clapton and he will make a decision," the envoy said. He appealed
Ior help Irom all participants in the meeting "to promote cultural exchange between the two countries."
North Korea established diplomatic ties with Britain in 2000. The reclusive communist state has been
making concerted eIIorts to beeI up its cultural diplomacy as it struggles to join the international
community.
Clapton's concert in Pyongyang, iI held, would be a rare opportunity Ior North Koreans to hear
Western rock music, as the communist country has banned rock music out oI Iear that it would spread
capitalist Western pop culture in the isolated society.
During the meeting that lasted Ior one and a halI hours, Ja gave a brieI explanation oI the past and
present situations surrounding North Korea and answered questions on human rights, nuclear issues
and cultural exchanges Irom participants. Among them were seven British lawmakers, human rights
activists, Korea experts, businessmen and journalists.
The envoy denied allegations oI a covert uranium enrichment program by Pyongyang and
nuclear technology transIers, both key sticking points delaying negotiations over North Korea's nuclear
programs. "There is no uranium enrichment program and the allegation that our country has transIerred
nuclear technology to Syria is groundless," Ja said. "We cannot disclose a non-existent thing, whether
the disclosure is made in public or in secret."
The six-party process Ior disarming North Korea is stalled over the dispute. Washington is insisting
that Pyongyang provide a "complete and accurate" list oI its nuclear programs, including an alleged
uranium enrichment program and technology transIers. The North claims it has already provided the
list.
sshimyna.co.kr
U.S. negotiator wants North Korean declaration in March
Thursday, March 6, 2008; 7:32 PM
NEW YORK (Reuters) - The top U.S. negotiator with North Korea said on Thursday that he wants
Pyongyang to submit a complete declaration oI its nuclear activities by the end oI March because
Iurther delays could slow the denuclearization process.
"It's important that we try to get through this in March, because we're kind oI running out oI time in
calendar year '08," U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill said in remarks to Columbia
University's Weatherhead East Asian Institute in New York.
North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and programs in exchange Ior economic
and diplomatic beneIits under a 2005 multilateral deal.
But the accord between the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States has become bogged
down by Pyongyang's Iailure to produce a declaration oI its nuclear programs by the end oI last year.
"Everything we've asked them to do, they can certainly do. Moreover, everything we've asked them to
do, they've already agreed to do," Hill told reporters aIter his speech.
Hill, who has been Washington's point man on North Korea, said he did not believe it would be
impossible to work around problems with the declaration. But without a complete declaration this
month and the U.S. presidential elections in November, Hill said it was important to Iinish the process
with North Korea by the end oI this year.
"What I'm worried about is getting enough time to Iinish the whole process because we don't want
partial denuclearization," Hill said.
(Reporting by Emily Chasan, editing by Philip Barbara)
US Lawmakers Seek Assurances From State Department On International
Committments
By Dan Robinson
Capitol Hill
07 March 2008
[EXCERPTS]
In a congressional hearing, Deputy Secretary oI State John Negroponte, Iaced questions Irom members
oI Congress on a range oI international issues, including Iraq and AIghanistan, the situation in the
Middle East, and DarIur. VOA's Dan Robinson reports, a House subcommittee hearing came as the
Bush administration seeks to unlock billions oI dollars in Iunding Ior key priorities.
[deletia]
Negroponte also asked lawmakers to approve $53 million needed to Iund additional deliveries oI heavy
Iuel oil Ior North Korea in support oI Six-Party eIIorts to end that country's nuclear program.
45th Anniversary of March 8 Revolution in Syria Marked
Pyongyang, March 6 [2008]
(KCNA) -- A meeting and a Iilm show took place at the Taedonggang Club Ior the Diplomatic Corps in
Pyongyang on Thursday to mark the 45th anniversary oI the March 8 revolution in Syria.
Present there on invitation were Charge d' AIIaires ad Interim Muhammad Adib Al Hani and staII
members oI the Syrian embassy here.
Kim Jin Bom, vice-chairman oI the Korean Committee Ior Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries
and vice-chairman oI the Korea-Syria Friendship Association, oIIicials concerned and working people
in the city were on hand.
Kim Jin Bom said at the meeting that the victory oI the March 8 revolution in Syria was a brilliant
result oI the just struggle oI the Arab people Ior independence, peace, progress and prosperity and a
new history started in Syria since then.
The Syrian Arab people are now striving to deIend the sovereignty oI the country and build a
modern state, he added.
Muhammad Adib Al Hani said that the Iriendly relations between Syria and the DPRK, provided by
Iormer President HaIez Al-Assad and eternal President Kim Il Sung, are now developing under the
deep care oI President Bashar Al-Assad and General Secretary Kim Jong Il.
Syria is Iully supporting the Korean people in their eIIorts to build a great prosperous powerIul
nation and reuniIy the country, he added.
A congratulatory letter to the president oI Syria was adopted there.
AIter the meeting the participants saw a Syrian Ieature Iilm.
Congratulations to Syrian President
Pyongyang, March 8 [2008] (KCNA) -- General Secretary Kim Jong Il sent a congratulatory message
to Bashar Al-Assad, regional secretary oI the Arab Baath Socialist Party and President oI Syria, on
Saturday on the occasion oI the 45th anniversary oI the March 8 Revolution in Syria.
The message said:
The March 8 Revolution marked an occasion oI historic turn in the Syrian people's struggle to
saIeguard the dignity and sovereignty oI the country and achieve its political stability and economic
development.
Our people have always and Iully supported the Syrian people in their righteous cause oI building
independent and modern Syria and solving the Mid-east problems in a Iair and comprehensive manner
under the guidance oI the Arab Baath Socialist Party headed by you.
Convinced that the relations oI Iriendship and cooperation between our two countries will grow
stronger in various Iields, I take this opportunity to sincerely wish you good health and happiness and
your Iriendly people greater progress and prosperity.
Greetings to Syrian President
Pyongyang, March 8 [2008] (KCNA) -- Kim Yong Nam, president oI the Presidium oI the DPRK
Supreme People's Assembly, sent a message oI greetings to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad on
Saturday on the occasion oI the 45th anniversary oI the March 8 Revolution in Syria.
Kim in the message said: I am rejoiced over the Iact that the Syrian Arab people have achieved many
successes in the eIIorts to build independent and modern Syria while invariably maintaining the
principled stand under the leadership oI the Arab Baath Socialist Party headed by you.
Extending support and solidarity to the Syrian people in their just cause oI deIending sovereignty
and security oI the country, retaking occupied Arab territory including the Golan Heights and solving
the Mid-east issues in a Iair and comprehensive way, the message wished the Syrian people greater
progress and success.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jFIwhKUyQcvjmRGM0jmHNa0T4WwD8V95NVG0
N. Korea Hopes for Friendship With Syria
6 hours ago
[Accessed 2008-03-08T15:40Z]
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) North Korean leader Kim Jong Il hopes Ior stronger Iriendship with
Syria, the North's oIIicial news agency reported Saturday, amid lingering suspicions oI a secret nuclear
connection between the two countries.
Kim expressed the hope in a message to Syrian President Bashar Assad on the anniversary oI a 1963
coup that brought Syria's Baath Arab Socialist Party to power, the North's Korean Central News
Agency reported.
"I express my Iirm belieI that the Iriendly cooperative relations between the two countries will be
Iurther expanded and strengthened in various areas," Kim said in the message.
The North's No. 2 leader, Kim Yong Nam, sent a similar message to the Syrian president, KCNA said.
North Korea has been suspected oI helping Syria with a secret nuclear program.
But Pyongyang has strongly denied the accusations, saying it has never spread its nuclear expertise
beyond its borders. Syria has also denied receiving any North Korean nuclear help.
The alleged nuclear link is believed to be a sticking point stalling international talks on the North's
nuclear programs, along with the communist nation's suspected uranium enrichment program.
Under last year's agreement with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, the North is
required to give a Iull account oI its nuclear programs, including whether it spread nuclear technology
beyond its borders.
Pyongyang claims it gave the nuclear declaration to the United States in November, but Washington
says the North never produced a "complete and correct" declaration.
North Korea and Syria established diplomatic relations in 1966.
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?idD8V8V0KG0&showarticle1
N. Korea admits to sending engineers to Syria
Mar 7 [2008] 08:45 PM US/Eastern
NEW YORK, March 7 (AP) - (Kyodo)North Korea admitted to sending engineers to military-
related and other Iacilities in Syria during its recent talks with the United States over its nuclear
program, diplomatic sources in New York said Friday [2008-03-07].
Pyongyang, however, denied its involvement in Syrian nuclear development, according to the sources.
The dispatch oI engineers and other personnel Ior bilateral cooperation, including on the military Iront,
started in around 2000, North Korea told the United States in their talks Irom the end oI last year to
January.
The North also exported materials to Syria, the sources said.
Pyongyang claimed most oI the personnel worked at civilian Iacilities, according to the sources.
http://www.spacewar.com/2006/080310090510.2wd9m4xb.html
US wants 'clear signal' from NKorea over nuclear declaration
SEOUL, March 10 (AFP)
Mar 10, 2008
North Korea must send a "clear signal" to Iully declare its nuclear programmes in order to get itselI
removed Irom a list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, the US ambassador here said Monday.
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow's demand to South Korea came as the six-party nuclear disarmament
talks on North Korea were stuck in a stalemate over Pyongyang's complaint over the list.
North Korea last year signed a landmark deal to abandon all its nuclear weapons in exchange Ior badly
needed energy and economic aid and major security and diplomatic beneIits.
But the disarmament process has been in a stalemate since North Korea missed an end-2007 deadline to
declare all its nuclear programmes.
Pyongyang has said it submitted a Iull list in November, but Washington insists it is still awaiting a
complete declaration, including a Iull account oI a suspected covert uranium enrichment programme.
Last week, North Korea's ruling communist party newspaper Rodong Sinmun blamed Washington Ior
the deadlock, saying the US has yet to start removing the North Irom a list oI state sponsors oI
terrorism.
"We aren't able to do that until we see a clear signal Irom the North Koreans that they are going to do
their part with regards to the declaration," Vershbow told a news conIerence.
"They have not yet shown us even the elements oI what will constitute a complete and concrete
declaration," the US ambassador to South Korea said.
He said Washington wants to push Iorward the disarmament process talks, which group the United
States, both Koreas, China, Japan and Russia.
But he said North Korea was still "in a wait-and-see mode" in making progress in the six-party talks,
aIter South Korea's new conservative government took over last month.
"It is clear that North Korea has to adjust, in Iact, to much closer alignment between Washington and
Seoul, as we move Iorward to the six-party talks," Vershbow said.
Last week, US State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey said he hoped to seek a complete
North Korean declaration in "the not too distant Iuture" as US top negotiator Christopher Hill hoped
six-party talks could resume this month.
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid2887258
Vershbow: Impatience building up on North
March 11, 2008
United States Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow said Pyongyang must adjust" to
warmer relations between Seoul and Washington aIter President Lee Myung-bak took oIIice.
Vershbow also said there is a "sense oI impatience building up" among participants in the six-party
talks on North Korea's nuclear program over the long delay by Pyongyang to Iully declare its nuclear
programs.
"We are pleased with President Lee's emphasis on strengthening U.S.-Korea relations, one oI the
central issues in his Ioreign policy doctrine," Vershbow said in a speech to the American Chamber oI
Commerce in Seoul yesterday.
"The key aspect oI it is the nation's continued support Ior the global war against terrorism and weapons
oI mass destruction."
Vershbow also reiterated Washington's position that it would remove North Korea Irom the U.S. list oI
state sponsors oI terrorism and liIt trade restrictions only aIter the North Iully completes the next step
toward denuclearization.
North Korea, according to an agreement made last October, is committed to making a "complete and
correct" declaration oI all oI its nuclear programs by Dec. 31, 2007, a deadline it missed.
"We will be prepared to do these two things only in parallel with North Korea's obligations," he said.
"There is a sense oI impatience building up, and we want to get on with it."
Vershbow cautioned that people "should not have any illusion" that the recent historic concert oI the
New York Philharmonic orchestra in Pyongyang could jump-start the stalled talks on North Korea. His
comment echoed sentiment on Capitol Hill that downplayed the political signiIicance oI the event.
"My view is that North Korea is calculating what should be its next move in the six-party talks," he
said. "It is clear that North Korea has to adjust to closer relations between Seoul and Washington."
[deletia]
http://seoul.usembassy.gov/113031008.html
"State of U.S.-Korea Relations 2008 and Beyond"
Remarks to Members of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Korea
Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
Grand Hyatt Hotel, Seoul March 10, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
[deletia]
A challenge thats been with us Ior a long time has been North Korea and its pursuit oI nuclear
weapons. We look Iorward to the closest possible cooperation with the new government to achieve the
complete denuclearization oI the Korean peninsula and North Koreas abandonment oI all its nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs.
The past year has seen some encouraging developments, including the shutdown and disablement oI
the Norths nuclear Iacilities at Yongbyon. Just two weeks ago, we all Iollowed the events connected
with the New York Philharmonics historic concert in Pyongyang. It was an extraordinary event
broadcast live across the entire peninsula. It was an opportunity Ior North Koreans to see Americans as
they really are rather than through the prism oI propaganda, and perhaps to see the possibility oI a
diIIerent kind oI relationship with the United States.
But we shouldnt have any illusions. North Koreas nuclear program still remains a Iundamental
problem. North Korea has yet to present a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs,
as they were supposed to do by the end oI last year. As Assistant Secretary Hill has emphasized, its
crucial in the Six-Party process Ior the North Koreans to IulIill their commitments. When theyre
ready to do so, well be ready to deliver on our commitments to remove the North Irom the State
Sponsors oI Terrorism List and the Trading with the Enemy Act. We want to move on to the next
stage, the stage oI Iull denuclearization, which will open the way to normal relations between North
Korea and the rest oI the world, and to economic assistance that can improve the lives oI the North
Korean people.
[deletia]
http://www.spacewar.com/2006/080310083023.0Ihpk7tz.html
SKorea reviews agreements due to NKorea nuke deadlock
SEOUL, March 10 (AFP)
Mar 10, 2008
South Korea will review inter-Korean economic projects agreed at an October summit due to deadlock
in a nuclear disarmament deal, the minister responsible Ior relations with Pyongyang said Monday.
"In implementing the agreements, we must consider a change oI circumstances," UniIication Minister
Kim Ha-Joong told a parliamentary conIirmation hearing.
North Korea last year signed the deal to abandon its nuclear weapons. But the process is at an impasse
while awaiting a North Korean declaration oI all its nuclear programmes.
At the summit, the South pledged help to repair the North's dilapidated railways. A cross-border
railway cargo service started in December Ior the Iirst time since the 1950-1953 Korean War.
The two sides also agreed to develop a joint economic zone around the North's Haeju city on the west
coast.
Since South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak took oIIice last month, inter-Korean relations have been
soured by a US-South Korea joint military exercise.
Lee, a conservative, pledged to take a Iirmer line with Pyongyang and to press the regime on its human
rights record.
North Korea has warned that inter-Korean relations might slip back to conIrontation.
Conservatives in the South want the government to stop providing unlimited aid to North Korea. They
have criticised previous governments Ior giving too much while gaining little in return.
But Kim said South Korea should push ahead with humanitarian aid to its impoverished neighbour.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/mar/102107.htm
Washington, DC
March 11, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
[deletia]
QUESTION: Yes. Sean, we know Chris Hill is going to Geneva later this week --
QUESTION: -- to meet with his North Korean counterpart. Do you consider the talks in trouble the
six-party process in trouble? Do you consider this just another meeting in a long line oI meetings?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well --
QUESTION: Whats the status?
MR. MCCORMACK: Lets hope that its a meeting that moves the process Iorward. And by moving
the process Iorward, I mean taking some positive steps towards the or talking about positive steps
towards completing dismantlement, to providing a complete declaration, which the North Korean
Government has promised to do in the context oI the six-party talks. We are prepared, along with our
other partners in those discussions, to IulIill our commitments. So -- but this is a discussion that is
based upon the principle oI action Ior action, so the other Iive members oI the six-party talks are
looking Ior North Korea to IulIill their commitments, and all the while we are going to continue to
IulIill ours.
As to the Iirst part oI your question, we believe that this diplomatic process still has a lot oI liIe leIt in
it. We are Iocused on trying to move the process Iorward. Were devoting a lot oI energy and Iocus to
it, as are other members oI the six-party talks, most notably the Chinese Government.
So the diplomacy continues to move Iorward. While it may not move Iorward at the pace that we
would have originally wished, we believe that there is the possibility to succeed in completing this
phase and then move on to a new phase in which we would start to talk about actually dismantling the
North Korean nuclear program and other aspects oI the September 2005 agreement that talk about
peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
QUESTION: But you dont think its in trouble?
MR. MCCORMACK: No, we still think that this process has a lot oI liIe in it.
[deletia]
QUESTION: One on North Korea. Do you still expect their talks to be just one day?
MR. MCCORMACK: Right now I think theyre scheduled Ior a day, but iI they need a Iew hours more
to discuss additional agenda items or to go deeper into the discussions, Im sure theyll take that time.
That will be up to Chris and his counterpart.
QUESTION: And have the North Koreans given any indication that they might provide a declaration or
something to move this Iorward?
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, Im not going to oIIer any particular comment. You can get
comment Irom the North Korean Government as to their expectations Ior the meeting.
|deletia|
http://news.aol.com/story/a/us-n-korean-nuke-negotiators-to-meet/n20080311121409990002?ecidRSS0001
U.S., N. Korean nuke negotiators to meet Thursday in Geneva:
AP
Posted: 2008-03-11 12:14:19
WASHINGTON, March 11 (Kyodo) - (EDS: ADDING SPOKESMAN'S QUOTES)
The top U.S. and North Korean nuclear negotiators will meet Thursday in Geneva to discuss
Pyongyang's declaration oI its nuclear activities, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said
Tuesday.
Christopher Hill, assistant secretary oI state Ior East Asian and PaciIic aIIairs, and Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Kye Gwan are expected to try to bridge diIIerences on the substance oI the declaration
that Pyongyang is obliged to submit under a six-party deal, the spokesman told reporters.
"This is part oI the six-party process. They're going to be discussing ways in which to move that
process Iorward," he said. "This phase has not yet been completed and we need to try to push Iorward."
The six-party nuclear talks have stalemated since Pyongyang missed an end-oI-2007 deadline to reveal
all details oI its nuclear activity, in breach oI the accord with the United States, China, South Korea,
Japan and Russia.
The diIIerences include North Korea's alleged uranium enrichment program, as separate Irom its
known plutonium-powered nuclear program, and Pyongyang's suspected transIer oI nuclear technology
to such countries as Syria.
The United States, which wants a "complete and correct" list, and North Korea have been discussing
possible solutions, including separating the issues Irom the main declaration as an attachment or
writing down both sides' arguments in the declaration.
"We have said that this should be a Iull and complete declaration and that means any proliIeration
activities, any activities related to highly-enriched uranium, any activities related to plutonium. Full and
complete," McCormack said.
Hill and Kim met in Beijing on Feb. 19 but Iailed to achieve a breakthrough. Hill tried in vain to hold
another round oI talks there on March 1.
Hill said during a talk at Columbia University in New York Thursday that it is vital Ior North Korea to
provide a Iull account oI its nuclear activity by the end oI this month.
"There is no drop-dead deadline, but it is important to try to get through this in March because we're
running out oI time," he said, reIerring to the change in the U.S. administration next year.
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN1161278720080311
U.S. and North Korean officials to meet on Thursday
Tue Mar 11, 2008 4:43pm EDT
By Arshad Mohammed
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. and North Korean oIIicials will meet in Geneva on Thursday to try to
revive a deal Ior Pyongyang to disclose its nuclear activities in return Ior aid and the easing oI U.S.
sanctions, U.S. oIIicials said.
II Pyongyang were to provide an accurate declaration, the United States could act "in a matter oI days"
to drop North Korea Irom its list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and to ease sanctions under the U.S.
Trading with the Enemy Act, said a senior U.S. oIIicial who spoke on condition he not be named.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Chris Hill will meet his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-Gwan to
discuss a 2005 deal under which Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear programs, U.S. State
Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters.
The deal, which suIIered a severe setback when Pyongyang tested a nuclear device in October 2006,
has been bogged down more recently by North Korea's Iailure to produce a promised declaration oI its
nuclear programs by the end oI last year.
"They are going to be discussing ways to move that process Iorward. ... We need to try to push
Iorward," McCormack told reporters oI the Geneva meeting, saying he did not know iI an agreement
on the document would emerge aIter the talks.
A sticking point oI the declaration had been Pyongyang's reluctance to discuss any transIers oI nuclear
technology to other nations, notably Syria, as well as its suspected pursuit oI uranium enrichment.
The United States has questions about any possible North Korean role in a suspected Syrian covert
nuclear site that was bombed by Israel in September. Syria has denied having a nuclear program but the
case remains murky.
A highly enriched uranium (HEU) program would give North Korea a second source oI Iissile material
with which it could produce nuclear weapons in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear Iacilities.
The senior U.S. oIIicial, who asked not to be named because oI the sensitivity oI the negotiations, said
he believed North Korea is comIortable with disclosing the proliIeration and uranium-related activities
in a separate, secret document.
"II the North provides what they need to in terms oI a complete and correct declaration and what is
required on HEU and proliIeration, our actions (on sanctions) can occur very much at the same time,"
he said.
He also said Washington -- which wants Pyongyang to give up its atomic activities, any weapons and
related materials beIore U.S. President George W. Bush leaves oIIice in January -- was heartened by
North Korea agreeing to the Geneva talks.
Under the so-called second phase oI the denuclearization agreement, North Korea committed to disable
its nuclear Iacility at Yongbyon, where it has produced plutonium, and to make the "complete and
correct" declaration.
In return, the other parties to the accord reached among the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the
United States, agreed to provide up to 1 million tonnes oI heavy Iuel oil or its equivalent.
There has been signiIicant progress in disabling Yongbyon -- U.S. oIIicials say 8 oI 11 tasks are
completed -- but North Korea has slowed down the process in recent months, arguing that the others
have delayed keeping their end oI the bargain.
The senior U.S. oIIicial said there had been no eIIort by the other Iive to delay deliveries oI Iuel oil or
other aid.
The Chinese are giving North Korea coking coal, the South Koreans have provided steel plates to
reinIorce mine rooIs and both countries are providing basic parts Ior power plants and mines.
"You will Iind on the South Korean and Chinese side that the (materials) will start to move very
quickly now," he said. "The contracts have been let and things are beginning to Ilow into a pipeline oI
materials moving to the North."
News oI the Geneva meeting came as the United States released its annual human rights report in
which North Korea was listed among the worst oIIenders.
The State Department cited extrajudicial killings, disappearances and arbitrary detention, including oI
political prisoners, and called North Korea's regime "repressive."
(Additional reporting by Sue Pleming; Editing by Eric Walsh)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/11/AR2008031102544.html?
U.S., N. Korea to Work Toward Ending Weapons Impasse
By Glenn Kessler
Wednesday, March 12, 2008; A08
Top U.S. and North Korean diplomats will gather in Geneva tomorrow amid signs that the two sides,
with the help oI China, have structured a diplomatic Iramework that could resolve an impasse that has
blocked a deal to end Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs.
Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill, the chieI U.S. negotiator, will meet with North Korean
counterpart Kim Gye Gwan Ior one or two days. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said,
"We're Iocused on trying to move the process Iorward."
Under an agreement reached in February 2007, North Korea was to have declared all oI its nuclear
programs and materials by the end oI the year. Pyongyang admitted to possessing 30 to 40 kilograms oI
plutonium, U.S. oIIicials said, but balked at providing Iull details about a suspected uranium
enrichment program and about whether it had cooperated with Syria in an alleged nuclear program
destroyed by Israeli Iighters last September.
Now, diplomats said, a possible Iace-saving solution Ior North Korea may have been Iound in which
those issues are separated Irom its initial declaration, such as in statements Irom Kim to Hill that would
become part oI the six-nation negotiations. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice recently signaled the
new approach in a statement aIter talks last month in Asia: "I really have less concern about what Iorm
it takes or how many diIIerent pieces oI paper there may have to be," as long as it results in progress.
Rice and Hill have increasingly Iocused on North Korea's stockpile oI plutonium as the real threat to
international security, oIIicials said. But to persuade Pyongyang to abandon the plutonium, obtained
Irom Iuel rods in a small nuclear reactor, the administration must Iirst settle the lingering questions
concerning uranium enrichment and Syria. Increasingly, top U.S. oIIicials view those as historical
issues compared with the immediate proliIeration risk posed by plutonium.
North Korea acquired much oI its plutonium aIter the 2002 collapse oI a Clinton administration
agreement that Iroze the reactor. The Bush administration accused North Korea oI cheating on the deal,
citing evidence that Pyongyang had a clandestine uranium-enrichment program. Plutonium and highly
enriched uranium are diIIerent routes to building nuclear weapons.
In a little-noticed speech at Amherst College on Jan. 30, Hill said that U.S. oIIicials had largely
concluded that thousands oI aluminum tubes acquired by North Korea in 2002 -- which sparked the
intelligence Iinding that Pyongyang was building a large-scale uranium-enrichment program -- were
not currently being used to create Iissile material.
"We have seen that these tubes are not being used Ior a centriIuge program," he said, according to an
audio recording oI the speech on Amherst's Web site. "We had American diplomats go and look at this
aluminum that was used and see what they are actually using it Ior. We actually had American
diplomats, people like myselI, carry this aluminum back in our suitcases to veriIy this is the precise
aluminum we knew the North Koreans had actually purchased."
Government scientists have discovered traces oI enriched uranium on the aluminum samples,
suggesting that they may have been used in such a program or that they came in contact with a
centriIuge kit that North Korea acquired Irom a Pakistani smuggling network.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20080312/NATION/169481933/1001
Ethnic dispute tears al Qaeda, Hayden says
By Bill Gertz
March 12, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said Osama bin Laden is putting more energy into hiding than into
running his terror network.
Internal divisions between Saudi and Egyptian leaders oI al Qaeda are producing "Iissures" within the
terrorist group and a possible battle over who will succeed Osama bin Laden, CIA Director Michael V.
Hayden said yesterday [2008-08-11|... in a wide-ranging interview with editors and reporters oI The
Washington Times.
[deletia]
On other issues, Mr. Hayden said:
North Korea's government has not provided a Iull accounting oI its plutonium, uranium-enrichment
program and arms proliIeration. Pyongyang must "readmit" that it has the uranium program, and "our
requirement as a nation is they've got to come clean on all three."
North Korea had a uranium-enrichment program, but the status is not clear.
[deletia]
http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Security/2008/03/12/pressurebuildingonnorthkorea/8866/
Pressure building on North Korea
By LEE JONG-HEON
UPI Correspondent
Published: March 12, 2008
SEOUL, South Korea, North Korea is under mounting pressure to hasten its disarmament process in
the Iace oI a strengthening South Korea-U.S. alliance Iollowing the inauguration oI a conservative
administration in Seoul.
Seoul's Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan used his Iirst press brieIing since taking oIIice on
Wednesday [2008-03-12] to call Ior the North to IulIill its denuclearization obligations, warning that a
Iurther delay would sap the momentum oI the hard-won disarmament process.
The North Korean nuclear issue "is making no progress" due to a deadlock over the country's alleged
uranium enrichment program and nuclear technology transIer to Syria, Yu said. "I am concerned that
the six-way (nuclear) talks may lose momentum," he said.
Under the six-nation agreement reached in February last year, the North completed the Iirst phase oI
disarmament in July by shutting down and sealing its plutonium-producing reactor at the country's
main nuclear complex in return Ior energy aid. But it has Iailed to Iinish the second phase oI the
disarmament deal that called Ior a declaration oI all its nuclear programs by the end oI last year,
delaying the third and Iinal phase oI dismantling its atomic weapons programs.
The North says it submitted a nuclear list in November, but the United States insists it must account
Iully Ior a suspected uranium weapons program. Pyongyang has Ilatly denied the existence oI a
uranium enrichment program and any transIer oI nuclear technology and materials to other countries.
"A complete and correct declaration is a key to moving to the next stage," Yu told the press conIerence.
"I expect a quick resolution oI the declaration issue," he said. The new diplomatic chieI also vowed to
strengthen policy coordination with the United States in dealing with the nuclear standoII and other
regional and global issues.
"The (Seoul) government will work out a vision Ior the alliance in the 21st century through close
consultations with the United States," he said. "We would deepen the alliance with the United States
beyond the Korean peninsula to jointly handle Northeast Asian and global issues."
Yu plans to travel to the United States on March 25-29 to discuss the bilateral alliance and tackle the
North Korean nuclear issues, ahead oI a planned trip to Japan slated Ior April 5-6. He leaves Ior China
next week Ior a three-day visit.
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak plans to visit the United States April 15-19, which will be
Iollowed by a two-day trip to Japan on his way back home.
Adding to pressure on the North, the top U.S. envoy in Seoul said North Korea must send a "clear
signal" that it plans to give a complete accounting oI its nuclear programs so that Washington could
move toward improving ties with Pyongyang.
The United States would not take North Korea oII its terrorism blacklist "until we see a clear signal
Irom the North Koreans that they are going to do their part with regards to the declaration,"
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow told a news conIerence in Seoul earlier this week. "There is a sense
oI impatience building up and we want to get on with it," he said.
The envoy called Ior a quick move Irom the North iI it wishes to avoid a tougher stance Irom Seoul and
Washington. "I think it is clear that North Korea has to adjust to closer relations between Washington
and Seoul," he said.
The sense oI urgency came as top nuclear negotiators Irom Washington and Pyongyang plan to meet in
Geneva later this week, in a new push to break the nuclear impasse. "We hope that progress will be
made at the Geneva talks so that the six-party process may move Iorward to the next stage," Yu said.
According to diplomatic sources, the Geneva talks may Iocus on a proposed compromise craIted by
China, which has hosted the six-nation nuclear talks. Under the proposed deal, the North may declare
its plutonium-producing Iacilities in an open document, while admitting the uranium-based program in
a separate, secret document.
The next step would be closed-door two-way contacts between Pyongyang and Washington to resolve
the uranium-based program, according to the sources.
Suh Jae-jean, a senior researcher at the government-run Korea Institute Ior National UniIication,
expects Pyongyang and Washington to accept the compromise deal because both want a resolution
beIore the Bush administration leaves in early 2009.
"The current standoII can be resolved by drawing up two documents that will enable North Korea to
save Iace and prevent backlash within the United States," Suh told a group oI journalists. "One
document should be an agreement made public and the other, an undisclosed document," he said.
Suh said the North is expected to make a strategic decision within this month. "North Korea wants
normalization oI diplomatic ties with the United States as a survival strategy. In addition, the North's
economic situation is too dire to reject the aid-Ior-disarmament deal," he said.
Seoul Urges N. Korea Nuclear Negotiators to Preserve 'Momentum'
By Kurt Achin
Seoul
12 March 2008
South Korea's newly appointed Ioreign minister is warning talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear
weapons capabilities could stall over unresolved issues related to the North's promised declaration.
However, oIIicials in Seoul are optimistic a one-on-one meeting this week between North Korean and
American negotiators may produce progress. VOA's Kurt Achin reports Irom Seoul.
In his Iirst media brieIing since taking oIIice, South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan
expressed concern about the Iuture oI the North Korea nuclear talks.
He says he is concerned the six-nation talks may lose "momentum."
For Iive years, South Korea has worked with the United States, Japan, China and Russia to persuade
North Korea to give up its nuclear programs, in exchange Ior Iinancial and energy aid along with
diplomatic incentives.
The six-nation diplomacy has produced progress in shutting down the North's main plutonium-
producing Iacilities. However, Pyongyang has Iailed to produce a complete declaration oI its nuclear
activities and stockpiles it promised to submit by the end oI 2007.
Yu said Wednesday the delay is because oI two basic obstacles.
He says there are roadblocks over accusations North Korea maintained a uranium enrichment program
and engaged in nuclear cooperation with Syria.
North Korea has never publicly admitted having a uranium enrichment program, but the United States
says it has abundant evidence such a program exists. Washington also suspects North Korea may have
lent assistance to a possible nuclear Iacility in Syria which Israeli warplanes bombed in September.
Negotiators in the six-nation process are now pinning their hopes on a meeting scheduled Thursday in
Geneva between U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill and senior North Korean envoy
Kim Kye Kwan. The diplomats are their respective countries' chieI delegates to the multinational
nuclear talks.
A similar one-on-one meeting last year in Berlin helped the two countries resolve a Iinancial dispute
that was paralyzing the diplomatic process. It is unclear what speciIic proposals the two envoys will
discuss. However, experts and some U.S. oIIicials have suggested North Korea may seek to address
Washington's concerns on the most sensitive issues in a document, separate Irom the Iormal nuclear
declaration.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iaoMroxkcjTDGuNZkWoctnsVjFAA
US mulls new statement to break North Korea deadlock
1 day ago
|Accessed 2008-03-13T15Z|
WASHINGTON (AFP) The United States is looking Ior a Ilexible way to unblock North Korea
nuclear talks without letting the Stalinist state oII the hook oI Iull disclosure, oIIicials said Wednesday.
One option set to be discussed at talks in Geneva Thursday is a separate declaration, addressing US
concerns that North Korea has been secretly exporting nuclear technology to Syria, a diplomatic source
said.
That would enable Iuller six-party talks to resume, the source said, putting renewed pressure on North
Korea to come clean on the Iull extent oI its publicly disclosed nuclear program.
"We'll look at any and all ideas with the understanding that at the end oI the day, we need a complete
and correct declaration," chieI US negotiator Christopher Hill told reporters beIore Ilying to Geneva.
"How we get that, what the pieces oI paper look like, I think we should be a little Ilexible on the
Iormat, but with the understanding that Ilexibility on Iormat doesn't mean Ilexibility on getting a
complete and correct declaration."
North Korea last year signed a landmark deal to abandon all its nuclear weapons in exchange Ior badly
needed energy and economic aid, along with major security and diplomatic beneIits.
But the process -- involving the United States, China, both Koreas, Russia and Japan -- has been stalled
since North Korea missed an end-2007 deadline to declare all its nuclear programs and disable a
plutonium plant.
"I think we have some ideas that are maybe workable but they are only workable in the context oI
providing a complete and correct declaration," said Hill, the top State Department oIIicial Ior East
Asia.
"We cannot have a situation where they don't give us a complete declaration and where we try to ignore
elements that need to be there."
North Korea has blamed Washington Ior the deadlock, citing a US Iailure to remove it Irom a list oI
state sponsors oI terrorism.
US accusations oI North Korean complicity in a secret Syrian atomic drive, and allegations that
Pyongyang has a Iurtive program to produce highly enriched uranium, have complicated the process.
Last September, Israeli military jets reportedly bombed a site in Syria aIter Israeli and US intelligence
determined the location housed a partially built nuclear reactor constructed with North Korean help.
Washington, which is under pressure Irom security hawks to get tough with North Korea, has already
rejected an initial declaration by Pyongyang that Iailed to address secret nuclear technology transIers to
Syria.
But the separate declaration being negotiated in Geneva between Hill and his North Korean
counterpart, Kim Kye-Gwan, would allow the six-party talks to get back on track, the diplomatic
source said.
The declaration would be submitted to the other countries in the process and made public, the source
added, declining to be identiIied.
Whatever emerges cannot be a "secret agreement" but must be transparent, Hill said, beIore being
asked iI he was Ieeling upbeat about his trip to Switzerland.
"I never talk about optimism or pessimism, except with the Red Sox," the US oIIicial said, reIerring to
his Boston baseball team.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKN1222924420080312
U.S. flexibility on North Korea deal has limits: envoy
Wed Mar 12, 2008 9:40pm GMT
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States insists on receiving a "complete and correct" North
Korean disclosure oI its nuclear activities under a disarmament-Ior-aid pact but can be Ilexible on the
Iorm oI that statement, the U.S. envoy to atomic talks with Pyongyang said on Wednesday.
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Chris Hill will meet his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-Gwan on
Geneva on Thursday to discuss a 2005 deal under which Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear
programs.
The deal has been bogged down more recently by North Korea's Iailure to produce a promised
declaration oI its nuclear programs by the end oI last year.
U.S. insistence on a "complete and correct" accounting oI North Korea's nuclear programs and
activities has clashed with Pyongyang's reluctance to discuss any transIers oI nuclear technology to
other nations, notably Syria, as well as its suspected pursuit oI uranium enrichment.
"We have some ideas that may be workable, but they're only workable within the context oI providing
a complete and correct declaration," Hill told reporters in Washington beIore leaving Ior Switzerland.
A senior U.S. oIIicial, who asked not to be named because oI the sensitivity oI the negotiations, said on
Tuesday he believed North Korea would be comIortable with disclosing the proliIeration and uranium-
related activities in a separate secret, document.
Asked about this Iormula, which analysts believe could help North Korea save Iace and advance the
stalled talks, Hill said: "I think we should be a little Ilexible on Iormat, but with the understanding that
Ilexibility on Iormat doesn't mean Ilexibility on getting a complete and correct declaration."
He indicated, however, that sensitive elements oI any North Korean declaration would not be kept
secret.
"I don't think we can have secret agreements, secretly arrived at," Hill said. "We have to make this
understandable to the public."
The United States has questions about any possible North Korean role in a suspected Syrian covert
nuclear site that was bombed by Israel in September. Syria has denied having a nuclear program but the
case remains murky.
"Any nuclear cooperation abroad needs to be clariIied and certainly (North Korea) has said that they
don't have any now and won't have any in the Iuture, but we also need to know what went on in the
past," Hill said.
(Reporting by Paul Eckert; Editing by Cynthia Osterman)
Press Stake Out at The Hotel de La Paix
Christopher R, Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
The Hotel de La Paix
Geneva, Switzerland
March 13, 2008
QUESTION: What are your expectations Ior this meeting?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First oI all, let me just say that I am very grateIul to the Swiss
authorities Ior helping to Iacilitate this meeting.
As you know, the DPRK suggested we try to get together here in Geneva, and I think it was a good
idea. Obviously what we are going to try to do is to have a thorough discussion oI the declaration. Now
I want to emphasize that the declaration is something that they have to deliver to the chair oI the Six-
Party process -- that is, the Chinese. But I would hope we would have a good discussion about it, and I
would hope that we would be able to talk about all oI the elements that we would expect to see.
QUESTION: Do you expect some movement, Mr. Secretary? Do you expect them to come up with
something new regarding the declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, rather than handicap this thing, why dont I go and talk to
them, and it would be easier iI I came back and told you iI we had some movement. I just dont know. I
do know that we need to get some movement. We are already some ten weeks behind iI we are going to
get onto phase three and what we see as the complete denuclearization, and we need to get moving. So
lets see iI we can get that done.
QUESTION: Youve said March is critical.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think it is pretty critical to get moving on this now. We are, as I
said, ten weeks late already -- or something like ten weeks late -- and we have to get to the declaration.
The declaration has to be a complete and correct declaration iI we are going to get onto the next phase.
QUESTION: Any type oI Iormat is acceptable, iI the content is
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Any type oI Iormat? Well, I wouldnt look Ior like a coloring book
or something like that, but obviously I think we can be Ilexible on Iormat. But we cannot be Ilexible on
the Iact that we need a complete and correct declaration. That is, we need all the elements there, and we
need them to be expressed correctly.
QUESTION: What is your best case scenario?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I dont know. My best case scenario is this is all over, and I go
home. (Laughter) But I think we are going to try to get through and have a good discussion on the
declaration and try to come to an understanding oI what it is they are going to be submitting to the
Chinese.
QUESTION: Just one meeting or more?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the plan is to meet early tomorrow morning as well.
QUESTION: How about the Uranium issue?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well that is part oI the declaration. So obviously that has to be
addressed. So we have a lot oI work to.
QUESTION: There seems to be talk about separating --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Only Irom you. We have talked about diIIerent Iormats, but we
have never talked about separating elements Irom the other, or separating them in time and space. We
need all oI the elements essentially at the same time. How the Iormat, how many pieces oI paper there
are, we can discuss that.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well look, we are going to have a discussion about where we are
and what we need to get done iI we are going to stay on schedule.
QUESTION: Is some oI this being done verbally or in private rather than on paper, or does everything
have to be on paper?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we have emphasized throughout that this is not a U.S.
problem. This is a problem oI six parties. And when we need a complete and correct declaration, that is
not some U.S. position; that is a position expressed in the October agreement. So I dont think verbal
assurances to the U.S. is really what does it. I think we need a declaration to reIlect all oI these
elements.
So lets see how we do. I will let you know.
Released on March 13, 2008
Press Briefing
Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Mission Geneva
Geneva, Switzerland
March 13, 2008
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, Ior those oI you who are not jet-lagged, youre up late. For
the rest oI us, it doesnt matter. |Laughter|.
Thank you Ior coming.
Weve had a long day oI discussions today in the context oI our consultation with the DPRK
delegation. Weve discussed a number oI issues, especially the question oI the substance oI what has
divided us Ior the last ten weeks, but also Iormat questions. I want to stress this was not a decisional
meeting. That is, we had good discussions about it. We looked at some oI the issues that have been
problematic. We explored some avenues Ior going Iorward, but were still working on these issues. I
look Iorward to communicating with Secretary Rice to give her an update on where we are and where
we hope to be.
We agreed that we can sort oI proceed on this basis. And our hope is that we can achieve what we need
-- which is a declaration which will be complete and correct -- and that the declaration will be provided
to the Chinese as the chair oI the Six-Party process.
Again, I dont want to get into the substance at this point -- except to say that we talked about Iormat
questions, and then we talked about the actual substance. We talked about substance insoIar as it relates
to the October 07 agreement and the need to cover all aspects oI that agreement. That includes such
issues as proliIeration, but also issues oI uranium enrichment, oI course. And, I might add, we had a
good discussion oI the need to address the question oI Japanese concerns.
So I would say it was a very good consultation. We certainly are Iurther along in this consultation than
we were when we got oII the plane this morning. So I would say theres been progress. But we are not
there yet, and we still have to continue to work on this.
With those sort oI opening comments let me take a couple oI questions.
QUESTION: Saki Ouchi with the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan. Ambassador Hill, would you be meeting
the North Koreans again tomorrow? And are you so Iar, what is your analysis oI whatever declaration
they might have come up with?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Im sorry, what is my analysis oI the --
QUESTION: How would you evaluate? Did the North Koreans come up with a satisIactory list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: As I said, we had some very good discussions, and we covered all
oI the issues we needed to cover. I might add that in addition to covering the Iormat questions oI how
the declaration would look and in addition to the speciIic issues within the declaration -- as you recall,
many oI them are contained in the October 07 agreement -- we also had kind oI a sneak preview oI
what the so-called phase three might look like. We discussed all aspects oI what were trying to do in
phase three. We also discussed issues such as humanitarian assistance and where that stands. We
discussed the issue oI heavy Iuel oil and the status oI that, the up-to-date status oI that.
As Ior tomorrow, our plan is: right now we need to report to our capitals. In particular, I need to report
to Secretary Rice. I havent done that as yet. And I know that Mr. Kim Kye-gwan needs to report to his
capital. And so well see how it looks tomorrow.
QUESTION: |Inaudible|, Fox News.
I know youre careIul about the substance, but you havent been satisIied with what the North Koreans
have provided so Iar regarding this declaration, regarding proliIeration and also uranium enrichment.
Have they moved at all? Have they gone closer to what you want or expect?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, again, I dont want to get into too much oI the substance.
Frankly, Id really rather report that to Secretary Rice. But let me just say weve had some good
discussions on all substantive issues, including the ones that you mentioned.
Yes, Mike.
QUESTION: You said that you were coming here with some workable ideas to try to move the process
Iorward. Do you Ieel aIter todays meeting that you have a basis Ior a declaration, to start moving
Iorward on a declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Let me say that I believe that as we meet here at almost midnight
Geneva time that weve moved the issues Iorward compared to when we arrived here this morning. Im
not in a position to say weve resolved these matters. But theres no question weve had a very
thorough discussion oI the Iormat and oI the substance and, I think importantly to us as well, oI the
next stage. So whether weve resolved these issues and whether weve achieved our goals, Im not in a
position right now to say so -- except to say that there is no question weve had some very good
discussions, and I look Iorward to brieIing Secretary Rice on precisely what those discussions were.
QUESTION: Are you starting to see a bit oI light at the end oI the tunnel? |Inaudible|
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hes asking about light at the end oI the tunnel. Thats such a
cliche. I mean Im really surprised at you. |Laughter|.
QUESTION: |Inaudible|.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well thats a rare example oI restraint. But let me say we really
went straight on in terms oI dealing with some oI the problems, especially the substantive problems,
because weve had an idea in Iormat terms oI how to address this Ior several weeks now. But I think
our problem has been on the actual substance. So we were able to tackle that, and I think were in a
better position now than we were when we arrived here. But iI you dont mind, I would really preIer to
brieI Secretary Rice on this beIore I brieI you.
Tomo, ok. Youre kind oI a ringer though. I mean, you know all this stuII. (Laughter)
QUESTION: Ambassador, right aIter the dinner Kim Kye-gwan told us reporters that the two issues --
the proliIeration and the enrichment -- that they havent done it, and they are not doing it right now,
and they are not going to do it in the Iuture. So that sounds like theyre still keeping a hard stance on it.
So do you Ieel that you have narrowed the distance between you and the North Koreans on todays
talk? And do you now have a more clear view that you can get this declaration done within this month?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I have made clear publicly -- and I must say I made clear
with the DPRK delegation today -- that we need to pick up the pace. We are already in March oI 08.
We have some ambitions Ior trying to get done with this, get through this in 08. And so thereIore
theres no question we need to move Iaster.
I want to emphasize that what we did today was not decisional. That is, we did not reach an agreement
today that will allow us to move on to phase three tomorrow. We did have, again, very substantive
discussions oI how to go Iorward, and were going to report to capitals and see where we are tomorrow
and the next day.
The DPRK has maintained a position on proliIeration, on uranium enrichment that we have really had
to challenge and had to work with them on. So Im not really in a position to tell you whether weve
resolved that -- except to say that I think weve made some progress today.
QUESTION: |Inaudible|, working Ior the Korean Broadcasting System. Simply, can I translate this
question to successIully pave the way to hold next Six-Party Talks or hold Six-Party Talks in a month?
And second, are you going to meet him tomorrow again?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: On the second question, we dont have a plan yet. I think we both
agreed we need to report to capitals very speciIically about some oI the discussions we had and the
ideas we had. The Iirst question, though, was -- I think youre asking me to write your lead, and Im not
sure I can. But --
QUESTION: Can I translate the good discussion successIully paved way to hold next Six-Party Talks
in a month?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, I see. Well, we are trying to get ready Ior making that progress
-- that is, Ior getting to phase three. And phase three would mean a Six-Party meeting, to be sure. This
was not a decisional meeting. So I dont want to suggest that we have paved the way, and were
waiting Ior the cement to dry in order to move Iorward. I think we still have some work to do on the
road Iorward. But it certainly -- Since weve run into this diIIiculty in early December, I think these
were probably the most substantive discussions weve had on how to go Iorward. But Im not prepared
at this point to tell you weve paved the way and that this will be a cakewalk Irom now on in.
QUESTION: Ambassador, did you come up with the agreement or understanding when you can
remove them Irom the terrorism list?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We certainly had a discussion oI the terrorism list and what the
issues are and what the timing would be Ior the terrorism list.
QUESTION: You mentioned in your opening statement that you addressed the issue oI the Japanese
concerns.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, I did.
QUESTION: Did you talk about the abduction issue --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I sure did.
QUESTION: -- and was there anything new that they said?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No. Nor was there anything new that I said, because I raise the
abduction issue just about every time weve met.
I think its Iair to say that as I addressed this issue oI the DPRKs bilateral relationship with Japan, I
did so in the context oI the overall eIIort to go Iorward. And I think my comments were very much
understood. But I think these issues, just as I need to report some issues to Washington, these need to
be reported to Pyongyang. So I would say on this issue we had a very clear understanding oI what we
need to see happen.
QUESTION: Was there anything diIIerent in their position on this and |inaudible|?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, these were points that I made to the DPRK and that they
need to report to |their| capital. So I think it was a very useIul exchange, but Im not in a position to
characterize their response.
QUESTION: Could you elaborate about what you had talked with Kim Kye-gwan on the terrorist list
and trading with the enemy act? And also, what did you talk about to normalize the relation between
U.S. and DPRK? And the last question is, are you going to have some kind oI a written, Iormal
agreement or promise note or something?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think everything that we discussed ultimately needs to be
reIlected in some kind oI written instrument. I dont think were going to allow an oral conversation to
be part oI the historical record on this.
With respect to the issue oI the terrorism list, abductions, etc., we also had a very good discussion oI
this, but we need to report to capitals. We have some ideas oI how to move Iorward. But we need to
report to capitals and see whether those are acceptable in capitals. And, in particular, I need to talk with
Secretary Rice. So youll Iorgive me iI I dont tell you more than Im going to tell Secretary Rice.
QUESTION: Considering the deadline Ior the terrorism list |inaudible| --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, the issue oI the terrorism list -- there is an annual terrorism
report, and then the issue oI when a country is taken oII the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism is quite
separate Irom the publication oI that report. So its not tied to the timing oI that report.
QUESTION: Im Irom Nippon Television. I just want to ask you, you mentioned that this meeting was
proposed by the North Koreans. In that sense, what was the diIIerence in their attitude? What kind oI
new answers did you get Irom a week ago or ten days ago?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, you know, I hate to be the spokesman Ior the DPRK and to
talk about their attitudes or this or that. Certainly I had looked Iorward to having a discussion with
them earlier, about a week ago in Beijing. Indeed, I Ilew up Irom Bangkok to do just that. We werent
able to get together. They proposed coming to Geneva.
I cant really give you much more inIormation -- except to say that we had a very substantive
discussion about Iormat and about the actual substance, the issues that have really divided us Ior these
last ten weeks. I do believe were Iurther along now than we were this morning. I need to report to my
capital, to Secretary Rice. I know that Mr. Kim Kye-gwan needs to report to his capital. And we will
see iI this meeting that I believe was very substantive and very useIul to all oI us, whether it can really
lead to or pave the way to the progress that we very much need in order to get on to phase three.
I want to emphasize that as diIIicult as phase two has been, phase three is going to be even more
diIIicult. For those oI you who Irom time to time look at video games, you know that phase two is
always more diIIicult than phase one, and phase three is always more diIIicult than phase two. And so
were very much playing that kind oI game.
All right? Thank you.
Sorry, one more. I always regret taking one more question, but go ahead. |Laughter|.
QUESTION: Mark |inaudible| with Bloomberg News. Did you hear any complaint Irom North Korea?
Did they say that the speed oI the promises were too slow?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We discussed, as I mentioned earlier, we discussed all aspects oI
our interaction, and that includes heavy Iuel oil. But, actually, I did not hear complaints about the
heavy Iuel oil -- because I think there was a realization that the U.S. has just in the past Iew days
completed or is completing its requirement under the heavy Iuel oil. I know that the Republic oI Korea
and China are working on heavy Iuel oil equivalents. That is part oI the issue, or the package with
regard to the disablement oI the Yongbyon Iacility. I think there was an understanding, including
within the DPRK delegation, that that is moving Iorward.
So I think we are more or less ok on that. But, again, were not playing this game Ior phase two. Were
trying to get on to phase three and see iI we can Iinish this job.
Thank you very much. Good to see you all.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5huSr2cto6oXklRH0nXdM8i7PEQ0wD8VCS4CG0
US Sees Progress but No NKorean Pact
By ELIANE ENGELER
13 hours ago |Accessed 2008-03-14T13:55Z|
GENEVA (AP) The United States and North Korea made progress Thursday in overcoming
obstacles that have stalled a major nuclear disarmament deal but remained short oI a breakthrough, the
chieI U.S. negotiator said.
Assistant U.S. Secretary oI State Christopher Hill told reporters that the talks in Geneva were probably
the most substantive that Washington has had with North Korea since problems developed in
December over disarming Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program.
"We certainly are Iurther along in this consultation than we were when I arrived this morning," Hill
said aIter meetings with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. "There has been
progress."
Hill said he wanted to report to U.S. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice beIore going into more detail.
"We've had good discussions on all substantive issues," Hill said. "Whether we've resolved these issues
and achieved our goals I'm not prepared to say."
Kim separately denied allegations that North Korea had a secret uranium enrichment program or that it
had any connection with a nuclear program in Syria.
"We did not have, we don't have and we will not have," Kim said.
Hill went into the Geneva discussions insisting that Pyongyang Iully reveal all details oI its nuclear
weapons program.
"We need to get some movement. We're already some 10 weeks behind," Hill said, reIerring to the
North Korean commitment to make a Iull declaration oI its program by Dec. 31.
North Korea agreed last year to provide a complete list oI its nuclear programs and disable its Iacilities
and its main reactor by the end oI 2007 as part oI a disarmament deal.
For its part, Washington promised aid and said it would consider removing North Korea Irom terrorism
and economic sanctions blacklists.
Pyongyang made unprecedented progress, shutting down and starting to disable its main nuclear reactor
last year. But the talks have Iaced an impasse since the North missed its December deadline.
North Korea complained that promised energy aid was late in coming. Washington said Pyongyang
still had to provide a detailed declaration oI its nuclear programs as a condition Ior receiving the
assistance, and North Korea insisted it gave the U.S. a list oI its nuclear programs in November.
South Korea, China, Japan and Russia have been working with the United States to resolve the dispute.
Hill said the United States, South Korea and China were well on the way to living up to their
commitment to provide energy aid to North Korea in exchange Ior the declaration and disarmament.
"I think there's a realization that the U.S. has just in the past Iew days completed or is completing its
requirement on the heavy Iuel oil," Hill said. "I know that the Republic oI Korea and China are
working on heavy Iuel oil equivalents."
"I think we are more or less OK on that," Hill said.
Associated Press writers Foster Klug in Washington, Kwang-tae Kim in Seoul and Alexander G.
Higgins and Frank Jordans in Geneva contributed to this report.
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL14308804
U.S., North Korea stay in contact in Geneva
Fri Mar 14, 2008 8:22am EDT
(Recasts paragraph 1 and adds U.S. mission comment on Sung Kim meeting in paragraph 6)
By Jonathan Lynn GENEVA, March 14 (Reuters) - U.S. oIIicials held Iurther discussions in Geneva on
Friday with North Korea a day aIter the two countries had substantive talks on getting the secretive
communist state to abandon its nuclear activities.
The top U.S. negotiator on North Korea, Christopher Hill, told reporters he was departing Ior Warsaw,
but leaving the state department's head oI Korean aIIairs, Sung Kim, in Geneva to Iollow up on
Thursday's talks.
The State Department's Kim is an expert on North Korea's nuclear programme and has visited the
Yongbyon Iacility that is at the centre oI negotiations and is currently being disabled.
"There's a growing understanding oI the issues that need to be resolved," said Hill, who is pushing
North Korea to speed up the pace oI the talks.
His comments showed that relations between the two enemies had improved to the extent that they
remained in touch, but they have still not agreed on how to carry out the deal in which Pyongyang will
abandon its nuclear programme.
A spokesman Ior the U.S. mission in Geneva said State's Kim had held a brieI Iollow-up discussion on
Friday with his North Korean working-level counterparts, but gave no Iurther details.
North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear programme in 2005 but the deal has been stalled by
Pyongyang's Iailure to produce a detailed declaration oI its nuclear projects by the end oI last year.
That deal was worked out in talks between six countries -- North and South Korea, Russia, Japan and
the United States, with China chairing the negotiations.
In return Ior abandoning its nuclear programme, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons as well
as energy, North Korea would receive humanitarian aid and Iuel oil, and see relations with the rest oI
the world normalised.
That would include Washington dropping North Korea Irom its list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, and
easing sanctions.
SIX PARTY TALKS
At Thursday's meeting, Hill and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan discussed all the
issues including enriched uranium, proliIeration, humanitarian aid, heavy Iuel oil Ior North Korea and
the abduction oI Japanese citizens.
For the talks to progress, North Korea must provide China with a Iull declaration oI its nuclear
activities.
That would culminate with the Iinal dismantling oI the Yongbyon Iacility, but Hill said they were not
yet ready to move to that phase.
North Korea's reluctance to discuss transIers oI nuclear technology to other countries and its suspected
pursuit oI uranium enrichment have delayed the declaration.
The United States has questions about a possible North Korean role in a suspected Syrian covert
nuclear site bombed by Israel in September. A uranium enrichment programme would give North
Korea a second source oI Iissile material to produce nuclear weapons besides its plutonium-based
Iacilities.
North Korea's Kim was quoted by Japanese and Korean media as denying any involvement in
enrichment or proliIeration.
"Our position is that there have never been such programmes in the past, there are no such things going
on currently and that we will not engage in them in the Iuture," Kyodo News quoted him as saying.
Hill said Iurther one-on-one meetings were needed beIore the six-party talks resumed, but said he had
no meetings arranged.
"I think there might be another need Ior a consultation but Irankly we'll all have to do a number oI
consultations with diIIerent parties beIore we have a six-party meeting," he said.
But Hill said the declaration Irom Pyongyang, whatever Iorm it takes, was not the goal oI the
negotiations.
"The purpose oI this six-party process is not a declaration. The purpose is the denuclearisation oI the
Korean peninsula and Ior that reason we really need to pick up the pace iI we're going to achieve that,"
he said. (Editing by Ralph Boulton)
Remarks to the Media in Geneva
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary oI State Ior East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs
Hotel de La Paix
Geneva, Switzerland
March 14, 2008
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Some oI our team is still here, including Sung Kim, so we will
Iollow up this morning to see the status oI what we are trying to get accomplished. But again I want to
emphasize that it was a very good meeting yesterday. We went through a lot. We talked a lot about the
Iormat, but we also talked a lot about substance.
I am not in a position though to say whether we are prepared to go on to phase three at this point, but
we will continue to be in touch with the DPRK delegation through the weekend. I also had some
discussions with other members oI the Six Parties, and I talked to Saiki-san three or Iour times by
telephone, including this morning. So we will see how it goes. But again it was a very good meeting,
and I am very appreciative to the Swiss authorities Ior helping to Iacilitate this.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the North again last night were reported as saying no on uranium
enrichment, no on proliIeration. It doesnt seem they have moved on those substantive issues that you
want them to move on.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, I am not responsible Ior what they say in their press
conIerences. I can just tell you we had some very good discussions, and we will see where we are.
QUESTION: How was the response Irom Secretary Rice? Was she satisIied with some improvements?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think you would have to ask the spokesman on that. I
talked to her a couple oI times, including at three in the morning our time. So I think we have been in
touch, and she is very Iamiliar with what we are trying to get accomplished here.
QUESTION: Would you be coming back Irom Warsaw to Geneva?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I dont have any plans to do that.
QUESTION: Do you think you need to meet with the Koreans bilaterally beIore going on to Six-Party
Talks?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think there might be another need Ior consultation. But Irankly, I
think we will have to do a number oI other consultations with other parties beIore we have a Six-Party
meeting. But again, it was a very Iull day oI discussion. We went through a lot oI issues that we needed
to go through. I think there is a growing understanding oI the issues that need to be resolved, so we will
see how we do. And I will leave Sung Kim here Ior another day, in case there is any need Ior Iace-to-
Iace Iollow up.
QUESTION: You said you need to make some progress within this month, it is critical.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think it is just a matter oI the timing. We are going to get
on to phase three and make some serious progress in 08 because the purpose oI this Six-Party process
is not a declaration. The purpose is denuclearization oI the Korean peninsula, and Ior that we need to
really pick up the pace iI we are going to achieve that.
QUESTION: Do you have a meeting scheduled?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I dont have a meeting scheduled right now.
QUESTION: Why did you have to talk to Saiki (inaudible) two or three times?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think I called him, and he called me. He had some messages to
pass on to me. And we also were doing some logistics because I look Iorward to him as well in a
bilateral consultation in the near Iuture.
QUESTION: When do you leave Ior Warsaw?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: About two minutes ago.
Briefing En route Santiago, Chile
En route Santiago, Chile
March 14, 2008
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: Do you have any kind oI readout on the negotiations that Chris Hill (inaudible) Geneva
now; I guess Sung Kim is going to carry on without him. Any progress, any (inaudible) uranium
enrichment (inaudible)?
SECRETARY RICE: My understanding I havent had a chance to (inaudible) readout. But my
understanding is that there will now have to be some period oI (inaudible) to the capitals and so I
wouldnt expect anything immediate, but its time to solve this issue in the declaration and thats what
were going to keep doing. The United States is ready to IulIill its obligations when North Korea
IulIills its obligations. So North Korea needs to IulIill those obligations.
QUESTION: Are there any plans Ior any (inaudible) Chris Hill back Irom Geneva and can you give us
any sense you talked about (inaudible) maintaining about how you were sort oI indiIIerent or Ilexible
on Iorm. Can you give us a sense now oI what is leIt to sort out? Is it a matter oI Iorm or is it still a
matter oI substance that theyre actually --
SECRETARY RICE: I would say its still a matter oI substance. And Chris doesnt have any plans to
go back to Geneva at this point. It was intended to be a one-day meeting. Hell come back to the United
States and well see where we are when he gets back. Ill have a chance to consult and hell have a
chance to talk himselI with the allies.
http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/03/17/scenariosIornkoreanuclearresolution/8929/
Scenarios for N.Korea nuclear resolution
By LEE JONG-HEON
UPI Correspondent
Published: March 17, 2008
SEOUL, South Korea, Closed talks between North Korea and the United States last week Iell short oI
producing a breakthrough to end the protracted nuclear standoII, with negotiators admitting substantive
diIIerences between the two sides.
But hope is cautiously reviving Ior a last-minute compromise. The two countries have leIt the door
open Ior Iurther meetings as both sides are under pressure to hasten the disarmament process.
Washington's chieI nuclear envoy Christopher Hill said his country was ready to exercise "Ilexibility
on the Iormat" oI North Korea's declaration oI its nuclear programs, saying, "We have some ideas that
may be workable."
Hill's North Korean counterpart Kim Kye Gwan also said diIIerences between Pyongyang and
Washington were not insurmountable, saying, "There are U.S. proposals we have been continually
considering."
The North Korean nuclear envoy did not disclose what the U.S. proposals were, but diplomatic sources
say Pyongyang and Washington are weighing three scenarios to bridge their diIIerences and move
Iorward to the next stage oI the denuclearization process.
One scenario involves separating the issues oI contention -- North Korea's alleged uranium enrichment
program and suspected nuclear proliIeration to Syria -- Irom the main declaration where the plutonium-
powered nuclear program would be speciIied.
Under a six-nation agreement reached in February last year, the North completed the Iirst phase oI the
disarmament in July by shutting down and sealing its plutonium-producing reactor at the country's
main nuclear complex in return Ior energy aid. But it has Iailed to Iinish the second phase oI the
disarmament deal that called Ior a declaration oI all its nuclear programs by the end oI last year,
delaying the third and Iinal phase oI dismantling its atomic weapons programs.
The North says it submitted a nuclear list in November, but the United States is calling Ior Pyongyang
to Iully clear up the suspicions about a uranium-based weapons program, including questions about
how the centriIuges and aluminum tubes it had bought were used.
Pyongyang has Ilatly denied the existence oI a uranium enrichment program. There is ample evidence
that North Korea acquired components Ior a centriIuge-enrichment program, but it is unclear that the
North produced highly enriched uranium or developed its enrichment capabilities in the manner
claimed by the United States.
The North's alleged transIer oI nuclear technology and materials to Syria is another thorny issue that
has put the disarmament process in limbo. The United States has questions about any possible North
Korean role in a suspected Syrian covert nuclear site that was bombed by Israel in September. But
Pyongyang denies any nuclear connection with Syria.
"By separating the plutonium problem Irom the sticky issues oI uranium and proliIeration, the two
sides can break the nuclear stalemate," the diplomatic source said. "The proposed option would make it
earlier Ior North Korea to submit the nuclear list," he said.
The second scenario would be that North Korea and the United States sign two separate agreements --
one open, the other secret. Under this idea, the North would declare plutonium-producing Iacilities in
an open document, while acknowledge, in a separate, secret document, its initial research and
development oI enriched uranium while citing the import oI centriIuges only Ior industrial purposes.
This option may be related to Hill's remark oI "Ilexibility on the Iormat."
Suh Jae-jean, a senior researcher at the government-run Korea Institute Ior National UniIication, has
campaigned Ior this option, saying the secret agreement would "enable North Korea to save Iace and
prevent backlash" Irom U.S. hawks.
The third and Iinal scenario involves essentially agreeing to disagree, with each side stating its own
views in the document. This idea calls Ior the United States to express its concerns about the possible
uranium program and transIer oI nuclear technology, while North Korea would state its denials in the
document.
Suh and other analysts say both North Korea and the United States are concerned that time is running
out to reach a breakthrough. II they Iail to produce tangible results within weeks, the nuclear problem
could be handed over to the next U.S. administration, given the upcoming U.S. presidential election.
The Bush administration, which is desperate to win a Ioreign policy success to oIIset its Iailures in the
Middle East, is still pushing Ior a big bargain with North Korea to end the nuclear standoII, which
would be a diplomatic victory Ior President George W. Bush, who leaves oIIice at the beginning oI
2009.
The North also does not want Iurther delay into next year, aIter a new lineup is established in
Washington, because Pyongyang desperately wants economic aid in return Ior hastening the
disarmament process.
"Likely is a grand political compromise between North Korea and the United States to move Iorward
the denuclearization process in the near Iuture," Suh said.
Moving Forward in 2008: The U.S.-East Asia Relationship
Foreign Press Center BrieIing
Washington, DC
March 19, 2008
3:00 P.M. EDT
[EXCERPTS]
AMBASSADOR HILL:
[deletia]
And the problem, oI course, that I, unIortunately, have to spend most oI time on is the issue oI
denuclearization in North Korea. I had a meeting just last week, as many oI you know, in Geneva. It
was a good substantive discussion. I had hoped that we could reach some conclusion about having the
DPRK, the North Koreans go Iorward with their declaration, which they need to give to the chair oI the
six-party process. They were unable to do that or unable to put together something that would meet, I
think, the deIinition that is set out in the October '07 agreement, that is complete and correct. And so
we talked about this. And now, I think, the DPRK's negotiating team is back in Pyongyang and we'll
give them a Iew days and see what the next step is.
I've said in a number oI settings that I think we are at a point where we really do need to make progress
soon to wrap up this second phase. I certainly would like to see it done in -- even in this month, in
March, because I think iI we're going to get onto the next phase, which is a very ambitious phase where
we would like to see the IulIillment oI the September '05 statement in which the DPRK is required to
denuclearize and rejoin the NonproliIeration Treaty, we better get moving on that very quickly iI we're
to get that done in '08. So we are trying to get this done as Iast as we can. We've devoted a lot oI
attention to it in recent weeks as we've been in this sort oI overtime period since the end oI December,
but we're not there yet.
[deletia]
QUESTION: Daguchi with Kyodo News. On your meeting with Kim Gye Gwan in Geneva, how was
the discussion on sequence and timing oI delisting them Irom the state sponsor oI terrorism list? Are
they still insisting on seeing delisting prior to the declaration? And can you be Ilexible on that timing
and sequence issue?
AMBASSADOR HILL: You know, I'm not sure I want to get into the speciIics oI what we talked
about except to say, as I've said beIore, that I don't see sequencing and timing as a problem. I think that
can be worked out. And when you look at the issues that we're dealing with there, sequencing and
timing has not emerged as a problematic element in the discussions. I think the really problematic
element is we don't have a commitment Irom the DPRK to provide a complete and correct declaration.
They'd rather have one that misses a Iew elements; that is, that's rather incomplete.
And I think the declaration, while some people think it's just a paper exercise, aIter all, one oI the main
issues has been the continued disablement oI the Yongbyon nuclear Iacility, disablement that Iollowed
the shutdown oI that Iacility in the latter part oI '07. So a lot oI people say, "Well, why are you so
concerned about the declaration when the real issues should be happening on the ground?" And I think
the answer is very clear that as we move Iorward and as we achieve complete denuclearization, we
need to have transparency in the process. We can't have a situation where they, you know, are - Iail to
list some oI their nuclear programs, where they Iail to list some oI the experiences they've had,
especially in their interest - in one case, in their interest in a uranium enrichment program. We need this
to be clear.
So I know there's a great deal oI impatience about it. People say, "Well, why can't you just accept
something partial and work on the rest later?" And I think we are really at a point where we have to
have a complete and correct declaration. That will be what enables us to wrap up phase two and then
we will go to what I described earlier and what I continue to describe as a very, very diIIicult phase
three. Getting a country that has produced Iissile material on its own and getting that country to
relinquish that Iissile material is obviously going to be diIIicult. Again, I don't think we're asking the
DPRK to do something that's not in its interest. I think it is very much in its interest to keep on this
program. There will be a lot on the table in this next phase and so, a lot on the table in terms oI their
access to economic assistance, in terms oI their diplomatic recognition, in terms oI their security
situation because we're prepared to replace the armistice with a more durable peace instrument.
So there is a great deal on the table that is in their interest, but they have to understand that we cannot,
at the end oI the day, permit them to hold on to nuclear material. So we're just going to have to keep
making that clear and I've said it to them 50 times and I'll be happy to say it another 50 times. So this is
where we are and I hope they will come to understand that they need to complete this phase two beIore
we get on to phase three. And I can assure you that issues such as sequencing and, you know, who's
going to step Iirst and this sort oI thing, that's not the issue. That really is not the issue. Those are issues
that may come up in other negotiations, but not in this one.
[deletia]
QUESTION: Can we assume that to mean that you will accept North Korea making separate -- I know
you don't like the word "separate," but separate pieces oI paper oI declaration, separating -- separate
between plutonium, uranium, proliIeration? And also, would you be willing to accept the declaration
directly Irom North Korea to the U.S. instead oI insisting that it be given to the chair, China?
AMBASSADOR HILL: Again, I don't think Iormatting is a problem. I really don't think how many
pieces oI paper are the issue here. Moreover, China has worked very hard in this process. China has
taken their responsibilities very seriously. They have put together a very good diplomatic team. They
are the chair oI the six-party process. I don't quite see the purpose in having the DPRK give the U.S.
the declaration when, in any other multilateral diplomatic process, you would provide it to the chair. So
I don't think -- I don't see the purpose oI it, nor has the issue really come up. The North Koreans have
not said, well, we'll give you the declaration but not the Chinese. So it's really not an issue.
So, again, what it Iinally looks like in terms oI numbers oI pieces oI paper, I don't know now. I mean, I
have an idea oI what it's going to look like, but it's not the problem. The problem is we don't have all
the elements oI their nuclear program. And iI they give to the Chinese as the chair an incomplete
declaration that skips elements oI the nuclear program, it is not politically sustainable Ior us or Ior other
members oI the six parties to say that we accepted a declaration, to say it IulIills the requirements in
October to be complete and correct, when, in Iact, it's incomplete and incorrect.
So this is a moment where I think we have to be pretty clear about what we need. Now, I know there's a
lot oI discussion about are there models, are there diplomatic models out there that can save people's
Iace, are there ways to handle things that don't require people to be -- you know, to Ieel that they have
had to change their position or something. OI course, there are things like that. And probably, in the
end, some oI these things can be put to use. The basic problem, though, is that the DPRK is not yet
prepared to provide the complete and correct declaration.
I've also said that as diIIicult as this issue is, I think the next phase will probably be even more diIIicult,
and thereIore it's in -- it's my judgment that as we -- as we go Iorward here, I predict that iI the six-
party process does not work Iinally, the problem will not be the Iormat oI the declaration or even the
scope oI the declaration, because I think we will Iigure out a way through the declaration. I am much
more Iocused on the next set oI problems, which is what we're calling phase three.
[deletia]
QUESTION: Okay. I know in Geneva, you said that there were a lot oI issues oI substance that weren't
cleared up, but you seem to be - have - be a little bit more optimistic on Iormat. I'm wondering iI you
came to an understanding or close to an understanding on Iormat in Geneva. And on the Iormat, the
issue oI a secret document on the sensitive issues oI uranium and proliIeration, it's still in the press, it
reIuses to die down. Can you deIinitively say that the United States will not accept a secret - a separate,
secret document on these issues?
(Laughter.)
AMBASSADOR HILL: I can deIinitively tell you that Iormat is not the problem. How - you know,
these things have to be explainable to our public, so the idea oI a secret document secretly arrived at
that one can never describe, you know, that's not what this is really about. I mean, this is about seeking
transparency. So again, how we do that and the Iormat, what documents are actually, you know, put out
Ior people's perusal, you know, I'm not in a position to say with any great - in any great detail. But you
know, we are not interested in more secrecy. We're interested in more openness.
And - I mean, that's what the declaration is all about too: Put things on the table, resolve issues that
have taken place and move on. I think the - to some extent, one oI the problems we seem to get Irom
the DPRK is that as we ask questions, they Ieel that somehow, this will be a never-ending series oI
questions. They think that I have nothing better to do in my time or in my liIe than to keep asking them
questions. And they've kind oI misunderstood where I am. We ask questions because we need answers
and when we get the complete and correct answers, we'll move on.
So the DPRK does not need to worry that our eIIorts to get clarity on this will somehow boomerang,
will somehow come back to cause problems Ior them. They need to understand that this is how we
resolve things and when we resolve them, we will move on and try to resolve the next problem. So it's
a sequential, step-by-step approach and people always say, "Why are you going step by step?" And the
answer is you can't just do it in one leap. You've got to, you know, work on each oI these problems,
resolve them, move on to the next.
And again, I think people do need to remind themselves that we have made some headway. We got
Yongbyon shut down, we've got it disabled and with every passing day, it's more and more disabled.
Now we've got to get a complete declaration in order to get on to some oI the continuing -- the next
elements and we'll continue to work that. And I'm telling you, at the end oI the day, iI this doesn't work,
it's not because we didn't try hard enough.
QUESTION: Did you (inaudible) Iormat?
AMBASSADOR HILL: We have discussed Iormat and we anticipate we will not have a problem on
Iormat.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/mar/102560.htm
Washington, DC
March 24, 2008
[EXCERPT]
MR. MCCORMACK: Uh-huh.
QUESTION: The Iirst one is: Has North Korea suggested additional bilateral talk with the U.S. aIter
the recent Geneva meeting? And my second question is: Washington Post reported yesterday that North
Korea had made a secret agreement to provide technical know-how and some materials Ior the reactor
with Syria. Do you have any comment on this report?
MR. MCCORMACK: In terms oI in terms oI the last part oI your question, we have said that the
North Korean declaration needs to be Iull and complete. That means talking about their plutonium
program, their HEU program, as well as any proliIeration-related activities. Im not aware oI any
request Ior any Iurther consultations within the context oI the six-party talks with our between the
United States and North Korea. Ill check with Chris Hill to see iI there is anything, but at this point,
Im not aware oI any.
http://www.acus.org/docs/Chris-Hill-20080324-TRANSCRIPT.htm
TRANSCRIPT

Ambassador Christopher R. Hill
Assistant Secretary oI State Ior East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs
Global Leadership Speaker Series
March 25, 2008

Frederick Kempe: Good aIternoon. Good aIternoon, Im Fred Kempe. Im President and CEO oI
Atlantic Council and Id like to welcome you to this installment oI our Global Leadership Speaker
Series Ieaturing Ambassador Christopher Hill.
I wont introduce Chris. Ill leave it to our executive committee member Irom our board, Frank
Kramer, to do that-except to say that weve known each other a very long time. Dating back to the mid
80s in Poland and then in the Iirst democratic elections in South Korea. And its wonderIul to have
you here and Iollowing your incredibly distinguished career where youve done so much service to our
country. And Ior that matter, Id say also to the world.
Our mission here at the Atlantic Council is to renew the Atlantic Community Ior 21st century global
challenges. And this speaker series brings key American and European policy makers to the Council to
discuss how best to deal with the global challenges that we Iace together. Id like to thank our board
member, David AuIhauser and his company, UBS, Ior their generous support oI this Global Leadership
Speaker Series Irom the very beginning.
We were Iortunate to have as the Iirst speaker in this series Nick Burns, then the Undersecretary Ior
Political AIIairs oI the State Department, who used his words to deIine a global agenda Ior the Euro-
Atlantic Community. He spoke oI a dramatic and undeniable shiIt in the European-American
relationship. Perhaps the most important oI a century. Likely to be Ielt Ior a generation to come. And
that the United States policy towards Europe is no longer about Europe, its about the rest oI the world.
He said, Its about what we together have to do to be eIIective and purposeIul around the world and in
all regions oI the world.
We Ior many years have had an Asia program at the Atlantic Council, but this new global Iocus on the
Atlantic relations makes the Asia Program more important than ever beIore. I want to thank Joe Snyder
whos the director oI the Asia Program Ior bringing together this event tonight along with his deputy,
Patrick deGategno.
OIten our work on Asia has a direct Euro-America connection, as Ior example when we conduct
trilateral discussions with the EU, China, and the U.S. on issues. And its clear that almost everything
that happens in Asia has implications, direct or indirect, Ior Europe and the United States. Weve done
work on U.S.-China security cooperation, weve done work on cross-Straits relationships across the
Taiwan Strait and weve done work on energy cooperation between the U.S., China, and India.
Finally, one oI our big projects Ior the last two years has been a study oI what it will take to normalize
U.S. relations with North Korea. We issued a major report on this last year and have just Iinished an
interim report aIter discussing our Iindings with the South Koreans. Later this year we will be taking
the report on the road to other countries oI the Six-Party process aIter which well make some
recommendations about a regional security structure. Many oI our board members, including those
serving on the Asia Committee have been critical to our eIIorts in this area. I want to thank Julia
Chang-Bloch, General John Fu, and Harry Harding, who are here today Ior their help in this work. And
now, here to introduce Ambassador Hill, is the chair oI the Asia Committee oI the Board and an
executive committee member oI the Atlantic Council, Frank Kramer. Frank has been an extraordinary
public servant over the years. He was the Assistant Secretary oI DeIense Ior International Security
AIIairs Irom 1996 to 2001 where he was dealing with, among other issues, Korean and Asian matters.
Hes also been Deputy Assistant Secretary Ior European and NATO aIIairs. So with that Frank, let me
hand it to you. Thank you very much.
Frank Kramer: Thanks, Fred. Were all here to listen, not to me, but to Chris Hill. Chris is one oI the
extraordinary Ambassadors Ior the United States, one oI the extraordinary diplomats. He and I Iirst met
when he was the Ambassador in Macedonia. He then went on to |be| the |U.S.| Ambassador in Poland.
He was Ambassador to South Korea; he was the Special Envoy Ior Kosovo; and obviously now hes
the Assistant Secretary Ior East Asia and PaciIic AIIairs and he heads the team oI the Six-Party talks on
the North Korea nuclear issue.
Hes spent enormous amounts oI time on this issue and hes probably been the person who is most
associated with the Iact that the talks have gone Iorward. Hes been patient, hes been diplomatic, and
hes been tough. And he has actually caused a certain amount oI things to happen. The nuclear Iacility
oI Yongbyon has largely shut down. We have had Iuel oil given to the North Koreans, and there are a
number oI steps Iorward, although I think many people would say thereve been a number oI steps
backward. Two Iorward, one back, some people say; |others say| one Iorward, two back. And I think
thats what hell be talking about today. As to where we really go Ior the next six months, Ior the next
year, how do we actually come to a conclusion? We have a new government in South Korea. Will that
make a diIIerence? We will have a new government in the United States. What impact will our
elections have? What impact will the government have? These are all open questions. Chris is about as
knowledgeable about this set oI issues as anyone in the world.
This is an extraordinarily capable audience I can see by looking around. There are a whole variety oI
people. There are some long-term players on the nuclear issue and many, many diplomats, military and
otherwise.
So, Im going to turn it over to Chris. He will speak and then he will take questions and answers. And
hell deal with the issues oI the declaration, which you all know, complete declaration. Im sure hell
deal with the issue oI What about actual destruction? And he might even deal with the issue oI
Damascus, What about the Syrian side oI the problem? With that, let me turn it over to Chris, and
lets hear what you have to say.
Ambassador Christopher Hill: Thank you very much, Frank. Its a great pleasure to be here. One
issue I will not deal with is, I noticed on CNN this morning, I hadnt seen a picture oI myselI Irom
some ten years ago on CNN, but there I was getting oII an airplane in Tuzla, and I know the question
was Was I concerned about sniper Iire? (laughter) All I can remember is getting oII that plane and
making a bee-line Ior the car because, you know, when you get oII oI a plane with a VIP you stand to
be leIt behind iI you dont get in that car in a hurry. So I crouched down and ran Ior the car.
But let me just say, it is a great pleasure to be here. Being here at the Atlantic Council brings back a lot
oI great memories, I must say. One, oI course, is being with Fred Kempe back in Poland in the
mid-80s. We had a soItball team at the American Embassy and we used to play the Marines and we
were pretty unsuccessIul at it. But one time I brought this ringer along, this reporter Ior the Wall Street
Journal, who I assured our Marines had never played baseball beIore. I think we won 16 to 2 thanks to
Iour grand slams by Fred. So Fred, great to see you again. Its the Iirst day oI baseball season . . . I
dont know what youre doing here! Anyway.
I suppose it would seem in years past that the Atlantic Council was the wrong place to talk about Korea
and Northeast Asia security, but I think in recent years especially, thanks to the work oI Frank Kramer,
but also Joe Snyder, who I know Irom previous assignments back when I was in Korea in the mid 80s.
That I think the Atlantic Council is very much engaged on these security issues in Asia and I think its
very good news Ior Asia that the Atlantic Council is so engaged on it.
When I look at the situation that were dealing with, these negotiations with North Korea, and in our
times I describe myselI as the Assistant Secretary Ior North Korea because it does take up an
inordinate amount oI time. I do try to bear in mind every single day what were really trying to do in
those negotiations. And what were trying to do is the sort oI thing the Atlantic Council has helped to
do over the decades. Which is to Iorm a greater sense oI community in the North Atlantic and what
were trying to do in Northeast Asia is to do precisely that.

OI course, were doing it through a rather intricate and diIIicult problem, that is, North Koreas nuclear
ambitions, which, by the way, have been theyve had nuclear ambitions Ior as long as the Atlantic
Council has been around. Those nuclear ambitions began sometime in the 1960s. They didnt just begin
with their sense oI upset and being labeled a member oI the Axis oI Evil, Irankly speaking. They were
well at it long beIore they Ielt bad listening to a speech. So I think we approach the task with the
understanding that weve got to get through denuclearization. But as we work on denuclearization we
can already see the beginnings oI a sense, a greater sense I should say, oI community in Northeast Asia.
We have a process called the Six-Party Talks. Everyone hates the word process. So do I. And a lot oI
people hate the word talks and so do I. But in putting together these six countries, very heterogeneous
countries, very diIIerent countries, countries that look at this issue in North Korea Irom very diIIerent
vantage points, very diIIerent perspectives, we can see that as we work on the issue were beginning to
Iorm a greater sense oI community. Even through the most diIIicult times oI the Japan-China
relationship a couple oI years ago, you could see that Japan and China were able to work together at the
Diaoyutai guest house. At times it seems like a prison because you get stuck there Ior a long time, but
its actually a very nice place to sit and have these multilateral meetings. But we were able to see how
Japan and China were able to work together through diIIicult times, how Japan and South Korea were
able to work together. You could see how the South Koreans in some respects were sort oI still
introducing themselves to the Chinese, and working well together. And it wasnt so long ago. Indeed it
was in the 1980s when there were no relations between China and South Korea, so you can see that
that relationship is also Iunctioning.
So what were hoping to do as we go Iorward is not only solve the conundrum oI North Koreas
nuclear ambitions, but also Iorm the sense oI community and perhaps make it something lasting on the
Northeast Asian landscape and seascape. That is, make these countries Ieel comIortable sitting
together, working out things, and talking to each other but also at some point in the Iuture maybe
having some dispute mechanism dispute resolution mechanism and otherwise having a sense that
they are all together in this region.
So as we Iace the various problems posed by not only North Koreas nuclear ambitions but also North
Koreas extreme selI isolation, that has caused this dark hole in the middle oI this region, as we deal
with that problem everyday we realize that we are addressing another problem, which is getting these
countries together into sharing a sense oI community. So I think that is going Iorward, but obviously
were not going to get there unless we can get through the North Korean nuclear issue. So let me
brieIly describe where we are and where we need to be.
Frank mentioned that wed gotten the reactor, the nuclear Iacility at Yongbyon shut down, and thats
or I think Frank said largely shut down actually thats completely shut down. What we also have
been able to do through this painstaking step by step process is not only to get it completely shut down,
but also disabled. The point about disabling is not so much to buy time during which it would take the
North Koreans money and eIIort to get the reactor going again. The idea oI disabling it is to make it
clear to the North Koreans that this is a one-way ticket toward eventual abandonment. So as we set out
on the Six-Party Talks to try to create a sort oI step by step process toward denuclearization, Iirst we set
out a statement oI principles, and then we came back and tried to implement each principle. And one oI
the most important principles, indeed I think the guiding principle iI you will, is that we would have
North Korea completely denuclearize, that is, abandon all their nuclear programs and all their nuclear
weapons. And so obviously they didnt want to do that overnight, so we began on a step-by-step
implementation. It took a while; there were a lot oI problems that came up in the meantime, which Im
still in therapy over some oI those problems and I certainly dont want to traumatize you with them, but
what we managed to do is to, last July, to turn the switch, shut it oII. Which is something that was done
in the 90s, but then I think importantly we got them to begin the disabling process. Now I think it was
encouraging to us as we got into disabling that the North Koreans said, we would like the Americans
to disable. We appreciated being asked and indeed I think it is in everyones interest that there are
American technicians, as there are as I speak to you tonight, working and living in Yongbyon. But what
we also wanted to do is make sure that the disabling process was pursuant to the six party process.
Because, again, we want to continue to Iorm this sense oI community. We dont want to turn this
process into a bilateral process. And so we worked it out with the six parties that the disabling would be
conducted by the U.S. at the behest oI the six parties. So since the Iall we have had teams there taking a
series oI measures, there are eleven total measures which are aimed at the disabling oI the Iacility,
leading to the eventual dismantling and abandonment oI the Iacility.
I must say this process is going well. People point out that some oI these disabling measures can be
redone and its true. But what I think is important about it is that the North Korean technicians, with
whom our people are working with on a daily basis, have understood this is a one-way ticket, that
theyre not planning to restart this thing. Indeed, when you look at the comparison oI how they
conducted the Ireeze or the shutdown oI the Iacilities in the 1990s with how theyve handled this there
is a big diIIerence and I would say the most important Ior us is the Iact that theres no maintenance
going on in the Iacility today. That is, when they cut out the reverse cooling loop, it has sat, this huge
hunk oI metal, has sat on the ground through the winter months with no eIIort to, you know, make it so
that it could somehow be reattached. Indeed it would take quite an eIIort to reverse the reverse cooling
pipe. So we, by working there, by being there everyday, have gained the sense that the North Koreans
really are committed to the abandonment oI this Iacility. So much so that some oI the critics oI the
whole process began by saying Well they could undo these activities in a matter oI months and as we
looked through and as we summed up the eleven activities we could see that we were essentially were
somehow buying some twelve, thirteen months oI disabling. But as the months have gone by, its pretty
clear that thats not going to happen and now the critics Ive heard say that actually the North Koreans
want to give up on Yongbyon and they never intended to keep it and thats why theyve allowed it to be
disabled. I would say, by the way, to that second point, to the question to how long could North Korea
have kept Yongbyon going iI they wanted to. And I think the same is Ior a Cuban taxi driver, driving a
1956 Chevy: as long as he wants. So I think the North Koreans could have kept Yongbyon going and iI
you look at the actual time that its run compared to any sort oI commercial power plant you can see that
there are many days, years leIt on that reactor. So they have made the decision to shut down that
Iacility and I think that we can Ieel positive about that.
The second element though, that we needed Irom them in this phase has proven to be a much more
problematic element. And that is the question oI them providing us a complete and correct its
always easier to remember iI you can alliterate it a complete and correct declaration oI all oI their
nuclear programs. Every year this problem has proven more diIIicult than many people anticipated.
This is divided into three main areas.
First oI all, oI course is the issue oI nuclear materials. Here we have very good reason to believe when
they give the declaration we will get a complete picture oI how much actual plutonium they have
produced Irom the actual Iacility. Whats important is, when you produce plutonium, Irom a Iacility
like that, there are means, there are ways, to veriIy the exact amount oI plutonium, and in the case oI
separated plutonium you want to be pretty exact in what youve got.
The second area is the question oI Iacilities. We know what their nuclear programs or what their
nuclear Iacilities are and what we need Irom the North Koreans to do is to list those Iacilities and to
make sure they give us a complete list. Here too we dont anticipate a serious problem in terms oI what
the Iacilities are going to be.
But the third element, I think has proven to be much more problematic, that is, nuclear programs. To be
sure the North Koreans are prepared to list the plutonium program. But we know we know Irom as
early as 2001-2002 we know that they had aspirations to have a uranium enrichment Iacility,
uranium enrichment program. We know they made certain purchases that were entirely consistent with
these aspirations. We need to know about what that is. II its continuing, we need to have it stopped. II
its already stopped, we need to know when it stopped and what the situation was. So thats one
problem that weve had.
The second is the Iact that we know, unIortunately, that North Korea has had some nuclear cooperation
with abroad. Some proliIeration issues, I think any reader oI the popular press knows what country Im
talking about but theres an issue where also we need to know, very clearly Irom the North Koreans,
what happened and iI its stopped, as they say it has, when did it stop, how did it stop?. And iI its not
going to continue, as they say its not, we need to have means to veriIy and to monitor that indeed there
is no such program now or in the Iuture. So as weve worked with the North Koreans, it has not been
easy. The North Koreans have said we dont have anything now and we wont have anything in the
Iuture, why are you dwelling on the past? AIter all, two out oI threes not bad Weve made the point
that we need clarity as to whats happened, were not looking to cause problems, were not looking to
create a situation where somehow we would pull out oI this, on the contrary we need clarity so that
somehow we can pull Iorward. And we are way into overtime at this point. We have expected this
phase oI the denuclearization to have been completed at the end oI December and here it is, already the
end oI March and its still not completed. And that has prompted some people to say they have not
IulIilled their part oI the bargain, the United States should pull out oI the Six-Party Talks. I mean, aIter
all the North Koreans were supposed to provide a complete and correct declaration by December 31st,
it hasnt happened, what are we doing still talking about this?
So I think theres a question I think where you have to look very speciIically at what your interests are.
Are your interests served by exerting your right to pull out? AIter all we can pull out oI this process any
time we want. But, or do you look at your interests and conclude that your interests are better served by
staying in it? Clearly Irom our vantage point our interests are better served by staying in the process. So
I think, we have continued to work with the North Koreans, we have worked with them multilaterally
through the six party process and bilaterally. By the way, I think a six party process, a multilateral
process has never meant that you cant have bilateral contacts. Its a pretty broad, pretty solid platIorm
to have a lot oI diIIerent processes. We have three way talks, we have two way talks, we do all kinds oI
talks. So I mean, this is a multilateral process in which you can very easily imbed bilateral process and
bilateral talks and we continue to work with the North Koreans on this.
Frankly, we went to Geneva last week or two weeks ago Ior what we thought would be talks that would
lead to a resolution oI this declaration issue. We had some very good discussions. But at this point we
do not yet have a complete and correct declaration Irom the North Koreans. Weve continued to have
talks through the New York Channel. Which is the means by which we communicate to the DPRK
government, to the North Korean government. And again, some oI those discussions, some oI those
speciIic things that weve been talking about I think could lead to a resolution oI this. Its my view, and
this is a, really a guess, iI the six party talks Iail, it will not be Ior lack oI a declaration. We will get
through this phase. The problem I think will come to the next phase. And the next phase I think is a Iar
more crucial phase because iI we have a declaration, iI we are able to rule out uranium enrichment as a
continuing problem, as it was a problem. II we are able to rule out that it is an issue that is producing
Iissile material. II we are able to ensure that there is no proliIeration or not Iurther proliIeration
concerns, we will be down to the problem oI getting North Korea to abandon the Iissile material that it
has already produce.
Now we will have a precise Iigure Ior that, a precise Iigure Ior how much plutonium they have
produced but in this third phase we will need them to turn over to the international community that
Iissile material and that in eIIect, become a non-nuclear country. This will be a big challenge. As we
get ready Ior this third phase, we look at some oI the things that we might put on the table. For
example, we believe we can put on the table an oIIer oI the establishment oI diplomatic relations with
North Korea and normalization. We would do that in the context oI a denuclearized North Korea. That
is, they denuclearize, we will establish Iull relations with North Korea. Does that mean we dont have
any more problems with North Korea? OI course not. We have a lot oI issues with North Korea, but we
will address those issues as we do with many countries that we have diplomatic relations. We will talk
about human rights as we do with many countries with whom we have diplomatic relations. We might
set up a human rights dialogue as we do, we have many other issues that I think we will need to
address. We will do that in the context oI having relations with a country that we, in addition to having
relations, we will continue to have some problems and we will deal with those through diplomatic
means. So thats one thing we can put on the table.
Another thing we can put on the table is the Iact that in Korea, in the Korean Peninsula we have had an
armistice, which is a, since 1953, its kind oI an elaborate cease-Iire, were prepared to move that
armistice to a peace treaty. And its a peace treaty that would give to North Korea a southern border
and South Korea a northern border. Obviously North Korea and South Korea would be primary players
in this but I think other players, namely the U.S. and China would have to play an important role in
this, but were prepared sit down and see iI we can work out a peace treaty with the understanding that
there are a lot oI complexities in this but were prepared to do it.
Thirdly, wed be prepared to assist with not only bilateral assistance trade packages but also assist in
getting North Korea better access to the international Iinancial institutions. This is not entirely within
the, its certainly not something the Iive parties can do on their own. Obviously North Korea will have
to live up to certain standards. There are statistics in various things that they would have to provide iI
theyre ever going to have membership in some oI these organizations. But were prepared to work
with them and see iI that could be accomplished and together also provide bilateral aid packages.
Fourthly, we would be prepared once they have denuclearized, once they are backed in the non-
proliIeration treaty and establish a record oI non proliIeration, we would be prepared to discuss with
them their desire Ior a civil nuclear program. North Korea does not have a lot oI Iossil Iuels at its
command. Energy is a huge problem Ior North Korea, and we would be prepared, once they are out oI
the nuclear business and into the NPT and have established a record oI no-proliIeration, we would be
prepared to talk to them about aspirations Ior a civil nuclear program. We are also prepared to work
with them on retraining opportunities Ior their scientists. North Korea has many scientists who have
been engaged in these nuclear programs over the years. Wed be prepared to sit down and see what can
be done in terms oI getting them out oI these Iields and into other scientiIic Iields.
Finally, and this goes back to the Iirst point I started with, were prepared to create a Northeast Asia
peace and security mechanism, whether it looks like the OSCE, whether it looks like some other
institution Irom some other part oI the world, will depend on the participants, I would say. We at this
point cannot say with any precision what it would look like, but North Korea could be one oI the
Iounding members oI this Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. So all oI these elements
would go on the table. And what North Korea needs to decide is does it want to keep its aspirations Ior
nuclear weapons in lieu oI all these other elements. So, again, iI we thought North Korea was simply
prepared to Iall out oI bed one day and get rid oI their nuclear programs, we would have done it one
day and I would be on to other things, but alas, they are the kind oI people who move step by step, and
we believe this is the best way to do this. We do Ieel it is an important accomplishment that not only is
the nuclear Iacility shut down, but it is disabled. This means that, iI we can get it down to that amount
oI plutonium, we know that it is that amount oI plutonium. That is, the plutonium will not be increasing
every month. We think that is an important accomplishment and an accomplishment worth keeping us
in the game to continue on this. I know theres a lot oI questions about can we get through this
ambitious third phase, during the liIe oI the Bush Administration, which has some 300 days to go. And
again, I think this is something North Koreans are going to have to answer. They have said on a
number oI occasions that they would like to reach this deal with the Bush Administration. Theyve said
it to us on a couple oI occasions. The question is whether theyre willing to Iollow through. North
Korea is a country that has a, how to put it, vertically oriented governing structure to be sure, but that
this is on live TV so I have to be a little diplomatic about that but at the same time, it is a place
with politics. And so I think it is Iair to say that there are people in North Korea who are really not with
the program here. Whod really rather continue to be producing this plutonium Ior whatever reason.
And so I think were going to have to understand that theyre just not going to wake up one day and
everythings going to be O.K.
Finally, let me just say that as we have gone Iorward, we have done this in an interagency process to be
sure. The State Department plays a big role, but we have worked with other agencies as well. I would
say the teamwork has been pretty good. Its not to say that we dont have people who are less enthused
about this than others but I think we have been able to work together. Im very proud oI the Ioreign
service oIIicers who have worked with me through this. But we have been able to get together a very
good team. And I think overall our countries relationships with that part oI the world have been helped
by our eIIorts in this regard. I think when you work in Asia, you want to show people in Asia that
youre sincere about what youre doing. I think weve managed to do that. I think you want to show
people in Asia that youre willing to work hard. I like to think the team we have together has indeed
shown that we can work hard. And I think when you work in Asia, although I wouldnt limit this to
Asia, when you work anywhere, you want to be respectIul oI your interlocutors and you want to show
an understanding that they come Irom diIIerent experiences, diIIerent national experiences than you do,
that they have a diIIerent history than you. That youre willing to listen at least 50 oI the time and
that youre willing to understand where theyre coming Irom and see iI we can work things out
together. And I think weve succeeded in doing that. So speaking oI not speaking more than 50 oI the
time, maybe this is a good time to go to questions. Thank you.

March 26, 2008
Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on the President's Trip to
the NATO Summit
[deletia]
Q Mr. Hadley, I was wondering -- back to China and the phone call today -- was there one particular
thing that prompted the President to call today? The violence in Tibet has been going on Ior almost a
couple weeks now. Is there anything that triggered today --
MR. HADLEY: Well, there are a couple things. One, the Taiwanese election presents an opportunity to
encourage China to reach out to Taiwan and to try and resolve diIIerences, and the President did not
want to let that go by. And that election, oI course, was just this last weekend.
Secondly, there seemed to us to be -- we have talked a lot about Tibet. The Secretary oI State has made
some comments. We've sent messages through a lot oI channels. Particularly since the President was
going to be talking to President Hu Jintao about Taiwan, he wanted to use that as an opportunity to talk
about Tibet. And in some sense, the message is the same. There's an opportunity here and China needs
to seize it.
Three, there have been ongoing discussions, as you know, on North Korea, an eIIort to get North Korea
to come Iorward with a complete and correct declaration. This has been going on Ior a while. It's time
to bring this to conclusion. As you know, China, as part oI the six-party talks, has been critical in this
conversation that members oI the six-party talks together have had with North Korea. It was time, I
think, Ior the President to signal to Hu Jintao that it's time Ior all the parties oI the six-party talks,
including China, to reengage with North Korea. And, again, iI you've got that agenda, you don't want to
not talk about Burma, because Burma is a very important issue, and China has real inIluence on it.
So you put all those together, seemed like a good time, and seemed like to be a Iairly robust agenda.
And as you can see Irom the readouts by the two sides, it was a very substantive conversation.
Remarks With Republic of Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu Myung-
hwan After Their Meeting
Benjamin Franklin Room
Washington, DC
March 26, 2008
SECRETARY RICE: Its a great pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Yu oI the Republic oI Korea. I
had an opportunity to meet with him when I was in Seoul Ior the inauguration oI President Lee Myung-
bak, but he was not yet oIIicially Foreign Minister at the time and he has now taken up those duties.
[deletia]
And weve had an opportunity to discuss regional issues oI interest. In particular, weve spent
signiIicant time talking about the six-party talks in which we are both engaged, talks that, iI they can
lead to the denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula, iI all parties Iollow their obligations, would really
be landmark -- have a landmark agreement in terms oI a more stable Korean Peninsula and a more
stable region.
[deletia]
MINISTER YU: Thank you, Madame Secretary. Secretary Rice and I had a very good meeting and
Iollowed by a working luncheon. We discussed matters related to the preparation Ior the upcoming visit
by the President Lee Myung-bak to Washington and Camp David, and we discussed ways to make it a
success.
Secretary Rice and I shared a view that our alliance relationship has played an important role in
maintaining peace and security Ior Korea, thus promoting this economic development and
democratization Ior the last several decades. And we also agreed to strengthen joint eIIorts to develop
the traditional Iriendly and cooperative relations into a Iuture-oriented partnership.
Secretary Rice and I also discussed North Korean nuclear problem and shared the view that six-party
talks is a useIul venue to pursue a peaceIul denuclearization oI North Korea. We agreed to increase our
eIIorts, in close coordination with other members oI the six-party talks, to persuade North Korea to
submit complete and correct declaration so that the next round oI six-party talks can be convened to go
into next phase oI dismantlement oI North Korean nuclear programs.
[deletia]
QUESTION: This question addressed to both the ministers. In your discussions, did you discuss the
current impasse in the eIIorts to end North Korea's nuclear weapons drive, particularly in terms oI the
declaration?
And the question oI South Korea easing its restrictions on U.S. beeI, as well as any timelines in terms
oI visa procedures Ior those two countries?
SECRETARY RICE: I think that was three questions, Minister -- (laughter) -- but we'll take them.
First oI all, on North Korea, as the Minister said, we had extensive discussions about the six-party
talks. We have made some progress in terms oI the shutdown oI the reactor and the disablement oI the
reactor. But it is really time now Ior there to be movement on the declaration so that, with that
declaration in hand, we can move Iorward on the next phase in the agreed statement, which is to
actually dismantle the North Korean program and account Ior all oI the programs and materials and the
like. Because, ultimately, that is the only way that we are going to be able to realize the vision oI a
completely denuclearized and peaceIul Korean Peninsula. And so we did have that discussion.
[deletia]
MINISTER YU: Regarding North Korean nuclear issue and about the declaration, I think time and
patience is running out. So I hope North Korea will submit a declaration as soon as possible, so as not
to lose good timing.
|deletia|
QUESTION: Kim Ghattas Irom the BBC. Madame Secretary, were wondering about the speciIics oI
what is holding up the six-party talks and whether the issue oI proliIeration and Syria is still the
sticking point.
Minister, youre also talking about the Iact that time is running out. What are you suggesting to make
this process move Iorward? What are you oIIering?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, as to what is holding it up, it is the declaration that is holding it up. And we
expect that the declaration and any associated documents will show the Iull range oI the North Korean
programs and activities so that there can be an eIIort to veriIy and to deal with anything that has
happened concerning North Korean programs and proliIeration and the like. Weve been concerned
about North Korean proliIeration Ior quite a long time.
The six-party Iramework should be able to deal with this problem or these problems so that we can
stay on course to the denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula. But it requires, Iirst, that there be an
accounting Ior those activities and Ior those programs. And so thats the process in which were
engaged. And again, it should it was supposed to have been completed on December 31st. Im not
one to say that exact deadlines are that important. To get it right is more important. But I completely
agree with the Minister that weve been at this Ior quite a long time and we are prepared, the United
States is prepared, to meet its obligations when North Korea has met its obligations.
MINISTER YU: North Korea was supposed to submit declaration by the end oI last year, so in order
not to lose timing and momentum oI six-party talks, we hope that North Korea will submit declaration
as soon as possible.
QUESTION: Thank you. My question is to both Madame Secretary and Foreign Minister Yu. What is
the link, iI there is any, between humanitarian aid to North Korea and the current impasse on the six-
party talks? Given the delay in the declaration, are both governments still willing to go ahead with Iood
assistance and other types oI humanitarian assistance to North Korea?
MINISTER YU: To me or to Madame Secretary?
SECRETARY RICE: Theres a very clear path ahead in terms oI what is expected oI North Korea and
what is expected oI the other parties to the six-party talks. And so as North Korea goes along the path
that it is supposed to, IulIills its obligations, then other parties in the six-party talks will do the same.
And Ior instance, the North Koreans have been disabling; Iuel deliveries have thereIore been available
to the North Koreans. So it should be very clear, and this was laid out in a way -- it was the North
Koreans who talk about action Ior action. Its been laid in a way that everyone knows what they need to
do and they know in what sequence they need to do it, and so thats the path that were Iollowing.
MINISTER YU: Well, Iood aid is basically humanitarian aid. But providing annually a larger scale oI
Iood is not 100 percent humanitarian. But iI there is anything a big necessity in North Korea, I think we
have to provide Iood aid without any conditions.
SECRETARY RICE: Yes. And let me just say the United States has always believed that humanitarian
needs oI people need to be met wherever they are. So on that point, were in complete agreement.
DPRK formally denies uranium enrichment, nuclear co-op with Syria
www.chinaview.cn
2008-03-28 19:58:14
PYONGYANG, March 28 (Xinhua) -- The Democratic People's Republic oI Korea (DPRK) on
Friday categorically denied it had ever carried out uranium enrichment nor had it proliIerated nuclear
Iacilities to other countries.
"The DPRK has never enriched uranium nor rendered nuclear cooperation to any other country. It
has never dreamed oI such things. Such things will not happen in the Iuture, either," the oIIicial news
agency KCNA quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying.
"The Bush administration was so absurd as to raise the issue oI suspected uranium enrichment," the
spokesman said. But "taking into consideration the Iace oI the Bush administration," the DPRK
rendered necessary sincere help by allowing U.S. experts to see sensitive military objects and providing
them with samples, he said.
As Ior the issue oI "suspected nuclear cooperation with Syria" raised by the United States, the DPRK
said it has nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, it still tries to meet the U.S. request Ior reconIirming its
commitment not to proliIerate the nuclear technology, the spokesman said.
"However, the Iurther the negotiations went on, the greater disappointment the attitude oI the Bush
administration brought to the DPRK," said the spokesman, adding: "The DPRK can never Iall victim to
the Bush administration's move to justiIy its wrong assertion."
The six-party talks, which involve the United States, the DPRK, the Republic oI Korea, China, Japan
and Russia, on dismantling the DPRK's atomic programs remain stalled by disputes over the issues oI
"uranium enrichment" and "nuclear proliIeration."
The DPRK has said it gave the U.S. a list oI its nuclear programs in November, but the U.S. says it
still awaits a "complete and correct " declaration.
North Korea Test-Fires Missiles
By Blaine Harden
Washington Post Foreign Service
Friday, March 28, 2008; 10:57 AM
TOKYO, March 28 -- North Korea test-Iired a volley oI missiles into the sea Friday and warned that it
might stop disabling its nuclear Iacilities unless the United States drops its demands Ior more details
about the North's nuclear arsenal.
The missile launch and the combative warning -- which accused the Bush administration oI
"persistently trying to cook up Iictions" -- came one day aIter the North expelled 11 South Korean
oIIicials Irom an industrial park north oI the border that separates the two Koreas.
The White House called the missile tests "not constructive" and said North Korea should "reIrain Irom
testing missiles," Reuters news service reported. But South Korea played down the missile Iirings,
characterizing them as part oI a routine military exercise. "We believe the North does not want a
deterioration oI relations between South and North," a government spokesman said.
The three truculent actions in two days suggest that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, aIter a relatively
placid stretch oI cooperative diplomacy, is increasingly peeved by demands Irom the United States and
South Korea.
The Bush administration is reIusing to liIt diplomatic sanctions against the North until it explains its
suspected uranium enrichment program and details any eIIorts to sell nuclear technology to Syria or
other countries. "North Korea should Iocus on the denuclearization oI the Korean peninsula and deliver
a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear weapons programs and nuclear proliIeration
activities," White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said aIter the tests were reported.
North Korea reiterated on Friday that it has "never enriched uranium nor rendered cooperation to any
other country."
South Korea's new president, Lee Myung-bak, who was sworn in last month, is taking a much tougher
line than his predecessors in dealing with the North. Lee's government has said it will condition Iood
aid and economic assistance on human rights and on timely dismantlement oI the North's nuclear
program.
This week's Ilare-up in tension on the Korean peninsula comes at an unusually stressIul time Ior Kim's
government. It is Iacing dire Iood shortages due to weather-related crop Iailures, the soaring world
price oI Iood and declines in aid Irom South Korea, China and the U.N. World Food Program. The
shortages are expected to reach their peak late this summer -- at a time when China, the North's closest
ally and primary beneIactor, will be hosting the Olympics.
Analysts say that China expects Kim's government not to allow disturbances inside North Korea that
could, during the games, send hungry reIugees spilling across the border into China.
For reasons that have not been explained publicly, China has been supplying less Iood assistance in the
past three years to North Korea, according to Iigures compiled by the World Food Program.
At the same time, China -- in order to keep more Iood Ior its own population -- has this year slapped
tariIIs on Iood exports. Combined with much higher grain prices on world markets, the 22 percent
Chinese tariII has substantially reduced the impoverished North's capacity to buy Iood Irom there.
Perhaps more important, South Korea has this spring delayed the delivery oI the Iree Iertilizer that the
North has come to rely on. The delay, according to analysts, means that this year's harvest in North
Korea will almost certainly Iall Iar short oI what is needed to Ieed the country next winter.
The World Food Program has warned that the North this summer will have about 25 percent less Iood
than it needs to Ieed the country's 23 million people.
Most oI the severely aIIected people are in rural northern areas oI the country, but a South Korean aid
group said this month that Iood shortages are also aIIecting the country's elite in the capital Pyongyang.
Citing unnamed sources inside the country, Good Friends, a Buddhist group that sends Iood and other
aid into North Korea, said that mid- and low-level oIIicials in the capital were not receiving rations oI
rice.
With the near-collapse oI the state-controlled economy in the North and a sharp increase in corruption
among local police, analysts say that widespread discontent over Iood shortages -- especially iI it
spreads among the urban elite -- has the potential to destabilize Kim's government.
Complicating Kim's situation Iurther, there are reports that North Korean military and industrial
oIIicials are unhappy with his government Ior granting access to U.S. diplomats to visit a missile
Iactory. Speculation about the inner workings oI the secretive North Korean government, oI course, is
mostly guesswork. But Keith Luse, an aide to Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), visited North Korea in
February and later wrote that Kim's eIIorts to strike a deal with the United States on nuclear weapons
might be a "stretch too Iar" Ior hard-liners in his country.
Actions taken in the past two days show that, Ior whatever reasons, Kim's government is much less
amiable that it was as recently as last month, when it welcomed the New York Philharmonic Orchestra
Ior an unprecedented concert in Pyongyang. A statement Friday Irom the North Korean Ioreign
ministry warned that the United States is endangering an agreement brokered last year by six nations.
The deal was intended to rid the North oI nuclear weapons while providing it with energy assistance
and ending its diplomatic and economic isolation.
The North insisted in Friday's statement that it has submitted paperwork that IulIills all its obligations
under the agreement.
"Should the U.S. delay the settlement oI the nuclear issue, persistently trying to cook up Iictions, it will
seriously aIIect the disabling oI nuclear Iacilities which has been under way so Iar with a great deal oI
eIIort," the statement said.
The Bush administration has said North Korea has, in Iact, disabled much oI its primary nuclear
Iacility, a plutonium plant at Yongbyon.
But it says that the North has Iailed to explain the extent oI a diIIerent bomb-making process --
uranium enrichment -- and has reIused to talk about whether it has shared nuclear technology with
other countries, including Syria.
DPRK Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Blasts U.S. Delaying Tactics in Solution of Nuclear
Issue
Pyongyang, March 28 [2008](KCNA) -- A spokesman Ior the DPRK Ministry oI Foreign AIIairs
released the Iollowing statement Friday blaming the U.S. Ior the deadlocked implementation oI the
October 3 agreement oI the six-party talks:
The implementation oI the October 3 agreement oI the six-party talks is at a deadlock due to the
behavior oI the U.S.
The U.S. has not IulIilled its commitments as regards the liIting oI the sanctions within the agreed
period but insisted on its unreasonable demands concerning the nuclear declaration, thus throwing
hurdles in the way oI settling the issue.
As clariIied in the statement issued by the spokesman Ior the Ministry oI Foreign AIIairs on January
4, the DPRK worked out a report on the nuclear declaration and inIormed the U.S. side oI this in
November last year. And when the U.S. proposed to have a Iurther discussion on the content oI the
report with the DPRK, the latter has shown so Iar such magnanimity as responding to such
negotiations.
Simple is the reason why the DPRK responded to the negotiations on the issue oI the nuclear
declaration.
The Bush administration was so absurd as to raise the issue oI "suspected uranium enrichment" in
2002, scuttling the DPRK-U.S. dialogue and straining the situation to an extreme pitch oI tension. This
pushed the DPRK to its access to nuclear weapons in the end.
The DPRK rendered necessary sincere help in clariIying the issue raised by the U.S. side, taking into
consideration the Iace oI the Bush administration which was to blame Ior the Iormer's access to nuclear
weapons.
When the U.S. side claimed that the issue oI "suspected uranium enrichment" can be solved iI the
DPRK tells about whereabouts oI the imported aluminum tubes, the DPRK took such a measure as an
exception as allowing U.S. experts to see even sensitive military objects and providing them with
samples.
And when the U.S. side was the Iirst to raise the issue oI the "suspected nuclear cooperation with
Syria," it asked the DPRK to reconIirm its commitment not to proliIerate the nuclear technology as the
relevant object oI Syria was destroyed by the bombing oI Israel, making it unnecessary to clariIy it any
longer.
This "suspicion", too, had nothing to do with the DPRK. But it was so broadminded as to meet this
request as a part oI its sincere eIIorts to help implement the October 3 agreement.
The DPRK has sincerely taken part in the negotiations taking the Iace oI the U.S. side into
consideration.
However, the Iurther the negotiations went on, the greater disappointment the attitude oI the Bush
administration brought to the DPRK.
The U.S. side is playing a poor trick to brand the DPRK as a criminal at any cost in order to save its
Iace.
The DPRK can never Iall victim to the Bush administration's move to justiIy its wrong assertion.
Explicitly speaking, the DPRK has never enriched uranium nor rendered nuclear cooperation to any
other country. It has never dreamed oI such things.
Such things will not happen in the Iuture, too.
Should the U.S. delay the settlement oI the nuclear issue, persistently trying to cook up Iictions, it
will seriously aIIect the disabling oI nuclear Iacilities which has been under way so Iar with a great deal
oI eIIort.
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200803310077.html
Syria got N. Korea help for N-facility
BY NANAE KURASHIGE THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
03/31/2008
An Israeli airstrike against Syria last September targeted a nuclear-related Iacility that was under
construction with technical assistance Irom North Korea, according to Israel's prime minister.
Japanese government sources said over the weekend that the Israeli leader, Ehud Olmert, brieIed Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda about the attack during summit talks in Tokyo on Feb. 27.
It is apparently the Iirst time that the intended target had been disclosed to the head oI a Ioreign
government.
Previously, Jerusalem had only acknowledged it carried out the Sept. 6, 2007, attack, but stopped short
oI identiIying the type oI Iacility.
Tokyo has shown keen interest in the disclosure as it suggests Pyongyang was providing nuclear
technology to Damascus in violation oI an agreement made at six-party talks on the North Korean
nuclear issue not to transIer nuclear materials, technology or know-how.
According to the sources, Olmert told Fukuda that the site was a nuclear-related Iacility that was under
construction with know-how and assistance Irom North Korean technicians dispatched by Pyongyang.
Olmert also said Israel remains concerned about the issue oI nuclear proliIeration by North Korea and
sought greater inIormation sharing with Tokyo through expanded dialogue on the issue.
Japanese government oIIicials expressed diIIering views on how to interpret Olmert's statement.
"While we cannot conIirm the Iacts, the Iact that such an assertion was made at an oIIicial occasion
such as a summit meeting is signiIicant, making it highly credible," said one high-ranking Foreign
Ministry oIIicial.
Another Foreign Ministry oIIicial pointed out, however, that the Israeli leader "may have only
presented Iacts that were Iavorable Ior the Israeli side."
Under a joint statement issued at six-party talks in September 2005, Pyongyang agreed to "abandon all
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs."
North Korea agreed to "provide a complete and correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs" and
reaIIirmed its "commitment not to transIer nuclear materials, technology or know-how" to other
countries, under a list oI actions Ior implementation oI the joint statement, agreed on during the talks in
October.
Washington has since sought clariIication Irom Pyongyang on suspected nuclear proliIeration by North
Korea to other countries such as Syria. Pyongyang has denied the allegations, leaving the talks stalled.
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200804/200804010018.html
U.S. Called N.Koreas Bluff Over Syria
Updated Apr.1,2008 09:22 KST
The U.S. in recent bilateral talks reportedly gave Pyongyang a list oI North Korean oIIicials involved in
the supply oI nuclear technology to Syria, a suspicion the North denies.
A high-level diplomatic source on Monday said that the U.S. obtained the list oI oIIicials including
nuclear engineers, who were involved in the supply oI nuclear technology to Syria, through various
intelligence networks. This persuaded the U.S. that the North Korea-Syrian nuclear connection did
exist.
According to the source, it was chieI U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill who gave the list to his
North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan during their latest nuclear talks. Kim denied knowing
anything about it.
Japans Asahi Shimbun on Sunday [2008-03-30] reported Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, during a
visit to Japan last month, told Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda that attacks by Israeli warplanes
inside Syria in September last year targeted a suspected nuclear Iacility where North Korean agents
were reportedly operating.
The daily quoted Olmert as telling Fukuda that Israeli air strikes in Syria last September attacked a
Iacility being built with a blueprint and technicians provided by North Korea. North Korea denies any
past or present involvement in nuclear development abroad.
(englishnewschosun.com )
Remarks Upon Arrival at Incheon Airport
Incheon Airport
Seoul, South Korea
April 1, 2008
QUESTION: Welcome back.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hi, how are you? Thank you. Its always great to get on the plane
Ior 14 hours and speak to you.
QUESTION: Do you have any opening comment?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Im sorry? No I dont.
QUESTION: There has been a report that you showed Kim Kye-gwan a list oI people who cooperated
in Syria and Kim Kye-gwan quickly denied the list (inaudible). Do you have anything to say on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, look, I m not going to discuss what our private discussions
are. Obviously weve had a lot oI discussion with them on getting a proper declaration, and it has to
include what their activities are in terms oI nuclear cooperation with other countries. They know that.
Weve worked with them on this. We had a lot oI discussion in Geneva. Weve been in touch with
them since then, and I hope we can Iigure out a way to get through this. But, obviously, we are kind oI
running out oI time right now.
QUESTION: This week DPRK are delivering a continuous message, escalating message toward South
Korea. What do you think about (inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I saw those comments, which are obviously completely
inappropriate and out oI line. I would mention that |the source was| KCNA, which I dont think is the
most reliable news agency in the world. Obviously, these are sorts oI comments that are just
inappropriate Ior discussing relations with other states. I dont think theres anything that people in the
ROK or the U.S. need to be too concerned about. I think we should probably not overreact to
comments that really have no basis in Iact and seem to be entirely propagandistic and aimed at
domestic audiences, whoever they are.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) missiles aIIects the Six-Party Talks process?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, no. I mean, I dont think Ill take a Iire extinguisher with me
to the next set oI talks. So it doesnt really make any diIIerence.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) running out oI time?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well you know, here we are April 1 and we still dont have this
thing. Again, we had some progress in Geneva. We thought we had some progress aIter that. So we ll
see. They know what they need to do.
QUESTION: Sir, dont you think we need a real deadline? We just cant sit and wait like this Iorever.
So dont you think -- .
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well this is not Iorever, okay? We havent been waiting Iorever.
But, obviously, we are getting to the point where we need to make some progress very quickly.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) How long? Do you have any speciIic deadline in mind?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, I dont have a speciIic deadline. Ill know it when I see it.
QUESTION: Do you still think that its possible to complete denuclearization oI DPRK in calendar
year 2008?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, they could complete it very quickly iI they wanted to. I
think the problem is that the DPRK needs to make this Iundamental decision. Again, I think we have
made progress on the declaration. But until we complete the declaration, we wont have succeeded.
And then we need to get on to the third phase, which is the very important phase where they should be
giving up all their nuclear ambitions. Obviously they are a -- You know, its a country that has
diIIiculty making decisions oI this kind. When I look at some oI the problems theyre conIronting right
now with Iood production and other things like that, theyre obviously in a diIIicult position.
Okay?
QUESTION: Do you Ieel that there are some sorts oI (inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I have no idea. I have absolutely no idea how that works.
QUESTION: Is there a downside to just waiting out the Bush Administration and doing nothing
(inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well look, iI youve been to the States lately you know its quite a
political season. We have several political candidates who are running Ior president. Absolutely
nobody has suggested that they want this problem. Nobody has suggested that they are interested in
giving the DPRK a better deal than the one we have put on the table. So I would say, Irom the DPRKs
point oI view, the time to settle is now.
QUESTION: Is there a talk oI when to meet next -- Six-Party Talks (inaudible) any discussion on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, again, weve got to get through this declaration. So no point in
having a meeting until we have a willingness on the DPRKs part to discuss all oI the nuclear
programs, which is the requirement that they have under the October declaration. So until we get that,
no point in discussing Iurther.
QUESTION: Has there been some progress in your Geneva meeting with Kim Kye-gwan until now?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Im sorry?
QUESTION: Has there been some progress in your Geneva meeting with Kim Kye-gwan?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, weve had some indirect contacts, and I would say there is
some progress on that. But, again, it doesnt really mean anything until we actually get a declaration
QUESTION: They at least agreed they have to provide the declaration?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think they agreed they have to provide a declaration, yes.
QUESTION: Do they still insist they already did so in November?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Not to us. Not to us. They never showed us the declaration. They
showed us some research materials, research reIerence materials rather, and it was very clear it was not
a complete and correct declaration. So you bet they are on the hook to do that.
QUESTION: Can we expect some developments in U.S. Iood aid in the near Iuture?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think we continue to monitor what we believe to be a
deteriorating Iood situation in North Korea. We continue to monitor it and be guided by what we can
do to help the North Korean people overcome these issues. But I think everyone is concerned about the
deteriorating Iood situation.-- I think everyone except, I guess, Ior KCNA.
QUESTION: So, now you havent come up with any concrete idea oI moving Iorward on that Iood
assistance?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, we havent. Obviously, whenever you have a Iood assistance
problem in a country, that countrys government needs to come Iorward, acknowledge they have some
problems, and make some speciIic requests. And we havent had that yet.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think -- I am not sure there is much more I can tell you. I mean,
you know the situation. I mean, they are just not quite there yet.
QUESTION: Are you still stuck over the same old issues (inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Basically. Basically --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) its all about wording now (inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, Ill let you know when its done. Its not good to talk about
things in the middle, because you can end up making more work Ior yourselI.
QUESTION: Do you have plans Ior a meeting with Kim Kye-gwan anytime during your (inaudible)
Asian trip?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, we have no speciIic plans.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, I dont like to talk about those things, because it just makes
my job more diIIicult.
So, all right?
(Later in the airport)
QUESTION: Two reporters Irom Kyodo here. Is it true that your talks with Kim Kye-gwan in Geneva
have come close to complete agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, no, because we dont have a declaration, and when we do I
will let you know. We dont have one, so --
QUESTION: Do you plan to meet with Kim Kye-gwan during your Asian tour?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I have no plans right now.
QUESTION: Do you think its possible to resume Six-Party Talks this month?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It depends on the North Koreans. It depends entirely on them.
QUESTION: Reportedly you have a list oI North Korean engineers who gave assistance to Syria.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I dont know what they are talking about. But, anyway, iI we had
any private discussions, I would keep them private.
QUESTION: What is the Iocus oI your discussion with Korean oIIicials here?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, I think we will be talking about a lot oI things, including the
situation in (inaudible).
Released on April 1, 2008
Comments by Assistant Secretary Hill in Jakarta, Indonesia
Jakarta, Indonesia
April 4, 2008
There is some thought oI a possible meeting, there's nothing that has been conIirmed thereIore I can't
make any announcements but I can tell you that we really need to get moving on this declaration. This
has held us up now Ior over three months. We don't have three months to spare anymore so we've
really got to see iI we can make some progress on this.
We have made very clear that the comments that were made in some cases by anonymous spokesmen
oI the Korea Central News Agency, the so called KCNA, that those comments were very, in many
cases very inappropriate and very unhelpIul to the situation. The DPRK (the Democratic People's
Republic oI Korea) needs to be reaching out to its neighbors, not, should not be engaged in that sort oI
commitment.
We have not seen, with respect to the six-party process, we have not seen how the six-party process is
aIIected by those comments. But I want to say that I have not seen, I've not met with any DPRK
representatives since Geneva and so we'll have to see whether those comments aIIected or not.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/apr/102984.htm
Washington, DC
April 4, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
QUESTION: Can you give us what you have on the U.S.-North Korean talks Ior next week, please?
MR. CASEY: Oh, well, where in the world is Chris Hill? Let's see what we can do Ior you there. I
apologize. There was some conIusion this morning about the exact timing oI his visit. So let me give
you a dramatic reading oI what I've got here Irom EAP and we'll see iI we can clariIy it Ior you.
First oI all, I think everyone knows that Chris met today in Jakarta with a variety oI oIIicials, including
President Yudhoyono and had some discussions about bilateral issues there. He then returned to Bali,
where he's been attending the Asia Societys Williamsburg ConIerence. Now hes going to leave Bali
on Sunday thats this Sunday, April 6th and go to Timor-Leste, as previously scheduled, Ior some
bilateral meetings there. And then he will depart Dili on Monday, April 7th and will arrive in Singapore
on the evening oI April 7th. Hell meet with Singaporean oIIicials on Monday evening and then you
thought Id never get to it on Tuesday the 8th, he will then have a meeting with Kim Kye Gwan, his
counterpart, in North Korean counterpart in the Six-Party talks. This meeting, again, is, as I said this
morning, a Iollow-up on the discussions that were held in Geneva last month.
Hes then expected to leave Singapore on the morning oI Wednesday, April 9th and and this is in
addition to what I told you this morning we now do have an additional stop Ior him, so hell be going
to Beijing later that day on the 9th and have discussions with Chinese oIIicials there. Im sure that will
include a variety oI topics, including some bilateral ones, but Im sure hell also use that as an
opportunity to provide a readout oI the discussions that he will have had previously with Kim Kye
Gwan. And then hell be leaving Beijing the evening oI April 8th* and arriving, again, that same that
same evening back here in Washington.
So, you know, you can start notiIying your correspondents in all oI those locations to start stalking him
at the usual hotels and places and times so that he can have an opportunity to tell you himselI about
how any oI these conversations have gone.
QUESTION: Do you have do you have any secret agreement between the U.S. and North Korea?
You have any --
MR. CASEY: No, thats a simple answer.
Yeah.
QUESTION: (Inaudible), what are the expectations Ior this meeting?
MR. CASEY: Oh, I think the expectations are as I described this morning. This is going to be a Iollow-
up on the talks held in Geneva last month. Im sure they will cover both issues related to the declaration
itselI as well as the implementation oI the disablement phase oI talks. As Chris has said too, his
discussions in Geneva also talked a bit about how we would move beyond that once the declaration is
provided to dealing with what is the most diIIicult phase in this process, which is the actual dismantling
and abandonment oI North Koreas nuclear programs. So I think we expect theyll have a good
conversation about those issues and Iurther the dialogue in Geneva.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Just sorry, as a Iollow-up, because Ambassador Hill, beIore leaving here, also he had
mentioned how he would not meet with the North Koreans unless there will be a Iinal resolution to the
declaration issue. Can we expect signiIicant progress in this meeting?
MR. CASEY: Well, I love that term, signiIicant progress. Im not sure what it means, but I love the
term nonetheless. Look, I think that we will know, and this is something Chris has also said repeatedly,
well know how much progress weve made when we have a Iull and complete declaration. Until that
happens, its pretty hard Ior me, or Ior him, or Ior anyone else to say, whether were one, ten or a
hundred degrees closer to achieving that goal. And ultimately, until that declaration is in, until we have
a Iull and complete declaration, we really wont be able to give you anything, I think, oI a benchmark
assessment oI how close we are or how Iar we are. And ultimately, it doesnt matter until and unless we
get the declaration. I appreciate the musical accompaniment. (Laughter.)
[deletia]
* Leaving Beijing the evening oI April 9th
(The brieIing was concluded at 1:20 p.m.)

Israel, U.S. plan to release details on Syria attack
By Barak Ravid and Amos Harel
Last update - 16:58 06/04/2008
Israel and the United States are coordinating the release oI details on the air Iorce strike in Syria last
September, which Ioreign reports claim targeted a nuclear installation Syria was constructing with
North Korean assistance. American oIIicials may reveal details oI the strike later this month during
congressional hearings.
Even though the deIense establishment in Israel is opposed to any publication oI details oI the attack,
the Prime Minister's Bureau and U.S. President George W. Bush's administration are oI the opinion that
it is now possible to reveal details because there is little chance oI a conIlagration as a result oI a Syrian
decision to avenge the attack.
Details oI the attack are likely to be revealed by senior Bush administration oIIicials during hearings
beIore Congress. Advisers to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Yoram Turbowicz and Shalom Turjeman,
discussed the issue last week in Washington with senior U.S. intelligence oIIicials, and National
Security Adviser Stephen Hadley.
During the meetings, the two sides agreed on which details oI the attack to make public and which
details could have negative implications. According to Ioreign reports, Israel transIered to the U.S.
detailed intelligence on the installation attacked, and the two sides agreed not to reveal any details
without prior coordination.
The view in Washington and in Jerusalem is that publishing details oI the attack will bolster Israel's
deterrence and may even lead Syria to cool its close ties with Iran and North Korea.
According to the American assessments, the revelations about the attack will also bolster its hand in
negotiations with North Korea on dismantling its nuclear arms.
However, the Israel deIense establishment is strongly opposed to revealing any details oI the attack in
Syria and expressed concern that any airing oI the details oI the attack will result in liIting the strict
censorship that was imposed in Israel on this incident.
Senior Iigures in the deIense establishment and the Israel DeIense Forces said in recent day that Israel
must convince the Americans to deliver the report to Congress "in closed session."
Intelligence analysts in Israel maintain that any Iurther release oI the details on the strike will
contribute to the already tense situation between Syria and Israel, which has been exacerbated in part
because oI Hezbollah's plans to avenge the assassination oI the group's terrorist mastermind, Imad
Mughniyah.
Any oIIicial release oI the details oI the attack and the nature oI the installation may push Syria's
Bashar Assad into a corner and put pressure him to respond, say intelligence oIIicials.
The possibility oI details being made public has also contributed to the mutual suspicions between the
PMO and the DeIense Minister's Bureau. In political circles it is now commonly accepted that the
release oI details oI the attack may help bolster the public image oI Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Some
politicians have oIIered assessments that Olmert may decide to liIt the curtain on details oI the attack
close to the 60th anniversary oI Israel's independence, in early May.
Other political sources say that the American revelations on this matter will not result in a change in
Israel's censorship policy, and insist that Olmert will not discuss the subject oI the attack during holiday
interviews.
The hearings at the House Intelligence Committee may be held in the coming weeks. Congressmen
have included in the bill on the intelligence budget that American intelligence agencies will not be
given large portions oI their budget unless they reveal in Iull the details oI the strike in Syria and the
nuclear cooperation between Pyongyang and Damascus.
This has led U.S. and Israeli oIIicials to conclude that American oIIicials will release details oI the
strike during the hearings.
Talks between the U.S. and North Korea are schedule to resume tomorrow in Singapore. One oI the
American conditions Ior liIting the sanctions on Pyongyang is Ior it to expose its nuclear collaboration
with other countries, which North Korea maintains does not exist. According to South Korean media
sources, Pyongyang has agreed to provide the U.S. with inIormation on its nuclear cooperation with
Syria, on condition that Washington will not make this public. The same sources stated that the U.S.
has given North Korea a list oI engineers that are suspected oI involvement in the construction oI the
installation that was targeted in Syria.
Meanwhile, readiness levels are high at Northern Command and in security Ior Israeli missions abroad,
as well as at airlines, as concerns remain that Hezbollah will try to avenge the assassination oI its
terrorist mastermind, Imad Mughniyah in February.
The statement by DeIense Minister Ehud Barak last week, that Israel would retaliate with a heavy hand
against any attack, was made Iollowing deliberations with intelligence oIIicials. There are concerns that
an order to carry out a terrorist attack has already been issued - and Barak's tough words were meant to
signal Hezbollah and its patrons, Syria and Iran, that Israel will respond to any attack.
http://ukpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5iKTo0KDQomlq22InXRFAGFY5J3zA
Syria strike details to be released
6 hours ago |Accessed 2008-04-08T15:15Z|
|EXCERPT
Israel and the US are coordinating the release oI details oI a mysterious Israeli air Iorce strike in Syria,
according to reports.
The Haaretz newspaper says US oIIicials might disclose details oI the Sept 6 strike later this month
during congressional hearings.
The Yediot Ahronot newspaper reported that the matter would come up April 17 beIore the
congressional Committee on Foreign Relations.

Israel concerned N. Korean nuclear know-how, material has reached Iran
By Barak Ravid
Last update - 02:38 07/04/2008
The United States and Israel seek to pressure North Korea to cease its nuclear cooperation with Iran,
which is one oI the motives behind their agreement to disclose details on the air-Iorce strike in Syria
last September.
According to inIormation obtained by Washington and Jerusalem, North Korea transIerred technology
and nuclear materials to Iran to aid Tehran's secret nuclear arms program.
U.S. and Israeli oIIicials agreed last week that the talks between the U.S. and North Korea, scheduled
to take place in Singapore tomorrow, should be used to pressure Pyongyang to disclose its nuclear
cooperation with countries in the Middle East. As a pressure tactic, U.S. oIIicials could reveal details oI
North Korea's cooperation with Syria to Congress.
Foreign news sources reported that in addition to helping Syria build the nuclear Iacility that Israel
attacked, North Korea sent engineers and various materials to the site. Israel and the U.S. Iear that
Pyongyang could be doing even more to boost Iran's nuclear program.
During their talks in Washington last week with high-ranking oIIicials, Yoram Turbowicz and Shalom
Turjeman, advisers to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, agreed that the details oI the air strike would be
released by the Americans.
Israel would continue to decline commenting on the matter, as it has done since September, and would
not alter its censorship policy.
Syria claimed that the Iacility hit was an unused military installation and denied having a nuclear
development program. North Korea also denies exporting its nuclear expertise. Iran claims that its
nuclear program is Ior civilian purposes only.
In the past Iew months Olmert has met with key world leaders to discuss Syria.
The most important meeting in Olmert's "campaign" to deIend the Israeli air strike and create a united
international Iront against Syria was with Russian President Vladimir Putin. On October 10, about a
month aIter the attack, the two leaders spoke on the phone about Syria and other issues. They agreed
that due to the sensitivity oI the matter, talks should be continued Iace to Iace.
On October 18, Olmert Ilew to Moscow Ior a Iive-hour visit. It had been announced, to much surprise,
the day beIore. OIIicials in the Prime Minister's OIIice said at the time that the Iranian issue was the
Iocus oI the talks, and that Olmert planned to present Putin with intelligence on a number oI strategic
issues.
Haaretz learned that Olmert presented Putin with the problems relevant to Syria.
Olmert briefs world leaders
One week later, Olmert Ilew to Paris and London, where he met with President Nicolas Sarkozy and
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, respectively, and Iilled them in on the operation. While in London,
Olmert also met with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was also visiting the British
capital.
AIter the air strike in Syria, two detachable Iuel tanks Irom Israeli Iighter planes were Iound in Turkish
territory, near the Syrian border. Turkish news reports said this proved that Israeli aircraIt had Ilown
over Turkish airspace on their way to their target.
Turkey made a Iormal complaint to Israel and asked Ior clariIications Irom Jerusalem.
In his hour-long meeting with Erdogan, Olmert brieIed the Turkish prime minister on the situation.
A Iew days later Olmert inIormed the cabinet that he had apologized to Erdogan Ior the Iuel-tank
incident.
"II Israeli planes indeed penetrated Turkish airspace, then it was without prior intent or any intent to
inIringe upon or undermine Turkish sovereignty, which we respect," Olmert told the cabinet.
'Report on Sept. 6 strike to show Saddam transferred WMDs to Syria'
By JPOST.COM STAFF
Apr 7, 2008 21:57
An upcoming joint US-Israel report on the September 6 IAF strike on a Syrian Iacility will claim that
Iormer Iraqi president Saddam Hussein transIerred weapons oI mass destruction to the country,
Channel 2 stated Monday.
Furthermore, according to a report leaked to the TV channel, Syria has arrested 10 intelligence oIIicials
Iollowing the assassination oI Hizbullah terror chieI Imad Mughniyeh.
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUST16187320080408
U.S. discusses compromise with North Korea-sources
By Teruaki Ueno
Mon Apr 7, 2008 9:47pm EDT
TOKYO (Reuters) - The United States and North Korea have been discussing a possible Iace-saving
compromise in a standoII over Pyongyang's accounting oI its nuclear programs, diplomatic sources
said, as the two sides headed into talks in Singapore.
Under the compromise proposal, North Korea would acknowledge U.S. assertions that the secretive
communist state had a clandestine program to enrich uranium Ior weapons and proliIerated nuclear
technology and material to Syria, diplomatic sources in Tokyo told Reuters.
"The compromise deal was Iloated when representatives Irom the United States and North Korea met
in Geneva last month," one oI the sources said.
Washington has said a major sticking point in talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear programs is
the need Ior Pyongyang to deliver a declaration giving a complete account oI its programs as called Ior
in a February 2007 six-party nuclear deal. That account was due at the end oI last year.
II the two sides accept the compromise proposal, it could come in a document separate Irom North
Korea's "complete and correct declaration" oI its nuclear ambitions, the source said.
Washington suspects North Korea oI having a secret program to enrich uranium Ior weapons and
proliIerating nuclear technology, and wants those issues addressed in the declaration. North Korea has
repeatedly denied the allegations.
North Korea has said it had already made the declaration and it described the U.S. suspicions as Iiction.
Another diplomatic source said it was not clear whether North Korea would accept the compromise.
"The proposal is Iace-saving to both sides," he said. "It is particularly Iace-saving to North Korea
because they don't have to directly admit that they had done something wrong."
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill is due to meet North Korea's Kim Kye-gwan in
Singapore later on Tuesday.
The talks between Hill and Kim come at a time oI heightened tension on the heavily armed Korean
peninsula in recent days aIter the North's missile tests and threat to attack the South.
II the North makes the declaration, it stands to be removed Irom a U.S. terrorism blacklist and be better
able to tap into Iinance that could boost its economy.
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9B7F28C5-1C60-484D-8103-29315D5A0E37.htm
N Korea 'agrees nuclear deal'
UPDATED ON:
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 09, 2008
17:40 MECCA TIME, 14:40 GMT
North Korea has reached an agreement on compensation in exchange Ior providing Iull details oI its
nuclear programmes, Pyongyang's Ioreign ministry told state media.
The issue has been hindering progress in disarmament talks between North Korea and the US, China,
Japan, South Korea and Russia.
"As a result oI the talks, a consensus was reached on the US measure to make political compensation
and the nuclear declaration essential Ior winding up the implementation oI the agreement," an
unidentiIied spokesman was quoted as saying by the Korean Central News Agency.
The deal includes North Korea's demand to be removed Irom a US terrorism blacklist, as well as
energy aid and major diplomatic and security beneIits.
Aid Ior weapons
In February 2007, North Korea had agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in return Ior aid.

Pyongyang last tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, but said it had submitted its declaration in November.

The US countered that the declaration did not account Ior an alleged secret uranium enrichment
programme or Ior alleged proliIeration to Syria.
The US response to talks with Pyongyang on Tuesday was less enthusiastic.

"We've deIinitely made progress |on a declaration| but I don't want to suggest there has been any major
breakthrough," Christopher Hill, the US negotiator, said.

Hill was speaking in Beijing aIter discussing the nuclear issue with Kim Kye Gwan, the senior North
Korean negotiator, in Singapore.

The US negotiator had been brieIing other parties to the six-nation disarmament deal on the outcome oI
the Singapore talks.

South Korea's Yonhap news agency quoted Kim as saying aIter the Tuesday meeting that diIIerences
between the two countries "have narrowed a lot".

Autumn breakthrough?

Wu Dawei, China's senior negotiator in the disarmament talks, said on Wednesday that they were
experiencing ups and downs and suggested that a breakthrough could be made "around autumn".

The main sticking points are believed to be the details North Korea will reveal about any nuclear know-
how or materials provided to other nations, along with allegations it had a secret uranium enrichment
programme in addition to its known plutonium programme.

China is North Korea's main diplomatic ally and source oI Iood and energy assistance.
Remarks Upon Departure From Six-Party Talks
U.S. Embassy
Beijing, China
April 9, 2008
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hi. How are you? Ive just come Irom brieIing and talking about
the Six-Party process with the chair oI the Six-Party process, Vice Minister Wu Dawei. Ive also had
the occasion today to talk about the situation with my ROK counterpart, Minister Chun Young-woo.
And this morning I met with my Japanese counterpart (inaudible) Saiki-san to discuss where we are.
Yesterday in Singapore, I had a long series oI discussions with my DPRK counterpart, Mr. Kim Kye
Gwan. I would say these were good discussions that I think allowed us to make some progress as we
try to get through this diIIicult -- what has turned out to be diIIicult -- second phase.
I want to stress that we havent yet arranged Ior all the Iactors, all the elements that need to be put
together. Obviously, this is a package. We are talking about a declaration that has several elements.
One oI the key ones, oI course, would be the amount oI plutonium that the DPRK declares. But weve
been able to have very good discussions on some oI the other key Iactors that have allowed us to go
Iorward.
Again, as is always the case in the Six-Party process, nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed. So
we have to continue to work on what an overall package oI elements therell be in order to conclude
phase two and then get on to the very important phase three -- where we anticipate, or we look Iorward
to, dealing with the question oI the DPRK separated plutonium and seeing what kind oI overall
arrangements can be made to have that third phase be the phase that IulIills the September '05
statement oI principles to achieve the denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula.
All in all, though, I would say it has been a good couple oI days. I think some oI the work that we were
able to do in Singapore was work that was kicked oII when Secretary Rice was here and we were
talking to our Chinese counterparts. So we have done a lot oI work with China on this. And a lot oI
what I talked about with Kim Kye Gwan in Singapore reIlects the work weve done with the other
parties, including work especially with the Japanese and the ROK.
So we have a lot oI work ahead oI us. I wouldnt want to suggest there is any major breakthrough. I
think we will be, as the days go by, we will be announcing some eIIorts to try to move ahead and
complete this second phase. I dont have anything to announce today, but I will be getting on a plane in
a Iew minutes, heading back to Washington. Ill be talking about this, where we are, with Secretary
Rice, and I think I have a Congressional hearing on Thursday. So the work will very much continue.
Maybe I can take a question or two?
QUESTION: Do you expect a partial declaration Irom the DPRK? (Inaudible.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think we will continue to be in close contact with the DPRK, as
we are with other partners. I think people need to understand this continues to be very much a Six-Party
process, and proposals we make to the DPRK need to be worked out within and by Six-Party members.
So, as always, China remains a very key Iactor in all oI this, which is why it was very important to get
back here and talk to the Chinese and see where we go Irom here.
Obviously, iI we can Iinalize the issue oI the declaration, that will be a key moment -- because the
declaration needs to be submitted to the Chinese chair. China then needs to bring the Six Parties
together. We need to look at the overall declaration, make sure it is consistent with our expectations,
and then we have to have to look ahead at how we are going to deal with the next phase. China is very
much the key Iactor in this, and thats why it is very important to stay very close to China.
QUESTION: What speciIics did you and Kim Kye Gwan discuss in Singapore?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we did get into some speciIic issues. There were detailed
discussions, but Im not sure I really want to discuss them in the press right now -- except to say they
were very detailed. And in the Six-Party process, iI you dont discuss details, youre bound to be
tripped up by them. We do need to discuss them and make sure we have a clear understanding, and we
did just that. But no, I dont want to get into those right now.
QUESTION: How close are we now to getting a declaration Irom the DPRK?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, weve deIinitely made progress on it. And, again, every time
I measure the time, Im always wrong. Just check with other people who have asked me the questions
about when were going to get something done. But weve deIinitely made some progress on it. I think
were going to try to do some more things in the next Iew days in terms oI trying to tee up what needs
to be done Ior this second phase. And well see iI we can, at that point, have a better time estimate. As
Ive said beIore, we dont have a lot oI time, and thats why we really do need to put it in place.
QUESTION: Can the declaration be direct or indirect? Can it have an attachment --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The Iormat issue is, weve had discussions about that. Weve
talked about that with all the partners. I dont think we have a problem with Iormat. I think its a
declaration process, iI you will. Whether it has three pieces oI paper or two pieces oI paper is not a big
issue Ior us. The issue is that it has to be complete and correct in order to make some progress.
QUESTION: How big an obstacle is North Korean-Syrian cooperation to the process?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The issue oI the DPRKs nuclear cooperation with other countries
has been a major issue. That is something that we have had considerable discussions about, and we will
probably continue to talk about it. But I think its something that, together with other things, we will
need to have all resolved as we get to the end oI this. I would just say we talked about that and other
things, and we did make progress.
MODERATOR: We have time Ior one more question, as long as its a short question.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Tomo, have you ever asked a short question in your liIe? All right,
well try this -- your Iirst ever. Go ahead.
QUESTION: What do you need to tee up in the next Iew days is it time or obstacles?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Time. Its time. Time and logistics. Time and logistics, they can be
obstacles. But we are dealing with time and logistics.
Okay, sorry theres not more news Ior you, guys. But thats the way it goes in this business.
See you later.
Israel briefed U.S. on Syria strike
Israel has kept the United States inIormed about its mysterious airstrike in Syria last year, Ehud Olmert
said.
The Israeli prime minister, who like the rest oI his government has reIused to provide details oI the
Sept. 6 bombing run that is widely assumed to have targeted a Syrian nuclear Iacility, said Wednesday
that the Bush administration is privy.
"Issues related to this subject were presented to the U.S. government by the deIense minister and
myselI," Olmert told reporters without elaborating.
Israeli media have reported that U.S. intelligence assessments on the airstrike could become public
during an upcoming debate in the U.S. House oI Representatives' Ioreign aIIairs committee.
Those who believe the Syrians were trying to develop a secret nuclear Iacility say Damascus may have
had help Irom North Korea, a regime under intense U.S. scrutiny.
Some Israeli pundits have suggested that Olmert diIIers with his deIense minister, Ehud Barak, on
whether to go public on the operation. Olmert denied this.
"Everything to do with these issues was precisely Iormulated between myselI and the deIense
minister," he said. "We conduct lengthy and elaborate discussions, and in the end we Iormulate a joint
policy."
Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on DPRK-U.S. Talks
Pyongyang, April 9 [2008](KCNA) -- A spokesman Ior the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the
Iollowing answer to the question put by KCNA on Wednesday as regards the DPRK-U.S. talks held in
Singapore:
The DPRK-U.S. talks were held in Singapore on April 8.
The talks had an in-depth discussion on issues arising in implementing the October 3 agreement oI
the six-party talks.
As a result oI the talks a consensus was reached on the U.S. measure to make political compensation
and the nuclear declaration essential Ior winding up the implementation oI the agreement.
The recent Singapore agreement Iully proved the eIIectiveness oI the DPRK-U.S. talks. We will
Iollow the IulIillment oI the commitments oI those countries participating in the six-party talks.
http://www.Iorward.com/articles/13141/
Israel May Reveal Details of Attack on Alleged Syrian Nuclear Program
U.S. Lawmakers Push Disclosure, Point to North Korean ProliIeration
By Nathan Guttman
Thu. Apr 10, 2008
Washington - Israel is considering disclosing classiIied inIormation about alleged nuclear ties between
North Korea and Syria due to concern that Washington may downplay the issue as it pursues closer ties
with Pyongyang.
Israeli sources say that Jerusalem holds inIormation implicating North Korea in a nascent Syrian
nuclear program, which was reportedly the target oI an Israeli air strike this past September.
Until now, Jerusalem has maintained a policy oI deliberate ambiguity regarding the attack, but Israel is
reluctantly considering opening up because oI Washingtons steps toward rapprochement with
Pyongyang. Israel oIIicials and American lawmakers believe that disclosing inIormation about the
attack may Iorce Washington to maintain a Iirm line on North Korean nuclear proliIeration.
Israel has concerns about North Korea because oI its proliIeration activity, but Israel doesnt want to
get into a conIlict over this issue or to take any action which could be viewed as opposing a policy led
by Condoleezza Rice, said David Makovsky, a senior Iellow at the Washington Institute Ior Near East
Policy.
To date, authoritative inIormation about Israels September 6, 2007, attack has been scarce. Following
the air strike, the Israeli government avoided making any public statements on the incident, and even
the countrys Iamously talkative Cabinet members stayed mum on the topic.
But the international media, which is not obliged to observe Israels military censorship laws, was Iull
oI inIormation about the attack, including beIore and aIter satellite images oI the targeted site. The
reports provide a Iairly detailed account oI the attack, describing its target as a partially built nuclear
site being constructed using North Korean know-how.
The issue re-emerged April 4, when Israeli media reported a dispute among policymakers in Jerusalem
about providing oIIicial inIormation regarding the attack. According to Iront-page reports in a number
oI leading Israeli newspapers, the inIormation was expected to be revealed in Washington during an
April 17 brieIing held by the House Foreign AIIairs Committee.
A spokeswoman Ior the committee, however, said this week that no hearing had been scheduled on
issues relating to Syria, Israel or North Korea. A representative Ior the House Intelligence Committee
also made clear that there were no plans to discuss the issue.
A congressional aide, speaking on condition oI anonymity due to what was described as the extreme
sensitivity oI the issue, told the Forward that administration oIIicials would be giving closed-door
brieIings to several members oI the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the near
Iuture. The brieIings, according to the congressional aide, will deal with Israels attack on Syria and
with North Koreas involvement in an alleged Syrian nuclear program.
Israeli oIIicials reIused to discuss the matter, citing the standing policy oI not commenting on any
aspect oI the attack. OIIicials did conIirm, however, that two senior advisers to Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert were in Washington in early April holding discussions with administration oIIicials. According
to Israeli press reports, these discussions also touched on the issue oI disclosing inIormation about the
September 6 air strike.
Meanwhile, talks between the United States and North Korea reached a critical point this past week.
Christopher Hill, the administrations point man Ior negotiations with Pyongyang, met April 8 in
Singapore with his North Korean counterpart in an attempt to overcome the current impasse, which
stems Irom Pyongyangs reIusal to disclose all its nuclear activity within the country and Irom its
proliIeration oI nuclear technology to other countries.
A Iull disclosure in writing is a condition set by Washington Ior removing North Korea Irom the list oI
states that sponsor terrorism, a move that would mark the beginning oI North Korea being accepted
back into the international community. A possible compromise being discussed is having North Korea
provide only a declaration acknowledging American Iindings on these issues.
Republican lawmakers have insisted that the Bush administration not drop North Korea Irom the list oI
terrorism sponsors beIore Pyongyang gives a Iull account oI its proliIeration activity.
Pyongyang continues to transIer missile technology to nations oI concern in South Asia and the
Middle East, a group oI Republican lawmakers wrote in a March 16 letter to Secretary oI State
Condoleezza Rice. Moreover, during last years July 4 missile launch by North Korea, the
international press reported the presence oI Iranian observers.
The group, led by Floridas Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who is the ranking Republican on the House Foreign
AIIairs Committee and a strong supporter oI Israel, argued that it is premature to remove North Korea
Irom the list because oI its supplying oI nuclear technology to other countries, which the letters
authors view as an even greater threat to American security.
Lawmakers also added to this years Intelligence Authorization Act a stipulation requiring the director
oI national intelligence to provide Congress with a quarterly report on the nuclear intentions oI Iran and
North Korea, although the legislation does allow the administration to keep the report classiIied and
allow only committee members and staIIers with security clearance to read it. Congressional sources
would not say iI the planned brieIings by the administration are in response to this legislation.
Israel, according to press reports, is concerned mainly about alleged North Korean involvement in
developing Irans nuclear program. In the talks held by Olmerts advisers in Washington this month,
the Israelis stressed the need to demand that North Korea come clean regarding its nuclear ties with
Iran as part oI any grand deal being negotiated by the United States, according to reports conIirmed by
Israeli sources in Jerusalem.
A congressional source, however, told the Forward that the need to disclose details oI the Israeli attack
on Syria had not been raised by either the administration or Jerusalem.
It is not clear that it is needed in order to make the case against North Koreas proliIeration record,
the congressional source said.
Washington, DC
April 10, 2008
[EXCERPT]
On North Korea --
Oh, yes, back there. Yes, in the back.
Is there any other inIormal and separate agreement between the U.S. and North Korea in Singapore
meeting? II you have any, can you tell us what is the contents oI inIormal agreement between U.S. and
North Korea?
Im not prepared to characterize the discussions beyond what I have said previously, what Chris has
said previously. The Singapore meeting, in Chriss Iirsthand characterization, took the discussion
beyond where they were in Geneva. Chris had the opportunity to have some Iurther discussions with
other members oI the six-party talks, his counterparts in the six-party talks in Beijing. Hes now back
here in the United States.
Theres work that remains to be done, and our basic position is that we are prepared to continue in that
work. We are prepared, along with the other members other Iour members oI the six-party talks, to
IulIill our obligations as North Korea IulIills its obligations, which includes dismantlement oI the
dismantle disabling oI the Yongbyon Iacility as well as a declaration.
There was a Iormal agreement, an inIormal agreement, that there are two kind oI agreement held
between U.S. and North Korea (inaudible)?
Again, this is not between the U.S. and North Korea. We are engaging them in the context oI the six-
party talks. We are Iully consulting with the other members, the other Iour members oI those talks
other than North Korea, about the declaration and the process oI working with North Korea to produce
a declaration that is acceptable to all the members oI the six-party talks. So this is not a U.S.-North
Korea issue.
There was what was the other part the other part to your question? Sorry.
Theres an inIormal --
Oh, right. As to we have said the the Iorm oI this is oI the declaration is not necessarily important.
Whats important is the substance oI it, whether or not it is acceptable to the other members oI the six-
party talks. So you know, whether it comes in one, two, three, Iour, Iive or more pieces oI paper, thats
not important. Whats important is the substance oI it.
U.S. Ready to Ease Sanctions on N. Korea
Pyongyang Would Have to Acknowledge Evidence About Nuclear Activities
By Glenn Kessler
Friday, April 11, 2008; A15
The United States is prepared to liIt two key economic sanctions against North Korea under a tentative
deal reached with that country this week, which requires Pyongyang to acknowledge U.S. concerns and
evidence about a range oI nuclear activities, U.S. and Asian diplomats said yesterday.
The agreement also requires North Korea to Iinish disabling its main nuclear Iacility and provide a Iull
accounting oI its stockpile oI plutonium. But, in a key shiIt, the two sides agreed to sidestep a dispute
over how much detail North Korea must provide about any past uranium enrichment-related activities
and its involvement in a mysterious Syrian Iacility bombed by Israel last September.
North Korea had balked at conIirming the Bush administration's allegations, stalling Ior months a
process designed to eliminate its nuclear programs. But aIter negotiations this week in Singapore and
last month in Geneva, the United States and North Korea agreed that Pyongyang must "acknowledge"
the allegations without precisely admitting them publicly.
That paves the way, diplomats said, Ior President Bush to remove North Korea Irom the U.S. list oI
state sponsors oI terrorism and to exempt it Irom the Trading With the Enemy Act.
U.S. oIIicials have concluded it is more important to persuade North Korea to surrender its weapons-
grade plutonium -- enough Ior perhaps halI a dozen weapons -- than Ior the process to collapse over the
impasse, according to Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill, the chieI U.S. negotiator.
"North Korea has diIIiculty saying things publicly," Hill said. Indeed, the still-secret text oI the new
agreement has elements similar to the Shanghai Communique issued by China and United States in
1972 during President Richard Nixon's historic visit, in which the two sides oIIered their own
interpretations oI key disputes.
Hill said that resolving questions about Pyongyang's interest in uranium enrichment remain important,
but that plutonium poses an immediate proliIeration risk.
"We are trying to Iocus on the plutonium as we try to resolve our suspicions on uranium enrichment,"
Hill said. Recalling Willie Sutton's line that he robbed banks because "that's where the money is," Hill
said: "That's where the bombs are. We don't have suspicions about plutonium; we have cold, hard Iacts
about plutonium."
North Korea acquired much oI its plutonium aIter the 2002 collapse oI a Clinton administration
agreement barring operation oI a plutonium-producing reactor. Bush accused North Korea oI cheating
on the deal, citing evidence that Pyongyang had a clandestine uranium-enrichment program. Plutonium
and highly enriched uranium oIIer diIIerent routes to building nuclear weapons.
Some North Korea experts are skeptical Pyongyang will ever give up its recently acquired plutonium.
Diplomats say Japan is upset that North Korea may be removed Irom the terrorism list beIore questions
are resolved about North Korea's abductions oI Japanese citizens. In its 2004 report, the State
Department said that the kidnapping issue was a Iactor in North Korea's inclusion on the list, but in
recent months the administration has steadily unlinked the two issues.
North Korea is one oI Iive countries on the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, which makes it subject to
severe U.S. export controls, particularly oI dual-use technology and military equipment. Those controls
prohibit much Ioreign aid and obligate the United States to oppose Iinancial assistance to the country
Irom institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Under the agreement, Pyongyang would also be Ireed Irom Iinancial sanctions imposed by the Trading
With the Enemy Act, a 1917 law that allows Ior a near-total economic boycott oI countries at war with
the United States.
Hill previously has said U.S. oIIicials concluded that thousands oI aluminum tubes acquired by North
Korea in 2002 -- which prompted the intelligence Iinding that Pyongyang was building a large-scale
uranium-enrichment program -- were not currently being used to create Iissile material.
North Korea allowed U.S. diplomats to visit a missile Iactory that used the tubes and to carry samples
home, but government scientists later discovered traces oI enriched uranium on the aluminum samples,
oIIicials said.
U.S. oIIicials said Iurther negotiations are needed, and an Asian diplomat said those will involve the
amount oI plutonium that North Korea plans to declare. Last year, North Korea said that it possessed
about 30 kilograms oI plutonium, much less than U.S. intelligence had estimated.
"The ball is on the North Korean side," the diplomat said, speaking on the condition oI anonymity. "We
need to have a clear explanation Ior the amount, and it has to be veriIied."
The United States is preparing about 500,000 tons oI Iood aid to assist North Korea with a devastating
grain crisis, but Hill said that is unrelated to the nuclear discussions.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hKO6E2Vs5MktD-DXHsbQ6tnT1-QD8VVTIR04
US, NKorea May Break Nuclear Impasse
By ANNE GEARAN 25 minutes ago [Accessed 2008-04-11T22:10Z]
WASHINGTON (AP) The United States is backing oII its earlier demand Ior a precise inventory oI
North Korea's nuclear programs and past activities that had hung up potentially historic disarmament
negotiations with the Communist nation.
U.S. oIIicials say they will still get the inIormation they need, but it will be packaged and presented in a
way more acceptable to the reclusive North. Any change in the terms, however, will open the White
House to criticism Irom the political right that the administration has gone soIt.
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice suggested Friday that a deal to resolve a Iour-month impasse may
be close, including a U.S. promise oI swiIt action to liIt economic and political penalties on the North.
"There are obligations on both sides," Rice said. "The U.S. is absolutely prepared to undertake its
obligations should the North Koreans IulIill their obligations."
Washington had reIused to take the North oII a U.S. terrorism blacklist, a coveted goal oI North Korean
leader Kim Jong Il, until negotiators have a "complete and correct" inventory oI the North's nuclear
program and past activities to spread weapons know-how to other nations.
North Korea had agreed in six-nation talks in October to provide the list and disable its Iacilities and its
main reactor by the end oI 2007. The North made unprecedented progress last year, shutting down and
starting to disable the reactor in exchange Ior aid and diplomatic concessions.
But the North missed the Dec. 31 deadline in a dispute over how speciIic, and how public, the North's
accounting had to be.
Now the Bush administration has decided that the exact contents oI the North Korean declaration are
less important than an assurance that the U.S. and other nations can check up on the North to make sure
it told the truth and isn't resuming any nuclear activities.
Asked Friday about a potential agreement to resolve the impasse, Rice did not repeat her usual demand
that the North produce a Iull and complete declaration oI its nuclear programs and past.
"We are trying to get people oII oI this sort oI 17th Century notion oI expiating sins and on to the
notion that the veriIication is the key here," a senior U.S. oIIicial said later. The oIIicial spoke on
condition oI anonymity because the deal is not Iinal.
The North would Iinish work to take its plutonium nuclear reactor out oI service and provide a Iull
accounting oI the program it ran there, including work to produce the nuclear device the North tested in
2006. That test conIirmed Pyongyang as a nuclear weapons state and intensiIied world eIIorts to
bargain the North out oI the weapons business.
A second, vaguer agreement would have the North "acknowledge" world worries about an alleged
separate nuclear development program using uranium, and about the North's activities to spread nuclear
technology or material to other nations, oIIicials said. The North would agree to new veriIication
programs to make sure it does not resume those suspect activities.
Previously, U.S. oIIicials had said the North would have to detail that alleged uranium program and
explain its presumed role in assisting Syria with what may have been an incipient nuclear program.
Israel last year destroyed a site widely believed to have housed that program.
OIIicials now say they are more concerned about the plutonium program, because oI its demonstrated
ability to yield a nuclear weapon, and did not want the dispute to threaten the entire disarmament deal.
"We are determined to have an outcome ... that would have the North Koreans account Ior all oI their
nuclear programs ... and their activities in nuclear proliIeration," Rice said.
A meeting oI nuclear envoys Irom the six nations involved in the talks the Koreas, China, the United
States, Japan and Russia could occur in Beijing in the next Iew weeks iI all sides IulIill their
obligations, the State department's lead negotiator with North Korea said Thursday
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN11346827
US must verify any North Korean declaration -Rice
Fri Apr 11, 2008 12:59pm EDT
(Adds quotes, background)
By Susan Cornwell
WASHINGTON, April 11 (Reuters) - The United States will have to veriIy whatever North Korea
discloses about its nuclear programs but Washington is not yet at a point where it can do so, U.S.
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice said on Friday.
"Any document that we get, any declaration that we get, has to be veriIied and it has to be veriIiable,"
Rice said at a news conIerence with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
Such veriIication could not take place overnight but the United States had to be certain it had the means
to do it, she said.
Six-nation talks over North Korea's nuclear program have been held up Ior months pending a Iull
accounting oI North Korea's nuclear activities -- a declaration that was due at the end oI last year.
People Iamiliar with the matter said this week the United States had reached a tentative agreement with
North Korea on how Pyongyang would disclose its nuclear programs, a step that would trigger its
removal Irom the U.S. list oI states that sponsor terrorism and termination oI other U.S. sanctions.
Rice said the United States was "still in the process oI trying to determine iI the North Koreans are
going to IulIill their obligations" under the six-party process.
"We are determined to have an outcome ... that would have the North Koreans account Ior all oI their
nuclear programs," she said. "We are not yet at a point as to where we can make a judgment as to
whether or not the North Koreans have met their obligations."
People Iamiliar with the matter said the United States and North Korea might break the deadlock with a
Iormula under which Washington would put Iorward its concerns about North Korea's suspected
uranium enrichment program and nuclear proliIeration -- and North Korea would then acknowledge
these concerns.
This could provide a Iace-saving way Ior Pyongyang to produce the declaration oI its atomic programs
required by the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.
The declaration has been held up partly because oI Pyongyang's reluctance to discuss any transIer oI
nuclear technology to other countries, notably Syria, as well as to account Ior its suspected pursuit oI
uranium enrichment. (Editing by John O'Callaghan)
Washington, DC
April 11, 2008
[EXCERPT]
QUESTION: What about those reports Iloating around that North Korea is prepared to make some
indirect declarations oI its nuclear holdings and --
MR. MCCORMACK: What part oI the Secretary's answer didn't you record? (Laughter.) Look, I don't
really -- I don't have much to oIIer beyond what she has told you in that regard. She did emphasize the
importance oI veriIication and veriIying any declarations that are made. There is actually a subgroup as
part oI the six-party talks which is charged with that task oI veriIying any declarations. And as she said,
that we are ready to live up to our obligations once North Korea has IulIilled its obligations.
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2008/04/12/30/0401000000AEN20080412001000320F.HTML
North Korea, U.S. reach secret deal to break nuclear deadlock, report says
2008/04/12 13:35 KST
SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and the United States have reached a secret deal to
end the impasse in the six-nation talks to dismantle the North's nuclear weapons program, a U.S.
government-Iunded radio station reported Saturday.
Under the secret agreement, reached at a meeting oI the top nuclear envoys oI the two countries
in Singapore early this week, the U.S. will make a declaration oI North Korea's alleged uranium
enrichment program and nuclear cooperation with Syria on behalI oI Pyongyang, Radio Free Asia
reported on its Web site, citing "multiple diplomatic sources" in Washington.
In return, the agreement calls Ior North Korea to "acknowledge" the U.S. concern over the two
issues, which have been key sticking points at the six-nation disarmament talks, and not to "challenge
the Iacts," the radio station said.
North Korea and the U.S. agreed to exchange a secret memorandum oI understanding on the
agreement, it said.
The radio station said North Korea agreed to make a complete and correct declaration oI its
nuclear weapons program "in the coming weeks." In a 2007 deal at the six-nation negotiations, North
Korea agreed to disclose Iull details oI its nuclear programs by the end oI last year in exchange Ior
economic aid and better ties with Washington, including its removal Irom the U.S. list oI countries
sponsoring terrorism.
The U.S. claims North Korea let the year-end deadline pass without any action, while North
Korea puts the blame on the U.S., arguing that it IulIilled its end oI the deal in November.
The U.S. dismisses the north's claim, arguing that its November declaration was "incomplete."
Despite the deadlock, North Korea has made progress in disabling its nuclear Iacilities by shutting
down its main nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.
Earlier this week, Assistant U.S. Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, Washington's chieI
negotiator Ior the six-nation talks, met his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan and later
acknowledged that "important" progress was made in Singapore.
However, Hill said more time is needed Ior the results to materialize.
North korea was more upbeat.
"A consensus was reached on the U.S. measure to make political compensation and the nuclear
declaration essential Ior winding up the implementation oI the agreement," North Korea's Ioreign
ministry said in a April 9 report by the country's korean Central News Agency.
Status of Syria strike hearing unclear
Yaakov Katz and Herb Keinon
THE JERUSALEM POST
Apr. 14, 2008
Despite an Israeli request, and amid heightened tensions with Syria, oIIicials in Jerusalem said on
Monday that it was still unclear whether US Congressional testimony on Israel's air strike against Syria
last September would be held in public or behind closed doors.
The hearing, scheduled Ior Thursday at the Subcommittee on Terrorism, NonproliIeration and Trade,
will discuss US policy in the Iace oI Iran's continued eIIorts to obtain nuclear capability.
According to the committee's current schedule, which appears on its Web site, the committee will hold
an open session which will hear testimony Irom Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ior Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes in the Department oI Treasury, and JeIIrey Feltman, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary oI State, Bureau Ior Near Eastern AIIairs.
The attack took place on September 6 in northeastern Syria when, according to Ioreign reports, a
number oI Israeli Air Force Iighter jets inIiltrated northeastern Syria and bombed a nuclear Iacility that
was being built there with North Korean assistance. Raising the issue at the hearing is seen in Israel as
part oI a congressional attempt to humiliate the Bush administration and prove that North Korea lied to
the US when it claimed to have abandoned its nuclear activity.
The assessment in Israel is that Iull disclosure oI the attack in an open congressional hearing could
"embarrass" Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iorce him to respond, possibly with military Iorce.
Assad has denied the reports that Syria was building a nuclear Iacility and has kept parts oI the Syrian
leadership in the dark regarding the true purpose oI the Iacility that was bombed. II the details oI the
attack are released in public, Israel Iears that Assad will come under immense pressure in Damascus to
take action.
However, Israel's deIense establishment believe that as long as the meeting is held behind closed doors,
Assad could plausibly deny any leaks emanating Irom such a hearing. Either way, Israel does not plan
on changing its policy oI silence on the issue.
OIIicials in Jerusalem said Monday that there was a disagreement in Israel between those - primarily
Irom the deIense establishment - concerned that public testimony would put Syria on the spot and
perhaps cause Assad to Ieel the need to take some kind oI retaliatory measure Ior the IAF attack, and
those who believe it was in Israel's interest to highlight in the US North Korea's nuclear involvement
with Syria.
The oIIicials said that those in the US interested in an open hearing want to show the public that while
the US is engaged in nuclear disarmament talks with North Korea, the North Koreans are behind
nuclear proliIeration in the world's most sensitive spots.
Relations with Syria reached a high point last week amid news reports that the Syrian military was
conducting military maneuvers along its border with Lebanon. Israeli deIense oIIicials said that the
moves were mainly deIensive and were being taken out oI Iear that Israel would attack Syria iI it were
attacked by Hizbullah in response to the February assassination oI arch-terrorist Imad Mughniyeh.
A House Intelligence Committee aide said that no hearings on topics related to Israel, Syria or North
Korea are listed on the public schedule. She noted that almost all intelligence committee hearings are
held in closed sessions, so it would be highly unlikely that inIormation about the Syrian incident would
be revealed in a public Iorum. It is also possible that any administration brieIing on the sensitive topic
would be done selectively with intelligence committee members.
Some members oI Congress have been pushing Ior Iuller disclosure oI the events surrounding
September 6 primarily because they are concerned about the reports alleging that North Korea has been
supplying Syria with nuclear capabilities in contravention oI its disarmament commitments made as
part oI the Six Party talks.
These members oI Congress are wary about the Six Party process continuing without having a clearer
picture oI North Korean activities in connection to Syria, among other issues. However, many oI the
members are sympathetic to Israel and understanding oI the Israeli perspective that disclosing
inIormation could push Syria to retaliate, something its leader Bashar Assad has reIrained Irom doing
until now.
There is also the hesitance oI the Bush administration to be Iactored in. The administration has strategic
concerns about revealing details oI the Syrian incident, and it is also in the midst oI a tug oI war with
Congress about disclosing sensitive inIormation on intelligence and decision-making. It also doesn't
want to give Congress reason to complicate the Six Party Talks, a delicate process that has suIIered
many hiccups along the way.
Hilary Leila Krieger contributed to this report
Senate to hold debate on Syria-N.Korea nuke ties next week
By Amos Harel and Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz Correspondents
Last update - 02:26 15/04/2008
The American administration intends to give the Senate Intelligence Committee an account oI the
nuclear ties between North Korea and Syria Ior the Iirst time on April 22.
Senior IDF oIIicers have warned, however, that the release oI any inIormation containing details oI the
Israeli Air Force strike in Syria last September could increase tension between Israel and Syria.
The meeting is expected to be held behind closed doors at Israel's insistence, but the Americans did not
promise not to brieI journalists aIterward.
Media reports in the United States could alter the gag order Israel has imposed on Israeli media
coverage oI the IAF's strike in Syria.
Washington sources on Monday told Haaretz that the administration and North Korea are making
headway in their talks about what to call Pyongyang's supply oI nuclear technology to Syria. North
Korea is expected to give the Americans a statement that indirectly acknowledges its violation oI the
agreement to dismantle its nuclear power by maintaining nuclear ties with Syria.
However, North Korea will not publicly admit to any guilt in this matter and the Americans are
expected to accept this. This arrangement would enable both sides to return to the agreement to
dismantle the North Korean nuclear program. In this case, the administration will be interested in
downplaying North Korea's ties with Syria and American oIIicials may make do with a general survey
on this issue to the Senate.
The Intelligence Committee has scheduled two hearings, on April 22 and 24. The Iirst session is
expected to be about the North Korean-Syrian issue.
Sources in Israel on Monday reiterated their position that any release, however partial, about North
Korea's ties with Syria, which would include details about the installation the IAF attacked, could
complicate the already tense situation between Israel and Syria.
These sources said that despite the administration's duty to report to Congress, they hoped it would be
done in a most limited way so as to avoid increasing tension in the Middle East.
The aIIair is causing tension between Israel's prime minister and deIense minister. The deIense
minister's aides suspect that the Prime Minister's Bureau has been covertly encouraging the Americans
to release inIormation about the attack, hoping to make political gains. The prime minister's aides deny
these allegations.
http://intelligence.senate.gov/hearings.cIm
[Accessed 2008-04-22T15:35Z]
April 14, 2008
12:40 P.M. EDT
[EXCERPT]
Q Thank you, Dana. At last meeting in Singapore between U.S. and North Korea, a tentative agreement
has been made Ior North Korea to report complete nuclear declaration. Under what condition United
States is to give North Korea some economic incentive, plus the removal oI North Korea Irom the
terrorist list? How was the President's response on that?
MS. PERINO: Well, as I have said beIore, there's a -- there is a package that was agreed upon in the
six-party talks in regards to North Korea. What we are waiting on right now is a complete and accurate
declaration. We don't have one yet, but Ambassador Chris Hill had good meetings last week. An issue
regarding the state sponsor oI terrorism list is a part oI that package, but things happen in sequence, and
so it is way premature to suggest that that's going to happen anytime soon.
Q Did he -- had made agreement with North Korean Kim Kye-gwan. The President agreed to that
agreement in Singapore.
MS. PERINO: I believe so, yes.
Okay, thanks.
END 1:06 P.M. EDT
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUST25567320080416
U.S. and North Korea envoys think key row cleared: sources
Wed Apr 16, 2008 8:41am EDT
By Teruaki Ueno
TOKYO (Reuters) - Negotiators Irom the United States and North Korea believe they have settled a
thorny dispute over Washington's allegations that Pyongyang had a program to enrich uranium Ior
weapons and proliIerated nuclear technology to Syria, diplomatic sources in Tokyo said on
Wednesday.
Under the Iace-saving deal reached by U.S. and North Korean envoys in Singapore last week,
Washington would state in a document its concerns about North Korea's suspected uranium enrichment
program and transIer oI nuclear technology and material to Syria, a diplomatic source said.
In the same document, North Korea would "acknowledge" the U.S. assertions, the source told Reuters.
"The negotiators concerned think that the issue over uranium and Syria has been settled," a Japanese
government source said. "It is hard Ior North Korea to admit (the U.S. assertions)," a Japanese
government source said.
The deal was reached when U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill held talks with North
Korea's Kim Kye-gwan in Singapore on April 8, the sources said.
The Iirst diplomatic source said it remained unclear whether top oIIicials oI the two governments
would accept the compromise deal.
Uranium enrichment could provide North Korea with a second way to produce Iissile material Ior
nuclear weapons in addition to its plutonium-based program, which it used to test an atomic device in
October 2006.
The Japanese government source said a huge gap remained over details oI North Korea's declaration oI
its plutonium-based nuclear arms program, stalling six-party talks on ending North Korea's nuclear
ambitions.
Six-party talks involve the United States, the two Koreas, China, Japan and Russia.
Washington has said a major sticking point in talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear programs is
the need Ior Pyongyang to deliver a "complete and correct" declaration oI its programs as called Ior in
a February 2007 six-party nuclear deal. That account was due at the end oI last year.
II the North makes the declaration, it stands to be removed Irom a U.S. terrorism blacklist and be better
able to tap into Iinance that could boost its economy.
U.S. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice said on Friday that the United States would have to veriIy
whatever North Korea discloses about its nuclear programs but Washington was not yet at a point
where it could do so.
Rice said the United States was "still in the process oI trying to determine iI the North Koreans are
going to IulIill their obligations" under the six-party process.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hqOCivLoF2IouIBR4S8-XKgMmOg
New mechanism set to verify North Korea's nuclear program
11 hours ago [Accessed 2008-04-17T14:00Z]
WASHINGTON (AFP) A mechanism is being set up to scrutinize any declaration provided by
North Korea oI its nuclear weapons program, the United States said Wednesday amid scepticism over a
tentative deal between the two nations.
The "new eIIort" will veriIy the long-delayed declaration by Pyongyang under a six-nation aid-Ior-
denuclearization deal, the State Department said.
"That's something that will be handled in the veriIication subgroup" oI the six-party talks, department
spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters when asked on prospective "veriIication methods" Ior
North Korea's nuclear program under the bid to end Pyongyang's atomic weapons drive.
The veriIication mechanism is expected to be set up under the "denuclearization oI the Korean
peninsula" working group, one oI Iive groups set up under a February 2007 agreement among the six
parties.
"It's a new eIIort. It's something that has been integrated into the talks, and I guess as a bureacratic
grouping then organized within the context oI those talks," McCormack said.
US Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice had discussed the establishment oI the veriIication subgroup
with leaders oI China and well as other countries, a State Department oIIicial said, speaking on
condition oI anonymity.
The announcement oI the veriIication measure Wednesday came amid criticism oI a reported
prospective deal reached earlier this month between US and North Korean envoys Ior the hardline
communist state to declare its nuclear program.
Under the deal, North Korea would provide a list oI its plutonium stockpile and merely "acknowledge"
concerns listed by the United States about its suspected uranium enrichment and nuclear proliIeration
activities, reports have said.
Washington had earlier called Ior a Iull accounting oI an alleged North Korean secret uranium
enrichment program and suspected proliIeration oI nuclear technology and material to Syria, charges
denied by Pyongyang.
Although the latest deal may have broken the months-old deadlock, it has caused a great deal oI
scepticism among experts.
"AIter months oI demanding that the North live up to its promise to provide a 'complete declaration oI
its nuclear programs,' the US is now backtracking," the Wall Street Journal said in an editorial
Wednesday headlined "Six-party giveaway."
John Bolton, a Iormer State Department non-proliIeration chieI, said the deal "rests on trust and not
veriIication" and warned that Pyongyang's "escape Irom accountability could break down international
counter-proliIeration eIIorts."
But Rice said last week that any declaration Irom North Korea had to be "veriIied and it has to be
veriIiable.
"And we have to make certain that we have means to assess what the North Koreans tell us, and we
have to have means to veriIy what the North Koreans tell us," she said.
North Korea had missed a December 31, 2007 deadline Ior providing a Iull declaration oI its nuclear
program and proliIeration activities, delaying implementation oI its denuclearization drive that
Washington wants completed beIore President George W. Bush leaves oIIice in January 2009.
AIter testing a nuclear bomb in October 2006, Pyongyang closed its key atomic plant and is now on the
verge oI disabling it under the six-party deal.
II North Korea completes providing the nuclear declaration, the parties could move to implement the
Iinal phase oI dismantling its nuclear program and materials.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2004357357hillqaweb18.html
Q&A: Top U.S. diplomat on N. Korean negotiations, China and the Olympics,
and American image
By Kristi Heim
Seattle Times staII reporter
Thursday, April 17, 2008 - Page updated at 09:46 PM
[EXCERPT]
U.S. Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill will be the point man Ior the U.S. as it makes what may be
a Iinal push toward resolving one oI the biggest threats to international security: a North Korean nuclear weapon.
The Bush administration Iaces criticism Irom some Ior soItening the U.S. stance against the rogue nation. But he
has weathered challenges beIore, keeping six-party talks among the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China,
Japan and Russia moving Iorward.
Negotiating the agreement with North Korea has been the hardest job oI his career, he said, one he's eager to put
behind him. Hill was in Seattle Wednesday Ior several appearances, including a talk with students at the
University oI Washington, where he sat down Ior a brieI interview with The Seattle Times.
Q: Has the issue oI North Korea's suspected uranium enrichment and transIer to Syria been resolved?
A: We're looking to try to resolve this so-called second phase. The second phase includes giving us a
declaration, and we need a declaration to cover all oI these elements Syria, uranium enrichment and
especially plutonium. We made progress in Singapore, but until we get all the elements done, and we're not done
yet, we're going to have some more diplomacy next week. I can't tell you whether it's resolved yet.
Q: What are the next steps?
A: We need to make sure that when the North Koreans present their declaration oI their plutonium holdings, that
it is complete and that we can veriIy that it's correct. And then there are some other things we need to ensure we
have means to monitor and veriIy that all oI these elements are done. So these veriIying things are the things
we're working on with the North Koreans and other parties in the six parties. I don't want to say I'm optimistic,
but I certainly don't want to say I'm pessimistic right now.
What we're trying to do is get to the point where we know precisely what their Iissile material holdings are, so
when we know precisely whether it's 35 kilos or 45 kilos, we can then have a Iinal phase negotiation where they
will abandon or give up that Iissile material. But until we get the declaration done, we can't get to that Iinal
phase.
Q: What restraints are being put on North Korea's distribution oI this Iissile material?
A: The good thing about Iissile material is it has a signature, so iI they ever sold it to somebody, and it was
discovered, we would know where it came Irom. We don't have any indication they have ever proliIerated Iissile
material, but that said, we don't know where it is. We know it's somewhere in North Korea. We don't know the
arrangements they have Ior guarding it. So we have to be very Iocused on trying to resolve the issue oI the
Iissile material, that is, trying to get them to do what they promised to do in September 2005, which is
abandon it.
Q: Is it important to keep any momentum going beIore a change in the U.S. administration?
A: My sense is there's broad bipartisan support Ior this step-by-step negotiation we're on. To be sure,
there's a lot oI criticism oI elements oI it. Some people have been saying we're going too Iar too Iast.
But overall, there's bipartisan support. I don't think a next administration, whether it's Republican or
Democrat, would really want to have this issue dropped in their laps. Everyone would like to have it
resolved. Whether it can be resolved or not will depend on the North Koreans.
Q: What will you be doing next week?
A: We're in very close contact with our partners. In Iact, the South Korean president is in Washington
at the end oI this week. We'll be having extensive discussions with the South Koreans on this. We are
also in almost daily communication with the Chinese on this.
And beyond that we'll have to see. I think everyone understands that we really should try to have this
wrapped up by the end oI this month.
Q: Do you think it's possible to open diplomatic relations with North Korea sometime soon?
A: I think in the context oI their denuclearization, that would be envisioned.
Q: What would be the time Irame?
A: It depends how quickly they are willing to give up their nuclear materials. II they're willing to do it
this year, we could establish relations this year.
But we won't have relations with a nuclear North Korea.
Q: How is China looking at the six-party talks?
A: China is a very active participant. It's an area we have succeeded in working with them very
productively and pragmatically on an area oI mutual concern. China looks at North Korea in very
diIIerent ways Irom how we look at them. You have to recall they were a historical partner and ally.
Chinese veterans associations trace their roots to the Korean War. All that said, China is very much
convinced that North Korea needs to give up its nuclear ambitions. They know that iI they don't, you
might have a situation where other countries Ieel they need a nuclear program.
Q: Do they have the same urgency?
A: Chinese always have perhaps a greater sense oI patience than we do, except iI the subject is Taiwan.
But I think we're working in sync. Many Americans think, well, why can't they just cut oII the North
Koreans, but that's not how they do business with a neighbor. They oIten use more Iriendly persuasion
than other people Ieel is appropriate.
[deletia]
Kristi Heim: 206-464-2718 or kheimseattletimes.com
http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/04/17/aIrica/OUKWD-UK-ISRAEL-SYRIA-OLMERT.php
Olmert says Israel not under Syrian nuclear threat
Reuters
Published: April 17, 2008
JERUSALEM: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said Damascus does not pose a nuclear threat to Israel,
making the cryptic comments in response to a question in a newspaper interview about a mysterious
Israeli air strike in Syria.
Israel has given no details on the identity oI the target its planes struck inside Syria on September 6.
Some U.S. oIIicials linked the raid to suspicions oI secret nuclear cooperation between Syria and North
Korea.
"There are things I am not willing to discuss, Olmert, asked about the air strike, said in an interview
published on Thursday in Israel's Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper.
"I will only say this: To the best oI my knowledge, Israelis are not under Syrian nuclear threat," Olmert
said.
Damascus and Pyongyang denied any nuclear ties.
(Reporting by Avida Landau)
On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary Rice
Washington, DC
April 17, 2008
(9:04 a.m. EDT)
[EXCERPTS]
SECRETARY RICE: Good morning, everyone. I came by just to take a Iew oI your questions, but Id
like to make a Iew comments Iirst on several issues.
[deletia]
Its obviously a busy week in terms oI the diplomacy. The President, oI course, will meet with Prime
Minister Brown today and talk about the whole range oI issues that we share with our British
colleagues. And then tomorrow, he will meet with the new South Korean President, President Lee.
Korea is a strategic ally oI the United States, and we look Iorward to this opportunity to advance our
global agenda with Koreas new leadership.
We will, oI course, also discuss the Six-Party talks, and I thought I might take a second to give you my
assessment oI where that process stands. North Korea is disabling its Yongbyon nuclear Iacility and we
are in the second phase oI our implementation agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The
outcome we and our partners require is a Iull account Irom North Korea oI all its nuclear programs,
including any uranium and nuclear proliIeration activities.
All six parties have obligations as well, which weve agreed to undertake in parallel with North
Koreas submission oI a declaration, a declaration that we will veriIy rigorously. The steps that we are
taking are measured ones, and we will continue to judge North Koreas actions and take other steps as
warranted.
I want to emphasize that we are at the beginning oI a very complex process, not the end -- a process
that must lead to the actual removal, Ior the Iirst time in history, oI nuclear material Irom North Korea
and a veriIiable end to its nuclear programs. Have we made progress through the Six-Party Iramework?
Yes. Is there still reason Ior caution and skepticism? Yes. Yet, the Six-Party Iramework has
demonstrated great value. Through it, we have Iound common ground with China, Japan, Russia and
South Korea on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Iighting proliIeration. The Iramework is
invaluable when North Korea conducted a nuclear test, allowing us to quickly respond at the United
Nations. This is much preIerable to the United States dealing with these issues alone. Further progress
on denuclearization will also enable us to step up our cooperation on other goals: a peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula; normalization oI relations; a new mechanism to cooperate on peace and security in
Northeast Asia; and, oI course, an opportunity to improve the lives oI the North Korean people. In
short, the six-party Iramework is a Iramework to elicit cooperation. It is also a Iramework to deal with
noncooperation.
[deletia]
With that, I'm happy to take your questions.
[deletia]
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, on North Korea. The Iull accounting that you're talking about, will
this be a public accounting oI the uranium program and the proliIeration activities? And iI this happens
to your satisIaction, will North Korea come oII the terror list in a quid pro quo in exchange Ior this
declaration?
SECRETARY RICE: We have -- obviously, this is a diplomatic matter, and not everything in
diplomacy is public. But we have no desire to hide Irom anyone the means by which we would account
Ior and then veriIy. There will be, undoubtedly, brieIings Ior Congress. I don't see any reason that we
shouldn't have a -- that people shouldn't have a sense oI what we're going to do -- I -- what we would
be expecting to do. I can't tell you that every detail oI every diplomatic encounter is going to be a
public matter. I think that isn't the nature oI diplomacy. But that there can be conIidence about what the
arrangements would be, I would Iully expect that that would be appropriate; that there would be
inIormation so that there would be conIidence about what the arrangements would be.
In terms oI what the United States would do, the liIting oI certain sanctions on the North Koreans, steps
that could be taken iI North Korea actually carries out its obligations, we're going to have to judge
whether North Korea has carried out its obligations.
But I will say this: We have a long way to go in terms oI all oI the various statutory sanctions and
multilateral and bilateral sanctions that would remain even iI the United States were to take the steps
that you outlined.
QUESTION: But on the terror list --
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- I mean, is that a -- are we going to see them come oII that terror list?
SECRETARY RICE: John, I'm going to wait until we can understand whether the North Koreans have
discharged their obligations in order to -- beIore we begin to discuss what our obligations are.
QUESTION: Can I Iollow up?
SECRETARY RICE: Oh, sure. Charlie. Do you mind?
QUESTION: Just to Iollow up on North Korea and on the -- meeting their obligations and the
declaration. This would also include reIerence to proliIeration activities and would mention Syria on
North Korea, iI that's the case?
SECRETARY RICE: As I've said, there has to be an accounting Ior all the nuclear programs. All the
nuclear programs include not just the uranium program, the plutonium program, but also nuclear
proliIeration activities. And we've made that very clear, not just to the North Koreans but to other
parties in the six-party talks. What the six-party Iramework gives you is a means by which the United
States is not leIt alone to deal with Iuture pledges that the North Koreans might make or representations
that the North Koreans might make about ongoing proliIeration activities.
Again, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea -- whenever the North undertakes these obligations, they're
undertaking them in the context within the Iramework oI the six-party talks. And I think that's very
important, because I can't think oI another way that one is going to get a handle on North Korean
proliIeration activities or deal with the pledges that they make.
[deletia]
QUESTION: Yes. Secretary Rice, you emphasize the importance Ior accounting with respect to North
Korea. Do you insist on having this speciIic veriIication mechanism on not only plutonium, but also on
uranium program and the proliIeration in North Koreas Iinal declaration?
SECRETARY RICE: The two programs are diIIerent, the uranium program and the plutonium
program, in that we, obviously, and the IAEA and the international community know a good deal about
the plutonium program. And so I think that the veriIication mechanisms Ior that will be one set oI
veriIication mechanisms, but there have to be means to veriIy what theyre doing. The uranium
program is a diIIerent matter, with Iar less knowledge, understanding about what actually happened
there and what is actually there. And so it will have to have its own will have to have their own
means oI working through the questions about that program. And the six parties will have to have the
the other parties will have to have means to work through those thoroughly. I have heard Irom my other
colleagues in the six parties that they, too, are concerned about veriIication and believe that veriIication
is going to be important.
Now, on -- one oI the innovations here on proliIeration is that, initially, the six parties did not deal with
proliIeration, the Six-Party Iramework did not deal with proliIeration. It will now need to deal with
proliIeration in light oI some recent concerns about North Korean activities in proliIeration. So each oI
these problems is diIIerent. And since each oI the problems is diIIerent, you have to look to means oI
veriIication that are diIIerent.
And let me just -- I think it goes without saying, but perhaps Id better say it. VeriIication takes some
time because these are complex programs, this is a nontransparent society, there is a history here oI
surprises. And so it will take some time, even past the second phase, Ior veriIication to completely play
out. But my point is just because we believe obligations may have been met in the second phase, iI
there is evidence in as were into the third phase that something was not true that was said in the
second phase, you know, there is always the ability and the absolute intention to react to that.
QUESTION: A Iollow-up on that.
SECRETARY RICE: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Do you have any immediate plans to send your team to North Korea to discuss about the
veriIication issue?
SECRETARY RICE: There will be a team that will go. I dont think we have a date yet, but weve
been looking to send an expert team to continue the discussions on veriIication. And again, I want to
emphasize this is a process, that this is not that Chris Hill did a very good job during these recent
discussions, but there is much more work to do in order to see whether North Korea is really going to
meet its obligations, how over time we are going to be able to veriIy that those obligations have,
indeed, been met.
QUESTION: Does that mean then that you would hold the terror list removal and the other things that
North Korea wants out oI this out until the veriIication is actually complete?
SECRETARY RICE: Anne, I think I said that the veriIication can take some time. What we need to
know is that weve got appropriate means Ior veriIication. Now, phase two will need to come to an end
with both sides having met its obligations. But the process doesnt come to an end at that point. And
whatever is done in phase two, iI its demonstrated in phase three that somehow something was wrong
in phase two, oI course, the United States reserves the right to take whatever steps it needs to, even iI
weve declared phase two complete.
QUESTION: So just to be just to be clear, Madame Secretary, iI they provide some kind oI
declaration that, based on your knowledge, that you Ieel is complete and you have a veriIication
mechanism that youre satisIied will be able to get you to where you think you need to be in terms oI
veriIication, then phase two would be and their obligations under phase two --
SECRETARY RICE: Im not going to make this mechanistic. We are going to judge whether or not we
think the North Koreans have discharged their obligations Ior phase two, and we will then decide
whether it is time Ior the United States to carry out its obligations. But phase two is not a Iree-standing
phase that just ends the process. There is a continuation all the way to the step that I outlined, which is
denuclearization, which means nuclear programs are veriIiably ended and the material is accounted Ior
and out. So all along that process, were going to continue to look at whether or not the veriIication or
whether -- to veriIy and continue to look at whether or not North Koreans are meeting their obligations
and, indeed, whether they have, indeed, met their obligations in prior phases.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, a clariIication.
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Is Syria an issue in proliIeration and why are you so Iar have been reluctant to say so
speciIically?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, Syria is most certainly an issue in proliIeration. Weve had troubles and
concerns about Syrian proliIeration as well. But look, we have several nonproliIeration questions on the
table about North Korea; we have Ior some time. What Im saying to you is that these come now -- it is
going to be very important that the proliIeration issues also be a part oI the Six-Party Iramework,
because to our -- our deIinition is that that is also a nuclear program, not just what may exist on the soil
oI North Korea. And that is a position that is shared by the other members oI the six parties.
QUESTION: And Syria is a part oI (inaudible)?
SECRETARY RICE: End oI story.
QUESTION: How about Iran?
SECRETARY RICE: Any country would be. II there is any concern, we have to deal with it in the six-
party talks.
Okay.
QUESTION: Thanks.
SECRETARY RICE: All right. Thank you.
2008/288
Seeking To Engage In Korea
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak spoke to Post reporters and editors yesterday through an
interpreter. Excerpt[]:
THE POST: Regarding the negotiations with North Korea: Were you saying the solution |Assistant
Secretary oI State| Chris Hill has come up with, the idea where North Korea says it acknowledges the
U.S. concerns and evidence about uranium and the Syria connection . . . that meets your approval?
LEE: As Ior your question about North Korea's cooperation with Syria or North Korea's activities in
the uranium enrichment program, we do not know the Iinal results or the outcome oI it. I believe that
we should wait a little bit beIore we know Ior sure.
However, perhaps we can assume that North Korea did in an indirect way admit to being involved in
these two activities, and iI so, considering the characteristics |oI the| regime, then perhaps we can
consider this as an acceptance or an admission that they were involved in these activities, and then this
will allow us to move on to the next level so that we can resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. . . .
Another very important point is that North Korea agree not to get involved Iurther in any proliIeration
activities.
N. Korea's nuclear past stays sealed
April 18, 2008
By Nicholas Kralev and Jon Ward
The Bush administration made another concession to North Korea yesterday by agreeing to keep secret
part oI a required declaration oI the country's nuclear programs, saving Pyongyang a public
embarrassment Irom its proliIeration activities.
The decision is likely to Iigure in weekend talks at Camp David between President Bush and South
Korea's newly elected President Lee Myung-bak, who came into oIIice in February pledging to take a
tough stand toward his northern neighbor.
"Not everything in diplomacy is public," Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice told reporters in
explaining the decision to reporters
For weeks, Miss Rice had insisted that North Korea publicly disclose all its past nuclear activities,
including its bomb-making with plutonium, any eIIorts to enrich uranium and any transIers oI nuclear
technology to other countries.
North Korea's reIusal to address those demands had stalled six-nation talks to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula Ior months.
CareIully choosing her language yesterday, Miss Rice promised to give the public "a sense" oI what
North Korea had done.
"There would be inIormation so that there would be conIidence about what the arrangements would
be," she said, oIIering to brieI Congress on the issue.
The administration had previously agreed to allow the North Koreans to address a uranium-enrichment
program Washington says they developed in the 1990s, as well as nuclear-related transIers to Syria and
other countries, in a document separate Irom the main declaration.
That main part, which is required by an October deal reached in six-nation negotiations, would Iocus
on the North's plutonium program. Both plutonium and highly enriched uranium can be used to make
atomic bombs.
The Washington Times reported in February that a secret document was being negotiated as a way Ior
Pyongyang to save Iace, since it has never publicly acknowledged the uranium-enrichment program. At
the time, administration oIIicials denied that report.
At the White House yesterday, Dennis Wilder, senior director Ior East Asian aIIairs at the National
Security Council, conIirmed that non-plutonium issues will be addressed in a separate document
prepared in "side negotiations that the United States has had with the North Koreans."
"That's a diIIerent matter, because that involves diIIerent kinds oI activities, such as proliIeration, and
that is being handled in a diIIerent manner," he said.
Miss Rice also suggested that the North would not have to wait Ior its declaration to be veriIied beIore
it received some oI the political and economic rewards it has been promised, such as removal Irom the
U.S. blacklist oI state sponsors oI terrorism.
"VeriIication takes some time, because these are complex programs," she said. Even iI the United
States were to take the North oII the blacklist, "we have a long way to go in terms oI all oI the various
statutory sanctions and multilateral and bilateral sanctions that would remain."
John R. Bolton, who was undersecretary oI state Ior arms control and international security during Mr.
Bush's Iirst term, said the administration is "obviously in Iull retreat."
"I think |removal Irom the terror list| will happen in a Iew weeks, and it will be a disgrace," he said.
"They think the plutonium issue is the only one that matters, and it's a potentially Iatal mistake."
Both Miss Rice and Mr. Wilder insisted, however, that Washington will receive all the inIormation it
has demanded, regardless oI the Iorm in which it is submitted to China, which leads the six-party talks.
The negotiations also include Japan, South Korea and Russia.
"The outcome we and our partners require is a Iull account Irom North Korea oI all its nuclear
programs, including any uranium and nuclear proliIeration activities," Miss Rice said.
It was not clear, however, whether the separate document will be submitted at the same time as the
main declaration.
A State Department oIIicial said that Sung Kim, director oI the department's Korea oIIice, will travel to
Pyongyang next week to Iinalize the agreement with the North, which was reached in principle last
week in Singapore between the two chieI negotiators, Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan.
North Korea has shut down and almost disabled its main nuclear complex at Yongbyon, but the goal oI
the six-party process is to "irreversibly" dismantle its programs. The declaration, which was due by
Dec. 31, is necessary to make sure the North has scrapped everything.
The United States also wants to know what happened to any past programs. A Syrian Iacility targeted
by an Israeli air strike in September has become a major issue Ior Washington because it was widely
reported to be a nuclear site under construction with help Irom North Korea.
Sean Lengell contributed to this report.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/18/washington/18diplo.html
Past Deals by N. Korea May Face Less Study
By HELENE COOPER
WASHINGTON The Bush administration appears to be preparing to back away Irom a demand that
North Korea Iully disclose all oI its past nuclear weapons activities, in an attempt to preserve a nuclear
agreement requiring it to disclose and dismantle the bulk oI its nuclear weapons program.
As described by administration oIIicials on Thursday, the step would relax a demand Ior North Korea
to admit Iully that it supplied Syria with nuclear technology. The United States would also agree to
postpone its demand that North Korea provide an immediate and Iull accounting oI its Iledgling
uranium program.
The new stance is intended to help complete a denuclearization deal that would Iocus instead on North
Koreas more extensive plutonium program, which has been at the heart oI its nuclear weapons
development and was the source oI raw material Ior the device it tested in October 2006.
The State Department spokesman, Sean D. McCormack, said the emerging agreement would not
represent a concession. He said that even iI North Korea did not Iully account Ior its uranium eIIorts,
the deal would allow inspectors access to all oI North Koreas nuclear Iacilities in order to veriIy that it
had stopped its weapons programs.
There is nothing inevitable about this process, and we are reserving judgment about this declaration
until we see it, Mr. McCormack said. Every aspect will be subject to veriIication, and iI we detect
that they have misled or attempted to mislead, there will be diplomatic consequences.
The new approach has been endorsed by Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and her chieI North
Korea negotiator, Christopher R. Hill, an assistant secretary oI state, who have argued that getting the
plutonium program shut down was better than getting nothing at all, an administration oIIicial said. But
it is being opposed by conservatives within the administration, including aides to Vice President Dick
Cheney, oIIicials said.
A lot oI people will say this Ialls short oI the Iull conIession, a senior administration oIIicial said oI
what the new approach would demand oI North Korea. They want them to appear in Town Hall and
acknowledge that they have sinned. But they werent willing to go that Iar.
The administration had previously sought Iull disclosure oI North Koreas role in the Syria program,
which a senior administration oIIicial said was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in Syria last September.
Under the new approach, the United States and North Korea have settled on Iudging the issue,
administration oIIicials said. North Korea will acknowledge that the United States is concerned about
the nuclear proliIeration to Syria but will not publicly admit to it. North Korea will also promise not to
engage in any more nuclear proliIeration, a senior administration oIIicial said.
In return, the United States would take North Korea oII the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and the
list oI countries noted in the Trading With the Enemy Act.
State Department oIIicials, preparing Ior a storm oI protest Irom conservatives who complain that such
an agreement would be too soIt on North Korea, hastened to say on Thursday that the United States
would continue to keep a host oI economic sanctions against North Korea, including prohibitions on
most Ioreign aid and limitations on trade.
The administration oIIicials who described the new American approach agreed to speak only on
condition oI anonymity, because North Korea had not yet agreed to the deal. Asked on Thursday
whether the United States was scaling back its demands, Ms. Rice responded only obliquely.
Were going to have to judge whether North Korea has carried out its obligations, Ms. Rice said
during a news conIerence. But I will say this: we have a long way to go in terms oI all the various
statutory sanctions and multilateral and bilateral sanctions that would remain even iI the United States
were to take the steps that you outlined.
President Bush appears to be supporting Ms. Rice and Mr. Hill, to the dismay oI those who say that the
administration, aIter six years oI acting tough on North Korea, is backing down. DeIenders oI the
emerging agreement counter that it would be a mistake to continue a strategy that has yet to produce a
lasting deal, and instead allowed North Korea to build up its plutonium stockpile and detonate a nuclear
device in 2006.
Part oI the problem Ior Mr. Bush is that the proposed deal, which many Ioreign policy experts say may
be the best the United States can hope Ior at this point, is being judged by standards set up by Mr. Bush
himselI.
The White House now Iinds itselI charting a similar course to the one taken by the Clinton
administration in striking a deal with North Korea in 1994. That agreement collapsed in 2002 aIter the
Bush White House accused North Korea oI secretly continuing work on a nuclear weapon.
Under the new deal, North Korea has agreed to dismantle Yongbyon, as part oI an agreement that, like
the Clinton deal, envisions that North Korea would ultimately give up all oI its nuclear material.
John R. Bolton, the Iormer United States ambassador to the United Nations and the most outspoken
critic oI the accord now taking shape, wrote an op-ed column this week in The Wall Street Journal that
compared Mr. Bush unIavorably with Ronald Reagan. His policy regarding North Koreas nuclear
weapons program looks more like something out oI Bill Clintons or Jimmy Carters playbook, Mr.
Bolton wrote.
The administration is sending a negotiating team next week to try to work with the North Koreans on
the details oI what exactly North Korea would have to disclose about its plutonium program and
how, under such an agreement.
We cant play trust me with plutonium, one senior administration oIIicial said. Nuclear experts at
the State Department and other agencies are working on a way to make sure that North Korea discloses
its entire plutonium program and capacity.
In addition, American oIIicials are pressing North Korea to take steps to alleviate concerns held by
Japan, which wants questions resolved about North Koreas abductions oI Japanese citizens.
The issue is scheduled to come up over the weekend when Mr. Bush meets with President Lee Myung-
bak oI South Korea. White House oIIicials say they do not plan to take North Korea at its word.
No one has let them oII the hook, said Dennis Wilder, special assistant to the president and senior
director Ior East Asian aIIairs.
Washington, DC
April 18, 2008
2:01 p.m. EDT
|EXCERPT|
QUESTION: What came out in the Secretarys meeting with President Lee at Blair House this
morning?
MR. MCCORMACK: This is a this was a meeting in preparation Ior President Lees meetings up at
Camp David. And that hes going to have I dont have a readout. They just did it one-on-one. I
believe it was one-on-one. And she typically does this beIore meetings between President Bush and
another head oI state, just to prepare the ground. We did have an announcement oI a deal on beeI,
which was most welcome. I think you saw a statement Irom Trade Representative Schwab. And oI
course, the -- President Bush and President Lee are going to talk about six-party talks, U.S.-South
Korean bilateral relations, and that agenda was reIlected in the discussions between the Secretary and
President Lee.
QUESTION: Did the subject oI the North Korean nuclear declaration and what might be required
under that declaration come up?
MR. MCCORMACK: I dont know. Im sure, given the news reporting Irom yesterday, that it came
up. And Ill take the opportunity to reiterate what I said this morning. And that is that we have yet to
see a declaration. We, the other members oI the six-party talks, have yet to see a declaration Irom the
North Koreans regarding all aspects oI their nuclear activities. And we are going to withhold any
judgment on this declaration until we have a chance to see it. And youre not going to see any
recommendation go Iorward to the President oI the United States Irom this Department until we are
comIortable with this declaration, until we believe that it is acceptable.
And whatever declaration there is, as Secretary Rice pointed out yesterday, is going to be subject to
robust veriIication. And iI at any point along the way, iI we actually do get to a declaration, and Ill
come back to that point in a second, its going to be subject to robust veriIication. And iI, at any point,
theres we or anybody else in the six-party detects that the North Koreans have attempted to deceive
us or attempt to provide us inIormation which was misleading or, in any way, Ialse, then there are
going to be consequences Ior that.
And I want to return back to the point about this process. It is important to keep in mind that while
there has been progress that has taken place within the Iramework oI the six-party talk concerning
disabling the Yongbyon Iacility and some oI the other discussions, theres nothing in this process that
is inevitable. It is based on perIormance. And iI North Korea, Ior example, doesnt perIorm, then the
process is not going to move Iorward. And they are not going to receive the beneIits that they might
otherwise have received, iI they had perIormed on the process, so --
QUESTION: (Inaudible) more on this?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, sure.
QUESTION: Could you be any more speciIic than you were in the gaggle this morning about the dates
that Sung Kim and the other the nuclear experts are going to meet at Pyongyang?
MR. MCCORMACK: I think theyre going to I think theyre going to meet Tuesday, Wednesday.
Theyre leaving Sunday.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. MCCORMACK: And it takes some time to travel there and I would expect that theyll be there
Tuesday, Wednesday. Theyll probably have discussions thatll last a day and a halI, two days.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. MCCORMACK: Mid-week, theyll be there mid-week. Well keep you up to date iI theres any
change to that.
QUESTION: Are there people Irom the veriIication bureau going with them or is that (inaudible)?
MR. MCCORMACK: I dont know. Ill we have to check on that to see.
MR. CASEY: Well try and get you something.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, well try to check to see what the composition is. I expect that its
probably going to be an interagency team, because really, what youre talking about some detailed
technical items here as well, especially as they would relate to a declaration and subsequent veriIication
oI the declaration.
QUESTION: Are they going to be talking about additional Iacilities beyond Yongbyon? Is that an issue
in the declaration?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we have yet to see what the North Koreans have put Iorward. They have
not yet come up with their Iinal declaration, so well see. II they bring up other Iacilities, then oI
course, that will be a topic oI discussion.
Yeah.
Rice: Syria 'most certainly an issue in nuclear proliferation'
By Shmuel Rosner and Yoav Stern, Haaretz Correspondents
Last update - 10:20 18/04/2008
[EXCERPT]
U.S. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice told reporters on Thursday [2008-04-17] that "Syria is most
certainly an issue in proliIeration."
Responding to reporters' questions, Rice spoke at length about the talks between the U.S. and North
Korea, which also addressed the issue oI North Korea's relations with Syria. The U.S. is demanding
that North Korea reveal all past activity relating to nuclear proliIeration, including its ties to Syria.
These came to light Iollowing September's airstrike in Syria, which Ioreign reports have attributed to
Israel.
April 19, 2008
President Bush Participates in Joint Press Availability with President Lee Myung-Bak of
the Republic of Korea
Camp David
11:17 A.M. EDT
[EXCERPTS]
[deletia]
PRESIDENT LEE: Both oI us reaIIirmed once again that under no circumstances would we allow
North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. Also, we agreed to work together closely within the six-party
talks so that North Korea can Iully and completely give up all their nuclear weapons programs as soon
as possible.
Korea and the United States do not harbor any hostile intent towards North Korea. We both agreed to
work together to help North Korea escape international isolation and to improve the lives oI the North
Korean people. President Bush supported our policy towards North Korea, including our
denuclearization "opening-3000" policy, and also said that the United States will continue to dialogue
-- seek ways to promote dialogue in exchange with North Korea.
[deletia]
We reaIIirmed that nuclear nonproliIeration and the promotion oI democracy and human rights are all a
vital component in making our world a better, saIer place. In this regard, in order to ensure sustainable
development, we agreed to work closely on the issues oI climate change and energy securities, matters
which are very serious and concerns us all.
[deletia]
I'm very happy with the results oI today's meeting. And we will work very closely together to see the
complete dismantlement oI the nuclear weapons program oI North Korea, and we will work closely
within the six-party talks Iramework. And we must see the satisIactory conclusion, which will lead to
helping the North Korean people lead better lives, with dignity.
Once again, Mr. President, I'm very happy to have met you, Mr. President, as well as Mrs. Laura Bush,
and thank you Ior the warm hospitality extended to me and my delegation by the people oI America.
We will work closely together with a Iuture-oriented mind. And I promise you I will do my very best,
Mr. President.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you, sir. Thank you. We'll do two questions a side, starting with Deb.
Q I have the same question Ior both oI you.
PRESIDENT BUSH: I warned him that this was going to happen. (Laughter.)
Q Well, at least it's not two questions.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, I know -- (laughter.)
Q First to President Bush, isn't scaling back demands about what North Korea has to declare giving in
to a country that has repeatedly demonstrated that it can't be trusted? Former U.N. Ambassador Bolton
has called it a complete collapse in the deal. And your critics are saying that you're selling out to get an
agreement. Why is it not?
PRESIDENT BUSH: Look, we're going to make a judgment as to whether North Korea has met its
obligations to account Ior its nuclear program and activities, as well as meet its obligations to disable
its reactor. In other words, we'll see. The burden oI prooI is there. We've laid out -- they've made some
promises, and we'll make a judgment as to whether they met those promises. And then we and our
partners will take a look at North Korea's Iull declaration to determine whether or not the activities they
promised they could do could be veriIied. And then we'll make a judgment oI our own as to whether or
not -- you know, about our own obligations.
You know, there's all kinds oI rumors about what is happening and what's not happening. Obviously
I'm not going to accept a deal that doesn't advance the interests oI the region. The whole objective oI
the six-party talks and Iramework is to get them to disclose their weapons programs, is to get them to
dismantle their plutonium processing, is to get them to talk about activities, nuclear activities. And
we'll make a judgment as to whether or not they do that. But somehow people are precluding -- you
know, jumping ahead oI the game. They have yet to make a Iull declaration. Why don't we just wait
and see what they say beIore people go out there and start giving their opinions about whether or not
this is a good deal or a bad deal.
But one thing is Ior certain: The most eIIective way to deal with this issue is to do so with parties like
China and Japan and Korea joining the United States and South Korea with a common voice. The
whole object oI this exercise is to convince the leader oI North Korea to give up his nuclear weapons
ambitions. That's the whole object.
And so we have yet to come to the stage where he has made a Iull declaration. And so we'll wait and
see what he says, and then we'll make a decision about our obligations, depending upon whether or not
we're convinced that there is a solid and Iull declaration, and whether or not there's a way to veriIy
whether or not he's going to do what he says he's going to do.
PRESIDENT LEE: As Ior the declaration oI North Korea, that is a very important process. I believe iI
North Korea's declaration is not satisIactory or iI the veriIication is not satisIactory, we could probably
have a temporary achievement, but in the long term, that will cause a lot more serious problems. I
believe President Bush shares this thought with me.
Mr. President Bush explained just now the declaration, the veriIication process, has not begun. We are
still waiting Ior North Korea to declare their Iull program. They should not get away with this
temporary measure. The United States is not dealing with North Korea alone; there are other parties to
the six-party talks, and they must all agree to North Korea's declaration. So in that regard North Korea's
declaration oI their nuclear weapons program should be complete and correct, and veriIication -- I'm
not sure how long that is going to take, but North Korea must IaithIully cooperate with veriIication
process.
All the parties oI the six-party talks are with one mind that the veriIication process must be Iull and
complete and satisIactory. I think it's inappropriate and unconstructive Ior us to have too many doubts
beIore the process even begins. The process is beginning. We should have trust in the process, and I
will watch this process and cooperate Iully.
Q (As translated.) I have a question Ior President Lee. Korea and the United States have made many
achievements through the summit meeting, especially North Korean nuclear issue and the
strengthening oI the alliance. As Ior North Korean nuclear issue, Mr. President Lee suggested setting
up a permanent liaison oIIice in both Seoul and Pyongyang. What are some oI the Iollow-up eIIects, iI
you do have any Iollow-up actions? And do you have any thoughts oI proposing a meeting with
Chairman Kim at an earlier date?
PRESIDENT LEE: The process is not something that we discussed between ourselves during the
summit meeting. In Iact, when I was staying in Washington, D.C., I had an interview with one oI the
newspapers there, and it came up. OI course it was not a sudden suggestion. I did have a meeting
among my staII and related ministries, and I talked about this in detail beIore I came to the United
States.
We have a new administration in Korea, and we haven't yet to begun dialogue with the North Koreans.
Inter-Korean dialogue -- there is a need Ior us to have dialogue all the time. Up until now we had
dialogues whenever the need arose, and then it would stop. However, dialogue should be based on
genuine cooperation and sincerity. And so with this in mind, I thought that it would be helpIul to set up
a permanent liaison oIIice in both Seoul and Pyongyang.
As Ior the summit meeting between myselI and Chairman Kim, I will agree to it when the need is real.
And I already said publicly that I am willing to meet with him -- not just once, but many times -- but iI
the meeting will yield substantial and real results. I believe only when that is possible I am ready to
meet with him and have sincere dialogue, because that will help to bring about peace and stability oI
the Peninsula.
So basically, I do hold that thought, but I'm not suggesting to have a meeting with Chairman Kim
anytime soon. II the need arises, again, I'm ready to meet with him.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Steven Lee.
Q Thank you very much, Mr. President. II I could Iollow up a little bit on North Korea. The North
Koreans agreed last year to make their disclosure. We're now in April and we've yet to see this
disclosure. There are continued negotiations, a new round next week. Are you concerned that, given
this record, they're not prepared to make this Iull disclosure, that they're stalling the process somehow?
And iI so, a question Ior both oI you, how do you respond to that?
PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes. OI course, I mean, they may be trying to stall. One thing about a non-
transparent society where there's not a lot oI Iree press, Ior example, or a lot oI opposition voices, it's
hard to tell what's going on. Now, he has made declarations, and he's testing the relationship. He's
wondering whether or not the Iive oI us will stay uniIied. And the only thing I know to do is to
continue pressing Iorward within the six-party Iramework.
The decision -- we've made our decision. "We," the Iive oI us, have made our decision and that is,
there's a way Iorward. And obviously we hope he chooses to honor his commitments in a veriIiable
way. But when you're dealing with a society in which it's hard to get inIormation out oI, you just have
to wait and see whether they're sincere or not. Unlike our society, oI course, where there's all kinds oI
people in the administration talking and sharing inIormation with you -- some oI it authorized, some oI
it's not -- it doesn't happen that way in North Korea. It's a closed society. It's a society in which the will
oI one person decides the course oI the Iuture.
And again, we're very hopeIul. We talked about our mutual desire to keep the six-party Iramework in
place, to deal with a lot oI issues. The Iirst one oI course is with North Korea. And it's -- I can just tell
you, Steven Lee, it's much more eIIective to have more than one voice speaking on this issue than to be
the sole voice speaking on the issue. And so iI there ever is going to be a breakthrough, it's through the
six-party Iramework.
And, look, I'm hopeIul. We'll see. This has been a -- I've been at this Ior quite a while, and there's been
moments where it looks like the process is going to go very smoothly and everybody is going to honor
their commitments, and then Ior one reason or another, there's a -- there was a setback. But the key
thing is, is that we haven't abandoned the eIIorts to solve this problem peaceIully and diplomatically.
PRESIDENT LEE: Thank you. II you correctly understand North Korea, and iI you do understand
North Korean society, you'll probably get a better picture why we are seeing some delay in the process
at the moment. II North Korea wasn't like that, then we would have the seen the resolvement oI this
issue already. We need persistent patience, ladies and gentlemen. And we need time in order to have
complete resolution oI this issue.
However, it's diIIicult to convince North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons program, but it's not
impossible. It is not impossible. I believe that. So in order to resolve this issue, I believe that the six-
party talks is the most eIIective way and mechanism to resolve this issue, like the President mentioned.
And right now we're in the stages oI waiting Ior their declaration, and then we can move on to the
veriIication process.
So I think it's up to you to make the atmosphere so that North Korea can IaithIully abide by their
promise and make the right declaration; that once North Korea does so, it is also in their interest to
make the correct decision to give a Iull and complete declaration. And it will also help the North
Korean people improve the quality oI their liIe, and that is the best strategic choice that they can make.
[deletia]
END 11:46 A.M. EDT
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-korea-usa.html
Bush: North Korea Must Declare Nuclear Programs
Filed at 2:42 p.m. ET
CAMP DAVID, Maryland (Reuters) - The United States and South Korea on Saturday demanded
North Korea submit its long overdue accounting oI its nuclear weapons programs but oIIered no clues
about how long they would be willing to wait Ior it.
Meeting Ior the Iirst time at the secluded presidential retreat, President George W. Bush and South
Korean President Lee Myung-bak also warned that once the declaration had been made, the
inIormation would have to be veriIied.
They appeared to back away Irom a reported proposal under which, according to sources Iamiliar with
the matter, Washington would list its concerns about the nuclear programs which Pyongyang would
then acknowledge.
Some U.S. conservatives have criticized that idea as giving in to North Korea and aimed at getting a
deal beIore Bush leaves oIIice in early 2009.
"You know, there's all kinds oI rumors about what is happening and what's not happening," Bush said
at a news joint conIerence with Lee. "Obviously I'm not going to accept a deal that doesn't advance the
interests oI the region."
North Korea, which tested a nuclear device in 2006, Iailed to meet a December 31, 2007 deadline to
reveal its nuclear weapons programs, a deal struck with the United States, China, South Korea, Japan
and Russia.
"So we'll wait and see what he says, and then we'll make a decision about our obligations, depending
upon whether or not we're convinced that there is a solid and Iull declaration," Bush said.
II Pyongyang makes the statement, the United States is expected to ease some sanctions imposed under
the U.S. state sponsors oI terrorism list and the U.S. Trading With the Enemy Act.
STALLING?
In addition to seeking details about North Korea's nuclear programs, the United States is concerned it
may have shared nuclear technology with U.S. political Ioes like Syria. Bush questioned why the North
Korean leader was delaying.
"They may be trying to stall," Bush said. "He's testing the relationship. He's wondering whether or not
the Iive oI us will stay uniIied, and the only thing I know to do is to continue pressing Iorward within
the six-party Iramework."
However, Bush and Lee did not say how long they were willing to wait Ior the inIormation. A team oI
U.S. experts will be in North Korea next week to see iI they can make any progress on completing the
declaration.
White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe declined to put a timetable Ior the declaration and said the
administration Iirst wanted to see what the team accomplished.
Lee, the Iirst South Korean president invited to Camp David, also expressed concerns about North
Korea's nuclear program. His predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun, sometimes Irustrated U.S. eIIorts with his
accommodating policies toward Pyongyang.
"We are still waiting Ior North Korea to declare their Iull program," he said through a translator. "They
should not get away with this temporary measure."
"It's diIIicult to convince North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons program but it's not
impossible," Lee said.
Separately, Bush and Lee agreed during their meeting to keep the current number oI U.S. troops in
South Korea and Bush said he would ask Congress to permit Seoul to buy the Iull complement oI U.S.
military hardware like NATO allies.
The United States has about 28,000 troops stationed in South Korea to help it deIend against invasion
by the communist North.
Bush also called on Congress to approve a Iree trade agreement with South Korea, but Democrats who
control the House oI Representatives and Senate have expressed concerns that it does not provide
adequate access to the Korean auto market.
Congress "must reject protectionism, must not turn its back on a Iriend and ally like Korea, must
approve the Iree trade agreement with Korea this year," Bush said.
(additional reporting by Tabassum Zakaria and Lisa Richwine in Washington; editing by Mohammad
Zargham)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20080419/NATION/595532081/1001
Bush defends declarations stance
April 19, 2008
By Jon Ward - CAMP DAVID, Md. President Bush today rejected the notion that the U.S. has
lowered the bar Ior North Korea's declaration oI nuclear activity, pushing back against criticism Irom a
Iormer top administration oIIicial.
The North Koreans, Mr. Bush said, "have yet to make a Iull declaration."
"Why don't we just wait and see what they say beIore people go out there and start giving their
opinions about whether or not this is a good deal or a bad deal?" he said, during a press conIerence at
his Camp David retreat with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak.
Mr. Bush said that critics oI his approach to Pyongyang which include John Bolton, the presidents
Iormer top counter proliIeration oIIicial at the State Department are "jumping ahead oI the game."
Mr. Bolton, who was also the presidents ambassador to the United Nations in 2005 and 2006, has
turned on the Bush administration in the last year.
Mr. Bolton insists that Mr. Bush has allowed Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice to derail a hardline
approach towards North Korea.
AIter the White House said this week that North Korea would be allowed to declare its nuclear
proliIeration activities in a separate declaration that would remain secret, Mr. Bolton said the
administration is now in Iull retreat.
Dennis Wilder, the presidents top Asia adviser, insisted on Thursday that a North Korean declaration
oI nuclear bomb-making activities would not be decoupled Irom a declaration on passing along
nuclear technology or materials to other countries.
No one has let them oII the hook with that declaration, Mr. Wilder said.
But Miss Rice said this week that she would only disclose a sense oI what the North Koreans had
revealed about past proliIeration, and oIIered to brieI Congress.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il had committed to provide a "Iull declaration," which the U.S. said
Ior months included proliIeration, by the end oI 2007.
Mr. Bolton said in a phone interview that the key issue remains whether the U.S. will take North Korea
oII the state sponsors oI terrorism list without veriIying that they have destroyed all nuclear weapons
and all bomb-making Iacilities.
Mr. Bush today simply said to wait and see, and did not address the issue oI separate agreements Ior
nuclear production and nuclear proliIeration.
There's all kinds oI rumors about what is happening and what's not happening. Obviously I'm not
going to accept a deal that doesn't advance the interests oI the region, Mr. Bush said.
Mr. Bush indicated that he might not have been pleased with all the disclosures this week by Mr.
Wilder and Miss Rice. He compared U.S. and North Korean press Ireedoms to make the point that in
the U.S., government oIIicials talk to the press more openly.
But when the president said that there's all kinds oI people in the administration talking and sharing
inIormation with you -- some oI it authorized, some oI it's not, he looked over at the delegation oI
U.S. oIIicials, which included both Miss Rice and Mr. Wilder.
Miss Rice could be seen aIter the press conIerence speaking animatedly with White House spokesman
Gordon Johndroe.
U.S. Team Headed to Pyongyang in Search of 'Significant Progress'
By Blaine Harden
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, April 22, 2008; A11
[EXCERPT]
SEOUL, April 21 -- For the Iirst time since the United States eased demands on North Korea Ior
nuclear disclosure, a U.S. delegation is headed to the communist state to try to veriIy the extent oI its
nuclear program.
Led by Sung Kim, a senior State Department expert on Korea, the interagency delegation arrived here
late Monday and was scheduled to drive north to Pyongyang on Tuesday across the heavily IortiIied
border.
"Everything is subject to veriIication," Kim told reporters aIter arriving here. He said that he hoped the
visit would bring "signiIicant progress" and that he expected detailed discussion oI a much-delayed
declaration North Korea has promised about its nuclear program.
That declaration, under a disclosure-Ior-aid deal negotiated last Iall and due last Dec. 31, was to have
been a "complete and correct" listing oI the North's nuclear activities, Irom the manuIacture oI
plutonium to details oI uranium enrichment and involvement in a Syrian Iacility bombed last year by
Israel.
Both plutonium and highly enriched uranium can be used in building nuclear weapons.
But North Korea has consistently reIused to talk publicly about uranium enrichment and nuclear
proliIeration.
To salvage the negotiations, the United States said this month that it would be satisIied iI the North
would "acknowledge" evidence and concern about these matters, without a precise public admission.
In the meantime, the North -- in return Ior the liIting oI sanctions -- would Iinish dismantling its
principal nuclear plant and account Ior all the plutonium it has produced.
North Korea has said it has produced about 66 pounds oI plutonium, but the U.S. government estimates
it has made more. Both sides agree that signiIicant parts oI the Yongbyon reactor have already been
disabled.
The delegation heading to Pyongyang on Tuesday plans to stay in North Korea Ior several days, a U.S.
Embassy spokesman said.
[deletia]
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-Ig-norkor23apr23,0,3070215.story
CIA to describe North Korea-Syria nuclear ties
OIIicials will tell Congress members this week that North Korea was helping Syria build a reactor last
year when it was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike, a U.S. oIIicial says.
By Paul Richter and Greg Miller
Los Angeles Times StaII Writers
10:15 PM PDT, April 22, 2008
WASHINGTON CIA oIIicials will tell Congress on Thursday that North Korea had been helping
Syria build a plutonium-based nuclear reactor, a U.S. oIIicial said, a disclosure that could touch oII new
resistance to the administration's plan to ease sanctions on Pyongyang.
The CIA oIIicials will tell lawmakers that they believe the reactor would have been capable oI
producing plutonium Ior nuclear weapons but was destroyed beIore it could do so, the U.S. oIIicial
said, apparently reIerring to a suspicious installation in Syria that was bombed last year by Israeli
warplanes.
The CIA oIIicials also will say that though U.S. oIIicials have had concerns Ior years about ties
between North Korea and Syria, it was not until last year that new intelligence convinced them that the
suspicious Iacility under construction in a remote area oI Syria was a nuclear reactor, the oIIicial said,
speaking on condition oI anonymity when discussing plans Ior the brieIing.
By holding closed, classiIied brieIings Ior members oI several congressional committees, the
administration will break a long silence on North Korean-Syrian nuclear cooperation and on what it
knows about last year's destruction oI the Syrian Iacility. Nonetheless, it has been widely assumed Ior
months that many in the administration considered the site a nuclear installation.
It was not clear Tuesday how recently North Korea may have been aiding Syria. But disclosure oI the
relationship to the committees is likely to bring criticism Irom conservative lawmakers who already
believe that U.S. overtures to North Korea have oIIered the government in Pyongyang too many
beneIits without assurances that it will disclose the extent oI its nuclear arms eIIort or ultimately
surrender its weapons.
U.S. oIIicials provided little explanation oI why they want to brieI lawmakers on the North Korean-
Syrian links aIter declining to do so Ior months.
A senior Senate aide said the timing appears driven by a Bush administration desire to apprise
committee members oI the latest intelligence on the reactor beIore releasing some oI the inIormation.
"I have this strong impression the reason they want to brieI the committee is they want to say
something publicly," said the aide, who discussed contacts with the administration only on condition oI
anonymity.
The administration has brieIed senior members oI the House and Senate intelligence committees, a
senior Senate aide said. But other lawmakers have remained in the dark. The administration has been
under pressure to extend brieIings to a larger circle oI lawmakers.
The administration is planning to ease sanctions on North Korea as part oI talks aimed at removing
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons. The six nations involved in the talks, which also include China, Russia,
South Korea and Japan, have been negotiating since 2003.
AIter a breakthrough last year in which North Korea agreed to shut down its only Iunctioning nuclear
production Iacility, it was rewarded with Iuel oil and the release oI Irozen bank Iunds. But talks stalled
aIter the Bush administration demanded that Pyongyang provide a Iull description oI its past nuclear
activities by a December 2007 deadline.
ShiIting course, U.S. oIIicials said two weeks ago that it would be suIIicient Ior the North Koreans to
acknowledge U.S. concerns about their nuclear activities. In return, administration oIIicials would
remove North Korea Irom the stigmatizing U.S. list oI countries that sponsor terrorism and Pyongyang
would no longer be subject to U.S. trade sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, a 1917 law.
The administration shiIt appeared to give ground to North Korea in the negotiations, spurring Iierce
criticism Irom U.S. conservatives and debate over the broader plan to ease sanctions as a step toward
dismantling Pyongyang's weapons programs.
But under the latest approach, U.S. oIIicials will describe to the North Koreans at least some oI their
conclusions about Pyongyang's links with Syria. Some analysts speculated that U.S. oIIicials may wish
to avoid sharing intelligence with North Korea beIore they have brieIed most members oI Congress.
Danielle Pletka, a vice president oI the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute think tank,
said the congressional brieIings were simply a step the administration needed to take to move Iorward.
"This is a box-checking exercise," she said.
Gordon Johndroe, a White House spokesman, said, "The administration routinely keeps appropriate
members oI Congress inIormed oI national security and intelligence matters." He declined to comment
on speciIic sessions, however.
Rep. Peter Hoekstra oI Michigan, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee,
complained in an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal in October that the administration "has
thrown an unprecedented veil oI secrecy around the Israeli airstrike," and that based on inIormation he
had been given "it is critical Ior every member oI Congress to be brieIed on this incident, and as soon
as possible."
Some administration oIIicials are believed to be unhappy with the latest developments in talks with
North Korea. But several analysts were skeptical oI speculation that the brieIing might have been
initiated by internal opponents who hope to set oII an outcry that would scuttle any deal with
Pyongyang.
"You'll have some outcry, but I doubt there are enough people on Capitol Hill even paying attention to
oppose it," said Gordon Flake, who Iollows the issue as executive director oI the Maureen and Mike
MansIield Foundation and is a critic oI such a pact.
He speculated that lawmakers would be reluctant to stand in the way oI the deal, because that would
risk criticism that they had blocked a hopeIul avenue oI progress on a top national security problem.
Another senior Senate aide said that although the disclosure might bring complaints, Congress would
not turn against the negotiations with North Korea. The critics would not be able to come up with any
better alternative, he said, speaking on condition oI anonymity when discussing senators' views.
U.S. to Link North Korea to Syria
Congress to Be Told
Damascus Got Help
Building a Reactor
By JAY SOLOMON
April 23, 2008; Page A7
[As of 2008-04-23T13:15Z, Google News lists this story as being posted 16 hours ago]
WASHINGTON -- North Korea was helping Syria build a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor beIore
Israel bombed the site last September, the Bush administration is set to tell Congress.
The new inIormation could increase the position oI hard-liners in Congress and the administration who
have argued against a deal being negotiated to dismantle North Korea's nuclear-weapons program. The
hard-liners say Pyongyang hasn't provided enough assurances it will dismantle its atomic arsenal in
return Ior economic and diplomatic incentives.
Neither Israel nor the U.S. has made public inIormation about the strike in Syria, though speculation
has been widespread that the targeted site was a nascent nuclear reactor. Some Republicans have
charged that the U.S. is playing down the matter to avoid hurting talks with North Korea.
This week, the Central Intelligence Agency is expected to begin brieIing members oI the Senate and
House intelligence committees on the Israeli strike, according to congressional and administration
oIIicials. The brieIings will be based in part on intelligence provided by the Israeli government, they
said.
The CIA is expected to say it believes North Korea was helping Syria develop a plutonium-producing
nuclear reactor similar to the Yongbyon Iacility North Korea built north oI Pyongyang, said an oIIicial
Iamiliar with the deliberations. It also is likely to say North Korean workers were active at the Syrian
site at the time oI the Israeli attack.
It isn't clear what speciIic evidence the U.S. oIIicials will present to support their allegations. They are
likely to acknowledge uncertainty about whether the alleged Syrian reactor was designed solely to
produce nuclear power Ior peaceIul purposes or also to make Iissile material Ior a nuclear weapon,
according to the U.S. oIIicial.
Syrian oIIicials have denied that they have sought to develop a nuclear capability oI any kind and say
the Bush administration is hyping the issue as a means to pursue an aggressive policy against both Iran
and Syria.
"We have seen in the past that this administration doesn't require evidence, but will use Ialse pretexts"
to pursue its agenda, said Ahmed Salkini, a spokesman at the Syrian Embassy in Washington. "We
hope the administration doesn't take a miscalculated step that could cause even more chaos in our
region."
A spokesman Ior the White House's National Security Council, Gordon Johndroe, said: "The
administration routinely keeps appropriate members oI Congress inIormed oI national security and
intelligence matters, but I'm going to decline to comment on any speciIic brieIings." A spokesman Ior
the CIA declined to comment.
The Bush administration's national-security team is divided between those who want to pursue
negotiations with North Korea and Iran about their nuclear ambitions and those who want to take a
harder line.
The hard-liners were dealt a blow in December with the release oI a National Intelligence Estimate
concluding that Tehran stopped developing nuclear weapons in 2003. The White House has challenged
the report, as have some in the intelligence community. By contrast, an airing oI the alleged North
Korea-Syria ties could put those who Iavor negotiations on the deIensive.
In recent months, Republicans in Congress have been pushing the White House Ior a wider brieIing on
the Israeli attack. "Things seem to be coming to a head now" on North Korea, said a Republican staIIer
on Capitol Hill who has pushed Ior the release oI the intelligence. "There's a sense we need to clear the
decks so that we can move Iorward."
The U.S.-led diplomatic drive to disarm North Korea oI its nuclear weapons is at a sensitive stage. U.S.
oIIicials estimate that North Korea extracted between 30 kilograms (66 pounds) and 60 kilograms (132
pounds) oI plutonium Irom its now-shut Yongbyon reactor, although some believe the total could be
higher. North Korea detonated a nuclear device in 2006.
The Bush administration has Iive U.S. oIIicials working in North Korea to permanently disable the
Yongbyon reactor. The dismantling is part oI the Iirst stage oI a disarmament agreement the U.S. and
North Korea reached last year. Under that stage, Washington and its negotiating partners have shipped
heavy Iuel oil to the North.
In the second stage, North Korea is supposed to give a thorough accounting oI its nuclear activities at
home and abroad in exchange Ior certain U.S. concessions, including removal Irom Washington's list
oI terrorism sponsors.
U.S. negotiators have pared initial demands that North Korea declare everything up Iront, say U.S.
oIIicials. State Department negotiators have hoped to persuade North Korea to acknowledge at least in
private that it helped Syria's nuclear program and that, separately Irom the Yongbyon program, it tried
to enrich uranium to create Iuel Ior a nuclear weapon.
Hard-liners say the Syrian developments show North Korea can't be trusted. They say it is time to
break oII negotiations and step up pressure on North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.
North Korea, too, may pull back Irom talks iI its alleged support Ior Syria receives a public airing in
Washington, some U.S. oIIicials and analysts say.
"Who knows how they'll respond?" said a U.S. oIIicial working on proliIeration activities. "Maybe
they'll kick us out oI Yongbyon?"
Israel has publicly been silent on the Syria strike, wary oI stoking tensions when it is Iacing threats
Irom the Islamist groups Hezbollah and Hamas.
Still, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government consented in recent weeks to a wider airing oI its
intelligence surrounding the Syria strike, say oIIicials involved in deliberations. Israel has long worried
about North Korea's military supplies to Iran and Syria.
Conservative pundits in the U.S. have attacked Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, the State
Department's point man on North Korea, Ior Iashioning a potential deal that is too weak. Vice President
Dick Cheney's oIIice and members oI the nonproliIeration bureaus at the Pentagon and State
Department are particularly skeptical oI the current denuclearization deal.
This week, the State Department dispatched envoy Sung Kim to Pyongyang in a bid to reach an
agreement on the list oI nuclear assets North Korea will agree to declare and veriIy as part oI the
disarmament process. Mr. Kim is Iocusing on gaining a speciIic accounting oI the plutonium
Pyongyang extracted Irom Yongbyon.
--Siobhan Gorman contributed to this article.
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN23349645
US thinks N.Korea aided Syria on plutonium program
Wed Apr 23, 2008 2:11pm EDT
(Adds details, quotes, background)
By Arshad Mohammed
WASHINGTON, April 23 (Reuters) - The Bush administration is expected to tell U.S. lawmakers on
Thursday that it believes North Korea was helping Syria build a nuclear reactor that could produce
plutonium, a U.S. oIIicial said on Wednesday.
The White House has said little about the question oI any North Korean nuclear assistance to Syria
since Israel conducted a mysterious Sept. 6 air strike inside Syria that media reports said was aimed at a
nuclear site built with Pyongyang's help.
"The sense is that the Syrians, with the help oI the North Koreans, were attempting to build an
undeclared Iacility that could indeed produce plutonium," said the oIIicial, who spoke on condition he
not be named because oI the sensitivity oI the matter, oI the congressional brieIings' likely content.
The Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal reported the inIormation in their Wednesday
editions.
While the oIIicial did not explicitly tie the closed-door brieIings to the Israeli strike, he hinted at this by
saying "iI an undeclared reactor in dangerous hands were put out oI commission beIore it was
operational, that's a good thing."
While a handIul oI lawmakers were brieIed on the issue last year, the decision to widen the circle
comes as Washington appears closer to a deal Ior North Korea to provide an overdue declaration oI its
nuclear programs.
Once the poor, Communist state has produced the declaration, the United States is expected to ease
sanctions on Pyongyang that Ilow Irom its presence on the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and
the U.S. Trading With the Enemy Act.
Analysts believe Thursday's brieIings aim to persuade members oI Congress that easing the sanctions is
justiIied.
SKEPTICISM
There is skepticism, especially among the administration's Republican allies in Congress, that relaxing
the sanctions is warranted and there are concerns North Korea will not produce the "complete and
correct" declaration oI its nuclear programs it has promised under a multilateral agreement.
The declaration is one step toward carrying out a 2005 agreement among the two Koreas, China, Japan,
Russia and the United States in which North Korea committed to abandon any nuclear weapons and
programs.
The brieIings could also open a diplomatic Pandora's box Ior the United States with implications Ior its
dealings with close ally Israel as well as with Syria and North Korea, which have had poor relations
with Washington.
The U.S. intelligence community is expected to give multiple brieIings on Thursday to members oI the
congressional committees that oversee armed services, Ioreign aIIairs and intelligence matters.
The U.S. oIIicial who asked not to be named said that there was "good intelligence ... Irom more than
one place and more than one source" on the suspected North Korean nuclear aid to Syria.
One matter oI sensitivity Ior Israel -- which is widely believed to be the source oI some oI the
intelligence on Syria -- is the possibility that wider disclosure could antagonize Damascus and produce
a negative reaction.
Syria is regarded by the United States as a state sponsor oI terrorism and it has long hosted Palestinian
groups that have carried out attacks on Israelis.
The brieIing could also irk North Korea, which U.S. oIIicials say is sensitive to the possible disclosure
oI any nuclear proliIeration it may have engaged in.
However, some congressional aides have said that a brieIing is a necessity iI the administration is to
win support Ior continuing the six-party process and Ior providing the Iunds needed to dismantle
Pyongyang's nuclear Iacilities.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ihstGuIkLbMQWop6Y8uT0IITX29w
NKorea gave Syria nuclear help: US official
1 hour ago [Accessed 2008-04-23T19:50Z]
WASHINGTON (AFP) In a move that could upset US policy towards North Korea, US intelligence
is set to tell lawmakers this week that Pyongyang shared nuclear know-how with Syria, a US oIIicial
said Wednesday.
The United States has concluded that the Stalinist regime's help came both beIore and aIter the
destruction oI a nuclear reactor being built in secret with North Korean help, said the oIIicial, who
requested anonymity.
"II it had been complete, the reactor would have been capable oI producing plutonium Ior nuclear
weapons but it was destroyed beIore it could do so," the oIIicial said. "That's the result oI solid
intelligence."
The oIIicial did not speciIy who had knocked out the Iacility, but Israel carried out an airstrike inside
Syrian territory in September in a move widely reported to have targeted a nuclear site.
US intelligence oIIicials plan to brieI US lawmakers Irom key committees on Thursday, amid deep
concern in the US Congress about progress in six-country talks to dismantle North Korea's nuclear
programs.
The White House declined to conIirm details oI the brieIings, but spokeswoman Dana Perino and US
DeIense Secretary Robert Gates said separately that inIormation on the issue could "soon" be made
public.
Asked when the public would be told about what US intelligence believes about such collaboration,
Gates told a Pentagon news conIerence: "Soon." He reIused to elaborate.
"I think Secretary Gates said it well. 'Soon' is a good, short answer," Perino told reporters at her daily
brieIing amid a Ilurry oI news reports that North Korea had aided Syria in a covert drive to obtain
nuclear capability.
"I'm not going to be able to say much on it today. And I'm not conIirming anything at this brieIing in
regards to the substance," Perino said as media outlets said the CIA would brieI lawmakers starting on
Thursday.
Asked whether she could give a reason Ior her silence, Perino replied: "No, I cannot. As you know,
we've been asked questions about this since last Iall. We have declined to comment, and I am not able
to do so at this time."
"II you guys can just be a little bit patient and let some conversations happen on the Hill (Congress),
then we will talk about it more at that time," the spokeswoman said.
Starting late Tuesday, US media outlets, citing unnamed US oIIicials, said that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) would tell lawmakers Irom key committees that Israel hit a nuclear site, possibly a
reactor, being constructed with North Korean help.
The news comes at a particularly sensitive time Ior the six-country talks aimed at stripping North Korea
oI its nuclear programs, months aIter Pyongyang was supposed to have Iormally "declared" the extent
oI its nuclear and proliIeration activities.
The Wall Street Journal said the CIA was expected to conIirm that Pyongyang was helping Damascus
build a reactor like North Korea's Yongbyon site, and that North Korean workers were at the Syrian
site at the time oI the Israeli attack.
It was unclear to what degree the brieIings will include evidence that Syria sought nuclear weapons, the
anonymous oIIicial told the daily.
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/04/23/syria.nuclear/
Source: Intel shows N. Korea-Syria nuclear link
From Barbara Starr
CNN Pentagon Correspondent
updated 46 minutes ago [Accessed 2008-04-23T21:45Z]
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- U.S. intelligence oIIicials will tell members oI Congress on Thursday that
North Korea was helping Syria build a nuclear Iacility, according to a source Iamiliar with internal
administration discussions.
The Iacility in question was bombed by Israeli planes in September.
The United States and Israel have reIused to comment on what the target oI the strike was.
Some members oI Congress have demanded to know what inIormation the administration has about the
incident.
Thursday's brieIings to intelligence, Ioreign relations and armed services committees in both chambers
oI Congress are intended to show that the building hit was a North Korean-designed reactor being built
with assistance Irom Pyongyang, the source said.
It is less clear whether North Korea had provided or was about to provide essential Iuel components to
Syria, according to the source.
The brieIings could complicate the six-party talks at which the United States and other major world
powers are trying to get North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang has resisted
disclosing its proliIeration activities.
The United States has soItened its demand that North Korea publicly admit to having a program to
develop highly enriched uranium and to having provided Syria with nuclear technology, key questions
that have leIt the negotiations stalled Ior months.
OIIicials said the United States concluded that it is more important to get a handle on the program than
to have North Korea "conIess" past nuclear sins.
The original agreement in the six-party talks did not deal with proliIeration, but Secretary oI State
Condoleezza Rice said last week that it was important to do so "in light oI some recent concerns about
North Korean activities in proliIeration."
"Syria is most certainly an issue in proliIeration," she said, adding, "We have several nonproliIeration
questions on the table about North Korea."
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, "The negotiations on the six-party talks and all
the actions the parties take will be judged on their own merits."
He added that President Bush and Rice would make decisions based on Washington's "compelling
interest" to rid North Korea oI its nuclear program.
The State Department and the Pentagon have said they are not involved in Thursday's congressional
brieIings. A White House spokeswoman declined to comment.
In the initial days aIter the attack on the Syrian Iacility, Iewer than two dozen people in the U.S.
government were brieIed on the intelligence surrounding the strike, and all were ordered to keep the
inIormation secret, according to a Pentagon oIIicial who asked not to be named.
The brieIing notice to House members describes Thursday aIternoon's topic as regarding the Middle
East, a congressional source said.
The brieIing might include video shot inside the Syrian Iacility beIore it was bombed, although a Iinal
decision about whether to show the video has not been made. It is believed that the video was shot by
Israeli intelligence or a mole Ior the Israelis, the source close to the administration said.
A media brieIing is also being considered, but some in the administration and Israel are concerned
about provoking Syria with the disclosure.
But when DeIense Secretary Robert Gates was asked Wednesday when the American public would be
told about allegations oI North Korea's nuclear assistance to Syria, he replied: "Soon."
Israel bombed the Iacility September 6, 2007, and satellite images show that little was leIt oI it.
Since the strike, questions have arisen as to why the Israelis took the action and whether the United
States supported the mission.
Syrian oIIicials said the bombing was an Israeli raid on a building they described as an empty military
warehouse.
The International Atomic Energy Agency said in October that the agency had "no inIormation about
any undeclared nuclear Iacility in Syria and no inIormation about ... reports" regarding an alleged
Iacility.
A satellite photograph oI the area taken in January seemed to indicate new construction on the site
where the Iacility once stood. E-mail to a Iriend E-mail to a Iriend
CNN's Elise Labott, Deirdre Walsh, Pam Benson, Jamie McIntyre and Adam Levine contributed to this
report
http://www.deIenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid4216
Presenter: Secretary oI DeIense Robert M. Gates
April 23, 2008
DoD News BrieIing with Secretary Gates Irom the Pentagon
[EXCERPT]
Q Mr. Secretary, this week key members oI Congress are being brieIed on what U.S. intelligence
knows about North Korea's providing oI nuclear-technical expertise to Syria. When, iI ever, will it be
appropriate Ior the American public to be told about what the U.S. believes was going on there?
SEC. GATES: Soon.
Q And can you say anything about it?
SEC. GATES: I think "soon" will do the job.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/print/20080423-4.html
April 23, 2008
12:45 P.M. EDT
|EXCERPT|
Q Secretary Gates was asked today when the American public would be told about North Korea's
nuclear assistance to Syria, and he said, "soon." Can you tell us what the administration has in mind
and how you're going to roll it out?
MS. PERINO: No, I think Secretary Gates said it well. "Soon" is a good, short answer. We are going to
be -- continuing to talk to members oI Congress. That action will be happening soon, and as soon as we
have more Irom there --
Q That will, or won't?
MS. PERINO: Will.
Q Has it started yet?
MS. PERINO: Well, let me decline to comment until they decide to talk to members oI Congress more
-- in an additional Iashion, and then we can provide more. I'm not going to be able to say much on it
today, and I'm not conIirming anything at this brieIing in regards to the substance oI the question.
Q Well, he's the one who said, "soon."
MS. PERINO: And he was right. (Laughter.)
Q Okay, the next question is, how does this, whatever North Korea has been doing, how does it aIIect
the six-party talks?
MS. PERINO: I think that -- let's let the action oI "soon" happen and then we'll be able to talk more
Iully about it.
Roger.
Q Can you just shed a little light on why you can't talk about it, or at least --
MS. PERINO: No. You know that we've been asked questions about this since last Iall. We have
declined to comment, and I'm not able to do so at this time.
Q Is it because oI the brieIing tomorrow on the Hill, and are you just waiting until that --
MS. PERINO: It's not appropriate Ior me at this point, at this moment, to talk about it Irom here, and so
I'll decline to do so until I'm allowed to.
Q Does it raise -- whatever it is -- (laughter) -- does it raise U.S. concerns even more about North
Korea and Syria?
MS. PERINO: I'd love to be able to answer your question, but iI I did, then it would answer the other
questions that I've already said I can't answer. And so let's just -- iI you guys can just be a little bit
patient and let some conversations happen on the Hill, then we'll be able to talk about it more at that
time.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/23/AR2008042302906.html?hpidtopnews
Videotape Shows Secret Syrian Site Modeled After N. Korean Reactor
By Robin Wright
Wednesday, April 23, 2008; 6:02 PM
A videotape taken inside a secret Syrian Iacility last summer convinced both the Israeli government
and the Bush administration that it was modeled aIter a North Korean reactor that produced plutonium
Ior nuclear weapons, according to senior U.S. oIIicials who said it would be shared with lawmakers
tomorrow.
The videotape oI the interior oI the site, code named Al Kibar by the Syrians, also showed North
Koreans working inside the Iacility, the oIIicials said. It played a pivotal role in Israel's decision to
bomb the Iacility last September, a move that was publicly denounced by Syria but not by Washington.
Sources Iamiliar with its contents say the video shows the design oI the Syrian reactor core is the same
as the North Korean reactor at Yongbyong, including a virtually identical physical conIiguration and
number oI holes Ior the Iuel rods. It shows "remarkable resemblances inside and out to Yongbyon,"
said a U.S. intelligence oIIicial. A nuclear weapons specialist called the video "very, very damning."
Nuclear weapons analysts and U.S. oIIicials predicted that the planned disclosures to Capitol Hill by
CIA director Michael V. Hayden could seriously complicate Washington's accelerating eIIort to
improve relations with North Korea as a way to halt that country's nuclear weapons program. They
come as diIIerent Iactions inside the administration have been battling over the merits oI striking a
nuclear-related deal with North Korea.
Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustapha today angrily denounced the U.S. and Israeli claims. "II they
show a video, remember that the U.S. went to the UN Security Council and displayed evidence and
images about weapons oI mass destruction in Iraq. I hope the American people will not be as gullible
this time around," he said.
U.S. oIIicials said that Israel shared the video with the United States beIore the bombing on Sept. 6,
aIter Bush administration oIIicials expressed skepticism last spring that the site, visible by satellite
since 2001, was a nuclear reactor built with North Korea's assistance.
But intelligence oIIicials will tell members oI the House and Senate intelligence and Ioreign relations
committees that the Syrian Iacility was not yet Iully operational and that there was no plutonium Ior the
reactor and no indication oI a Iuel capability, according to U.S. oIIicials and intelligence sources.
David Albright, president oI Institute Ior Science and International Security and a Iormer U.N.
weapons inspector, said the absence oI such evidence warrants skepticism that the reactor was part oI
an active weapons program. "The United States and Israel have not identiIied any Syrian plutonium
separation Iacilities or nuclear weaponization Iacilities. The lack oI any such Iacilities gives little
conIidence that the reactor is part oI an active nuclear weapons program. The apparent lack oI Iuel,
either imported or indigenously produced, also is curious and lowers conIidence that Syria has a
nuclear weapons program," Albright said.
U.S. intelligence oIIicials will also tell the congressional committees that the new site Syria has rebuilt
at Al Kibar is not Ior a reactor. "The successIul engagement oI North Korea in the Six Party Talks
means that it was unlikely to have supplied Syria with such Iacilities or nuclear materials aIter the
reactor site was destroyed," Albright said. "Indeed, there is little iI any evidence that cooperation
between Syria and North Korea extended beyond the date oI the destruction oI the reactor."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/23/AR2008042302906.html?hpidtopnews
N. Koreans Taped At Syrian Reactor
Video Played a Role in Israeli Raid
By Robin Wright
Thursday, April 24, 2008; A01
A video taken inside a secret Syrian Iacility last summer convinced the Israeli government and the
Bush administration that North Korea was helping to construct a reactor similar to one that produces
plutonium Ior North Korea's nuclear arsenal, according to senior U.S. oIIicials who said it would be
shared with lawmakers today.
The oIIicials said the video oI the remote site, code-named Al Kibar by the Syrians, shows North
Koreans inside. It played a pivotal role in Israel's decision to bomb the Iacility late at night last Sept. 6,
a move that was publicly denounced by Damascus but not by Washington.
Sources Iamiliar with the video say it also shows that the Syrian reactor core's design is the same as
that oI the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, including a virtually identical conIiguration and number
oI holes Ior Iuel rods. It shows "remarkable resemblances inside and out to Yongbyon," a U.S.
intelligence oIIicial said. A nuclear weapons specialist called the video "very, very damning."
Nuclear weapons analysts and U.S. oIIicials predicted that CIA Director Michael V. Hayden's planned
disclosures to Capitol Hill could complicate U.S. eIIorts to improve relations with North Korea as a
way to stop its nuclear weapons program. They come as Iactions inside the administration and in
Congress have been battling over the merits oI a nuclear-related deal with North Korea.
Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustapha yesterday angrily denounced the U.S. and Israeli assertions. "II
they show a video, remember that the U.S. went to the U.N. Security Council and displayed evidence
and images about weapons oI mass destruction in Iraq. I hope the American people will not be as
gullible this time around," he said.
U.S. oIIicials said that Israel shared the video with the United States beIore the Sept. 6 bombing, aIter
Bush administration oIIicials expressed skepticism last spring that the Iacility, visible by satellite since
2001, was a nuclear reactor built with North Korea's assistance. Israel has a nuclear weapons arsenal
that it has never declared.
But beginning today, intelligence oIIicials will tell members oI the House and Senate intelligence,
armed services and Ioreign relations committees that the Syrian Iacility was not yet Iully operational
and that there was no uranium Ior the reactor and no indication oI Iuel capability, according to U.S.
oIIicials and intelligence sources.
David Albright, president oI Institute Ior Science and International Security (ISIS) and a Iormer U.N.
weapons inspector, said the absence oI such evidence warrants skepticism that the reactor was part oI
an active weapons program.
"The United States and Israel have not identiIied any Syrian plutonium separation Iacilities or nuclear
weaponization Iacilities," he said. "The lack oI any such Iacilities gives little conIidence that the reactor
is part oI an active nuclear weapons program. The apparent lack oI Iuel, either imported or
indigenously produced, also is curious and lowers conIidence that Syria has a nuclear weapons
program."
U.S. intelligence oIIicials will also tell the lawmakers that Syria is not rebuilding a reactor at the Al
Kibar site. "The successIul engagement oI North Korea in the six-party talks means that it was unlikely
to have supplied Syria with such Iacilities or nuclear materials aIter the reactor site was destroyed,"
Albright said. "Indeed, there is little, iI any, evidence that cooperation between Syria and North Korea
extended beyond the date oI the destruction oI the reactor."
The timing oI the congressional brieIing is nonetheless awkward Ior the Bush administration's
diplomatic initiative to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and permanently disable
the reactor at Yongbyon. The CIA's hand was Iorced, oIIicials said, because inIluential lawmakers had
threatened to cut oII Iunding Ior the U.S. diplomatic eIIort unless they received a Iull account oI what
the administration knew.
Also, the terms oI a tentative U.S.-North Korean deal require that North Korean oIIicials acknowledge
U.S. evidence about its help with the Syrian program, and so the disclosures to Congress are meant to
preempt what North Korea may eventually say.
Following talks with the South Korean president last weekend, President Bush said that it was
premature to make a judgment about whether North Korea was willing to Iollow through with a
commitment to publicly declare its nuclear-related programs, materials and Iacilities.
Washington and Pyongyang still diIIer over what should be included in that declaration, a State
Department oIIicial said. Sung Kim, the State Department director oI the OIIice oI Korean AIIairs, is in
Pyongyang Ior discussions about the contents.
Syria's top envoy to Washington said the CIA brieIings were meant to undermine diplomatic eIIorts
with North Korea, not to conIront Syria. Why, Moustapha said, are "they repeating the same lies and
Iabrications when they were planning to attack Iraq? The reason is simple: It's about North Korea, not
Syria. The neoconservative elements are having the upper hand."
He added, "We do not want to plan to acquire nuclear technology as we understand the reality oI this
world and have seen what the U.S. did to Iraq even when it did not have a nuclear program. So we are
not going to give them a pretext to attack Syria."
BeIore the site was bombed, the Iacility included a tall, boxy structure like those used to house gas-
graphite reactors and was located seven miles north oI the desert village oI At Tibnah in the Dayr az
Zawr region, 90 miles Irom the Iraqi border, according to photographs released by the ISIS, a nonproIit
research group.
The White House and the CIA declined to comment on the brieIings.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/world/asia/24korea.html?hp
U.S. Sees N. Korean Links to Reactor
By DAVID E. SANGER
April 24, 2008
WASHINGTON AIter seven months oI near-total secrecy, the White House is preparing to make
public on Thursday video evidence oI North Koreans working at a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor just
beIore it was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike last September.
Until now, the administration has reIused to discuss the video or the attack, other than in a highly
classiIied brieIing Ior a Iew allies and crucial members oI Congress.
But senior oIIicials in Israel and the United States have said the target was a nascent nuclear reactor
that had been under construction Ior years. Israeli and American analysts had concluded that it was
loosely modeled on the reactor North Korea used to obtain the Iuel Ior its small nuclear weapons
arsenal.
Israeli jets destroyed the site on Sept. 6, and the Syrians, aIter issuing some protests, bulldozed the area
and constructed a building on the exact Iootprint oI the old one. They have reIused to allow
international nuclear inspectors to visit the location.
The timing oI the administrations decision to declassiIy inIormation about the Syrian project has
raised widespread suspicions, especially in the State Department, that Vice President Dick Cheney and
other administration hawks were hoping that releasing the inIormation might undermine a potential
deal with North Korea that would take it oII an American list oI state sponsors oI terrorism.
Making public the pictures is likely to inIlame the North Koreans, said one senior administration
oIIicial who would not speak on the record because the White House and the State Department have
declared there would be no public comment until the evidence is released. And thats just what
opponents oI this whole arrangement want, because they think the North Koreans will stalk oII.
But another senior oIIicial said it was possible that the revelations would Iorce the North Koreans to
describe their actions in Syria more Iully when they issued a long delayed declaration oI their nuclear
activities.
That proposed deal, negotiated by Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary oI state Ior East Asian
and PaciIic aIIairs and the primary interlocutor with North Korea, has become the latest battleground in
a seven-year struggle within the Bush administration over North Korea policy.
That policy has veered Irom eIIorts to squeeze North Korea in hopes that the government oI Kim Jong-
il will collapse, to negotiating with the country alongside Russia, China, South Korea and Japan, each
oI which has pursued a somewhat diIIerent approach toward the North.
Mr. Hill was put in charge oI the talks more than three years ago in the hope oI Iinding a new way to
deal with the North Koreans. But support Ior him has wavered, and President Bush has repeatedly
warned aides not to agree to anything that makes me look weak, according to Iormer oIIicials who
sat in on meetings with him on North Korea.
Mr. Cheneys oIIice and other conservatives have argued that Mr. Hills proposed deal would amount
to a huge concession. In return Ior a minimal declaration Irom North Korea an accounting oI how
much plutonium it has produced it would be removed Irom the terrorism list and would no longer be
subject to economic sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act.
North Korea has reIused to say what, exactly, it provided to the Syrians, or what happened to an eIIort
to start a second pathway to building arms, using uranium.
The deal would allow the North to continue to Iudge on those matters, leaving unexplained the question
oI why it appeared to be buying uranium enrichment equipment Irom Pakistan. That equipment, many
experts believe, was intended to help North Korea build a second path to a bomb, in case it was Iorced
to give up its plutonium program.
In a presentation on Thursday to crucial members oI Congress, and then in a presentation to reporters,
American intelligence oIIicials are expected to show images Irom a video, believed to have been
obtained through Israeli intelligence services. The video, which Mr. Hill has shown to senior South
Korean oIIicials, shows Korean Iaces among the workers at the Syrian plant.
Other pictures, oIIicials say, show what appears to be the construction oI a reactor vessel inside the
building that Israel later destroyed. It is unclear what the administration is willing to release. Syrias
ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, did not answer messages leIt Ior him on
Wednesday.
For weeks aIter the Israeli attack in September, neither Israeli nor American oIIicials would talk about
the attack, Israels Iirst on a nuclear site since the 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.
When The New York Times published a lengthy account oI the Syria attack on Oct. 14, revealing that
Israeli and American analysts judged that the target was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, Mr. Bush
and the White House reIused to answer questions about it. Later, oIIicials said they Ieared that the
Syrians would retaliate against Israel iI they Ielt publicly humiliated.
It is not clear what has changed, apart Irom the politics oI the moment. Mr. Hills boss, Secretary oI
State Condoleezza Rice, has not voiced strong support Ior Mr. Hills eIIort to coax the North Koreans
along, granting them rewards Ior steps along the way to compliance with a deal that calls, ultimately,
Ior the country to give up its weapons.
Ms. Rice has been a strong critic oI the 1994 agreement between North Korea and the Clinton
administration, complaining that it was Iront loaded with rewards Ior the North.
That is exactly what critics say she and Mr. Hill have done in the most recent agreement. But Mr. Hill
has argued in private that the Syrian episode and the uranium enrichment are side shows, and that the
critical issue is stopping North Korea Irom producing more plutonium and giving up what it has. But
his State Department colleagues say that he has been told not to deIend the deal, or even explain it.
Hes Ieeling pretty abandoned by Rice and Bush, one oI his colleagues said Wednesday. Mr. Hill did
not respond to messages.
Syria's nuke facility was nearly completed when Israel bombed it
By Nicholas Kralev and Sara A. Carter
April 24, 2008
The Bush administration is set to tell Congress today that a nuclear Iacility in Syria built with North
Korean help was nearly complete when Israel bombed it in September, but that Pyongyang has not
provided any Iurther nuclear assistance to the hard-line Arab nation, at least at that site, U.S. oIIicials
said.
CIA Director Michael V. Hayden and other intelligence oIIicials are expected to brieI several
congressional committees in closed-door sessions, breaking the administration's silence on the issue.
The Iacility has become a major issue in six-nation negotiations to end the North's nuclear programs.
"The belieI is that the reactor was nearing completion," said one oIIicial Iamiliar with the content oI the
brieIings. "It would have been able to produce plutonium."
According to wire services, another U.S. oIIicial said the intelligence that will be presented to
lawmakers would include "some pretty compelling beIore and aIter |aerial| pictures oI the site."
The presentation is expected to include still photographs taken Irom videotape recorded inside the
Syrian Iacility, the oIIicial said, adding that the intelligence is expected to show that Syria was building
a nuclear reactor complex much like the North Korean nuclear reactor complex at Yongbyon.
The Yongbyon reactor has been almost disabled by U.S. specialists. Both programs were based on
technology to produce plutonium a man-made element used to make the Iissile core oI atomic
bombs.
Administration and congressional oIIicials spoke about the Syrian Iacility in the past tense. One oIIicial
said it was "good that it was put out oI commission," and others added that the Israeli air strike
occurred beIore Iuel "had been placed in the reactor."
Satellite photos taken beIore the Israeli strike show a large cubical building thought to have housed the
reactor. The building is absent Irom photos taken aIterward.
DeIense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the administration will be able to discuss the issue publicly
"soon," but the oIIicial spokesmen Ior the main national security agencies reIused to comment on the
matter and only oIIered general statements.
"We have certain responsibilities to brieI the Congress on matters oI Ioreign policy and national
security, in this case, intelligence matters," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told
reporters.
U.N. oIIicials said the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could not conIirm the
administration's conclusions because Syria reIused access to the site in question, and the IAEA
authorities needed to take ground samples and conduct interviews.
The chieI U.S. negotiator with North Korea, Christopher R. Hill, has said that Pyongyang insists it is
not currently engaged in proliIeration activities and will not be in the Iuture.
Asked yesterday whether the North has assisted Syria's nuclear program since the Sept. 6 bombing,
oIIicials said, "Not at that site." They declined to elaborate.
The oIIicials, all oI whom spoke on the condition oI anonymity because oI the sensitivity oI the matter,
said they based their conclusions on "very good intelligence derived Irom a variety oI sources." They
added that the Israeli government was inIormed about the congressional brieIings.
However, Yuval Steinitz, a member oI the Israeli Knesset's Foreign AIIairs and DeIense Committee,
said that no such inIormation had been provided to legislators.
"This is inconsistent with the standard procedure," he said. "I'm upset with our government. It is not
healthy that such a brieIing is taking place in another parliament, even iI it is a Iriendly parliament like
the U.S. Congress."
Administration oIIicials and outside analysts said that aIter today's brieIings, members oI Congress are
likely to ask what North Korea's behavior means Ior the Iuture oI the six-party talks. Even though they
disagreed on the answer to that question, they all deplored the North's assistance to Syria.
"It's a very outrageous step, but what do you do now? Throw away the whole process? That's a
conundrum," a Iormer administration oIIicial said.
Another Iormer oIIicial, John R. Bolton, who was undersecretary oI state Ior arms control and
international security during President Bush's Iirst term, said: "North Korea is outsourcing its nuclear
weapons program. And iI you want to hide your activities Irom inspectors in North Korea, what better
place than in Syria?"
The United States has insisted that North Korea disclose any nuclear assistance it has provided to Syria,
as well as other countries, in a declaration that was due Dec. 31 as part oI a deal reached in the six-
party talks last year.
Pyongyang, however, has reIused to do so, and the administration has looked Ior "creative" ways to
help both countries save Iace but move the process Iorward, so that Yongbyon's dismantling can at
least begin beIore Mr. Bush leaves oIIice in January.
Joshua Mitnick contributed to this report Irom Tel Aviv and Betsy Pisik Irom New York.
April 24, 2008
Statement by the Press Secretary
Today, administration oIIicials have brieIed select Congressional committees on an issue oI great
international concern. Until Sept. 6, 2007, the Syrian regime was building a covert nuclear reactor in its
eastern desert capable oI producing plutonium. We are convinced, based on a variety oI inIormation,
that North Korea assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities. We have good reason to believe that reactor,
which was damaged beyond repair on Sept. 6 oI last year, was not intended Ior peaceIul purposes.
CareIully hidden Irom view, the reactor was not conIigured Ior such purposes. In deIiance oI its
international obligations, Syria did not inIorm the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oI the
construction oI the reactor, and, aIter it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury evidence oI
its existence. This cover-up only served to reinIorce our conIidence that this reactor was not intended
Ior peaceIul activities.
We are brieIing the IAEA on this intelligence. The Syrian regime must come clean beIore the world
regarding its illicit nuclear activities. The Syrian regime supports terrorism, takes action that
destabilizes Lebanon, allows the transit oI some Ioreign Iighters into Iraq, and represses its own people.
II Syria wants better relations with the international community, it should put an end to these activities.
We have long been seriously concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its
proliIeration activities. North Korea's clandestine nuclear cooperation with Syria is a dangerous
maniIestation oI those activities. One way we have chosen to deal with this problem is through the Six
Party Framework. Through this process we are working with our partners to achieve the veriIiable
denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula. The United States is also committed to ensuring that North
Korea does not Iurther engage in proliIeration activities. We will work with our partners to establish in
the Six Party Framework a rigorous veriIication mechanism to ensure that such conduct and other
nuclear activities have ceased.
The construction oI this reactor was a dangerous and potentially destabilizing development Ior the
region and the world. This is particularly true because it was done covertly and in violation oI the very
procedures designed to reassure the world oI the peaceIul intent oI nuclear activities. This development
also serves as a reminder that oIten the same regimes that sponsor proliIeration also sponsor terrorism
and Ioster instability, and cooperate with one another in doing so. This underscores that the
international community is right to be very concerned about the nuclear activities oI Iran and the risks
those activities pose to the stability oI the Middle East. To conIront this challenge, the international
community must take Iurther steps, beginning with the Iull implementation oI the United Nations
Security Council resolutions dealing with Iranian nuclear activities. The United States calls upon the
international community to redouble our common eIIorts to ending these activities and preventing the
spread oI weapons oI mass destruction in this critical region.
April 24, 2008
12:40 P.M. EDT
MS. PERINO: Hello, everyone. I don't have anything to start with, so we'll go straight to questions.
Q Does the inIormation that's being released today about North Korea and Syria help or hurt the
administration's argument that North Korea is going to Iully disclose its nuclear activities?
MS. PERINO: As I said this morning, there are many things I'm not going to be able to comment on in
today's brieIing, which I know is very Irustrating, not just Ior you but Ior me, too.
Q I'm not talking about the inIormation itselI, but I'm talking about --
MS. PERINO: But commenting on -- by answering that question I would be also answering the
previous question. There are Hill brieIings that are ongoing right now. Out oI respect Ior that process,
and Ior the members oI Congress to be able to hear this Irom administration oIIicials Iirst, I'm going to
deIer to answer speciIic questions on that until they have a chance. But I would reIer you back to what
the President said on -- just last Saturday at Camp David in regards to the North Koreans and the six-
party talks and North Korea's declaration.
Q When did President Bush see the videotape oI what happened in Syria?
MS. PERINO: Again, I'm going to decline to comment on speciIics oI whatever is being said to Capitol
Hill right now and what other people -- what you all might see later today.
Q Was it shown to the South Korean President?
MS. PERINO: I'm not commenting on it. You can chase me around the podium -- (laughter.)
Q One more general question, though. The administration got it wrong on Iraq and weapons oI mass
destruction. Why should this new inIormation, whatever it is, be believed?
MS. PERINO: Again, Mark, I am going to -- I understand the question. I appreciate that you'd like Ior
me to be able to answer it. I am not going to be able to answer these questions. I'm going to let the
senior administration oIIicials and intelligence oIIicials talk to Capitol Hill. Last Iall we did brieI 22
members oI Congress, House and Senate members, consistent with our obligations. More members are
being brieIed today and I'm going to let that process take place.
Q Dana, on that point, because you brought up the lawmakers, two oI them who were brieIed today
who were among those who were brieIed back in the Iall came out -- Chairman Reyes and Ranking
Republican Hoekstra -- and they were livid, I think to say the least. And what Hoekstra said -- and I'm
quoting him -- he says, "We were used." The administration -- he said, we were told -- "We were used
today by the administration, not because they Ielt they had to inIorm Congress because it was their
legal obligation to do that, but because they had other agendas in mind." He says, any bond oI trust
between the administration and Congress has been shattered. And he says it will now be very diIIicult
to get any agreements, in particular, anything based on the six-party talks through Congress. What do
you say to that?
MS. PERINO: Obviously we would be very disappointed that he Ieels that way and would hope he
understands our tremendous respect Ior members oI Congress. And as I said, back in the Iall we brieIed
22 members oI Congress, consistent with our obligations. He was one oI them. There are tensions that
exist between the executive branches and the legislative branches on a range oI issues in regards to who
should know what when. But we will continue to work with Representative Hoekstra and continue to
talk with him. And he was part oI the brieIings this morning, and again, I'm not going to comment on
anything until those brieIings can be completed today.
Q He says he just doesn't Ieel that then, in September, eight months ago, that they got any kind oI
decent explanation as to why the other members oI the committee shouldn't have been brieIed. They
asked Ior them to be brieIed. And he said, I don't -- still don't believe we've gotten a good explanation
then today Ior this delay. Why now?
MS. PERINO: Again, I will decline to comment. There will be more inIormation that will hopeIully
answer more oI these questions later today. It could be that once senior administration oIIicials talk
with Representative Hoekstra that he still won't be satisIied, and we'll have to satisIy that he got an
answer that he believes is satisIactory. We'll have to accept that -- that's his opinion. But we certainly
have tried to work with him and the Democrats across the board, and consistent with our obligations,
brieIed the appropriate members oI Congress last Iall.
Q Syria is saying that this is an attempt -- all it is is an attempt to put pressure on North Korea. Is the
United States at this point trying to increase pressure on North Korea to comply with its nuclear
declaration?
MS. PERINO: Our pressure on North Korea has been ongoing through the six-party talks, and you just
heard Irom the President on Saturday about that. I think that by the end oI the day, I think a lot oI these
questions will be answered Ior you. I'm not able to go into details here.
Bret.
Q Will one oI those questions later today be why this inIormation came out? Will we Iind that out later
today?
MS. PERINO: I believe that you will be given more inIormation about that later today and that -- again,
will it satisIy everybody? I don't know. But let's let the brieIings take place and then we can go Irom
there.
Q What Iorm will the inIormation be put out later here? Is there a statement by the White House?
MS. PERINO: As I said this morning, I am working to get something that could come out Irom me as
soon as possible. I'm having to be respectIul oI the congressional brieIing schedule that is ongoing
today, and I'm trying to push the system a little bit Ior not only our interest to make sure that we inIorm
the American public, but Ior yours so that you get -- don't get jammed on the back-end oI your day. I'm
aware oI deadlines and hope that we can meet them.
Q Are there other agency brieIings, backgrounders or otherwise -
MS. PERINO: I'd just reIer you to the intelligence community Ior that.
Q But you will be having a statement later today, but maybe not beIore 5:00 p.m., 6:00 p.m.?
MS. PERINO: I hesitate to put a time on it. I'm pushing as hard as I can. It probably will not be as early
as I would like.
Q Is it tied to the conclusion oI the brieIings on the Hill?
MS. PERINO: I'm trying to work on that and trying to push the system a little bit. I'm not sure iI I'll be
successIul.
Q Dana, just to be clear, Hoekstra did already get his brieIing and he wasn't satisIied. So will you be
reaching out again to him?
MS. PERINO: OI course, we'll just have to -- our senior oIIicials and our staII talk with him and his
staII on a regular basis.
Q Dana, in October the President said that any such proliIeration activities would be a grave threat to
the United States and that North Korea would Iace serious consequences. Does he stand by those
statements?
MS. PERINO: Yes.
Q What should the consequences be then?
MS. PERINO: Well, let's let the brieIings take place and the declaration take place, and we will move
on Irom there.
Q And what's the international component to this? Have you talked to the other -- do the other six-party
-- or Iour parties know the inIormation that's being provided to Congress today?
MS. PERINO: This will not come as a surprise to any members oI the six-party talks.
Q Okay. And I understand that the United States reached out to the IAEA today. Do you want
inspectors to go into Syria to make sure that they're satisIied -- make sure that Syria is in compliance
with the NPT?
MS. PERINO: I don't know who reached out, iI they did. So I'm not aware oI that. I don't know who it
would have been. But I think when I have my statement today that you'll have later this aIternoon, that
that question will be at least partially answered.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080425/apongoprwh/nkoreasyria
White House says Syria 'must come clean' about nuclear work
By PAMELA HESS, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - The White House said Thursday that North Korea's secret work on a nuclear reactor
with Syria was "a dangerous and potentially destabilizing development Ior the world," raising doubts
about Pyongyang's intention to carry through with a promised disclosure oI its nuclear activities.
Seven months aIter Israel bombed the reactor, the White House broke its silence and said North Korea
assisted Syria's secret nuclear program and that the destroyed Iacility was not intended Ior "peaceIul
purposes."
Top U.S. intelligence oIIicials who brieIed reporters said they had high conIidence in the judgment that
North Korea had aided Syria with its nuclear program and the intention was to produce plutonium. But
they claimed only low conIidence Ior the conclusion that it was meant Ior weapons development, in
part because there was no reprocessing Iacility at the site something that would be needed to enrich
nuclear material Ior use in a bomb.
The Bush administration's assertions could undermine six-party negotiations to try to resolve the
nuclear standoII with North Korea. But a senior administration oIIicial told reporters he hoped the
disclosure would instead provide leverage to oIIicials trying to get an accurate accounting oI North
Korea's nuclear and proliIeration activities.
The White House issued a two-page statement aIter lawmakers were given details about the reactor in a
series oI brieIings on Capitol Hill that included a video presentation oI intelligence inIormation the
administration contends establishes a strong link between North Korea's nuclear program and the
bombed Syrian site. The brieIing also included still photographs that showed a strong resemblance
between speciIic Ieatures oI the plant and one near Yongbyon in North Korea.
Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., chairman oI the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the revelations
make it clear that any deal to eliminate North Korea's nuclear programs must also stop its proliIeration
activities and include vigorous veriIication. But he said the inIormation in the brieIings was not a cause
to end the talks.
"To the contrary, it underscores the need Ior pursuing the talks, which remain our best chance to
convince North Korea to abandon its pursuit oI nuclear weapons and to stop proliIeration," Biden said.
The White House said the International Atomic Energy Agency also was being brieIed on the
intelligence.
While calling North Korea's nuclear assistance to Syria a "dangerous maniIestation" oI Pyongyang's
nuclear weapons program and its proliIeration activities, the White House said it remained committed
to the talks.
The United States became aware North Korea was helping Syria with a nuclear project in 2003, said
intelligence oIIicials who spoke on condition oI anonymity because oI the matter's sensitivity. The
critical intelligence that cemented that conclusion, they said, came last year: dozens oI photographs
taken Irom ground level over a period oI time, showing the construction both inside and outside the
building.
The Israeli strike on Sept. 6, 2007, ripped open the structure, known as the Al Kibar reactor, and
revealed even more evidence to spy satellites: reinIorced concrete walls that echoed the design oI the
Yongbyon reactor.
AIter the attack, Syria tried to bury evidence oI its existence and erected a new building to hide the site.
The building is not believed to house a new reactor, the oIIicials said.
"This coverup only served to reinIorce our conIidence that this reactor was not intended Ior peaceIul
activities," White House press secretary Dana Perino said. "The Syrian regime must come clean beIore
the world regarding its illicit nuclear activities."
The Syrian reactor was within weeks or months oI being Iunctional when Israeli jets destroyed it, a top
U.S. oIIicial told The Associated Press, speaking on condition oI anonymity because oI the sensitivity
oI the matter. The oIIicial said the Iacility was mostly completed but still needed Iueling and signiIicant
testing beIore it could be declared operational.
"We had to assume they could throw the switch at any time," a senior intelligence oIIicial said.
No uranium, which is needed to Iuel a reactor, was evident at the site, a remote area oI eastern Syria
along the Euphrates River. But senior U.S. intelligence oIIicials said the reactor was similar in design
to the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, which has in the past produced small amounts oI plutonium,
the material needed to make powerIul nuclear weapons.
A senior intelligence oIIicial said the intelligence agencies believe North Korea was motivated by
"cash" rather than a desire to obtain plutonium Irom the reactor.
Syria has maintained in the past that the site was an unused military Iacility, and on Thursday, its
embassy denounced what it called the U.S. "campaign oI Ialse allegations." It accused the
administration oI trying to mislead Congress and world opinion "in order to justiIy the Israeli raid in
September oI 2007, which the current U.S. administration may have helped execute."
Senior U.S. oIIicials said the U.S. military was not involved in the attack, and the U.S. government,
although inIormed in advance, did not approve it.
"Israel made the decision to attack," a senior administration oIIicial said. "It did so without any so-
called green light Irom us. None was asked Ior and none was given."
"It has become obvious that this maneuver on the part oI this administration comes within the
Iramework oI the North Korean nuclear negotiations," the Syrian statement said.
And in an apparent reIerence to prewar claims by the Bush administration that Iraq had possessed
weapons oI mass destruction, the statement concluded: "The Syrian government hopes that the
international community and the American public, particularly, will be more cautious and aware this
time around in Iacing such unIounded allegations."
Top members oI the House Intelligence Committee who were brieIed on the reactor said it posed a
serious threat oI spreading dangerous nuclear materials.
"This is a serious proliIeration issue, both Ior the Middle East and the countries that may be involved in
Asia," said Rep. Pete Hoekstra, R-Mich.
Hoekstra and Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, told reporters aIter the
closed brieIing that they were angry that the Bush administration had delayed inIorming the Iull
committee Ior so long. That delay has created Iriction that may imperil congressional support Ior
Bush's policies toward North Korea and Syria, Hoekstra said.
The White House also used its statement as an opportunity to denounce the nuclear activities oI Iran,
which it says is a threat to the stability oI the Middle East. Perino said the international community
must take Iurther steps, beginning with Iull implementation oI U.N. Security Council resolutions.
While Washington was awash in condemnation oI North Korea's proliIeration activities, the communist
regime is expressing optimism about current six-party negotiations with the United States, China,
South Korea, Russia and Japan. The optimism over the talks is raising hopes oI breaking the impasse
that has deadlocked arms negotiations.
North Korea's Foreign Ministry said Thursday that it had discussed technical matters with the
Americans Ior moving Iorward on that and other agreements Irom the arms talks. "The negotiations
proceeded in a sincere and constructive manner and progress was made," the ministry said in a
statement.
As part oI that process, the North is required to submit a "declaration" detailing its programs and
proliIeration activity, but the talks are stalled over Pyongyang's reIusal to publicly admit the Syria
connection. However, oIIicials say the North Koreans are willing to accept international "concern"
about unspeciIied proliIeration.
Associated Press writers Deb Riechmann, Barry Schweid, Matthew Lee, Anne Flaherty, Edith Lederer
and Bassem Mroueh contributed to this report.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on
Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement
April 24, 2008
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Hello. My name is |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 1|. And I
have the start-oII role. It's been a pretty busy morning and aIternoon, as you might imagine. We've
been on the Hill having dialogue with our committees.
What I want to do is just Irame the issue. I read the press reporting coming out here. So I'm almost at
the point oI saying are there any questions. But just let me say that what we're going to discuss is a
nuclear reactor. It was constructed by the Syrians in the eastern desert oI Syria along the Euphrates
River on the east side. The Syrians constructed this reactor Ior the production oI plutonium with the
assistance oI the North Koreans.
Our evidence goes back an extended period oI time. We have had insights to what was going on since
very late '90s, early 2000, 2001 that something was happening. Our issue was pinning it down and
being more precise. We had increasing appreciation Ior what was happening in the 2003, 2006
timeIrame. But we still couldn't quite pin it down, as will become apparent to you when we show you
more oI the physical evidence that you'll see in just a moment.
In the spring oI last year, we were able to obtain some additional inIormation that made it conclusive.
And so, we engaged in this policy process oI now that we have the evidence, what do we do about it?
The evidence concluded a nuclear reactor, as I mentioned, constructed by the Syrians, started probably
in 2001, completed in the summer oI 2007. And it was nearing operational capability.
So Irom that point oI departure, I am joined by |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 2| who will provide details
on the intelligence and what we knew and so on. We will show you a video oI the evidence - so give
you a chance to ask questions about that. And then |a Senior Administration OIIicial|, seated to my
right will be available Ior responding to any policy questions you might have. So with that, I'll turn it
over to |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 2|.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: The Iormat I've got, I'll talk a bit; I've got some slides that
will show up behind me that shows some data. And then, we'll run the video. The video may overlap a
bit with some oI the inIormation I give verbally or on the slides. Given some oI this inIormation will be
your Iirst exposure to it, we just thought that was the best way oI doing it. And I think you're all aware
that the video presentation, I think everyone will get a copy.
As |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 1| said, inIormation we acquired since 2001 has indicated cooperation
between North Korean nuclear entities and high-level Syrian oIIicials. And we went to the 2001 data -
and I know this is true in you business - when you learn something, it doesn't just illuminate the Iuture;
it illuminates the past. And when we acquired inIormation in 2001 and then were able to look backward
on inIormation that had been collected but not quite understood, it's clear to us that this cooperation
between North Korean nuclear-related personalities and entities and high-level Syrian oIIicials began
probably as early as 1997, which - and now this is estimate now, all right, not court-oI-law evidence -
puts it into the HaIez al Assad regime in terms oI the original decision to begin this cooperation.
Now, as early as 2003, we judged that the interactions probably were nuclear-related, again, because oI
who it was we were seeing in these interactions. But we had no details on the nature or location oI the
cooperative projects. We assessed the cooperation involved work at sites probably within Syria. But
again, we didn't know exactly where. So we had this body oI evidence, kind oI - almost like a cloud oI,
boy, there's something going on here but we can't get a whole lot oI precision about it.
We received indications in '05 that the Syrians and North Koreans were involved in a project in the
Dayr az Zawr region oI eastern Syria, but again, no speciIic inIormation on the nature or the exact
location oI the work. But you can see, as evidence mounts, more conIident there is cooperation, more
conIident it involves nuclear-related people. And now, we've got a Iairly good sense as to where the
center point oI the cooperation might be.
Imagery searches oI the region revealed a large unidentiIied building under construction in a remote
area near the Euphrates River near a point that we call al Kibar. And there you see the photo. The Iirst
time we saw it was aIter this evidence - look out there - remember '05, '06 timeIrame - take a look
there. We identiIied the Iacility. And once again, sometimes the present illuminates not just the Iuture
but can illuminate the past. We looked back on historical imagery that Iound that the only high-quality
imagery we had was oI a building that looked pretty much like this. It was externally complete.
And it's hard to Iigure out looking at that building what its purpose is. And it certainly didn't have any
observable, externally observable characteristics that would say, oh, yeah, you got yourselI a nuclear
reactor here - things like a massive electrical-supply system, massive ventilation, and most importantly
a cooling system. We acquired inIormation, though, in the spring oI '07 that enabled us to conclude that
this non-descript-looking building in al Wadi, near the Euphrates River in eastern Syria was indeed a
covert nuclear reactor. The inIormation included photographs oI the interior and the exterior oI the
building located in Dayr az Zawr showing key Ieatures oI the reactor.
Now, we careIully compared these photos, which are obviously handheld - and we've got a certain
volume oI them measured in the dozens - these handheld photos with the overhead photos. And I'm
here to assure you that all the windows, doors, holes in the wall, and so on, matched up; i.e., these
handheld photos are oI that building we showed you in the overhead photo. And that's very important
because the handheld photos reveal construction activity at the site in a period oI time prior to the
external completion oI the building. Does that make sense?
Okay, good.
The reactor inside that building was clearly not conIigured to produce electricity. We saw no way and
there are no power lines coming out oI it, none oI all the switching Iacilities that you would need, and
Irankly was less well-suited Ior research - I mean, obviously, we're holding up hypotheses here, right -
less well-suited Ior research than some existing nuclear Iacilities that we and the Syrians know about
and have been made public in Syria.
Now, we assess that North Korea has assisted Syria with this reactor because, one, it uses North
Korean-type technology. The building resembles North Korea's Yongbyon plutonium power reactor.
That's Yongbyon on the leIt. That's that non-descript building in the eastern Syrian Desert beIore the
curtain walls and Ialse rooI were put on the top oI it to hide its shape, which, without those curtain
walls and Ialse rooIs seem to carry the telltale signatures similar to the Iacility at Yongbyon.
Internal photographs oI the reactor vessel under construction shows that it's a gas-cooled graphite-
moderated reactor similar in technology and conIiguration to the Yongbyon reactor. And you can see
that more clearly in this photo that compares the control rods and the reIueling tube arrangements oI
both reactors. That's internal imagery oI al Kibar on the leIt and Yongbyon on the right.
And just to hit a point I said earlier, you see the kind oI crawlspace back there? II you have access to
the wealth oI photographs that we had, you can work Irom the crawlspace to the wall to the windows to
the ventilation duct to the duct coming out the window, and now you're looking at the overhead
photography oI that window in the right place with the duct coming out oI it. See what I'm trying to
describe Ior you - that we are very conIident that that on the leIt is inside that building that we showed
you in the overhead imagery.
Our inIormation also indicates involvement oI nuclear-related North Koreans in a project somewhere in
the area. And we also have evidence oI cargo being transIerred Irom North Korea, most likely to this
reactor site in 2006. The reactor was destroyed in an Israeli air strike early in the morning oI 6
September 2007 as it was nearing completion but beIore it had been operated and beIore it was charged
with uranium Iuel.
Shortly aIter the attack, the Syrians began - this is mid-September now - a massive eIIort to destroy the
ruined reactor building and to remove all potentially incriminating nuclear-related equipment and
structures. Much oI the work was done at night or was hidden by tarps in an attempt to conceal it Irom
our overhead observation.
The Syrian eIIorts to dismantle and destroy the building revealed Ieatures oI the internal arrangements
and structure that corroborated what we saw beIore and were consistent with the ground photos that we
had obtained. II you understand what we're doing here, you have the building. There were real hard
reinIorced concrete things in there like the sarcophagus around the reactor and as you can see heat
exchanges and so on. The Israeli strike make it inoperable; Syrians decide, okay, we've got to take it
down. As you begin to blow it up, what remains the hard, reinIorced concrete structures, which are
the guts oI the reactor. And that's what you're seeing. This is aIter the Syrians had begun to dismantle
what the Israelis destroyed and the telltale signs oI it being a nuclear reactor become even more visible
as they go about the destruction.
Now, we prepared a video presentation that summarizes our assessment oI this Syrian covert reaction
project and their eIIorts to cover up its existence. And so, although some oI this will repeat what I've
said, I think it's oI use to us. Why don't we just let it roll. And I've got a word or two to Iollow. And
then I think |the Senior Administration OIIicial| has some things to say.
(Begin video segment.)
MODERATOR: Syria's covert nuclear reactor at al Kibar. This presentation describes a nuclear reactor
Syria was building secretly, its destruction and Syria's subsequent eIIorts to cover up evidence oI the
reactor project.
The reactor was built in a remote area oI eastern Syria near the Euphrates River. The nearest town is
called al Kibar. Our inIormation supports the Iollowing key points: Syria was building a gas-cooled
graphite-moderated reactor that was nearing operational capability in August 2007. The reactor would
have been capable oI producing plutonium Ior nuclear weapons. It was not conIigured to produce
electricity and was ill-suited Ior research.
The reactor was destroyed in early September 2007 beIore it was loaded with nuclear Iuel or operated.
We are convinced, based on a variety oI inIormation, that North Korea assisted the Syrian's covert
nuclear activities both beIore and aIter the reactor was destroyed. Only North Korea has built this type
oI reactor in the past 35 years.
Features oI the Iacility and its location indicate Syria attempted to maintain its secrecy. Syria moved
quickly to cover up its covert nuclear activities by demolishing and burying the reactor building and by
removing incriminating equipment. These actions probably were intended to Iorestall identiIication oI
reactor debris by international inspectors and are inconsistent with peaceIul nuclear intentions.
We have detailed inIormation showing that the al Kibar Iacility was a nuclear reactor. A three-
dimensional computer model oI the Iacility has been created using Ieatures and dimensions through
photographs oI the Iacility. This diagram shows key Ieatures oI a gas-cooled graphite-moderated
reactor, the type built at al Kibar. We have photographs showing some oI these important reactor
components under construction including vertical tubes in the top oI the reactor Ior control rods and Ior
reIueling, a reinIorced-concrete steel-lined reactor vessel, and the water-supply systems use heat
exchangers to remove heat Irom the carbon-dioxide coolant.
The main Ieature oI the reactor hall, shown here in the center oI the building, was the top oI the reactor
vessel. The pattern oI holes on the Iloor were the ends oI vertical tubes used Ior control rods and
reIueling oI the corps, a key Ieature oI gas-cooled reactors. We judge other Ieatures oI the building,
such as heavily sealed reinIorced-concrete rooms Ior heat exchangers and a spentIuel holding pool also
are consistent with typical gas-cooled reactors.
This photograph shows the top oI the reactor vessel in the reactor hall beIore concrete was poured
around the vertical control rod and reIueling tubes. Note the similar arrangement oI vertical tube
openings in the top oI the Syrian reactor on the leIt and North Korea's Yongbyon plutonium production
reactor on the right. We assess the Syrian reactor was similar in size and capacity to this North Korean
reactor. Only North Korea has built such gas-cool graphite-moderated reactors in the past 35 years.
This photograph shows the steel liner Ior the reinIorced-concrete reactor vessel beIore it was installed.
The network oI small pipes on the outside oI the liner is Ior cooling water to protect the concrete
against the reactor's intense heat and radiation. The animated model shows how this component was
positioned in the reactor vessel. This photograph and view oI the computer model shows the concrete
reactor vessel under construction. The photograph shows the steel liner in place within the vessel.
Satellite imagery, together with ground photographs oI the Iacility under construction, showed Ieatures
oI the cooling water-supply system. A key Ieature was pipes running up a canyon to supply water Irom
the Euphrates River to an underground storage tank at the reactor site. The site lacked key Ieatures oI
alternative Iacilities such as Iuel storage and turbines Ior an oil-Iired power plant or pipes Irom the site
Ior irrigation or water treatment. The water would have been pumped Irom the tank through heat
exchangers in the reactor building and the hot water would return to the river by a separate pipeline.
When the pipeline and pump house were externally completed in early August 2007, no Iurther
observable construction was necessary beIore the reactor could begin operations. We assess that the
reactor could have been complete and that start oI operations could have begun at any time although
additional weeks to months oI testing were likely.
We have inIormation spanning more than a decade that indicates sustained nuclear cooperation
between Syria and North Korea. We obtained this photograph, Ior example, showing the head oI North
Korea's nuclear reactor Iuel manuIacturing plant in Yongbyon. Seen also at the Six-Party talks in the
photograph on the right, together is Syria with the head oI the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission.
Other examples oI cooperation include senior North Koreans Irom the Yongbyon nuclear complex
made multiple visits to Syria beIore construction oI the al Kibar reactor began in 2001. In 2002, North
Korean oIIicials were procuring equipment Ior an undisclosed site in Syria. North Korea, that same
year, sought a gas-cooled reactor component we believe was intended Ior the Syrian site. A North
Korean nuclear organization and Syrian oIIicials involved in the covert nuclear program reportedly
were involved in a cargo transIer Irom North Korea to probably al Kibar in 2006.
North Korean nuclear oIIicials were located in the region oI the reactor both early and late in 2007. Our
inIormation shows that North Korean advisors also probably assisted with damage-assessment
inIerence aIter the reactor was destroyed. A high-level North Korean delegation traveled to Syria
shortly aIter the reactor was destroyed and met with oIIicials associated with Syria's covert nuclear
program. The reactor building was irreparably damaged early in the morning oI September 6th, 2007,
beIore it became operational, causing a collapse oI the central reactor hall and surrounding light walls
and rooI structures.
Damascus, including Syrian President Assad has speciIically and IorceIully denied that a nuclear
Iacility was destroyed or that it has any undeclared nuclear Iacilities. Syria has gone to extraordinary
lengths to conceal the existence and nature oI the al Kibar reactor both during its construction and aIter
it was destroyed. These photographs show how a light rooI and thin curtain walls were added aIter the
main reactor hall was completed. They alter the building's outline, which otherwise resembles the
proIile oI North Korea's plutonium-production reactor at Yongbyon seen in the photograph on the leIt.
This photograph shows how much the building's appearance changed aIter the curtain walls and rooI
were added. The reactor building was located in a remote area oI the Syrian Desert and was built in a
canyon which concealed it Irom view. Further measures including earthen wall or mound that has been
in place to block the view oI the reactor Irom the bottom oI the canyon. The concealment aIIorded by
the reactor site's terrain and by the building modiIications suggest Syrian attempts to maintain the
secrecy oI the Iacility.
Immediately aIter the building was destroyed, the Syrians began taking additional measures to limit
potential observation oI the reactor and their activities including covering the exposed reactor vessel
with tarpaulins; erecting structures to prevent satellite observation oI their activities; and opening holes
in the building, probably to remove heavy reactor-related equipment.
Syria destroyed the remainder oI the reactor building with a massive controlled demolition on October
10th, 2007, as part oI an ongoing eIIort to remove all evidence oI the reactor's existence. Demolition oI
the building, however, revealed key nuclear-related interior structures that remain because they were
made oI heavily reinIorced concrete. These corresponded in conIiguration and location to key gas-
cooled reactor Ieatures oI our photography-based computer model, including the concrete reactor
vessel, the shielded heat-exchanger rooms, and the probably spent Iuel storage pool area.
Syria continued to demolish the building and remove equipment and by late October covered the
excavation Ior the reactor building and remaining debris with earth. Syria subsequently erected a light
metal-Iramework building over the site oI the destroyed reactor and began preparing a pipeline to
connect the site's water-pumping system to a water-treatment plant a Iew kilometers away, most likely
an attempt to Iurther cover up the nuclear nature oI the al Kibar site. We do not know the Iunction oI
the new building, but we assess it is not nuclear related and primarily is intended to discourage
excavation oI any remaining reactor debris.
In conclusion, our inIormation shows that Syria was building a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor
that was nearing operational capability in August 2007. The reactor would have been capable oI
producing plutonium Ior nuclear weapons. It was not conIigured to produce electricity and was ill-
suited Ior research. The reactor was destroyed in early September 2007 beIore it was loaded with
nuclear Iuel or operated. We are convinced based on a variety oI inIormation that North Korea assisted
Syria's covert nuclear activities both beIore and aIter the reactor was destroyed. Only North Korea has
built this type oI reactor in the past 35 years.
Features oI the Iacility and its location indicate Syria attempted to maintain its secrecy. Syria moved
quickly to cover up its covert nuclear activities by demolishing and varying the reactor building and by
removing incriminating equipment. These actions probably were intended to Iorestall identiIication oI
reactor debris by international inspectors and are inconsistent with peaceIul nuclear intentions.
(End video segment.)
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just like to make a couple oI points - one oI the questions
you may have is why are we making this disclosure now and why not beIore. Our Iirst concern was to
prevent conIlict and perhaps an even broader conIrontation in the Middle East region. We were
concerned that iI knowledge oI the existence and then destruction oI the reactor became public and was
conIirmed by sources that the inIormation would spread quickly and Syria would Ieel great pressure to
retaliate. And, obviously, that would have been a threat to Israel and risked the possibility oI a broader
regional conIrontation which we hoped to avoid. As time has passed, our assessment is that that risk
has receded. We have an obligation to keep Congress inIormed with matters such as this. We had
brieIed 22 members oI Congress in positions oI leadership and chairs and ranking members oI key
committees last September and October. We wanted and Congress wanted us to brieI more widely
within Congress. We also Ielt that we could - and we also Ielt that we could use public disclosure to
advance a number oI policy objectives. So the calculation was the risks oI greater discussion and
disclosure had declined and were now acceptable and that, Ior a number oI reasons, timing was good
now to advance some policy objectives
We are at the point in the - Ior example, Iirst let me take North Korea. We are at the point in theSix-
Party talks where we believe going public will strengthen our negotiators as they try to get an accurate
accounting oI North Korea's nuclear programs. We believe and hope that it will encourage North Korea
to acknowledge its proliIeration activity, but also to provide a more complete and accurate disclosure oI
their plutonium activities and their enrichment activities as well.
With respect to Iran, the Syrian episode reminds us oI the ability oI states to obtain nuclear capability
covertly and how destabilizing the proliIeration oI nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be. And
obviously everyone is concerned about that with respect to Iran, and we hope that disclosure will
underscore that the international community needs to rededicate itselI to ending Iran's nuclear
enrichment activities, and needs to take Iurther steps to ensure that Iran does not obtain nuclear
weapons. And countries can start by the Iull implementation oI the U.N. Security Council resolutions
already dealing with Iranian nuclear activities, which are not being implemented as aggressively and
Iully as they should.
Finally, with respect to Syria, at the present time there are major initiatives underway to advance the
cause oI Ireedom and peace in the Middle East: There are talks between Israelis and Palestinians; there
is progress in building a stable and democratic Iraq; there are eIIorts in Lebanon to consolidate its
sovereignty aIter a long period oI Ioreign occupation. Actions by the Syrian regime threaten progress
along each oI these tracks. Disclosure oI Syria's nuclear activities, we hope, will help us in convincing
other nations to join us in pressuring Syria to change its policies.
One oI the things that I'm sure also people are wondering is whether there was any discussion between
us and the Israelis about policy options and how to respond to these Iacts. We did discuss policy
options with Israel. Israel considered a Syrian nuclear capability to be an existential threat to the state
oI Israel. AIter these discussions, at the end oI the day Israel made its own decision to take action. It
did so without any green light Irom us - so-called 'green light' Irom us; none was asked Ior, none was
given.
We understand the Israeli action. We believe this clandestine reactor was a threat to regional peace and
security, and we have stated beIore that we cannot allow the world's most dangerous regimes to acquire
the world's most dangerous weapons.
Thank you.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Okay, are you going to moderate Ior us? Go ahead.
Q: I - just some detail on the North Korean involvement - and you showed that one photograph in the
video presentation. The question is where was that taken and when was it taken? And are there any
other photographic - other photos or video oI North Koreans actually at the site oI the reactor?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: No. First oI all, the video you've seen is the video we have,
okay? The photo is undated and we are certain that the photo was taken in Syria. You saw the license
plates on the vehicle behind the two individuals were Syrian license plates.
Was there a third piece here?
Q: Yeah. Is there any other - are there any other - I mean, so there is no other photographic evidence or
video that shows North Koreans at the Iacility?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: There are some - there's none more compelling that what we
showed you.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: There are also some things that you're going to ask questions
about - sources - and so we're not going to be able to answer those. There's a rich level oI inIormation
here that we - we can't discuss the sources or methods, and that's what we're going to try to work
around to let you see what we can show you, which we have showed you, and we just won't comment
on speciIicity about we knew this point or that point or when.
Q: I just have a Iollow-up. The inIormation I had earlier today is that at least one oI the images - it may
have been this particular image - was North Korean nuclear scientist Chon Chibu, who was linked
directly to Yongbyon.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: That's him.
Q: That's him? And then my other question is a very basic question. This video presentation I would
assume was put together by the CIA or -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 1| asked us, when this all
started breaking about a year ago, really picked up pace, to marshal the resources oI the entire
community. So what you've seen here was constructed here, that's right.
Q: And this was shown on the Hill today.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Yes.
Q: |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 2|, it has been awhile - Syria kind oI committed to trying to
counterbalance the Israeli nuclear program several years ago and started working on that, and Syria has
been a crossroad Ior all types oI unsavory activity Ior many years, so are you Iairly certain that this is
the only type oI activity going on there - was the only type oI activity going on there?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: In terms oI the nuclear program? Clearly, it's something
we'll continue to keep a Iull-court press on, all right? Let me say that. But with the destruction oI this
Iacility, this is - I'll use the word achievement; I don't have time to think oI a better one - in terms oI
ending that kind oI behavior. There is cooperation that continues, however, between North Korea and
the Syrians with regard to the Syrian missile program, and we see that same kind oI cooperation
between North Korea and Iran.
Q: A quick Iollow-on: Would the U.S. have considered any kind oI activity had the Israelis not?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We obviously were looking very closely at options, and we
had looked at some approaches that involved a mix oI diplomacy and the threat oI military Iorce with
the goal oI trying to ensure that the reactor was either dismantled or permanently disabled, and
thereIore never became operational.
We looked at those options. There were, as I mentioned to you, conversations with the Israelis. Israel
Ielt that this reactor posed such an existential threat that a diIIerent approach was required. And as a
sovereign country, Israel had to make its own evaluation oI the threat and the immediacy oI the threat,
and what actions it should take. And it did so.
Q: You said in your brieIing that the only apparent purpose oI this reactor was to use plutonium not Ior
power but apparently Ior weapons purposes.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: It lacked the -
Q: Can you give us an assessment and tell us what kind oI inIormation you might have about the
existence - iI it does exist and iI you have the inIormation - oI a Syrian nuclear weapons design
program? And secondly, can you tell us whether these pictures Irom inside the building are at diIIerent
stages or are they all at one particular point in time?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: The pictures inside oI the building are over a period oI time,
okay? And I really don't have anything more to add with regard to a Syrian weapons program.
Q: Two questions along those same lines. While there is similarity with the Yongbyon plant, there is no
reprocessor, which oI course is right next to the Yongbyon plant - at least that you've showed us today.
It's unclear Irom your presentation how they would have obtained the Iuel which have been the process,
I would guess, iI you - you would have seen. And you note the similarity with the North Korean reactor
and said no reactor like that had been made in some time, but this is a Calder Hall reactor whose design
has been sort oI out there Ior a long while, so could they have obtained the technology as opposed to
needing help Irom individuals?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: The body oI evidence that we have over a period that spands
a decade gives us very high conIidence that, A, this is a nuclear reactor; B, that there was long-term,
detailed cooperation between the North Koreans and the Syrians in terms oI nuclear cooperation; and iI
anything, the actions since the strike that we have been able to detect reinIorce our belieI that North
Koreans were actually involved - not just in kind oI a theoretical or a broad-based nuclear cooperative
eIIort with the Syrians, but were cooperating at this site.
Q: And the reprocessor and the Iuel?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: There is no reprocessing Iacility in the region oI al Kibar.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: I might add something that would helpIul here. These are
lessons learned that are - that came out oI previous experience about how to put more rigor into our
process. So there's a diIIerence between evidence and an assessment. And when we examined this
inIormation, and what |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 2| alluded to, let me just reinIorce: very sensitive;
everybody wants to know; everybody wants to have a part oI the decision. So the decision was taken by
the President to restrict access signiIicantly. So we made this CIA-centric to restrict those who were
aware and it worked.
The entire community participated. The entire community contributed. And you know who is in the
community. You know we take pictures; you know we listen, and so on. So I'll just leave it at that. We
had very rich, rich inIormation. So when we worked through the data, in large part what you saw here,
we concluded with high conIidence it is a nuclear reactor oI the design that was described Ior
plutonium. We had, at that time, medium conIidence that the North Koreans were and are participating.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: At the reactor, not in generalized nuclear cooperation.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: To go with the question you're asking - weapons - we said,
we believe it. There's no other reason Ior it. But our conIidence level that it's weapons is low at this
point. We believe it, but it's low based on the physical evidence.
Q: Even at the time oI the destruction oI the reactor?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Even at the time. So now, what that asks is, in a nuclear
program, it's complex. There are a series oI steps and stages. So was that something evidence that
would be uncovered at a point in time? And I'll just leave it right there as to where it is at the moment,
other than to say we have reasonable conIidence that we have - that the Israelis have destroyed a
capability. And we are monitoring everything to see iI there's anything subsequent to that.
Q: Do we have nay reason to believe that the Syrians now have or are building a reprocessing
capability?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Just let me leave it with what I described.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: And as you say, this makes no sense without that.
Q: This does make no sense without that. And that's my hardest part with the evidence that you've
shown. And I think it's interesting that you have a low-conIidence level that they -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: But be very speciIic about what I'm saying is - iI you are
going to make a clinical judgment that the evidence supports all the way through, you have to have the
clinical evidence in hand.
Q: Did you tell the Israelis you have low conIidence it was Ior weapons?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: No, you need to understand. I'm sorry to dwell on the point.
This is very, very important.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: This is very important.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: We told our President Iour things: This is a reactor; the
North Koreans and the Syrians are cooperating on nuclear activities; the North Koreans and Syrians are
cooperating on the construction oI this reactor; and this reactor - its purpose - is to create Iuel Ior a
nuclear weapons program. Those are the things we concluded.
Now, when you look at the body oI evidence oI those Iour sentences and begin to sort out how much oI
that is based on an overwhelming body oI evidence as opposed to a more limited body oI evidence and
thereIore more reliant on assessment, the Iact that it was a nuclear reactor - absolutely high conIidence;
the Iact oI Syrian-Korean nuclear cooperation spanning a decade at an intense level, high conIidence.
At the time oI the strike, Iact oI North Korean-Syrian cooperation in the building oI that reactor,
medium conIidence that then got higher because oI events, some oI which we have alluded to in the
brieIing, okay. The Iact that that material was going to be used Ior a weapons program - we believe that
to be true, but because we did not have, as |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 1| points out, additional clinical
evidence oI other activities, we could only give it a low conIidence level. But you need to - and I think
you understand what I'm trying to say. That's not more or less sure; it's just that it's a way oI
communicating that Ior which you have a large body oI evidence and that Ior which you may not.
Q: Where is that conIidence level now?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: In terms oI -
Q: On the last one - you said a low conIidence level that this was Ior weapons or has that changed in
the aItermath oI -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: No. No, that has not changed. However - however - actually,
David, we haven't addressed it, but I would suggest to you that the Syrian behavior aIter the strike -
keeping it secret, destroying it, not allowing the IAEA - iI anything, it certainly doesn't weaken that
there were neIarious purposes Ior the reactor.
Q: Three questions. Did the United States military aid in any way this Israeli strike through
reconnaissance or through targeting help? Did the U.S. obtain these photos or were they Irom another
country's intelligence agency? And what is the intention oI North Korea's cooperation here? Is it cash-
motivated? Are they looking to get plutonium themselves Ior their own reprocessing?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: What was one?
Q: One was did the U.S. military aid in any way the ISR with targeting or some other -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Let me talk a little bit obliquely here, okay. There is a rich
intelligence exchange with a body oI partners around the world that included an exchange on this
inIormation here. There is diIIerence between a rich exchange oI intelligence and providing
inIormation that would actually enable the targeting and strike oI this kind oI target.
Q: So you shared inIormation. You didn't give them targeting inIormation.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: We were in A, not B on this. The second one?
Q: And the second one is did the U.S. intelligence agencies obtain these photos or did they come
through another nation's intelligence?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: I'm only Iree to say that we acquired the photos, and we have
- and I tried to communicate to you under whatever guise we acquired them the conIidence level we
have in them.
Q: And North Korean intentions? Cash?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Cash.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: It's cash.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Cash.
Q: So they weren't going to be taking this -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: We don't -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: We examined -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: We examined that. We examined that hypothesis. This just
wasn't -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Probably not.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: - you know, a reactor in Syria Ior Syria, that it may be
outsourcing. And our judgment based on the overwhelming body oI evidence is it was A, not B. That it
was in Syria Ior Syria.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: I'm sorry. Yeah, you're right. |The Senior Administration
OIIicial| is correcting me. Option A was in Syria Ior North Korea; option B was in Syria Ior Syria. We
think it was in Syria Ior Syria, although we examined both options and held it up to the light with the
available evidence.
Q: How much money is it in Ior North Korea?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Not at liberty to say.
Q: I believe a Calder Hall reactor is Iueled with naturally occurring uranium. Is there such deposits in
Syria? Have you looked to see whether or not the Syrians were actually mining their own uranium, and
iI so, again, have you located that site? And iI not, where were they going to get the uranium Irom?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: |Senior Intelligence OIIicial 3|, is there anything that you
know that we can share?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 3: No, sir.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Okay.
Q: Can I just ask to be clear what you mean - when you're talking about low conIidence present how
that compares to, in the talking points here that you lay out, the nearing operational capability? Can you
just walk me through what exactly that means?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: That's right. Sure.
Q: And was that weeks and possibly months, as some oIIicials have suggested?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: It is weeks and possibly months, and we were at high
conIidence that - well, to put it another way, anything we could see about this reactor we had already
seen in terms oI getting it ready to throw the switch. And once they breached the wall down there in the
Euphrates and Iilled the cooling pond and gave those pumps access to the water, as Iar as things we
could see externally, this thing was good to go, and thereIore we had to assume they could throw the
switch at any time, although we know they did not know throw the switch prior to the strike. And I'm
sorry, the other question?
Q: So I'm trying understand, then, okay, so they were nearing operational capability but then can you
compare what that means -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Okay, I got it.
Q: - the low conIidence. I want to be clear on that.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Yeah. Again, this is a bit arcane, and I'm trying to be very
precise with our language here, okay. We were certain, okay, this was a reactor and that it was going to
produce plutonium. We saw no other logical use Ior that plutonium based upon - no other use Ior the
reactor other than creating plutonium. And then our judgment was that the Syrians would only have
done this - with the great expense and perhaps political risk involved - Ior a weapons program,
although we had not yet detected the detailed and constituent elements oI such a weapons program.
That is - and thereIore, we said, we believe, Mr. President, that is what this is Ior.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: It may be -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: But the body oI evidence on which we're basing that is more
limited than some oI the other things we're telling you.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: It may be useIul, too, to separate it in pieces. Go to the
question that was asked about natural uranium. You can take natural uranium, get access to t, build a
plant like this, and cause a reactor to operate, which would produce plutonium. So atural uranium in
one place, a reactor to produce plutonium, and now you have to reprocess it to urn it into the kinds oI
material that would be used Ior weapon - so what we're describing to you with regard to our conIidence
level, plus with the regard to the reactor in the middle piece.
Q: And then what have the North Koreans said to you? Have they denied any oI this? Have they
admitted any oI this? And Ior you |Senior Administration OIIicial|, what then do you do moving
Iorward with the Six-Party talks. You suggested this will strengthen your hand, your negotiators. But
what are the North Koreans telling you privately about all oI this? Are they going to come Iorward and
admit anything? And what do you think - what eIIect will it have on the Six-Party talks?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to see. We would oI course like it iI they would
publicly admit this program and the truth oI what has been laid out here. We hope as a minimum that
they will not try to deny it. We hope that the Iact that we have had such detailed understanding oI this
activity, which they tried so - that this - oI this activity, which obviously they and Syria very much tried
to hide, will convince them that there is no point in trying to cover up not only proliIeration activity but
enrichment activity and plutonium activity, and it will thereIore incentivize them to make the kind oI
Iull accounting oI their various activities and programs that they have undertaken to do. We will
obviously have to see.
One oI the reasons we think now is a good time to do this is because oI those ongoing conversations -
those conversations on their declaration, as you know, are ongoing. And we will hope this will give
North Korea and incentive to do a Iull accounting and will strengthen our hands oI our negotiators in
insisting on it.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Can I just make a comment on Iran because I know that's
eventually - iI we stayed long enough, you're eventually going to get there. And I think it's useIul to
talk about nuclear weapons and Iran in this context because this all is potentially interrelated.
There are a couple oI ways to get to nuclear weapons. One, we're describing how North Korea did it.
The path that Iran is choosing to pursue is diIIerent. You enrich natural uranium to some level. II you're
going to enrich it to the point that you run a nuclear power plant, you're about at the 3.8, 3.9 level. That
is what they claim they are doing.
The diIIerence between Iissile material - this nuclear grade or weapons grade versus running a plant is
you just keep spinning it until it gets to be 90 percent highly enriched uranium. When we did our NIE,
what we announced in our unclassiIied key judgments, that the Iranians had a secret program, secret
program to produce highly enriched uranium, and they had a program designed to - working on the
design oI a nuclear device; meaning, think oI it as an implosion device that would result in a nuclear
warhead.
When we published our NIE, we had not planned to make unclassiIied key judgments available to the
public; thereIore we wrote our estimate Ior a very sophisticated audience believing or understanding
that they understood that in the program, it's basically three large pieces: There is pursuit oI Iissile
material; there is a delivery system - ballistic missiles or some other; and then there is weapons design.
The only thing that the Iranians halted that we had awareness oI was design oI the warhead. They
continue with ballistic missiles and they continue with Iissile material pursuit. It was a secret program
that they halted. They have never admitted that. So one oI our concerns is, is there a connection with
North Korea? II there is, we don't know it. But is there something going on there that resembles this
program that we we're talking about in Syrian in Iran.
That is a very large concern oI ours, a major problem that we're attempting to address. But our
unIortunate choice oI words in our NIE caused you all in the press to misrepresent what we were trying
to explain. Three parts oI the program; they halted one narrow piece oI it, which was a secret program -
weapons-head design. They continue with Iissile material; they continue with ballistic missile systems
Ior delivery. So we don't know where it is at the moment.
Q: No Iran-North Korea connection?
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: None.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: On nuclear issues.
Q: On nuclear issues.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: Robust connection on -
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 1: Other places, yes.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL 2: - missile issues.
Q: Just to Iollow up on the Six-Party talks. The assumption now or what is being said is that the
negotiators are really Iocusing on plutonium equation and the ATU, and the Syrian assistance is kind oI
being pushed down the road a little bit. Does this brieIing and this inIormation that is coming out now
shiIt that equation? Is that no longer what the White House wants?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have said that North Korea needs to do a Iull
accounting oI its plutonium activities, its enrichment activities and its proliIeration activities. And that's
what we are pursuing now. In addition, one oI the things that this has done - and I think we'll encourage
- is to supplement, in some sense, the Six-Party Iramework by building in a capacity to veriIy the
disclosures that North Korea is hopeIully going to make so that iI, down the road, there is evidence that
suggests that disclosures are inaccurate or not Iull and complete that there will be a veriIication
mechanism available in the Iramework oI the Six-Party talks to pursue that issue. So we think we have
constructed a Iramework in the Six-Party talks Ior dealing with this issue. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thanks, everybody, Ior coming.
https://www.cia.gov/news-inIormation/press-releases-statements/cia-director-hayden-announces-Iindings-on-covert-syrian-reactor.html
CIA Director Hayden Announces Findings on Covert Syrian Reactor CIA Director Hayden Announces Findings on Covert Syrian Reactor CIA Director Hayden Announces Findings on Covert Syrian Reactor CIA Director Hayden Announces Findings on Covert Syrian Reactor
Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General Mike
Hayden Announcing Findings on Covert Syrian Reactor
April 24, 2008
At our town hall meeting in January, I praised the outstanding work oI our oIIicers in tackling a very
sensitive counterproliIeration issue, one that I could not identiIy at the time because it was highly
compartmented. As oI today, some aspects have been declassiIied and will be publicly released this
aIternoon, so I can share with you the highlights oI this extraordinary story.
Last spring, we acquired inIormation conIirming that a building in eastern Syria was a covert nuclear
reactor using North Korean technology. We had suspected the two nations were cooperating on nuclear
technology as early as 2001, and although imagery had revealed the existence oI the building, it lacked
Ieatures associated with a nuclear installation.The new inIormation included photographs oI the interior
and exterior that oIIered our Iirst unambiguous indication that the building was a nuclear reactor.
Moreover, the reactor would have been capable oI producing plutonium Ior nuclear weapons, was not
conIigured to produce electricity, and was ill-suited Ior research.
On the morning oI 6 September 2007, the reactor was destroyed as it was nearing completion, but
beIore it had been operated or charged with uranium Iuel. Syrian eIIorts to dismantle the ruined
building and remove every trace oI the incriminating equipmentlargely conducted at night or under
tarpaulins Ior concealmentIurther underscored Damascuss less than benign intent Ior the Iacility. A
video presentation summarizes our analysis oI the Syrian reactor project and North Korean
involvement in greater detail.
Our team eIIort on the Al Kibar reactor is a case study in rigorous analytic tradecraIt, skillIul human
and technical collection, and close collaboration with our Community colleagues and liaison partners.
Our oIIicers put in long hours on this issue Ior many months, and their hard work paid oII by directly
advancing our nations security and that oI our allies. To everyone who contributed to this success, my
congratulations on a job well done.
White House revises N. Korea nuke deal
By Nicholas Kralev
April 25, 2008
The Bush administration is renegotiating a tentative deal with North Korea on a declaration oI its
nuclear activities to include better veriIication provisions, aIter the agreement upset some on Capitol
Hill and even in the administration, oIIicials said yesterday.
AIter insisting Ior months that Pyongyang disclose any nuclear exports, as well as a secret uranium-
enrichment program Irom the 1990s, the administration agreed two weeks ago to write what it knows
about those activities and have the North "acknowledge" the U.S. concerns.
"That was a major change, and many people were caught by surprise," one congressional oIIicial said.
In an attempt to address concerns about the shiIt on the declaration, the administration now emphasizes
the importance oI veriIication oI the North's secret activities.
Congressional support Ior any deal with Pyongyang is crucial because it is likely to require legislative
approval, and U.S. taxpayers' money will be needed to dismantle the North's nuclear programs.
In a letter to President Bush on Wednesday, 14 Republican senators expressed "concern about the
present course oI action on North Korea's nuclear program being pursued" by the administration.
Although they did not mention the April 7 Singapore talks between chieI U.S. negotiator Christopher
Hill and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, the senators said that the current state oI
negotiations sends the wrong message to Iran and other "rogue regimes."
The administration told Congress in intelligence brieIings yesterday that a nuclear Iacility in Syria
Ilattened by an Israeli air strike in September was built with Pyongyang's help.
"From all appearances, Kim Jong-il believes that the United States will take whatever deal we can get,
allowing him to dictate the time, place, manner and content oI the IulIillment oI his promises," the
senators said.
The letter, a copy oI which was obtained by The Washington Times, was signed by Sens. John Ensign
oI Nevada and Jon Kyl oI Arizona, among others.
Because Congress has not yet been brieIed on the Singapore agreement, oIIicials declined to discuss it
publicly. But in their private remarks, some said that, even though it seems peculiar, it is worth
considering.
"What's important is to achieve removal oI North Korea's plutonium program," a congressional source
said. "That might require some sacriIices."
The Bush administration says that, even though Washington will write the document, it is seeking Iull
access to any sites that might be linked to those activities, so it can veriIy the North Korean claim that
they are not ongoing.
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice took pains last week in a brieIing to reporters to stress that, iI the
United States discovered that it had been "misled" by the North, any beneIits it has received in the
meantime would be taken away.
Miss Rice suggested that one oI those beneIits removal Irom the U.S. blacklist oI state-sponsors oI
terrorism would not have to wait until all veriIication is completed.
She sent the director oI the State Department's Korea desk, Sung Kim, to Pyongyang this week to Iine-
tune the Singapore agreement and make sure that the Iinal result oI the declaration does not suIIer Irom
the Iact that the United States will write the part on proliIeration and uranium-enrichment.
North Korea has promised to produce the main part oI the declaration dealing with its plutonium
program. The main Iacility oI that program at Yongbyon has been almost disabled by U.S. experts.
In the next phase oI the North's denuclearization, Yongbyon must be dismantled, again with a large
U.S. role in the process. The administration, however, is barred Irom using taxpayers' money by a 1994
law known as the Glenn amendment, sponsored by then-Sen. John Glenn.
"Congress should swiItly enact legislation allowing the president to waive the Glenn amendment
restrictions that will otherwise prevent the United States Irom carrying out Iuture nuclear
dismantlement operations in North Korea or veriIying North Korean compliance," Sen. Joseph R.
Biden Jr., Delaware Democrat and chairman oI the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said
yesterday.
Washington, DC
April 25, 2008
12:39 p.m. EDT
|EXCERPT|
QUESTION: Can you talk about the Syria-North Korea issue and the brieIing that took place
yesterday?
MR. MCCORMACK: No, no, not at all. (Laughter.) Sorry, not going to do it.
QUESTION: Part oI the brieIing was that there was a senior North Korean oIIicial that was involved in
the six-party talks that was in Syria.
MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Do you have any more inIormation about when this picture was taken? Because it looks
to me as iI the person that was in Syria, perhaps, was a lot younger and maybe wasn't the senior oIIicial
that's involved in the six-party talks when he was actually in Syria, so --
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, I don't, Elise, sorry. In terms oI the intelligence materials and the
intelligence assessments, I'm going to have to point you to my colleagues in the intelligence
community. I know that they have distributed some materials to the media yesterday and there were
some background brieIings. I'm just going to have to reIer you either to those materials or to them Ior
any additional Iollow-up questions you might have.
QUESTION: Okay. It just seems that, like, some oI the -- and I'm not even talking about the kind oI
reactor itselI and the photos --
MR. MCCORMACK: No, no. I know the one you're talking about.
QUESTION: It does seem that you're making a link between cooperation with Syria and North Korea,
some oI it which, you know, started at a level -- like, some oI the evidence just seems to be kind oI a
little bit old. And I was wondering iI -- iI there's a concern on the part oI the Administration that by
bringing all this evidence out into the open, that you're opening yourselves up to the same type oI
criticism about the strength oI the evidence that you Iaced aIter the presentation oI Secretary Powell to
the UN, that, like, people are going to start, you know, picking it apart and, you know, obviously, this
Administration has, you know, a reputation Ior, you know, not the strongest intelligence in the world.
So iI you -- (laughter) -- I'm being diplomatic.
MR. MCCORMACK: Is that the intelligence community or our IQs?
QUESTION: Well, maybe the IQs oI the intelligence community.
MR. MCCORMACK: I see.
QUESTION: But iI you could talk to your conIidence that the international community may have about
this.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Look, Elise, I can only point to the assessment oI the intelligence
community about this inIormation. You know, they can -- they have presented a very compelling case
in terms oI the reactor and who was responsible Ior building it. You can look at the pictures and the
similarities between Yongbyon and the Iacility on the ground in Syria. They've also detailed a number
oI other links. And they're quite conIident in their analysis based on the materials that they have. I don't
think they would have agreed to provide these materials and provide this assessment in public, never
mind providing it also to Iriends and allies and others around the world, iI they weren't conIident in
their assessment.
QUESTION: But just a quick Iollow-up. But you do understand that the intelligence community
around the world and, you know, governments and perhaps the IAEA might take your intelligence with
a grain oI salt this time.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, look, in terms oI the IAEA, we brieIed them yesterday. There was a team
oI oIIicials Irom Washington who traveled to Vienna to brieI oIIicials below the level oI Secretary
General ElBaradei regarding the intelligence, what the -- some oI the raw materials as well as their
analysis oI the situation. We believe that it is a case that merits investigation and Iollow-up by the
IAEA. Ultimately that will be their decision whether or not they do Iollow up with Syria and try to
conduct an investigation to determine more Iacts on the ground. But, you know, beyond that, you
know, the intelligence community is really they can speak to their case. They can speak to their
conIidence in the levels their conIidence levels in their analysis, based on the materials that they
have. And Irom what I have seen and what I have read, what I have been brieIed on, they are conIident
oI their assessment.
QUESTION: Just a Iollow-up brieIly?
QUESTION: Sean, we have asked many times that can you trust North Korea and Iran as Iar as their
nuclear program is concerned, that answer was yes, and we are working on that. Now, can you have
some links as Iar as this outcome is concerned Irom A.Q. Khan and China, as Iar as helping North
Korea and then going to spreading other countries?
MR. MCCORMACK: I dont have any inIormation in that regard, Goyal. And I just to correct what
you stated at the top there, the whole reason why you have a veriIication regime is to possibly get to the
state at which there is mutual trust among the parties in the six-party talks. That is something that is
earned. It is something that is developed over time. Right now, were working on the veriIication part.
QUESTION: Do you still believe and trust in six-party talks?
MR. MCCORMACK: We believe in the six-party talks, Goyal, yeah. We believe in the mechanism.
We believe in the process. And as Ive said beIore, we believe that it can lead to the goal that
everybody shares, and that is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and, ultimately, a better situation Ior
the Korean people. But again, its a process that is based on perIormance in this mechanism. We
believe its a strong mechanism. But it is also a mechanism, iI there is not perIormance, that can deal
with noncooperation.
QUESTION: Sean?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, yeah.
QUESTION: Going back to Elises point Ior a second.
QUESTION: I think that there is some concern that certainly the Syrians are going to be have already
and will this aIternoon and will Ior the near Iuture say, you know, this is dont be gullible, America,
or the world.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Uh-huh.
QUESTION: You know, they were wrong the last time they made a public presentation. And, arguably,
the last public presentation that was made was actually more public than this. You know, you had the
Secretary oI State go up to the UN beIore the Security Council and make a compelling case. He said at
the time he since retracted that, saying that. And in this case, you have a situation where theres no
oIIicial who has put their name to anything, except Ior that statement Irom the White House, which
doesnt contain any oI the evidence. That evidence is out there with no oIIicials name attached to it,
only as a video. Are you less conIident in this inIormation than you were in the inIormation on Iraq,
because no one is willing to put no one is willing to go on the record and say and make these
allegations or present this intelligence?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah. OI course, people are going to try to draw these analogies. They arent
analogous situations. Look, you know, I dont think I am not a person that is steeped in all oI the raw
materials and the analysis here, so its I really cant do their analysis justice.
QUESTION: Well, why not?
MR. MCCORMACK: And but youre --
QUESTION: In 2003, it was the Secretary oI State sitting at the UN Security Council
QUESTION: -- live, on worldwide television
QUESTION: -- with the Director oI the Central Intelligence Agency, sitting directly behind him.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Yeah.
QUESTION: And now youve got two or three guys over in wherever speaking on background,
presenting what some might say is, you know, similar a similar case, similar evidence to what was
presented in public beIore the UN.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah. Matt, I just -- you know, I really dont think, in any way, the situations are
analogous back in 2003 and the present in terms oI the circumstances and the policies and the history
leading up to all oI this.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. MCCORMACK: Look, like I said, the intelligence community has said that they stand by their
analysis and they have tried to be open in terms oI releasing some oI the materials and talking about it,
albeit on background. But again, I would encourage people who have questions about this to put it
directly to the experts on this. I certainly couldnt do the case justice here, as I am not (inaudible).
QUESTION: Well, I guess no, no, Im not trying to get you --
MR. MCCORMACK: No.
QUESTION: -- to repeat it on --
QUESTION: -- on camera or, you know, with your name attached to it.
QUESTION: What Im trying to Iigure out is why was there a decision why doesnt anyone or why
was the decision made not to have anyone attach their name, their reputation to this?
MR. MCCORMACK: Matt, you can as Ior the Iorm --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. MCCORMACK: In terms oI the Iorm in which the inIormation was presented, I think you can
talk to the intelligence community about that.
Okay, Param.
QUESTION: Sean, the question thats being asked aIter the revelation is very obvious question is
whether the United States has raised this with North Korea and what was the response?
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Certainly, over the past several months, this issue has been raised with
North Korea. It has been in the context oI the six-party talks and it has also been an issue that has been
discussed. And the inIormation, in some Iorm, has been discussed among all the members oI the six-
party talks. And we believe, actually, that has been very constructive and helpIul to the process oI the
six-party talks and, in Iact, the mechanism oI the six-party talks, because it has put veriIication really at
the top oI the list oI the things that the six-party mechanism is trying to accomplish. You can have
declarations, you can have actions, but those things need to be veriIied.
And this inIormation has strengthened that case to the point where you have China that is now going to
be chairing a group within the six-party mechanism on issues related to veriIication. And I would
expect that, should the process move Iorward, that that is going to be an essential component oI the six-
party process. And also, it has had the eIIect oI putting nonproliIeration really Iront and center in this
process.
When we talk now about the denuclearized Korean Peninsula, we talk about plutonium, we talk about
highly enriched uranium, we also talk about nonproliIeration as an equal component. And that is, in our
view, a very signiIicant development. It has always been part oI the process, but really, the prominence
oI it within the six parties has been raised. And that has been a positive aspect, I think, that has come
out oI this.
QUESTION: And just a quick Iollow-up.
QUESTION: So what is the response to the North Koreans on this? I mean, this is very important
because you have brought the case --
QUESTION: -- across the globe. And people are interested in the sense that youre having a dialogue
with North Korea.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, the six parties well, the other Iive parties oI the six parties, Im sorry
yeah.
QUESTION: I mean I mean, you have meet -- met North Korea on the sidelines and --
MR. MCCORMACK: Sure. No, yeah, exactly, but it is important and signiIicant that it is in that
context oI the six parties because we, again, dont believe and continue to believe that bilateral
dialogue will really not get us to where we want to go. It is really the six-party mechanism that has
allowed us to get to the point where we have now, which is signiIicant, and that will allow us
ultimately to achieve the goals we all want, again, iI North Korea chooses to perIorm.
QUESTION: But what is the response by the North Koreans when you --
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, look, you know, again, Im not going to share every exchange within the
context oI those discussions, but I would leave it to them and that theyre Iully capable oI responding in
public. I have not thus Iar seen any response Irom them in public.
QUESTION: Sean?
QUESTION: Sean, you said the issue has been raised with the North Koreans.
QUESTION: But has this video presentation speciIically been shown to --
MR. MCCORMACK: InIormation has been shared with them. I cant speak to whether the video that
was prepared by the intelligence committee itselI was shared with them. But certainly, enough
inIormation was shared so that they understood that we knew exactly what had happened.
QUESTION: You said this morning that they had some awareness that something would be made
public.
QUESTION: Can you elaborate on that? Can you say to what extent they knew what the nature oI the
activities would be --
MR. MCCORMACK: No, we didnt --
QUESTION: -- or when you told them or how you told them?
MR. MCCORMACK: We didnt brieI them in details about our plans, but they were aware that, in
some Iorm or Iashion, this issue was going to be surIaced publicly.
QUESTION: But when did you tell them?
MR. MCCORMACK: I dont have a speciIic date Ior you, but over the past months.
QUESTION: And was this used as a leverage point in the negotiations?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I mean, just go back to what I said. I believe that, you know, iI -- looking
back on the process over the past several months, that this -- we have made eIIective use oI this
inIormation in the context oI the six parties. But again, you know, we will see, based on North Koreas
behavior, whether or not this process move Iorwards. It gets down to their perIormance.
Yeah.
QUESTION: What is the next step now on a practical level in the six-party talks? What is going to be
happening next? And can you say more about Chinas role in terms oI veriIication?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, in terms oI veriIication, thats something that will, I would expect, evolve
over time. The next steps practically are the Iive parties waiting Ior North Korea to provide a
declaration. I suppose it shouldnt be a Ioregone conclusion that they will provide one. We all hope and
expect that they will. Once they do, well, thatll be handed over to the Chinese as chair oI the six-party
process. Once thats handed over, itll be examined, analyzed, judged. And iI it does account Ior all
aspects oI their nuclear program, then the Secretary oI State and this building will have to make a
recommendation to the President whether or not the process moves Iorward. The President will have to
decide. And iI it does move Iorward, then that declaration, oI course, would be subject to veriIication
and they would also have to carry out their outstanding obligations with respect to disabling Yongbyon.
And then the other parties would be, I believe at that point, prepared to IulIill their obligations.
QUESTION: I mean, in the past, this process oI getting them to provide the declaration has involved
trips by Chris Hill, meetings, and so Iorth. Is there anything like that planned?
MR. MCCORMACK: Not at the moment. Sung Kim is expected to be back this aIternoon in
Washington and he will brieI people back here as to what he heard Irom the North Koreans. And you
know, perhaps, at that point, we may have some Iurther characterization oI his discussions. Im sure it
wont be very elaborate. Perhaps well have some Iurther characterization oI what he heard when he
was in Pyongyang, and then it really gets to North Korea and what they choose to do.
QUESTION: Sean, outside oI the IAEA, were the other six -- were the six parties brieIed separately,
individually, as a group, on yesterdays --
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, I can see iI I can share with you a bit more the variety oI brieIings
that took place through diplomatic channels over the past couple oI days. But the other, what, Iour
parties, I guess you can say, over the period oI months, and I don't have speciIic dates Ior you, were
brieIed in some Iorm on the inIormation that we have.
QUESTION: The other Iour? Don't you mean the other Iive?
MR. MCCORMACK: China --
QUESTION: Maybe not as Iull as the other -- as the Iour got, but --
MR. MCCORMACK: China and South Korea, Japan and Russia.
QUESTION: So they --
MR. MCCORMACK: They received the brieIing. And also the North Koreans were presented with this
inIormation as well.
QUESTION: So did --
MR. MCCORMACK: This took place over, I believe it was late last year.
QUESTION: So none oI this would -- none oI what came out yesterday would have been a surprise to
any oI the --
MR. MCCORMACK: I can't -- again, I can't speak to exactly what materials were presented to the
other members oI the six-party talks or to other Iriends and allies or Iriends and allies that were brieIed
around the world. But the substance and basically the bottom-line conclusion was -- shouldn't have
come to the -- a surprise -- shouldn't have come as a surprise to any oI the six-party members.
Yeah. Well, Samir -- Samir, you have one on this?
QUESTION: Yes.
QUESTION: Can I have a Iollow-up? I'm sorry.
MR. MCCORMACK: Kirit, yeah.
QUESTION: II you don't mind, one more.
QUESTION: Following up on that real quick, at what point did you tell the Israelis you were going to
make a public rollout oI this inIormation?
MR. MCCORMACK: Like I said, we brieIed a number oI Iriends and allies around the world over the
past several days or over the past period oI time -- past months.
QUESTION: And did that include the Israelis?
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, I don't have the Iull list in Iront oI me.
QUESTION: And the second question that I had, and I apologize iI you answered it beIore I came in. I
missed the Iirst couple oI questions. Does the State Department believe that now that this inIormation
is actually, in Iact, public, it will complicate your eIIorts in the six-party talks to get a declaration Irom
the North Koreans?
MR. MCCORMACK: We'll see. It shouldn't. I don't believe that it should. But that ultimately is a
question that should be directed at the North Koreans. And you know, I can't tell you whether or not
they are seeking a pretext to not IulIill their obligations or they Iully intend to. We'll see. The prooI oI
that will be in their actions and we'll be watching to see what they do in the coming days and weeks.
QUESTION: To put it another way, do you think this will help get a declaration Irom the North
Koreans?
MR. MCCORMACK: Kirit, we'll see. You know, again, it's very diIIicult to determine what goes into
the -- what calculations go into their decision making, Kirit. It's a very closed -- very closed process.
We'll see.
QUESTION: But, I mean, you must have been (inaudible) with the idea, hopeIully, that this would
actually help the process, right?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think I just talked about that, the ways in which we believe it has helped
the process. And certainly, at a minimum, it has laid down a very clear line in terms oI a declaration,
what is required in terms oI their proliIeration activities. So I think they understand very clearly the bar
that they need to get over on that part oI the declaration.
Yeah.
QUESTION: The Syrian Ambassador was seen visiting the State Department. Did you present him a
brieIing about the evidence?
MR. MCCORMACK: There was a discussion here at the State Department. JeII Feltman spoke with
the Syrian Ambassador here yesterday.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressRelease/2008/prn200806.html
IAEA Press Releases
Press Release 2008/06
Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
25 April 2008 , The IAEA Secretariat was provided with inIormation by the United States on 24 April
claiming that the installation destroyed by Israel in Syria last September was a nuclear reactor.
According to this inIormation, the reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been
introduced into it.
The Agency will treat this inIormation with the seriousness it deserves and will investigate the veracity
oI the inIormation. Syria has an obligation under its saIeguards agreement with the IAEA to report the
planning and construction oI any nuclear Iacility to the Agency.
The Director General deplores the Iact that this inIormation was not provided to the Agency in a timely
manner, in accordance with the Agency's responsibilities under the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty
(NPT), to enable it to veriIy its veracity and establish the Iacts. Under the NPT, the Agency has a
responsibility to veriIy any proliIeration allegations in a non-nuclear weapon State party to the NPT
and to report its Iindings to the IAEA Board oI Governors and the Security Council, as required.
In light oI the above, the Director General views the unilateral use oI Iorce by Israel as undermining the
due process oI veriIication that is at the heart oI the non-proliIeration regime.
Accusing N. Korea May Stall Nuclear Pact
Both Nations Cite Progress, but Allegations About Aid to Syria Chill Lawmakers
By Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright
Saturday, April 26, 2008; A12
The Bush administration gambled this week that its detailed accounting oI North Korean assistance to a
Syrian nuclear program would help pave the way Ior a nuclear disarmament agreement with
Pyongyang, but the allegations so angered Republican lawmakers that support Ior a deal may be
seriously weakened.
To signal displeasure, Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) placed a hold on an ambassadorial nomination oI
a Iormer aide to the chieI U.S. negotiator with North Korea, Christopher R. Hill. "People are very mad,
very angry" about the prospect oI an agreement with "a regime that has repeatedly demonstrated that its
word is indistinguishable Irom a lie," said an aide to a key Republican lawmaker.
Despite the Iresh accusations oI North Korean wrongdoing, U.S. and North Korean oIIicials said this
week they were making progress on key aspects oI the disarmament deal, which requires North Korea
to declare how much plutonium it has made Ior its nuclear arsenal and to turn over thousands oI
documents concerning the inner workings oI the Yongbyon nuclear Iacility.
A U.S. negotiator returned yesterday Irom three days oI talks in North Korea aimed at meeting goals
set by President Bush, national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and Secretary oI State Condoleezza
Rice, oIIicials said. Hill told reporters yesterday that the discussions were "lengthy" and "productive,"
echoing a statement by North Korea that "the negotiations proceeded in a sincere and constructive
manner, and progress was made there."
But criticism oI the administration's handling oI the matter did not come only Irom Capitol Hill.
Mohamed ElBaradei, director general oI the International Atomic Energy Agency, yesterday said the
United States should not have waited so long beIore disclosing what it suspected about North Korea's
ElBaradei also reiterated his criticism oI Israel Ior its "unilateral use oI Iorce" in a Sept. 6 bombing raid
that destroyed the nuclear reactor Syria was allegedly building with North Korea's help, saying it
prevented the agency Irom veriIying whether undeclared nuclear activity had been taking place at the
site.
Administration oIIicials said yesterday that beIore the Israeli bombing, Rice and a majority oI other
senior oIIicials had supported using inIormation about the two countries' secret collaboration to
squeeze Damascus diplomatically, with the aim oI stopping its interIerence in Lebanon and halting the
passage oI insurgents through Syria into Iraq.
U.S. oIIicials told Israel that it would beneIit iI Washington were able to get Syria to stop all its
"neIarious activity," one oIIicial said. But Israel decided that Syria's Al Kibar Iacility was "an
existential threat" and needed to be destroyed beIore reactor Iuel could be loaded or processed, the
oIIicial said.
Another oIIicial said the Israelis, having seen the long, inconclusive negotiations with Iran over its
nuclear programs, had little interest in a solution involving the United Nations and the atomic energy
agency. An Israeli oIIicial declined to comment on the U.S.-Israeli discussions.
"We looked at the possibility oI talking to |the Syrians| on the diplomatic track," a senior
administration oIIicial said yesterday, "using this to say, 'You need to comply with your international
obligations, stop aiding Ioreign Iighters going into Iraq, stop disrupting the situation in Lebanon, stop
supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, stop repressing your own people, and stop this nuclear activity.' And
telling them we would look at military options but we wanted to take the diplomatic track Iirst. But all
oI our political discussions became moot when Israel acted."
OIIicials said they received their strongest evidence oI a North Korean-Syrian connection a year ago,
primarily Irom Israel, at about the time the North Koreans had inked a deal with the United States and
its negotiating partners to proceed with dismantlement. Since then, U.S. negotiators had demanded and
received North Korea's promise to acknowledge U.S. inIormation about collaboration with Syria.
Key lawmakers nonetheless made it clear that unless the intelligence about Syria was described to them
in detail, they would block Iunding Ior the deal and oppose a key waiver oI a law preventing U.S. aid to
a country that detonates a nuclear weapon.
OIIicials said the timing oI the administration's disclosure was also inIluenced by a provision oI the
U.S. law governing state sponsors oI terrorism, a list that has long included North Korea. Under the
proposed nuclear disarmament deal, Washington has agreed to remove North Korea Irom the list, but
the law requires that it Iirst demonstrate that North Korea has not assisted another country on the list
Ior at least six months. The intelligence presented this week indicated that North Korea helped Syria in
removing equipment Irom the site through early October, meaning the six-month window only recently
closed.
IAEA oIIicials are not optimistic about the prospects Ior their own investigation into the Syrian Iacility.
"It'll be very diIIicult to get to the truth," said a diplomat close to the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency.
"II you give the IAEA inIormation in a timely manner, as soon as you have it, and the veriIication body
can credibly go in there and investigate on the ground, then you may someday know the truth. The way
this was done, we have only their word and photographs."
North Korea, in its negotiations with U.S. oIIicials, was told about key aspects oI the U.S. intelligence
on the Syrian site and had been warned that a public presentation would be Iorthcoming. But the State
Department did not brieI Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustapha until Thursday, in a session described as
"cold and correct but not angry" by a senior State Department oIIicial.
At a news conIerence yesterday, Moustapha said the U.S. claims have no credibility at home or abroad.
"This administration has a proven record oI IalsiIying and Iabricating stories about WMDs. They have
done this beIore, they have done this yesterday, and they will continue to do this in the Iuture," he said.
The Iacility was an vacant military building at the time oI the Israeli airstrike and was not a secret Irom
anyone, he said. "Every commercial satellite service available on Earth was able to provide photos oI
this so-called secret Syrian site Ior the past Iive, six years. I think something is very absurd and
preposterous in the whole story."
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gwu1N6NdbI7MThXmiNHyFH-ZMHygD9093COG0
IAEA's ElBaradei criticizes US Ior holding back inIormation
By GEORGE JAHN
1 day ago [Accessed 2008-04-27T13:00Z]
VIENNA, Austria (AP) The head oI the U.N. nuclear watchdog chastised the United States on
Friday [2008-04-25] Ior withholding inIormation on what Washington says was a nuclear reactor being
built secretly in Syria with help Irom North Korea.
International Atomic Energy Agency director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, also criticized Israel Ior
bombing the alleged nuclear Iacility site seven months ago.
ElBaradei issued a strongly worded statement that reIlected his anger about being kept out oI the loop
about Washington's investigation oI the site and the alleged North Korean assistance.
The IAEA said ElBaradei was not told about the inIormation until Thursday, the day U.S. oIIicials
brieIed Congress about the evidence, which they say includes dozens oI photographs taken Irom
ground level and Iootage oI the interior oI the building gathered by spy satellites aIter the Israeli strike
in September.
"The director general deplores the Iact that this inIormation was not provided to the agency in a timely
manner, in accordance with the agency's responsibilities under the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty, to
enable it to veriIy its veracity and establish the Iacts," said a statement Irom the IAEA.
In Washington, the State Department brushed aside ElBaradei's complaint.
"The Iact oI the matter now is this is an issue that is worthy oI investigation putting aside these
questions oI timing," spokesman Sean McCormack said.
The IAEA's mission includes trying to keep nuclear proliIeration in check, and it depends on member
states Ior inIormation to carry out that task.
ElBaradei and the Bush administration have clashed beIore. In the runup to the Iraq war, he challenged
U.S. claims that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed weapons oI mass destruction. In 2005,
Washington made a Iailed attempt to prevent ElBaradei's re-election.
The IAEA promised Friday to Iollow up on the U.S. intelligence, saying it would "treat this
inIormation with the seriousness it deserves and will investigate the veracity oI the inIormation."
ElBaradei also criticized Israel's airstrike oI the site. Israel has maintained total silence on the issue
since the Sept. 6 bombing.
"The director general views the unilateral use oI Iorce by Israel as undermining the due process oI
veriIication that is at the heart oI the non-proliIeration regime," the statement said.
The IAEA did not directly criticize North Korea or Syria, but said "Syria has an obligation ... to report
the planning and construction oI any nuclear Iacility to the Agency."
Syria denies that it was building a nuclear reactor and insists the site bombed by Israel was an unused
military Iacility.
Syria's U.N. Ambassador Bashar Ja'aIari pledged Friday to cooperate with the IAEA and suggested that
"the main target oI the American CIA allegations against Syria is to justiIy the Israeli attack against the
Syrian side."
"We should be very careIul and cautious with regard to all these kind oI allegations. Anybody could
Iabricate anything these days," Ja'aIari added.
Top U.S. intelligence oIIicials who brieIed reporters in Washington on Thursday said they had high
conIidence in the judgment that North Korea had aided Syria with its nuclear program and the intention
was to produce plutonium. The oIIicials spoke on condition oI anonymity because oI the sensitivity oI
the matter.
However, they said there was no reprocessing Iacility at the site something that would be needed to
extract plutonium Irom spent reactor Iuel Ior use in a bomb. That gives little conIidence that the Iacility
was meant Ior weapons development, they said.
John Bolton, a Iormer U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said ElBaradei's criticism was "entirely
unwarranted" and deIended Israel's decision to strike the Syrian site.
"The IAEA was and remains unable to deal with regimes like Syria," he told the AP. "Israel did what
was necessary to deIend itselI, and the U.S. had no obligation to brieI the IAEA in such a matter."
Associated Press writers Pamela Hess and Matthew Lee in Washington and Edith M. Lederer at the
United Nations contributed to this report.
State Department Tells U.N. to Stop Complaining and Start Investigating Syria's Secret
Nuclear Reactor Project
Friday, April 25, 2008
VIENNA, Austria The State Department had a pointed response Friday Ior the U.N.'s criticism that
the U.S. did not come Iorward with inIormation about Syria's clandestine nuclear reactor program: Get
over it and start investigating.
"We would expect and hope that the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) would investigate
this matter," spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters. "The Iact oI the matter now is this is an issue
that is worthy oI investigation putting aside these questions oI timing."
McCormack was responding to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's complaint that the U.S.
did not give his organization intelligence inIormation sooner on what Washington says was a nuclear
reactor in Syria being built secretly by North Korea.
ElBaradei's also chastised Israel Ior bombing the site seven months ago, in a statement whose strong
language reIlected anger at being kept out oI the picture Ior so long.
The White House broke its silence about the issue on Thursday, just hours aIter top U.S. legislators
members oI the House oI Representatives Intelligence Committee were brieIed on the alleged
reactor. U.S. intelligence oIIicials said evidence included dozens oI photographs taken Irom ground
level as well as Iootage oI the interior oI the building taken by spy satellites aIter the Israeli strike.
The IAEA's mission includes trying to keep nuclear proliIeration in check, and it depends on member
states Ior inIormation in trying to carry out that task. The agency is investigating allegations that Iran
tried to make nuclear weapons, and it is using not only its own research but intelligence provided by
the U.S. and other members oI the 35-nation IAEA board.
"The director general deplores the Iact that this inIormation was not provided to the agency in a timely
manner, in accordance with the agency's responsibilities under the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty, to
enable it to veriIy its veracity and establish the Iacts," said an IAEA statement, issued a day aIter
ElBaradei was brieIed.
Additionally, "the director general views the unilateral use oI Iorce by Israel as undermining the due
process oI veriIication that is at the heart oI the nonproliIeration regime," it said.
Promising a Iollow-up, the statement said the IAEA "will treat this inIormation with the seriousness it
deserves and will investigate the veracity oI the inIormation," adding: "Syria has an obligation ... to
report the planning and construction oI any nuclear Iacility to the Agency."
John Rood, the U.S. undersecretary oI state Ior arms control, brieIed ElBaradei by telephone.
Additionally, a senior U.S. oIIicial, who spoke on condition oI anonymity because oI the sensitivity oI
the matter, said a U.S. intelligence team was in Vienna to brieI IAEA representatives.
A senior diplomat linked to the IAEA said ElBaradei had already let his displeasure be known to Rood,
during the U.S. oIIicial's phone call, over the delay between the time the inIormation became available
to the U.S. and when he was inIormed oI it. U.S. Congressional Intelligence Committee members also
expressed anger Thursday over the seven-month time lapse beIore their committee was brieIed.
In Washington, the State Department brushed aside elBaradei's complaint.
"The Iact now is that the IAEA is being brieIed, they are being provided the inIormation and we
believe that this is certainly an issue that merits close scrutiny and investigation by the IAEA,"
McCormack said.
"The Iact oI Syria having a nuclear reactor that is in violation oI their NPT obligations in our
estimation is something worthy oI investigation by the IAEA," McCormack said, reIerring to the
NonproliIeration Treaty. "And, certainly the Syrians as a member oI the treaty should grant access to
the IAEA to the site."
John Bolton, who has served as U.S. ambassador and beIore that held Rood's job at a time the U.S. was
considering trying to push ElBaradei out Irom his position, said the IAEA's chieI criticism is "entirely
unwarranted."
"The IAEA was and remains unable to deal with regimes like Syria," he said in an e-mail to the AP.
"Israel did what was necessary to deIend itselI, and the U.S. had no obligation to brieI the IAEA in
such a matter."
While U.S. undersecretary oI state Ior arms control several years ago, Bolton was a chieI ElBaradei
critic at a time Washington was lobbying Ior ElBaradei's replacement because oI his diIIerences with
the U.S. administration over how much oI a nuclear threat Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq posed.
ElBaradei did not criticize Syria and North Korea. And U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he
lacked "concrete inIormation" on the issue. But the U.N. chieI told reporters while on a visit to Vienna
that "as a matter oI principle, this proliIeration oI weapons oI mass destruction ... is a serious source oI
great concern"
"(The) international community must work hard to prevent such proliIeration," he said.
Repeating its previous stance, Syria denied the allegations Thursday.
But in Seoul, Kim Sook, South Korea's top nuclear envoy, said the allegations oI nuclear cooperation
between North Korea and Syria were credible and urged Pyongyang to IulIill a promise to declare all
its atomic programs.
"We share the concern expressed by the U.S. government about the North Korean nuclear weapons
program and nuclear proliIeration activities," Kim told The AP in a telephone interview Friday.
[deletia]
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5h9koW8sbYaxGGzOuU1O6cntXva1AD9095UJ80
Syrian envoy says CIA fabricated evidence
By PAMELA HESS
1 day ago |Accessed 2008-04-27T13:35Z|
WASHINGTON (AP) Syria's ambassador to the United States said Friday that the CIA Iabricated
pictures allegedly taken inside a secret Syrian nuclear reactor and predicted that in the coming weeks
the U.S. story about the site would "implode Irom within."
"The photos presented to me yesterday were ludicrous, laughable," Ambassador Imad Moustapha told
reporters at his Washington residence.
However, he reIused to say what the building in the remote eastern desert oI Syria was used Ior beIore
Israeli jets bombed it in September 2007.
Senior U.S. intelligence oIIicials said Thursday they believe it was a secret nuclear reactor meant to
produce plutonium, which can be used to make high-yield nuclear weapons. They alleged that North
Korea aided in the design, construction and outIitting oI the building.
Syria bulldozed the building's ruins a month aIter it was bombed and constructed a new, larger building
in its place, leaving little or no evidence oI what had been on the site.
Moustapha would not explain the purpose oI the new building. But he said the lack oI military
checkpoints, air deIenses or barbed wire Iences around either building should show that it was not a
sensitive Iacility.
So Iar, Syria has not allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the area.
Syria's ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar Ja'aIari, pledged on Friday to cooperate with the
IAEA and suggested that "the main target oI the American CIA allegations against Syria is to justiIy
the Israeli attack against the Syrian side."
In a message to employees, CIA Director Michael Hayden praised the agency's "outstanding" work,
calling it "a case study in rigorous analytic tradecraIt, skillIul human and technical collection."
But some outside nuclear experts were questioning some oI the CIA's analysis, though not disputing its
conclusions.
David Albright, president oI the nonproIit Institute Ior Science and International Security, analyzed
commercial satellite imagery oI the bombed Iacility last Iall and surmised then it was a nuclear reactor.
He questioned the intelligence agencies' conclusion that the reactor was within months or weeks oI
completion.
"It's not clear-cut it was ready to turn on," Albright said.
He also took issue with the Bush administration's assertion that the reactor was solely intended to
support a nuclear weapons program. OIIicials said Thursday the reactor was ill-suited Ior electrical
generation it lacked distribution wires or substations and did not bear the hallmarks oI a research
reactor. They concluded the plutonium was thereIore meant Ior weapons but acknowledged they had no
direct evidence oI that.
Almost all reactors produce plutonium, even those dedicated to peaceIul purposes, Albright said.
"Civilian uses are possible and cannot be dismissed out oI hand," he said. "I think the CIA and the
White House have not shown that the only possibility Ior this reactor is that it was to make plutonium
Ior nuclear weapons."
"It very well could be true," he said, "but it is Iar less than ironclad, absent other inIormation."
According to the CIA, the Syrian reactor was modeled on a small North Korean reactor built at
Yongbyon. That Iacility produced a small amount oI plutonium Ior nuclear weapons. Albright said that
Iacility was also a research eIIort to determine iI the North Koreans could scale up the model to
produce electricity eIIiciently.
SiegIried Hecker, the co-director Ior StanIord University's Center Ior International Security and
Cooperation, said the evidence strongly suggests Syria's intention was to produce plutonium. He agreed
with the assessment that the plant was not well-suited Ior generating electricity.
"On the other hand, it was the best path to bomb-grade plutonium," he said. "That was most likely the
primary purpose oI this Iacility."
One piece oI evidence that casts doubt on Syrian intentions to produce plutonium Ior weapons was the
absence oI a reprocessing Iacility, necessary to extract plutonium Irom spent nuclear Iuel.
But Anthony Cordesman, a military expert with the Center Ior Strategic and International Studies, said
that may not have been a serious impediment. Syria could quickly build such a reprocessing capability,
he said.
Cordesman also said the CIA undercut its case against Syria by not explaining how a plutonium-
producing reactor would Iit into Syria's "long history" oI suspicious activities that suggest it is trying to
develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
http://www.gulInews.com/region/Syria/10208874.html
Doubts cast over US data on Syrian nuclear reactor
By Demetri Sevastopulo and Daniel Dombey, Financial Times
Published: April 27, 2008, 00:45
Washington: When US oIIicials on Thursday rolled out evidence to support allegations that North
Korea had helped Syria construct a nuclear reactor, they said the intelligence community had "low"
conIidence that the purpose oI the reactor was to produce plutonium Ior nuclear weapons.
Some experts are questioning the strength oI the intelligence included in the high-proIile presentations
that were made to more than 200 members oI Congress on Saturday and later to the media.
"The end result has been Iar more speculation about the meaning and credibility oI US reporting than
should have been the case," said Anthony Cordesman at the Centre Ior Strategic and International
Studies.
"Once again, the US intelligence community has created an unnecessary mess by rushing out a halI-
complete product, and Iailing to put the inIormation in releases in proper context." Meanwhile, a
nuclear physicist close to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cast doubt yesterday on the
veracity oI US intelligence.
"When you look at the |US intelligence services| pictures, they show only raw construction," an expert
close to the IAEA said.
"It was just the shell oI a site, and the walls did not look like the ones needed Ior a plutonium reactor."
Walls oI a plutonium reactor "need a lot oI piping, there was nothing like that on the pictures", he
added.
Assad says facility Israel bombed not nuclear: paper
Sunday, April 27, 2008; 9:52 AM
DUBAI (Reuters) - The Syrian site Israel bombed in September was not part oI a nuclear weapons
program, but was a military Iacility under construction, President Bashar al-Assad said in remarks
published on Sunday.
Last week, Washington released intelligence alleging Syria had built a nuclear reactor with North
Korean help beIore an Israeli air strike destroyed the Iacility on September 6.
"Is it logical? A nuclear site did not have protection with surIace to air deIenses? A nuclear site within
the Iootprint oI satellites in the middle oI Syria in an open area in the desert?" Assad asked Qatar's al-
Watan newspaper in an interview conducted beIore the U.S. accusations were made.
At that stage, he was commenting on media reports that said the target was a nuclear site. "The truth is
that the raid was at a military site under construction," Assad said in the interview. "We are against
mass destruction weapons Ior Israel, Iran or others."
Assad said it was illogical Ior Syria to seek a nuclear bomb. "Where would we use it? On Israel it
would kill the Palestinians. I do not see this as logical."
Speaking aIter the U.S. accusations, Syria's ambassador to the United States dismissed as "a Iantasy"
the U.S. allegations.
Assad said he did not know why Israel, oIIicially at war with Syria since the 1973 Middle East conIlict,
bombed the site.
"Why did they raid it, we do not know what data they had, but they know and they see through
satellites; they have raided an incomplete site that did not have any personnel or anything. It was
empty," he added.
BILATERAL RELATIONS
Asked about Syria's response, Assad said: "Retaliation does not mean a missile Ior a missile, a bomb
Ior a bomb or a bullet Ior a bullet ... They (Israelis) understand what we mean. We do not say that we
will retaliate, i.e. we will bomb."
"You have to ask a diIIerent question; had Syria not been harming Israeli policy would Israel have
carried out an operation oI this sort? The truth is that we have the means to respond, but in our own
way."
"We understand Israel wants to provoke Syria and possibly to drag Syria into war while we do not seek
war. We have been clear about this point. We have other means and we do not necessarily have to
declare them."
Assad reIused to answer a question about reports that Syria was seeking to acquire Russian missiles.
"II there was a door open, even iI it was small, Ior peace you should not seek war but you should seek
to deIend yourselI. Now are you prepared or not, psychologically we are always ready and constantly
prepare ourselves, but in terms oI results no one knows results until the battle itselI."
Watan ran part oI the interview on Thursday in which he said Damascus was ready to negotiate with
Israel through Turkey to "Iind common ground" Ior peace, but any direct talks must wait until a new
U.S. president is elected.
Syria says it received word Irom Turkey that Israel was willing to give back the occupied Golan
Heights in Iull in return Ior peace with the Arab state -- a key issue that led decade-long negotiations to
Ialter in 2000.
(Reporting by Summer Said; writing by Inal Ersan)
US Lawmakers Criticize Bush Administration Over Intelligence on Syria
By Michael Bowman
Washington
27 April 2008
U.S. legislators oI both political parties are criticizing the Bush administration Ior only recently
disclosing intelligence it possessed about an alleged secret Syrian nuclear reactor that Israel bombed
last year. From Washington, VOA's Michael Bowman reports.
Last week, senior U.S. intelligence oIIicials revealed that they have long believed that the Iacility
targeted by Israel was a Syrian reactor designed to produce plutonium that had been constructed with
the assistance oI North Korea. The revelation took many in Washington and beyond by surprise, and is
dcausing deep concern among Republican and Democratic members oI Congress.
A key ally oI President Bush on Capitol Hill, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence
Committee, Representative Peter Hoekstra, says last week's brieIing by U.S. intelligence oIIicials leIt
him with more questions than answers. Hoekstra voiced his concerns about the Syrian Iacility on
CNN's Late Edition program.
"How close was this to being operational? Who Iunded this Ior Syria? How close was the North
Korean-Syrian cooperation? And where else might North Korea have been involved in proliIeration,"
he asked.
Hoekstra said, had the Bush administration revealed what it knew about the Syrian Iacility sooner, his
committee and other entities could have probed the matter and possibly arrived at answers beIore now.
Hoekstra's words were echoed by a Democratic member oI the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. Senator Dianne Feinstein said, not only should the Bush administration have been more
Iorthcoming about the intelligence it possessed on the Syrian Iacility, the intelligence should have been
presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"I think it should have gone immediately to the IAEA," she said. "That is why the IAEA is there |to
investigate|. And by not sharing inIormation immediately, what we do is destroy their veriIication
potential as an independent outside agency."
Feinstein added that she was puzzled by the timing oI the Bush administration's release oI intelligence
on Syria, coming seven months aIter Israel bombed the suspected nuclear Iacility.
In brieIings with the news media, U.S. intelligence oIIicials said the delay in disclosure was motivated
by a desire to prevent conIrontation and conIlict in the Middle East. They said they Ieared Syria would
Ieel greater pressure to retaliate against Israel Ior the bombing iI U.S. intelligence about the Iacility had
been made public.
Syria has steadIastly denied U.S. allegations about the purpose oI the Iacility.
U.S. intelligence has come under greater scrutiny at home and abroad with many questioning the
reliability and accuracy oI the inIormation America gathers on its adversaries since the lead-up to the
2003 the U.S.-led invasion oI Iraq.
At the time, the Bush administration alleged Iraq was actively pursuing weapons oI mass destruction.
To date, little iI any prooI has come to light in Iraq that supports the administration's contention, which
served as a primary justiIication Ior ousting Saddam Hussein.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-Ig-intel28apr28,1,968447.story?trackrss
Timing of North Korea revelations questioned
A key Republican says evidence alleging North Korea's link to a site in Syria is a bid to gain leverage
in nuclear talks.
By Nicole Gaouette
Los Angeles Times StaII Writer
April 28, 2008
WASHINGTON A senior Republican congressman assailed the Bush administration Sunday Ior the
timing and nature oI its charges that North Korea helped Syria build a secret nuclear weapons Iacility.
Administration oIIicials went beIore the Senate and House intelligence panels last week carrying
satellite imagery and photos that they said linked North Korea with the desert structure that Israel
destroyed in an airstrike last year.
"The administration has handled this very badly" and "has a credibility problem," Rep. Peter Hoekstra
oI Michigan, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, said on CNN's "Late
Edition."
The allegations come as negotiations continue between the United States and other countries and North
Korea over the dismantling oI the Pyongyang government's nuclear program.
In exchange Ior North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program, the Bush administration has
oIIered to ease sanctions on the isolated country and remove it Irom a list oI states that sponsor
terrorism -- steps that conservative lawmakers see as unacceptable concessions.
Hoekstra said he believed that the administration's revelations were an attempt to gain leverage in the
talks, but that the strategy might backIire with Congress, particularly among those conservatives.
"I think the administration believes it will help them get to a deal with North Korea," he said.
"The timing oI it, what inIormation they released, what inIormation they did not release and who they
released it to, is going to make it more diIIicult Ior them to reach an agreement that will be supported
by Congress and supported by the American people," Hoekstra said.
Both Hoekstra and Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein oI CaliIornia, a member oI the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, said on the CNN program that based on the administration's presentation,
they had little doubt the Syrian Iacility was related to nuclear production.
Some photos appeared to show rods that control heat in a nuclear reactor and buildings that bear strong
structural and engineering similarities to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor.
"This is compelling inIormation," Hoekstra said.
In remarks published Sunday, Syrian President Bashar Assad dismissed the allegations that the site
known as Al Kibar was involved in nuclear activities.
"Is it logical?" Assad told a Qatari newspaper, insisting that Al Kibar had been a nonnuclear military
site. Assad reportedly gave the interview beIore the administration's April 24 presentation to Congress
and was responding to media reports that the site may have housed a reactor.
"A nuclear site did not have protection with surIace-to-air missiles? A nuclear site within the Iootprint
oI satellites in the middle oI Syria in an open area in the desert?" Assad said.
Feinstein said the administration's inIormation raised questions about North Korea's potential
proliIeration activities in other parts oI the world.
She suggested that North Korea may have been the target oI the administration's inIormation campaign,
and that the administration may also have been "one way or another inIluencing an agreement with
Syria and Israel."
Hoekstra and Feinstein also criticized the White House Ior not sharing more inIormation with Congress
in general and the intelligence committees in particular, a recurring complaint against the Bush
administration.
Despite lawmakers' repeated requests Ior brieIings, the administration has said almost nothing about
the Israeli airstrike, which took place Sept. 6, 2007.
Feinstein said she learned oI the North Korean link Ior the Iirst time when the administration sent CIA
Director Michael V. Hayden, Director oI National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell and White House
national security advisor Stephen Hadley to brieI Congress last week.
Lawmakers are wary because the Bush White House has been tightIisted with inIormation, Feinstein
said. When the administration does share intelligence, such as the Syrian satellite imagery and photos,
she said, "it makes us very suspicious as to why are they doing it right now."
Alluding to the administration's incorrect prewar claims that Iraq had weapons oI mass destruction,
Hoekstra said the White House needs to build trust.
"The administration has a credibility problem. And iI they're going to deal with this credibility
problem, the way to deal with it is to be more open, especially with members oI Congress," he said.
nicole.gaouettelatimes.com
N.Koreans may have died in Israel raid in Syria: NHK
Reuters
Monday, April 28, 2008; 3:23 AM
TOKYO (Reuters) - Ten North Koreans helping build a suspected nuclear reactor in Syria may have
died in an Israeli air raid last September, Japanese public broadcaster NHK said on Monday, citing
South Korean intelligence oIIicials.
The report Iollows the release oI photographs by the United States last week oI what it said was a
Syrian nuclear reactor capable oI producing plutonium built with North Korean help.
Israel destroyed the suspected reactor in a September 6 air strike.
NHK said the dead included oIIicials oI the North Korea's communist party unit that exports weapons
and military technology and members oI the North Korean military unit which made nuclear Iacilities
in the country.
Two or three North Koreans survived the air strike but it is not clear what happened to them aIterwards,
NHK reported.
Syria has denied the U.S. charge as "a Iantasy."
Pyongyang has been reluctant to discuss any transIer oI nuclear technology to other countries, notably
Syria, as well as to account Ior its suspected pursuit oI uranium enrichment.
(Reporting by Yoko Kubota)
Hayden: Syrian site could have produced fuel for 2 weapons
By PAMELA HESS
Monday, April 28, 2008; 11:00 PM
WASHINGTON -- CIA Director Michael Hayden said Monday that the alleged Syrian nuclear reactor
destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in September would have produced enough plutonium Ior one or two
bombs within a year oI becoming operational.
U.S. intelligence and administration oIIicials publicly disclosed last week their assessment that Syria
was building a covert nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance. They said it was modeled on the
shuttered North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, which produced a small amount oI plutonium. The Syrian
site, they said, was within weeks or months oI being operational.
"In the course oI a year aIter they got Iull up they would have produced enough plutonium Ior one or
two weapons," Hayden told reporters aIter a speech at Georgetown University.
Almost all reactors produce plutonium, even those dedicated to peaceIul purposes, according to David
Albright, president oI the nonproIit Institute Ior Science and International Security. Albright analyzed
commercial satellite imagery oI the bombed Iacility last Iall and surmised then it was a nuclear reactor.
Neither the United States nor Israel told the International Atomic Energy Agency about the Syrian site
until last week, about a year aIter they obtained what they considered to be decisive intelligence:
dozens oI photographs Irom a handheld camera that showed both the interior and exterior oI the
mysterious compound in Syria's eastern desert.
From the CIA's perspective, that intelligence was not the United States' to share with the U.N. nuclear
watchdog, Hayden said.
"We've made it clear we did not have complete control over the totality oI the inIormation because
obviously it was the result oI a team eIIort," he said. "One has to respect the origin oI the inIormation
in terms oI how it is used."
The head oI the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency chastised the United States on Friday Ior withholding
inIormation on the alleged Syrian reactor. One oI the IAEA's missions is to try to prevent nuclear
proliIeration, and it depends on member states Ior inIormation.
A senior administration oIIicial told reporters last week that the United States kept the inIormation
secret aIter the Israeli strike because it Ieared revealing it might provoke Syria to strike back at Israel.
Alleged Syria-North Korea Nuclear Cooperation Raises Questions
By Gary Thomas
Washington
28 April 2008
U.S. intelligence oIIicials last week outlined details oI what they said was North Korean nuclear
assistance to Syria. Syria has denied U.S. allegations that it was running a covert nuclear weapons
program or that it was getting help Irom Pyongyang. As VOA correspondent Gary Thomas reports, the
timing oI the revelations has raised questions about the motivation Ior their release.
Alleged North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria is not exactly Iresh news. AIter a secret Israeli
air strike destroyed a Iacility in Syria last September, Andrew Semmel, the top State Department
oIIicial Ior nonproliIeration, said publicly that the United States was concerned about nuclear activity
in Syria and suggested Damascus was getting help Irom Pyongyang. When speaking to reporters oII the
record other oIIicials were even more speciIic.
US oIIicials said this Syrian nuclear reactor built with North Korean help, which was hit by Israeli
strike
However, intelligence oIIicials only brieIed members oI Congress in detail about it last week. And, in a
surprising move Ior the usually secret intelligence community, they also brieIed selected members oI
the media.
Semmel, now retired, says he is puzzled that it took so long to reveal the inIormation since Congress
has been pressing Ior details oI Syria's activity since the Israeli raid.
"Congress has been pressing the administration,and others have been, too, to come clean on this or to
come out some more with a little bit more inIormation. And at this point in time maybe the Ieeling was,
'maybe' is the key word here, maybe the Ieeling was that somehow or another the intelligence
community and others could not keep the lid on it any more, so they wanted to go out, I'm putting a
positive spin on this, by the way, so there would be no major distortions oI what actually happened, he
said."
Semmel, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary oI State Ior NonproliIeration Policy, says the message oI
the revelations could have been targeted at one or several countries.
"The calculation may very well have been that there are multiple positives to this, message to Iran,
message certainly to Syria, message to North Korea, et cetera. What puzzles me is why we waited until
now to even inIorm the International Atomic Energy Agency. It seems to me that iI we wanted the
I.A.E.A. to play a positive role as a neutral monitor oI the situation that we would have shared that
inIormation with them, perhaps discreetly, much earlier," said Simmel.
The I.A.E.A., which is the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, was only brieIed by U.S. oIIicials last week.
Semmel says that when he raised with policymakers the idea oI notiIying the I.A.E.A., he was rebuIIed.
"This was so tightly held that one didn't know whether in Iact we were or not sharing that with the
I.A.E.A. Some oI us even at my Iairly senior level raised the question in our limited circle. And
basically there was no response, this is not Ior discussion. It was really a bizarre policy issue," he
added.
MurhaI Jouejati, a Syrian-born specialist on Middle East aIIairs at the U.S. National DeIense
University, says the revelations could be aimed at getting leverage with North Korea in the six-party
talks over its own nuclear program. He also thinks that they might be aimed at undercutting any
potential deal between Israel and Syria over Israel's holding oI the Golan Heights.
"There is a history, oI course, oI apparently the Bush Administration not wanting Israel to engage with
the Syrians, wanting to isolate the Syrians totally. And on the other hand, again, those elements in the
administration have Ior a long time apparently not wanted North Korea to get oII as easily, they say, as
this on their nuclear activities. And so both really make sense to me. Which one has more weight, I'm
not really sure. They are both very plausible," he said.
Jouejati also says that while Syria possesses some chemical and biological weapons capability, it has
neither the money nor the inIrastructure Ior a costly nuclear venture.
Syrian reactor capacity was 1-2 weapons/year: CIA
By Randall Mikkelsen
Reuters
Monday, April 28, 2008; 9:06 PM
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A suspected Syrian reactor bombed by Israel had the capacity to produce
enough nuclear material to Iuel one to two weapons a year, CIA Director Michael Hayden said on
Monday.
Hayden said the plutonium reactor was within weeks or months oI completion when it was destroyed in
an air strike last September 6, and within a year oI entering operation it could have produced enough
material Ior at least one weapon.
"In the course oI a year aIter they got Iull up, they would have produced enough plutonium Ior one or
two weapons," Hayden told reporters aIter a speech.
The reactor was oI a "similar size and technology" to North Korea's Yongbyon reactor, Hayden said,
disputing speculation it was smaller than the Korean Iacility.
"We would estimate that the production rate there would be about the same as Yongbyon, which is
about enough plutonium Ior one or two weapons per year," he said.
Hayden's comments were the Iirst statement on the suspected reactor's capacity, and his Iirst public
remarks since the United States released photos oI what it said was a secret nuclear reactor built with
North Korean aid.
Syria has denied the U.S. charges and accused Washington oI involvement in the air attack by Israel,
which is believed to have the only nuclear arsenal in the Middle East.
A diplomat close to the U.N. nuclear watchdog and outside analysts have said the U.S. disclosure did
not amount to prooI oI an illicit arms program because there was no sign oI a reprocessing plant needed
to convert spent Iuel Irom the plant into bomb-grade plutonium.
The United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency has also criticized the United States Ior
waiting until this month to share its intelligence. The delay complicates the IAEA's eIIort to conIirm
whether the Iacility was a plutonium reactor.
'TEAM EFFORT'
Hayden said the United States lacked the liberty earlier to pass on the intelligence, which he said was
acquired in a "team eIIort." ABC News reported in October that Israel had obtained pictures oI the
Syrian complex Irom an apparent mole and showed them to the CIA.
"We did not have complete control oI the totality oI the inIormation," Hayden said. U.S. oIIicials have
declined to identiIy sources oI the intelligence.
Asked whether Washington had eventually gotten approval to pass on the intelligence, Hayden said,
"One would never share the intelligence without consultation with that nation, as a general principle."
A senior Bush administration oIIicial said at a brieIing last week the intelligence was disclosed this
month in part to pressure North Korea in disarmament talks to Iully acknowledge its nuclear and
proliIeration activities, and to widen the circle oI U.S. lawmakers brieIed on the issue.
Congressional support is key to President George W. Bush's goal oI making progress toward ending
North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
Senior intelligence oIIicials said at the brieIing they told Bush the Syrian Iacility was a plutonium
reactor built with North Korean cooperation and intended to Iuel a nuclear weapons program.
They acknowledged their conIidence level was relatively low over its purpose as a weapons Iacility,
due to limited evidence.
The oIIicials said there was no reprocessing Iacility in the area oI the destroyed reactor, but declined to
Iurther discuss their views oI any Syrian reprocessing capability.
(Editing by Peter Cooney)
April 29, 2008
Press ConIerence by the President
Rose Garden
10:31 A.M. EDT
[EXCERPT]
Q Mr. President, thank you, sir. Previously when asked about Israel's September bombing oI the Syrian
Iacility, you reIused aggressively to discuss it. Then suddenly last week, your administration released
classiIied photos and details oI that bombing, intelligence oIIicials claiming that it showed that this
Iacility was a North Korean-designed nuclear Iacility being actually built with the help oI Pyongyang.
Why the turnaround, sir? What did you hope that that would accomplish? And what do you say to
lawmakers oI both parties on Capitol Hill who are quite concerned that indeed iI this was what this
Iacility was, that it took some eight months Ior you to inIorm them, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Let me correct the record. We brieIed 22 members oI Congress on
what I'm about to tell you. First, we were concerned that an early disclosure would increase the risk oI
a conIrontation in the Middle East or retaliation in the Middle East. As I mentioned to you early on, we
did notiIy 22 members oI Congress, key committee chairmen. And I was -- I'm mindIul that there was
going to be this kind oI reaction, and oI course, we wanted to include more members oI Congress at a
time when we Ielt the risk oI retaliation or conIrontation in the Middle East was reduced, and so that
moment came upon us, and then extended the brieIings.
We also wanted to advance certain policy objectives through the disclosures, and one would be to the
North Koreans, to make it abundantly clear that we may know more about you than you think, and
thereIore, it's essential that you have a complete disclosure on not only your plutonium activities, but
proliIeration, as well as enrichment activities.
And then we have an interest in sending a message to Iran, and the world Ior that matter, about just
how destabilizing a -- nuclear proliIeration would be in the Middle East, and that it's essential that we
work together to enIorce U.N. Security Council resolutions aimed at getting Iran to stop their
enrichment programs. In other words, one oI the things that this example shows is that these programs
can exist and people don't know about them -- because the Syrians simply didn't declare the program;
they had a hidden program.
And Iinally, we wanted to make it clear to Syria -- and the world -- that their intransigence in dealing
with helping us in Iraq, or destabilizing Lebanon, or dealing with Hamas -- which is a destablizing
Iorce in our eIIorts to have a Palestinian state coexist peaceIully with Israel -- that those eIIorts are --
gives us a chance to remind the world that we need to work together to deal with those issues. So that's
why we made the decision we made.
Bush: Revealing Reactor Was Meant to Pressure N. Korea
By Michael Abramowitz
Wednesday, April 30, 2008; A15
President Bush said yesterday that his administration's disclosure oI secret inIormation last week about
suspected North Korean assistance Ior a Syrian nuclear reactor was designed to pressure Pyongyang to
come clean on its nuclear activities.
At a Rose Garden news conIerence, Bush also said he wanted to send a message to Iran to cooperate
with international eIIorts to limit proliIeration, and to Syria to help stabilize Iraq and Lebanon.
"One oI the things that this example shows is that these programs can exist and people don't know
about them," Bush told reporters. He added that "the Syrians simply didn't declare the program; they
had a hidden program."
Bush and other senior administration oIIicials were silent Ior nearly eight months about Israel's
destruction last September oI a building that U.S. intelligence oIIicials said last week was a nuclear
reactor, built with North Korea's assistance. Syria has denied it was building a reactor.
The discovery oI North Korean ties to the Iacility has complicated U.S. eIIorts to get the country to
give up nuclear weapons. Under a deal involving Pyongyang, Washington and other parties to the talks,
North Korea is supposed to provide an inventory oI its nuclear program, but it has yet to do so.
Bush said the disclosures last week should make it "abundantly clear" to North Korea that "we may
know more about you than you think, and thereIore it's essential that you have a complete disclosure on
not only your plutonium activities, but proliIeration, as well as enrichment activities."
In recent negotiations, the administration has pulled back on its demand Ior Iull disclosure, requesting
that North Korea only acknowledge U.S. concerns and evidence on proliIeration and uranium
enrichment.
Bush avoided criticism oI Iormer president Jimmy Carter's recent talks with Hamas, the radical
Palestinian group classiIied by the U.S. government as a terrorist entity. The United States reIuses to
engage with Hamas, which Bush said is "undermining peace."
"They're the ones whose Ioreign policy objective is the destruction oI Israel," he said. "They're the ones
who are trying to create enough violence to stop the advance oI the two-party state solution."
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/sssyria01020430.asp
CIA's Hayden: Syria was on verge of becoming nuclear power
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
WASHINGTON The U.S. intelligence community, in an about-Iace Irom an assessment oI less than
a year ago, has concluded that Syria was close to becoming a nuclear power.
In the course oI a year aIter they got Iull up they would have produced enough plutonium Ior one or
two weapons," CIA director Michael Hayden said.
The new assessment was that Syria was weeks away Irom operating a North Korean-built plutonium
production plant near the Turkish border. That Iacility, the intelligence community assessed, could
have produced up to two bombs in the Iirst year oI operation.
On April 28, Hayden said the Syrian reactor could have begun producing suIIicient amounts oI
plutonium Ior an atomic weapon. Speaking to reporters aIter an address at Georgetown University, the
CIA director said inIormation oI the North Korean-designed nuclear reactor came Irom Israel and could
not be shared with the IAEA until mid-April.
"We've made it clear we did not have complete control over the totality oI the inIormation because
obviously it was the result oI a team eIIort, Hayden said. "One has to respect the origin oI the
inIormation in terms oI how it is used."
OIIicials acknowledged that the U.S. assessment marked a near reversal oI that in July 2007 when
Israel provided aerial photographs oI the plant and a video oI the North Korean scientists inside. At the
time, the oIIicials said, the CIA and State Department said the North Korean Iacility destroyed by
the Israel Air Force in September 2007 was years away Irom being completed and even tested.
"Much oI the revision oI the CIA assessment came aIter the Israeli bombing when evidence oI nuclear
material was Iound," an oIIicial said. "We also learned a lot Irom the Syrian reIusal to the International
Atomic Energy Agency to visit the site."
OIIicials acknowledged that the State Department, particularly Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice
sought to play down the Israeli evidence. They said Ms. Rice and her aides recruited CIA analysts who
asserted that the Syrian Iacility, termed Al Kibar, was not designed Ior an atomic bomb.
Ms. Rice and Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill were said to have argued that any
determination oI a North Korean nuclear Iacility in Syria would torpedo U.S.-led negotiations Ior
Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. OIIicials said Israel did not report any uranium
shipments to Al Kibar.
The U.S. intelligence community eventually agreed with the Israeli assessment oI a North Korean
nuclear program in Syria. OIIicials said Hayden agreed with analysts who determined that Pyongyang
violated its February 2007 pledge to halt nuclear proliIeration. The intelligence community suspected
that North Korea had been helping Syria's nuclear program since 2001.
By June 2007, oIIicials said, the CIA received inIormation Irom Israel that North Korea was building a
suspected nuclear reactor. OIIicials said the Israeli aerial and ground-based photographs overcame
doubts that stemmed Irom satellite images oI the Iacility.
At that point, Hayden said, the U.S. intelligence community dismissed arguments that the reactor could
be meant Ior energy production. He said the Israeli photographs also showed that the building was a
nuclear reactor.
"Our team eIIort on the Al Kibar reactor is a case study in rigorous analytic tradecraIt, skillIul human
and technical collection, and close collaboration with our community colleagues and liaison partners,"
Hayden said on April 24. Our oIIicers put in long hours on this issue Ior many months, and their hard
work paid oII by directly advancing our nation's security and that oI our allies."
May 1, 2008
Press BrieIing by Tony Fratto
12:40 P.M. EDT
[EXCERPT]
MR. FRATTO: Good aIternoon, everyone. I actually have nothing to lead oII with, so we can go
straight to questions. Terry, you ready?
Q The President said this week at the news conIerence that he wanted to make -- that one oI the reasons
you disclosed the North Korean program in Syria last week was to make them know that we know
more than they think we might. Has there been any response Irom North Korea? Has there been any
communication since the -- last week's disclosure?
MR. FRATTO: I'm not aware oI a speciIic response Irom the North Koreans. But it's clear, as the
President talked about, we want to make sure that we're transparent in this and what we're seeing with
respect to proliIeration activities, and that the world can see what we knew. We made it clear in our
brieIings to the Congress, and that's the best way to proceed on this.
Now, we've had our State Department oIIicials who were recently in North Korea, and they continue
their communications in the context oI the six-party talks, and they're progressing. And we just counsel
some patience, and wait to see what we get back Irom the North Koreans, in terms oI their declaration,
that it be complete and accurate. And so we're working with them on that.
Q How long is the United States willing to wait?
MR. FRATTO: I don't think it's something that you can put a time Irame on. Sooner is better than later,
and that's what our negotiators are working towards.
Yes, Helen.
Q When did it reach this magniIicent decision Ior transparency when it waited eight months, or seven
months to reveal it?
MR. FRATTO: Those were decisions that were made by the intelligence community and our senior
oIIicials here. And we respect the concerns oI Congress, that we heard Irom Congress, and they
thought this was the best way to proceed. And the President made the decision on that.
Q You don't call this a devotion to transparency, do you?
MR. FRATTO: I think in this case it was important to be transparent, and that's a decision we made,
Helen.
Q And not to put pressure on Korea and so Iorth?
MR. FRATTO: I think we were clear in how -- in what the context was oI that.
http://www.Ias.org/irp/dni/osc/dprk-syria.pdI
[EXCERPT]
Syria: U.S. nuclear reactor allegations aim to create Mideast crisis
By The Associated Press
Last update - 05:04 03/05/2008
GENEVA - Damascus on Friday [2008-05-02| accused the current U.S. administration oI Iabricating a report
allegedly proving Syria had built a nuclear reactor in a plot to destabilize the region.
"U.S. allegations about the reactor were manuIactured in order to create Iurther crisis in the Middle East," Syrian
Ambassador Faysal al-Hamoui told a conIerence on the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty in Geneva.
Earlier Friday the United States submitted a paper to the conIerence saying the treaty's biggest problem was
noncompliance by countries like Syria and Iran which it said were seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
The United States also cited North Korea's nuclear weapons program and said reports its nuclear cooperation
with other countries warranted serious vigilance.
"North Korea's clandestine nuclear cooperation with Syria ... is a dangerous maniIestation," the U.S. paper said.
North Korea assisted Syria's covert work in building a nuclear reactor capable oI producing plutonium and not
intended Ior peaceIul purposes, it said.
The U.S. paper made no mention oI allegations that the reactor was destroyed in an Israel Air Force bombing
raid in September.
Al-Hamoui said the allegations made by the administration oI U.S. President George W. Bush were part oI a
disinIormation campaign.
"We call upon member states to exercise caution and not to Iollow as other people have Iollowed the vein oI an
administration which can only be described as madness," he told the meeting oI the 190 countries signed on to
the treaty.
Al-Hamoui said Australia and France lack credibility Ior reIerring to the U.S. allegations and Ior Iailing to
mention Israel's own nuclear arsenal.
He said French Ambassador Jean-Francois Dobelle had twice reIerred to the U.S. allegations.
"France played a major and pivotal role in building the Israeli nuclear program and continues to supply Israel
with nuclear technology, which is a clear inIringement oI the NPT," al-Hamoui said.
"We call on Syria to come clean about its past and current nuclear activities," said Dobelle, who also urged the
International Atomic Energy Agency to launch a thorough investigation oI the Syrian program.
Australian Ambassador Caroline Millar told the conIerence that the U.S. inIormation about Syria is very
disturbing.
"Syria has an obligation under its saIeguards agreement with the IAEA to report the planning and construction oI
any nuclear Iacilities," she said.
http://www.Iederalnewsradio.com/?nid82&sid1399357
Diplomats say IAEA chief urging more US flexibility on Iran
By GEORGE JAHN
May 6, 2008 7:09pm
[EXCERPT]
VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The head oI the International Atomic Energy Agency urged Washington on
Tuesday to show more sensitivity in dealing with Iran iI it hopes to see Tehran make concessions on its
nuclear program, diplomats said.
The diplomats, speaking to The Associated Press aIter a meeting between IAEA chieI Mohamed
ElBaradei and Undersecretary oI State John Rood, said the American diplomat made no commitments,
but promised to take ElBaradei's concerns back to his superiors.
Rood, the top U.S. oIIicial on nuclear nonproliIeration, declined to go into details oI his discussions
with ElBaradei beyond conIirming that Iran and Syria were among the topics oI the meeting.
But one diplomat, who agreed to discuss the substance oI the conIidential meeting only on condition oI
anonymity, said ElBaradei urged the U.S. to broaden its approach to Iran to address Tehran's economic
and security concerns in exchange Ior nuclear concessions.
The diplomat also said Syria still has not given IAEA inspectors permission to examine the site oI an
alleged nuclear reactor destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in September something Rood said Damascus
needed to do.
"Obviously Syria has a lot oI explaining to do," Rood said. Asked why the U.S. withheld until recently
intelligence that could have helped the IAEA press its case with Syria, he said a "concern about the
potential Ior a military conIlict" prompted Washington to keep mum at Iirst.
He was apparently alluding to post-airstrike tensions between Israel and Syria.
|deletia|
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/Ieatures/the-iaeas-dilemma-with-syrias-al-kibar-nuclear-site
The IAEA's dilemma with Syria's Al Kibar nuclear site
By Fiona Simpson
6 May 2008
Although Israel's September 2007 raid on what it believed to be the Al Kibar nuclear site in Syria has
oIten been compared to its 1981 raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, the aura oI secrecy
surrounding the Syria raid stands in stark contrast to the extensive public explanations oIIered by Israel
27 years ago. Further details about the Syria raid have recently been provided, but they didn't come
Irom Israel. Instead, senior U.S. intelligence oIIicials presented them to Congress and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in late April--nearly eight months aIter the raid.
In a February Bulletin web-edition piece entitled "IAEA Special Inspections AIter Israel's Raid on
Syria," I argued that while the IAEA had the authority to invoke special inspections in regards to
Syrian activities at Al Kibar, it probably would have never done so given the lack oI concrete evidence.
Instead, in bilateral discussions, the IAEA asked Syria Ior access to the site; a request that was
evidently reIused.
Since then, at an April 24 brieIing, senior U.S. intelligence oIIicials brought more substantial evidence
Iorward, identiIying the raid's target as "a nuclear reactor . . . constructed by the Syrians . . . Ior the
production oI plutonium with the assistance oI the North Koreans." They also asserted the presence oI
North Korean nationals at the reactor, apparently documented in photographs. The brieIing stated that
the Iirst evidence oI such activity was discovered in the late 1990s, with reactor construction estimated
to have begun in 2001. In spring 2007, intelligence oIIicials received more inIormation about the site,
including interior and exterior photographs. They maintained that this inIormation revealed the
construction oI a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor similar to the reactor at Yongbyon in North
Korea. But they acknowledged that they didn't know how the reactor was going to be Iuelled and that
there weren't any indications that a reprocessing Iacility existed or was being built--a necessity to
extract plutonium Irom the spent Iuel rods removed Irom the reactor. As a result, they noted that their
conIidence level was "low" that the activities at Al Kibar were those oI a nuclear weapons program.
The timing oI the brieIing has been the source oI much speculation. While some, President George W.
Bush included, have said the delay was to ensure that Syria wasn't unnecessarily antagonized, others
believe it's a tactic by the Bush administration to aIIect ongoing negotiations with North Korea. More
likely, the administration caved to increasing pressure Irom Congress to brieI it beIore Congress
needed to approve removing sanctions on North Korea. Bush has also claimed that the disclosure oI
intelligence was intended to send a "message" to Iran. (See "Bush DeIends Syria Reactor Claim.")
International reaction
There's speculation that Israel wasn't in Iavor oI the brieIing, as Irom the outset, it worried that too
much public attention might bait Syria into retaliation. (See "Israelis Upset U.S. Divulged Strike
Details" and "North Korea and Syria: Oh, What A Tangled Web They Weave.") Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert's oIIice turned down requests Ior comment, reIerring the media to statements he made a
week earlier, when he noted, "The Syrians know what our position is, and we know what their
expectations are."
Unsurprisingly, Ior its part, Syria has vehemently denied the charges that Al Kibar was nuclear-related,
claiming the target was a vacant military building that wasn't even protected. Like Israel, North Korea
has remained quiet on the matter.
The IAEA, which was brieIed on the same day as Congress, spoke out sharply against the United States
and Israel. It noted in a press release, "The director general deplores the Iact that this inIormation was
not provided to the agency in a timely manner . . . |He| views the unilateral use oI Iorce by Israel as
undermining the due process oI veriIication that is at the heart oI the nonproliIeration regime." The
press release reaIIirmed that Syria had an obligation to inIorm the IAEA prior to the construction oI
such a Iacility and that the agency intended to investigate the inIormation provided to it. But the bulk oI
the oIIicial reaction was devoted to a reiteration oI IAEA saIeguard responsibilities under the Nuclear
Non-ProliIeration Treaty (NPT) and the agency's displeasure with the United States and Israel over the
raid and the silence that Iollowed.
This displeasure links back to the question oI special inspections. As noted above, the lack oI evidence
upon which to proceed eIIectively kept the IAEA Irom exercising its authority. But had the evidence
been provided to the agency in the absence oI a strike against Syria, it would have been under serious
internal and external pressure to call Ior a special inspection oI the site. II the IAEA Iailed to do so, the
agency would have been risking its credibility and inviting questions about the useIulness oI the special
inspections provision and the circumstances needed to invoke it. How this might have then played out
in the IAEA Board oI Governors iI Syria reIused to grant the inspections is diIIicult to say. Also
diIIicult to assess is how the IAEA might have proceeded had the evidence been immediately provided,
but with the added complication oI the strike.
Possible outcomes
During the brieIing, U.S. intelligence oIIicials stated that Al Kibar was "not yet part oI an active
weapons program." Although such a statement lends itselI to misinterpretation, the use oI the word
"yet" assumes that the simplest explanation Ior an undeclared Syrian nuclear reactor is probably the
correct explanation--i.e., that it was eventually intended Ior proliIeration purposes. Nonetheless, the
questions raised by the lack oI a reprocessing Iacility, as well as the questions regarding how, when,
and by whom such a reactor was to be Iuelled, remain unanswered. (See "Syria Update III: New
InIormation about the Al Kibar Reactor Site.")
Within the context oI denuclearizing North Korea, renewed discussion over Syria and its links to North
Korea doesn't appear to have put either the Six-Party Talks or work toward dismantling the North
Korean nuclear program in any more jeopardy than would have resulted Irom simply Iailing to answer
congressional questions about the raid. Although North Korea missed the December 31 deadline to
provide a complete inventory oI its nuclear program, the administration, which had originally insisted
that North Korea detail its enrichment activities as well as reprocessing activities, was moving toward
an alternative that would allow North Korea simply to acknowledge U.S. concerns about these
activities and alleged nuclear cooperation with other parties. And despite the recent brieIing, which
deepened the hostility oI some in Congress toward the administration's policy on North Korea, the
House Foreign AIIairs Committee approved a bill that would allow Iunds to be used toward North
Korea's denuclearization. But the bill requires the president to demonstrate that Pyongyang isn't
providing proliIeration-sensitive nuclear technology to Syria or Iran beIore removing North Korea Irom
the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism.
As part oI its own investigation, the IAEA indicated that it will submit a new request to Syria to visit
the site. (See "IAEA to Look Into Syria Reactor Claim.") This decision has been welcomed by several
countries at the 2008 NPT Preparatory Committee, which is currently underway in Geneva.
In the raid's aItermath, Syria reIused IAEA access to Al Kibar, but Damascus has now reversed that
position, claiming it has "nothing to hide." In a sense, this is true; the original site has been bulldozed
and new construction has started. ThereIore, because oI the time that has elapsed between the raid and
the availability oI the evidence, it seems unlikely that any on-the-ground investigations will be able to
provide conclusive prooI oI the allegations and evidence provided at the April 24 brieIing--particularly
so given that no nuclear material had been introduced to the site, ruling out the utility oI certain
saIeguards techniques (environmental sampling, Ior instance) that would detect the presence oI such
material. Indeed, the absence oI nuclear material at Al Kibar seems to be one oI the Iew things that all
the parties involved agree upon.
May 7, 2008
Notice: Continuation of the National Emergency Blocking Property of Certain Persons
and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria
On May 11, 2004, pursuant to my authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act oI
2003 (Public Law 108-175), I issued Executive Order 13338, in which I declared a national emergency
with respect to the actions oI the Government oI Syria. To deal with this national emergency, Executive
Order 13338 authorized the blocking oI property oI certain persons and prohibited the exportation or
re-exportation oI certain goods to Syria. On April 25, 2006, and February 13, 2008, I issued Executive
Order 13399 and Executive Order 13460, respectively, to take additional steps with respect to this
national emergency.
I took these actions to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, Ioreign
policy, and economy oI the United States constituted by the actions oI the Government oI Syria in
supporting terrorism, maintaining its then-existing occupation oI Lebanon, pursuing weapons oI mass
destruction and missile programs including the recent revelation oI illicit nuclear cooperation with
North Korea, and undermining U.S. and international eIIorts with respect to the stabilization and
reconstruction oI Iraq.
Because the actions and policies oI the Government oI Syria continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, Ioreign policy, and economy oI the United States, the
national emergency declared on May 11, 2004, and the measures adopted on that date and on April 25,
2006, in Executive Order 13399, and on February 13, 2008, in Executive Order 13460, to deal with that
emergency, must continue in eIIect beyond May 11, 2008. ThereIore, in accordance with section
202(d) oI the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing Ior 1 year the national
emergency authorizing the blocking oI property oI certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or
re-exportation oI certain goods to Syria.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 7, 2008.
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-33457320080507
IAEA chief hopes for clarity on Syria facility soon
Wed May 7, 2008 9:44pm IST
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The head oI the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Wednesday he hoped his
agency would be able to shed light in the next Iew weeks on whether a Syrian Iacility bombed by Israel
last year was an undeclared atomic reactor.
The United States released intelligence last month that it said showed Syria built a reactor with North
Korean help beIore Israeli warplanes destroyed it last September. Damascus has denied the
accusations.
Mohamed ElBaradei, director oI the International Atomic Energy Agency, said the IAEA was in
contact with Syria to veriIy the U.S. intelligence and recalled Damascus's obligation to report any
nuclear activities to the agency.
"I hope that in the next Iew weeks we will be able to shed some light on the nature oI the Iacility that
was destroyed," he told reporters aIter talks with EU oIIicials in Brussels.
"Syria has an obligation to notiIy the agency iI they are, iI they were, building any nuclear reactors," he
said. Damascus has not granted U.N. inspectors access to the area despite several requests since
September, diplomats say.
The U.S. material included photos and other inIormation the CIA said showed the Iacility's potential
Ior nuclear weapons purposes.
Syria has said the inIormation was Iorged, comparing it with U.S. reports oI mass destruction weapons
hidden in Iraq which were never Iound aIter U.S.-led Iorces toppled Saddam Hussein.
Damascus has instead accused Washington oI involvement in the air attack by Israel, a staunch U.S.
ally widely believed to have the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal.
Syria has repeatedly sparred with the United States and Western allies over the matter at a nuclear Non-
ProliIeration Treaty review meeting under way in Geneva.
The IAEA and others have criticised the United States Ior waiting until last month to share its
intelligence, and analysts have raised questions over whether the U.S. material amounted to prooI oI
any undeclared arms programme.
Diplomats close to the IAEA say it will be much harder to uncover evidence now than it would have
been beIore the attack.
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/englishedition/einternational/287525.html
Abduction issue not a prerequisite to removing N. Korea from list of state sponsors of
terrorism
[Interview] Alexander R. Vershbow, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea
This year, The Hankyoreh is celebrating its 20th anniversary with a series oI articles and interviews in
the print edition oI the paper to commemorate the publication oI its Iirst issue on May 15, 1988. As a
special addition to our online edition, Jang Jungsoo, The Hankyorehs the executive editor and the
Iormer editor oI this website, met with Alexander R. Vershbow, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea,
on May 7 |2008| in the ambassadors oIIice in Seoul.
[EXCERPT]
Q. Question on North Korea. The 6 Party Talks are at an important crossroads. But, as the U.S.
mentions the possible cooperation between North Korea and Syria, there is a concern that the 6 Party
Talks may get tangled with Middle East issues.
A. Several months ago, at a private meeting with the North Koreans, the U.S. said that we were aware
oI North Korea's assistance in the construction oI a nuclear Iacilit in Syria. Since then, North Korea has
said they acknowledge our concern, reaIIirming that they will not be involved in transIerring nuclear
materials, technology and know-how to a third country in the Iuture, in accordance with the existing
agreement in the 6 Party Talks. ThereIore, this issue is already being addressed within the Iramework
oI the 6 Party Talks, and we are now making eIIorts to build a comprehensive veriIication mechanism
that can address plutonium issues as well as this issue.
http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/104470.htm
Remarks After Breakfast With Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yu
Myung-hwan
John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State
Grand Hyatt
Seoul, South Korea
May 8, 2008
8:40 a.m.
QUESTION: Sir, how was your discussion this morning with the Minister?
DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE:Very good, a chance to discuss a range oI issues oI bilateral
interest; oI course, the United States and South Korea are strategic allies, we have a very close
relationship, and obviously this was an opportunity Ior me to come and pay my respects aIter the
Iormation oI a new government here.
QUESTION: Could you share some oI the things that were discussed on the North Korea nuclear issue
since you have a team oI oIIicials visiting today?
DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE:Well just to say that, that process is on-going and the United
States and South Korea, I think, share an interest in common in encouraging the process oI
denuclearization oI the Korean peninsula and as a result we both have a great interest in the progress oI
these Six Party Talks. As you say, there is work going on as we speak.
QUESTION:Have you heard Irom North Korea about your evidence, the evidence youve laid out on
the Syria connection?
DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE:Well this is an issue oI concern to us and it is an issue that
has been discussed in our diplomatic exchanges with North Korea. Its another reason why we attach so
much importance to a thorough and accurate declaration on the part oI North Korea with respect to
their nuclear Iacilities and programs.
QUESTION: So there have been discussions with North Korea?
(sorry the Secretary has to go)
DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE:Yeah,okay. Thanks a lot. Nice to see you.
Released on May 8, 2008
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/104548.htm
North Korea and Iran: An Administration Perspective
Patricia McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security and NonproliIeration
Remarks at National DeIense University Symposium
Washington, DC
May 8, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
I've been asked to discuss U.S. nonproliIeration policy with regard to the two proliIerators oI greatest
current concern -- Iran and North Korea.
Our work is not yet complete in either case. Iran, in particular, is proving resistant to the ultimate
objective oI the dual-track approach adopted by the P51. Its hallmarks have been pressure applied by
the UNSC in three successive Chapter VII sanctions resolutions and the package oI incentives
originally oIIered Iran on 1 June 2006. In the case oI North Korea, we continue to pursue diplomatic
negotiations through the Six-Party Talks, a process that has produced some concrete results, including
the shutdown and on-going disablement oI three core Iacilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex such
that, once all disablement activities are completed, it is estimated that it will take North Korea upwards
oI one year or more to re-establish operations there.
D.P.R.K.
Let me take a moment to address the issue North Korea-Syria nuclear cooperation - a matter that was
brieIed to the Congress on April 24. We have long been seriously concerned about the D.P.R.K.'s
proliIeration activities, and North Korea's clandestine nuclear cooperation with Syria is a dangerous
maniIestation oI those activities. The United States believes, based on strong evidence that North Korea
assisted with the construction oI a reactor at Al-Kibar in Syria. We have good reason to believe that the
reactor, which was damaged beyond repair on September 6 oI last year, was not intended Ior peaceIul
purposes.
We have chosen to address this problem through the Six Party Framework. In September 2007, the
United States began raising its concerns with North Korea about nuclear cooperation with Syria. We
have made our concerns known to North Korea in a Irank and comprehensive way, and the North
Koreans have acknowledged our concerns. The North Koreans have stated that there is no ongoing
nuclear cooperation with any Ioreign country, and that there will be no such cooperation in the Iuture.
We have been Iollowing Syrian-North Korean interactions since the destruction oI the reactor, and we
have not seen the same level oI interaction as we did beIore the reactor's destruction; however, we
cannot be certain all cooperation has ceased. We continue to be on alert Ior signs oI any nuclear
cooperation, and any renewed activities. We remain attuned to potential North Korean relationships
worldwide, especially given North Korea's continued proliIeration oI missiles and other weapons.
Through the Six-Party Iramework, we are working to address North Korea's proliIeration activities,
which is integral to achieving the veriIiable denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula and ending the
threat posed by a nuclear North Korea. We will work with our partners to establish in the Six Party
Framework a rigorous veriIication mechanism to ensure that such conduct and other nuclear activities
have ceased. We remain conIident that the Six-Party process is the best mechanism to address the
danger to the United States and the international community posed by the D.P.R.K.'s nuclear programs.
Following completion oI the Second Phase, we hope to move quickly into a Iinal phase, which will be
aimed at abandonment oI North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,
dismantlement oI all North Korea's nuclear Iacilities, capture oI all Iissile material the D.P.R.K. has
produced, and a comprehensive veriIication oI North Korea's denuclearization.
Released on May 9, 2008
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/may/104487.htm
Washington, DC
May 8, 2008
[EXCERPTS]
QUESTION: On North Korea, can you comment on the Wall Street Journal report that North Korea's
going to hand over this week to the U.S. boxes oI documents, including Yongbyon Iacility's operation
history?
And also, do you have any updates on the U.S. team that's in North Korea to discuss Iood aid to North
Korea?
MR. MCCORMACK: Food aid -- the Iood aid team has leIt. They are --
QUESTION: Any updates --
MR. MCCORMACK: Their discussions -- they were inconclusive, I guess you could say. They went
there to take a look at whether or not conditions had changed suIIiciently so that we could, in good
conscience, in good Iaith, provide Iood aid and know that it was going to get to people who need it. So
at this point, those discussions are inconclusive. I don't know that they've had a chance to brieI back
people here in Washington, so I can't give you a more Iull description. But essentially, they go out there
and look at, is there a need and can we eIIectively get Iood aid to people who need it. That's been an
issue not only Ior us, but others in the international humanitarian assistance community.
In terms oI Sung Kim, I expect that he's probably going to be coming back over -- into South Korea
tomorrow. And I expect that he is going to bring with him -- I know that he is going to bring with him a
signiIicant number oI documents related to North Korea's plutonium program. And we'll have an
opportunity over the coming days -- days and weeks to assess the signiIicance oI these documents. It is
a large number. I can't provide you an exact number right now. We have to take a -- you know, really
go through it very careIully. And with respect to these -- you know, with respect to the documents and
how they may play in the declaration process, you know, our top three priorities are going to be
veriIication, veriIication, veriIication.
So this is part oI a process that is unIolding. We will see, perhaps, North Korea providing a declaration
to China, who is the chair oI the six-party talks, and these documents will play a role in that process.
But again, it is going to be a veriIication process that plays out over a period oI time.
QUESTION: The documents, including the operation Iacility?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I'm not going to try to characterize them any more than to say that they
relate to their plutonium program, because we haven't had a chance to get a detailed look at the
documents.
[deletia]
Anything else on North Korea?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. MCCORMACK: Okay.
QUESTION: What prompted the North Koreans to hand over this stack oI documents? Was there --
was this in response to a request the U.S. had made or --
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, this is part oI what we have been working -- we, on behalI oI the six-party
talks, have been working with them on. And again, it's part oI the declaration process that speaks to the
veriIication aspect oI it.
Yeah.
QUESTION: On Iran -- do you have more on North Korea?
MR. MCCORMACK: You have North Korea? North Korea.
QUESTION: Yeah, I was just wondering, did you get any initial reaction Irom Sung Kim about the
documents? Was it everything that he was hoping to get? And also, did -- when he went there, was
there anything else on his agenda besides picking up these documents or was it -- was that basically --
MR. MCCORMACK: This was the main -- this -- the documents were the main reason he was going.
And its diIIicult to make an assessment oI whether or not this is the Iull extent oI what the North
Koreans said that they were going to turn over. At this point, I dont have reason to question that. But
again, let us take the time to look through the documents careIully, analyze them, and at that -- aIter we
have done that, well be able to determine their Iull signiIicance.
[deletia]
QUESTION: I see. And the second question: There is some speculation in the media in the Middle East
about the meeting when Deputy Assistant Secretary Feltman invited the Ambassador oI Syria --
QUESTION: -- and theres some rumors, you know. Do you have any guidance or any readout on what
happened on 20 on that meeting which took place on the 24th oI April?
MR. MCCORMACK: Oh, this is the one to inIorm him that we were going to be talking about --
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. MCCORMACK: -- their reactor or their Iormer reactor? (Laughter.) The it was about a 15-
minute meeting, Samir. It was really Iocused on that topic.
Yeah.
QUESTION: One more on North Korea. The assessment oI the documents that Sung Kim received,
will the U.S. primarily be doing the assessment or will the other Iour parties also receive the
documents?
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, good question. Certainly, our Iolks are going to be doing an
assessment and we are obviously going to be consulting very closely with the other members oI the
talks about this and sharing the inIormation. Ill try to get you more on sort oI the technical aspects oI
how people are going to how an evaluation oI the documents is going to unIold.
QUESTION: And are there any additional stops to Sung Kims trip?
MR. MCCORMACK: No. Hell be coming back here.
QUESTION: Yeah, and just to Iollow up on that, in terms oI the declaration itselI, I mean, not all oI the
parties are nuclear states with the kind oI nuclear expertise that the United States has or Russia has, Ior
instance. So how do you have you decided, like, on a mechanism Ior weighing the declaration?
Because all Iive parties have to be happy with it, but not all Iive parties are equally, kind oI --
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, these are all highly developed economies with a great deal oI
technical expertise on issues related to nuclear technology, certainly with South Korea and in Japan,
thats in civilian uses. So I think everybody brings something to the table and some level oI expertise
that they can apply in making their own judgments about this. But certainly, theres going to be a lot oI
discussion among the members oI the six-party talks about the declaration once its received. I have to
emphasize, we havent received, or the Chinese have not yet received, that declaration.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-nuclear-treaty.html
Powers Say Atom Control Treaty At Risk, Cite Iran
May 9, 2008 Filed at 5:51 a.m. ET
[EXCERPTS]
GENEVA (Reuters) - The Iive major nuclear-armed powers said on Friday the Non-ProliIeration
Treaty was under threat and cited Iran's uranium enrichment campaign in a rare joint call Ior action to
shore up the NPT.
North Korea's nuclear test blast in 2006, Iran's pursuit oI potentially bomb-capable enrichment and new
allegations Syria covertly tried to build an atomic reactor with North Korean help spotlight mounting
challenges to the treaty, analysts say.
"The proliIeration oI nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security," the
United States, Russia, China, Britain and France said in a joint address on the Iinal day oI a two-week
meeting oI 106 NPT member nations.
The Iive said they stood squarely behind a revised packet oI economic incentives which they, along
with Germany, plan to present to Iran soon to shelve its enrichment program.
They urged North Korea, which bolted Irom the NPT in 2003, to carry out a now-stalled six-party
accord to disarm.
SYRIA ADDED TO NPT CONTROVERSY
Syria, like Iran repeatedly assailed by Washington and some allies at the meeting, was omitted Irom the
powers' statement, apparently due to reservations oI some about U.S. intelligence purporting to show
Damascus was close to completing a secret reactor beIore Israeli warplanes destroyed it last September.
Syria has rejected the Iindings as "Iorged" but is now under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) investigation.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/asia/09diplo.html
North Korea Gives U.S. Files on Plutonium Efforts
By HELENE COOPER
May 9, 2008
WASHINGTON North Korea has turned over to the United States 18,000 pages oI documents
related to its plutonium program dating Irom 1990, in an eIIort to resolve remaining diIIerences in a
pending agreement meant to begin the denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula, Bush administration
oIIicials said Thursday.
The documents contain inIormation about North Koreas three major campaigns to reprocess plutonium
Ior nuclear weapons, in 1990, 2003 and 2005, a senior oIIicial said. The oIIicial, like some others who
agreed to discuss the documents, spoke on the condition oI anonymity because oI diplomatic
considerations.
But the documents do not include inIormation on two other areas about which North Korea has
promised to be Iorthcoming a uranium program that some oIIicials in the Bush administration
regard as another track toward weapons development, and North Koreas involvement in the
proliIeration oI nuclear material.
State Department oIIicials have nevertheless described the move on Thursday as an important step,
saying they hope it will help to resolve a dispute over how much plutonium North Korea holds.
Administration oIIicials have not said how much plutonium North Korea has admitted to possessing,
but they have criticized as incomplete a preliminary declaration it made last December.
The documents, which Iill seven boxes, will help shed light on why they have a lower Iigure, said an
administration oIIicial who insisted on anonymity. He said one reason could be that North Korea has
more nuclear waste than expected, which could have led to lower plutonium production than the United
States had estimated.
OIIicials in Pyongyang, the capital oI North Korea, gave the documents to Sung Kim, the director oI
the State Departments Korea oIIice, on Thursday, and he was poring over them in his hotel beIore
bringing them back to the United States this weekend, State Department oIIicials said. They said that
several other American diplomats would accompany Mr. Kim and the documents on a commercial
Ilight back to Washington so they could transport the boxes as carry-on luggage. Transporting them as
checked baggage would be too risky, the oIIicials said. The acquisition oI the documents is the latest
step in the Bush administrations eIIort to complete a nuclear pact with North Korea beIore it leaves
oIIice in January. The nuclear deal has come under Iire Irom some conservatives, in and out oI the
administration, who contend that North Korea cannot be trusted to end its nuclear program.
On Wednesday, The Wall Street Journals editorial page, which has opposed the pact, said Christopher
R. Hill, the assistant secretary oI state Ior East Asia and PaciIic aIIairs, had made a mockery oI the
interagency process. It said he had been bypassing other Bush oIIicials and, instead, handpicking
experts to work at Yongbyon, where North Korea is dismantling its nuclear reactor.
Mr. Hill has the backing oI Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice, and they have kept President Bushs
support Ior a pact that many Ioreign policy experts say is the administrations best chance at a tangible
Ioreign policy accomplishment beginning the denuclearization oI the Korean Peninsula in its
remaining months.
The administration has Iocused its eIIorts on getting North Korea to disclose Iully inIormation about its
plutonium cache, which represents what most experts say is the bulk oI its nuclear program.
In return Ior the inIormation it seeks on plutonium, the administration has relaxed a demand Ior North
Korea to admit that it supplied Syria with nuclear technology. The United States has also indicated that
it will postpone a demand that North Korea provide an immediate and Iull accounting oI its Iledgling
uranium program.
North Koreas plutonium program was the source oI raw material Ior the device it tested in October
2006.
Sean I. McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said that oIIicials would take time to review the
documents to determine whether North Koreas declaration about its plutonium program is satisIactory.
He said that any Iinal agreement would include a strict veriIication process Ior all North Korean
nuclear activities.
Our top three priorities are going to be veriIication, veriIication, veriIication, Mr. McCormack said.
http://aIp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hugtrUS14EBkOdpUO4wwSWIcEww
US awaits 'complete' NKorea report: Negroponte
TOKYO (AFP) The United States is still awaiting a complete report Irom North Korea on its
nuclear activities, Deputy Secretary oI State John Negroponte said Friday [2008-05-09|, aIter the
communist state handed over documents.
"We still await more complete results and a more complete report as to exactly what happened,"
Negroponte told reporters aIter brieIing Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura on
developments.
US nuclear expert Sung Kim was leaving North Korea on Friday with papers which will be used to
help veriIy an eventual declaration Irom North Korea on its past nuclear activities, the US State
Department said.
"I know he's bringing back some records that have to do with the nuclear production programmes oI
North Korea," Negroponte said.
But he was cautious over the papers aIter North Korea in December missed a key deadline in a six-
nation deal to make a declaration on all nuclear material, including stockpiled plutonium which could
be used Ior bomb-making.
"This is part oI the ongoing process connected with the six-party talks and leading hopeIully to the Iull
denuclearisation oI the Korean peninsula," he said.
"So I would say this was a step in a process but it's an ongoing process," he added.
The North, which staged a plutonium-based nuclear test in October 2006, is disabling its plutonium-
producing reactor and other plants under a deal reached in February 2007 with the United States,
China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.
In return Ior total denuclearisation, the North would receive energy aid, a liIting oI US sanctions, the
establishment oI diplomatic relations with Washington and a Iormal peace treaty.
In addition to the declared plutonium operation, Washington said the declaration must clear up
suspicions about alleged secret uranium enrichment and about suspected proliIeration to Syria.
The North denies both activities. Under a reported deal, it will merely "acknowledge" US concerns
about the two issues in a conIidential separate document to Washington.
Purchases Linked N. Korean to Syria
Pyongyang Company Funneled Reactor Parts to Damascus, Intelligence OIIicials Say
Sunday, May 11, 2008; A18
When North Korean businessman Ho Jin Yun Iirst caught the attention oI German customs police in
2002, he was on a continental buying spree with a shopping list that seemed as random as it was long.
Yun, police discovered, had been crisscrossing Central Europe, amassing a baIIlingly diverse collection
oI materials and high-tech gadgets: gas masks, electric timers, steel pipes, vacuum pumps, transIormers
and aluminum tubes cut to precise dimensions.
Most oI these wares Yun had shipped to his company's oIIices in China and North Korea. But some oI
the goods, U.S. and European oIIicials now say, were evidently intended Ior a secret project in Syria: a
nuclear reactor that would be built with North Korean help, allegedly to produce plutonium Ior
eventual use in nuclear weapons.
According to U.S. oIIicials, European intelligence oIIicials and diplomats, Yun's Iirm -- Namchongang
Trading, known as NCG -- provided the critical link between Pyongyang and Damascus, acquiring key
materials Irom vendors in China and probably Irom Europe, and secretly transIerring them to a desert
construction site near the Syrian town oI Al Kibar.
It was the company's suspicious buying habits -- and the branch oIIice it opened in Damascus -- that
inadvertently contributed to the alleged reactor's discovery and later destruction in a Sept. 6 Israeli
bombing raid, U.S. oIIicials say. Joint ChieIs oI StaII Chairman Michael Mullen declined in an
interview to say whether Washington helped with the raid, but he strongly endorsed it.
"The reactor which was being built was not very Iar Irom being operational and needed to be hit,"
Mullen said.
Alerted to NCG's suspect purchases in Europe, Western spy agencies were able to track the movement
oI NCG employees and purchases to Syria in 2003, where the outlines oI the reactor scheme eventually
became apparent. The site was closely scrutinized by Western intelligence oIIicials Ior months beIore it
was destroyed by Israel. During that period, U.S. oIIicials collected aerial images and acquired interior
photos that showed apparent reactor components.
Syria has maintained that the Iacility was always nonnuclear, but U.S. oIIicials say that as the
government cleared the site oI debris aIter the bombing, some telltale reactor components that had been
deliberately hidden became visible.
"We judged that these interactions were probably nuclear-related . . . because oI who it was we were
seeing in those interactions," a senior U.S. intelligence oIIicial said at a brieIing in Washington last
week about the Syrian-North Korean venture. "We assessed the cooperation involved work sites
probably within Syria. But again, we didn't know exactly where."
Attempts to contact Yun and other NCG oIIicials by phone and e-mail were unsuccessIul.
Syria acknowledges "a working relationship" with North Korea, but Syrian Embassy spokesman
Ahmed Salkini said it does not deIy any international law. "II this company conducts business with
Syria, the terms oI transactions would abide by, and would be within, the legal Iramework oI the
international community," he said, adding that the embassy has not heard oI NCG.
U.S. oIIicials say the Pyongyang-based NCG used an oIIice in Beijing as a base Ior procuring materials
and as a distribution center Ior items that could not be legally routed through North Korea because oI
trade sanctions.
A spokesperson at the Chinese Embassy denied any knowledge oI the company and its activities.
"I am not aware oI anything about the North Korean company mentioned. . . . China is steadIastly
opposed to the proliIeration oI weapons oI mass destruction and its deliveries, and it has been IaithIully
honoring its international obligations and responsibilities," Wang Baodong said in an e-mailed
statement.
ProliIeration experts say NCG used many methods to conceal the intended use oI the items it was
acquiring.
NCG has acted "as a trading agent or middleman, buying items through Chinese trading companies or
directly Irom Ioreign companies," said David Albright, president oI the Washington-based Institute Ior
Science and International Security and an expert on the international black market Ior nuclear
technology.
Because oI its branch oIIice in China, NCG can buy equipment Irom suppliers throughout the world,
even in Europe and possibly in the United States, particularly iI the companies have subsidiaries in
China, Albright said. Moreover, export controls in China are poorly implemented and simple to evade.
Other North Korean companies with oIIices outside the country have bought militarily sensitive
equipment Irom commercial vendors, including parts Ior making ballistic missiles, nuclear bombs and
other advanced weapons, U.S. oIIicials say. Over the years, they have bought metals used in uranium
enrichment and chemical precursors Ior highly lethal nerve agents, the oIIicials said.
"North Korea oIten works through these trading companies, which Iacilitate business deals and other
activities overseas that earn Ioreign exchange Ior the government and especially Ior the top leadership.
They have been very active in the past in Iacilitating missile sales in countries like Syria and Iran," said
Larry Niksch, an expert on Asia at the Congressional Research Service.
A U.S. counterproliIeration oIIicial said in an interview that North Korea typically uses "one, two or
more layers" oI Iront companies so it can plausibly deny knowledge oI actual intended use.
"Sometimes they can Iool the supplier by saying the goods are intended Ior another country altogether.
North Korea does this very well," said the oIIicial, who spoke on the condition oI anonymity because
U.S. investigations remain classiIied.
Over the past decade, NCG's activities have been the target oI investigations spanning two continents.
Its attempt to purchase hundreds oI high-strength tubes Irom European businesses attracted the
attention oI the German government in 2003. The tubes were made oI a highly specialized type oI
aluminum used in making centriIuges Ior uranium enrichment, but Yun, the NCG businessman, told
German companies that they were destined Ior an aircraIt Iactory in China, according to court
documents.
Eventually, Yun -- who earlier served as the head oI North Korea's United Nations delegation in
Vienna, the home oI the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency -- struck a deal with a Bavarian company to
obtain 22 tons oI British-made tubes. They were placed on an Asia-bound ship in April 2003 and made
it as Iar as the Suez Canal beIore German authorities ordered the cargo seized.
A subsequent investigation by nuclear weapons experts, including several at the International Atomic
Energy Agency, concluded that the tubes were not suited Ior aircraIt. The Chinese company named by
NCG as the intended user denied ordering such tubes, U.S. and European investigators said.
In court documents and interviews, German oIIicials alleged that NCG had operated as a Iront
company Ior years and had sought to buy a wide range oI sensitive equipment Irom European Iirms,
including oscilloscopes and other electronic gear used in making and testing nuclear detonators.
Neither Yun nor NCG was charged with wrongdoing in Germany, but the owner oI the company that
sold the tubes was sentenced to Iour years in prison Ior his role in the sale.
The discovery oI a series oI attempted purchases prompted the CIA to predict that North Korea could
have an operational uranium enrichment Iacility by 2005. But no such Iacility has ever been identiIied,
and North Korea insists the tubes were meant Ior other programs, including missile production. North
Korea has allowed U.S. oIIicials to take smelted aluminum it purchased Irom other countries back to
the United States Ior analysis.
U.N. Resolution 1718 stipulates that all member states must "prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale
or transIer" to North Korea "through their territories or by their nationals, or using their Ilag vessels or
aircraIt, and whether or not originating in their territories" any material or technology that would
contribute to a nuclear weapons program.
White House and State Department oIIicials have declined to comment on whether the Bush
administration is trying to get China to act against NCG.
"We have nothing to add beyond what has already been said about North Korean nuclear cooperation
with Syria," said State Department press oIIicer Gonzalo Gallegos. "As the White House said last
week, the United States is . . . committed to ensuring that North Korea does not Iurther engage in
proliIeration activities."
StaII writer Glenn Kessler contributed to this report.
Experience With Syria Exemplifies Challenge That Detection Presents
By Joby Warrick
Monday, May 12, 2008; A16
Syria went to extraordinary lengths to conceal its undeclared construction oI a plutonium-producing
nuclear reactor Irom spies in the sky and on the ground in recent years, according to a draIt report by
independent nuclear experts brieIed by Bush administration oIIicials.
The eIIectiveness oI the camouIlage eIIort raises new doubts about the prospects Ior certain detection
oI Iuture clandestine nuclear weapons-related activities, the Institute Ior Science and International
Security concluded in its report on the Syrian Iacility. "This case serves as a sobering reminder oI the
diIIiculty oI identiIying secret nuclear activities," the report said.
U.S. intelligence oIIicials last month released images oI the Syrian Iacility beIore it was bombed by
Israel last September and bulldozed by the Syrian government once the raid became public. U.S. and
Israeli oIIicials have said the Iacility was a nearly completed nuclear reactor built with North Korean
help and Iitted with a Ialse rooI and walls that altered its shape when viewed Irom above.
According to the ISIS report to be released this week, the Iake rooI was just the start. Syrian engineers
went to "astonishing lengths" to hide cooling and ventilation systems, power lines and other Ieatures
that normally are telltale signs oI a nuclear reactor, authors David Albright and Paul Brannan wrote.
For example, the main building appears small and shallow Irom the air, but it was evidently built over
large underground chambers -- tens oI meters in depth -- that were large enough to house the nuclear
reactor, as well as a reserve water-storage tank and pools Ior spent Iuel rods, the report said.
An extensive network oI electrical lines appears to have been buried in trenches. Traditional water-
cooling towers were replaced with an elaborate underground system that discharged into the Euphrates
River. And, instead oI using smokestack-like ventilation towers prominent at many reactor sites, the
ventilation system appears to have been built along the walls oI the building, with louver openings not
visible Irom the air, the authors contended.
The ISIS report noted that early skepticism that Syria was building a reactor there was based partly on
the observable absence oI revealing Ieatures. "The current domestic and international capabilities to
detect nuclear Iacilities and activities are not adequate to prevent more surprises in the Iuture," the
report warned.
Albright, a Iormer U.N. weapons inspector, said his conclusions were based not only on photographs oI
the Syrian site but also on interviews with government oIIicials who closely monitored the Iacility
while it was under construction.
Syria has repeatedly denied that the Al Kibar Iacility was a reactor. Its ambassador, Imad Moustapha,
at a April 25 news conIerence in Washington described the allegations as "absurd, preposterous
stories." "This administration has a proven record oI IalsiIying and Iabricating stories about weapons oI
mass destruction," he said.
On Wednesday, International Atomic Energy Agency director general Mohammed Elbaradei said his
organization should be able to report in coming weeks whether the Iacility was an undeclared nuclear
reactor.
StaII writer Robin Wright contributed to this report.
[Sourcebook note: the ISIS report is available at
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/syria/SyriaReactorReport_12May2008.pdf Materials from the
report are reproduced in Appendix B of this sourcebook.]
Briefing on Latest Developments in the Six-Party Talks
Sung Kim, Director oI the OIIice oI Korean AIIairs
Washington, DC
May 13, 2008
(10:30 a.m. EDT)
[EXCERPTS]
[deletia]
MR. KIM: Thanks, Tom. Good morning. As you know, I just came back yesterday Irom my second trip
to North Korea in two weeks. We brought back, as you can see, documents Irom North Korea. These
are operating and production records Ior the 5-megawatt reactor and the reprocessing plant in
Yongbyon. They number 18,822 pages, 314 volumes. We believe these documents will provide an
important Iirst step in veriIying the North Koreas -- the DPRKs declaration.
Our team oI experts now have these documents and will be undertaking a comprehensive review oI the
contents. I might just, Ior props sake, this is an example oI a volume oI operating records. These
documents are in Korean, so it will actually take some time to translate all oI the documents. But we
have a team oI experts working on these documents and, hopeIully, well be able to conduct at least a
preliminary review oI the documents in a Iew weeks.
In addition to receiving the documents, we had very detailed, substantive discussions with DPRK
interlocutors Irom the Foreign Ministry as well as the General Department oI Atomic Energy on all
aspects oI their declaration. As you know, the declaration will be submitted to the Chinese because
China chairs the process, but we were able to discuss some reIerence materials that would Iorm the
basis Ior the declaration. I think those discussions were productive, and we look Iorward to continuing
the exchange with them through the New York channel.
[deletia]
QUESTION: I mean, were there any more discussions while you were up there on the Syrian reactor
issue? Because I think this was your Iirst trip there since the intelligence was made public and Im just
curious iI there was any more Ieedback or recognition Irom the North Koreans that they had played a
role in developing it, or are they still outright denying this? Because I assume this was something you
raised.
MR. KIM: We actually didnt discuss that issue during my trip.
QUESTION: You said that you talked a lot about the declaration and aspects oI the declaration while
you were in North Korea. Do you now Ieel that the declaration is on track and that, within the next Iew
weeks, that you will have a declaration Irom North Korea?
MR. KIM: Our delegations sense was that the reIerence materials that would Iorm the basis Ior the
declaration appears quite comprehensive, quite Iull. But its really I think its too early to tell whether
it would be ready anytime soon. I think we will continue our discussions with the North Koreans
through the New York channel and well, oI course, continue to consult with our six-party partners.
QUESTION: II these iI this is part oI a veriIication process, what precisely will they be putting into
the declaration in regards to the plutonium program? I mean, isnt this would they are they
considering this to be part oI their declaration? Not just the veriIication phase, not Ior just Ior
veriIication purposes, but actually, theyre saying, this is what were doing? And are they considering
this their declaration on plutonium?
And secondly, what is going to be the next step Ior the U.S.?
MR. KIM: I dont believe this they consider this to be the declaration itselI. I think they will be
submitting a separate document to the Chinese that would, I think, be their declaration. I think these
documents are important supporting documents Ior the declaration, but not the declaration itselI.
QUESTION: Can I just ask -- you said in that the U.S. thought that what the North Koreans came out
with at the end oI last year was inadequate. And its my understanding its inadequate because they
didnt address things like uranium enrichment and proliIeration, but also because you thought the
number was too low. To what can you tell us why you thought what they said in the end oI last year
was inadequate and whether this goes any way in terms oI meeting those shortcomings, in terms oI the
background inIormation and possible reasons why the number was so low, Ior example, with
(inaudible) waste?
MR. KIM: Yeah. I think its probably inappropriate Ior me to go into details oI the declaration and
what is likely to be the declaration at this stage. I can tell you that the reIerence materials that we saw
late last year did not have many oI the details that is now included in their latest set oI reIerence
material.
QUESTION: And was that a large reason why it was inadequate?
MR. KIM: Im sorry?
QUESTION: Is that a large reason why it wasnt good enough?
MR. KIM: Yeah. I mean, we would like to see a complete, credible declaration.
[deletia]
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Pagearchives&Areasd&IDSP192908
May 14, 2008
No. 1929
Syrian Ambassador to U.S. Slams Bush Administration over Syrian Nuclear Plant
Allegations: 'Sometimes It Amazes Me That My Enemy Is So Nave, Superficial, and
Stupid'
The Iollowing are excerpts Irom an interview with Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. 'Imad MustaIa,
which aired on Al-Jazeera TV on May 5, 2008.
To view this clip, visit http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1763.htm .
"This [U.S.] Administration is Characterized By A Great Deal Of Recklessness, In Addition to its
Capabilities for Fabricating and Lying"
'Imad Mustafa: "Even though this story |about a Syrian nuclear reactor| is ridiculous, we do not take
it lightly. This |U.S.| administration is characterized by a great deal oI recklessness, in addition to its
capabilities Ior Iabricating and lying, and oI causing the utmost damage to other nations, as well as to
the American nation itselI. This is not propaganda. This is the reality in which the American people is
living right now. ThereIore, we do not take this story lightly.
"We believe that this story comes in a certain context. This story, as presented by the American
administration, is another link in a continuous chain oI actions, which the U.S. administration has been
taking against Syria Ior at least Iour years.
"There are two very signiIicant diIIerences between then and now. When the U.S administration made
its Ialse claims in the past - even though some people doubted the claims about Iraqi WMDs - the
American political establishment as a whole accepted the administration's account, in order to wage the
war against Iraq. Both Democrats and Republicans, who Iorm the U.S. political establishment, are very
upset today because they have realized that the U.S. administration lied to them and dragged them into
a war, which has turned into a muddy quagmire oI blood and destruction - blood and destruction in
Iraq, and a lot oI blood and huge damage in the U.S.
"This war has destroyed Iraq, but it also wounded the national pride oI the U.S. There was damage on
both sides, even iI not to the same extent. The diIIerence is that Irom the moment the U.S.
administration presented its Iabricated story about the Syrian nuclear reactor, in both houses oI
Congress and in both the Republican and Democratic parties there has been great discontent."|...|
"The Administration Thought... It Could Once Again Increase the Tempo of the Drumbeat of
War by Unleashing a New Nuclear Crisis In Our Region"
"The current U.S. government is very upset about losing the momentum Ior waging a war or aggression
against Iran, because political public opinion in the U.S. does not support such a war. The
administration thought - this is my analysis, but I can't swear to it - that it could once again increase the
tempo oI the drumbeat oI war by unleashing a new nuclear crisis in our region all oI a sudden, and then
lumping together all oI us - the countries oI the 'Axis oI Evil,' the rogue states."
"Sometimes It Amazes Me That My Enemy is So Nave, Superficial, and Stupid... The American
Media, Legislative, Political, and Intelligence Establishment Has Already Begun to Pound Away
At This Account "
"ThereIore, it presented the American people with a story according to which there is a great danger in
that region, because evil rogue states like Syria and Iran are arming themselves with nuclear weapons,
while the good, democratic, and angelic state oI Israel is in terrible danger, and we have to do
something in order to save Israel Irom the evil oI those rogue states. This reckless hotheadedness oI
theirs... Sometimes it amazes me that my enemy is so nave, superIicial, and stupid. They did not plan it
very well.
"We in Syria are expecting this new story to collapse as a result oI two types oI blows - internal and
external blows. The American media, legislative, political, and intelligence establishment has already
begun to pound away at this account, and the blows will only increase.
"You will be able to check what I am telling you very soon. Voices are beginning to be heard. They are
still Iew, but they are constantly increasing, and they doubt this account very clearly. But there are also
external blows. Over the past three days, I noticed dozens oI articles published by nuclear technology
experts Irom various countries, Irom Western Europe and the U.S., who analyzed and explained why
this story is stupid and ridiculous, and they showed that scientiIically and technologically, this account
is completely unreliable."
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article1406789.php/
Syria reactor site raises concerns ahead of IAEA meet (Extra)
May 21, 2008, 17:58 GMT
Vienna - As Israel and Syria engaged in indirect peace talks, diplomats in Vienna on Wednesday
expressed their concern over Syria's lack oI cooperation into the probe oI its alleged reactor destroyed
by Israel.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is still trying to get access to Syria's al-Kibar site,
where Israel in September bombed what it said was a secret nuclear reactor Syria built with support oI
North Korea.
Attempts by the IAEA to persuade Syria to allow inspections remained without success, diplomats said.
'Syrian authorities have a lot oI explaining to do. They must allow IAEA inspectors to visit the site and
ensure there are no other undeclared activities,' US Ambassador Gregory Schulte said.
According to US intelligence released in late April, the reactor could have produced plutonium Ior
nuclear weapons, making Syria the latest in a number oI countries like North Korea, Libya or Iran who
violated their obligations under the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty (NPT).
Iran always maintained that its nuclear programme, kept secret Ior almost two decades, was solely
peaceIul. AIter Israel's bomb raid, Syria said the al-Kibar site had conventional military uses.
Syria was unlikely to be an agenda item at the IAEA's June board oI governors meeting, as the IAEA to
date had little to report, diplomats said, but said there were internal discussions oI how to proceed in
the matter.
Several members were however expected to raise the issue and press Ior a more thorough investigation
during the meeting, starting on June 2.
At the time oI the US intelligence release on Syria's alleged reactor work on April 24, IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei sharply criticised the United States Ior leaving the IAEA in the dark by
not sharing intelligence with the UN nuclear watchdog earlier.
Analysis: An attempt to break the Iranian-Syrian alliance
By YAAKOV KATZ
May 21, 2008 22:59 , Updated May 22, 2008 6:55
[EXCERPT]
Also oI concern are the news reports that emerged on Wednesday [2008-05-21], according to which
inspectors Irom the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were denied access to two Iacilities in
Syria suspected oI being connected to the nuclear reactor that Israel bombed and destroyed along the
Euphrates River in September. The nature oI the Iacilities has not been exposed, but it leaves open the
possibility that Syria may still have operational components oI its destroyed nuclear program.
http://www.Ias.org/irp/congress/2008rpt/hrpt110-665.pdI
[deletia]
Issues regarding Committee notification of Syrias nuclear program
In April 2008, the Director oI National Intelligence (DNI) brieIed the Committee on the
construction oI a covert nuclear Iacility in Syria and its subsequent destruction in September 2007.
Over the course oI the preceding eight months, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member
had requested that the President brieI the Iull membership oI the Committee about these
developments,which signiIicantly impact U.S. Ioreign policy toward the Middle East and North Korea.
Just hours beIore a highly-orchestrated public roll-out oI the previously classiIied intelligence,
the President Iinally sent brieIers to the Committee. The delay was inexcusable and violated the
National Security Act oI 1947, which requires that the executive branch keep Congress Iully and
currently inIormed oI all intelligence activities. Congress should be brieIed on the threats to the
United States in a timely manner, not simply when it is politically expedient.
The world is more dangerous today than at any time since 9/11. There are serious challenges to
U.S. national and international security that require the Administration and Congress to work together.
The Administrations clear disdain Ior the legitimate oversight role oI Congress makes it diIIicult Ior
Congress to do its part in meeting these challenges and keeping America secure.
[deletia]
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSL2340597020080523
Syria hesitant to grant IAEA access: diplomats
By Karin Strohecker
Fri May 23, 2008 1:05pm EDT
[EXCERPTS]
VIENNA (Reuters) - Syria has yet to accept a request Irom the U.N. nuclear watchdog to visit a site
where Washington says Damascus covertly built an atomic reactor, and has demanded more details
about the proposed trip, diplomats said.
The head oI the U.N. body, the International Atomic Energy Agency, said on May 7 that he hoped to
be able to shed light "in the next Iew weeks" on whether a Syrian Iacility, bombed by Israel last year,
was an undeclared nuclear reactor.
[deletia]
At the start oI May, the IAEA wrote to Syria asking to see the targeted area. Syrian atomic energy chieI
Ibrahim Othman visited Vienna on May 9 Ior talks with the agency's chieI, Mohamed ElBaradei,
diplomats Iamiliar with the matter said.
Those talks did not produce any agreement on the timing and nature oI a trip by senior inspectors, they
added.
One diplomat said on condition oI anonymity that the agency had received a letter Irom Damascus
earlier this week asking Ior more details on the proposed visit. The agency has replied and is now
waiting Ior a Iurther response, the diplomat added.
"NOTHING TO HIDE"
Syria's U.N. envoy said in late April that Damascus would cooperate with the IAEA inquiry and had
"nothing to hide."
[deletia]
Gregory Schulte, the U.S. envoy to the IAEA, reiterated on Wednesday [2008-05-21] the Iacility at the
site was not a typical power or research reactor.
"Syrian authorities have a lot oI explaining to do," Schulte told journalists. "They must allow IAEA
inspectors to visit the site and ensure there are no other undeclared activities."
(Additional reporting by Mark Heinrich, editing by Mark Trevelyan)
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/Is/105217.htm
Fact Sheet
Bureau oI International Security and NonproliIeration
Washington, DC
May 26, 2008
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
[EXCERPT]
What is the value of the PSI?
The PSI provides committed states with a Iramework Ior coordinating counterproliIeration activities to
thwart proliIerators increasingly sophisticated tactics. In recent years, In recent years we have seen the
emergence oI black-market operatives who, Ior the right price, are willing to use their knowledge,
access to materials, and personal connections to provide WMD-related goods and services to terrorists
and countries oI proliIeration concern. Five years ago, the world became aware that an international
black market network, headed by Dr. A.Q. Khan, had Ior many years been supplying clandestine
nuclear weapons programs. Seizure oI the cargo ship BBC China exposed the network and ultimately
led to Libyas decision to end its nuclear and missile programs. Most recently, the discovery oI Syrias
covert nuclear reactorbelieved not to be Ior peaceIul purposes--demonstrated that proliIerators are
capable oI pursuing their dangerous objectives even as the world is watching. And today, Iran
continues its pursuit oI nuclear technology and missile systems that could deliver WMD in direct
violation oI the UN Security Council.
http://christiannewswire.com/news/503976737.html
Statement by the President
Contact: White House, OIIice oI the Press Secretary, 202-456-2580
COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo., May 28 [2008]/Christian Newswire
The Iollowing text a statement the President oI the United States oI America:
Members oI the international community are gathered in Washington, D.C., today on the IiIth
anniversary oI the ProliIeration Security Initiative (PSI). Since Iormer Polish President Kwasniewski
and I Iirst announced the initiative on May 31, 2003, in Krakow, Poland, PSI partner nations have been
taking cooperative action to stop the proliIeration trade and to deny terrorists, rogue states, and their
supplier networks access to weapons oI mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related
materials.
Five years ago, the world became aware that an international black market network, headed by A.Q.
Khan, had Ior many years supplied a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Libya. Recently, the
discovery oI Syria's covert nuclear reactor demonstrated that proliIerators are capable oI pursuing
dangerous objectives even as the world becomes more vigilant. And today, in violation oI United
Nations Security Council resolutions, Iran continues to enrich uranium and develop missile systems
that could eventually deliver WMD. These proliIeration activities undermine peace and security and
remind us oI the continued need Ior cooperative action.
The PSI has responded to this challenge and achieved a solid record oI success. Beginning in 2003
with only 11 states, the PSI has grown to more than 90 nations Irom every region oI the world
committed to conduct interdictions and deter those engaged in this dangerous trade. As a result oI the
collaborative eIIorts and training it sponsors, PSI is an increasingly eIIective tool to carry out real-
world WMD-related interdictions, Irom shutting down Iront companies, to disrupting Iinancial
networks, prosecuting proliIerators, and stopping shipments oI sensitive materials Irom reaching their
intended destination.
I commend all PSI partners Ior the work they have undertaken and pledge continued U.S. leadership
and support Ior the eIIort. I urge all responsible nations to join this global initiative to end WMD
proliIeration.
Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley at the Proliferation Security
Initiative Fifth Anniversary Senior Level Meeting
Washington Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.
May 28, 2008
10:07 A.M. EDT
[EXCERPT]
In today's world, more states have pursued or are pursuing the capacity to develop and deploy the Iull
range oI weapons oI mass destruction. Since the end oI the Cold War, we have seen Libya develop an
illegal nuclear program, North Korea conduct a nuclear weapons test, Iran enrich uranium, and Syria
come close to completing a nuclear reactor that could have produced plutonium Ior nuclear weapons.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jRShQkJRmI2ODHgHOl2KH0PwQMcgD90UB5L80
CIA watching for al-Qaida 'succession crisis'
By PAMELA HESS 12 hours ago |Accessed 2008-05-28T13:30Z|
[EXCERPTS]
WASHINGTON (AP) The U.S. is making "a big and continual push" to capture or kill al-Qaida
leader Osama bin Laden, but his demise won't end the organization's menace, CIA Director Michael
Hayden said Tuesday [2008-05-27] in an Associated Press interview.
[deletia]
On other topics, Hayden said:
[deletia]
Even without Israeli intelligence, the CIA would have known by last July that a building in Syria's
western desert was meant to be a secret nuclear reactor when a pipe system Irom the Euphrates River to
the building was constructed.
"That was a powerIul cooling system going to a building with no visible heat source," Hayden said.
Israeli jets destroyed the building in August 2007, although Syria has denied it was a nuclear Iacility.
North Korea's arms trade helping Syria build a nuclear reactor, or selling missile technology to Iran
is motivated by cash. "It's a starved economy, with very, very Iew sources oI Ioreign exchange," he
said. "This is one oI the ones where they can actually turn a proIit."
Search Is Urged for Syrian Nuclear Sites
U.S. Presses U.N. on 3 Alleged Facilities
By Joby Warrick and Robin Wright
Thursday, May 29, 2008; A14
The Bush administration is pressing U.N. inspectors to broaden their search Ior possible secret nuclear
Iacilities in Syria, hinting that Damascus's nuclear program might be bigger than the single alleged
reactor destroyed by Israeli warplanes last year.
At least three sites have been identiIied by U.S. oIIicials and passed along to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, which is negotiating with Syria Ior permission to conduct inspections in the country,
according to U.S. government oIIicials and Western diplomats. U.S. oIIicials want to know iI the
suspect sites may have been support Iacilities Ior the alleged Al Kibar reactor destroyed in an Israeli air
raid Sept. 6, the sources said.
The U.N. nuclear watchdog, which has been seeking access to the Al Kibar site since shortly aIter the
bombing, has acknowledged receiving requests to expand the scope oI its inspections, but provided no
details.
U.S. government oIIicials declined to describe the speciIic sites that have drawn interest, or to discuss
how they were identiIied. However, the United States and other Western governments have long been
interested in identiIying possible locations Ior a Iacility in Syria that might have supplied nuclear Iuel
rods Ior a Syrian reactor. Although the Al Kibar site was described as nearly operational at the time oI
the Sept. 6 bombing, it had no clear source oI the uranium Iuel necessary Ior operation, according to
U.S. intelligence oIIicials and diplomats Iamiliar with the site.
Syria, which has denied having a nuclear weapons program, has not yet responded to IAEA requests
Ior a Iirm date Ior inspections.
U.S. intelligence oIIicials contend that the Al Kibar Iacility was built with North Korean assistance, to
produce plutonium Ior nuclear weapons. CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said in an interview that the
intelligence community's insight into Syria's nuclear ambitions has deepened since the Israeli raid.
"Do not assume that Al Kibar exhausted our knowledge oI Syrian eIIorts with regard to nuclear
weapons," Hayden said. "I am very comIortable -- certainly with Al Kibar and what was there, and
what the intent was. It was the highest conIidence level. And nothing since the attack last September
has changed our mind. In Iact, events since the attack give us even greater conIidence as to what it
was."
He predicted that Syria would "almost certainly attempt to delay and deceive" the IAEA. But he added:
"We know what they did."
The absence oI a clear Iuel source Ior the reactor -- as well as a Iuel-reprocessing Iacility Ior extracting
plutonium -- has baIIled experts who have studied the Syrian project. "It's like having a car but not
enough gas to run it," said David Albright, a Iormer U.N. nuclear inspector in Iraq and the president oI
the Institute Ior Science and International Security.
But weapons experts also noted that Western intelligence has had a mixed record on the reliability oI
leads provided to U.N. inspectors. "U.S. intelligence has had a serious credibility problem on weapons
oI mass destruction Ior a decade," said John Pike oI GlobalSecurity.org, adding that "they have been
known to be right on occasions."
Weapons experts also noted that IAEA inspectors Iace a diIIicult task in assessing claims about Syria's
program. AIter the Sept. 6 bombing, Syria bulldozed the ruins oI the Al Kibar Iacility and erected a
new building on the same spot. "I think by now they've had enough time to cover their trail," Pike said.
In recent weeks, the Bush administration has increased diplomatic pressure on Syria. Yesterday,
national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley said Syria was caught last year trying to procure equipment
that could have been used to test ballistic missile components.
Appendix A
Commentary
http://www.IoreignaIIairs.house.gov/archives/108/89406.pdI
[EXCERPT]
Nuclear
As I inIormed Congress last Iall [i.e., fall of 2002], we are concerned about Syrias nuclear R&D
program and continue to watch Ior any signs oI nuclear weapons activity or Ioreign assistance that
could Iacilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware oI Syrian eIIorts to acquire dual-
use technologiessome, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical
Cooperation programthat could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia and
Syria have approved a draIt program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian
expertise could provide opportunities Ior Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to
pursue nuclear weapons. The Syrians have a Chinese-supplied miniature research reactor under
IAEA saIeguards at Dayr Al Hajar.
Syria is a party to the Non-ProliIeration Treaty, and has a standard saIeguards agreement with the
IAEA but, like Iran, has not yet signed or, to our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA
Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is an important tool that, iI Iully implemented, could
strengthen the IAEAs investigative powers to veriIy compliance with NPT saIeguards obligations and
provides the IAEA with the ability to act quickly on any indicators oI undeclared nuclear materials,
Iacilities and activities. We believe the Additional Protocol should be a new minimal standard Ior
countries to demonstrate their nonproliIeration bona Iides.
Pyongyangs Upper Hand
John R. Bolton
Wall Street Journal, Opinion
August 31, 2007
The Six-Party talks on North Koreas nuclear weapons program have now descended into a miasma oI
working groups, one oI which, on U.S.-North Korea bilateral issues, will meet this weekend in
Geneva. It is worth paying attention to the outcome oI this gathering.
North Korea wants to be taken oII the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and, as soon as possible,
to enjoy Iull diplomatic relations with Washington. Pyongyang may well succeed, as many in the U.S.
State Department seem more eager to grant Iull recognition to the Pyongyang dictatorship in North
Korea than to the democracy in Taiwan. This would be a proIound mistake on our part.
Nearly 200 days have passed since Feb. 13, when the Six-Party Talks on North Koreas nuclear
weapons program produced an agreement to eliminate that program. Despite encomiums about the
virtues oI diplomacy, little real progress has been made in eliminating Pyongyangs program.
Negotiations in July ended without agreement on a timetable, despite repeated State Department
assurances since February that the North would be held to strict deadlines.
The Yongbyon reactor is shuttered, but that reactor was not Irequently operational in the recent past,
and may well be at the end oI, or even beyond, its useIul liIe. The return oI International Atomic
Energy Agency inspectors to Yongbyon provides North Korea with a new patina oI respectability,
despite the near certainty that signiIicant nuclear activity is happening anywhere but Yongbyon.
In Iact, the key change is that economic assistance is once again subsidizing and reinIorcing Kim Jong-
ils hold on power. Heavy Iuel oil, Iood and other humanitarian assistance Irom South Korea, and
substantial unpublicized aid Irom China are all Ilowing North. Cheeky Pyongyang is once again
demanding that the outside world supply it with light-water nuclear reactors. The second North-South
Summit in Pyongyang, postponed until Octobercloser to South Koreas presidential electionswill
provide renewed legitimacy to the North Korean dictatorship, and may bolster the political chances oI
South Korean advocates oI appeasement, in turn providing Kim Jong-il even more breathing room.
Kim is once again besting the U.S. in accomplishing his two central strategic objectives: staying in
power and preserving his nuclear-weapons program. The working groups currently underway do
nothing to achieve the proper ends oI U.S. Ioreign policy. A Iew weeks ago in Shenyang, China, the
denuclearization working group met without visible progress, even on permanently dismantling
Yongbyon.
There is still simply no evidence that Pyongyang has made a decision to abandon its long-held strategic
objective to have a credible nuclear-weapons capability. This inconvenient Iact should make it
impossible Ior the State Department to concede on other issues, even iI it were inclined to do so.
Creative minds are thereIore working on ways to explain that any Iorthcoming North Korean
declaration oI its nuclear capabilities is Iull and complete, thus eliminating the remaining troubling
obstacles to Iull normalization oI relations.
Consider a possible North Korean declaration, perhaps draIted with States coaching, which would
say something like this: We manuIactured two nuclear devices, one oI which we detonated last
October. We detonated the other earlier, but you didnt recognize it as a nuclear explosion. We
currently have no nuclear devices. Our plutonium reprocessing eIIorts were not very successIul, which
explains why we only had two devices, neither oI which produced large yields. We ultimately disposed
oI our limited remaining plutonium to others, and we have no idea where it now is. We currently have
no plutonium. On uranium enrichment, we purchased some UF6 and a small number oI centriIuges Ior
a test cascade Irom A.Q. Khan, but we could not progress due to inadequate Iunds. Accordingly, we
long ago sold all but a small amount oI the UF6 and the centriIuges to third-parties. We will produce
what little we have at Yongbyon shortly. Thats it. Are we done now?
Many will Iall Ior this pretense oI Iull disclosure, especially those needing a diplomatic success to
justiIy long years oI Iaith in the Six-Party Talks. The alternative is to reject any North Korean
declaration without Iull and timely veriIication. IAEA inspections alone are not enough. Its capacities
are limited. Indeed, much oI the IAEAs work is accomplished on the basis oI intelligence provided by
governments.
Precisely because our knowledge oI the Norths nuclear program is incomplete, we need an intrusive,
indeed invasive, veriIication mechanism beIore having any conIidence that North Koreas nuclear
program is in Iact being dismantled. We need smart and extensive veriIication activities inside North
Korea, including no-notice inspections, a Iull range oI sensors and sampling, unrestricted interviews
and document reviews. II the North rejects eIIective veriIication, that is yet another basis to repudiate
the Feb. 13 quicksand deal.
We need to know, among other things, precisely how many nuclear weapons the North has
manuIactured, how and where it manuIactured them, how many it now has, and how much reprocessed
plutonium remains available Ior weaponization. II any devices, Iissile material or nuclear
manuIacturing equipment have leIt North Korea, we need to learn the speciIics.
We need to understand the Iull extent oI its uranium enrichment program, and iI weapons-grade
enriched uranium was produced, where it is and how much there is oI it. We also need to know
speciIically iI North Korea possesses any enriched uranium metal or any weapons- or missile warhead-
design inIormation.
President Bush has stressed that we must also deal with Pyongyangs biological, chemical and ballistic
missile programs. We must address these programs, especially the missiles, soon. Failure to make
explicit the important connection between weapons and delivery systems will certainly come back to
haunt us, and we are on the verge oI allowing this point to slip away entirely.
Finally, we need to learn the details oI North Korean nuclear cooperation with other countries. We
know that both Iran and Syria have long cooperated with North Korea on ballistic missile programs,
and the prospect oI cooperation on nuclear matters is not Iar-Ietched. Whether and to what extent Iran,
Syria or others might be saIe havens Ior North Koreas nuclear weapons development, or may have
already participated with or beneIited Irom it, must be made clear.
For our own saIetys sake, and that oI allies like Japan and South Korea, there can be no compromises
on these points.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/bstephens/?id110010619
Osirak II?
Israel's silence on Syria speaks volumes.
BY BRET STEPHENS
Tuesday, September 18, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
In the late spring oI 2002 the American press reported that Israel had armed its German-made
submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. In Israel, this was old news. It was also headline news.
"Washington Post: Israeli subs have nuclear cruise missiles," was how the Jerusalem Post, oI which I
was then the editor, titled its story oI June 16. It wasn't as iI we didn't previously know that Israel had
purchased and modiIied the German subs Ior purposes oI strategic deterrence. Nor did we delight in
circumlocutions. We simply needed the imprimatur oI a Ioreign source to publish items that Israel's
military censors (who operate as iI the Internet doesn't exist) Iorbade us Irom reporting Iorthrightly.
So it's more than a little telling that the Israeli newspaper Haaretz chose, in the wake oI an Israeli Air
Force raid on Syria on Sept. 6 dubbed "Operation Orchard," to give Iront-page billing to an op-ed by
John Bolton that appeared in this newspaper Aug. 31. While the article dealt mainly with the six-party
talks with North Korea, Mr. Bolton also noted that "both Iran and Syria have long cooperated with
North Korea on ballistic missile programs, and the prospect oI cooperation on nuclear matters is not
Iar-Ietched." He went on to wonder whether Pyongyang was using its Middle Eastern allies as saIe
havens Ior its nuclear goods while it went through a U.N. inspections process.
How plausible is this scenario? The usual suspects in the nonproliIeration crowd reject it as some kind
oI trumped-up neocon plot. Yet based on conversations with Israeli and U.S. sources, along with
evidence both positive and negative (that is, what people aren't saying), it seems the likeliest suggested
so Iar. That isn't to say, however, that plenty oI gaps and question marks about the operation don't
remain.
What's beyond question is that something big went down on Sept. 6. Israeli sources had been telling me
Ior months that their air Iorce was intensively war-gaming attack scenarios against Syria; I assumed
this was in anticipation oI a second round oI Iighting with Hezbollah. On the morning oI the raid,
Israeli combat brigades in the northern Golan Heights went on high alert, reinIorced by elite Maglan
commando units. Most telling has been Israel's blanket censorship oI the story--unprecedented in the
experience oI even the most veteran Israeli reporters--which has also been extended to its ordinarily
hypertalkative politicians. In a country oI open secrets, this is, Ior once, a closed one.
The censorship helps dispose oI at least one theory oI the case. According to CNN's Christiane
Amanpour, Israel's target was a cache oI Iranian weapons destined Ior Hezbollah. But iI that were the
case, Israel would have every reason to advertise Damascus's ongoing violations oI Lebanese
sovereignty, particularly on the eve oI Lebanon's crucial presidential election. Following the January
2002 Karine-A incident--in which Israeli Irogmen intercepted an Iranian weapons shipment bound Ior
Gaza--the government oI Ariel Sharon wasted no time inviting reporters to inspect the captured
merchandise. Had Orchard had a similar target, with similar results, it's doubtIul the government oI
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert--which badly needs to erase the blot oI last year's Iailed war--could have
resisted turning it into a propaganda coup.
Something similar goes Ior another theory, this one Irom British journalist Peter Beaumont oI the
Observer, that the raid was in Iact "a dry run Ior attack on Iran." Mr. Beaumont is much taken by a
report that at least one oI the Israeli bombers involved in the raid dropped its Iuel tanks in a Turkish
Iield near the Syrian border.
Why Israel apparently chose to route its attack through Turkey is a nice question, given that it means a
detour oI more than 1,000 miles. Damascus claims the Iuel tank was discarded aIter the planes came
under Syrian anti-aircraIt Iire, which could be true. But iI Israel is contemplating an attack on Tehran's
nuclear installations--and it is--it makes no sense to advertise the "Turkish corridor" as its likely avenue
oI attack.
As Ior the North Korean theory, evidence Ior it starts with Pyongyang. The raid, said one North Korean
Ioreign ministry oIIicial quoted by China's Xinhua news agency, was "little short oI wantonly violating
the sovereignty oI Syria and seriously harassing the regional peace and security." But who asked him,
anyway? In August, the North Korean trade minister signed an agreement with Syria on "cooperation
in trade and science and technology." Last week, Andrew Semmel, the acting counterproliIeration chieI
at the State Department, conIirmed that North Korean technicians oI some kind were known to be in
Syria, and that Syria was "on the U.S. nuclear watch list." And then there is yesterday's curious news
that North Korea has abruptly suspended its participation in the six-party talks, Ior reasons undeclared.
That still leaves the question oI just what kind oI transIers could have taken place. There has been some
speculation regarding a Syrian plant in the city oI Homs, built 20 years ago to extract uranium Irom
phosphate (oI which Syria has an ample supply). Yet Homs is 200 miles west oI Dayr az Zawr, the city
on the Euphrates reportedly closest to the site oI the attack. More to the point, uranium extraction Irom
phosphates is a commonplace activity (without it, phosphate is hazardous as Iertilizer) and there is a
vast gulI separating this kind oI extraction Irom the enrichment process needed to turn uranium into
something genuinely threatening.
There is also a rumor--sourced to an unnamed expert in the Washington Post--that on Sept. 3 a North
Korean ship delivered some kind oI nuclear cargo to the Syrian port oI Tartus, Iorcing the Israelis to
act. That may well be accurate, though it squares awkwardly with the evidence that plans Ior Orchard
were laid months ago.
More questions will no doubt be raised about the operational details oI the raid (some sources claim
there were actually two raids, one oI them diversionary), as well as Iresh theories about what the
Israelis were aIter and whether they got it. The only people that can provide real answers are in
Jerusalem and Damascus, and Ior the most part they are preserving an abnormal silence. In the Middle
East, that only happens when the interests oI prudence and the demands oI shame happen to coincide.
Could we have just lived through a partial reprise oI the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear
reactor? On current evidence, it is the least unlikely possibility.
Mr. Stephens is a member oI The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His column appears in the
Journal Tuesdays.
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews39304
MIDEAST: Neocons Tie N. Korea to Israeli Strike on Syria
Analysis by Khody Akhavi
WASHINGTON
Sep 18 [2007| (IPS) -
Nearly two weeks have passed since Israeli warplanes conducted a mysterious raid against an as yet
unidentiIied target in northeast Syria. Details oI the incident have been slow to come, as oIIicials Irom
both countries have remained tight-lipped.
In the absence oI a clear picture oI what happened in the early hours oI Sep. 6, speculation in the U.S.
mainstream media has grown as to what exactly the Israelis targeted, and why Damascus -- assuming it
was the target oI an unprovoked attack -- has been so muted in its response.
Was Israel's attack aimed at testing Syria's radar deIences? Did the air strike seek to disrupt arms
shipments to Lebanon's Hezbollah? Was it a dress rehearsal Ior a possible Iuture strike on Iranian
nuclear Iacilities?
Feeding the speculation, a Iamiliar clutch oI George W. Bush administration hawks appear to be
suggesting that Israel's apparent air strike may have targeted a joint North Korea-Syria nuclear venture.
Writing in the opinion pages oI the Wall Street Journal more than a week beIore the incident, Iormer
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John R. Bolton asserted, "We know that both Iran and Syria
have long cooperated with North Korea on ballistic missile programs, and the prospect oI cooperation
on nuclear matters is not Iar-Ietched."
"Whether and to what extent Iran, Syria or others might be 'saIe heavens' Ior North Korea's nuclear
weapons development, or may have already beneIited Irom it, must be made clear," he wrote. Bolton
resigned his position at the U.N. in late 2006 and currently serves as a senior Iellow at the neo-
conservative American Enterprise Institute.
Comments made by a State Department oIIicial last Friday Ianned the Ilames Iurther and bolstered the
neoconservative argument. Andrew Semmel, acting deputy assistant secretary oI state Ior nuclear non-
proliIeration policy, told the Associated Press that the U.S. believes that Syria may have a number oI
"secret suppliers" to obtain nuclear equipment as part oI a covert programme.
The Bush administration has maintained a hard-line policy stance on Syria. It has not had high-level
diplomatic relations with the country since the assassination oI Iormer Lebanese Prime Minister RaIiq
Hariri in 2005. The U.S. has alleged that Syria played a role in the assassination.
Neoconservatives appear to be re-igniting a political narrative that Iits neatly with the inIamous cast oI
the "axis oI evil". While not explicitly mentioned, Syria has oIten been designated as a junior partner oI
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea's "reign oI terror" because oI its support Ior Islamist opposition groups such
as Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza.
"They want to torpedo the North Korea deal, they have clung doggedly to making sure that there is no
cooperation in Syria, and they're the same people who got us into this mess in the Middle East in the
Iirst place," said Daniel Levy, a Iormer Israeli peace negotiator and senior Iellow at the Washington-
based New America Foundation.
The Iocus on North Korea comes as the U.S. prepares to implement a deal to end the country's nuclear
weapons programme, a diplomatic approach that has drawn the ire oI policy hawks like Bolton.
"Bolton represents the crowd that is very distressed that the U.S. has declared deIeat in North Korea by
trusting the North Koreans. They would like to scuttle that agreement," wrote Syria expert Josh Landis,
on his widely-read blog, www.syriacomment.org.
"While doing it, anything they can drag into to boost the notion oI weapons transIers between Korea
and Syria and Iran will be icing on the cake. Israeli planes were trying to get the goods," he wrote.
Some U.S. analysts have been very dubious oI an actual Syrian nuclear threat, describing the
speculation surrounding the incident as a manuIactured stunt aimed at advancing a neoconservative
agenda.
"This story is nonsense. The Washington Post story should have been headlined 'White House OIIicials
Try to Push North Korea-Syria Connection.' This is a political story, not a threat story," said Joseph
Cirincione, director Ior nuclear policy at the Washington-based Centre Ior American Progress,
according to an interview with Foreign Policy.
"Once again, this appears to be the work oI a small group oI oIIicials leaking cherry-picked, unvetted
'intelligence' to key reporters in order to promote a pre-existing political agenda. II this sounds like the
run-up to the war in Iraq, it should. This time it appears aimed at derailing the U.S.-North Korean
agreement that administration hardliners think is appeasement. Some Israelis want to thwart any
dialogue between the U.S. and Syria," he said.
Cirincione previously served as director Ior non-proliIeration at the Carnegie Endowment Ior
International Peace.
The Israeli media -- bound by an army censor that restricts coverage oI the incident -- has relied largely
on Ioreign press reports to reconstruct the incident.
"The Israeli press have gone out oI their way to say to the Israeli public, 'we know |the story|, we're
gonna selectively quote Irom the overseas rumours and you can Iill in the gaps,'" Levy told IPS. "|The
press| was dismissive about the reports about arming Hezbollah, and gave greater weight to those
connecting Syria and North Korea."
Syria lodged a Iormal complaint with the U.N. Tuesday over the "Ilagrant violation" oI its airspace last
week by the Israeli warplanes, which Damascus claims dropped munitions on its territory. Israel and
Syria have technically been at war since 1967, when Israel occupied the Golan during the Six-Day
War.
The air strike Iollows a summer that saw heightened tension between the two countries, a period that
provides the necessary context Ior the eventual Israeli action.
"Something will come to light and will make it clear to everyone -- the Israelis were sitting on
intelligence," said Levy.
Experts are still unsure oI what that intelligence entails, and whether is it "nuclear", "non-
conventional", "chemical", or nothing oI the sort. Regardless, in most oI the narratives, the North Korea
connection remains a salient point.
But whatever happened in the early hours oI Sep. 6 does not appear to have soured Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert's eIIorts to restart negotiations with his adversary. Olmert announced on Monday
that Israel was prepared to hold negotiations with Damascus, without preconditions and without
ultimatums, according to the Jerusalem Post.
[Editorial]
Shock Waves From Syria
Did Israel bomb a secret nuclear Iacility equipped by North Korea?
Thursday, September 20, 2007; Page A20
THERE'S BEEN no oIIicial conIirmation oI the targets or results oI an Israeli air raid in northeastern
Syria on Sept. 6. Yet, like a subterranean explosion, the event is sending shock waves through the
Middle East and beyond. Syria has protested to the United Nations, though it hasn't been very clear
about what it's protesting. On Tuesday [18 September 2007], a Iront-page editorial in Damascus's main
government-run newspaper criticized the United States Ior not condemning the attack. An Israeli
newspaper, meanwhile, noted triumphantly that no nation other than North Korea had come to Syria's
deIense, rhetorically or otherwise.
What happened? Media accounts are beginning to converge on a report that Israel bombed a Iacility
where it believed Syria was attempting to hatch its own nuclear weapons program with North Korea's
assistance. The Post's Glenn Kessler reported that the strike came three days aIter a ship carrying
material Irom North Korea docked at a Syrian port and delivered containers that Israel believes held
nuclear materials. It's not clear whether U.S. intelligence agencies concur with Israel's conclusion, and
independent experts have said that Syria lacks the resources Ior a credible nuclear weapons program.
It nevertheless is beginning to look as iI Israel may have carried out the boldest act oI nuclear
preemption since its own 1981 raid against Iraq's Osirak nuclear complex. II so, its silence is shrewd. It
has allowed Syria to avoid a military response and every other Arab state to pretend that nothing
happened. So Iar, the most serious Iallout may be China's abrupt and unexplained postponement oI
scheduled "six-party" talks on North Korea's nuclear program.
The non-news has boosted the previously rock-bottom poll numbers oI Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert. This week he jauntily announced that he was open to peace talks with Syria. Still, the lasting
repercussions oI the raid have yet to become clear. One question is how the government oI Bashar al-
Assad will respond to what may have been a devastating Israeli blow -- coupled with what can only be
interpreted as silent approval by Syria's neighbors and most oI the rest oI the world. Will Mr. Assad be
Irightened out oI the cocky aggressiveness that has caused him to sponsor or Iacilitate terrorism in
Israel, Iraq and Lebanon? Or will he choose to escalate?
Another choice is Iaced by the Bush administration, which hopes to complete an accord with North
Korea by the end oI the year under which North Korea will disclose all oI its nuclear programs and
disable its Iacilities. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice said this week that concerns about
proliIeration only added to the urgency oI moving ahead on the deal. That's true -- but it doesn't mean
U.S. negotiators can ignore the possibility that North Korea was shipping nuclear equipment to Syria
even while promising to dismantle its own program. Pyongyang's dealings with Syria are a legitimate
and necessary subject oI inquiry when the six-party talks resume -- and they ought to be part oI North
Korea's promised disclosure.
http://www.stratIor.com/products/premium/readarticle.php?id295783
Israel, Syria and the Glaring Secret
September 25, 2007 17 54 GMT
By George Friedman
What happened in the Middle East on Sept. 6?
The Iirst reports came Irom the Syrians, who said their air deIenses Iired at an Israeli warplane that had
penetrated Syrian airspace and dropped some ordnance on the country's North. The plane then Iled
toward the Mediterranean at supersonic speeds, the Syrians said, noting that sonic booms had been
heard.
A Syrian delegation was meeting Turkish oIIicials about the same time, and the Turks announced that
two Israeli Iuel tanks had been dropped inside oI Turkish territory, one in Gaziantep province and the
other in Hatay province. That would mean the aircraIt did come under some sort oI Iire and dropped
Iuel tanks to increase speed and maneuverability. It also would mean the plane was Ilying close to
Turkish territory or over Turkish territory, at the northwestern tip oI Syria.
The Israelis said nothing. It appeared at Iirst glance that an Israeli reconnaissance Ilight had attracted
Syrian attention and got out oI there Iast, though even that was puzzling. The Israelis monitor Syria
careIully, but they have close relations with the Turkish military, which also watches Syria careIully.
We would assume they have intelligence-sharing programs and that reconnaissance in this area could
have been done by the Turks or, more likely, by Israeli reconnaissance satellites. Yet, an Israeli
reconnaissance Ilight seemed like the only coherent explanation.
What was most striking Irom the beginning was the relative silence on all sides. The Israelis remained
mum, not even bothering to leak a misleading but plausible story. The Syrians, aIter threatening to take
the issue to the U.N. Security Council, have been less vociIerous than one would expect. The United
States had nothing oIIicial to say, but U.S. sources leaked a series oI incompatible explanations. The
Turks, aIter requesting an explanation Ior the Iuel tanks, dropped the matter.
The leaks, which seemed to be coming Irom the Americans, raised the scope oI the operation Irom a
reconnaissance to something more. It was U.S. sources who said up to eight aircraIt were involved in
the operation. Early on, a leak originating in the United States implied that there might have been
Israeli commandos involved as well. U.S. leaks also mentioned that a shipment oI cement had been
delivered to Syria Irom North Korea a Iew days beIore the incident and implied that this shipment
might have contained nuclear equipment oI some sort that was the real target oI the attack. All three
countries were silent oIIicially on the intent oI the attack, but the Americans were Iilling in some
blanks with unoIIicial hints.
The media also were Iilled with a range oI contradictory speculation. One story said this was a dry run
Ior an Israeli air attack against Iran. Another said the Israelis were demonstrating their ability -- and
hence the U.S. ability -- to neutralize Syrian air deIenses as a signal to Iran that it, too, is vulnerable.
Some stories also claimed that new missiles, not nuclear materials, were being shipped to Syria. There
were many other explanations, but these were either pure speculation or were deliberately being Ied to
the media in order to conIuse the issue.
OIIicials Iinally started to go public last week. Israeli opposition leader and Iormer Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu said he was consulted in advance and supported Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert's action in Syria. U.S. President George W. Bush went out oI his way -- commenting directly
and through his press secretary -- to make it understood that he also knew a raid had been carried out,
but had absolutely nothing to say about it. That drew attention to two things. First, the United States
knew what was going on. Second, the United States was going to keep the secret -- and the secret was
an important one. Between Netanyahu and Bush, the reconnaissance theory was dead. An important
operation occurred Sept. 6. It remains absolutely unclear what it was about.
Another leak appeared via the Sunday Times, this time with enough granularity to consider it a genuine
leak. According to that report, the operation was carried out by Israeli commandos supported by Israeli
aircraIt, under the direct management oI Israeli DeIense Minister Ehud Barak. It had been planned
since June, just aIter Barak took oIIice, and had been approved by the United States aIter some
hesitation. The target was in Iact nuclear "material" provided by North Korea, according to that leak.
All oI this makes perIect sense, save one thing. Why the secrecy? II the Syrians have nuclear Iacilities,
the Israelis should be delighted to make it public. Frankly, so should the United States, since the Bush
administration has always argued that nuclear proliIeration to rogue states, including Syria, is one oI
the key problems in the world. The Syrians should be spinning the story like crazy as well, denying the
nuclear program but screaming about unprovoked Israeli-U.S. aggression. The silence Irom one or two
parties makes sense. The silence Irom all parties makes little sense.
Looked at diIIerently, Israel and the United States both have gone out oI their way to draw attention to
the Iact that a highly signiIicant military operation took place in Northern Syria, and compounded the
attention by making no attempt to provide a plausible cover story. They have done everything possible
to draw attention to the aIIair without revealing what the aIIair was about. Israel and the United States
have a lot oI ways to minimize the importance oI the operation. By the way they have handled it,
however, each has chosen to maximize its importance.
Whoever they are keeping the secret Irom, it is not the Syrians. They know precisely what was attacked
and why. The secret is not being kept Irom the Iranians either. The Syrians talk to them all the time. It
is hard to imagine any government oI importance and involvement that has not been brieIed by
someone. And by now, the public perception has been shaped as well. So, why the dramatic secrecy
designed to draw everyone's attention to the secret and the leaks that seem to explain it?
Let us assume that the Sunday Times report is correct. According to the Times, Barak Iocused on the
material as soon as he became deIense minister in June. That would mean the material had reached
Syria prior to that date. Obviously, the material was not a bomb, or Israel would not have waited until
September to act. So it was, at most, some precursor nuclear material or equipment.
However, an intervening event occurred this summer that should be Iactored in here. North Korea
publicly shiIted its position on its nuclear program, agreeing to abandon it and allow inspections oI its
Iacilities. It also was asked to provide inIormation on the countries it sold any nuclear technology to,
though North Korea has publicly denied any proliIeration. This was, in the context oI the six-party
negotiations surrounding North Korea, a major breakthrough.
Any agreement with North Korea is, by deIinition, unstable. North Korea many times has backed oII oI
agreements that seemed cast in stone. In particular, North Korea wants to be seen as a signiIicant power
and treated with all due respect. It does not intend to be treated as an outlaw nation subject to
interrogation and accusations. Its selI-image is an important part oI its domestic strategy and,
internally, it can position its shiIt in its nuclear stance as North Korea making a strategic deal with
other major powers. II North Korea is pressed publicly, its willingness to implement its agreements can
very quickly erode. That is not something the United States and other powers want to see happen.
Whether the Israelis Iound out about the material through their own intelligence sources or North
Korea provided a list oI recipients oI nuclear technology to the United States is unclear. The Israelis
have made every eIIort to make it appear that they knew about this independently. They also have tried
to make it appear that they notiIied the United States, rather than the other way around. But whether the
intelligence came Irom North Korea or was obtained independently, Washington wants to be very
careIul in its handling oI Pyongyang right now.
The result is the glaring secrecy oI the last Iew weeks. Certainly, Israel and the United States wanted it
known that Syria had nuclear material, and that it was attacked. This served as a warning to other
recipients oI North Korean nuclear technology -- most especially Iran. At the same time, the United
States did not want to publicly embarrass North Korea, out oI Iear that the North Koreans would simply
chuck the disarmament talks. Moreover, Damascus had no interest in publicizing that it had thoughts oI
a nuclear program, so it quieted down.
We should note that iI this theory is true, and the United States and Israel discovered the existence oI a
Syrian nuclear program only Irom North Korean inIormation, this would represent one oI the most
massive intelligence Iailures imaginable by both Israel and the United States. Essentially, it would
mean that, unless this was the Iirst shipment oI material to Syria, Israel and the United States Iailed to
detect a Syrian nuclear program on their own. That is possible, but not likely.
It is a neat theory. It might even be a true theory. But it has problems. The biggest problem is why
Syria would be trying to obtain nuclear technology. Sandwiched between Israel and Turkey -- a country
that has not had great relations with Syria in the past -- and constantly watched by the United States,
the probability oI it developing a nuclear capability undetected is inIinitesimal, and the probability oI
Israel not taking it out is nonexistent. Moreover, Syria is not Iran. It is poorer, has less scientiIic and
other resources and lacks the capability to mount a decadelong development eIIort. Syria actually plays
a Iairly conservative game, taking its risks in Lebanese politics and allowing jihadists to transit through
the country on their way to Iraq. Trying to take on Israel or the United States in a nuclear gambit is not
the Syrians' style. But certainly they were caught doing something, or they would be screaming to high
heaven.
There has been persistent discussion oI nuclear material in Syria, which, iI we took the words seriously,
would tend to indicate that something radioactive, such as enriched uranium or plutonium, was present.
II what was delivered was not equipment but radioactive material, the threat might not have been a
Syrian nuclear program, but some sort oI radioactive device -- a dirty bomb -- that might be handed oII
to Hezbollah. The head oI Israel's military intelligence was quoted as saying something about the attack
having re-established Israel's deterrence power aIter its Iailures in the 2006 conIlict with Hezbollah.
Perhaps the problem was that the material was being transIerred Irom North Korea to Syria on its way
to Lebanon, possibly to use against Israel.
That would explain Syria's relative silence. Concern that the deal with North Korea will Iall apart might
keep the United States quiet. But a Syrian transIer oI such material to Hezbollah normally would set
Israel to raging at the Syrians. The Americans might have kept quiet, but the Israelis would have leaked
much earlier than this. Israel would want to use the threat as a tool in its public relations war.
Another reason Ior the silence could be psychological warIare against Iran. The speculation above
might be true in some variant, but by remaining ominously silent, the Israelis and Americans might be
trying to shake Iran's nerve, by demonstrating their intelligence capability, their special operations
ability and the reach oI their air power. With the Israelis having carried out this attack, this very visible
secrecy might be designed to make Iran wonder whether it is next, and Irom what direction an attack
might come.
Normally such international game-playing would not interest us. The propensity oI governments to
create secrets out oI the obvious is one oI the more tedious aspects oI international relations. But this
secret is not obvious, and it is not trivial. Though it is true that something is Iinally being leaked three
weeks aIter the attack, what is being leaked is neither complete nor reliable. It seems to make sense, but
you really have to work hard at it.
At a time when the United States is signaling hostile intentions toward Iran, the events in Syria need to
be understood, and the Iact that they remain opaque is revealing. The secrecy is designed to make a lot
oI people nervous. Interestingly, the Israelis threw a change-up pitch the week aIter the attack,
signaling once again that they wanted to open talks with the Syrians -- a move the Syrians quickly
rebuIIed.
When events get so strange that interpretation is a challenge, it usually indicates it was intended that
way, that the events are signiIicant and that they could point to Iurther instability. We do not know
whether that is true, but Israel and the United States have certainly worked hard to create a riddle
wrapped in a mystery.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0926/p07s02-woap.html
Did N. Korea give Syria nuclear aid?
Irom the September 26, 2007 edition
The US will press for details in the next round of six-party talks, to be held Thursday in Beijing.
By Donald Kirk ,
Correspondent oI The Christian Science Monitor

Seoul
The US Iaces a dilemma going into the next round oI six-nation talks on North Korea's nuclear
weapons: how Iirmly to press North Korea Ior details oI proliIeration oI its nuclear technology to
Ioreign clients.
Ahead oI the Thursday meeting in Beijing, the issue has assumed critical importance with revelations
oI an Israeli raid early this month on a Syrian base where North Koreans were suspected oI imparting
not only know-how but also materiel needed Ior Syria to develop nuclear warheads.
"The US government has some evidence, but they seem to be deciding now is not the right time to talk
about it," says Kim Tae Woo, senior research Iellow at the Institute oI DeIense Analyses, aIIiliated
with the South Korean deIense ministry.
Indeed, US oIIicials have said almost nothing publicly about what was going on at the base near the
Turkish border in northern Syria that according to media reports prompted Israel Iirst to send in
commandos and then to bomb it.
Mr. Kim believes that Syria's goal was to get "the technology Ior enrichment" oI uranium, and that
North Korea probably supplied uranium Iluoride the gaseous substance Irom which emerges the
highly enriched uranium needed Ior nuclear warheads.
North Korea's expertise in highly enriched uranium raises another issue Ior negotiators to consider at
the upcoming six-party talks: the exact status oI North Korea's highly enriched uranium program.
The chieI US envoy, Christopher Hill, says he hopes Ior "clarity" on the issue at this week's six-party
talks at which North Korea's envoy, Kim Kye Hwan, is to list in detail all aspects oI his country's
nuclear program.
A top North Korean oIIicial acknowledged the existence oI the program to a delegation to Pyongyang
led by Mr. Hill's predecessor, James Kelly, in October 2002, but North Korea since then has denied
anything to do with enriched uranium.
North Korea-Syria connection
This week, North Korea may get around the issue oI highly enriched uranium, according to analysts
here, by admitting that it received advice, and perhaps some centriIuges, Irom Pakistan in the days
when the Pakistan nuclear program was run by the since-disgraced physicist A.Q. Khan. North Korea
can then say it never did anything more to develop warheads with uranium and the Pakistan
relationship was short-lived and no longer exists.
North Korea may have more diIIiculty, however, explaining what was going on at the Syrian base.
"The Israelis must have had pretty good evidence," says Robyn Lim, proIessor oI international relations
at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan. "The US had to have been told in advance oI the raid, and the
Turks would have to have known in advance as well."
But why would North Korea have a team at the Syrian base while six-party talks are about to resume?
"The connection with Syria is ongoing business," says Mr. Kim oI the Institute oI DeIense Analyses.
"It's not something that can be disconnected. The US must have been aware oI that inIormation Ior a
long time."
Indeed, Syria maintains strong relations with North Korea. A Syrian delegation visited Pyongyang last
week.
"There's no doubt Syria has long been interested in the enrichment oI uranium," says Kim. "The Syrian
delegation in Pyongyang was probably talking about both nukes and missiles."
ProIessor Lim, a Iormer Australian intelligence analyst, says while North Korea will "pretend to come
clean" at the talks, the presumption is the North continues to export missiles to Middle Eastern
countries and may well have also been selling nuclear secrets. She sees North Korea as participating in
the talks Ior the sake oI the enormous aid that's promised iI the North convinces the US, South Korea,
China, Russia, and Japan that it has abandoned its nuclear program.
"The talks are designed just to keep enough aid Ilowing to prop up the regime," she says.
N. Korea could react
Analysts doubt, however, that the six-party talks will Iail despite the issues oI proliIeration and highly
enriched uranium. North Korea has already shut down its Iive-megawatt reactor at its nuclear complex
at Yongbyon where it's believed to have made up to a dozen warheads, including one that it detonated
last October in its only nuclear test to date.
Mr. Hill "will have no other option" but to raise the issue oI proliIeration in the talks, says Kim Song
Han, a proIessor at Korea University. Nonetheless, he says, the priority will be to make North Korea
disable its Yongbyon Iacilities, which made warheads with plutonium at their core.
"II the US pushes North Korea to be more detailed," ProIessor Kim says, "North Korea will react very
harshly."
This week's talks will help set the stage Ior next week's North-South Korean summit in Pyongyang at
which South Korea's President Roh Moo Hyun is to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Mr. Roh
says he wants to pursue a "peace system" with North Korea while talking only brieIly about the nuclear
issue since it's already "being resolved."
Kim predicts North Korea will go through with disablement oI its Iacilities at Yongbyon but remains
"pessimistic" about dismantlement the Iinal stage and is not certain iI inspectors will ever see
Iacilities elsewhere, including the site oI the underground nuclear test.
http://www.Ioreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyid3979
Seven Questions: The World According to John Bolton
Posted September 2007
[EXCERPT]
Negotiations with North Korea are on a kniIes edge. Rumors oI secret Israeli raids on alleged Syrian
nuclear Iacilities and possible U.S. airstrikes on Iran are roiling political salons Irom Washington to
Riyadh. In this Seven Questions, Iormer U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton oIIers
some advice Ior those conIronted with a dangerous world.
FOREIGN POLICY: Its been a tense week on the nuclear Iront, with Syria accusing Israel oI invading
its airspace, and then North Korea blasting Israel Ior doing so. Youve been one oI the only people who
have spoken openly about the likelihood that Israel bombed nuclear Iacilities in Syria. II that were the
case, why do you think Israel wouldnt announce it had done so?
John Bolton: Well, I dont think we really know what the target oI the Israeli raid was. There seems to
be a lot oI indication that there was a North Korean-Syrian project in the nuclear Iield, although
obviously the details oI that are not known. And what that suggests is that we need very clear answers
Irom the North Koreans in the context oI the six-party talks |as to| whether indeed they are
proliIerating nuclear technology, whether theyre outsourcing their programor just exactly what it is
theyre doing.
Now, what the Israeli raid actually hit, I dont think people know. I was certainly reacting against the
notion that it was an attack on a shipment oI missiles bound Irom Iran to Hezbollah, because I dont
think the Israelis would take the risks inherent in an attack on Syrian territory against a target like that.
To me, it suggests that it was a higher-value target, and a nuclear Iacility oI some kind would deIinitely
qualiIy. But what exactly the target is, I dont know myselI, and Im not sure that theres anything but
speculation out there at this point. There has been at least some public acknowledgment through
oIIicial U.S. sources that there are concerns about not just North Korean ballistic-missile cooperation
with Syria, which weve known about Ior some time, but the possibility that theres cooperation on the
nuclear Iront as well.
http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/Ieatures/222736/we-came-so-close-to-world-war-three-that-day.thtml
So close to war
We came so close to World War Three that day
James Forsyth and Douglas Davis
Wednesday, 3rd October 2007
On 6 September, when Israel struck a nuclear Iacility in Syria
A meticulously planned, brilliantly executed surgical strike by Israeli jets on a nuclear installation in
Syria on 6 September may have saved the world Irom a devastating threat. The only problem is that no
one outside a tight-lipped knot oI top Israeli and American oIIicials knows precisely what that threat
involved.
Even more curious is that Iar Irom pushing the Syrians and Israelis to war, both seem determined to put
a lid on the aIIair. One month aIter the event, the absence oI hard inIormation leads inexorably to the
conclusion that the implications must have been enormous.
That was conIirmed to The Spectator by a very senior British ministerial source: II people had known
how close we came to world war three that day thered have been mass panic. Never mind the Iloods or
Ioot-and-mouth Gordon really would have been dealing with the bloody Book oI Revelation and
Armageddon.
According to American sources, Israeli intelligence tracked a North Korean vessel carrying a cargo oI
nuclear material labelled cement as it travelled halIway across the world. On 3 September the ship
docked at the Syrian port oI Tartous and the Israelis continued Iollowing the cargo as it was transported
to the small town oI Dayr as Zawr, near the Turkish border in north-eastern Syria.
The destination was not a complete surprise. It had already been the subject oI intense surveillance by
an Israeli OIek spy satellite, and within hours a band oI elite Israeli commandos had secretly crossed
into Syria and headed Ior the town. Soil samples and other material they collected there were returned
to Israel. Sure enough, they indicated that the cargo was nuclear.
Three days aIter the North Korean consignment arrived, the Iinal phase oI Operation Orchard was
launched. With prior approval Irom Washington, Israeli F151 jets were scrambled and, minutes later,
the installation and its newly arrived contents were destroyed.
So secret were the operational details oI the mission that even the pilots who were assigned to provide
air cover Ior the strike jets had not been brieIed on it until they were airborne. In the event, they were
not needed: built-in stealth technology and electronic warIare systems were sophisticated enough to
blind Syrias Russian-made anti-aircraIt systems.
What was in the consignment that led the Israelis to mount an attack which could easily have spiralled
into an all-out regional war? It could not have been a transIer oI chemical or biological weapons; Syria
is already known to possess the most abundant stockpiles in the region. Nor could it have been missile
delivery systems; Syria had previously acquired substantial quantities Irom North Korea. The only
possible explanation is that the consignment was nuclear.
The scale oI the potential threat and the intelligence methods that were used to Iollow the transIer
explain the dense mist oI oIIicial secrecy that shrouds the event. There have been no oIIicial brieIings,
no winks or nudges, Irom any oI the scores oI people who must have been involved in the preparation,
analysis, decision-making and execution oI the operation. Even when Israelis now oIIer a Iirm no
comment, it is strictly oII the record. The secrecy is itselI signiIicant.
Israel is a small country. In some respects, it resembles an extended, iI chaotic, Iamily. Word gets
around Iast. Israelis have lived on the edge Ior so long they have become addicted to the news. Israels
media is Iar too robust and its politicians Iar too leaky to allow secrets to remain secret Ior long. Even
in the Iace oI an increasingly archaic military censor, Israeli journalists have Iound ways to publish
and, iI necessary, be damned.
The only conceivable explanation Ior this unprecedented silence is that the event was so huge, and the
implications Ior Israeli national security so great, that no one has dared break the rule oI omerta. The
Arab world has remained conspicuously and signiIicantly silent. So, too, have American
oIIicials, who might have been expected to ramp up the incident as prooI oI their warnings about the
dangers oI rogue states and WMDs. The opposite is true. George Bush stonewalled persistent questions
at a press conIerence last week with the blunt statement: Im not going to comment on the matter.
Meanwhile the Americans have carried on dealing with the North Koreans as iI nothing has changed.
The Syrian response, when it eventually came, was more Iorthcoming but no more helpIul. First out oI
the blocks was Syrias ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar JaaIari, who happily announced that
nothing had been bombed in Syria and nothing had been damaged.
One week later, Syrias Vice-President, Farouk a-Shara, agreed that there had, aIter all, been an attack
on the Arab Centre Ior the Studies (sic) oI Arid Zones and Dry Lands (ACSAD). Brandishing a
photograph oI the Arab League-run plant, he declared triumphantly: This is the picture, you can see it,
and it proves that everything that was said about this attack was wrong.
Well, perhaps not everything. The Iollowing day, ACSAD issued a statement denying that its centre
had been targeted: Leaks in the Zionist media concerning this ACSAD station are total inventions and
lies, it thundered, adding that a tour oI the centre was being organised Ior the media.
On Monday, Syrias President, Bashar Assad, oIIered his Iirst observations oI the attack. The target, he
told the BBC disingenuously, was an unused military building. And he Iollowed that with vows to
retaliate, maybe politically, maybe in other ways.
Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that the United States had accumulated a growing body oI
evidence over the past six months and particularly in the month leading up to the attack that
North Korea was co-operating with Syria on developing a nuclear Iacility. The evidence, according to
the paper, included dramatic satellite imagery that led some US oIIicials to believe the Iacility could
be used to produce material Ior nuclear weapons. Even within Americas intelligence community,
access to that imagery was restricted to just a handIul oI individuals on the instructions oI Americas
National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley.
Why are all sides so reluctant to clariIy the details oI this extraordinary event? In the Middle East,
noted Bret Stephens, a senior editorial executive at the Wall Street Journal and an acute observer oI the
region, that only happens when the interests oI prudence and the demands oI shame happen to
coincide. He suggested that the least unlikely explanation is a partial reprise oI the Israeli air strike
which destroyed Iraqs Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.
Another oI the least unlikely possibilities is that Syria was planning to supply its terrorist clients with
dirty bombs, which would have threatened major cities throughout the world. Terrorism is a growth
industry in Syria and it is only natural that, emboldened by its Iranian ally, the Syrian regime should
seek to remain the market leader by supplying the ultimate weapon to Hezbollah, Hamas and a plethora
oI Palestinian rejectionist groups who have been given house-room in Damascus.
The Syrians have good reason to up the ante now. The Alawite regime oI Bashar Assad is Iacing a slew
oI tough questions in the coming months most particularly over its alleged role in the murder oI the
Iormer Lebanese leader, RaIiq Hariri, and its active support Ior the insurgency in Iraq. Either oI these
issues could threaten the survival oI the regime. How tempting, then, to create a counter-threat that
might cause Washington and others to pull their horns in and perhaps even permit a limited Syrian
return to Lebanon?
But that does not explain why the consignment was apparently too large to be sent by air. Look deeper
and you Iind an array oI other highly plausible explanations. The North Koreans, under intense
international pressure, might have chosen to park a signiIicant stockpile oI nuclear material in Syria
in the expectation oI retrieving it when the heat was oII. They might also have outsourced part oI their
nuclear development programme paying the Syrians to enrich their uranium while an
international team oI experts continued inspecting and disabling North Koreas own nuclear Iacilities.
The shipment might even and this is well within the least unlikely explanations have been
intended to assist Syrias own nuclear weapons programme, which has been on the cards since the
mid-1980s.
Apart Irom averting the threat that was developing at Dayr as Zawr, Israels strategic position has been
strengthened by the raid. Firstly, it has as Major General Amos Yadlin, the head oI Israels military
intelligence, noted restored its deterrence, which was damaged by its inept handling oI the war in
the Lebanon last year. Secondly, it has reminded Damascus that Israel knows what it is up to and is
capable oI striking anywhere within its territory.
Equally, Iran has been put on notice that Israel will not tolerate any nuclear threat. Washington, too,
has been reminded that Israels intelligence is oIten a better guide than its own in the region, a crucial
point given the divisions between the Israeli and American intelligence assessments about the
development oI the Iranian bomb. Hezbollah, the Iranian/Syrian proxy Iorce, has also been put on
notice that the air-deIence system it boasted would alter the strategic balance in the region is impotent
in the Iace oI Israeli technology.
Meanwhile, a senior Israeli analyst told us this week that the most disturbing aspect oI the aIIair Irom a
global perspective is the willingness oI states to share their technologies and their weapons oI mass
destruction. I do not believe that the Iormer Soviet Union shared its WMD technology, he said. And
they were careIul to limit the range oI the Scud missiles they were prepared to sell. Since the end oI the
Cold War, though, we know the Russians signiIicantly exceeded those limits when selling missile
technology to Iran.
But the Iloodgates were opened wide by the renegade Pakistan nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan,
who is revered in Pakistan as the Father oI the Islamic Bomb. Khan established a virtual supermarket oI
nuclear technologies, parts and plans which operated Ior more than a decade on a global stage. AIter
his operation was shut down in 2004, Khan admitted transIerring technology and parts to Iran, Libya
and North Korea. ProliIeration experts are convinced they know the identities oI at least three oI his
many other clients: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
In addition to selling nuclear-related knowhow, the Khan network is also believed to have provided
Syria with centriIuges Ior producing enriched uranium. In 2003, concern about Syrias nuclear
ambitions was heightened when an experimental American electronic eavesdropping device picked up
distinctive signals indicating that the Syrians had not only acquired the centriIuges but were actually
operating them.
II Israels military strike on Dayr as Zawr last month was surgical, so, too, was its handling oI the
aItermath. The only certainty in the Iog oI cover-up is that something big happened on 6 September
something very big. At the very least, it illustrates that WMD and rogue states pose the single greatest
threat to world peace. We may have escaped Irom this incident without war, but iI Iran is allowed to
continue down the nuclear path, it is hard to believe that we will be so lucky again.
Douglas Davis is a Iormer senior editor oI the Jerusalem Post and James Forsyth is online editor oI The
Spectator.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?qNTc0NjIzYTY3ZGM5MjFhY2M1ODIxMTcxYWU2Y2ViMWU
Raid Revelation
Getting brieIed on World War III.
By Stanley Kurtz
NRO Contributing Editor
October 23, 2007 6:00 AM
II people had known how close we came to World War III that day there would have been mass panic.
That is how a very senior British ministerial source recently characterized Israels September raid on
what was apparently a Syrian nuclear installation. Whether matters were quite that grave is an open
question. Yet it does seem clear that the Iull story oI the Israeli raid has not been told, nor its Iull
signiIicance recognized. Now two key members oI Congress have raised an alarm about this event,
thereby throwing our nuclear agreement with North Korea into question.
Briefings
Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, as senior Republicans on the House Intelligence and Foreign
AIIairs Committees, respectively, were among the mere handIul oI members oI Congress brieIed on the
Israeli air strike. What they learned obviously dismayed them greatly, as is evident Irom What
Happened in Syria? a Wall Street Journal opinion piece published by Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen this
past Saturday.
In that piece, Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen protest the unprecedented veil oI secrecy, thrown over the
airstrike noting that the vast majority oI Ioreign relations and intelligence committee members have
been leIt in the dark on the details oI the raid. Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen acknowledge that they have
personally been sworn to secrecy, yet add that: ...based on what we have learned...it is critical Ior
every member oI congress to be brieIed on this incident, and as soon as possible.
Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen obviously believe that Syria obtained nuclear expertise or material Irom
outside state sources. And while they base their concern on press reports, it seems likely that their top-
secret brieIings conIirmed this Iact. Notable here is Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinens repeated use oI the
phrase North Korea, Iran, or other rogue states when reIerring to Syrias possible nuclear
collaborators. AIter their brieIing, Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen seem just as concerned about Iranian
involvement as North Korean.
Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen protest the administrations willingness to provide the press with
anonymous inIormation on background, to shape this story to its liking, while keeping members oI
Congress in the dark. We believe this is unacceptable, they say, noting that the administration has
ignored numerous letters Irom Congress asking that all members be brieIed. Hoekstra and Ros-
Lehtinen speciIically express concerns about two administration-inIluenced stories in the New York
Times and one in The Washington Post. Finally, Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen threaten to oppose any
nuclear deal with North Korea unless all members oI congress are brieIed on the reasons Ior the Israeli
raid.
While the secrecy that surrounds this issue Iorces us to read between the lines, two broad Iactual
questions emerge Irom Hoekstras and Ros-Lehtinens oped. First, in what sense has the administration
been shaping (or misshaping) the Syria story to its liking? Second, is there more to this story than
recent press reports have indicated?
North Koreas Role
Consider one oI the articles singled out by Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen, an Oct. 14 New York Times
story by David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti.
While this story conIirmed that Israel had struck a partially completed nuclear reactor, apparently
modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile oI nuclear weapons Iuel, the article also
raises doubts: ...American and Ioreign oIIicials would not say whether they believed the North
Koreans sold or gave plans to the Syrians, or whether the Norths own experts were there at the time oI
the attack. It is possible, some oIIicials said, that the transIer oI the technology occurred several years
ago.
Yet the suggestion that North Korean personnel might not have been involved in the ongoing
construction oI the reactor contradicts a New York Times story oI October 9, just a Iew days beIore,
which said that within the administration there appears to be little debate that North Koreans
Irequently visited a site in the Syrian Desert that Israeli jets attacked Sept. 6. The story on October 9
was that the North Koreans were surely present at the Syrian installation, but that the nuclear nature oI
the site was less certain. Once nuclear activity at the site was conIirmed by the Times on October 14,
however, administration sources on background apparently did their best to Ioster uncertainty about
North Korean involvement. In other words, iI the Koreans are there, it might not be nuclear, and iI its
nuclear, the Koreans might not be there.
The point is that the administration is subtly attempting to cast doubt on any reported link between
North Korea and the Syrian reactor (without directly denying such a link). Otherwise it would become
obvious that North Korea is Ilagrantly violating its nuclear agreement with the United States.
Apparently, their secret brieIing has led Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen to believe that the administration is
obIuscating the reality oI North Korean proliIeration, in order to preserve the six-party deal.
In Iact, Irom the beginning until the present, press reports have given strong indications oI ongoing
North Korean involvement in the Syrian nuclear project. One oI the Iirst reports (and still arguably the
most extensive and important report) on the raid, Irom the London Sunday Times oI Sept. 16, quoted
Andrew Semmel, who was the acting deputy assistant secretary oI state Ior nuclear nonproliIeration
policy. Speaking oI Syrias nuclear project, Semmel was asked iI North Korean technicians were
present there. Semmel replied, There are North Korean people there. Theres no question about that.
Another Sunday Times piece, oI Sept. 23, oIIered Iurther evidence oI North Korean involvement.
Israeli intelligence had suggested to the administration over the summer that North Korean personnel
were at the Syrian site, said the Sunday Times. In Iact, Israeli deIense sources were said to have taken
to reIerring to the target site as the North Korean project. The Sunday Times also noted the unusual
stridency oI North Koreas condemnations oI an event so Iar Irom East Asia. In a sense, the North
Koreans were outing themselves by their protests. The Sunday Times also reported that diplomats
stationed in North Korea and China, based on intelligence reports reaching Asian governments,
believed that a number oI North Koreans had actually been killed in the raid.
More recent reports have taken up the same theme. On October 7, Washington Post columnist Jim
Hoagland noted that a senior oIIicial with access to highly classiIied intelligence reports said that ...the
Israelis destroyed a nuclear-related Iacility and caused North Korean casualties at the site.... And
October 19, ABC News quoted a senior U.S. oIIicial claiming that the Syrians could not have built
their reactor without North Korean expertise, meaning that the Syrians must have had human help
Irom North Korea.
II these reports are true, Hoekstras and Ros-Lehtinens concerns about eIIorts by the administration to
lead the press away Irom the North Korean connection (without explicitly denying it), is completely
understandable. Again, Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen appear to Iear that the administrations now
dominant policy-making Iaction (led by Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and DeIense Secretary
Robert Gates) is trying to protect the six-party agreement by suppressing the reality oI North Korean
proliIeration.
Irans Role
What about Iran? As noted, the persistent and strong emphasis Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen place on
possible Iranian participation in the Syrian nuclear program cant help but make us suspect that their
secret brieIing contained reports oI Iranian involvement. Yet Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen reIer to press
reports oI an Iranian role, and there are some such reports.
Former U.N. ambassador John Bolton has expressed concerns that both North Korea and Iran may be
outsourcing their nuclear programs in Syria. We know that Syria has served as a conduit Ior North
Korean shipments oI missile components to Iran, and there are concerns that North Korean nuclear
material may have taken the same route (see Sunday Times, Sept. 16). On Sept. 12, a New York Times
report said The Israelis think North Korea is selling to Iran and Syria what little |nuclear material|
they have leIt. A useIul recent overview oI the Israeli raid titled How close were we to a third world
war? adds an important bit oI new inIormation based on earlier reports in the Kuwaiti press. Ali Rheza
Ali, a Iormer Iranian deputy deIense minister who deIected several months ago, supplied intelligence
sources in the West with inIormation about the site targeted by the Israelis. OI course, that knowledge
would imply close Iranian involvement in Koreas nuclear project. (For more on possible Iranian
involvement, see my Deterrence Lost.)
Distress over North Korean and Iranian involvement in nuclear proliIeration to Syria possibly as a
way oI hiding their own nuclear programs Irom the United States would certainly make sense oI
Hoekstras and Ros-Lehtinens public complaint. Yet there may be more at work. The American press
reports cited by Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen have so Iar seemed to conIirm only the existence oI a
nascent plutonium reactor modeled on North Koreas Iacility at Yongbyon, a construction project
that could take as many as three to six years to complete (see NYT Oct. 14). While Syrian wrath at
Israels destruction oI even a nascent nuclear reactor could certainly have led to a retaliatory attack and
general war in the Middle East, worries over a potential world war three caused by Israels
destruction oI a reactor three to six years Irom completion seem a bit overblown. These worries might
make more sense iI there is something more to this story than what American news sources have
conIirmed.
Warhead?
Several early and unconIirmed reports on the Israeli raid point to the possibility that in the days
immediately beIore the airstrike, the North Koreans may have shipped a cache oI Iissile material
possibly including a nuclear warhead to Syria. According to the Sept. 16 Sunday Times,
preparations Ior the attack began when the head oI Israels intelligence agency, the Mossad, presented
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert with evidence that Syria was seeking to buy a nuclear device Irom North
Korea. The Iear was that the warhead would be Iitted atop one oI Syrias North Korean-made Scud-C
missiles, already armed with North Korean designed chemical warheads. This was supposed to be a
devastating surprise, said an Israeli source, Israel cant live with a nuclear warhead. The Sept. 16
Sunday Times goes on to connect the warhead story with a Washington Post report that the raid was
linked to the arrival three days earlier oI a ship carrying North Korean material labeled as cement but
suspected oI concealing nuclear equipment.
A nascent nuclear reactor, three-to-six years Irom completion, does not give oII radiation. Yet the
London Sunday Times reported on Sept. 23 that Israeli commandos seized samples oI nuclear material
and returned them to Israel Ior examination. A laboratory conIirmed that the unspeciIied material was
North Korean in origin. The Washington Posts Jim Hoagland reported on October 7 that a senior
oIIicial with access to highly classiIied intelligence reports said that the Israelis provided the United
States with physical material and soil samples Irom the site taken both beIore and aIter the raid.
Soil samples are commonly used to conIirm the presence oI Iissile material.
Here is where we begin to see potential contradictions, or at least diIIiculties. Some stories speak oI
nuclear material or even warheads, while other stories reIer only to an incomplete reactor, and even
deny that Iissile material was present at all. For example, the ABC story oI Oct. 19, claims that no
Iissionable material was Iound because the Iacility was not yet operating. The U.S. hesitated to
approve the attack, according to this report, precisely because oI the lack oI Iissionable material. While
the ultimate nuclear intentions Ior the site were unmistakable, the U.S. apparently worried that it
would be challenged without the sort oI absolute prooI provided by Iissionable material.
Reactor and More?
Yet reports that Iissionable material oI some sort was involved in the raid persist, and there are a ways
in which these reports could be reconciled with the ABC story. The October third edition oI Britains
Spectator carried a more detailed account oI the Iate oI the North Korean shipment oI cement than
earlier reports. This is the same article, by the way, in which a very senior British ministerial source
said wed come close to world war three that day.
According to the Spectator, the Israelis tracked the North Korean cement shipment to the same site
that had already been under intense Israeli surveillance as a possible nuclear installation (i.e. the
incomplete reactor). It was at this point, just days beIore the attack, that elite Israeli commandoes were
dispatched to collect the soil samples that indicated the ship cargo had been nuclear (and, according to
the London Sunday Times, oI North Korean origin). So its possible that the ABC report and the report
Irom the Spectator could both be correct. The U.S. may have worried through the summer months
about attacking the nascent reactor because oI the lack oI Iissile material (and also Ior Iear oI what a
raid would do to the six-party talks). Yet the arrival oI the North Korean shipment oI cement three
days beIore the attack, and the subsequent Israeli soil samples, may have turned the tide and led the
U.S. to approve what the Israelis at that point surely Ielt compelled to do.
Conclusions
Our examination oI diverse news accounts oI the Israeli raid on the Syrian nuclear Iacility yields
several conclusions. First, there is signiIicant evidence oI ongoing and recent North Korean
involvement. Especially given the inIormed criticisms oI Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen, apparent eIIorts
by select administration sources to downplay North Korean involvement appear unconvincing. Second,
especially in light oI the inIormed concerns expressed by Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen, but also in light
oI press accounts, there is reason to Iear signiIicant Iranian involvement in Syrias nuclear program,
either as a Iacilitator, as a destination Ior North Korean nuclear material transiting Syria, or both. Third,
there is at least some signiIicant evidence Ior direct North Korean transIer oI Iissile material perhaps
even a nuclear warhead to Syria and/or Iran. That, oI course, would constitute the most serious
possible violation oI the six-party agreement, and would be a grave threat to the security oI the United
States and the world.
In light oI this evidence, should Congress now oppose Americas nuclear agreement with North Korea?
And along with North Korea, should Iran be held to account in this aIIair? Perhaps. In any case, based
on an analysis oI press reports, and on the inIormed protests oI Representatives Peter Hoekstra and
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, its clear that we need more open inIormation beIore we can conIidently sign on
to the six-party agreement. At a minimum, the scope oI congressional brieIings on the Israeli raid needs
to substantially increase.
Stanley Kurtz is a senior Iellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
http://www.conservative.org/pressroom/2007/071031jb.htm
Bush's North Korea Meltdown
By John R. Bolton
The Wall Street Journal
October 31, 2007
Facts about Israel's Sept. 6 raid on a suspected nuclear Iacility in Syria continue to emerge -- albeit still
incompletely, especially regarding the involvement oI the Democratic People's Republic oI (North)
Korea. Important questions remain, such as whether its personnel were present when the attack
occurred, and whether they had been working to clone the Yongbyon nuclear Iacility in the Syrian
desert since the North Korean commitment in February (the latest in a long series) to give up its nuclear
programs.
Seemingly unperturbed, however, the Bush administration apparently believes North Korea is serious
this time, unlike all the others. The concessions continue to Ilow in essentially only one direction,
crossing repeated "red lines" Washington had drawn.
These include: (1) the humiliating U.S. collapse on North Korea's access to international Iinancial
markets; (2) accepting a mere "Ireeze" oI Yongbyon (misleadingly called "disablement" by the
administration) rather than real dismantlement; (3) Iailing to ensure enIorcement oI U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1718's sanctions, imposed aIter Pyongyang's nuclear test; and (4) the State
Department's palpable hunger to remove North Korea Irom the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and
the Trading With the Enemy Act's prohibitions, and re-establish Iull diplomatic relations.
The Bush administration's most serious concession is Iorthcoming, in which the U.S. will accept, with
little or no concrete veriIication, Pyongyang's imminent declaration that it actually has very little
nuclear activity other than what we have long known about at Yongbyon.
Even critics Irom the leIt now worry that State is conceding Iar more than it should. Jack Pritchard, the
special envoy Ior negotiations with North Korea who resigned during Secretary oI State Colin Powell's
tenure because our policy was too unyielding, said recently that North Korean oIIicials think "they can
ask Ior and get what they want Irom the Bush administration because |it| is so eager to demonstrate a
diplomatic achievement." Mr. Pritchard concluded, "The North Koreans are rubbing their hands
together with glee."
Our current Secretary oI State, Condoleezza Rice, and other partisans oI the six-party talks respond to
all internal administration complaints or criticisms by asking, "What is your alternative? What would
you have us do otherwise, risk war on the Peninsula?" Herewith, some responses:
First, it is simply inapposite to judge every tactical decision -- to accede or stand Iirm on this or that
subsidiary point -- by Iorecasting the complete demise oI the entire six-party process iI North Korean
sensibilities are ruIIled by occasionally saying "no." Indeed, showing tactical toughness can Irequently
enhance the long-term prospects Ior success, not reduce them. Sadly, however, toughness at the tactical
or strategic level is no longer the hallmark oI our North Korea policy. Weakness is the watchword.
Second, beIore it is too late, President Bush has to draw a deep line in the sand on veriIication. The
State Department has yet to say anything publicly about how veriIication will be accomplished,
especially on the North's uranium-enrichment eIIorts, giving rise to the suspicion that our negotiators
don't really have a clue what they mean. The idea oI North Korea Ior years engaged in cloning
Yongbyon in Syria (or anywhere else -- Burma, Ior instance) should be a Iire bell in the night.
President Reagan's mantra oI "trust but veriIy" in the Cold War days didn't oIIend anyone, and iI it
oIIends Kim Jong Il, that should tell us something. II anything, however, with North Korea, President
Bush should reverse Reagan's order: Let's see real veriIication, and leave trust until later.
Third, consider the severely negative eIIect these repeated concessions have on our relations with Japan
and South Korea. President Bush used to stress that this was a "six-party" process, but now all oI the
action is bilateral. The State Department's lust to remove North Korea Irom the terrorism list is having
a proIoundly negative impact on our treaty ally, Japan, the nation most directly threatened by
Pyongyang's nuclear capability. Thomas SchieIIer, the Bush administration's ambassador to Japan,
reportedly complained recently to the president that he was "cut out oI the process." State should
explain why it trusts North Korea more than our ambassador to Tokyo, and why we ignore Tokyo's
concerns over North Korea's kidnappings oI Japanese citizens.
South Korea is Iacing a critical presidential election in December. The last thing Washington should do
is pursue concessionary policies that might enhance the prospects Ior a new president who Iollows the
same appeasement line as incumbent President Roh Moo-hyun. II South Korea can discard Mr. Roh's
rose-colored glasses, our overall prospects will improve considerably, but our unquestioning embrace
oI North Korea could have exactly the wrong impact in the South's volatile politics.
Fourth, and most importantly, the right response to the North Korean threat is to apply pressure steadily
and consistently, rather than hastily releasing it. AIter its nuclear test, Pyongyang Iaced growing
pressure Irom the cumulative impact oI Chinese anger, U.N. Security Council sanctions, ongoing
implementation oI the ProliIeration Security Initiative (PSI), and the U.S. Treasury's continuing
Iinancial squeeze.
There was a plan, oI sorts, and it was producing some evidence oI success. Instead oI squeezing harder,
such as by encouraging reIugee Ilows out oI the North, the administration did a U-turn. It let a
desperate North Korea up oII the mat, provided tangible economic support Ior this appallingly
authoritarian regime, allowed Kim Jong Il to relegitimize himselI, and undercut the PSI world-wide.
The icing on Kim's cake is that Ior years -- beIore, during and aIter the 2005 and 2007 "agreements" --
North Korea was happily violating its commitments. Instead oI Iocusing China on solving the problem
oI the regime it has propped up Ior so long, we absolved China, sidelined Japan, inserted ourselves and
started liIe-support Ior the administrators oI the world's largest prison camp.
This will perpetuate the North Korean problem, not solve it. Any by perpetuating Kim Jong Il's regime,
and its continuing threat, it is actually the State Department's policy that poses the greater risk to
international peace and security. This is true not only Ior Pyongyang, but Ior other would-be
proliIerators watching our ongoing Iailure to stop North Korea.
The debate within the Bush administration is not yet over, although time is short beIore irreparable
harm is done. Growing restiveness in Congress among Republicans and Democrats may increasingly
become a Iactor. For President Bush, I can only hope he re-reads his Iirst term speeches on North
Korea.
Mr. Bolton serves on the American Conservative Union's Board oI Directors, is a senior Iellow at the
American Enterprise Institute, and is the author oI "Surrender Is Not an Option: DeIending America at
the United Nations," out next week Irom Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions.

http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20071101NKSyria.asp
The Curious Incident in Northern Syria and Its Potential Proliferation
Implications
Prepared Remarks by Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
For the Korea Economic Institute Forum, What If They Did It? North Korea, Syria, and
Nuclear Proliferation, November 1, 2007
Nearly two months aIter Israels Sept. 6, 2007 raid on a Iacility in Northern Syria, there is suggestive
but ultimately inconclusive evidence that it may have been a small reactor still under construction.
Opponents oI the six-party process toward the veriIiable denuclearization oI North Korea are
suggesting that possible North Korean involvement may provide reason Ior a shiIt in policy regarding
the six-party talks and the implementation oI the steps outlined in the October 3 joint statement.
Indeed, any North Korean assistance involving the export or technical training, advice, services, or
assistance related to items on the trigger list oI the Nuclear Suppliers Group would violate North
Koreas and the recipient states obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1718 oI October
14, 2006 to cease the export oI items which could contribute to DPRKs nuclear-related, ballistic
missile-related, or other weapons oI mass destruction related programmes.
Furthermore, in the recent six-party talks statement oI October 3, 2007: The DPRK reaIIirmed its
commitment not to transIer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. While North Korean
assistance may have predated the October 3 statement and even the October 2006 Security Council
resolution, it would clearly violate the spirit oI its commitments.
The reports citing unnamed sources alleging that the Iacility was a nuclear reactor and that North Korea
might have provided assistance raise extremely troubling questions about Syrian and North Korean
behavior. However, I believe that even iI there is strong evidence oI North Korean complicity, it would
be imprudent Ior the administration or the Congress to take actions or make statements that might
scuttle the six party process.
We must recall that in the Iall oI 2002, the administration accused North Korea oI pursuing a uranium
enrichment program on the basis oI preliminary intelligence assessments that were later revised to
reIlect that the program was not as advanced as previously believed. Nevertheless, the United States
decided at the time to cut-oII heavy Iuel oil shipments that were part oI the Agreed Framework an
agreement some in the Bush administration were only too eager to rip apart. As a result, North Korea
kicked out IAEA inspectors, restarted plutonium operations, produced enough Iissile material Ior about
10 bombs, and, in 2006, engaged in an orgy oI missile Ilight testing, and set oII a nuclear test
explosion.
In the Iinal analysis, U.S. policymakers must weigh whether the risk posed by the possible construction
oI a Syrian research reactor and possible North Korean assistance warrants the possible delay in
veriIiably dismantling a known and greater threat: North Koreas own research reactor; reprocessing
plant, and accounting Ior and taking out oI circulation whatever nuclear bombs, nuclear bomb material,
and uranium enrichment equipment North Korea may have.
This does not mean that the U.S. policymakers cannot be tactically tough as John Bolton argues they
should, it just means that their response needs to be careIully calibrated and must amount to more than
overheated rhetoric and name-calling.
II Syria was indeed building a reactor and iI North Korea was involved, there are other steps the United
States could and should take to hold the DPRK accountable and ensure that Pyongyang provides no
Iurther nuclear assistance to other states without derailing the prospects oI veriIiably dismantling North
Koreas nuclear program and risking the possibility oI Iurther North Korean proliIeration
transgressions. Ill go into Iurther detail about this in a Iew minutes.
In addition, iI there is or was credible U.S. or Ioreign intelligence inIormation or other evidence that
Syria was engaged in building a reactor, I believe it should have been presented to the IAEA and/or the
Security Council Ior evaluation so that a collective response and Iollow up investigation -- could be
undertaken.
As a signatory to the nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty under comprehensive IAEA saIeguards, Syria is
obligated under the current interpretation oI paragraph 42 oI its comprehensive IAEA saIeguards
agreement (INFCIRC/153) to provide design inIormation on new Iacilities to the Agency as soon as the
decision to construct or authorize construction oI a new Iacility is taken (i.e. well beIore construction
actually begins) in order to create conIidence in the peaceIul purpose oI the Iacility and to provide
adequate lead-time Ior saIeguards preparations.(1)
II Israel or the United States had inIormation suggesting Syria was building a reactor or some other
prohibited item, it could have inIormed the IAEA and/or the Security Council, which could then and
could still -- call upon on Syria to clariIy the purpose oI the Iacility and possibly lead to an IAEA
investigation and visit to the site.
This is essentially what the United States did in 2002 with inIormation that surIaced about Irans
unreported nuclear activities at the Natanz site.
Such an investigation could have been and could still be immensely useIul not only in understanding
the nature oI the Iacility but also the sources oI assistance. We must consider that North Korea may not
have been the main or sole supplier oI nuclear technology and components. Syria is oI course suspected
oI having received assistance Irom the A.Q. Khan network.(2)
Utilizing the Agency to draw attention to a possible Syrian violation oI saIeguards would put Syria on
the deIensive and strengthen the credibility oI the institution as an eIIective and legitimate instrument
in monitoring and enIorcing compliance at a time when the Security Council and the IAEA are at odds
with Iran.
Such a message might also have been more helpIul in persuading Iran to suspend its uranium
enrichment program, come clean about its nuclear program, and agree to a diplomatic resolution.
In addition, the Iailure oI any state to report any inIormation to the IAEA about possible nuclear
saIeguards violations, and Israels strike Iirst, ask questions later approach are also worrisome and
unwise and undermine the authority oI the IAEA in siIting out the truth in Iran and elsewhere.
Knowns and Unknowns
While there are still more questions than answers at this point, it is important to siIt out the knowns
Irom the unknowns.
Based on that, we might draw some preliminary conclusions, Iormulate some reasonable hypotheses
that might help explain events that have unIolded to date, and consider what should and should not be
done in response to these possibilities.
What we know is this:
Syria and Israel have acknowledged there was a strike on a military Iacility in Syria.
Satellite imagery suggests the Iacility could have been a small research reactor similar in
design to the 5 megawatt North Korean reactor at Yongbyon. Such a Iacility by itselI would not
constitute a clear and imminent danger to either Israel or the United States given that Syria
would also need to have a plutonium reprocessing Iacility to harvest plutonium Ior a weapon.
Syria already possesses a very small research reactor under IAEA saIeguards.
We know Irom commercial satellite imagery that Syria cleared the site aIter the raid. By itselI,
this proves little, though it certainly raises suspicions that Syria is trying to remove evidence
that the structure could have been used to house a reactor or something else it doesnt want
others to see. The raid itselI and Syrias clearing oI the site clearly would complicate any on site
investigation by the IAEA or others to determine whether a reactor was under construction.
Commercial satellite photos also indicate that construction on the main building was well
underway in Sept. 2003, which means Syria may have received assistance sometime beIore that
date. This also likely means that the site has been under Western satellite surveillance Ior some
time and it suggests that U.S. intelligence analysts did not believe that it was a reactor or some
other missile or WMD-related Iacility.
Some press reports quote unnamed oIIicials saying that North Korean nationals were present at
the site. Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary oI State Ior Nuclear NonproliIeration Andrew
Semmel also told reporters on Sept. 14: There are North Korean people there. Theres no
question about that, adding |j|ust as there are a lot oI North Koreans in Iraq and Iran.
Semmel did not clariIy what sort oI activities the North Koreans were conducting in Syria. This
suggests that any inIormation about North Koreans at the site would most likely have come
Irom a human intelligence source or sources, which are not always reliable or precise.
This is not the Iirst time there has been a controversy over intelligence assessments concerning
the Syrian nuclear program. You might recall that Knight Ridder newspapers, The New York
Times, The Washington Post, and others reported that in 2003, Undersecretary oI State John
Bolton was Iorced to call oII congressional testimony because members oI the intelligence
community were concerned that Bolton was prepared to assert stronger claims regarding
concerns over Syrias pursuit oI nuclear weapons than was warranted by the intelligence.(3)
We know that only the top Congressional intelligence and Ioreign aIIairs committee members
have been brieIed by the U.S. intelligence community on the incident. And two oI them, Reps.
Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen, complained bitterly in an Oct. 21 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal
that until Congress is Iully brieIed, it would be imprudent Ior the administration to move
Iorward with agreements with state proliIerators.
We also know that Administration oIIicials, while declining to publicly comment on the incident
itselI, have said that the six-party disarmament deal with North Korea would not go ahead iI
North Korea was Iound to be smuggling nuclear arms, equipment or know-how abroad.
Asked at a Capitol Hill hearing on Oct. 25 by Democratic Representative David Scott oI Georgia iI the
issue oI the Syrian Iacility had been brought up in disarmament talks with North Korea, Assistant
Secretary oI Sate Ior East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs, Christopher Hill said: "Yes, I have raised this
issue."
During a Sept. 20 press conIerence, President Bush was asked a question about the Syrian raid and
reports oI North Korean involvement to which he said: to the extent that they are proliIerating, we
expect them to stop that proliIeration, iI they want the six-party talks to be successIul.
What May Explain the Events That have Unfolded to Date: Two Theories
So, what actually might have gone on and why is the administration maintaining oIIicial silence on the
matter?
II Syria was building a nuclear reactor or some other nuclear Iacility and iI North Korea was involved,
what is the appropriate course oI action to prevent Iurther proliIeration oI the kind, while
simultaneously ensuring that North Koreas current commitments under the October 3 implementation
agreement Ior the disablement oI its nuclear Iacilities and Iull declaration oI its nuclear program go
Iorward?
Should Congress be Iully brieIed? What should be done to uncover what Syria was up to and who
might have provided illicit equipment and know-how?
Based on what is in the public domain there seem to be two plausible theories:
Theory 1. Given that the Syrian Iacility was under surveillance and construction Ior some time and
given that the U.S. intelligence community apparently did not believe that it was a nuclear-related
project, senior U.S. oIIicials were not conIident enough to conIront Syria publicly with the charge.
Recall the 2003 debate about how to characterize the Syrian nuclear program. Likewise, given that the
inIormation suggesting a North Korean presence at the site would likely have come Irom a human
intelligence source or sources, senior U.S. oIIicials might not have had high enough conIidence in the
inIormation to publicly accuse North Korea oI violating its nuclear non-assistance pledges.
Still, based on statements by Christopher Hill and President Bush, it is clear that the matter has been
pursued with the North Koreans privately and that the Bush administration has probably already made
it clear that iI North Korea wants to see the six-party agreement implemented, including removing the
DPRK Irom the state sponsors oI terrorism list, North Korea cannot be engaged in any proliIeration
activity.
II the administration has not already done so, it should demand that the complete and correct
declaration oI all oI North Koreas nuclear programs -- as called Ior in the Feb. 13 2007 and Oct. 3
six-party statements -- must include a Iull accounting oI all North Korean nuclear-related commerce or
technical assistance to other states or non-state actors.
Theory 2. It is also possible that the United States government has inIormation that more clearly
demonstrates Syrian nuclear activity at the site and direct involvement by the North Koreans. Even iI
this is the case, the administration may be Iorging ahead with the six-party process and taking the
matter up with North Korea privately because they correctly understand the value oI using the six-party
process to veriIiably dismantle North Koreas nuclear program and snuII-out its proliIeration activities
rather than publicly taking issue with North Korea on the matter and risking the possibility that they
will deny their involvement, iI only to save Iace.
As Christopher Hill told reporters Sept. 14: The reason we have the six-party process and the reason
we have put together a number oI pretty serious countries in this process is to make sure that the North
Koreans get out oI the nuclear business.
Congress Role
Under either scenario, it is important that the administration brieI relevant Congressional members and
committees sooner than later. While there are clearly some members oI Congress who will seek to use
this incident to undercut support Ior the appropriation oI Iunds to provide North Korea with heavy Iuel
oil as called Ior in the six-party agreement, Congressional support Ior the administrations policy and
the six-party process will likely erode iI they are kept in the dark.
Eventually, Congress and possibly the rest oI us will Iind out more about the events surrounding the
Israeli raid and the target either through oIIicial channels or Irom someone like Glenn Kessler. It is
important to note that when there are lives at stake, sources to protect, or ongoing intelligence activities
underway, there may good reason to delay providing Congress with a Iull accounting. However, we are
now almost two months beyond the Sept. 6 raid and it is diIIicult to understand why other members oI
Congress have not yet been brieIed.
Furthermore, even iI North Korea was engaged in ongoing proliIeration activity, it is likely that the
administration could persuade Congress that they should not jeopardize the larger aims oI the six-party
process by withholding support Ior heavy Iuel oil shipments. Rather, the administration could Iuture
beneIits, such as removal oI North Korea Irom the state sponsor oI terrorism list, iI it does not Iully
account Ior its nuclear program and cease all Ioreign nuclear and missile assistance.
Conclusions
So in conclusion, what iI North Korea and Syria were colluding on a secret nuclear project?
1. It should be condemned and the IAEA should request access to the site and be provided relevant
inIormation Irom other states as part oI an investigation.
2. The Bush administration and Congress should agree to use not abandon the six party process to
ensure that North Korea is no longer engaged in such activities.
3. The Bush administration should brieI Congress about the episode in order to solidiIy support Ior
the six party denuclearization agreement and any actions the administration may pursue through the
IAEA Board oI Governors and/or the Security Council regarding possible Syrian nuclear activities.
Thank you.
1. Prior to 1992, the phrase in para 42 oI the IAEAs comprehensive saIeguards agreement (INFCIRC/
153), which reads "as early as possible beIore nuclear material is introduced into a new Iacility" was
translated into meaning that design inIormation Ior new nuclear Iacilities needed to be

provided to the Agency "no later than 6 months beIore the introduction oI nuclear material into a new
Iacility". This interpretation was included in the General Parts oI the Subsidiary Arrangements that are
attached to each comprehensive saIeguards agreement.
As a saIeguards strengthening measure, the Board agreed to a new interpretation oI paragraph 42
proposed by the Secretariat in February 1992 (GOV/2554/Att.2/Rev. 2), which requires that design
inIormation on new Iacilities be provided to the Agency as soon as the decision to construct or
authorize construction oI a new Iacility is taken (i.e. well beIore construction actually begins) in order
to create conIidence in the peaceIul purpose oI the Iacility and to provide adequate lead-time Ior
saIeguards preparations. All non-nuclear weapon state NPT parties under comprehensive saIeguards
were also required to adapt their related Subsidiary Arrangements to take into account the new
interpretation.
2. Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary oI State Ior Nuclear NonproliIeration Andy Semmel stated on
Sept. 14 that |w|e do know that there may have been contact between Syria and some secret suppliers
Ior nuclear equipment. Whether anything transpired remains to be seen, Iurther noting that |w|ere
watching very closely.
Semmels comments mirror a 2004 declassiIied report to Congress by the director oI national
intelligence on weapons oI mass destruction proliIeration. The report, released last year, discusses
potential Syrian contacts with the A.Q. Khan network. It indicates that Pakistani investigators in late
January 2004 said they had conIirmation oI an IAEA allegation that |Abdul Qadeer| Khan oIIered
nuclear technology and hardware to Syria, according to Pakistani press, and we are concerned that
expertise or technology could have been transIerred. We continue to monitor Syrian nuclear intentions
with concern.
3. According to a July 15, Knight Ridder report (CIA: Assessment oI Syria's WMD exaggerated, by
Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay), U.S. oIIicials told Knight Ridder that Bolton was
prepared to tell members oI a House oI Representatives International Relations subcommittee that
Syria's development oI biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that
they posed a threat to stability in the region. The CIA and other intelligence agencies said that
assessment was exaggerated.
All Still Quiet on the Syria Bombing
By Jackson Diehl
Monday, November 5, 2007; A19
It was two months ago tomorrow that Israeli warplanes bombed what Israel and the United States
believed was a nascent Syrian nuclear complex along the shore oI the Euphrates River. But the political
shock waves that should have accompanied that remarkable event -- which was both an audacious act
oI preemption and a revelation oI an apparent Syrian bomb program-- have been bottled up by the
decisions oI the Israeli government and the Bush administration not to speak publicly about the strike.
Now Israeli and U.S. oIIicials are quietly debating whether to go on the record and allow those shock
waves to explode across the Middle East and beyond. At stake are not only Israel's tense relations with
Syria, which so Iar has chosen not to retaliate, but a host oI other pressure points: Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations; the integrity oI the International Atomic Energy Agency; Western leverage over Syrian
dictator Bashar al-Assad; and -- not least -- the Iragile U.S. nuclear bargain with North Korea, which is
believed to have aided the secret construction.
For the Israeli government oI Ehud Olmert, the decision to suppress news oI the strike in September --
including the military censorship oI Israel's aggressively Iree press -- was pretty straightIorward.
Trumpeting the successIul attack not only would have prompted global denunciations oI Israel but
might have pushed Assad into launching an attack on the Golan Heights or a missile at Tel Aviv. The
architect oI the attack, DeIense Minister Ehud Barak, is a Iormer head oI Israel's most elite clandestine
commando squad, and he remains convinced that military special operations are best kept secret.
Two months later that calculus hasn't much changed. Barak and Olmert are still worried enough about a
Syrian military response to have moved an upcoming military exercise oII the Golan; Olmert and other
senior oIIicials have been dropping hints about opening political negotiations with Damascus. Olmert
knows that Iull disclosure oI the operation would probably blow up the Israeli-Palestinian peace
meeting in Annapolis that Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice hopes to convene this month. Among
other problems, Arab states that Olmert and Rice hope will attend would surely cancel iI they were
obliged to react to an event that they have so Iar pointedly ignored.
Outside Jerusalem and the State Department, however, pressure Ior an oIIicial account oI the raid -- or
more important, Ior the intelligence that prompted it -- is growing. The International Atomic Energy
Agency and its Ireelancing director, Mohamed ElBaradei, want to investigate the alleged reactor site.
The agency's experts have been studying aerial photographs and asking U.S. oIIicials Ior inIormation.
In theory, at least, an IAEA probe could compound the blow suIIered by Assad by Iorcing him to
explain -- on pain oI possible sanctions by the U.N. Security Council -- whether and how Syria violated
its commitments under the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty.
So Iar the Bush administration has reIused to cooperate with ElBaradei, who has all but openly sided
with Iran in its attempt to deIlect U.N. orders to Ireeze its uranium enrichment. Having debunked U.S.
claims about a reborn Iraqi nuclear program in early 2003, ElBaradei would be certain to seize on any
ambiguities in the Israeli and U.S. evidence about the Syrian reactor. II he raised doubts that the project
was intended to produce plutonium, both Olmert and the Bush administration would be damaged.
There is, however, a petitioner much tougher to resist than the IAEA director: Republican
representatives who are demanding that "every member oI Congress be brieIed on this incident, and as
soon as possible," as Reps. Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen put it in a recent Wall Street
Journal op-ed. The two House members were already brieIed because oI their positions as ranking
minority members on the intelligence and Foreign AIIairs committees; what they heard evidently
convinced them that possible covert collaboration between Syria and North Korea needs to be Iully
aired and debated beIore the United States proceeds with negotiations to end North Korea's bomb
program.
Here some Bush administration oIIicials are sympathetic. They have been Irustrated by what they
describe as the stubborn resistance oI Rice to connect what was discovered in Syria to the North
Korean disarmament talks. Rice's North Korean point man, Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill, told
Congress last month that Pyongyang had been asked to disclose any cooperation with Syria as part oI a
promised Iull report on its weapons programs.
II it answers the question, North Korea may end up blowing the whistle on Damascus. And iI it chooses
to lie? Then the pressure on the Bush administration to disclose what it knows about the Israeli raid
may become irresistible.
http://www.newsmax.com/insidecover/boltonunreturn/2007/11/10/48398.html
Bolton Blasts U.N. at U.N.
Saturday, November 10, 2007 9:09 AM
By: Newsmax StaII
[EXCERPTS]
Former U.S./U.N. ambassador John Bolton returned to U.N. headquarters in NYC on Friday to launch
his new book "Surrender Is Not An Option"
Bolton conIessed that on many issues he really does not have a current pipeline into the White House,
but he did not shy away Irom commenting on several key issues conIronting the Bush administration.
On Israel's recent strike on a suspected secret Syrian nuclear Iacility:
"This was some kind oI Syrian-North Korean joint venture in the nuclear Iield....So, it would not
surprise me that to avoid inspection at Yongbyon (North Korea) they decided to recreate (a clone) near
the Euphrates River (in Syria)....So, I could even see this as a three-way joint venture with Iran, North
Korea and Syria."
Bolton chastised the White House Ior maintaining a "gag" order on any comments pertaining to the
Israeli strike:
" The administration, I think, has made a real mistake in not allowing more Iacts to come out. Because,
I think it is undercutting its own argument about North Korea's commitment to giving up its nuclear
weapons program."
Neither the oIIice oI UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, nor the State Department would oIIer any
reaction to the Bolton comments though several oIIicials Irom the US/UN mission did accompany the
Iormer ambassador during his United Nations visit.
Bolton: Annapolis will set us back
Hilary Leila Krieger
THE JERUSALEM POST
Nov. 15, 2007
A Iormer Bush administration stalwart who has become a vocal critic told The Jerusalem Post this
week that the planned meeting in Annapolis later this month to push Ior Israeli-Palestinian peace is "a
mistake."
John Bolton, a leading neoconservative who served as the US ambassador to the UN beIore leaving the
administration last winter, spoke to the Post Iollowing a lecture Tuesday night on his new book, which
takes issue with aspects oI American policy toward Iran, North Korea and Lebanon, among others.
"It's a mistake to push ahead with the Annapolis peace conIerence in November or December," he said,
noting that the date hasn't been Iinalized.
"I just don't see this as the moment to make progress on Israeli-Palestinian matters. And I don't think
that a Iailed conIerence will simply leave us at the status quo. I think it will set us back, so I think the
eIIort is perhaps well-intentioned but misconceived."
In his talk he reIerred to an Israeli government with "internal political diIIiculties" and a Palestinian
Authority that's "broken perhaps beyond repair," so any attempt at an "unnatural" reconciliation could
leave US inIluence diminished.
Bolton, who spoke to an audience at the American Enterprise Institute think tank here, where he now
holds a position, also strongly attacked the US response to an Israeli attack oI an alleged incipient
nuclear Iacility in Syria earlier this Iall.
He described "the pall oI silence that the administration has caused to Iall over Israel's September 6
raid" as "what may be the most disturbing event oI recent American history." That's because, in his
estimation, the administration was so invested in diplomacy with North Korea that it was willing to
make an enormous error by overlooking the proliIeration North Korea allegedly engaged in to supply
the Syrian site, as well as possible Iranian connections.
"II you're aIraid to have this inIormation come out, what does it say about the nature oI the diplomacy
that's under way?" he asked.
Speaking to the Post, he dismissed concerns that revealing the nature oI the attack - which has been
shrouded in secrecy in Israel, in part because oI military censorship - would increase the likelihood oI a
Syrian military response.
"I don't think Syria has the military capability and I think they know it," he said.
In his presentation, he called Ior regime change in Syria and said that the poor Western approach on
Iran means that the same option, oI regime change or a military attack are the only two remaining
alternatives to prevent Iran Irom acquiring nuclear weapons.
In his book, Surrender Is Not an Option: DeIending America at the United Nations and Abroad, Bolton
attacks the way the US has conducted its Iran policy. Instead oI immediately reIerring signs oI illicit
Iranian nuclear activity to the UN Security Council Ior sanctions several years ago, America allowed
Britain, France and Germany to undertake negotiations with Iran.
Because oI that, he assesses, "Iran gained almost Iour years oI additional time to perIect an indigenous
capacity throughout the entire nuclear Iuel cycle, leaving us in a Iar more vulnerable position than
when we started." His chilling summation: "This is the road to the nuclear Holocaust."
Bolton also recounts in detail the Iormulation oI the US position at the UN Ior dealing with Israel's war
with Hizbullah last summer, again Iaulting the Bush administration Ior backing down Irom its original
demands. Instead oI sticking to the insistence that the conIlict not end with a mere cease-Iire that would
maintain the status quo vis-a-vis Hizbullah and Israel, he says, the administration caved in to
international demands and the situation got worse.
"Contrary to everything we had said at the outset oI the hostilities, the net result, over a year later,
appeared yet again to be just another Middle East cease-Iire," he writes, "which was, iI anything,
somewhat less Iavorable to Israel, and certainly less Iavorable to democracy in Lebanon, than beIore."
Bolton, who has been on the receiving end oI harsh criticism Ior his unrepentant neoconservative
stances and outspokenness, quit the government aIter he Iailed to make his temporary appointment as
UN ambassador permanent when the Senate wouldn't conIirm him. Since he leIt oIIice, he has openly
criticized the Bush administration Ior straying Irom what he considers its original principles.
He has been particularly disparaging oI the State Department, a perennial source oI Irustration Ior him,
and has suggested it be overhauled.
He also doesn't shy Irom biting put-downs, lambasting Iormer UN secretary-general KoIi Annan Ior
equating himselI to a "secular pope" and UN International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammad
El-Baradei Ior Iorgetting that "he works Ior the member governments oI the IAEA and not the other
way around."
Bolton's section headings take aim at the IAEA ("How Many IAEA Meetings Does It Take to Screw in
a Lightbulb?") and the European Union ("Iran in the Security Council: The EU-3 Find New Ways to
Give In") among others.
His book, he said, was partly aimed at providing more inIormation to the public ahead oI the 2008
elections.
http://www.It.com/cms/s/0/eb301496-93c7-11dc-acd0-0000779Id2ac.html?nclickcheck1
Mystery still surrounds Israels Syria attack
Published: November 15 2007 23:37
Last updated: November 15 2007 23:37
Rarely does President George W. Bush bite his lip when discussing axis oI evil states such as Syria
and North Korea.
But Ior more than two months Mr Bush has done just that when asked about a September 6 Israeli
strike on a mysterious Syrian site. So has every other US administration oIIicial speaking on the record,
as well as the Israeli government itselI, Iuelling a continuing controversy about the incident.
This is not my Iirst rodeo, Mr Bush said at a press conIerence last month aIter being asked about the
incident at least six times. And I know where youre trying to get me to comment. Im not going to
comment on it, one way or the other.
This uncharacteristically taciturn approach has angered some oI the presidents Republican supporters,
amid a series oI newspaper reports that the Syrian site was a nuclear reactor built with North Korean
help. But as the weeks since the Israeli raid pass, more questions than answers have surIaced about
what precisely the Israelis hit.
The Republican anger has been displayed by legislators such as Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, respectively the senior Republican members oI the House oI Representatives committees on
intelligence and Ioreign aIIairs. Among a select handIul oI congressmen brieIed on the incident by
Michael McConnell, the USs director oI national intelligence, they did not respond to the brieIing as
intended, calling instead Ior the administration to come clean publicly about what had occurred.
Until Congress is Iully brieIed it would be imprudent Ior the administration to move Iorward with
agreements with state proliIerators, they said in the Wall Street Journal, in reIerence to the six-party
talks on Koreas nuclear programme.
John Bolton, Iormerly Mr Bushs ambassador to the UN, argues that the administration is unduly
preoccupied with reaching a deal in those negotiations and with the Iorthcoming international
conIerence in Annapolis, Maryland, on the Israel-Palestinian conIlict, to which Syria is likely to be
invited.
Theres a growing suspicion that the veil oI secrecy about Syria doesnt have so much to do with
intelligence as with protecting the six-party talks and the Annapolis conIerence, Mr Bolton says.
Israeli government oIIicials have told me that Secretary |Condoleezza| Rice told them in no uncertain
terms that the inIormation |about the attack| better not come Irom them.
David Albright, a respected Iormer United Nations weapons inspector, has used satellite imagery to
argue that the Israelis probably attacked an installation on the Euphrates river at Dawar az Zawr,
eastern Syria, which was similar in shape to North Koreas Yongbyon reactor.
I believe pretty strongly that Israel thinks it attacked a nuclear reactor and that the US didnt say they
were wrong, he says, adding that his suspicions were heightened by the recent addition oI a pump
house that could supply water Ior a reactor, and Iurther images that showed Syria razed the site aIter
the Israelis struck.
The recent photo evidence showing the Syrians clearing the sites indicated that they are clearly trying
to hide something, says Joe Cirincione, a non proliIeration expert at the Centre Ior American Progress.
He says that the evidence so Iar tilts towards the theory that it was a reactor in Syria but does not
establish it.
But he adds: Theres no evidence it was an imminent threat, arguing that iI there was a reactor, it was
probably years Irom producing plutonium and that Syria lacks a reprocessing Iacility to turn its spent
reactor Iuel into plutonium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UNs Vienna-based nuclear watchdog, is also not
convinced the site was a reactor.
Diplomats in Vienna warn against relying on satellite photos, saying that it is quite possible that the
installation was no more than the adjunct oI a chemical Iacility or a shed used to make agricultural
equipment. They add that they were surprised that the site lacked a security Ience, an unusual omission
in a top secret Iacility.
I am amazed that people can say they know the Iunction oI an installation just because they see its
dimensions, adds JeIIrey Lewis, an arms control expert at the New America Foundation. Its a box
on a river. He adds that, Iar Irom being in a remote site, the Dawar az Zawr Iacility is just over a mile
Irom a well-known tourist site in Halabiya, Irom which raIting trips down the Euphrates can be
organised.
Meanwhile, President Bashar al-Assad says the Israeli aircraIt hit a disused military building with
nothing in it.
The mystery may not continue indeIinitely: under the talks Iramework, North Korea is due to give an
account oI its nuclear activities by the end oI the year. And so Iar, despite Mr Boltons concerns, the
events in Syria have not interrupted those negotiations.
The opponents oI the six-party talks wanted to use this strike to kill this deal, said Mr Cirincione.
But the president isnt having it.
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/master-gambler-kim-jongil-may-Iinally-be-ready-Ior-his-last-throwoI-
dice/2007/11/16/1194766968271.html
Master gambler Kim Jong-il may finally be ready
for his last throw of dice
Hamish MacDonald
November 17, 2007
[EXCERPT]
IN THE longest-running poker game in Asia, the master player is starting to lay some oI his cards on
the table.
This week in Vienna, oIIicials Irom North Korea began giving some details to American and other
counterparts about the secret acquisition oI uranium enrichment know-how Irom Pakistan at the start oI
the decade.
II their story is convincing, a crisis that only Iive years ago had worried US and Chinese military
planners studying armed intervention may be winding down.
It will depend on how much Kim Jong-il, the reclusive leader oI North Korea Ior the past 13 years, is
prepared to show, and how many cards he tries to keep up his sleeve.
Under the six-nation agreement (involving the US, Japan, China, South Korea and Russia) worked out
in Beijing in February-March this year, North Korea is to disable its three key nuclear plants by the end
oI 2007, provide a list oI all nuclear arms activity, account Ior all its Iissile material and address US
suspicions about a highly enriched uranium eIIort.
As a reward, North Korea will receive 1 million tonnes oI heavy Iuel oil or equivalent aid and the US
and Japan will move to open normal diplomatic relations.
Provision oI a light-water reactor Ior electricity generation will be discussed at some point, and
Pyongyang included in a new regional security agreement.
The Iour years oI negotiations in Beijing were not without last-minute hold-ups. Washington hawks,
suspicious oI dealings with a regime they view as "evil" and bound to Iail, had treasury oIIicials Ireeze
the North Korea's hard currency holdings in Macau's Bank Delta Asia.
Kim upped the ante by conducting his country's Iirst nuclear weapon test in October 2006. Now he is
co-operating, having shut down his only reactor at Yongbyon and started talking about uranium.
But there is still a long way to go, points out Korea expert Peter Beck, director oI the US Committee
Ior Human Rights in North Korea, who spoke at Sydney's Lowy Institute this week.
Notably, the North Koreans have to account Ior about 50 kilograms oI plutonium produced since they
revved up the Yongbyon reactor in early 2003 aIter being conIronted by President George Bush's
Administration about the uranium program.
Nor have the North Koreans been utterly good boys since the Beijing agreement, iI they were
connected with the mysterious Iacility in Northern Syria taken out in an Israeli air strike on September
6.
"The imagery was very clear that the Syrians were up to no good," Beck said. "The Israelis are
convinced it was a nuclear program and the North Koreans were involved."
The bigger mystery is why Bush and his close neo-con aides have not made more oI this breakout.
AIter the 2006 nuclear blast, Bush said the new red line Ior Kim was any attempt to proliIerate nuclear
weapons. "Short oI Iiring a weapon at some country, I don't see what red lines they have leIt to cross,"
Beck said.
Still, the usual neo-con spoilers oI North Korea diplomacy like Iormer arms control director and United
Nations ambassador John Bolton, have been pushed out oI the picture.
"Obviously Darth Vader |Vice-President Dick Cheney| is still in the background and we don't know
when he's going to weigh in," Beck said.
But Ior more than a year Christopher Hill, the highly active Assistant Secretary oI State Ior East Asia
and the PaciIic, has been given a relatively Iree hand to engage with Pyongyang, and the State
Department proIessionals are back in control.
Perhaps Cheney is saving his ammunition Ior Tehran.
http://washingtontimes.com/article/20071117/NATION/111170046/1002
Bush says N. Korea talks show 'results'
By Jon Ward
The Washington Times
November 17, 2007
President Bush deIended negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program yesterday, saying they have
been eIIective, but he added that the communist regime must give a Iull declaration oI its nuclear
activities beIore the end oI the year.
Some regional analysts said the president's remarks indicate that the Bush administration has decided
not to move Iorward with talks unless North Korea discloses a role in helping Syria build nuclear
Iacilities.
"The six-party talks have delivered measurable results," Mr. Bush said, reIerring to the negotiations
among North Korea, the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia and China.
Mr. Bush, speaking Irom the White House alongside Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda during a
joint statement, said that although North Korea has begun to shut down its Yongbyon reactor, "hard
work remains to be done."
"North Korea has agreed to provide a Iull declaration oI all its nuclear programs and proliIeration
activities by the end oI this year," Mr. Bush said. "Full declaration is one oI the next steps North Korea
must take to keep the six-party talks moving."
Richard C. Bush, director oI the Center Ior Northeast Asian Studies at the Brookings Institution, said
the president appeared to be "laying down a marker."
"I'm not sure that North Korea has agreed to provide a Iull declaration oI its proliIeration activities,"
Richard Bush said. "I suspect that the words 'proliIeration activities' are code Ior the Syria program,
and we have decided we need an explanation oI what was going on in Syria in order to close any
deals."
An Israeli air strike on Sept. 6 in Syria is suspected to have destroyed a partially constructed nuclear
reactor oI North Korean design, though the U.S. and Israeli governments have pointedly reIused to
discuss the strike.
The Syrian government has not admitted that it was building nuclear Iacilities.
An Oct. 3 document that was agreed upon as part oI the six-party talks does say that North Korea
"committed not to transIer nuclear materials, technology or know-how."
However, when the document discusses the declaration that North Korea will make, it says it "will
include all nuclear Iacilities, materials and programs." There is no mention oI documenting
proliIeration activities.
At an Oct. 17 press conIerence, Mr. Bush said that "the issue oI proliIeration has equal importance with
the issue oI weaponry, and that North Korea has said that they will stop proliIerating, just like they
have said they will Iully disclose and disable any weapons programs."
A State Department oIIicial said the U.S. government is "interested in the North Koreans telling us
what they have and what they are doing, so we can know what they are telling us they're going to stop."
The Bush administration has been criticized Ior signing on to the agreement with North Korea in
February, clearing the way Ior the six-party talks to resume aIter a long standoII. The president's
Iormer ambassador to the U.N., John R. Bolton, and others, have said the agreement is ineIIectual.
Nicholas Kralev contributed to this report.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19pletka.html?r1&oreIslogin
November 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributor
Diplomacy With the Devil
By DANIELLE PLETKA
Washington
NEITHER George W. Bush nor the national security expert who advised him through his Iirst
presidential campaign seemed captivated by the prospect oI a Nobel Peace Prize or encomiums Irom
the chattering classes. But something has happened over the last seven years. The allure oI a place in
history has grown. How else to explain the about-Iace President Bush and Secretary oI State
Condoleezza Rice have made on key Ioreign policy issues Irom North Korea to the Middle East peace
process?
Early in his term, President Bush jettisoned the crown jewels oI the Clinton administrations Ioreign
policy the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the North Korea Agreed Framework. In each case,
experts still disagree about whether he was right to do so. But the Iact is that Bill Clinton had gone the
extra mile in the Middle East and achieved nothing. And revelations that the North Koreans had been
cheating on their 1994 commitment to abandon nuclear weapons made maniIest the Iraud underlying
that breakthrough.
Seven years into the Bush presidency, however, what was old is new again. The blackmailing
Pyongyang regime is now one with which the United States can do business. Nevermind that in 2002,
American and Spanish warships discovered a North Korean vessel carrying Scud missiles to Yemen or
that in 2005 the Treasury Department designated the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia as a primary
money-laundering concern Ior its role in North Koreas illegal weapons, counterIeiting and drug
businesses.
Now suddenly, Washington eschews comment on North Korean arms sales. And as Ior Banco Delta
Asia, its back in business and its Irozen money has been returned to North Korea. Worse, Ms. Rice has
now signed on to a new Mark II version oI the agreed Iramework, which has considerably Iewer
benchmarks Ior the North Koreans than the Clinton administration deal did.
Ostensibly a commitment by North Korea to disclose and abandon all nuclear programs including a
secret highly enriched uranium program the deals vague, open-ended nature promises endless
renegotiation. As to why an administration that once insisted upon complete, veriIiable and
irreversible dismantlement is now O.K. with nebulous abandonment, the record is silent.
Back in 2001, the newly minted Bush administration was scornIul oI Bill Clintons eIIorts to build a
Palestinian state with a terrorist government in place. Mr. Bush reIused to allow Yasir AraIat to darken
the White House door and said he would not support the establishment oI a Palestinian state until its
leaders engage in a sustained Iight against the terrorists. Now Hamas is in control oI Gaza, Mahmoud
Abbas is the powerless president oI a Palestinian Authority and members oI his Fatah Iorces tried to
assassinate Israels prime minister.
Nonetheless, Ms. Rice has been to the region repeatedly and recently sought advice Irom not just Bill
Clinton but, oI all people, Jimmy Carter. Next week, shell be playing host to Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert oI Israel and his Palestinian antagonists at a cozy chat session in Annapolis, Md. (None seem as
committed to the meeting as Ms. Rice originally expected to last three days, it has reportedly been
pared down to one.)
The clearest sign oI Ms. Rices eagerness to make deals with Pyongyang and the Palestinians is her
willingness to overlook egregious misbehavior by her negotiating partners. Much like the Clinton
administration, which disregarded early warning oI a uranium enrichment program in hopes oI staging
a historic presidential visit to Pyongyang in 2000, the United States is now ignoring evidence oI
North Korean nuclear and missile proliIeration to the Middle East.
For example, in September Israeli jets destroyed what Israeli and American intelligence assessed to be
a North Korean-built nuclear reactor in Syria. OIIicials who have seen the intelligence tell me the
structure was the result oI several years oI transIers between North Korean nuclear suppliers and Syrian
buyers. Ms. Rices most revealing comment? An explanation that issues oI proliIeration do not aIIect
the Palestinian-Israeli peace eIIorts we are making.
This bizarre rationalization is oddly divorced Irom reality: how could Israel possibly be indiIIerent to
its neighbors acquiring nuclear technology Irom Americas partner in the new agreed Iramework? The
statement simply invites Americas adversaries to capitalize on the administrations desperation. Why
not engage in bad behavior iI the Bush administration, like the Clinton administration, will look the
other way?
By kowtowing to the conventional wisdom oI what a secretary oI state should do, Condoleezza Rice is
making her legacy dependent on the Iuture behavior oI a North Korean tyrant and Palestinian
pretenders. Ultimately, that will serve neither selIish nor national interests.
Danielle Pletka is the vice president Ior Ioreign and deIense policy studies at the American Enterprise
Institute.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/Iline/stories/20071207505405700.htm

Frontline
Volume 24 - Issue 23 :: Nov. 24-Dec. 07, 2007
INDIA'S NATIONAL MAGAZINE
Irom the publishers oI THE HINDU
Syrian signals
JOHN CHERIAN
in Damascus
[EXCERPTS]
Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Naji al-Otari, speaking to the international media in Damascus in
the last week oI October, said that tremendous pressure was being exerted on Syria to change its
domestic and Ioreign policies. We will remain steadIast, said Otari. Syrian dissident groups are being
nurtured in Western capitals. Washington and Paris are in the IoreIront oI these activities meant to
destabilise one oI the Iew remaining secular governments in the region. There have been concerted
attempts to link Bashar al-Assad to the assassination oI Iormer Lebanese Prime Minister RaIik Hariri.
[deletia]
The Israeli air strike in September against a target in northern Syria still generates a lot oI comment.
Otari categorically stated that the stories about Israel targeting an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor were
part oI Zionist propaganda.
He said that the allegations about North Korean help Ior Syrias nascent civilian nuclear programme
were Iabricated by Israel. The International Atomic Energy Agency chieI, Mohamed ElBaradei, has
also dismissed the Israeli claims. Many intelligence analysts believe that the Israeli war planes targeted
a Syrian arms depot in Deir ez-Zor. Bashar al-Assad said that the target was a small military building
under construction.
The raid was also obviously part oI the continuing U.S.-Israel psychological warIare against Syria and
Iran. The message to Damascus and Teheran is that Israels air Iorce still carries punch even though its
army was humiliated in Lebanon. Washington may also be seeking to signal to the international
community that on matters relating to proliIeration in West Asia, it would preIer to act in concert with
Israel as the nuclear policeperson.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/MiddleEast/IK21Ak03.html
Middle East
A warning shot for Iran, via Syria
By Gareth Porter
Nov 21, 2007
WASHINGTON - Until late October, the accepted explanation about the September 6 Israeli air strike
in Syria, constructed Irom a series oI press leaks Irom US oIIicials, was that it was prompted by
dramatic satellite intelligence that Syria was building a nuclear Iacility with help Irom North Korea.
But new satellite evidence has discredited that narrative, suggesting a more plausible explanation Ior
the strike: that it was a calculated eIIort by Israel and the United States to convince Iran that its nuclear
Iacilities could be attacked as well.
The narrative promoted by neo-conservatives in the George W Bush administration began to unravel in
late October with the release by a private company oI a series oI satellite images showing that the same
square, multi-storey building that was hit by Israeli planes on September 6 had been present on the site
Iour years earlier. Although the building appears to be somewhat more developed in the August 2007
image, it showed that the only major change at the site since September 2003 was what appears to be a
pumping station on the Euphrates and a smaller secondary structure.
Media reports based on leaks Irom administration oIIicials had suggested that the presence oI a water
pump indicated that the building must have been a nuclear reactor. But JeIIrey Lewis, a specialist on
nuclear technology at the New America Foundation, pointed out in an interview with Inter Press
Service (IPS) that the existence oI a water pump cannot be taken as evidence oI the purpose oI the
building, since other kinds oI industrial buildings would also need to pump water.
The campaign oI press leaks portraying the strike as related to an alleged nuclear weapons program
assisted by North Korea began almost immediately aIter the Israeli strike. On September 11, a Bush
administration oIIicial told the New York Times that Israel had obtained intelligence Irom
"reconnaissance Ilights" over Syria showing "possible nuclear installations that Israeli oIIicials
believed might have been supplied with material Irom North Korea".
The Bush administration oIIicials leaking this account to the press, obviously aligned with Vice
President Dick Cheney, were hoping to shoot down the administration's announced policy, pushed by
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice, oI going ahead with an agreement to provide Iood and Iuel aid to
North Korea in exchange Ior the dismantling oI its nuclear program.
They had lost an earlier battle over that policy and were now seeking to use the Israeli strike story as a
new argument against it.
The oIIicials did not want the intelligence community involved in assessing the alleged new evidence,
suggesting that they knew it would not withstand expert scrutiny. Glenn Kessler reported in the
Washington Post on September 13 that the "dramatic satellite imagery" provided by Israel had been
restricted to "a Iew senior oIIicials" and not disseminated to the intelligence community, on orders
Irom National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley.
The intelligence community had opposed a previous neo-conservative eIIort in 2002-2003 to claim
evidence oI a Syrian nuclear program at the same site. A senior US intelligence oIIicial conIirmed to
the New York Times on October 30 that US intelligence analysts had been aware oI the Syrian site in
question "Irom the beginning" - meaning Irom beIore 2003 - but had not been convinced that it was an
indication oI an active nuclear program.
In 2002, John Bolton, then under secretary oI state Ior arms control and international security, wanted
to go public with an accusation that Syria was seeking a nuclear weapons program, but the intelligence
community rejected the claim. A State Department intelligence analyst had called Bolton's assertion
that Syria was interested in nuclear weapons technology "a stretch" and other elements oI the
community also challenged it, according to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report.
The attack on the site was an obvious demonstration oI Israeli military dominance over Syria, generally
considered a vital ally oI Iran by Israeli and US oIIicials. It was also in line with the general approach
oI using Iorce against Syria that Cheney and his allies in the administration had urged on Israel beIore
and during the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in summer 2006.
During the war, Deputy National Security Adviser Elliot Abrams told a senior Israeli oIIicial that the
Bush administration would not object iI Israel "chose to extend the war beyond to its other northern
neighbor", leaving no doubt he meant Ior Israel to attack Syria, IPS reported last December.
David Wurmser's wiIe Meyrev Wurmser, director oI the neo-conservative Hudson Institute's Center Ior
Middle East Policy, told Israel's Ynet News in December 2006 that, "many parts oI the American
administration believed that Israel should have Iought against the real enemy, which is Syria and not
Hezbollah". She said such an attack on Syria would have been "such a harsh blow Ior Iran that it would
have weakened it and changed the strategic map in the Middle East".
Both Israeli and US oIIicials dropped hints soon aIter the Israeli air raid that it was aimed at sending a
message to Iran. Ten days aIter the raid, Israeli's military intelligence chieI Amos Yadlin declared to a
parliamentary committee, "Israel's deterrence has been rehabilitated since the Lebanon war, and it
aIIects the entire regional system, including Iran and Syria ..."
Although he did not reIer explicitly to the strike in Syria, the Iact that the Syrian raid was the only
event that could possibly have been regarded as restoring Israel's strategic credibility leIt little doubt as
to the meaning oI the reIerence.
That same day, Reuters quoted an unnamed US DeIense Department oIIicial as saying that the
signiIicance oI the strike "was not whether Israel hit its targets, but rather that it displayed a willingness
to take military action".
On September 18, Iormer United Nations ambassador John Bolton was quoted by JTA, a Jewish news
service, as saying, "We're talking about a clear message to Iran. Israel has the right to selI-deIense - and
that includes oIIensive operations against WMD |weapons oI mass destruction| Iacilities that pose a
threat to Israel. The United States would justiIy such attacks."
On October 7, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who enjoys access to top administration
oIIicials, quoted an unnamed oIIicial as providing the oIIicial explanation Ior the Israeli attack as
targeting "nuclear materials supplied to Syria by North Korea".
But then, without quoting the oIIicial directly, Ignatius reported the oIIicial's description oI the raid's
implicit message: "|T|he message to Iran is clear: America and Israel can identiIy nuclear targets and
penetrate air deIenses to destroy them."
The oIIicial's suggestion that the strike was a joint US-Israeli message about a joint policy toward
striking Iran's nuclear sites was the clearest indication that the primary objective oI the strike was to
intimidate Iran at a time when both Israel and the Cheney Iaction oI the Bush administration were
Iinding it increasingly diIIicult to do so.
Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. His
latest book, Perils oI Dominance: Imbalance oI Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published
in June 2005.
Last update - 10:25 22/11/2007
Inside Intel / Not a reactor - something far more vicious
By Yossi Melman
Ten weeks have passed since the Israel Air Force attacked in Syria, and there is still no reliable
inIormation about the precise target that was destroyed, or about the importance and necessity oI the
attack. Since Israel keeps maintaining its veil oI secrecy, Everything that is known comes Irom leaks by
anonymous U.S. administration oIIicials to several oI the major American media outlets. What is
almost certain, judging Irom the leaks, are the Iollowing Iacts: A nuclear site built by the Syrians was
attacked, and there was some connection to know-how and technology transIerred Irom North Korea.
The prevailing assumption is that it was a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor that was in stages oI
construction, that would have enabled Syria to produce plutonium to manuIacture a nuclear bomb.
This assumption relies Iirst and Ioremost on an analysis by scholar David Albright, director oI the
Institute Ior Science and International Security in Washington (ISIS). Albright was part oI the United
Nations supervisory unit in Iraq that searched Ior weapons oI mass destruction. In recent years, he and
his institute have gained a reputation as experts in nuclear proliIeration. He is considered close to the
U.S. intelligence communit and to have connections with the Israeli deIense establishment.
A month ago Albright, as well as The Washington Post and The New York Times, published satellite
photos oI the site attacked in Syria. The photos were taken on August 10, 2007 and reveal a structure
built adjacent to a hilly slope, not Iar Irom the Euphrates River. Incidentally, it would be interesting to
learn who knew already then, about a month beIore the attack to take photographs oI the Syrian
structure Irom the satellite company DigitalGlobe.
A reactor without a dome
Albright compared the structure in Syria to satellite images oI a structure located at the Yongbyon
nuclear site in North Korea. The dimensions oI the two structures are similar - about 48 by 32 meters
and lacking a dome. The structure in North Korea is a nuclear research reactor built on the basis oI a
1980 Chinese archetype. As opposed to the Western countries, in the Communist bloc countries,
reactors commonly have a Ilat rooI and lack a dome. For example, the reactor in Chernobyl, Ukraine,
where the radioactive leakage disaster occurred in 1985, had no dome.
The oIIicial production capacity oI the reaction in Yongbyon, which was Iueled with enriched uranium,
is 5 megawatts, but the experts estimate that in Iact its capacity had been extended. Over the years,
particularly during the period when North Korea was not under the supervision oI the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it produced plutonium Irom the nuclear Iuel rods. U.S. intelligence
estimates that even aIter the nuclear test conducted about a year ago (a test which Iailed), North Korea
still has reserves oI about 40 kilograms oI plutonium, which is suIIicient to produce 10 atom bombs.
This plutonium is not under supervision, and North Korea could have concealed it in its laboratories or
sold it to another country - Syria, Ior example.
Albright's assessments, which hold that what was attacked in Syria was a nuclear reactor, have become
almost an authoritative voice. They have been unreservedly adopted all over the world, Israeli media
included.
But ProI. Uzi Even oI Tel Aviv University is challenging them here Ior the Iirst time. On the basis oI
an analysis oI the same satellite photos, which have been published in the media and on Web sites and
are accessible to everyone, he believes that the structure that was attacked and destroyed was not a
nuclear reactor. Even, a Iormer Meretz MK, is a chemist who until 1968 worked at the nuclear reactor
in Dimona (KAMAG - Hebrew Ior the Nuclear Research Center). For years he has been keeping track
oI, and writing about, Israel's nuclear policy and the proliIeration oI nuclear weapons worldwide.
Even's questions relate to several substantive issues. First, in the reactor in Yongbyon, one can clearly
see a chimney, which is necessary Ior the emission oI the radioactive gases (incidentally, based on the
emission oI the gases experts can determine the capacity oI the reactor). In the satellite photos oI the
structure in Syria there is no chimney. It could be claimed that the Syrians may not have had time to
build it. This is a reasonable answer, but it is overshadowed by the Iact that there is evidence that the
structure was under construction already Iour years ago. There are satellite photos oI the site Irom
2003. In these photos one can clearly see in one oI the building walls openings, which disappeared in
the 2007 photos. "We can assume that construction began even beIore 2003," says Even. "In all those
years, Iive years or even more, a chimney had still not been built? Very strange."
No less strange in his opinion is the Iact that the "reactor" did not have cooling towers. The pumping
station seen in the photos, 5 kilometers Irom the site, cannot, according to him, be a substitute Ior such
towers. "A structure without cooling towers cannot be a reactor," he says, pointing to the satellite photo
Irom Yongbyon, in which one can clearly see the cooling tower, with steam rising Irom it.
Another structure essential Ior a reactor is missing Irom the Syrian photos: a plutonium separation
Iacility. As mentioned, the reactor is Iueled by enriched uranium oI Iuel rods, which undergo a process
oI radiation. In order to turn them into plutonium, they have to be processed chemically in a plutonium
separation Iacility.
And there is an additional question. II this was, in Iact, a nuclear reactor, whose construction was not
completed, clearly it would have taken the Syrians several years until they were able to operate it and
produce plutonium. Why was Israel in a rush to attack a reactor that was under construction, years
beIore it would have become operational? Was it willing to risk an all-out war with Syria because oI a
reactor in stages oI construction? (A war Israel was aIraid would erupt last summer, even without any
connection to the nuclear issue.) This is very unlikely.
To give an example, the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981 was carried out very shortly beIore it would
have become operational. From this, we may conclude that a nuclear reactor under construction, which
is Iar Irom endangering Israel, should not have been a worthy target Ior attack.
Even more dangerous
All these explanations and others lead Even to believe that what was destroyed was not a nuclear
reactor. II this is the case, what was the purpose oI the structure?
"In my estimation this was something very nasty and vicious, and even more dangerous than a reactor,"
says Even. "I have no inIormation, only an assessment, but I suspect that it was a plant Ior processing
plutonium, namely a Iactory Ior assembling the bomb."
In other words, Syria already had several kilograms oI plutonium, and it was involved in building a
bomb Iactory (the assembling oI one bomb requires about Iour kilograms oI Iissionable material).
Processing the plutonium and assembling the bomb require utmost caution, because plutonium is one
oI the most toxic and radioactive materials. One microgram can kill one person, and a gram is capable
oI killing a million people. Handling it requires special lathes, but because oI its lethal nature nobody is
allowed to come into direct contact with plutonium or with the lathes. That is why there is a need to
build labs containing dozens oI glove boxes, which isolate and separate the worker Irom the material
and the equipment.
What reinIorces Even's suspicion that the structure attacked in Syria was in Iact a bomb assembly plant
is the Iact that the satellite photos taken aIter the bombing clearly show that the Syrians made an eIIort
to bury the entire site under piles oI earth. "They did so because oI the lethal nature oI the material that
was in the structure, and that can be plutonium," he said. That may also be the reason they reIused to
allow IAEA inspectors to visit the site and take samples oI the earth, which would give away their
secret.
Another piece oI inIormation crucial Ior reinIorcing Even's assumption is the scant attention paid in the
Israeli media to an op-ed published last month in The Wall Street Journal by two members oI the U.S.
Congress, Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Hoekstra is the senior Republican member oI the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Ros-Lehtinen is the senior Republican member
oI the House Foreign AIIairs Committee. They expressed their anger at the Iact that the Bush
administration "has thrown an unprecedented veil oI secrecy around the Israeli airstrike. It has brieIed
only a handIul oI very senior members oI Congress, leaving the vast majority oI Ioreign relations and
intelligence committee members in the dark. We are among the very Iew who were brieIed, but we
have been sworn to secrecy on this matter."
They write in the article that Syria received "nuclear expertise or material" Irom North Korea, and in
the same breath they mention Iran, without explaining why. They claim that the administration leaks
are intentionally vague: to justiIy the Israeli attack but also to blur North Korea's part in the aIIair.
The two Congressmen have a clear agenda: They want the administration to remove the cloak oI
secrecy and tell the members oI Congress and the public the truth about what happened, in the belieI
that such inIormation will lead the majority in Congress to understand that the negotiations with North
Korea should be stopped.
North Korea's consent to shut down the Yongbyon reactor and to allow renewed international
monitoring oI it (although it is not clear what will happen to the Iissionable material in its possession -
enriched plutonium and uranium), was achieved aIter exhausting contacts that lasted Ior about Iive
years, with China, Russia, the U.S., Japan and South Korea. In exchange, North Korea will receive
economic assistance and Iuel. Hoekstra and Ros-Lehtinen are apparently aware that revealing the truth
about North Korea's role will lead to pressure on the U.S. administration to discontinue the contacts
with the regime in Pyongyang. But Ior exactly the same reason, the administration is not interested in
doing so, particularly not at this sensitive time when it is trying to prevent Iran's nuclear program.
And what about Israel? Wasn't it in Israel's interest to publicize what was bombed in Syria? OI course
it was. Even more so iI this was a plant Ior assembling a nuclear bomb based on inIormation,
technology and Iissionable material that Syria re ceived Irom North Korea, perhaps with the knowledge
and consent oI Iran, or even more than that.
Then why is Israel insisting on continuing to maintain total secrecy? The only logical explanation
(except Ior the embarrassment oI Syrian President Bashar Assad, which doesn't particularly bother
Israel), is the desire not to make things hard Ior the U.S. Administration.
U.S. to hold N. Korea to nuclear promises
By Nicholas Kralev
November 29, 2007
The chieI U.S. negotiator with North Korea, concerned that Pyongyang might Iail to provide a Iull
declaration oI its nuclear-related materials and activities by year's end, as it has promised, will return to
the North on Monday, U.S. oIIicials said yesterday.
The envoy, Christopher R. Hill, whose visit will be the second in less than six months, warned oI a
"crisis" iI North Korea's list Ialls short oI a "Iull disclosure."
Mr. Hill intends to tell the North Koreans what the United States expects to see on the list and plans to
press them particularly on two main issues: their suspected uranium-enrichment program and the exact
number and type oI their nuclear weapons, diplomats said.
"Whatever declaration they make needs to be Iull and complete with respect to their nuclear program,"
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters. "It's going to be an important element oI
what they produce as part oI their commitments under the six-party talks."
An incomplete list would stall the six-nation process that envisions the North dismantling its nuclear
programs in exchange Ior political and economic rewards Irom the United States, South Korea, China,
Japan and Russia.
"The data declaration will be a critical test oI the North's real willingness to give up its nuclear
weapons," said Bruce Klingner, senior research Iellow at the Heritage Foundation.
The uranium-enrichment issue appears to be the most challenging, diplomats and analysts said.
Washington accused North Korea oI pursuing such a program in 2002, based on inIormation Irom
Pakistan that it had sold the North centriIuges and other related materials.
Pyongyang has repeatedly denied the U.S. claim, and the Bush administration has reIused to share
prooI even with its closest Asian allies.
Pakistani President Pervez MusharraI wrote about the North Korean purchases Irom the shadowy
network oI A.Q. Khan, the Iather oI the Pakistani atom bomb, in his autobiography "In the Line oI
Fire," which he promoted last year on U.S. TV talk shows.
Although the North is said to have admitted to acquiring various materials that could be used in a
uranium-enrichment program, it is still reIusing to acknowledge possessing centriIuges, the core
element in such a program.
"II there is even the slightest doubt in the international community that a uranium-enrichment program
exists, the North Koreans will play on that doubt," said Michael O'Hanlon, senior Iellow in Ioreign
policy studies at the Brookings Institution.
"This will probably be a tactical negotiation, though they would be better oII making a clean decision"
to disclose everything they have, he said.
Mr. O'Hanlon and other analysts said the North Koreans could be holding on to the centriIuges card to
Iorce the United States to take them oII its list oI state sponsors oI terrorism.
The other thorny issue is the number oI the North's plutonium-based weapons. The chieI North Korean
negotiator, Kim Kye-gwan, has said that neither the number nor the exact type will be disclosed, but
Mr. Hill has made it clear he expects to see that inIormation in the declaration.
Another matter the clarity oI which is Iar Irom certain is the North's proliIeration activities.
Following an Israeli air strike on a suspected nuclear Iacility in Syria that may have been housing
materials Irom North Korea, President Bush said Pyongyang had agreed in an Oct. 3 six-party
statement to provide "a Iull declaration oI any proliIeration activities."
The document in question does say that the North is "committed not to transIer nuclear materials,
technology or know-how," but when it comes to the declaration, it says it "will include all nuclear
Iacilities, materials and programs." There is no mention oI documenting proliIeration activities.
Mr. Klingner said Mr. Bush "may have inadvertently raised the bar."
Mr. Hill said during a stop in Japan yesterday that, in addition to Pyongyang, he would visit the North's
main nuclear complex in Yongbyon, whose main Iacilities are currently being disabled as part oI the
Oct. 3 agreement.
"I think we are making progress and clearly we have more to do, but I think we are on schedule Ior
getting to the end oI the year and getting all our commitments done," Mr. Hill told reporters in Tokyo.
http://www.Itd.de/karrieremanagement/businessenglish/:Business20English20Mystery20Israel20Euphrates/285337.html
Mystery still surrounds Israel's attack by the Euphrates
von Daniel Dombey (Washington)
FTD.de, 29.11.2007
II it was a Syrian nuclear reactor built with North Korean aid, nobody is talking.
Rarely does President George W. Bush bite his lip when discussing "axis oI evil'' states such as Syria
and North Korea.
But Ior more than two months Mr Bush has done just that when asked about a September 6 Israeli
strike on a mysterious Syrian site. So has every other US administration oIIicial speaking on the record,
as well as the Israeli government itselI, Iuelling a continuing controversy about the incident.
"This is not my Iirst rodeo," Mr Bush said at a press conIerence last month aIter being asked about the
incident at least six times. "And I know where you're trying to get me to comment. I'm not going to
comment on it, one way or the other."
This uncharacteristically taciturn approach has angered some oI the president's Republican supporters,
amid a series oI newspaper reports that the Syrian site was a nuclear reactor built with North Korean
help. But as the weeks since the Israeli raid pass, more questions than answers have surIaced about
what precisely the Israelis hit.
The Republican anger has been displayed by legislators such as Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, respectively the senior Republican members oI the House oI Representatives committees on
intelligence and Ioreign aIIairs. Among a select handIul oI congressmen brieIed on the incident by
Michael McConnell, the US's director oI national intelligence, they did not respond to the brieIing as
intended, calling instead Ior the administration to come clean publicly about what had occurred.
"Until Congress is Iully brieIed it would be imprudent Ior the administration to move Iorward with
agreements with state proliIerators," they said in the Wall Street Journal, in reIerence to the six-party
talks on Korea's nuclear programme.
John Bolton, Iormerly Mr Bush's ambassador to the UN, argues that the administration is unduly
preoccupied with reaching a deal in those negotiations and with the Iorthcoming international
conIerence in Annapolis, Maryland, on the Israel-Palestinian conIlict, to which Syria is likely to be
invited.
"There's a growing suspicion that the veil oI secrecy about Syria doesn't have so much to do with
intelligence as with protecting the six-party talks and the Annapolis conIerence," Mr Bolton says.
"Israeli government oIIicials have told me that Secretary |Condoleezza| Rice told them in no uncertain
terms that the inIormation |about the attack| better not come Irom them."
David Albright, a respected Iormer United Nations weapons inspector, has used satellite imagery to
argue that the Israelis probably attacked an installation on the Euphrates river at Dawar az Zawr,
eastern Syria, which was similar in shape to North Korea's Yongbyon reactor.
"I believe pretty strongly that Israel thinks it attacked a nuclear reactor and that the US didn't say they
were wrong," he says, adding that his suspicions were heightened by the recent addition oI a pump
house that could supply water Ior a reactor, and Iurther images that showed Syria razed the site aIter
the Israelis struck.
"The recent photo evidence showing the Syrians clearing the sites indicated that they are clearly trying
to hide something," says Joe Cirincione, a non proliIeration expert at the Centre Ior American Progress.
He says that the evidence so Iar "tilts towards the theory that it was a reactor in Syria but does not
establish it".
But he adds: "There's no evidence it was an imminent threat," arguing that iI there was a reactor, it was
probably years Irom producing plutonium and that Syria lacks a reprocessing Iacility to turn its spent
reactor Iuel into plutonium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's Vienna-based nuclear watchdog, is also not
convinced the site was a reactor.
Diplomats in Vienna warn against relying on satellite photos, saying that it is quite possible that the
installation was no more than the adjunct oI a chemical Iacility or a shed used to make agricultural
equipment. They add that they were surprised that the site lacked a security Ience, an unusual omission
in a top secret Iacility.
"I am amazed that people can say they know the Iunction oI an installation just because they see its
dimensions," adds JeIIrey Lewis, an arms control expert at the New America Foundation. "It's a box on
a river." He adds that, Iar Irom being in a remote site, the Dawar az Zawr Iacility is just over a mile
Irom a well-known tourist site in Halabiya, Irom which raIting trips down the Euphrates can be
organised.
Meanwhile, President Bashar al-Assad says the Israeli aircraIt hit a disused military building with
"nothing in it".
The mystery may not continue indeIinitely: under the talks Iramework, North Korea is due to give an
account oI its nuclear activities by the end oI the year. And so Iar, despite Mr Bolton's concerns, the
events in Syria have not interrupted those negotiations.
"The opponents oI the six-party talks wanted to use this strike to kill this deal," said Mr Cirincione.
"But the president isn't having it."
http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/syria-israel-peace-talks-plan/2007/11/29/1196037074419.html
Syria, Israel peace talks plan
Robin Wright
November 30, 2007
RUSSIA and the US are tentatively planning a second Middle East peace conIerence, in Moscow in
early 2008, with major parties hoping to begin a comprehensive peace eIIort that would include direct
talks between Israel and Syria.
Syria's delegate to this week's talks in Annapolis said that Damascus wanted the Moscow gathering to
begin negotiations between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights, a border region seized by Israel
during the 1967 War.
"It is our hope that we can revive the Syrian track in Moscow," Syria's deputy Foreign Minister,
Fayssal Mekdad, said.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert indicated that he hoped at some point to resume talks with Syria,
but cautioned that the time is not yet ripe. He said Syria must change its behaviour, notably its support
Ior Hezbollah.
But the presence oI a Syrian delegation in Annapolis "may be the beginning oI a reconsideration" on
the part oI Damascus, he said.
Mr Olmert said US President George Bush indicated privately that he had no objection to an Israeli
dialogue with Syria iI Israel determined this was in its own interest. Mr Bush's only admonition to the
Israelis, he said, was: "Don't surprise us."
AIter talks at the White House, Mr Bush promised Mr Olmert and Palestinian president Mahmud
Abbas his Iull support to overcome deep doubts on whether new peace talks could yield an accord next
year.
Mr Abbas and Mr Olmert were to return home to conIront sharp scepticism Irom Iriends and Ioes alike
over the peace drive.
Mr Bush, who called Middle East peace "something we all want", did not invite Mr Abbas or Mr
Olmert to speak at the event in the White House Rose Garden, and the three leaders did not shake
hands. The muted moment was in sharp contrast to the ebullient 1993 handshake on the South Lawn
between the then US president, Bill Clinton, the late Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the late
Palestinian leader Yasser AraIat.
The new peace push won a cautious show oI support Irom the 22-member Arab League, whose chieI,
Amr Mussa, cited "misgivings" but warily welcomed the agreement to thaw negotiations that have
been Irozen during President Bush's seven years in oIIice.
WASHINGTON POST, With AFP
http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?qnode/8492
The Israeli Attack in Syria and The State Department Response
Fri, 2007-11-30 05:37
By Herbert London
The veil oI secrecy surrounding the Israel invasion oI what is alleged to be a Syrian nuclear Iacility on
September 6 is understandable. Israel is not willing to disclose its military capabilities and technical
advantages.
On the other hand, the secrecy is having and will continue to have a proIoundly negative eIIect on
United States' diplomatic credibility. Since North Korea was involved in one way or another with the
Syrian Iacility either by providing enriched uranium, nuclear technology or plutonium, it makes sense
to discuss Kim Il Jung's pernicious role in exporting nuclear material.
Yet the State Department, leading a discussion in the Six Party talks over North Korea's nuclear
capability, does not want to upset the so-called apple-cart by describing North Korea's malevolent
inIluence. Silence in this case is deadly, but the State Department goal is an agreement, however empty
the ultimate result might be.
What hasn't been seriously entertained is the inIluence oI silence on the talks in Annapolis and back
channel conversations with the Iranians. II the United States chooses to avert its gaze to North Korea's
mischieI, the message being conveyed is that you can get away with a great deal iI you negotiate with
the U.S. and oIIer the illusion oI conciliation.
In Iact, diplomacy has become a weapon used against this government by our enemies mindIul oI our
energetic pursuit oI treaties. This is the twenty-Iirst century version oI the Munich Accord with
appeasement the goal Ior State Department oIIicials who do not know how to say "no."
Moreover, the hidden message at Annapolis is the U.S. wants a deal even iI it means giving tacit
support to terrorists and selling out our allies. What other conclusion can one reach iI we are unwilling
to blow the whistle on North Korean nuclear exports.
For some who believe it always pays to talk to adversaries (Obama Barack comes to mind), it should be
noted that negotiations can serve as a cover Ior violent acts. In the haste to produce an "understanding"
the U.S. can overlook or rationalize any action that might jeopardize a treaty. Yet as history has
demonstrated treaties are worthless iI one oI the parties chooses to ignore its terms. Think oI the
Kellogg-Briand pact or the Locarno Treaty.
It should be noted that in addition to the dissemination oI nuclear material, the North Koreans have
provided every rogue state in the Middle East with missile technology to deliver weapons oI mass
destruction. The SCUD arsenal in Iran, Ior example, has its provenance in North Korea.
There are times in Ioreign aIIairs when silence is golden. As already noted, I can appreciate Israel's
reluctance to discuss details oI its September 6 attack. But the U.S. is in a diIIerent position vis-a-vis
North Korea and its involvement with possible Syrian nuclear material. This disclosure warrants
transparency in my judgment.
UnIortunately the State Department wants deals more than disclosure. As a consequence, the Iull story
oI North Korea's involvement with Syria won't be known in the short term. But there is something we
do know: Israel would not have attacked unless the material in question was a direct threat to its
security and Syria would not have cleaned up the site unless the material might prove to be an
embarrassment.
What we also know is North Korea's involvement in this imbroglio, since a North Korean vessel
carrying sensitive material was monitored by Israeli surveillance satellites days beIore it arrived in
Syria. The key question that remains open is why the State Department maintains secrecy about this
matter. But, than again, I think I know the answer to this question.
Herbert London is president oI Hudson Institute and proIessor emeritus oI New York University. He is
the author oI Decade oI Denial (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001).
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gT-mmFW2C0J6n3j8Rvi7xCmIwD8T8O4900
Obstacles Loom in NKorea Nuclear Talks
By FOSTER KLUG Dec 1, 2007
WASHINGTON (AP) Even as the Bush administration marks unprecedented progress in North
Korean nuclear disarmament talks, two looming impediments could undermine years oI delicate
negotiations.
One is a suspicion, especially among U.S. conservatives, that North Korea has helped Syria pursue a
nuclear weapons program. Such cooperation would raise the specter oI a country that boasts nuclear
weapons providing atomic assistance to a nation Washington considers hostile and a sponsor oI
terrorism.
The other issue is the U.S. claim the North pursued a secret uranium enrichment program, as well as its
known plutonium production. A 1994 nuclear deal collapsed aIter the United States conIronted the
North with the uranium claim in 2002; years oI acrimony and stalemate Iollowed, culminating in a
North Korean nuclear test last year.
North Korea is required to provide a list outlining all its nuclear programs by year-end as part oI a six-
nation disarmament process, and the United States will be pushing Ior credible details about these two
sensitive issues to allow President Bush to move the accord Iorward.
Bush is looking to North Korean disarmament as a way to burnish a legacy beleaguered by Iraq. A
Iailure could turn into a political issue ahead oI next year's presidential and congressional elections.
The North's nuclear declaration will top the agenda oI Christopher Hill, the lead U.S. envoy at the
nuclear talks, during his trip this week to the country.
"Chris Hill's credibility is really tied to the North Koreans coming clean on some type oI uranium
program," said Ralph Cossa, president oI the PaciIic Forum Center Ior Strategic and International
Studies think tank. "II they don't do that, it's going to be extremely diIIicult" Ior the administration to
sell the deal.
On Sept. 6, Israeli warplanes struck a target in Syria, which, according to media reports quoting
unidentiIied U.S. oIIicials, was a nuclear Iacility linked to North Korea. Some congressional staIIers
caution that the reports have not been supported by any public evidence.
At private talks Nov. 16 in New York, attended by current and Iormer U.S. oIIicials and North Korean
government representatives, members oI the American delegation pressed the North to provide details
about any nuclear ties with Syria.
Former Secretary oI State Henry Kissinger, Victor Cha, a Iormer White House adviser on North Korea,
and others argued that it would be diIIicult to take the North oII a U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terror, a
crucial North Korean demand in nuclear talks, iI there were a lack oI clarity about whether the North
had provided nuclear cooperation to Syria, according to a person at the meeting. Syria also is on the
terror list.
Another participant said the Americans did not appear to have speciIic inIormation about North
Korean-Syrian nuclear dealings, aside Irom the news reports. The participant described the exchange as
people with an interest in the nuclear talks' success trying to share with the North Koreans their anxiety
over the reports.
Both people spoke on condition oI anonymity because the meeting was private.
U.S. lawmakers wary oI the North Korean negotiations have seized on the Syrian issue to urge caution.
Writing in The Wall Street Journal, Republican Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Peter Hoekstra urged
the Bush administration to provide inIormation about the Israeli attack. The administration, they wrote,
has "thrown an unprecedented veil oI secrecy around the Israeli airstrike."
Syria has denied repeatedly that it is building a nuclear Iacility. North Korea denies accusations it has
spread its nuclear expertise beyond its borders.
U.S. diplomats are pressing North Korea Ior a "serious and credible" nuclear declaration, and Hill has
said he expects to have intense discussions about the list during his trip to the North.
North Korea has said it does not have a uranium program; the United States says, however, that in 2002
North Korea's government privately acknowledged a program in talks with Hill's predecessor. The
United States alleges the North's uranium program was created with help Irom a nuclear black market
run by A.Q. Khan, the Iounder oI Pakistan's atomic weapons program.
Jack Pritchard, the State Department's chieI North Korea expert until 2003, said Hill probably will use
the North Koreans' desire to be removed Irom the U.S. terrorism blacklist to push them to outline their
uranium eIIorts.
North Korea already has begun disabling its main nuclear Iacilities under an agreement with the other
countries at the talks China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. Washington hopes to
use the North's declaration as a guide to nuclear programs to be dismantled by the end oI next year.
Robert Gallucci, a Iormer U.S. diplomat who signed the 1994 nuclear deal with the North, said the
current accord is unclear about how to "deal with gaps between what we expect they should be
declaring and what they may declare."
II North Korea does not oIIer a serious declaration, he said, "not only will conservatives who are all
geared up to throw mud at this thing I think even others oI us, who really want a deal to work, will
say, `Well, wait a minute, you really have to achieve some reasonable level oI transparency.'"
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?
Iile/2007/12/5/worldupdates/2007-12-05T013445Z01NOOTRRTRMDNC0-308279-1&secWorldupdates
Israel's wings clipped by U.S. report on Iran
By Dan Williams
December 5, 2007
MYT 5:15:47 AM
JERUSALEM (Reuters) - A public diIIerence oI opinion between Israel and its U.S. ally about
intelligence on Iran's nuclear capability will make it harder Ior the Jewish state to launch any unilateral
preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear sites.
A U.S. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Monday said Iran had a nuclear arms project
but shelved it in 2003, posing an unprecedentedly overt challenge to Israel's assertions that its arch-Ioe
was bent on acquiring a bomb.
Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert attends a ceremony marking the Iirst night oI the Hanukkah
Iestival at a military base near West Bank city oI Nablus, December 4, 2007. (REUTERS/Oleg Popov)
Though the NIE said Iranian uranium enrichment Iacilities may produce warheads in the next decade,
its reIusal to perceive an imminent threat sent shockwaves through Israel, which is more used to having
Washington endorse its regional strategic vision.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Iaced with doubts by some U.N. Security Council powers on the
need to press sanctions against Tehran, urged that diplomatic pressure be intensiIied.
Israeli DeIence Minister Ehud Barak suggested that American spies had suIIered a "disconnect". He
later said Israel would pursue "various options" against Iran, but did not elaborate.
The remarks Iell Iar short oI past hints that Israel, which is widely assumed to possess the Middle East's
only atomic arsenal, could go it alone and hit Iran iI it deemed diplomacy a dead end in removing what
it sees as a threat to its existence.
"What this report means is that there will be no preemptive U.S. military action against Iran in the
Ioreseeable Iuture," said a recently retired Israeli government intelligence analyst.
"That means there will be no U.S. 'green light' Ior Israeli strikes. It looks like a done deal," said the ex-
analyst, who declined to be named given the sensitivity oI the subject.
The report came amid mounting speculation that President George W. Bush could launch U.S. military
action beIore he leaves oIIice in January 2009, even though Washington says it is committed to
resolving the Iranian stand-oII diplomatically.
Bush said he read the NIE report as a warning about Iran's latent capabilities: "Iran was dangerous. Iran
is dangerous." Israeli media reported that Bush planned to come to Israel in January -- his Iirst visit as
president -- to show solidarity.
Whether or not Israel -- which drew brieI censure Irom U.S. President Ronald Reagan by bombing
Iraq's reactor in 1981 -- would set itselI a condition oI winning Washington's assent to similarly take on
Iran is a matter oI some debate.
EXPECTING SURPRISES
Israel, which has peace deals with only two oI the surrounding Arab states, depends on the United
States Ior $2.8 billion in annual deIence aid and diplomatic backing at the United Nations, where it is
oIten assailed Ior its treatment oI the Palestinians.
"I don't think the Israelis ever asked us permission to do anything," said one senior U.S. oIIicial with
knowledge oI Israel's military aIIairs. "II they attack Iran, you can be sure it will be in a way that's
hugely surprising Ior everyone."
A retired Israeli diplomat with deIence planning experience said secrecy was key. For high-risk
missions like a long-range bombing run, he said, "it would be unwise to check in, even with our closest
allies, ahead oI time".
But Israel would not want angry allies aIter the event.
The retired Israeli diplomat allowed that the NIE report complicated any Israeli plan to attack Iran,
which has denied seeking nuclear weapons and vowed to retaliate Ior such strikes with missile salvoes
on Israel and U.S. targets in the GulI.
"You resort to Iorce oI arms when you Ieel all other options have been exhausted, and then you explain
yourselI -- both to your own countrymen, as required in a democracy, and to the world at large," the
retired diplomat said.
"This report requires that Israel, which now appears isolated and alarmist, work extra hard to build its
case."
Top Israeli oIIicials have been meeting regularly with U.S. counterparts Ior closed-door discussions on
Iran. The Iormer Israeli intelligence analyst said the NIE's conclusions suggested Israel has had a
problem winning over the Americans: "Surely iI we had hard prooI that Iran was about to go nuclear, it
would have aIIected the report's conclusions?"
The retired diplomat pointed to Israel's Sept. 6 air strike on northern Syria as a possible precedent Ior
an attack on Iran.
Israel and the United States have not given details on the Syrian target, which analysts speculated was a
nascent nuclear reactor. Syria denied having any such project.
"Look at how muted the world reaction was to whatever happened in Syria. II you don't admit
anything, then you can't be held to account," the retired diplomat said.
Israel may not be equipped to repeat its Syria or Iraqi sorties in Iran, whose nuclear Iacilities are
distant, numerous and well-IortiIied.
North Korea and Syria
by Victor Cha
Updated Dec.7,2007 09:35 KST
In the coming days, there is an entirely real possibility that the White House will notiIy the U.S.
Congress oI its intention to remove North Korea Irom the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism, opening a
path toward eventual diplomatic normalization with a country that the U.S. has technically been at war
with since 1950. This move would reIlect a more pragmatically-oriented policy toward the reclusive
nuclear state by President George W. Bush in his second term that balanced his strong disapproval oI
the Pyongyang regimes human rights abuses with practical diplomacy aimed at getting North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il out oI the nuclear weapons business. His able negotiator Ambassador Christopher
Hill has succeeded in utilizing the multilateral six-party talks to leverage U.S. and Chinese diplomatic
pressure on the North while also giving Pyongyang ample opportunities Ior bilateral talks with the U.S.
which it so badly seeks. President Bush and Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice have given Hill
enough negotiating room to show that Washington is serious about Iinding a solution to this problem.
The policy has garnered unanimous support in Asia and bipartisan support at home. However this
policy has not come without cost. Bushs second term Ilexibility on North Korea has not sat well with
the conservative core oI the Republican Party and has elicited bold criticism Irom Iormer senior
oIIicials like John Bolton.
The next phase oI the negotiations appears to be moving along. North Korea is working methodically
through 11 steps to disable the reactor at Yongbyon, and is required to provide a nuclear declaration by
Dec. 31. In exchange Ior this, the U.S., China, Russia, and South Korea would provide energy
assistance, and in an apparent side agreement, the U.S. has promised to delist North Korea Irom the list
oI state sponsors oI terrorism and remove economic sanctions that have been in place since the Korean
War. Make no mistake, iI the North disables and declares by the end oI 2007, the Bush administration
will have gone Iurther in denuclearizing North Korea than any previous U.S. administration.
Pyongyang would no longer be able to make plutonium Ior nuclear weapons; it will have Iessed up on
its secret uranium-based nuclear program which led to the breakdown oI the Clinton-era agreement;
and American and other inspectors would be on the ground in the closed communist state veriIying all
oI this. This would be an unadulterated success.
So whats the problem? The prospect oI delisting North Korea Irom the terrorism list has elicited some
grumbling Irom Japan. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda came to the White House last week to remind
President Bush that North Korea needs to come clean on citizens it has abducted Irom Japan in order to
get taken oII the list. There is widespread agreement that progress on this issue is needed such that the
U.S. does not abandon its most important ally in Asia.
But the real problem is Syria. The silence Irom all circles has been deaIening Iollowing the Israeli
attack on what is believed to be a Syrian nuclear Iacility built with cooperation Irom North Korea. One
assumes the silence stems in part Irom the Iact that no one wants to be on record characterizing
intelligence, and there are probably debates taking place about the nature oI the cooperation and
whether it continued aIter the six-party denuclearization agreements in 2005 and 2007.
Some hardliners within the Bush administration have apparently tried to use the Syria revelations as a
deal-breaker Ior North Korea and move to a containment-type policy. But this neither solves the North
Korea nuclear weapons problem, nor the potential proliIeration problem. The answer is to stick with
the negotiations and to get to the year-end goal oI disabling the Norths bomb-making capabilities.
The second part oI the deal -- the nuclear declaration -- becomes inIinitely more crucial, however. II
Pyongyang is serious about being removed Irom the terrorism list, then its declaration must include a
Iull disclosure oI any nuclear cooperation with Syria or others. This does not need to be public, Ior
reasons oI Iace, but iI and when President Bush notiIies Congress oI his intention to delist North Korea
Irom the terrorism list, then he needs to be able to assure Congress and the world that Pyongyang is out
oI any nuclear business with states currently on the list. II he cannot do this, then the U.S. should Iind a
Iormula short oI Iully delisting North Korea. The North Koreans, South Koreans, and Chinese might
respond that Washington needs to IulIill its end oI the bargain and not impose new conditions in order
to show political will and commitment. This is a Ialse charge. No party has shown more political
commitment to this negotiation than the U.S. to the extent that Bush and Rice may even be
overexposed on the policy today. They certainly would be iI the North's declaration oIIered no
transparency on Syria.
Victor Cha is Director oI Asian Studies and D.S. Song ProIessor at Georgetown University. From 2004
to 2007 he was Director oI Asian AIIairs at the White House and deputy head oI the U.S. delegation to
the six-party talks.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorialopinion/editorials/articles/2007/12/09/theconversionoIgeorgebush/
GLOBE EDITORIAL
The conversion of George Bush
December 9, 2007
IF THERE was any lingering doubt that President Bush is moving away Irom his original, imperious
style oI statecraIt, the personal letter he sent last week to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il should
dispel that doubt Ior good. In the past, Bush said he loathed Kim, calling him a tyrant and a pygmy. Yet
in the letter that was hand-delivered to Kim by Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, Bush
addressed the recipient as Dear Mr. Chairman and concluded with the polite Iarewell Iormula,
Sincerely, George Bush.
Such a letter Irom any oI Bushs recent predecessors would have been unremarkable. Coming Irom
him, however, it heralds a longoverdue and much-needed conversion.
AIter wasting six years reIusing to conduct genuine negotiations with North Korea years in which
that country produced enough plutonium Ior eight to 10 nuclear weapons Bush Iinally rejected the
Iutile policy oI administration hardliners and backed Hills diplomatic eIIorts to negotiate an agreement
that could lead to the dismantling oI North Koreas nuclear weapons, materials, and Iacilities.
Bushs letter to Kim Jong Il was needed at this stage oI the process Hill negotiated. North Korea has
complied with its initial obligations by disabling its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Now it must make a
complete declaration not only oI all its nuclear materials and weapons, but also oI past transIers oI
nuclear goods or know-how to other countries. This commitment takes on special signiIicance iI North
Korea was involved with the alleged nuclear site in Syria that Israel destroyed in September.
The declaration is due in the next Iew weeks, though Kim was not expected to come clean all at once.
Past practice suggests he is more likely to parcel out the truth in installments, testing Washingtons
adherence to its commitments and eliciting the highest possible price, in economic and political
beneIits, Ior each disclosure.
Kims goal in striking a deal was to end hostile relations with the United States. So, Bushs letter was
meant to show not only that he stands behind Hills promises, but also that Kim can achieve normalized
relations with the United States iI North Koreas nuclear declaration is complete and accurate.
By engaging with the North Korean dictator, Bush is emulating not only Bill Clinton but also his own
Iather, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixon, John Kennedy, and Dwight Eisenhower. They
negotiated and made deals with Soviet leaders, Mao Zedong, and North Vietnams communist regime.
From ancient Athens until now, the rules Ior statecraIt have been unalterable. The neoconservative
notion that one must never negotiate with evil but only destroy it was always a doctrinal
delusion. Now that Bush seems to have learned this lesson, he would be well advised to apply it to Iran
and Syria.
http://www.jewishpress.com/displayContentnew.cIm?modea&sectionid61&contentid26788&contentName'Sun,20Stand20Still'
'Sun, Stand Still'
By:Avraham Shmuel Lewin
Wednesday, December 12, 2007
Zeev Raz was the leader oI the IDF attack Iorce that bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981.
Today he works at Elta Systems LTD, one oI Israels leading deIense electronics companies and a
subdivision oI Israel Aerospace Industries.
The Jewish Press met recently with the Iormer IAF pilot to get his thoughts on the Israeli bombing in
September oI an alleged nuclear Iacility in Syria; on Israels options in dealing with what Israeli leaders
still consider a very real Iranian nuclear threat; and on what went through his mind as he carried out
one oI the most daring military actions in Israels history.
The Jewish Press: Do you have any special insight into what exactly Israel did in Syria this past
September?
Raz: We still dont know what actually transpired in Syria. It seems there was nuclear activity there
that originated Irom North Korea. OI course, iI we see an enemy country engaged in nuclear activity, it
doesnt mean we automatically must rush in and bomb it. To this day Shimon Peres says and he bases
this on what several nuclear experts told him that even iI we hadnt bombed Iraq 26 years ago, the
Iraqis still wouldnt be able to produce a nuclear bomb.
But oI course, what went on in Syria in cooperation with North Korea smelled so bad that even a
dovish Mapainik like the late Moshe Sharett (who opposed the Sinai Campaign in 1956) would have
supported bombing the Syrian Iacility.
Even before the U.S. released its new intelligence findings stating that Iran allegedly suspended
its nuclear program in 2003, Israel seemed undecided about launching a strike a la the 1981
operation in Iraq. Whats your view on this?
Any preemptive Israeli strike against Iran would be potentially beneIicial to Israel but also very risky.
Why do you think there was such a heated debate in 1981 about whether to approve the bombing oI
Iraq?
In hindsight it appears that bombing Iraq was the obvious thing to do because it was successIul. But try
to look at it through the eyes oI Ezer Weizman or Yigal Yadin or YoseI Burg in 1981 when they had to
make a decision. They said, "Look, we just signed a peace treaty with Egypt, and in the end the Arabs
will have a nuclear bomb anyway, you cant stop it Iorever, and they know we have one so iI they try
to do something theyll be wiped oII the map. So why bomb Iraq? What do you expect Israel to do, go
aIter every country that has an atomic bomb and bomb it?"
This was the thinking oI people like Weizman, Yadin, Burg, Shimon Peres and others. They thought
the peace treaty with Egypt would break down because oI this action. They were mistaken, but no one
could know this in advance.
Begin himselI didnt know whether bombing Iraq would break the treaty with Egypt, but he said that
Saddam Hussein having an atomic bomb was a greater threat to Israel than the loss oI a peace treaty
with Egypt. My personal opinion, by the way, is that Begin anyway had started having second thoughts
about the treaty he signed with Egypt.
So in retrospect you have no doubt Israel was right in bombing the Iraqi reactor?
Now, post Iactum, its obvious we had to do it. But again, beIore we actually did it we really didnt
know what the diplomatic Iallout would be, nor did we know Ior sure whether the action would
succeed and that all oI our planes and pilots would return home saIely.
It never dawned on us that the Iraqis would do absolutely nothing to stop us and so many other things
would work in our Iavor.
Considering that in 1981 Israel did not hesitate to tell the world it was responsible Ior taking out Iraqs
reactor, why all the secrecy about what transpired in Syria in September?
Thats a very good question. My opinion I cant prove it but I have no other explanation is that in
1981 Israel admitted to it because it was right beIore the elections. I remember distinctly the chieI oI
staII telling us we wont admit to anything and we should keep our mouths shut and act as though we
know nothing just as the government does now with Syria.
Suddenly, the day aIter the attack, I heard on the radio that Israel said it bombed Iraq. I was in total
shock. When I returned Irom the mission I hadnt even told my Iamily where Id been.
Some Israelis actually accused Begin, who was in the midst of a very tough fight for reelection, of
ordering the raid to drive up his approval ratings.
Yes, I recall there were people who said at the time that Begin approved the action because oI the
upcoming elections, but in my opinion that is not true and just puts those who said it in a bad light. And
I say this as someone who did not vote Ior Begin.
He approved the attack not because oI the elections but because oI what I heard our Intelligence tell
him. They said, Listen, iI youre going to wait until 1982 the reactor will be hot and active and there
will be a lot oI radiation (like what happened in Chernobyl in 1986), so wipe it out now beIore it has a
chance to become active.
I think he did the right thing.
Look, when we received our reactor in Dimona Irom France, its output was so low that it didnt have
what it would take to build a nuclear bomb. So what did we do? We raised its output. We were sure
that eventually the Iraqis would do the same thing raise the output oI their reactor and in the end
produce a bomb.
Assuming the Iranians are still, or will soon resume, actively working on developing a nuclear
capability, it will be much more difficult for Israel to do in Iran what it did in Iraq in 1981. In
light of that, is there any way Israel could deliver the kind of blow that would prevent Iran from
building a nuclear bomb?

Even iI we succeed in an attack on Iran, it will not be long beIore the Iranians are again actively
involved in trying to build a nuclear capability. In Iact, an Israeli attack will give them even more
motivation to do so. So even iI we bomb Iran, the eIIect will be similar to that oI a temporary
painkiller.
OI course I hope that iI we do attack we will be successIul and all our pilots will return home saIely. It
will be much harder than what we did in Iraq. Among other Iactors, we didnt have to reIuel in the air
when we attacked Iraq but you cant Ily to Iran and back without reIueling in the air.
You know, one oI the planes that bombed Iraq was manned by Ilan Ramon, who perished in the NASA
space shuttle accident several years ago. He was the youngest one among us and the only one not yet
married.
He was our navigator, in charge oI Iuel, etc. When I was told what we were being asked to do in Iraq, I
went to Ilan and asked him iI it were possible to return to Israel aIter the strike without reIueling. To
get there was no problem, but how about getting back? He said that in Iact we didnt have enough Iuel,
and so wed have to do all kinds oI tricks to get back saIely.
Can you describe the feeling you had when you bombed the reactor?
I Ielt I had a big zchus, or privilege. It was very diIIicult Ior me to become a pilot. I was a weak pilot
in the beginning. And now here I was, entrusted with carrying out such a mission. I Ielt a huge
responsibility, as iI the whole project rested on my shoulders and iI I made the slightest mistake
everything would be doomed and I wouldnt be able to look at myselI in the mirror. That is why the
only thing that was on my mind was to Iind the target.
Its like the story oI the old Chinese hunter who is about to die and calls in his three sons to decide who
among them would inherit his bow and arrow.
He asks the Iirst son, "What do you see?"
He says, "I see you and everybody around us, a window, and outside the window there is a tree and on
it a bird."
The Iather says, "No, youre not a hunter."
He asks the second son what he sees. "I see a window and outside the window a tree with a bird on it,"
he tells his Iather.
The Iather says, "Youre not a hunter either." Then he asks the third son what he sees and the third son
simply says, "I see a bird." The Iather says, "You are a hunter because a hunter only sees his target."
That is what went through my mind the whole time "Where is the target, where is the target?"
By the way, none oI us thought not even in the IDF General StaII that we would all come back
alive.
Are you saying that when each of you took off you said goodbye to Israel and goodbye to your
life?
Absolutely. Maybe some oI us would come back, but we were sure there was no way that everyone
would. So as Iar as each oI us, individually, was concerned, it was our last day on earth.
Doesnt that thought go through every pilot on this type of mission?
Yes, but in this case the risk was much greater. And yet things happened there that to this day we have
no explanation Ior. For instance, according to all calculations the Iraqi radar systems were supposed to
have spotted us at least 15 minutes beIore the bombing despite the Iact that we Ilew at very low
altitude.
Thats why we had eight and not Iour F-16 Iighters, because we thought Ior sure the Iraqis would spot
us and send several MIGs to try to down us. We thought we would encounter heavy resistance.
Dont Iorget, the Iraqis were threatened by Iran too, so Ior sure they had their radar system and Iighter
MIGs on alert. We never thought we would take them by such complete surprise. But they didnt do a
thing.
Here is another inexplicable thing: King Hussein was vacationing in Aqaba and saw us on our way
toward Iraq. He immediately phoned Amman our intelligence picked up the whole conversation then
and reported it to them. But those idiots ignored it and didnt do anything.
The way you are describing it, it sounds like an outright miracle.
Absolutely. OI course it was a miracle. How is it possible that even aIter we bombed the reactor not
one plane tried to down us?
Ill tell you something else: It takes an hour and a halI to get back Irom Iraq to Israel and we were
Ilying 40,000 Ieet above the ground. The General StaII originally wanted us to carry out the bombing
aIter sunset so it would be harder Ior the Iraqis to attack us on the way back. But I was opposed to that.
I thought iI we did the bombing aIter sunset there wouldnt be enough light and our planes would miss
their target so I insisted that the bombing take place beIore sunset.
As a result, we Ilew back as the sun was setting. But since the planes were traveling at such a Iast
speed, the sun was out all the time and never set. It was as though it remained standing in the middle oI
the horizon.
At that time we pilots all radioed each other reciting the same exact biblical verse Joshua 10:12:
"Sun, stand still over Gibeon, and moon, over the Valley oI Ayalon."
You know, as I am recalling this now I am getting goose bumps.
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/124606
9 Tevet 5768, December 18, '07
Published: 12/17/07, 5:47 PM
Ex-US Ambassador to UN John Bolton Speaks on Arutz-7
9 Tevet 5768, 18 December 07 05:52
by Hillel Fendel
(IsraelNN.com) John Bolton, who served as the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Irom August 2005 to December 2006, spoke with IsraelNationalRadio's Tovia Singer about the
recent Bush Administration intelligence report on Iran's nuclear capabilities. The controversial
diplomat said the report was more political than intelligence-based, and that it was meant only to
undercut President Bush's policies on Iran.
Singer began by asking Bolton, author oI a recent book entitled, Surrender is Not an Option: DeIending
America at the UN and Abroad, "How did you manage to maintain your sanity while working in such a
hostile environment as the UN?"
Chuckling, Bolton replied, "It was truly a target-rich environment there, and not the most hospitable.
But it was important to have someone stand up Ior American interests, and make sure that we're not
turned into a well-bred doormat there at the UN and that our Ioreign policy options are not
constrained."
Singer: "But it certainly got you in an enormous amount oI trouble, Ior you've always been outspoken,
and you're not hostile to the Jewish State, and you believe in the war on terrorism - basically, you drive
the leIt crazy! Why do you do it?"
Bolton: "I like to think that Sen. Joe Biden actually tipped his hand a little back in 2001 when he
opposed my conIirmation Ior my Iirst job in this administration as Undersecretary Ior Arms Control; he
said that his trouble with me was that over the years, I have been 'too competent.' They were worried
that I might actually change things."
Not Quite an "Intelligence" Report
When Singer said he wanted to bring up the recent American intelligence report that downplayed the
Iranian nuclear capabilities and brought great joy to Iran and to the leIt, Bolton said, "I don't think we
should call it an intelligence report, but rather a document oI the Executive Branch. It was a highly-
politicized document, written by some who are not even intelligence community proIessionals, but
rather Irom the State Department... In theory, they all work Ior the President, but they don't like his
policies and they think that he's too belligerent towards Iran - though my own personal view is that the
President was not tough enough - and this paper was intended to undercut the Bush position. This
report has put Bush's policy on the bottom oI the ocean."
"Let me just take one speciIic example to show how distorted it was," Bolton said. "The headlines all
over the world aIter the report were that Iran has no nuclear weapons program - but in Iact the
document reIers only to a halt on weaponization - putting a nuclear device on top oI a ballistic missile,
which is just a sliver oI the all-out nuclear program. It's an important piece, yes, but it's just a small
part. Since 2003 Iran has made steady progress towards all the technology it needs Ior a nuclear
weapon, and it can turn its program back on - iI it was ever turned oII - in a snap. This report will be
very harmIul to the cause oI stopping Iran Irom getting a nuclear weapon."
Bolton went on to say that the job oI the intelligence community is merely to "provide the Iacts, and
what we do not need Irom the intelligence people is their view on how to put those Iacts into a political
policy; Ior that, we have government leadership. UnIortunately, this report shows that the intelligence
community has gone way beyond its legitimate boundaries."
North Korea: A Criminal State
Singer asked why Iran, with its enormous oil reserves, does not just send ten billion dollars over to
cash-strapped North Korea and buy a nuclear weapon?
Bolton: "It's possible; North Korea is a criminal state, and would sell anything to anyone Ior hard cash.
But my judgment is that Iran wants a sustained nuclear capability; they want to master everything so
that it doesn't have to be dependent on a place like North Korea."
Israeli Censorship on Attack on Syria is Mistake
"I think we should all be paying more attention to the site that Israel struck in Syria back on September
6. You know, you in Israel are operating under extraordinary censorship about that, but I think this is a
mistake - we need to get the Iacts out about what was going on there at that site near the Euphrates
River. We need to know more about the nuclear partnership between Syria and North Korea there."
Singer: "Has this report buried the strategy oI imposing sanctions against Iran?"
Bolton: "Yes, certainly Ior the short term. But I have Iaith in the Iranians that they will soon do
something that will tip their hand again and do something to show that they are working towards
nuclear capability. I don't think the report will stand Ior very long, but let's Iace it, it's done a lot oI
damage."
Message to Israel
Singer: "You are now speaking to many Jews and non-Jews throughout the Land oI Israel, Irom the
Jordan to the Mediterranean. Your message to them?"
Bolton: "I think it's important to keep your Iocus on national security and not get diverted by political
rhetoric and the demands oI people who are out trying to build legacies Ior themselves. You have to
keep the long-term and your national interest in mind and remember who your Iriends are."
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,523991,00.html
SPIEGEL INTERVIEW WITH FORMER US DIPLOMAT JOHN BOLTON
'Bush's Foreign Policy Is in Free Fall'
December 18, 2007
Former US Diplomat John Bolton is no longer in oIIice, but he still has a lot to say about American
Ioreign policy. SPIEGEL spoke to him about Bush's soItness abroad, Rice having been taken hostage
by the liberal State Department, and why it doesn't matter that the world hates the US.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Ambassador, you worked closely with the president and you shared his hawkish views
on Iraq. But your new book is Iiercely critical oI George W. Bush. Why?
Bolton: His Ioreign policy is in Iree Iall. The president is turning against his own best judgment and
instincts under the inIluence oI Secretary (oI State Condoleeza) Rice. She is the dominant voice,
indeed, almost the only voice on Ioreign policy in this administration.
SPIEGEL: The popular reading oI her looks a bit diIIerent. She is presumed to be weak and not
particularly eIIicient.
Bolton: No. Rice is channeling the views oI the liberal career bureaucrats in the State Department. The
president is Iocusing all his attention on Iraq and, by doing so, has allowed the secretary to become
captured by the State Department. He is not adequately supervising her. It is a mistake.
SPIEGEL: Could it be that your pique really comes Irom the Iact that the president doesn't seem to be
listening to neoconservatives like you anymore?
Bolton: The vice president (Vice President Dick Cheney) is still there. But the idea that somehow the
neocons were so powerIul is a myth -- I mean, it was Iive or six people, Ior God sakes. I am not a
neoconservative. I am pro-American.
SPIEGEL: You have said that the new moderate Ioreign policy currently being Iollowed by Bush
compromises the security oI the United States.
Bolton: Well, I think so. North Korea is going to get away with keeping its nuclear weapons. I think
the (National Intelligence Estimate) sends Iran a signal they can do whatever they want...
SPIEGEL: ...You are talking about the recent report by US intelligence services that Iran stopped its
nuclear weapons program in 2003 ...
Bolton: Yes. For 12 hours aIter the NIE announcement, there was not a word Irom Iran. They were
sitting there in Teheran saying: "What devious trick are the Americans playing on us now?" They
couldn't believe it and Iinally declared victory.
SPIEGEL: In the past, you argued Ior a military intervention in Iran. Do you still consider that an
option?
Bolton: I don't have the same high conIidence these intelligence analysts do that, in Iact, there was a
Iull suspension oI the military program in Iran. This is not like those claims about Cheney pressuring
the poor intelligence community to spin intelligence on Iraq. This is politicization Irom the other side --
people in the intelligence community allowing policy preIerences to aIIect their analysis and judgments
about the intelligence.
SPIEGEL: And where is the president? Is he merely a puppet?
Bolton: Look at the North Korean policy. The North Koreans certainly were involved in that Iacility in
Syria that was raided by the Israelis. The North Koreans renege on their commitments and we still
negotiate.
SPIEGEL: What do you see as the alternative -- bombing Pyongyang?
Bolton: I'm not running around the world looking Ior ways to create hostilities. The solution to North
Korea is the reuniIication oI the Korean Peninsula. China could inIluence the North; it supplies 80 to
90 percent oI North Korea's energy. The United States have to put pressure on China in order Ior China
to pressure North Korea.
SPIEGEL: Do you have any second thoughts about the American engagement in Iraq?
Bolton: It was right to overthrow Saddam Hussein. It was the regime itselI that was a threat. I think in
hindsight, what I would have done is turn authority back over to Iraqis much more quickly and say:
"Your country, you Iigure out how to run it."
SPIEGEL: Would you say the world is now a saIer place than beIore the Iraq war?
Bolton: Yes. There is now no possibility that Iraq is going to have weapons oI mass destruction. We
had the ancillary strategic victory when (Libyan leader) Moammar GadhaIi gave up his nuclear
weapons program as well. When he looked at Saddam, he concluded -- incorrectly -- that he might be
next.
SPIEGEL: You don't seem to doubt the go-it-alone approach oI the United States although anti-
Americanism is rising across the world. Doesn't such a negative view oI America weaken US power?
Bolton: I don't think so. I have looked at public opinion polls in France in the late 1940s and early
1950s during the height oI Marshall Plan aid. They had a very negative attitude towards the United
States then. There were negative attitudes towards the United States because oI Vietnam. There were
negative attitudes about the United States when Reagan wanted to deploy intermediate range ballistic
missiles. I don't think the president should base his Ioreign policy on American public opinion polls, let
alone Ioreign public opinion polls.
SPIEGEL: What kind oI Ioreign policy will the next president pursue?
Bolton: II you get a President (Hillary) Clinton, you might well Iind, just as aIter Vietnam, that there is
a retraction Irom Iraq and oI American inIluence in the world. And in a couple oI years the Europeans
will be complaining about that too. See how long American troops last in Europe under an
administration that thinks it is time Ior America to come home.
SPIEGEL: Is that a threat?
Bolton: No. The European Union can now act like a major power, at least that is what the European
Union tells us. So they should do so -- they can experiment with Russia.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Ambassador, thank very much Ior taking the time to speak with us.
Interview conducted by Cordula Meyer
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataIdnk00400&num3051
Can Kim Jong Il Implement the Declaration of His Nuclear Programs?
By Park Hyun Min
|2007-12-19 22:57|
Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
With 13 days remaining, North Korea has to disable its Yongbyun nuclear Iacility and declare nuclear
programs by December 31st.
The project to move Yongbyun nuclear reactors Iuel rods to the nearby a cistern Ior disablement was
introduced in the latter halI oI last week and it will take approximately 100 days Ior the project to be
completed, reported Kyodo New Service.
Nuclear Iuel rods amounting to around 8,000 weigh 50 tons total, so it will be diIIicult to Iinish the
project beIore March. However, once the project is completed, recharging the reactor will be
technologically diIIicult. ThereIore, this can be evaluated as an epochal stage in the disablement
process.
The Iorecast Ior the delay in the completion oI disablement was reiterated by Chinas top representative
Wu Dawei, Vice Minister oI Foreign AIIairs, at the Six-Party talks on the 6th oI this month, Due to
technical issues, it will be diIIicult Ior North Koreas nuclear disablement to be completed by the end
oI the year.
Further, U.S. Secretary oI State Condoleeza Rice has said that the U.S. is not concerned about whether
or not disablement will be completed by December 31st. Due to essential technical issues, the U.S.
cannot rush the process.
Thus, the U.S. has already widened the breadth oI understanding regarding the possibility oI the
postponement in deadline regarding one or two projects as long as disablement has begun.
President Bush already sent an autographed letter, the Iirst letter he has sent to Kim Jong Il, requesting
the Norths reporting oI good Iaith within the end oI the year.
That is, iI North Korea accurately declares the amount oI abstracted plutonium and suspicions about the
Uranium Enrichment Program (UEP), which turned into a second-round nuclear threat in 2002, as well
as the presumed nuclear connection with Syria, the removal oI North Korea Irom the list oI terrorism-
sponsoring nations, the termination oI the application oI Trading with the Enemy Act, regime saIety,
and economic support can be ensured.
North Korea has adhered to the position oI groundless rumors regarding suspicions oI its nuclear
expansion and the UEP issue, which were previously introduced.
However, it was expressed that North Korea imported high-level aluminum pipes reaching about 150
tons through a Iormer Russian businessman and Pakistans President Pervez MusharraI also revealed in
last years autobiography that he handed over 20 centriIuges to the North.
In actuality, North Korea is known to have said in passing at an inIormal meeting regarding the
importing oI aluminum pipes, which is the crux oI the UEP issue, We used them in missile parts or in
airplane manuIacturing.
However, experts have evaluated that these aluminum pipes cannot be used as parts oI missiles or
airplanes. It will be diIIicult to jump to the 2nd-phase oI denuclearization without a complete
declaration oI this issue.
In the midst oI this, Tom Casey, Assistant Spokesperson Ior the State Department, said on the 17th
(local time), I know the Chinese are still working on timing Ior another envoys level meeting but I
don't have any dates to share with you at this point.
The direction oI the Six-Party Talks, which has been steadily continuing aIter the resolution the BDA
issue, depends on completion oI the nuclear program declaration by the end oI the year.
Simultaneously, Vice-Minister Wu Dawei embarked on the path to visiting the North on the 17th. It has
not been conIirmed whether or not the Vice-Minister visited the North as a special envoy, but through
this opportunity, the interest in breakthroughs related to the diIIicult nuclear declaration issue has been
increasing.
In the present, China does not have the leverage to persuade the North, but according to the level oI
North Koreas declaration oI the nuclear programs, this is a critical period on which hangs whether or
not the positive momentum oI the Six-Party Talks can be sustained.
SatisIaction regarding the declaration oI the nuclear programs depends wholly on the U.S. Vice-
Minister Wu is expected to play a certain kind oI a role to Iind out common grounds between the two
sides.
The issue is whether all nuclear programs in the declaration will become objects oI abandonment. Can
Kim Jong Il implement a decision regarding denuclearization and abandon its nuclear weapons? This
will only be possible when Kim Jong Il has the conIidence oI sustaining its regime by abandoning its
weapons.
Subverting Bush at Langley
By Robert D. Novak
Monday, December 24, 2007; A15
Outrage over the CIA's destruction oI interrogation tapes is but one element oI the distress Republican
intelligence watchdogs in Congress Ieel about the agency. "It is acting as though it is autonomous, not
accountable to anyone," Rep. Peter Hoekstra, ranking Republican on the House intelligence committee,
told me. That is his mildest language about the CIA. In careIully selected adjectives, Hoekstra calls it
"incompetent, arrogant and political."
Chairman Silvestre Reyes and other Democrats on the intelligence committee join Hoekstra in
demanding investigation into the tape destruction in the Iace oI the administration's resistance, but the
Republicans stand alone in protesting the CIA's deIiant undermining oI President Bush. In its clean bill
oI health Ior Iran on nuclear weapons development, the agency acted as an independent policymaker
rather than an adviser. It has withheld Irom nearly all members oI Congress inIormation on the Israeli
bombing oI Syria in September. The U.S. intelligence community is deciding on its own what
inIormation the public shall learn.
Intelligence agencies, Irom Nazi Germany to present-day Pakistan, Ior better or Ior ill, have tended to
break away Irom their governments. The OIIice oI Strategic Services, the CIA's World War II
predecessor, was inIiltrated by communists. While CIA tactics were under liberal assault in Congress
during the Watergate era, current accusations oI a rogue agency come Irom Republicans who see a
conscious undermining oI Bush at Langley.
The CIA's contempt Ior the president was demonstrated during his 2004 reelection campaign when a
senior intelligence oIIicer, Paul R. Pillar, made oII-the-record speeches around the country criticizing
the invasion oI Iraq. On Sept. 24, 2004, three days beIore my column exposed Pillar's activity, Iormer
representative Porter Goss arrived at Langley as Bush's handpicked director oI central intelligence.
Goss had resigned Irom Congress to accept Bush's mandate to clean up the CIA. But the president
eventually buckled under Iire Irom the old boys at Langley and their Democratic supporters in
Congress, and Goss was sacked in May 2006.
Goss's successor, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, restored the status quo at the CIA and nurtured relations
with congressional Democrats in preparation Ior their coming majority status. Hayden, an active-duty
Iour-star Air Force general, Iirst antagonized Hoekstra by telling Reyes what the Democrats wanted to
hear about the Valerie Plame-CIA leak case.
There is no partisan divide on congressional outrage over the CIA's destruction oI tapes showing
interrogation oI detainees suspected oI terrorism. Hoekstra agrees with Reyes that the Bush
administration has made a big mistake reIusing to let oIIicials testiIy in the impending investigation.
Republicans also complain that the National Intelligence Estimate concluding that Iran has shut down
its nuclear weapons program was a case oI the CIA Ilying solo, not part oI the administration team.
Donald M. Kerr, principal deputy director oI national intelligence, said on Dec. 3 that the intelligence
community "took responsibility Ior what portions oI the NIE Key Judgments were to be declassiIied."
In a Dec. 10 column Ior the Wall Street Journal, Hoekstra and Democratic Rep. Jane Harman, a senior
member oI the intelligence committee, wrote that the new NIE "does not explain why the 2005 NIE
came to the opposite conclusion or what Iactors could drive Iran to 'restart' its nuclear-weapons
program." (Six days later on "Fox News Sunday," Harman called the NIE "the best work product
they've produced.")
Hoekstra is also at odds with Hayden over the CIA's reIusal to reveal what it knows about the Sept. 6
Israeli bombing oI Syria's nuclear complex. Only chairmen and ranking minority members oI the
intelligence committees, plus members oI the congressional leadership, have been brieIed. Other
members oI Congress, including those on the intelligence committees, were excluded. The intelligence
authorization bill, passed by the House and awaiting Iinal action in the Senate, blocks most oI the CIA's
Iunding "until each member oI the Congressional Intelligence committees has been Iully inIormed with
respect to intelligence" about the Syria bombing.
In a June 21 address to the Society Ior Historians oI American Foreign Relations, Hayden unveiled the
"CIA's social contract with the American people." Hoekstra's explanation: "The CIA is rejecting
accountability to the administration or Congress, saying it can go straight to the people."
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/25/AR2007122500864.html?hpidopinionsbox1
A Chance to Rein In North Korea
By Nicholas Eberstadt
Wednesday, December 26, 2007; Page A21
Last week's presidential election in South Korea presages a sea change in that key U.S. ally's policies
toward North Korea. The resounding deIeat oI the candidates who Iavored more oI Seoul's all-carrot,
no-stick approach to Kim Jong Il presents Washington with a horizon oI new possibilities Ior reining in
Asia's most troublesome dictator. The question now is whether the Bush Ioreign policy team will be
adept enough to seize this opportunity.
The landslide vote, to be sure, was in large measure a rebuke oI President Roh Moo-hyun's inept
handling oI the economy and polarizing domestic policies. Yet, taken together, the candidates who
opposed the "Peace and Prosperity" policy (originally dubbed "Sunshine") toward North Korea in last
Wednesday's election received more than 63 percent oI the vote -- compared with 35 percent Ior all
those who approved oI it. Why the widespread discontent with "sunshine"? Because what had started as
a policy oI reconciliation with the North had degenerated in practice into almost reIlexive appeasement
oI the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il. Unsurprisingly, many ordinary Koreans Iound that kind oI
"sunshine" too distasteIul, too embarrassing and just a bit too dangerous.
South Koreans winced as their government repeatedly abstained Irom U.N. votes criticizing North
Korea Ior human rights abuses. They grumbled as they saw their tax-Iunded "economic cooperation"
projects with the North devolve into an economic liIeline Ior a still-hostile government in Pyongyang.
And they worried as the undisguised riIt with Washington over "the North Korean threat" created
unmistakable strains in the vital U.S.-South Korean alliance.
adicon
South Korea, in short, is ready Ior a new and more critical approach to engagement with North Korea --
and this is just what President-elect Lee Myung-bak has promised. Lee is no Cold Warrior: He styles
himselI as a pragmatist who judges by results. Since his election, he has signaled that restoring the
health oI the U.S.-South Korean alliance and achieving a genuine denuclearization oI the North Korean
regime are to be top Ioreign policy priorities. He has also served notice to Pyongyang that it can no
longer count on Seoul Ior a "see-no-evil" spin on events in the North -- much less unconditional
handouts.
There would seem to be great promise in this new attitude toward "engagement with the North" -- to
say nothing oI new vistas Ior genuine cooperation between the United States and South Korea on the
multiIaceted North Korea problem.
With Seoul Iinally willing to criticize Kim Jong Il' s gulag "paradise," Ior example, an eIIective
worldwide human rights campaign in the name oI the North Korean people comes much closer to
reality. With a South Korean government that no longer insists on sitting on the sidelines, the
ProliIeration Security Initiative to interdict illicit North Korean revenue (Irom drug-running,
counterIeiting, weapons sales and the like) stands to be much more eIIective -- and that much more
costly to Kim Jong Il. No longer a "runaway ally," South Korea could at last join with the United States
and Japan in a common policy to bring real pressure on North Korea Ior real denuclearization -- and to
impose real penalties Ior noncompliance.
Today, China can depict its support Ior the North as joining a South Korean bandwagon. Without the
cover oI a seemingly all-Iorgiving South Korean government, China would Iinally be Iorced to make
hard choices about the Kim Jong Il regime -- within the conIines oI the six-party talks and beyond.
But is the Bush Ioreign policy team ready to make use oI this long-desired diplomatic windIall Irom
South Korea?
For a variety oI reasons (among them the Republicans' loss oI Congress in 2006 and the situation in
Iraq) the Bush team all but abandoned its previous posture toward North Korea at the end oI last year.
These days it appears intent on producing only "good news" on the North Korean Iront. "Good news"
about North Korea, Ior its part, seems to have been deIined down to meaning a nuclear deal with Kim
Jong Il -- irrespective oI the Iine print.
II this sounds implausible, consider the actual record oI U.S. diplomacy with North Korea over the past
12 months.
Early this year, the U.S. government quietly agreed to help "unIreeze" more than $24 million in suspect
North Korean Iunds Irom bank accounts in Macau. Why? Because North Korean nuclear negotiators
threatened not to return to the table until their Dear Capo got his money back.
AIter returning to the six-party talks, the North Korean side then inked an "action plan" in February
that promised to provide an accounting oI its previous nuclear activities within two months. Here we
are at the end oI the year with no accounting -- and, so Iar as one can tell, no worries Irom the White
House, either.
In September word emerged that Israeli jets had leveled a Iacility in Syria that Irom the air looked a lot
like the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. The Syrian site was reputedly being developed with North Korean
assistance. Yet under Washington's new rules oI engagement with Pyongyang, the Bush team has
scarcely whispered a word about this mysterious -- and potentially grave -- international incident.
And by the way: Have you heard Irom President Bush's special envoy Ior human rights in North Korea
over the past year? Neither has anybody else.
Last week's election in South Korea should serve as a wake-up call to the Bush administration. With
willing new partners in the wings in Seoul, President Bush still has the chance to register some real
gains Ior his legacy on North Korea -- and, more important, Ior the security oI the Iree world.
Nicholas Eberstadt, the Henry Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute, is
a member oI the U.S. Committee Ior Human Rights in North Korea.
N.Korea Likely to Miss Critical Deadline
Updated Dec.26, 2007 07:04 KST
North Korea is likely to miss an agreed deadline to declare all its nuclear programs and stockpiles and
disable nuclear Iacilities by the end oI this year.
A South Korean government oIIicial on Tuesday said, "There is no sign yet that North Korea has
decided to make an accurate declaration. Its improbable that the North will declare its nuclear
programs by the end oI the year, with only a week remaining beIore the New Year."
It is unclear whether the North is positively reIusing to make a Iull declaration oI all materials and
programs under a Feb. 13 six-nation agreement or whether it is stalling to get a bigger compensation
package Irom the U.S. A positive reIusal would derail the entire Iramework.
Under the Feb. 13 denuclearization deal, the U.S. agreed to strike the North Irom a blacklist oI state
sponsors oI terrorism and liIt sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act provided the North
disables its nuclear Iacilities and makes a Iull declaration to the IAEA.
According to South Korean oIIicials, North Korea is dragging its Ieet while denying the main U.S.
allegations: that it has or had a uranium enrichment program and transIerred nuclear materials to Syria.
The North's nuclear Iacilities are, as it happens, being disabled in cooperation with a U.S.-led team.
Though the processes will be diIIicult to complete by the end oI the year due to technical problems oI
extracting spent Iuel rods, it will be possible to Iinish them around February, the South Korean oIIicials
added.
A South Korean oIIicial said, "We've seen many instances when the North dragged its Ieet in
implementing its promises. An accurate declaration is more important than keeping the deadline. A
decision Irom North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is needed now more than ever beIore, he added.
Meanwhile, the North's Workers' Party daily Rodong Shinmun in newly belligerent language on
Tuesday accused U.S. warmongers oI Irenetically preparing behind closed doors Ior a maneuver to
ignite a second Korean War. Such a maneuver makes us suspicious iI the U.S. has any real intention to
continue the dialogue."
The daily complained about an aerial war exercise in the shape oI the dispatch oI an F-18 hornet
strike Iighter to South Korea Irom an overseas base. Looking at the U.S. double-dealing attitude, we
deeply suspect whether the U.S.' call Ior dialogue is a disguised tactic." It added, "Nobody knows what
kind oI shocking incident the U.S. warmongers might ignite to prevent the North Korean-U.S. talks
Irom proceeding Iurther.
The state-run Korean Central News Agency on Sunday quoted Kim Kyok-sik, chieI oI the general staII
oI the Korean People's Army, as saying tensions remain on the Korean Peninsula due to
Washingtons persistent war maneuvers."
According to the KCNA, the North Korean Army chieI was addressing a rally to mark the 16th
anniversary oI Kim Jong-il's inauguration as supreme commander. "The U.S. is still maneuvering
behind the doors to ignite a war oI aggression against the North, while clamoring about dialogue and
talks in public, Kim Kyok-sik said. Only in July, Kim Jong-il told Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi, "In recent days, there are signs that the situation on the Korean Peninsula will likely improve to
some extent."
Editor's Notes: Man of the year, 2007... we hope
David Horovitz
THE JERUSALEM POST
Dec. 27, 2007
"UnIortunately, despite our yearning Ior peace as we reach out to our neighbors, the time has not yet
come to sheath our sword. It must remain sharpened and honed, prepared to Iace any enemy...
"We will be prepared Ior the challenges posed to us by the terror organizations and by others who have
not yet come to terms with the existence oI the State oI Israel in the Middle East... We will become
stronger in order to deter them. And iI need be, we will be prepared to overcome them."
From a letter sent to the soldiers and employees oI the IDF by Gabi Ashkenazi on February 14, the day
he became the 19th IDF chieI oI the General StaII.
On September 6, Israeli jets raided a target in Syria whose precise nature has neither been oIIicially
disclosed nor unoIIicially proven.
The remarkable strike, evading Syrian radar and other deIenses, prompted a Ilood oI rather conIused
and embarrassed reactions Irom Damascus, including an assertion Irom the Syrian vice president that
the target was the harmless "Arab Center Ior the Studies oI Arid Zones and Dry Lands" - a claim which
was, amusingly, swiItly denied by said Arab Center.
Almost as remarkable as the strike was the relative silence Irom Jerusalem. Rather than crowing about
the intelligence that had established the need Ior and enabled the raid and highlighting the pinpoint
accuracy oI the attack, the political echelon, (almost) to a man, kept uncharacteristically mum.
Much less surprisingly, the IDF, under its relatively new chieI oI General StaII, had no comment either.
Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, who had set the tone Ior his media interactions months earlier by asking his
spokesman's department to cancel the interviews it had lined up Ior him to mark Independence Day, is
more oI a doer than a talker.
Amid the strict military censorship that still surrounds that September 6 raid, the most that can be said
is that it was oI critical importance to Israel's well-being; that the Syrians, according to Ioreign reports,
belatedly got Iound out doing something nuclear in tandem with North Korea that they had thought
would remain undiscovered; and that Israel's silence, in turn enabling Damascene denial rather than
humiliation, was crucial in preventing the single strike Irom escalating into a war.
Although the raid represented an impressive display oI Israeli air and other prowess, it would be an
overstatement to assert that, at a stroke, it revived an Israeli deterrent capability so battered by our
demonstrable vulnerability to rudimentary rocket attack - Irom south Lebanon during the 2006 war
with Hizbullah, and Irom Gaza to this day.
Nonetheless, it likely gave pause to potential enemies, renewing respect Ior the IDF's capacity to do the
unexpected with exemplary proIessionalism. Sending his Iorces into rapier-action deep inside hostile
territory, demonstrating the improved readiness to grapple with enemies that he had promised in his
introductory letter, Ashkenazi, a member oI the Golani inIantry Iorce that participated in the 1976
Entebbe hostage rescue, reconnected the IDF to such past glories.
This is the essence oI Ashkenazi's goal Ior the IDF. "We will become stronger in order to deter |our
enemies|. And iI need be, we will be prepared to overcome them."
IT IS Iervently to be hoped that Ashkenazi, chieI oI the General StaII Ior 10 and a halI oI the past 12
calendar months, is Israel's Man oI 2007. II so, we may never know it Ior certain, Ior much oI his
success will lie in the degree to which he is indeed making Israel suIIiciently strong as to deter its
enemies.
It may be that September's surgical strike - and the avoidance oI war - marks the Iirst such success. But
Ashkenazi is making his quiet impact more widely, too - gradually correcting the damage done to
Israel's military image by the Second Lebanon War, rebuilding the IDF's credibility with the US, and
bringing his analysis oI regional developments, and consequent Israeli imperatives, to a generally
receptive political echelon.
He is not universally acclaimed as a deep strategic thinker. Nor is there Iull consensus behind his
emphasis on ground Iorces, with some critics sniping that he is preparing the IDF Ior the last war rather
than the next one. But the elegant theorizing oI his predecessor Dan Halutz about the universal
capabilities oI an air Iorce proved so misguided in the Second Lebanon War. And the IDF was exposed
more as a rusted than a well-oiled Iighting machine. The no-nonsense, keenly intelligent and
workaholic Ashkenazi is proving a sobering antidote - the ultimate IDF insider reviving the IDF Irom
the inside.
He inherited a shellshocked military whose Iailure to decisively prevail against Hizbullah constituted
an enemy dream come true and an Israeli nightmare. Our loquacious deIense chieIs had assured us
early in that conIlict that Hizbullah would be largely destroyed within days. And yet more than a month
later, the sophisticated might oI the Israeli Air Force had Iailed to thwart the salvos oI primitive
Katyushas, Iailed to deter the guerrilla army so unexpectedly resilient in Iiring them.
Ashkenazi's remedy has been a return to basics: An investigation oI what had gone wrong and why,
and a determination to rectiIy it. The most obvious and immediate change lies in the attitude to
training. Almost Irom the day he succeeded Halutz, Ashkenazi has reversed norms under which key
units could go years without intensive training, a state oI aIIairs that selI-evidently leIt them ill-
prepared Ior the instant resort to war ordered by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on July 12, 2006.
Frequently out in the Iield himselI, Ashkenazi, who already had the respect oI his peers and
subordinates, having risen gradually through the ranks to the IDF's top positions, has cemented the
reputation oI a hands-on, hands-dirty commander.
At the same time, he has credibility among ministers, which helps mightily when deIense spending
battles are waged. Brought back Irom the cold to take the post oI DeIense Ministry director-general by
then-minister Amir Peretz, Ashkenazi is now also said to enjoy a good relationship with chieI oI staII
No. 14, Peretz's successor Ehud Barak.
Ashkenazi is still watching Lebanon closely - acutely concerned by the rearming oI Hizbullah and by
the political shiIts that could give it veto power over Lebanese government decisions as critical to Israel
as the Iuture deployment oI the Lebanese Army and the renewal oI UNIFIL's mandate. But other Ironts
are still more demanding.
LIKE BARAK, Ashkenazi has taken to warning oI late that a major IDF incursion into Gaza looks ever
more likely so long as the Kassams rain down on Sderot and its environs.
But the chieI oI the General StaII does not want to invade the Strip. He knows how treacherous it
would be Ior the IDF to Iight there, how many lives would be lost, and how rapidly the Kassam crews
would reassert themselves the moment the army pulled back.
His recipe would be to ratchet up the constraints on Hamas - to keep border crossings closed, to
drastically reduce Iuel and electricity supplies, to prevent the Palestinian Authority Irom sending in
Iunds which wind up in Hamas hands.
He supports any mustering oI pressure on Egypt to change its behavior at the border and work seriously
to prevent the massive, ongoing smuggling oI arms into the Strip and the departure oI Hamas activists
Ior terror training. Hence the security establishment's recent dispatch oI video Iootage to the United
States documenting Egypt's complicity - a move, as Iirst reported in The Jerusalem Post last week,
designed to alert American leaders to Cairo's Iailures, and thus to condition at least some oI the annual
American aid package to Egypt on more serious eIIorts to close down the smuggling tunnels and
properly seal the border.
As Ior the West Bank, Ashkenazi takes seriously the prospect oI Hamas replicating its Gaza takeover
there. Indeed, like the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), the IDF was not surprised by the ease with
which Hamas Iighters deIeated the US-trained Fatah Iorces in Gaza, recognizing the greater motivation
oI the Islamists and the weakness and lack oI loyalty and accountability in the Fatah hierarchy post-
AraIat. When it comes to internal Palestinian conIlict, runs the cold IDF assessment, the Fatah gunmen
don't know how to kill or be killed.
Ashkenazi's message to the political echelon is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas
and his relative moderates in the PA survive only because the IDF maintains Iull Ireedom oI movement
in the West Bank and can thus thwart the threat oI the Islamists. Pulling back the IDF, ostensibly to
help Abbas, would have the opposite eIIect.
Aides to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert determinedly talk up the successes in Nablus oI the PA's latest
small-scale police deployments, express growing satisIaction about improved cooperation with PA
security commanders, and thus speak optimistically about the possibilities, in time, Ior Israel to start to
withdraw Irom the Iorward positions it has maintained since the outbreak oI the second intiIada seven
years ago and to relinquish territory to PA control. The assessment in Ashkenazi's IDF, by contrast, is
that while Israel has every interest in creating the conditions Ior improved relations with Abbas's PA, a
signiIicant IDF pullback in 2008 is plain unthinkable, that the PA Iorces are anything but capable oI
imposing security, and that a premature handover oI control would render both the PA and Israel
vulnerable to an upsurge in Islamic terrorism.
IF ASHKENAZI and Olmert seem a distance apart in weighing PA security capabilities, they may see
more eye-to-eye when it comes to Syria. Olmert and his aides have Ior weeks been highlighting Israel's
readiness Ior renewed talks. And in notable contrast to US President George W. Bush's recent
declaration that he ran out oI patience with President Bashar Assad "a long time ago," Olmert took
pains to praise Assad Ior sending a representative to last month's Annapolis conIerence.
Ashkenazi well recognizes the immense potential beneIits oI separating Syria Irom its alliance with
Iran - including the consequent isolation oI Teheran, the weakening oI Hizbullah, the blow to terror
groups and the positive repercussions in Iraq - and believes that Assad may be responsive to economic
leverage. While the US has been too ready to maintain its huge Iinancial aid to the Egyptians, it may be
overly reluctant, in Ashkenazi's thinking, to contemplate drawing in the Syrians via economic leverage.
Assad, aIter all, is waging a constant struggle Ior survival, and might not be averse to American
economic overtures with tremendous potential domestic beneIits.
It is worth noting at this point that the idea oI Damascus being wooable is Iar Irom unanimously
accepted. For one thing, it is hard to reconcile the image oI a potentially Iriendly Syria with the Iact
that the "Arab Center Ior the Studies oI Arid Zones and Dry Lands" constituted so proIound and
immediate a threat as to have prompted Israel's high-risk bombing raid three-and-a-halI months ago.
For another, the critics suggest that there's too much wishIul thinking and not enough Iact to justiIy the
assessment that Syria might Iorsake its longstanding alliance with the ever-more powerIul Iran in Iavor
oI a new, untested partnership with an America that is plainly in Middle East retreat.
NEEDLESS TO say, as Ashkenazi prepares the IDF to deIend Israel in a region characterized by
growing instability and Iurther potential deterioration, Iran stands out as the key existential threat.
The US National Intelligence Estimate oI Iran's nuclear weapons program, with its headline-making
assertion that Teheran halted such activities in 2003, is, to put it mildly, not shared in the Israeli
military establishment. And it has not impacted Israel's own intelligence estimates.
IDF thinking is that Iran is vulnerable to outside pressures and can be stopped short oI military action.
But iI all else Iails, Israel would have to act and could act, though no-one should delude themselves that
this would involve a repeat oI the single-strike bombing oI Saddam Hussein's Osirak Iacility in 1981.
Stopping Iran militarily would require not a one-oII action, but a sustained campaign.
Such an action, given Iran's capacity Ior retaliation and the colossal regional implications, is almost
unthinkable. Ashkenazi's ambition is to so revive both Israel's deterrent capability, and its credibility
with its allies regarding the nature oI the Iranian threat, as to help create the international circumstances
in which military intervention against Iran becomes unnecessary.
OI course, iI he were able to achieve that, we'd happily laud him as our man oI the decade.
U.S. Courts North Korea's Army
New Strategy Recognizes
Military's Pivotal Role
In Nuclear Disarmament
By JAY SOLOMON
December 29, 2007; Page A3
WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration, worried that the North Korean military may block
advances in disarmament negotiations, has started an unusual campaign to reach out directly to the
communist state's army leaders.
The new strategy comes as Pyongyang is expected to miss an important deadline Monday requiring the
North to Iully declare its nuclear assets and programs, including the believed pursuit oI uranium-
enrichment technologies.
But the White House is still expected to provide North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il more time to meet
his commitments. And the U.S. continues to support expanding cultural engagement, such as a
scheduled February perIormance in Pyongyang by the New York Philharmonic.
"What is important to us is that when we do get the declaration, whatever day it is, it needs to be Iull
and complete," State Department spokesman Tom Casey said Friday.
Senior-level engagement between the American and North Korean militaries has been signiIicantly
limited during the past seven years. Senior U.S. oIIicials say their new outreach to the Korean People's
Army, or KPA, stems Irom their knowledge that Pyongyang's military ultimately controls the majority
oI North Korea's nuclear assets and installations. These American oIIicials also say their eIIorts are
driven by a lack oI certainty over whether North Korea's generals would even honor a request by Mr.
Kim Ior them to turn over nuclear weapons.
"Would the military back Kim Jong Il iI he truly wants to give away the program? That's the bottom-
line question," said a U.S. oIIicial working on disarmament issues. "Maybe |Mr. Kim| doesn't have
control oI the military."
The oIIicial and other North Korea analysts say the KPA has the most to lose iI Pyongyang agrees to
destroy its nuclear weapons stock. Their development provides the KPA with leverage over the U.S.
and Japan, and entrenches the military as the elite power center inside North Korea. Without nuclear
weapons, the KPA and North Korea would have only a marginal proIile internationally, these oIIicials
say, and Washington needs to make clear there are other ways Ior North Korea to prosper.
The U.S. outreach to the North Korean military has come during a number oI recent negotiating
sessions between Washington and Pyongyang.
|Kim Jong Il|
American diplomats say they have speciIically requested Irom North Korea's Foreign Ministry the
attendance oI senior KPA oIIicers at these meetings. And U.S. oIIicials also say they have been
mindIul to place American military oIIicers, including a two-star general, on most oI their diplomatic
missions as a signal to Pyongyang that Washington seeks increased military-to-military engagement.
So Iar, however, these oIIicials say, North Korean diplomats have rebuked Washington's requests,
citing the Foreign Ministry's preeminence in the denuclearization talks. "We need more buy-in Irom
their military," said a senior U.S. oIIicial pushing this engagement with the KPA. "The military
remains the big question mark Ior us."
ConIidence-building measures are another tool the Bush administration is using to try to soIten the
North Korean military's hostility to the denuclearization process.
Even as the negotiations continue, North Korea's state-owned media have regularly broadcast
propaganda suggesting the Pentagon is using nuclear disarmament as a pretext Ior a Iull-scale invasion
oI the North. Pyongyang's Korean Central News Agency reported this week that the "dialogue
advertised by the U.S. while seeking conIrontation is, in Iact, nothing but a military option to disarm its
dialogue partner mentally and mount a surprise preemptive attack."
The planned New York Philharmonic perIormance in Pyongyang is seen as one way Washington can
soIten its image inside North Korea, say U.S. diplomats. The orchestra is speciIically expected to play
the "Star Spangled Banner" and other symbols oI American culture traditionally demonized by the
North. North Korean diplomats view the coming visit oI the large U.S. delegation to Pyongyang as a
tool with which it can appeal to hard-liners in the KPA and Korean Workers' Party about Washington's
intentions, according to U.S. oIIicials.
Lower-level interaction between the U.S. and North Korean militaries occur regularly along the
demilitarized zones that still divide North and South Korea. The Pentagon and KPA have also
cooperated on searches Ior U.S. soldiers missing since the 1950-53 Korean War. But the last senior-
level engagement came in October 2000 when Mr. Kim dispatched one oI the KPA's top three oIIicers,
Vice Marshal Cho Myong Rok, to the White House to hold direct talks with President Bill Clinton.
Vice Marshal Cho carried a personal letter Irom Mr. Kim to Mr. Clinton inviting him to visit
Pyongyang. And the two sides signed a nonaggression statement that many in Pyongyang's military
viewed as a prelude to a Iormal peace treaty ending the Korean War, according to U.S. and South
Korean oIIicials. Secretary oI State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang weeks later, and Mr. Clinton
seriously considered going as well beIore his term expired.
Just months later, however, the detente between Washington and Pyongyang Iaded with the
inauguration oI President Bush, who later designated North Korea a member oI an "axis oI evil,"
including Iraq and Iran. This diplomatic U-turn made many in the KPA particularly skeptical about
Washington's long-term strategic intentions, say U.S. intelligence oIIicials.
Despite Pyongyang's recent negative rhetoric, U.S. oIIicials say North Korea has actually been
proactive in disabling the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, another key requirement oI the disarmament pace.
But North Korea appears to be stalling in declaring all its nuclear assets and programs. Pyongyang has
denied in six-party talks that it secretly developed a uranium-enrichment program to produce Iissile
material alongside the Yongbyon Iacility, as Washington has charged. And Pyongyang also has denied
aiding third countries, such as Syria, in developing nuclear power or weapons programs.
A speciIic dispute has already emerged between the U.S. and North Korea over the testing oI an
aluminum tube provided by Pyongyang to international inspectors. According to a U.S.
counterproliIeration oIIicial, the tube tested positive Ior contamination with a Iissile material,
suggesting it may have been used in uranium-enrichment work. The oIIicial said it was possible the
tube was contaminated beIore being shipped to North Korea but Pyongyang hasn't been Iorthcoming
about the source.
The U.S. is also pushing Ior clarity on North Korea's suspected cooperation with Syria in developing
weapons oI mass destruction. Israeli aircraIt struck a Syrian Iacility in September near the Euphrates
river, and American oIIicials say intelligence showed a signiIicant number oI North Korean personnel
working at the site going back years. These U.S. oIIicials say they're not certain that Pyongyang was
aiding Damascus in developing a nuclear reactor but that the North Koreans need to account Ior their
activities in the Middle East.
"The North Koreans usually say: Let's just talk about the Iuture not the past," said the U.S.
counterproliIeration oIIicial.
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Off the Terror List
December 29, 2007; Page A10
North Korea promised that by December 31 it would declare its nuclear programs and dismantle its
Iacilities. So dictator Kim Jong Il celebrated the holidays by suggesting Wednesday he might slow
down disabling nuclear plants iI the world's Santas didn't deliver "promised" economic aid to his
doorstep. He may welcome the New Year by stiIIing the U.S. yet again.
As part oI this deal, the U.S. has agreed to consider removing North Korea Irom its list oI state
sponsors oI terrorism. Under U.S. law, such removal would be contingent on the President certiIying to
Congress that North Korea hasn't provided support Ior international terrorism during the preceding six-
month period. Chris Hill, the chieI U.S. negotiator, said that "We will Iollow the letter oI the law in that
regard."
II so, we hope he takes a close look at a report just out Irom the Congressional Research Service.
Written by Larry Niksch and Raphael Perl, the report cites "reputable sources" as saying North Korea
has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in
recent months, both terrorist organizations.
The CRS report cites a French online journal, Paris Intelligence Review, which last year published a
detailed account oI what it described as an extensive program by Pyongyang to give arms and training
to Hezbollah. The aid included instruction by North Korean trainers in the development oI underground
Iacilities Ior storing arms, Iood and medical installations. This, the French journal said, signiIicantly
improved Hezbollah's ability to Iight Israel in the 2006 war.
For Iurther evidence oI a possible North Korea-Hezbollah link, CRS reIerences an article published last
month in the South Korean newspaper, Joon Ang Ilbo. According to Moon Chung-in, a proIessor at
Yonsei University and an expert on security issues, the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, believes
that North Korea was the source oI "vital missile components" Ior Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The researchers also note reports in September in the Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun oI North Korean
arms shipments to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. According to Sankei, North Korea made several
attempts this year and last to deliver machine guns, automatic riIles and anti-tank rocket launchers to
the Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lankan navy intercepted several North Korean ships carrying the arms,
Sankei reported, sinking two oI the vessels, capturing North Korean crew members and seizing some
arms.
The CRS paper concludes that iI the Administration doesn't address the reports oI North Korean
support oI Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers -- and, we'll add, even more disturbing reports oI nuclear aid
to Syria -- it could "damage the integrity" oI the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terror. It could also "limit
the ability" oI the U.S. to deal with "what appears" to be a "rising level oI North Korean support Ior
international terror groups."
It is very worth noting that South Korea's President-elect, Lee Myung-bak, who takes oIIice in
February, has pledged to get tough on the North. Mr. Bush might have a talk with this new partner
about a world in which we make concessions to North Korea, and they -- still -- do nothing to change
their intentions.
U.S. intelligence act digs deeper into North Korea's nuclear activities
2007/12/31 03:31 KST
WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 (Yonhap) -- As members oI the six-nation talks on denuclearizing
North Korea toil to get the country to completely disclose its nuclear stockpile, U.S. Congress plans to
dig deeper into exactly what the stockpile contains, and into Iresh suspicions oI North Korea-Syria
nuclear connections.
The Intelligence Authorization Act Ior Iiscal year 2008 limits relevant U.S. Iund appropriations
until each member oI the congressional intelligence committees has been "Iully and currently
inIormed" about the Israeli strike oI a Syrian Iacility, allegedly a nuclear-related installation that North
Korea was helping to equip.
The legislation also requires the director oI national intelligence to submit at least one report
within Iiscal year 2008 detailing the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, Iollowed by two
reports in Iiscal year 2009.
The House passed the intelligence act on Dec. 13 Iollowing a conIerence committee meeting with
the Senate, a process in which the two chambers discuss and agree on any amendments.
North Korea appears most likely to miss the Monday deadline to submit a declaration listing all
oI its nuclear materials and programs, plus any proliIeration activities. The declaration is a key part oI a
six-nation agreement aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, committed to by South and North
Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan.
The true extent oI Pyongyang's nuclear activities, however, remains hazy, including how much
Iissile material it produced and how much oI it has been converted to atomic weapons. It's also unclear
whether the country was able to enrich uranium, an alternative to plutonium in making weapons, and
whether it transIerred any oI its arms or technology to other nations.
The report Irom the House-Senate conIerence indicated concerns by Congress over allegations oI
North Korea's nuclear cooperation with Syria.
Israel on Sept. 6 struck a Syrian site, claiming it was a nuclear Iacility being built with North
Korea's assistance. Both Pyongyang and Damascus have denied any atomic collaboration.
The section on limiting Iund appropriations was added at the House-Senate conIerence. It
prohibits expenditure to less than 30 percent oI authorized amount until "the Iull membership oI the
congressional intelligence committees are Iully and currently inIormed about an important intelligence
matter," the conIerence report says.
The inIormation provided should include whether any agent or citizen Irom North Korea or other
countries was present at the Syrian site, and any intelligence the U.S. obtained on the matter Irom
Ioreign governments, it says.
The initial version oI the act required a quarterly report Irom the national intelligence director on
North Korea and Iran, but this was reduced in Irequency in response to a request Irom the director to
lessen the number oI reports required by legislators.
The intelligence reports on North Korea and Iran should include assessments oI their nuclear
weapons programs, evaluation oI the sources on which those assessments are based, and discussion oI
any dissents or caveats that would reduce conIidence in the assessments.
Although the Irequency oI the reports was reduced, the lawmakers "otherwise concur that it is
essential that the intelligence community places a high priority on reporting to Congress on nuclear
developments in Iran and North Korea," the conIerence report says.
ldmyna.co.kr
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-paciIic/7166581.stm
Real test looms for N Korea
By Aidan Foster-Carter
Korea analyst
Published: 2008/01/01 15:54:37 GMT
North Korea has missed another nuclear deadline.
Under a deal reached in February 2007, the North Korean regime oI Kim Jong-il had agreed to do two
things by December 31: disable its Yongbyon reactor site, and provide a Iull declaration oI all its
nuclear activities.
But the year ended with work still incomplete at Yongbyon - and stony silence Irom Pyongyang.
The two Ds are diIIerent. Yongbyon was already closed down since July, and the US team supervising
its disabling reported Iull local cooperation.
North Korea has evidently decided to sacriIice these ageing Iacilities - a cause oI concern Ior almost 20
years - now that they have done their job and given Kim the bomb, as seen in October 2006's small
nuclear test.
Deja vu is unavoidable. Under the Clinton-era 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, Yongbyon
was sealed - but not disabled - until late 2002, when the Bush administration accused North Korea oI
running a separate covert nuclear programme based on highly enriched uranium (HEU).
In an escalating row, North Korea expelled International Atomic Energy Agency monitors and restarted
the site, producing more plutonium and so enabling 2006's nuclear test.
Disabling Yongbyon now - with Iull dismantlement as a Iuture Iinal stage - is meant to ensure no
repetition by putting it beyond use (to borrow a term Irom Northern Ireland).
The current delay seems mainly technical. To extract and remove some 8,000 Iuel rods at this decrepit
Iacility simply could not be done saIely by year-end.
However, there are now hints that recently Pyongyang has slowed the process due to reported
dissatisIaction with what it is - or is not - getting by way oI rewards Ior its co-operation.
This puzzles the other Iive nations involved in the six-party process - China, the US, South Korea,
Japan and Russia.
Most have sent heavy Iuel oil and other energy aid, as an agreed quid pro quo.
Only Tokyo reIuses, as it still demands a Iull account oI the Iate oI Japanese abducted by North Korea
in the 1970s and 1980s.
Pyongyang regards that issue as closed, and relations are at rock bottom.
North Korea also wants to come oII the US State Department's list oI countries accused oI supporting
terrorism, and an end to long-standing US sanctions.
Both were speciIied in last February's breakthrough, but the US reckons Mr Kim has not yet done
enough.
While Japan opposes any delisting unless the abductions are cleared up, Washington would not let that
objection be a deal-breaker iI all else were going smoothly. But it is not.
Three cruxes
The real problem is the nuclear declaration. At least three cruxes may be holding this up.
One is the North's alleged enriched uranium programme. Though the US is now unsure how Iar this
had got, it has prooI oI purchases Irom Pakistan's rogue nuclear entrepreneur Dr AQ Khan.
Those transactions need explaining.
A new worry is the Syrian connection. In September Israel bombed a mystery Iacility there, widely
rumoured to involve nuclear cooperation with North Korea (though both deny this).
With nuclear proliIeration to the Middle East a double red line Ior the US, Washington has to know the
Iull truth on this - and be absolutely assured there will be no Iuture repetition, anywhere.
Above all, there is the $64,000 question: how many bombs and how much plutonium does Mr Kim
have, where are they, and will he give them up as did Libya's Muammar GaddaIi?
Coming clean
On each oI these three issues there is a clash oI systems.
North Korea is a pathologically secret state, even on everyday matters.
Coming clean simply does not come naturally.
And nuclear weapons are Mr Kim's sole trump card.
Unlike Mr GaddaIi, he has no oil or other resources to parlay.
The Libyan route is hugely risky Ior him.
Military hardliners in the Korean People's Army (KPA) would see it as surrender.
With Mr Kim turning 66 in February and no successor in place, any wrong move could cause political
turmoil in Pyongyang.
George W Bush's problem is diIIerent.
He is desperate to leave oIIice with a Ioreign policy success to balance Iraq and AIghanistan, hence last
year's U-turn to engage North Korea.
But any deal has to be credible to a hostile Congress, and Republican hawks who remain deeply
suspicious oI a regime which Mr Bush once notoriously called part oI an "axis oI evil."
No more Bart
Hence heavyweights like Henry Kissinger have been wheeled out to meet North Koreans in New York,
reinIorcing the message stressed by the tireless chieI US negotiator, assistant secretary oI state
Christopher Hill.
But personal rapport may not be enough.
Mr Bush even sent Mr Kim a direct letter, urging timely IulIilment oI obligations already agreed to.
The point they are all emphasising is that what might be called North Korea's stock, Bart Simpson
riposte - nobody saw me/didn't do it/can't prove a thing - will not wash this time.
On uranium enrichment, on Syria, on the nuclear stockpile - on all these the US and others need more
than some pro Iorma story.
This has to be the real deal, or the six-party process becomes a charade.
What iI Pyongyang stays silent? The process can brook a certain amount oI delay.
Yongbyon's closure last year was three months late, owing to the complexities oI unwinding a
disagreement over a bank.
Similarly, a couple oI months' technical hitch in disabling Yongbyon is no problem.
But the nuclear declaration is another matter.
By February or March, silence or recalcitrance Irom Pyongyang will put the other Iive on the spot.
By then, too, South Korea will have a new president: Lee Myung-bak, who takes oIIice on 25 February
aIter his landslide win in December's election.
A moderate conservative, Lee plans to strengthen ties with the US.
Unlike his liberal predecessor Roh Moo-hyun, Lee says he will make Seoul's aid to the North
conditional on Iull nuclear compliance.
Back to the future
That could alter the balance in the six-party process. Initially, an "axis oI carrot" troika - China, Russia
and South Korea - oIIset a hardline US and Japan, beIore Mr Bush's switch to engagement leIt Tokyo
isolated.
But iI Pyongyang is deIiant, the US, Japan and South Korea may all resume their traditional role as
sceptical iI not hostile, ranged against China and Russia too playing their old Cold War parts as Mr
Kim's big brothers and (albeit reluctant) deIenders.
A year hence, regime change in Washington will add a Iurther twist.
Mr Kim may procrastinate in hopes oI a Democrat victory, as he did in 2004 hoping John Kerry would
deIeat Mr Bush.
But he is mistaken iI he imagines this would bring a soIter US line.
As so oIten beIore, in theory the ball is in North Korea's court.
But iI Mr Kim reIuses or tries to Iudge his nuclear declaration, that lobs the problem back to his
interlocutors.
At the end oI the day, none oI them - not even a tetchy Japan - is in any mood or position to back up
hostile words with deeds.
Unless China Iinally loses patience, a nuclear North Korea may be here to stay - Ior as long as Mr Kim
and his rebarbative regime survive.
Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research Iellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds
University
http://www.Ioreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyid4116
What America Must Do: Jessica T. Mathews
Foreign Policy Passport
Jan 1, 2008
Jessica T. Mathews tells FP why its time to talk to Syria.
[EXCERPT]
FP: What do you make oI the news blackout on the Israeli attack on Syria in September? Is it, as recent
analysis has suggested, that iI there were a connection between North Korea and Syria, the White
House wants it buried simply because it wants the North Korean deal to stick?
JTM: I think thats probably true, but there are other reasons why they would want to keep it quiet. The
Israeli move is illegal under international law and IAEA |rules|, and I think the |Bush| administration
probably doesnt want to have that discussed.
Whats more extraordinary is the Iact that it stayed a secret in Israel, where nothing generally stays a
secret among people-in-the-know Ior longer than about two days. I think that the Israelis did Ieel a
threat and had credible intelligence, but I think their desire to reestablish their existential deterrent,
which was badly damaged by their military Iailings in the war in Lebanon, was very important to them.
Israel really depends on a belieI in their incredibly potent military Iorce that can do anything. I think
that when Gen. |Ehud| Barak came back into the government, his No. 1 assignment was to Iind a way
to repair the damage that the war did to the Israeli DeIense Forces reputation. That had everything to
do with this raid.
Jessica T. Mathews is president oI the Carnegie Endowment Ior International Peace.
http://www.investors.com/editorial/editorialcontent.asp?secid1501&statusarticle&id284167992830766
EDITORIALS & OPINION
Out On A Kim
INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY
Posted 1/2/2008
North Korea: The communist regime has missed a deadline in the agreed-to process to shut down its
nuclear weapons program. Sadly, it's exactly what we've come to expect Irom Pyongyang.
The Democratic People's Republic oI Korea was supposed to have disabled its nuclear complex at
Yongbyon and reported the details oI its atomic weapons program by Dec. 31. As oI Wednesday
morning, the second day oI the new year, it had done neither.
Less than a month ago, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, chieI U.S. envoy to the six-party
talks on North Korea's nuclear arms program, expressed conIidence that the Yongbyon Iacility, shut
down in July, would be disabled by the deadline. A U.S. team was on the ground supervising the
project and Pyongyang was reportedly cooperating.
It seemed Hill was not as conIident, however, regarding North Korea making a Iull and honest
declaration about its program. He telegraphed his concerns by publicly insisting that Pyongyang's
disclosures must be "complete and correct" and hold "no surprises."
Apparently he should have been uneasy about both.
It was nearly one year ago, in February 2007, when high-living North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il
agreed to the arrangement, which included aid to the DPRK, primarily heavy Iuel oil, and improved
diplomatic relations with nations that had cut or cooled their ties to Pyongyang.
He can't say he has not had enough time to comply.
Yes, disabling a nuclear Iacility is complicated and laborious. In particular the saIe removal oI Iuel rods
has great potential to cause delays. But Kim's regime has shown that it cannot be trusted; concern that it
might be dragging its Ieet to extract more concessions Irom the U.S. and other nations involved in the
talks is justiIiable.
One oI the rewards Pyongyang is likely seeking is North Korea's removal Irom the State Department's
list oI terrorist-sponsoring nations. But that should have to wait until basic changes have been made in
North Korea's government. There can be no Iaith put in the word oI Kim nor in those at the highest
levels oI his regime.
For instance, even while Kim was supposed to be cleaning up his nuclear weapons mess, it's possible
perhaps even probable that North Korea was involved with Syria in some sort oI nuclear
weapons program. Israel did not Ily into Syria in September to bomb an aspirin or "baby milk" Iactory.
The U.S. response to the missed deadline was right out oI the State Department's pantry oI milquetoast
statements. "We think it's possible Ior the North Koreans to provide a Iull and complete declaration,
and we hope they will do that as soon as possible," just doesn't have the bite it should have.
There is the Irightening possibility that Kim is looking beyond having his regime removed Irom the
State Department list oI terrorist-sponsoring states and stalling until he can Iill out a potent nuclear
arsenal. It would Iit his history oI Iailing to keep promises.
With that in mind, the White House needs to engage in tough diplomacy with North Korea, even iI the
other nations in the talks South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, none oI whom would be
comIortable with a nuclear-armed North Korea seem unwilling to do the same. Decisive U.S.
leadership, as it oIten does, will go a long way in this case.
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/01/our-view-on-nuc.html
Our view on nuclear diplomacy: N. Korea misses a deadline
Dont get too tough, too Iast on paranoid regime.
Posted at 12:21 AM/ET, January 03, 2008 in Foreign AIIairs - Asia - Editorial, Nuclear weapons -
Editorial, Politics - Editorial, Politics, Government - Editorial, USA TODAY
Besides the ball dropping in Times Square, something else important was supposed to happen by
midnight Dec. 31. The North Korean regime oI Kim Jong Il had promised to provide a Iull accounting
oI all its neIarious nuclear activities. Kim, being less reliable than the ball, missed the deadline. While
that's no cause Ior celebration, nor is it reason Ior overreaction.
Kim's nuclear pledge last year was seen as a rare Ioreign policy breakthrough. In return Ior coming
clean, and as he delivers in dismantling his main nuclear Iacilities at Yongbyon under U.S. supervision,
he is gradually being given a range oI rewards. Those include Iuel Ior his impoverished people, nuclear
reactors Ior electricity and less hostility Irom the United States.
The missed deadline raises the specter oI a new crisis and gives ammunition to hawks who say that
negotiating with Kim's bizarre regime is pointless. Certainly, iI Kim continues to stall, he should be
denied the Iood, Iuel, technology and international respect he craves.
For the moment, however, the Bush administration has had an appropriately low-key, skeptical
response to the latest delay. Earlier this year, North Korea missed a deadline to start dismantling the
Yongbyon Iacility, but the process eventually went Iorward.
What is important is that Kim accounts Ior nuclear weapons and Iuel made so Iar at Yongbyon;
whether he has an illicit uranium program, as the United States suspects; and how much help he has
given to other rogue regimes, including Libya, Iran and possibly Syria.
To keep North Korea on track requires a mixture oI sticks and carrots Irom the countries involved in
"six-party talks" (China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, the United States and North Korea). In the past,
Kim has been adept at playing Ior time and sowing dissension. South Korea has been particularly
enabling, but it now has a new president who wants to no longer be soIt on North Korea. The role oI
China, its inIluential communist neighbor, is particularly important.
Dealing with North Korea can be inIuriating. Kim likes to play psychological chicken to wring extra
concessions.
Finding the right levers isn't easy. At times, they can be mind-bogglingly petty, given how much is at
stake. Kim granted concessions, Ior example, aIter his Iunds oI several million dollars Ior luxury goods
were unIrozen. His Iather warmed up to personal diplomacy Irom Jimmy Carter, who says they bonded
over Ily-Iishing. So President Bush's recent gambit oI sending a letter to Kim holds more promise than
earlier bluster about North Korea being part oI the "axis oI evil."
Threatening North Korea and isolating it even more has a tendency to push this paranoid power to
more desperate actions. II Kim continues to Ilout deadlines, ratcheting up the pressure will become
necessary. As the new year begins, however, patience and persistence are the best approaches.
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/01/opposing-view-a.html?locinterstitialskip
Opposing view: A diplomatic charade
Unseemly talks with Kim Jong II pose security threat to U.S., allies.
By Nicholas Eberstadt
Posted at 12:20 AM/ET, January 03, 2008 in Foreign AIIairs - Asia - Editorial, Nuclear weapons -
Editorial, Politics - Editorial, Politics, Government - Editorial, USA TODAY
Once and Ior all: Can we please stop pretending that Kim Jong Il is negotiating with us in good Iaith?
The only surprise about North Korea's latest missed deadline and broken promise in the ongoing
"six-party talks" is Washington's seemingly unending tolerance Ior this diplomatic masquerade.
Well into the IiIth year oI negotiations on denuclearizing North Korea, what tangible results do our
arms control conIerees have to show Ior their eIIorts? Only a temporary shutdown oI the North's
Yongbyon plutonium Iacility. (State Department happy-talk notwithstanding, that Iacility has not yet
been Iully "disabled," much less "dismantled.")
What about the covert uranium enrichment program, whose exposure back in 2002 triggered today's
nuclear drama in the Iirst place? Pyongyang still oIIicially denies its very existence. Indeed, breaking
pledges signed last February, North Korea has not yet even bothered to oIIer an accounting oI its past
nuclear activities to its "negotiating partners" (China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United
States).
Our response to that violation has been, yes, a request Ior more talks! In the no-penalty wonderland oI
conIerence diplomacy, it would appear Kim Jong Il can blow us oII whenever he wants conIident
we'll always shuIIle back to the table. But the unseemly charade oI denuclearization negotiations with
North Korea is worse than an embarrassment. It is, in Iact, compromising the security oI America and
her allies.
During the six-party talks, the North Korean government continued to amass plutonium Ior weapons.
Over those same years, Pyongyang went Irom hinting it had nuclear weapons, to explicitly declaring it
possessed nukes, to test-blasting a nuclear weapon.
Viewed without illusion, these vaunted denuclearization talks with North Korea have in practice
provided diplomatic cover Ior Pyongyang to achieve its long-desired status as a nuclear weapons state.
And, by the way, any American oIIicial who thinks Kim Jong Il wouldn't dare sell his nuclear wares
abroad is oII in a dream world.
The Bush team apparently has no benchmarks Ior Iailure in its nuke talks with Pyongyang so the
conIerencing continues. But it continues at our peril.
Nicholas Eberstadt, a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author oI The North Korean
Economy Between Crisis and Catastrophe.
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cIm?storyid10441641&CFID
Nuclear North Korea
Eerie silence
Jan 3rd 2008
SEOUL AND TOKYO
From The Economist print edition
Golly: the Dear Leader won't come clean about his bombs
ANOTHER deadline, another disappointment. Last February North Korea agreed with Iour oI its
neighbours and the United States to give up its ambitions as a nuclear power in return Ior lashings oI
aid and rehabilitation Irom its standing as an international pariah. Crucial to the deal was North Korea's
subsequent promise to declare all its nuclear activities by December 31st. The deadline came. It went.
From Pyongyang, not a squeak.
Though hardly out oI keeping Ior such a secretive, recalcitrant regime, the silence has generated
unease, even embarrassment, among North Korea's counterparts in the six-party talks hosted by China,
which, typically, described the hold-up as natural. But the administration oI President George Bush
reversed a once hostile policy in the past year in an attempt to prove that engagement with North
Korea, even aIter it let oII a nuclear bomb, could work. America's patience will have limits.
For now it will not sound the alarm. AIter all, an earlier part oI the deal, the closure oI the Soviet-era
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in July, came three months later than promised. Since then American
inspectors have moved into Yongbyon to see that it is disabled and eventually dismantled. December
31st was also meant to be the deadline Ior Yongbyon's disablement, which was missed as well. But this
week America was at pains to stress North Korean technical co-operation. II anything, it said, the delay
was because oI its own insistence that due care be taken in removing the thousands oI Iuel rods Irom
the ageing reactor.
A Iew weeks' delay in the declaration oI North Korea's nuclear programmes would be tolerable. Any
longer and the six-party process would be in trouble. For the nuclear programmes are the crux oI the
matter. Declaring them was never going to come easily to Kim Jong Il, North Korea's Dear Leader.
His nuclear weapons, however Iew and Ieeble, provide his only leverage against the world. Yet
America is unlikely to stand Ior any bluIInot least because oI suspicions that a Syrian site bombed by
Israel in September was a nuclear Iacility that had North Korean help.
The questions now are not only how much plutonium North Korea has extracted and how many
warheads it has made. The Bush administration also wants to know the scale oI the programme to
enrich uranium to which North Korea admitted in 2002. Earlier claims by America about its scale seem
exaggerated; still, it has evidence that Pakistan's nuclear racketeer, Abdul Qadeer Khan (see article),
sold the North uranium-enriching gear.
Hitherto, those in the six-party talks have given North Korea the beneIit oI the doubt: only Japan has
been openly sceptical about the North's sincerityat least until it has come clean about the Japanese
kidnapped by the regime in the 1970s and 1980s. Now Mr Kim may Iace a hardening oI the ranks.
However badly Mr Bush needs a Ioreign-policy success, he will not move towards normalising
relations with North Korea beIore nuclear progress. As Ior South Korea, President Roh Moo-hyun has
until now seen no evil; yet even his Ioreign minister now admits that dealing with a nuclear North
Korea is a Sisyphean task. What is more, Mr Roh steps down next month and his conservative
successor, Lee Myung-bak, is no Ian oI sunshine diplomacy. He promotes a harder line to the North:
aid and investment Irom Seoul should Iollow nuclear disablement.
Mr Kim may yet come clean on his programmes, and denuclearisation continue apace. II he doesn't, it
is not obvious what the world can do about it.
U.S. Should Focus More on N.Korean Plutonium
Updated Jan.7,2008 09:28 KST
In a statement issued by a Ioreign ministry spokesman, North Korea, which missed the end-2007
deadline to declare all oI its nuclear weapons and materials, claims it did prepare a list oI items to
declare and notiIied the U.S. in November oI last year. Since the U.S. says it has received no such
notice Irom the communist country, the comments sound like North Korea's way oI saying it has no
intention oI declaring its nuclear weapons and materials. Yet North Korea did not harshly criticize the
U.S. or present new demands.
The basic reason the North Korean nuclear situation has reached a stalemate is because North Korea
has Iailed to declare its nuclear weapons and materials. The problem has become more complicated
with North Korea denying the existence oI its uranium-enrichment program and allegations that it
transIerred nuclear technology to Syria. The Pakistani president and Pakistan's chieI nuclear scientist
have testiIied they transIerred uranium enrichment technology to North Korea. And a Syrian nuclear
Iacility that was destroyed in a bomb attack by Israeli Iorces is believed to bear a strong resemblance to
North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear Iacility. These are matters that will not be resolved simply by North
Korea denying them.
But Irom South Korea's perspective, these problems are not at the center oI the issue oI North Korea's
nuclear threat. Judging Irom various testimonies and North Korea's own admissions, it is very likely
true that North Korea did come up with a uranium enrichment program. But it will be realistically
impossible Ior the North to produce a nuclear bomb with enriched uranium because it does not have
enough electricity to do so. It is also doubtIul that North Korea would Ieel the need to proceed with the
uranium enrichment program since it is believed to have already processed quite a large amount oI
plutonium and produced nuclear bombs using it. This problem surrounding uranium has come to the
surIace and has been exaggerated due to diIIerences in opinion between hawks and doves within the
U.S. government, and now it seems that the issue may have degenerated into a war oI justiIication
between the two countries. Although it is important to Iind out whether North Korea did in Iact transIer
nuclear technology to Syria, at this point, such eIIorts, iI true, have been halted.
The central issues oI the North Korean nuclear threat are how much plutonium North Korea has
processed, how many bombs it has made using that material, how much plutonium it has leIt and where
it is keeping it. This is the core oI the problem that South Korea and the international community are
Iacing right now.
II the reports that North Korea notiIied the U.S. that it processed 30 kg oI plutonium are true, then this
is a truly serious situation. U.S. intelligence oIIicials believe North Korea has processed at least 50 kg
oI plutonium. II North Korea has scrapped only 30 kg and has hidden 20 kg somewhere, it can produce
several nuclear weapons at any time. II that's true, then we will end up with North Korea as a nuclear
power, rather than getting it to Iully scrap its nuclear programs and weapons. The U.S. must waste no
time in Iocusing on the real threat oI North Korea's plutonium and veriIy whether the communist
country has the will to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The issue oI enriched uranium can be
addressed later.
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePaciIic/wm1771.cIm
North Korea: Clouds Block the Sunshine at the Six-Party Talks
by Bruce Klingner
WebMemo #1771
January 10, 2008
North Korea's Iailure to meet yet another negotiating deadline raises more doubts about its commitment
to get rid oI its nuclear weapons. Other events oI recent weeks raise disturbing new questions about
U.S. policy toward North Korea. The Six-Party Talks have reached an impasse due to conIlicting
interpretations over the level oI detail Pyongyang must provide on its nuclear weapons programs, a
shortIall brought on by U.S. acquiescence to vague negotiating text. The most recent joint statement
called on North Korea to desist, disable, declare, and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. It
appears that Pyongyang has added deny, deceive, and delay to the mix. And it appears that U.S.
negotiators, in an attempt to shield the talks, concealed the Iact that North Korea made an inadequate
declaration.
The magnitude oI the dispute between the U.S. and North Korea over critical aspects oI the data
declaration will make it more diIIicult Ior diplomats to continue papering over diIIerences. Instead, the
U.S. and its allies must be resolute on insisting that North Korea declare the number oI nuclear
weapons and amount oI Iissile material that it has, as well as provide Iull transparency oI its uranium-
based weapons program and proliIeration activities. Six-Party Talks participants should withhold
additional economic or diplomatic beneIits Ior North Korea until it Iully complies with these
obligations and allows veriIication inspections. It would also be prudent to prepare contingency
measures, including the sanctions called Ior under U.N. Resolution 1718 and, in the longer term,
returning the nuclear impasse to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).
North Korea's Obligations
North Korea agreed in the October 2007 Six-Party Talks joint statement to "provide a complete and
correct declaration oI all its nuclear programs...by 31 December 2007." This requirement Iollowed its
February 2007 agreement to "discuss with other parties a list oI all its nuclear programs |within 60
days|."
Beyond violating the December 31 deadline, North Korea remains in deIiance oI U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1718 oI October 2006. In response to North Korea's nuclear weapons test that month, the
U.N. Security Council demanded that North Korea immediately rejoin the Non-ProliIeration Treaty and
comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear saIeguards. The UNSC also
decided that Pyongyang should "abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a
complete, veriIiable, and irreversible manner...|and provide| access to individuals, documentation,
equipments and Iacilities."
Conflicting Interpretations of Disclosure Requirements
The Six-Party Talks joint statements were Ilawed because they Iailed to delineate the extent oI North
Korea's data declaration requirements. The Bush Administration has stipulated that Pyongyang must
Iully disclose its nuclear weapons and Iissile material, the extent oI its program to covertly develop
uranium-based nuclear weapons, and any proliIeration activity with other nations.
North Korea claims it provided a complete nuclear declaration to the United States in November 2007,
one month beIore the deadline. Pyongyang's oIIicial statement, that it "has done what it should do,"
matches private statements to visiting oIIicials that it does not intend to provide more inIormation. At
that time, the expected deIiciencies in North Korea's declaration likely inIluenced the U.S. delegation
to decide against Iormally presenting the document at the next round oI negotiations, which would have
taken place in early December 2007. The need to keep sensitive details secret is understandable; but to
conceal the Iact that a declaration was made, and essentially negotiated, undermines the
Administration's credibility.
North Korean non-compliance is not a mere inconvenience or speed bump; it is a brick wall that should
halt Iurther progress until completely resolved. The data declaration deals with the core requirements oI
the Six-Party Talks process; namely, Iull denuclearization and transparency. Described in Iurther detail
below, Pyongyang may have already crossed the red line drawn by the Bush Administration on North
Korean nuclear proliIeration to other rogue nations.
Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, or Waiting for Godot?
It remains unknown whether North Korea's intransigence reIlects standard negotiating tactics or an
unwillingness to ever denuclearize. II the Iormer is the case, Pyongyang would be expected to raise the
price Ior its compliance by resurrecting previous demands such as light-water reactors or a non-
aggression pact. But the latter seems more likely. Throughout the negotiations, North Korean oIIicials
have indicated a goal oI gaining international recognition as a nuclear weapons state and giving up only
the capability oI producing nuclear weapons in the Iuture.
North Korea's deIiant posture marks a rejection oI Washington's eIIorts to get the regime to come clean
on its uranium weapons program. With the ball back in the U.S. court, two developments have
constrained Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill's negotiating room and increased skepticism
about the nuclear agreement: the exposure oI possible North Korean nuclear proliIeration to Syria, thus
crossing the U.S.-drawn red line; and the revelation that North Korean aluminum tube samples
contained uranium traces.
The big issue now is how low the U.S. will go to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks. The Bush
Administration, entering its Iinal year and longing Ior a Ioreign policy legacy, will be increasingly
tempted to accept Pyongyang's halI-hearted compliance as suIIicient justiIication to continue
negotiations. The Administration adopted a Iirmer line on the data declaration only Iollowing criticism
oI its stonewalling about possible North Korean nuclear proliIeration to Syria.
The U.S. may even claim suIIicient progress to justiIy providing all economic and diplomatic beneIits
called Ior in the joint statement and convening a meeting oI the Ioreign ministers. That course oI
action, however, risks undermining the potential to Iinally achieve a Iull denuclearization oI the Korean
Peninsula.
Verification: The Next Test
II the two sides are able to resolve the data declaration imbroglio, the next hurdle will be negotiating
suIIicient veriIication measures to prevent a recurrence oI North Korean cheating. Several months ago,
when there was still optimism over the Iorthcoming data declaration, a Bush Administration oIIicial
downplayed the need Ior strenuous veriIication: "Most oI it should be pretty quick iI it meshes with
U.S. Intelligence Community estimates." However, subsequent North Korean statements saying that it
had produced 30kg oI plutonium--signiIicantly less than U.S. Intelligence Community estimates oI
50kg--underscores the need Ior an extensive veriIication regime.
The Bush Administration, however, is unlikely to demand requisite veriIication measures without
outside pressure.
What the U.S. Should Do
The United States should take the Iollowing steps to induce North Korea to comply with its
commitments:
* Acknowledge the revised declaration when it is oIIered--however inadequate it may be.
* Avoid the past U.S. tendency to oIIer more beneIits in an attempt to break the logjam caused by
North Korean intransigence.
* Impose a hiatus on providing any additional economic or diplomatic beneIits. Six-Party Talks
meetings can continue, but they should not be "business as usual" until North Korea completes its
obligations.
* Do not remove North Korea Irom the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism until it has IulIilled all legal
requirements as well as admitted to previous terrorist acts. Reducing these issues to a nuclear
negotiating chip would trivialize human rights issues, including the Iate oI Japanese abductees.
* Insist on adequate monitoring requirements to veriIy the data declaration once it is provided. An
extensive veriIication protocol should include a suIIicient quota oI short-notice, "challenge" inspections
oI suspect sites.
* Request that President-elect Lee Myung-bak delineate and announce the linkages between South
Korea's ongoing and Iuture economic incentives and the concrete steps North Korea must take toward
nuclear compliance.
* Integrate South Korea's unilateral aid to North Korea into the conditionality oI multilateral Six-
Party Talks process. Also, any deal should include World Food Program monitoring standards to
ensure Pyongyang does not divert humanitarian assistance.
* Urge South Korea to impose conditionality not only on government-sponsored inter-Korean
projects but also on South Korean business ventures, including those proposed during the inter-Korean
summit.
* Call on China to impose conditionality in its economic engagement with North Korea, which is the
latter's primary source oI unconstrained Iinancial gains.
* Ask South Korea to join the ProliIeration Security Initiative.
* Implement U.N. Resolution 1718 sanctions against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, and
require North Korea and Syria to divulge the extent oI their nuclear cooperation.
* Maintain international law enIorcement measures against North Korean illicit activities. Sanctions
should be maintained until the behavior that triggered them has abated.
* Closely integrate U.S., South Korean, and Japanese initiatives toward North Korea to enhance
negotiating leverage and to secure Pyongyang's Iull denuclearization.
* Reject requests to convene a Ioreign ministers meeting or send a special presidential envoy to
resolve the impasse.
* II North Korea does not comply with its obligations within two months, bring the North Korean
nuclear issue back to the U.N. Security Council.
Conclusion
Six-Party Talks participants need an integrated plan to induce North Korea to comply with its
commitments. With the cut-oII oI unconditional aid and business activity, as well as Iunding Irom
illicit activities, North Korea would Iace a Iundamental choice between isolation and economic
stagnation or conditional engagement with beneIits. Negotiations cannot be open-ended and stationary,
since that would play to Pyongyang's goal oI deIerring international punishment and isolation.
Like an errant student, North Korea is handing in its research paper late and demands a passing grade.
The U.S. should insist that negotiators don't grade on a curve.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120001236110482565.html
COMMENTARY
North Korea's True Colors
By JOHN BOLTON
January 11, 2008; Page A11
There's more positive news Irom the Democratic Peoples Republic oI Korea: Its leaders have reIused to
make any Iurther disclosure concerning its nuclear programs.
How is this umpteenth violation oI the Feb. 13, 2006, agreement in the Six-Party Talks positive?
Because at a critical moment on a gravely important issue, North Korea has again shown its true colors,
thus providing the United States an opportunity to extricate itselI Irom this unwise and dangerous deal.
Troubles in the six-party talks on Korea emerged long beIore this most recent public maniIestation oI
Pyongyang's unwillingness to give up anything oI consequence concerning its nuclear program. Israel's
Sept. 6 raid against a likely Syrian-North Korea nuclear project was a Iire bell in the night that the
regime was up to its old tricks -- at least Ior anyone willing to listen. The administration's continuing
reIusal to allow Israel to make public the true nature oI this Iacility will only come back to haunt it, not
only on North Korea, but also on its Middle East policy. II no North Koreans were involved, why not
shout it out? II the Iacility was not nuclear, why not do the same? The signiIicance oI the Sept. 6 attack
has not Iaded in Congress, nor will the demands Ior more public disclosure.
In the aItermath oI the Feb. 13 agreement, North Korea had to develop a cover story Ior its uranium-
enrichment activities, as well as a way to conceal its stock oI plutonium and actual nuclear weapons.
And yet -- despite the seemingly active and continuing collaboration by the U.S. State Department in
coming up with a convincing line oI patter -- Pyongyang still insists it never engaged in uranium
enrichment, producing as evidence melted-down tubes. Melting the tubes was curious in and oI itselI,
suggesting that in their original Iorm they appeared much more like centriIuge equipment than artillery
barrels. The regime made a Iatal mistake, however, because the metal showed unmistakable traces oI
highly-enriched uranium (HEU).
Perhaps even the State Department's East Asia Bureau was shocked at this evidence oI North Korean
duplicity. In any event, the "dual use" dodge was now out oI play, and Pyongyang had to be persuaded
to come up with a more convincing cover story. Even this they have now reIused to do.
The timing is important, because elements within the U.S. intelligence community were questioning the
community's 2002 assessment that North Korea had launched a production-scope procurement eIIort
Ior enrichment equipment. This eIIort, similar in origin and intent to the recent National Intelligence
Estimate on Iran's nuclear program, may well have been sidetracked by the Iindings oI HEU, which at
least in part reinIorced the 2002 conclusions.
Moreover, whatever the North Korean declaration says about its nuclear activities -- assuming just Ior
sport that we actually get a declaration -- it was always only a Iirst step in a long process oI
veriIication, and not even the most important one. II North Korea and the State Department, working
together, can come up with something they think will pass the public smile test once it is released, we
still need to veriIy the accuracy and completeness oI the declaration. Here is where State has Iailed
most obviously: There has yet to be, 11 months aIter the Feb. 13 agreement, even a hint oI what
speciIic mechanisms will veriIy a declaration. Unless and until this vacuum is Iilled, we are going
nowhere Iast in denuclearizing North Korea.
So, as Kim Jong Il's hero, Lenin, used to say, "what is to be done?"
President Bush can now argue without Iear oI contradiction that he has done more than anyone could
expect to give Iantasy a chance, and thereIore make a policy course correction. North Korea has
dragged out its perIormance Ior nearly a year, has less and less incentive to make Mr. Bush look good,
and has in sight the possibility oI a resumed Clinton administration, or something even weaker. By
resuming a tough line on North Korea, Mr. Bush can at least make a Iuture administration's retreat Irom
a tougher, more realistic course, more diIIicult to explain.
Given the recent South Korean presidential election results, Mr. Bush will soon have a willing ally in
Lee Myung-bak, who will be inaugurated on Feb. 25. AIter 10 years, a realist will once again occupy
Seoul's Blue House, one who will support a tougher American line rather than oppose it.
Mr. Bush should meet with Mr. Lee as soon as practicable, and urge South Korea to join the
ProliIeration Security Initiative, a genuinely important Bush administration legacy. This will help
squeeze the North, by adding South Korea's considerable knowledge and capabilities in the waters
around the Korean Peninsula.
It will also reinIorce Japan's continuing tough line under Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda -- given
president-elect Lee's apparent willingness to conIront North Korea on its horriIying oppression oI its
own citizens and its international record oI kidnappings. II South Korea now joins with Japan in
pressing the North hard on the kidnappings, Japan is less likely to bend under State Department
pressure. This should certainly provide ample reason Ior the U.S. not to remove North Korea Irom the
list oI state sponsors oI terrorism Ior the remainder oI the Bush administration.
Aligning Japan and South Korea with the U.S. will allow President Bush to increase the pressure on
North Korea internationally by resuming Iinancial sanctions and other "deIensive measures." It would
also help put the spotlight back on China, which has the real economic leverage to Iorce a change in
North Korea's nuclear policy, iI it chose to exert it.
We are long past the point oI allowing China to cover Ior Kim Jong Il without any cost in its relations
with the U.S. Getting China to take concrete steps against North Korea's nuclear capabilities through
increased economic and political pressure would be a true diplomatic success Ior the Bush
administration in its waning days.
Hiding the evidence
Reconstruction effort at bombed Syrian site likely aimed at covering up evidence
Ronen Bergman
Published: 01.13.08, 15:01
Israel Opinion
A person who is closely Iamiliar with what happened in Syria back in September 2007 estimated
Saturday night that the renewed construction work at the bombed Syrian site is not a joint Syrian-North
Korean attempt to reestablish an atomic project through which Pyongyang aimed to supply Syrian
President Bashar Assad with nuclear weapons production means.

Rather, he estimated that the reconstruction work is part oI the eIIort to hide what was at the site prior
to the bombing.

According to assessments, these eIIorts are being undertaken mostly Ior Iear that the International
Atomic Energy Agency would request to visit the site. According to the estimate, it is unlikely that the
Syrians will attempt to reconstruct the secret project at the exact same location and in the exact same
manner, aIter it was uncovered in such an embarrassing Iashion. II the Syrians would want to
reconstruct the project, they will secretly set it up in a completely diIIerent location.

Satellite images showed that Iollowing the bombing, the Syrians engaged in massive eIIorts at the site
and cleared the ruins oI the Iacility that was targeted by the Air Force. Now they are building
something out there that looks very much like the giant structure that was there beIore.

The objective oI this eIIort, according to estimates, is two-Iold: First, reinIorce the oIIicial Syrian
declarations that the building targeted by the Air Force was meaningless, and there we see a copy being
built and it is clear that it is not a nuclear Iacility. Second, this enables more extensive work below the
structure in order to remove Irom there any remnants oI what was at the site beIore, without the
sensitive Ieelers oI Israeli and American spy satellites hovering above being able to see and document
it.

Calm may be deceptive
And on the same subject, but Irom a diIIerent angle, sources who are Iollowing developments in Syria
warn that the danger oI an all-out war in the wake oI the September bombing has apparently passed
yet the calm may be deceptive. We should not be underestimating Assads hurt pride.

In the summer oI 2001, aIter the Air Force bombed Syrian targets in Lebanon twice in response to
Hizbullah activity, Syria changed its approach to Hizbullah and Irom being a transIer point Ior Iranian
weapons it turned into being the organizations main arms supplier.
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Helsinki, Redux?
January 21, 2008
Listen to the U.S. State Department, and the six-party talks with North Korea are working: Pyongyang
has agreed to abandon its nuclear program, China and South Korea are stepping up their diplomatic
roles, and all Washington needs is patience.
Enter Jay LeIkowitz, President Bush's Special Envoy Ior Human Rights in North Korea, with a reality
check. In a speech Thursday in Washington, Mr. LeIkowitz said "it is increasingly clear" that the Bush
Administration will end with North Korea remaining "in its present nuclear status." In other words,
Pyongyang will not honor its promises.
Mr. LeIkowitz oIIers a Iew reminders: North Korea has ignored two deadlines to disclose the details oI
its nuclear program, announced it will strengthen what it calls its "war deterrent," and is suspected oI
having proliIerated some kind oI nuclear technology to Syria. He added that China and South Korea
have been "unwilling to apply signiIicant pressure on Pyongyang" and have supplied large amounts oI
aid "even though it is oIten diverted Irom those in need to the regime elite and military."
To reorient U.S. policy, Mr. LeIkowitz proposes a Helsinki process Ior North Korea, echoing Ronald
Reagan's successIul eIIort to undermine the Soviet Union almost three decades ago. Under this plan,
Washington would tie aid to veriIiable progress on human rights and disarmament. "The key is to make
the link between human rights and other issues explicit and non-severable, so that it cannot be
discarded in any Iuture rush to 'get to yes' in an agreement," Mr. LeIkowitz says.
Mr. LeIkowitz's analogy with the Soviet Union is not perIect. Kim Jong Il has demonstrated that he has
more in common with Stalin than Mikhail Gorbachev. Mr. LeIkowitz is correct, however, to say the
six-party talks aren't working and that a more "holistic" approach is needed. In addition to linking aid to
improvements in human rights, he suggests restricting North Korea's access to the international
banking system, a tactic that proved eIIective until it was rejected by the State Department. He is also
right that the newly elected President in South Korea will likely take a tougher line toward Pyongyang
-- especially iI encouraged to do so by Washington.
Mr. LeIkowitz's words bear special notice because he is close to Mr. Bush, who appointed him, and to
whom he reports. A State Department spokesman said Friday that his "comments certainly don't
represent the views oI the Administration." Then again, maybe they do.
Slowly, but Surely, Pyongyang Is Moving
By David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
Thursday, January 24, 2008; A19
The optimism with which the October agreement with North Korea was welcomed has Iaded amid
accusations that the North again is not keeping its commitments. First came word that "disablement" oI
nuclear Iacilities was slowing. Then there was the missed Dec. 31 deadline Ior North Korea to declare
the Iull scope oI its nuclear program, including its plutonium stockpile and uranium enrichment
activities. And earlier in the Iall, North Korea was accused oI helping Syria construct a nuclear Iacility
in its desert, reportedly a reactor.
The Iinger-wagging, told-you-so naysayers in and out oI the Bush administration should take a deep
breath. There is no indication that North Korea is backing away Irom its commitments to disable key
nuclear Iacilities and every reason to expect this process to unIold slowly, with North Korea taking
small, incremental steps in return Ior corresponding steps Irom the United States and others in the six-
party discussions.
Disablement oI the Iive-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon slowed in part because the United States
decided that unloading the irradiated Iuel rods as Iast as North Korea proposed could needlessly risk
exposing the North Korean workers to excessive radiation. North Korea is unloading the rods and
making steady progress on the other aspects oI disablement at the Yongbyon site. Could it be
happening Iaster? Probably, and North Korea would point out that promised shipments oI heavy Iuel
oil are also slow in coming.
North Korea's nuclear declaration was to be received by Dec. 31. On Jan. 2, White House
spokeswoman Dana Perino said the United States was still "waiting to hear" Irom the North.
Pyongyang responded that the United States had its declaration. AIter some tail-chasing, it emerged
that North Korea had quietly shared an initial declaration with the United States in November.
According to media reports, this declaration stated that North Korea had a separated plutonium
stockpile oI 30 kilograms and denied that it had a uranium enrichment program.
Does this quantity oI separated plutonium make sense? Yes. In short, 30 kilograms is at the lower end
oI the range oI plutonium that we have assessed North Korea could have separated. This estimate is
based on what we know about how long its reactor operated to build up plutonium in the Iuel rods and
how much plutonium was chemically extracted Irom this Iuel at the nearby reprocessing plant.
What about any enriched uranium? There is no question that North Korea has committed to providing
the other nations in the six-party discussions with inIormation about its uranium enrichment eIIorts and
should be held to that commitment. But we should not lose sight oI an uncomIortable Iact -- that U.S.
policymakers misread (at best) or hyped inIormation that North Korea had a large-scale uranium
enrichment program. There is ample evidence that North Korea acquired components Ior a centriIuge-
enrichment program, but Iew now believe the North produced highly enriched uranium or developed its
enrichment capabilities in the manner once claimed by the United States.
The success or Iailure oI this latest agreement with North Korea must not hinge on the uranium issue.
This is an interesting and relevant part oI its nuclear program, but it is still a Iootnote in the context oI
its plutonium production.
Reports that North Korea has cooperated with Syria on a hidden nuclear program are troubling but
must also be kept in context and, until additional inIormation is available, should not be allowed to
undermine the agreement. It is possible that North Korea was selling sensitive or dual-use equipment to
Syria's nuclear program. The best argument Ior holding the deal together is that it brings North Korea
into the Iold, bit by bit, making it harder Ior it to slip back into the arena oI illicit deals and keeping a
bright light on its activities. As Ior the "box in the desert" that Israel bombed in September, it is gone
now and whatever has replaced it is almost certainly not a reactor.
Accusations in the Israeli media that North Korea transIerred plutonium to Syria, where it was to be
placed into bombs, are baseless. The transIer oI such material Ior weapons would be a casus belli with
dire consequences Ior both countries, and this surely is understood by both Kim Jong Il and Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad.
North Korea is looking to the United States to keep its promises on delisting it as a terrorist state.
UnIortunately, given the climate in Washington and the perception that North Korea is slow-rolling the
declaration process, this is unlikely over the near term. Pyongyang should be realistic in its
expectations.
For Washington, and the unIairly maligned advocates oI the six-party process, the task is to maintain
laser-like Iocus on taking the next step toward IulIillment oI the October agreement, with the goal oI
moving to the disarmament phase, and not allowing these hard-won steps to be drowned out by the
noise oI detractors.
David Albright, a Iormer U.N. weapons inspector, is president oI the Institute Ior Science and
International Security. Jacqueline Shire is a senior analyst at ISIS and a Iormer State Department
Ioreign aIIairs oIIicer.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?editionid1&categid5&articleid88464
The door has closed on Syrian-Israeli negotiations
By Itamar Rabinovich
Commentary by
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
The prospect oI a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement looms over the Arab-Israel and larger Middle Eastern
arenas as a potentially signiIicant but ever elusive issue. On the eve oI the Annapolis conIerence, the
dormant Israeli-Syrian track seemed inIused with new liIe; a Iew weeks later it appears blocked yet
again.
Such Iluctuations are not new to this track. At the height oI the post-Madrid peace process, when the
Clinton administration and Iour Israeli prime ministers actually gave the Syrian track preIerence over
the Palestinian track, several intense eIIorts were invested in achieving a Syrian-Israeli deal. They
ended in Iailure and tilted the peace process toward the Palestinians and Jordan.
During the Iirst six years oI the current decade, the Israeli-Syrian track seemed to have lost all
relevance due to the convergence oI several developments: First, President HaIez Assad's death and his
son and successor's Iailure to establish himselI as an authoritative Iigure; second, Ariel Sharon's ascent
to power in Israel and his determination to Iocus on the Palestinian issue and reluctance to withdraw
Irom the Golan; third, the transIormation oI the Syrian-Iranian alliance and partnership oI the 1990s
into an unequal relationship between an Iranian senior and a Syrian junior partner; and Iourth, the
deterioration oI Syria's relationship with the Bush administration, initially in 2003 over Iraq and then,
in 2005, over Lebanon.
The Bush administration's and the American president's personal animosity toward Syria and President
Bashar Assad was such that when Sharon's successor, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, began to tinker
with the idea oI renewing negotiations with Syria, he was told in no uncertain terms by Washington
that the Bush administration objected to a diplomatic initiative that would help Syria steer its way out
oI isolation and rebuild its legitimacy in the international arena.
But as noted above, this seemed to change on the eve oI the Annapolis conIerence. It may seem odd
that a conIerence devoted to the Palestinian issue would serve to revive interest in the Syrian track. But
in the event, it was precisely the State Department's Iear that Syria would sabotage the quest Ior an
Israeli-Palestinian settlement that led to the renewal oI a limited American-Syrian dialogue.
An understanding was worked out that consisted oI three elements. First, Syria would participate in the
Annapolis conIerence, thus enhancing its legitimacy. Second, Annapolis would still be solely devoted
to the Palestinian issue, but clear reIerences would be made to the need Ior a "comprehensive"
settlement and to Syria's own turn Iarther down the road. And third, Syria tightened control over its
border with Iraq and may also have promised to help resolve the political institutional crisis in
Lebanon.
This trend was reinIorced by parts oI the Israeli government, particularly those linked to the security
establishment that called Ior renewal oI negotiations with Syria. Some oI their arguments echoed the
reasoning oI the 1990s: It was easier to conclude an agreement with a state like Syria than to resolve
the complex national conIlict with the Palestinians. Other arguments were new, shaped by current
realities: Beyond resolving the bilateral conIlict, a deal with Damascus would detach Syria Irom Iran
and Hizbullah, transIorm the strategic equation in the region and diminish iI not eliminate the challenge
Iaced by Israel in and Irom Lebanon.
In Iact, intermediaries were employed by Israel to explore the prospect oI such a deal with Syria, but to
no avail. Assad's position is clear and unchanging: Syria is willing to renew negotiations based on the
Ioundation built in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is not satisIied with the hypothetical, conditional
"deposit" presented then by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin but wants a "commitment" to withdraw Irom
the Golan in return Ior a "cold peace." Such an agreement must be bilateral, and "preconditions"
concerning relations with Iran or other parties are unacceptable.
The narrow opening oIIered by Annapolis now seems to have closed. The main reason is Lebanon,
where Syria continues to meddle, intimidate and even kill in order to preserve and restore its position.
This is totally unacceptable to President George W. Bush, who sees the survival and success oI the
Siniora government as a high priority. With this Irame oI mind, and in view oI the priority the president
and his secretary oI state assign to completion oI Israeli-Palestinian negotiations beIore the end oI
2008, the prospect oI American willingness to invest in the revival oI a Syrian-Israeli negotiating track
is remote.
In Israel, Prime Minister Olmert, bracing Ior the publication oI the Winograd Report and Iighting to
keep the right-wing parties in his coalition (unhappy as they are with the ongoing negotiations with the
Palestinians), is hardly likely to open yet another political Iront with the powerIul (and presently
dormant) Golan lobby.
It is important to remember that this discussion oI the ups and downs oI the Israel-Syria diplomatic
option is being conducted in the ominous shadow oI potential military escalation. Assad has stated
several times that while he is seeking to renew negotiations with Israel he is also building a military
option. Israel's destruction oI a nuclear reactor in its early stages in northeastern Syria last September 6
served to demonstrate how determined and Iar-reaching Syria's quest Ior "strategic parity" with Israel
can be.
Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's Iormer ambassador to Washington and chieI negotiator with Syria, is the
Ettinger proIessor oI contemporary Middle Eastern history at Tel Aviv University. His new book, "The
View Irom Damascus," is due this spring. This commentary Iirst appeared at bitterlemons-
international.org, an online newsletter.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/31/opinion/eddromi.php
Don't dump Olmert
By Uri Dromi
JERUSALEM:
Ten months ago, when the Winograd Commission issued its interim report on the handling oI the 2006
Lebanon war, there were calls Ior Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to step down. There are again now that
the Iinal report is in: According to polls published Thursday, 57 percent oI the Israelis believe Olmert
should go.
Though I was never one oI Olmert's Ians, I thought then that he shouldn't step down, and I still think so
now.
Since the interim report came out, two comprehensive books on what we call the Second Lebanon War
were published, which leIt no stone unturned. ThereIore this week's report didn't tell the Israeli public
anything it had not known beIore: that in the years preceding the war, there was a complacency with
regards to the growing threat oI Hezbollah; that years oI policing the West Bank and Gaza had
weakened the Israeli Army's preparedness Ior real war; that the military placed too much reliance on
the capabilities oI air power and technology to achieve victory; that the civilian leaders, Olmert and
then-DeIense Minister Amir Peretz, were inexperienced, acted hastily and made mistakes that cost the
live oI soldiers and civilians. Israelis are perIectly aware oI all this, and more.
Israelis, however, diIIer on the question oI whether Olmert should Iollow the example oI his partners in
the Lebanon blunder - Peretz and Iormer ChieI oI StaII General Dan Halutz - and resign. Those
wishing to see heads roll argue that war is the ultimate test oI national leadership, and once a
nonpartisan, serious commission has declared that Olmert Iailed that test, he should go.
Others believe that while Olmert's perIormance in the war was poor indeed, the results oI the war are
Iar Irom being a total Iailure.
The strategy oI Hezbollah - taking the north oI Israel hostage by the threat oI the Katyusha rockets -
was challenged and eventually shattered. By taking Israel to war in the summer oI 2006, Olmert
restored Israel's deterrence, even iI he did it in a Ilawed way. Just look at the calm on the Lebanese-
Israeli border Ior the last 18 months. It seems that Hassan Nasrallah, the head oI Hezbollah, is not so
keen any more to invoke the wrath oI the Israeli Army.
Furthermore, since 2006 there has been a vigorous eIIort to Iix the Ilaws exposed within the army and
Israeli society.
The army is not the same, experts agree. The generals who were there during the war resigned,
accumulated rust has been chipped away, training has been doubled, military doctrines reexamined, old
equipment replaced.
Olmert himselI, bruised by the war, seems to have learned his lessons. II Ioreign sources are correct,
then last September Israel, under his leadership, destroyed a partly constructed nuclear reactor in Syria
apparently modeled on a North Korean one. II there is one thing Israelis are concerned about today
more than the last Lebanon war, it is the nuclear threat. So Israelis may be wondering whether their
prime minister isn't the right man Ior the job aIter all.
Then there's the peace process. Forcing Olmert to resign now would throw Israel into political mayhem
Ior a long period. President George W. Bush's commitment to an Israeli-Palestinian accord by the end
oI 2008, though not highly realistic, will immediately be declared null and void.
The chaotic situation in Gaza, the dependence oI Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on a stable
Israeli partner and the Iragile relations between Israel and Egypt all demand a cool-headed Israeli
leadership - not a cut-throat election campaign.
Will Ehud Olmert survive his Battle oI Winograd?
It depends on how much credit Israelis will be willing to give him and on their assessment oI the
alternatives. Writing about the interim report on these pages in May 2007, I concluded that the
"Israelis, while not happy with their prime minister, preIer Ior the time being to carry on with him
rather than rock the boat even Iurther." I think they still do.
Uri Dromi is the director oI the Mishkenot Shaananim conIerence center in Jerusalem. He was the
spokesman oI the Rabin and Peres governments between 1992 and 1996.
In North Korea, Process Over Progress
By Michael Gerson
Friday, February 1, 2008; A21
By my count, at least Iive Iormer high-level Bush administration oIIicials are deeply disillusioned with
the current policy on North Korea.
This brewing discontent broke into open revolt two weeks ago when Jay LeIkowitz, the special envoy
on North Korean human rights, committed the gaIIe oI stating the obvious: North Korea is not serious
about nuclear disarmament. The current six-party talks will do little to change that Iact. And the price
we are paying to pursue those talks is silence about the suIIering oI a brutalized, Iriendless people.
AIterward, even some oI LeIkowitz's supporters complained that he had ventured "out oI his lane."
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice slapped the special envoy down hard, noting to reporters that he
"doesn't know what's going on in the six-party talks." LeIkowitz's speech was quickly scrubbed Irom
the State Department's Web site.
But LeIkowitz spoke aIter 2 1/2 years oI Irustration. The East Asia bureau at the State Department,
headed by Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, has consistently viewed the raising oI human
rights as an impediment to the serious work oI negotiating with Kim Jong Il. The Korea desk tried and
Iailed to exclude LeIkowitz Irom important policy meetings with the president. It attempted
unsuccessIully to weaken the North Korea section in the State Department's annual human rights
report. Human rights groups generally view Hill with great suspicion.
Some State Department oIIicials working in nonproliIeration and intelligence reportedly share
LeIkowitz's dissatisIaction. But, as one Iormer Bush oIIicial made clear to me, "Rice's treatment oI Jay
shows that you need to stay quiet iI you want to stay in government."
Even critics oI the current approach believe that the agreement reached last February was worth a try.
AIter testing a nuclear weapon, North Korea was under serious international pressure. The U.N.
Security Council passed a tough resolution that included economic sanctions. So North Korea promised
to move away Irom its nuclear ambitions in stages, beginning with a Ireeze on work at its plutonium
reactor and enrichment complex -- though some experts suspected that the plant was already nearing
the end oI its useIul liIe. In return, the North Koreans received pledges Ior 1 million tons oI heavy Iuel
oil.
The problem has come in the months since. Having begun the path oI negotiations, the State
Department has consistently moved the goal posts closer to keep North Korea at the table. The second
stage oI compliance was supposed to be the permanent "disablement" oI the plutonium complex, which
is now interpreted as disablement that is irreversible Ior a year. Some experts believe it is actually
reversible in a Iew months. To keep the process going, America has returned money that the North
Koreans gained Irom money laundering, drug traIIicking and proliIeration.
And North Korea's nuclear disclosure, due at the end oI 2007, was not even close to adequate. Kim
declared 30 kilograms oI plutonium but did not even mention uranium enrichment, weapons
components or proliIeration to Syria. This is a Iar cry Irom Libya's Iull disclosure in 2004, in which
that nation sent its most sensitive nuclear program materials to a Iacility in Tennessee.
North Korea Ieels little pressure as a result oI its noncompliance. China seems relieved that Kim hasn't
recently misbehaved and urges patience. The South Korean government continues to hold up its end oI
a protection racket: To keep the peace, South Korea provides North Korea with aid, which is diverted
to strengthen North Korea's military, which threatens South Korea, which gives more aid to keep the
peace.
This is the problem oI State Department "realism." Negotiations that begin as a means become the end
itselI -- a kind oI blind and dreamy Iaith in the magic oI the process. Any Iorm oI criticism or coercion
disappears, because "the North Koreans won't negotiate under pressure" -- when, in the past, the North
Koreans have negotiated only under pressure.
Kim's goal in the six-party talks is clear: He wants to trade a single, aging nuclear complex Ior the
easing oI sanctions. By all accounts, North Korea's supreme leader has the mentality and social skills oI
a troubled 13-year-old -- but he seems to be doing remarkably well in these negotiations.
The alternative is not to end the talks or impose a blockade. It is, as LeIkowitz pointed out, to pursue a
more sophisticated diplomacy Iamiliar Irom the Cold War. Tie the improvement oI relations to both
security and human rights. Encourage the new South Korean government to demand more North
Korean openness in exchange Ior resources and cash. Push the United Nations to identiIy North Korean
entities Ior sanctions. Above all, talk about the rights oI North Koreans once again, so the prisoners and
the dead are not Iorgotten.
michaelgersoncIr.org
http://www.Iorbes.com/home/business/2008/01/31/nuclear-north-korea-biz-wash-cx0201oxIord.html
North Korea: We Can Work It Out
OxIord Analytica 02.01.08, 6:00 AM ET
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il said Wednesday his country would cooperate on implementing
agreements reached at multilateral talks.
Kim pledged to renew his government's commitment to the deals when speaking with a visiting senior
Chinese Communist Party oIIicial yesterday, according to Chinese press reports.
However, until these most recent remarks, progress last year with North Korea--both in multi-party
talks and through strengthened ties with South Korea--has stalled. Now, in changing political
circumstances, global relations with North Korea may begin to deteriorate once again.
Sung Kim, director oI the U.S. State Department's oIIice oI Korean aIIairs, visited Seoul, Beijing and
Pyongyang Ior three days earlier in the week. His aim is to jump-start the six-party negotiations on
North Korea's nuclear programs; the talks have stalled since Pyongyang Iailed to meet a 2007 year-end
deadline to disable its Yongbyon nuclear site and declare all its nuclear activities.
Disabling
Yongbyon closed in July; since then, disablement to put it beyond use has proceeded under U.S.
supervision. SaIety concerns made the year-end deadline non-Ieasible, but Pyongyang has recently
slowed the removal oI Iuel rods Irom the Iacility Irom 80 to 30 per day, claiming that other parties are
delaying the delivery oI promised energy aid, and diplomatic relations have stalled.
Declaration
The resistance oI North Korea to reveal the details oI its nuclear programs is even more problematic.
North Korea says it has already given the U.S. a list--in November 2007--but Washington remains Iar
Irom satisIied on three key issues:
--HEU: Pyongyang is suspected oI pursuing or having pursued a second nuclear program, using highly
enriched uranium (HEU), in addition to its known plutonium-based Iacilities.
--Syria: Some suspect a link between North Korea and a plant in eastern Syria, bombed by Israel last
September, raising nuclear proliIeration issues.
--Bombs: All nuclear weapons and Iissile material have to be declared in accordance with
commitments Pyongyang has made.
Clarity
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il can have no doubt about what is required aIter close liaison between
the lead U.S. negotiator, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill, and North Korean Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Kye-gwan. As with disablement, a slight delay with the declaration would be tolerable,
but worries persist.
Kim Jong-il may be unable to persuade hard-line generals to give up their nuclear deterrent; he may
expect the world will have to accept a de Iacto nuclear North Korea, as it has with India and Pakistan.
He may even be holding out Ior a better deal Irom the next U.S. president when Bush leaves oIIice a
year Irom now.
U.S. DiIIerences
ConIusing signals have been coming out oI the United States:
On Jan. 17, Jay LeIkowitz, appointed special envoy on human rights in North Korea beIore the U.S.
switch to engaging with Pyongyang last year, called North Korea a "serial proliIerator...not serious
about disarming in a timely manner."
LeIkowitz said the country would still have nuclear weapons Bush's term ends. He remarked that Seoul
and Beijing could do more to inIluence Pyongyang, and suggested U.S. policy might also be under
review.
The U.S. State Department swiItly disavowed these views, but they struck a nerve. II Kim reneges,
neo-conservatives--who opposed engagement all along--will claim vindication, and the multilateral
talks may unravel as governments ponder how best to handle a deIiantly nuclear North Korea.
To read an extended version oI this article, log on to OxIord Analytica's Web site.
http://www.yobserver.com/opinions/10013687.html
Analysis: Irans secret Syrian plan
Posted in: Opinions
Written By: OLIVIER GUITTA
Article Date: Feb 5, 2008 - 3:22:39 AM
Israel has been providing intelligence and satellite images to the U.S. about a secret Syrian nuclear
program Ior several months, according to media reports. Discussions between Israel and the United
States took place last summer regarding a possible strike. But when Israel Iound the matter so pressing
that when they realized the U.S. was not ready to act, on September 6 they attacked a Syrian nuclear
site. Hence the question: what is Syria really up to or more to the point what is Iran up to?
First, let's start with an underreported explosion that occurred in a Syrian military base outside Aleppo
on July 26. Jane's DeIense Weekly reported, citing Syrian deIense sources, as saying the explosion took
place during a test to Iit a "Scud C" missile with a mustard-gas warhead. It quoted the sources as saying
the explosion occurred when Iuel caught Iire in the missile production laboratory.
But there might be another explanation. Kuwait's Al Seyassah newspaper recently reported that a Shiite
Lebanese religious cleric claimed the Iranians were allegedly supervising a chemical weapons
manuIacturing program and that tens oI Iranian experts and engineers died as a result oI that explosion.
He also said Israelis attacked the base. He added that Western oIIicials told him they received prooI
Irom Israel on the Syrian chemical weapons program. Even iI Israel's involvement is not proven, what
remains sure is that it must be very happy that a chemical weapons Iacility in Syria has been partly
destroyed.
Now regarding the September 6 strike; while we may never know what really occurred, what remains
sure is that the situation is direr than one could imagine and that most likely, Israel did not just bomb a
nuclear site in the early stages. Indeed, the silence oI the international community and especially the
Arab world aIter the attack is a Iirst, and it shows the gravity oI what happened. Even though Syria and
its Iranian sponsor are detested, and in the case oI Iran Ieared, in the Muslim world, the Iact that there
was no condemnation oI Israel at the U.N. could be interpreted as a tacit relieI that Israel acted.
Another prooI oI what transpired came Irom ranking Republicans on the House Intelligence and
Foreign Relations committees, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Peter Hoekstra, who were brieIed on the Israeli
strike and sworn to secrecy. They wrote an op-ed in the October 20 Wall Street Journal clearly
underlining the seriousness oI the situation regarding both the North Korean and Iranian involvement in
the Syrian arms program.
Finally, the Iact that the Bush administration (including President George W. Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney and most notably DeIense Secretary Robert Gates) has been ramping up the rhetoric and
taking action against Iran (including the latest sanctions against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards) in
the past week, might also be linked to what really happened in Syria.
The Syrian story is Iar Irom over: in Iact, on October 23, Al Seyassah ran a story about potential new
secret nuclear sites in Syria. According to Western sources cited by the paper, it is possible that Syria is
developing other nuclear sites with the help oI North Korea, Iran and Iraqi experts, the latter who Iled
their country at the start oI the Iraq war in 2003. In Iact, observation satellites have allegedly located in
Syria at least two other sites similar to the one destroyed by Israel last month.
Iran's handwriting is all over the wall Irom the chemical to the nuclear arms program in Syria. Indeed,
in research conducted last year as part oI an article published in Washington's The Examiner, this
reporter delved into Syrian's secret nuclear program, making the point that Syria might actually be
"Plan B" Ior Iran. By helping develop nuclear sites in Syria, strikes on Iran might turn out to be useless.
This was a smart strategy until Israel bombed the Syrian nuclear site on September 6 and made the
world notice.
* Olivier Guitta is a Ioreign aIIairs and counterterrorism consultant in Washington DC and the Iounder
oI the newsletter The Croissant. (www.thecroissant.com)
http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/Iiona-simpson/20080211.html
IAEA special inspections after Israel's raid on Syria
By Fiona Simpson ,
11 February 2008
"The Israelis are already attacking our allies. It is time to teach them a lesson or else Syria will be
next."
-- Statement attributed to Soviet DeIense Minister Dimitriy Ustinov at a cabinet meeting immediately
Iollowing Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor.
Several months have passed since Israel attacked what was rumored to be a partially constructed
nuclear Iacility in Syria. The Iacility--allegedly undertaken with North Korean assistance--has
remained a subject oI speculation, its existence oIIicially unconIirmed. Israel, the United States, and
Syria (apart Irom a letter oI protest to the U.N. Security Council and U.N. secretary-general) have
remained nearly silent on the subject. Save Ior North Korea, the same holds true Ior the rest oI the
international community.
Although unconIirmed, the rumors have started a discussion about the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and Syria's obligation to the IAEA under its comprehensive saIeguards agreement,
concluded in accordance with its obligations under Article III oI the Nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty
(NPT), to which Syria belongs. Other related questions have been asked regarding whether the IAEA
has the authority to dispatch inspectors to Syria on the basis oI the allegations.
Background. In 1992, in an attempt to respond to the discovery oI Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons
program, then-IAEA Director General Hans Blix called Ior the saIeguards system to possess more
"teeth." As part oI this eIIort, at a February 1992 meeting, the IAEA Board oI Governors reaIIirmed the
IAEA's right to conduct special inspections under the comprehensive saIeguards agreement to be
concluded by all non-nuclear weapon states belonging to the NPT. At the same meeting, the board
expanded the requirement on the provision oI nuclear Iacility design inIormation beyond that called Ior
under paragraph 42 oI INFCIRC/153, which required inIormation to be provided "as early as possible
beIore nuclear material is introduced into a new Iacility."
1
Instead, the board called Ior revisions to existing subsidiary arrangements to be incorporated into both
new and old saIeguard agreements.
2
These revisions would oblige states with comprehensive saIeguard
agreements in Iorce to provide preliminary inIormation to the IAEA as soon as a decision has been
made to construct, authorize to construct, or modiIy a Iacility. Finally, in an interesting coincidence, the
February 1992 board session also approved the text oI the comprehensive saIeguards agreement Ior
Syria, which would enter into Iorce on May 18, 1992.
Safeguard obligations and the question of special inspections. The potential implications oI the
raid--i.e., the possibility that Syria had quietly been constructing a nuclear Iacility--brought all three oI
these board decisions into the spotlight. By the end oI 1997, Richard Hooper, the then-director oI the
Division oI Concepts and Planning in the IAEA's Department oI SaIeguards, wrote in the IAEA
Bulletin, "The early provision oI design inIormation now is incorporated in all new and most existing
subsidiary arrangements." Syria, whose saIeguards agreement entered into Iorce aIter the board
decision to revise the subsidiary arrangements, would thereIore need to inIorm the IAEA as soon as it
decided to construct a Iacility, iI such construction was underway.
3
In order to clariIy whether the allegations against Syria had any basis, the IAEA secretariat (i.e., the
director general) does possess the authority to invoke the special inspections component oI
INFCIRC/153. According to this document, the IAEA is empowered to make special inspections to
either veriIy the inIormation contained in special reports (not applicable in this case) or "iI the agency
considers that inIormation made available by the state, including explanations Irom the state and
inIormation obtained Irom routine inspections, is not adequate Ior the agency to IulIill its
responsibilities under the agreement."
4
Those responsibilities are deIined at the document's outset: ". . .
to ensure that saIeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms oI the agreement, on all source
and special Iissionable material in all peaceIul nuclear activities within the territory oI the state, under
its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere Ior the exclusive purpose oI veriIying that
such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
5
|Emphasis
added.|
The controversy here lies in the language reIerring to the IAEA's responsibilities as the application oI
saIeguards to nuclear material only. (Notably, the NPT's language is slightly broader, reIerring to the
goal oI saIeguards as preventing the diversion oI "nuclear energy" Irom peaceIul uses.) However, iI
evidence was presented to the IAEA indicating that Syria was building a Iacility and hadn't inIormed
the IAEA oI its decision, questions would invariably arise as to whether there could be conIidence that
saIeguards were being applied to all nuclear material within the state. Above all, it's the phrase "iI the
agency considers" that's most signiIicant, as it gives the IAEA, on paper at least, a reasonable amount
oI latitude. According to the agreement, the authority to invoke special inspections Iollows Irom the
IAEA's perception oI whether or not it can carry out its saIeguards mandate; the justiIication Ior special
inspections presupposes a relatively Ilexible interpretation thereoI.
But, in practice, the invocation and the implications oI special inspections are more complicated, with
the IAEA obliged to balance its saIeguards mandate against the sovereignty and rights oI its member
states. The IAEA has only Iormally invoked special inspections twice--in 1992, at Romania's request to
clear up outstanding discrepancies that occurred under Nicolae Ceausescu's regime, and a year later,
when the IAEA became aware oI inaccuracies in North Korea's initial report, due in part to inIormation
provided by the United States. North Korea reIused to allow the IAEA to carry out the special
inspections, which the board had approved, leading to a report to the U.N. Security Council on North
Korean noncompliance.
Against this backdrop, it's not surprising that the IAEA director general stated in the case oI the raid
against Syria, "II countries have inIormation that the country is working on a nuclear-related program,
they should come to us. We have the authority to go out and investigate." As noted, satellite photos
appear to show a building similar to North Korea's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
6
But
those photographs are subject to interpretation, and others who have examined the images consider
them inconsistent with the allegations. In any event, it's highly unlikely that the IAEA would have
invoked special inspections on the basis oI media reports, allegations, and a quickly razed site (on
which new, and likely non-nuclear, construction is now underway)--not simply because its credibility
could be damaged iI nothing were discovered, but because oI the IAEA's sensitivity to antagonizing
some member states by dispatching or seeking to dispatch inspectors on the basis oI what remain
allegations by others.
7
More to the point, under the saIeguards agreement, any disagreement concerning the need Ior
additional access between the IAEA and the state entitles the state in question (in this case, Syria) to
request that the board consider it.
8
The board's member states, wary oI inspections oI the kind
indicated above (and many oI them historically touchy about the use oI outside intelligence by the
secretariat), tend to stay conservative on such matters in the best oI times, let alone at a time when
political sensitivities, such as those that currently exist over the question oI Iran's nuclear program, are
high.
Moreover, while the board reaIIirmed the IAEA's right to conduct special inspections in 1992, it added
that such inspections should be invoked "rarely." A rejected request Ior special inspections would be
worse Ior the IAEA's credibility than special inspections that had never been invoked. In addition, the
memories oI Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's nearly completed Osirak reactor and more importantly, its
aItermath, shouldn't be overlooked as a Iactor in the IAEA's somewhat diIIident response to recent
events.
As opposed to its 2007 raid on Syria, Israel conducted a public campaign to explain why it bombed
Osirak. The day aIter the attack, it presented a letter to the president oI the U.N. Security Council,
outlining its reasoning--namely, Iraq intended to use its NPT membership as a cover to develop nuclear
weapons and that IAEA saIeguards weren't adequate to detect such activity. Within months, the Israeli
government released a publication that Iurther detailed its thinking.
9
Outside oI Israel, an emergency
meeting oI the Arab League Council was convened in Baghdad, which concluded with a resolution
calling upon the United Nations to impose sanctions on Israel. Unlike the 2007 conIerence, in which
the raid on Syria went unmentioned, the 1981 IAEA General ConIerence became a Iorum Ior member
states to express their anger with Israel and ended with a successIul vote Ior the IAEA to suspend all
technical assistance to Israel and consider suspending Israel's IAEA membership rights unless it placed
all its Iacilities under IAEA saIeguards. In an address to the U.N. Security Council on the subject, then-
IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund labeled the attack on Osirak as an attack on the IAEA's
saIeguards system--a viewpoint Washington directly rebutted during the 1981 General ConIerence.
10
A year later at the General ConIerence, a narrowly approved vote on Israel's credentials took place. In
response, the United States, Britain, and several other Western delegations walked out with the U.S.
delegation head stating, "This pattern oI abusing the U.N. system to carry on political vendettas is
corrosively dangerous."
11
Washington then suspended its IAEA membership Ior Iive months--a
suspension that entailed a Ireeze on U.S. Iunding to the IAEA. Two months aIter the U.S. walkout,
Blix, then the new IAEA director general, reportedly said that iI the suspension oI U.S. participation
stretched into the Iollowing year, "it could cripple our operations."
12
Thus, the Iact that the reaction to the Syrian raid has been Iar more cautious isn't simply because the
raid remains publicly unclear; the IAEA's reluctance to push the issue onto the board's agenda also
reIlects an understanding oI how costly this could prove to be--both Iiguratively and literally.
ThereIore, while the IAEA has the authority to invoke special inspections in the context oI the raid on
Syria, the chances oI it acting upon that authority are slim and will remain so in the absence oI concrete
evidence. Syria's decision to raze the bombed building hasn't helped matters Ior the IAEA in this
regard.
Conclusion. At Iirst glance, it may seem as iI the raid on Syria provided an opportunity Ior the IAEA
secretariat to allay concerns by invoking special inspections and, in so doing, testing the board on its
1992 proviso that such inspections were to be rarely used. But in the wake oI the international
community's silence, the allegations oI a partially constructed nuclear Iacility in Syria remain conIined
to media reports, which oIten quote unnamed sources. And the lack oI concrete evidence to bring
beIore the board increases the likelihood that such a move would backIire, resulting in the board
rejecting the request Ior inspections and, like the Osirak case, raising the inevitable ire oI some member
states and increasing the politicization in the board. ThereIore, Israel's raid on Syria doesn't represent
the best opportunity to test the board on what the 1992 reaIIirmation oI the IAEA's right to conduct
special inspections means in practice.
However, it does raise the question oI the IAEA's practical authority in this regard. As oI January 22,
only 86 states have an Additional Protocol to their NPT saIeguards agreement in Iorce. The Additional
Protocol, which greatly expands the IAEA's rights oI access to inIormation and locations in a state,
allows the IAEA to provide credible assurance that there aren't undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in a state, and not simply regarding the non-diversion oI declared nuclear material. Clearly,
special inspections wouldn't be viable, practical, or a politically Ieasible quasi-substitution Ior the tools
and access granted under the Additional Protocol, particularly since the Board oI Governors still
Iormally considers the Additional Protocol a voluntary undertaking.
But without an Additional Protocol, as its director general likes to point out, the IAEA cannot provide
credible assurance about undeclared nuclear material or activities within a state. Moreover, although
required under the NPT, 30 states (also as oI January 22) haven't brought even the basic saIeguards
agreement into Iorce. As international concerns regarding nuclear black markets and other clandestine
nuclear activities increase, and until the Additional Protocol is universal and mandatory--a
controversial subject itselI--it may be that questions similar to those currently being asked about Syria
will arise--whether or not in the wake oI some kind preemptive military action. While the vagueness oI
the allegations about Syria don't provide the best Ioundation upon which to do so, at some point, the
IAEA and some oI its member states may eventually need to be prepared to push its board on the
interpretation oI the IAEA's right to conduct special inspections. The raid on Syria provides them with
an opportunity to start thinking careIully about this now.
1
The text oI INFCIRC/153 (corrected) provides the basis Ior negotiating saIeguards agreements between the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and non-nuclear weapons states parties to the Nuclear Non-ProliIeration
Treaty (NPT); "The Structure and Content oI Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection
with the Treaty on the NonproliIeration oI Nuclear Weapons," INFCIRC/153 (corrected), Vienna, 1972.
2
Subsidiary arrangements to saIeguards agreements are the "document containing the technical and administrative
procedures Ior speciIying how the provisions laid down in a saIeguards agreement are to be applied." IAEA
SaIeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition, Section 1.26, IAEA, 2001, pp. 8-9.
3
The speciIics oI saIeguards agreements and subsidiary arrangements concluded between the IAEA and the Syria
aren't public. However, Syria's comprehensive saIeguards agreement is understood to incorporate the revisions called
Ior by the Board to Code 3.1 oI its subsidiary arrangements (i.e., the early provision oI design inIormation). See also
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, "Syria Update: Suspected Reactor Site Dismantled," (PDF)
Institute Ior Science and International Security (ISIS), October 25, 2007. Syria hasn't concluded an Additional
Protocol to its saIeguards agreement, which would have allowed the IAEA wider access. Like other states oI the
region, it has traditionally linked the conclusion oI an Additional Protocol with Israel's accession to the NPT and the
establishment oI a Mideast nuclear-weapon-Iree zone.
4
Special reports are made iI any unusual incident or circumstances lead the state to believe that there is or may have
been a loss oI nuclear material in excess oI speciIied limits or iI changed circumstances have made the unauthorized
removal oI nuclear material possible; See INFCIRC/153 (corr.), Part II, paragraph 73(b).
5
Ibid., Part I, paragraph 2.
6
Albright, Brannan, and Shire, "Syria Update" (PDF).
7
William J. Broad, "Syria Rebuilding on Sites Destroyed by Israeli Bombs," New York Times, January 12, 2008.
8
INFCIRC/153 (corr.), Part II, paragraphs 77 and 21.
9
"The Iraqi Nuclear Threat: Why Israel Had to Act," (Jerusalem: Government oI Israel, 1981). The report discussed
the Iraqi hostility to Israel, the nuclear threat it would eventually pose, and the perceived inadequacy oI the saIeguards
as they would be applied to the reactor.
10
Sigvard Eklund, "Address to the U.N. Security Council Meeting," June 19, 1981, reprinted in "PeaceIul Nuclear
Development Must Continue," IAEA Bulletin, December 1981, pp. 4-5. Eklund claimed, "From a point oI principle,
one can only conclude that it is the agency's saIeguards system which has also been attacked"; The U.S. head oI
delegation, Deputy Energy Secretary Kenneth Davis asserted, "The United States Government . . . cannot support the
view that the Israeli action constituted an attack on the agency and its saIeguards regime or that it caused damage to
that regime." See "Statement by U.S. Representative Kenneth Davis to the General ConIerence oI the International
Atomic Energy Agency: Resolution Condemning Israel Ior Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility," Documents on
Disarmament, (New York: United Nations, 1981), p. 454.
11
Henry Giniger, Milt Freudenheim, and Katherine J. Roberts, "The World in Summary; Mideast Politics; In Atomic
Forum," New York Times, September 26, 1982. The report quotes Davis.
12
Judith Miller, "Head oI World Arms Agency Sees Peril In Curbs," New York Times, November 17, 1982.
http://www.aei.org/publications/Iilter.all,pubID.27501/pubdetail.asp
A New Middle East, After All
By Reuel Marc Gerecht
Posted: Monday, February 11, 2008
[EXCERPT]
America's retreat Irom democratic Lebanon has been somewhat counterbalanced by Israel's bombing
raid against the suspected nuclear site near Dayr az-Zawr, in Syria, which surprised and silenced both
Damascus and its key backer, Tehran. But even here, the reaction in Washington is distressing. The
Israelis exercised preemption, and the Bush administration--which has made preventive war an oIIicial
part oI America's post-9/11 doctrine--remained silent. The administration seems little inclined to
dispute Israeli intelligence, but even iI it thought the Israelis were wrong about North Korean
involvement in this suspected nuclear site, the signal Irom the raid is exactly the one the president and
the vice president were trying to send the Iranians about their nuclear Iacilities iI they didn't stop
uranium enrichment. It's hard to imagine a more helpIul event Ior European and American Iran
diplomacy, with its good-cop, bad-cop approach, yet Washington let it Iall Ilat. It appears the
administration went easy on Damascus partly Ior the illusory promise oI Syrian participation in the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process--which shows how Iar it has reverted to a pre-9/11 understanding oI
the Middle East.
http://www.IpiI.org/IpiItxt/4951
Hardliners Target Dtente with North Korea
Suzy Kim and John FeIIer
February 11, 2008
Editor: Emily Schwartz Greco
The Bush administrations approach to North Korea was once quite consistent with its overall Ioreign
policy. There was name-calling, a preIerence Ior regime change, and an emphasis on military solutions.
Not surprisingly, then, the relationship between the United States and North Korea, like so many other
tense stand-oIIs, deteriorated over the last seven years. The United States accused the third member oI
the axis oI evil oI money-laundering, missile sales, and a secret program Ior the production oI
nuclear material. For its part, North Korea responded tit Ior tat at the rhetorical level. And, in October
2006, it upped the ante by exploding a nuclear device. II the United States were not tied up in other
military conIlicts, and eyeing Iran to boot, a war in Northeast Asia might have been higher on the
administrations to-do list.
But all oI that appeared to change in 2007. Chastened by military Iailures in Iraq and AIghanistan,
anxious about the vulnerability oI the Republican party on Ioreign policy issues in 2008, and accused
oI having allowed North Korea to go nuclear on its watch, the Bush administration reversed its hard-
line policy. Washington agreed to negotiate seriously with Pyongyang, provide it with incentives on the
road to denuclearization rather than only at the end oI the process, and meet Iace to Iace when
necessary.
The results oI this turnabout were dramatic. The February 13, 2007 agreement in the Six Party Talks
among the United States, the two Koreas, Japan, China, and Russia not only illuminated a path
toward a denuclearized Korean peninsula. It also outlined steps toward the normalization oI political
relations with Pyongyang, a replacement oI the Korean War armistice with a peace treaty, and the
building oI a regional peace structure Ior Northeast Asia.
Many conservatives were aghast that the Bush administration, aIter six years oI ABC (Anything But
Clinton), was essentially exhuming the Clinton administrations engagement policies toward North
Korea. From their perspective, the Six Party Talks were only supposed to be a holding pattern until the
regime in Pyongyang Iinally collapsed through a combination oI outside pressure and internal
weakness. When the Six Party Talks instead produced a breakthrough agreement, Iormer U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton denied any achievement and declared, I think the six-
party talks Iailed. He then recycled his earlier position: I think the only solution is the enhanced
isolation oI North Korea, ultimately bringing the regime down and peaceIully reuniting the peninsula.
So Iar in 2008, progress toward implementing last years February 13 agreement has slowed. North
Korea has begun shutting down its Yongbyon plutonium Iacilities and readmitted inspectors, and the
United States has sent about 50,000 tons oI heavy Iuel oil and 5,000 tons oI steel products Ior its power
plants. Nevertheless, disagreements remain. North Korea missed the Iirst deadline Ior delivering a
complete declaration oI its nuclear program, and a second one looms at the end oI February.
Meanwhile, the United States has yet to remove the country Irom the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism.
Even iI these hurdles are cleared, several more remain. It is not yet clear whether North Korea will
entirely give up its nuclear deterrent or whether the United States will remove all economic sanctions
and extend diplomatic recognition.
The Iragile detente between North Korea and the United States might succumb to its internal
challenges. But hard-line opponents dont want to leave it to chance, and so are marshalling their
arguments to strangle this hopeIul development in its cradle.
Criticisms oI engagement policy Iall into several categories. Some critics, like Bolton, continue to hold
onto the old Bush strategy oI isolation and regime change because, they argue, North Korea cannot be
trusted to abide by any agreement. Other critics Iocus on North Koreas nuclear program itselI, both its
internal characteristics and purported external cooperation with countries such as Syria. A third set oI
criticisms Iocuses on the February 13 agreement itselI and identiIy Ilaws, ambiguities, and blind spots,
particularly around the question oI veriIication. Another group Iocuses instead on North Koreas
human rights record. And Iinally there are conservative critics in Japan and South Korea who are
attempting to undermine detente Irom the sidelines.
In short, the negotiators trying to implement the agreements reached in the Six Party Talks Iace a host
oI internal and external challenges. The hard-line criticisms can be addressed. But its not certain
whether engagement supporters in Washington or in Pyongyang have suIIicient political capital to push
the process Iorward in 2008.
The Nuclear Challenge
North Koreas nuclear program has long been a mystery. Its never been clear how much Iissionable
material the country has produced. Although the country Iroze its plutonium Iacilities as part oI the
1994 Agreed Framework, it is unclear how much time and resources it devoted to pursuing a second
path to a bomb, namely highly enriched uranium (HEU). Even the October 2006 nuclear test remains a
puzzle. Some experts have declared it a Iailure, while others speculate that North Korea succeeded with
a low-yield experiment.
For a small and relatively weak country, mystery can be very useIul, and North Korea has been
reluctant to disarm itselI oI such a weapon. The current conIlict over the countrys declaration oI the
Iull extent oI its nuclear program is a case in point. North Korea claims that it already provided Iull
inIormation in November, in advance oI the December 31 deadline. But the United States is not
satisIied with the amount oI plutonium that North Korea has declared or with the governments
contention that it never set up a HEU program.
These points are negotiable. The amount oI plutonium that North Korea has reportedly declared 30
kilograms is at the low end oI U.S. estimates, so this is well within negotiable range. Getting
agreement on the amount oI reprocessed plutonium in North Koreas hands involves some massaging
oI the numbers, which is what happened in 1994 as well. The HEU program, meanwhile, is more a
matter oI saving Iace than dismantling a viable program. The Bush administration wants to demonstrate
that its 2002 accusations, which derailed the 1994 Agreed Framework, had some merit. North Korea,
however, wants to demonstrate that it did not violate the spirit oI that agreement. Both sides have
moved closer to agreement. The U.S. government has already admitted that its initial estimates were
exaggerated. And experts suggest that evidence oI uranium residue in aluminum tubes that North Korea
provided to investigators, which would suggest actual enrichment, is the result oI contamination Irom
Pakistani material. Christopher Hill has all but admitted that North Korea didnt use these tubes Ior
uranium enrichment.
Syria Connection
What might not be negotiable, however, is the Syria connection, which hardliners have seized on to
prove that North Korea remains an incorrigibly rogue power.
In early September, the U.S. media reported on Israeli military strikes against Syria that destroyed what
might have been a nuclear Iacility. Some reports suggested that the Iacility had been built with North
Korean assistance and that North Korean engineers had even died in the bombing. II the media reports
were correct, North Korea had crossed the critical red line established by the Bush administration (aIter
Pyongyang crossed the earlier red line when it tested a nuclear weapon). And yet, the Bush
administration didnt raise a Iuss at all. It instead allowed the State Department to go about its business.
With hardliners like Bolton and the State Departments senior arms control and security oIIicial Robert
Joseph no longer on the inside, the State Department has had more maneuvering room to pursue an
engagement policy.
But congressional opponents oI engagement certainly raised a Iuss about the purported Syria
connection. We regret that the administration has ignored numerous letters Irom Congress asking that
all members be brieIed on the Israeli airstrike, wrote Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL) in The Wall Street Journal. Failing to disclose the details oI this incident to the legislative
branch, preventing due diligence and oversight -- but talking to the press about it -- is not the way to
win support Ior complex and diIIicult diplomatic eIIorts to combat proliIeration by rogue nations. The
congressional representatives cautioned the administration not to move Iorward on any agreements
with North Korea until this matter was cleared up.
The Syria connection remains suIIiciently mysterious that engagement opponents will be able to
exploit it at any point when it seems that detente is moving Iorward. As Bolton has put it, The idea oI
North Korea Ior years engaged in cloning Yongbyon in Syria (or anywhere else -- Burma, Ior instance)
should be a Iire bell in the night.
But the notion that any country would be interested in a clone oI Yongbyon is quite IarIetched. AIter
all, North Koreas Iacility is itselI based on a rather old English model the Calder Hall design and
Syria could just as easily have skipped North Korea and gone back to the original. That is, iI Syria were
in Iact building a nuclear plant, which is still not veriIied. As Seymour Hersh reports in The New
Yorker, a Iormer senior U.S. intelligence oIIicial with access to the current intelligence says that "We
don't have any prooI oI a reactor -- no signals intelligence, no human intelligence, no satellite
intelligence."
Bolton slips in a sly suggestion that North Korea is cloning Yongbyon elsewhere. In brieIings with its
Asian allies in early 2005, the United States similarly accused North Korea oI providing Libya with
uranium hexaIluoride. But it turned out that the U.S. government had misled its allies. North Korea had
provided the material to Pakistan, which already has a nuclear program, a business transaction that the
United States had known about Ior years.
As such, there still remains no evidence that North Korea is engaged in nuclear proliIeration, whether
in Syria or elsewhere. North Korea is certainly short oI cash, and nuclear know-how and materials are
valuable commodities. But no one knows the true marketability oI North Koreas program, and
certainly it would pale in comparison to what North Korea could earn Irom giving up its nuclear
program wholesale.
Trust, Then Verify?
II North Korea provides a declaration oI its nuclear programs that U.S. negotiators can live with, and
the United States then proceeds to remove the country Irom the state sponsors oI terrorism list, the
process moves on to the next level. At that point, North Korea is supposed to submit to a more intrusive
inspection regime and begin to give over all oI its nuclear material.
Opponents oI engagement are readying their arguments, and they largely Iocus on the question oI
veriIication. The Heritage Foundations Bruce Klingner, Ior instance, compares the veriIication
protocols Irom the Cold War with what is being proposed in the Six Party Talks and Iinds them
wanting.
To veriIy the extent oI North Korean plutonium production, inspectors must be allowed to conduct
short-notice challenge inspections oI suspect sites as well as to take samples oI Iissile material, he
writes. North Korea's reIusal in 19921993 to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to
access two suspect nuclear sites precipitated the Iirst nuclear crisis. The agency has never gained access
to the sites.
In Iact, during the lead-up to the Iirst nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, North Korea allowed an initial
inspection by Hans Blix oI the International Atomic Energy Agency and produced a 150-page
document detailing its uranium mining sites and nuclear power plants. It turned out that the North
Korean list closely matched Western estimates oI the scope oI its nuclear program, writes Michael
Mazarr in his study, North Korea and the Bomb. True, North Korea reIused to allow the IAEA to visit
the two suspect sites, claiming that they were conventional military Iacilities. But the real problem was
that aIter allowing six IAEA inspections and providing the detailed list oI its programs, North Korea
hadnt gotten anything out oI the deal: no economic aid or investment, no broader political contacts
with Washington or Seoul or Tokyo, not even the ability to veriIy that U.S. nuclear weapons had been
withdrawn Irom the South, Mazarr concludes.
The current demand that North Korea submit to an intrusive inspection regime as a precondition Ior
moving Iorward with engagement recapitulates this earlier conIlict.
BeIore it throws open its mostly highly secretive sites, North Korea wants some sign that its
longstanding enemies the United States, Japan, and South Korea have changed their adversarial
policies. South Korea has largely done so. But the United States has only sent over some heavy Iuel
and rescued a Iew North Korean sailors who were attacked in the Red Sea by pirates. Japan, still
obsessed with the abduction issue, has shown no sign oI changing tack.
The veriIication procedures that the Agreed Framework established are still applicable to the
dismantlement oI the Yongbyon Iacility. They worked during the 1990s, and there is no reason to doubt
that they will work again. Expanding veriIication to short-notice inspections oI all suspect sites
throughout the country can only be achieved through give-and-take negotiations and the building oI
trust, not through Iiat.
Human Rights
II negotiators manage to settle all the outstanding disputes over the nuclear issue, other stumbling
blocks loom. Perhaps the most vexing is the issue oI human rights. The debate over human rights in
North Korea as it intersects with policy discussions over engagement inevitably Iocuses on the
prudence oI linking human rights concerns with political issues such as nuclear negotiations and
normalization oI relations. Central to this debate is not whether there are human rights violations in
North Korea. No doubt North Koreans endure major human rights violations. As economic migrants or
political reIugees who have crossed into China, North Koreans Iace dire living conditions. They are in
danger oI being discovered not only by the authorities but also by anyone wanting a reward Ior turning
in undocumented immigrants. For those remaining in North Korea, the list oI human rights concerns is
long, ranging Irom the Iull spectrum oI civil and political rights to social and economic rights.
The heart oI the matter is: how should these rights be protected and by whom? The answer largely
revolves around the issue oI regime change. Some, like Bolton, argue that North Korean human rights
can best be protected iI the regime is toppled. Others, like the German doctor Norbert Vollertsen, go so
Iar as to encourage large reIugee outIlows to Ioster the collapse oI the regime.
But human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have been leery oI linking human rights
to such political agendas throughout its long history oI human rights activism precisely because such
strategies only serve to detract Irom the issue in several ways. Political agendas take the Iocus away
Irom human rights and play into geopolitical power struggles. In the short term, they provoke harsher
measures that directly aIIect the most vulnerable. In the North Korean case, this was seen in the
crackdowns by Chinese authorities aIter high proIile bids Ior asylum in the scaling oI embassy
compound walls. Such strategies Ioster distrust rather than cooperation. Proponents oI regime change
seem oblivious to the even greater potential threat to human rights in the chaotic aItermath oI regime
collapse. In short, most human rights organizations believe that human rights should not be used as a
political tool.
A negative example oI what happens when human rights are linked to political agendas is the North
Korea Human Rights Act oI 2004. This legislation authorizes $24 million Ior each oI the Iiscal years
between 2005 and 2008 Ior assistance to North Korean reIugees, promoting human rights, democracy,
and Ireedom oI inIormation inside North Korea. In addition, the bill mandated the appointment oI a
special envoy Ior human rights in North Korea, a position subsequently Iilled by lawyer Jay LeIkowitz.
On the surIace, it seems that the legislation stands up Ior human rights, alleviating a major
humanitarian crisis. However, it has another objective. During a speech given to the Heritage
Foundation on April 19, 2007, LeIkowitz emphasized the need Ior increasing Ilows oI inIormation into
and out oI North Korea by smuggling in radios so that North Koreans might listen to programs like the
Voice oI America and Radio Free Asia. While all oI these are crimes in North Korea, and getting
caught could subject the oIIender to extreme Iorms oI punishment, the long-term trend has been a
steady increase in the porosity oI the country, he casually stated. In the struggle Ior human rights in
North Korea, we not only can help try to save the lives oI the North Korean people, most immediately,
but we can also try to help make the region and the world saIer by helping to bring about a similar
transIormation |as in the Soviet Union|. In this way, human rights can be a means to a greater end.
LeIkowitz leaves little room Ior doubt that this greater end is the collapse oI the North Korean
regime.
More recently on January 17, LeIkowitz seemed to consign the Six Party Talks to premature death in a
speech at the American Enterprise Institute. He declared that North Korea, despite Iour years oI nuclear
disarmament talks, will likely still have its nuclear weapons when the next U.S. president takes oIIice
in 2009. He accused Pyongyang oI not being serious about disarming in a timely manner,
pronouncing that North Korea has not kept its word. Revealing the longstanding split within the
administration on how to deal with North Korea, his statement was hurriedly taken oII Irom the State
Departments website, and its author quickly put in line by Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice.
|LeIkowitz| doesnt know whats going on in the six-party talks, and he certainly has no say on what
American policy will be in the six-party talks, she said sternly. I know where the president stands,
and I know where I stand, and those are the people who speak Ior American policy.
LeIkowitz deliberately overstepped his bounds to undermine the nuclear talks by linking them to
human rights. Security issues and human rights issues are linked inextricably, he has said. They
both derive Irom the nature oI the regime, and any long-term eIIort by the international community to
alleviate security concerns in northeast Asia will have to seek to modiIy the nature oI the |North
Korean| regime. Although his job is to press Ior human rights, LeIkowitz views his role through the
prism oI national security and regime change. His apparent misunderstanding oI his own job presents
one oI the strongest cases against linking human rights with political agendas.
Japan
Opposition to detente with North Korea isnt conIined to the United States. In both South Korea and
Japan, hard-line conservatives have adopted many oI the arguments concerning North Koreas weapons
program, veriIication procedures, and human rights. But they also have other agendas.
The outrage in Japan over North Koreas admission that its agents had been responsible Ior kidnapping
13 Japanese citizens during the 1970s and early 1980s hardened into a conservative movement in Japan
that opposes engagement with North Korea. North Korea returned Iive oI the 13 abductees to Japan
soon aIter the announcement and pronounced the rest dead. However, conservatives in Japan insist that
no progress can be made in normalizing relations between the two countries until the return oI the
remaining eight along with an unknown number oI others, claiming that they are still alive. The
conIusion over the status oI the eight abductees revolves around DNA tests perIormed on the alleged
remains, which came back as those oI unrelated people.
However, in February 2005, a world-renowned scientiIic journal, Nature, concluded that such analyses
oI cremated specimens are highly inconclusive and easily contaminated by those coming into contact
with them. More to the point Ior Koreans oI both the North and South, however, is that the issue oI
abduction cannot bypass the history oI hundreds oI thousands oI Koreans Iorcibly conscripted by Japan
during its colonization oI Korea to serve Japans imperial interests as Iorced laborers, soldiers, and
most notoriously as comIort women, many oI whom were abducted. Japans call Ior justice Ior
Japanese abductees rings hollow next to its stubborn resistance in dealing with its own past.
South Korea
Although Lee Myung-bak, South Koreas new president-elect, asserts continuity with previous policies,
hes also quick to point out his pragmatic approach toward North Korea. His Ioreign policy, dubbed the
MB Doctrine, Iocuses on a Ior-proIit version oI engagement that promises bold economic support to
help increase North Koreas per-capita income to $3,000 within 10 years iI it abandons its nuclear
weapons program. Tapping into Irustrations expressed by many South Koreans at what appears to be
stalled progress in North Koreas opening, Lee has pledged to move away Irom the unilateral policy
oI appeasement that has been implemented without principle and embrace a strategy oI reciprocity as a
means to induce North Koreas genuine opening.
OI course, the quid pro quo is the complete dismantlement oI North Koreas nuclear program. One sign
oI Lees more hard-line approach is his plan to eliminate the UniIication Ministry, which has been the
locus oI South Koreas engagement policy during the last decade.
On the other hand, capitalizing on his victory at the polls, Lee has come out more strongly than
outgoing President Roh Moo-hyun in agreeing to unconditional meetings with North Korean leader,
Kim Jong-il. II a summit between the leaders oI South and North Korea will help persuade the North
to give up its nuclear programs and beneIit both the South and North, I can do it anytime, Lee has
said.
As a Iormer chieI executive at the Hyundai conglomerate, Lee has pledged to run his administration
more like a business. With an eye to investing in China and the Iormer Communist bloc, Lee may be
hedging his bet that economic incentives will be the key to enticing North Korea out oI its hermit
status. On January 17, Lee conIidently announced that his administration will exert all-out eIIorts to
promote dialogue and exchanges with North Korea. II the North abandons its nuclear program, the
South will take the initiative in raising an international cooperation Iund amounting to about $40 billion
and provide a comprehensive aid package to upgrade Iive sectors in the Norththe economy, Iinance,
education, the inIrastructure and living conditions.
There are similarities among hard-liners in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. They all see
human rights as the thin edge oI the wedge to open up North Korea and transIorm, iI not eliminate, the
regime. They are skeptical that North Korea intends to denuclearize or abide by any international
agreements. They are critical oI engagement policies Ior being asymmetrical. Nevertheless, South
Korean hardliners are diIIerent because, unlike their counterparts in other countries, they must continue
to live on the Korean peninsula with North Korea. As such, they generally recognize that the alternative
to engagement is economic stagnation at best and at worst the outbreak oI hostilities devastating the
lives oI millions all oI which will have direct impact on the lives oI South Koreans. Whatever his
pedigree as a conservative, Lee Myung-bak understands that there is no viable alternative to
engagement.
In 2006, Peoples Solidarity Ior Participatory Democracy (PSPD), one oI South Koreas largest NGOs,
issued a statement on behalI oI a coalition oI human rights organizations in the country. PSPD
criticized the politicization oI the North Korean human rights issue within the UN, calling Ior mutual
cooperation rather than the imposition oI political pressures. Most importantly, it emphasized the need
to establish peace on the Korean peninsula by resolving the relationship between the U.S. and North
Korea as a precondition to improving the human rights situation in North Korea. In approaching the
human rights issue in the DPRK, the statement reads, the right to peaceIul survival on the Korean
peninsula is essential to the promotion oI all other rights. Engagement is a prerequisite Ior peace and
human rights.
Pushing Engagement Forward
Over the last year, hard-line opponents to engagement with North Korea have largely been quiet.
Special Envoy LeIkowitz has made a couple oI speeches, but he has been slapped down by, oI all
people, Rice. John Bolton and other Iormer administration oIIicials have done what they can Irom
outside the tent, but the louder they criticize the Six Party Talks, the more they underscore their own
lack oI inIluence. The hard-line Japanese politician Shinzo Abe, who made his reputation on the
abductee issue, has been replaced by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who is much less willing to use the
abductee issue to win support at home. President-elect Lee Myung-Bak in South Korea, his
conservative bona Iides notwithstanding, embraces some kind oI engagement policy with the North.
The ineIIectuality oI the hard-line Iaction, however, might have less to do with a lack oI political
inIluence than a perceived lack oI need. The hardliners have not strenuously exerted themselves to
bring down the Six Party Talks perhaps because they believe that iI they wait long enough the
negotiations will, like North Korea itselI, eventually collapse Irom within. Although the State
Department is committed to reaching agreement with North Korea and rebutting its critics on the
right it is also peculiarly blind to its own intransigencies. Although North Korea meets all the
requirements Ior removal Irom the state sponsors oI terrorism list, by the State Departments own
criteria, the administration reIuses to take this Iirst step even though it is a revocable decision
compared to North Koreas Iull declaration oI its nuclear programs. The State Department continues to
hold Iirm on its HEU allegations, even though the only tangible prooI rests with Pakistan the claims
oI President Pervez MusharraI and the proliIeration czar A. Q. Khan. The Bush administration has been
unable or unwilling to extract documentary prooI Irom its putative ally. With the State Department so
ambivalent in its commitments, hardliners dont need to expend their own political capital to wreck
engagement.
The State Department also Iaces the diIIicult legacy oI the Bush administrations overall Ioreign policy.
In the last seven years, U.S. Ioreign policy throughout much oI the world has Iailed to garner the trust
necessary to enable negotiations with North Korea to proceed in good Iaith. What Washington needs is
a step-by-step process oI building trust. Otherwise, American diplomacy will ring hollow. Engagement
is a prerequisite Ior IruitIul progress not only on human rights, but much more.
Whats at stake is an end to more than halI a century oI hostilities in U.S.-North Korea relations, 20
million North Korean lives, and a peaceIul and prosperous East Asia. The United States has to commit
to the long haul. Its time to give engaged diplomacy a chance.

Suzy Kim, a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, is the Iormer international secretary oI
MINKAHYUP Human Rights Group in Seoul, Korea, and is currently a visiting assistant proIessor oI
East Asian Studies at Oberlin College. John FeIIer is the co-director oI Foreign Policy In Focus
(www.IpiI.org) at the Institute Ior Policy Studies. They are both members oI the Alliance oI Scholars
Concerned about Korea (www.asck.org).

http://www.aei.org/publications/Iilter.all,pubID.27534/pubdetail.asp
Six Parties, Zero Progress
By Dan Blumenthal
Posted: Tuesday, February 19, 2008
ARTICLES
The Weekly Standard
Publication Date: February 25, 2008
The State Department is engaged in heavy-duty spin to keep alive the clearly Iailing Six Party Talks on North
Korean disarmament. But no amount oI spin can hide the Iact that whoever becomes president in 2009 will Iace
a North Korean problem worse than that which Bill Clinton bequeathed to George W. Bush.
Last week, beIore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Christopher Hill, State's top Asia diplomat, had to
explain away the Iact that Pyongyang has missed its deadline Ior Iully declaring all oI its nuclear weapons
programs. Even more diIIicult was Iudging the very open question oI continuing North Korean proliIeration.
Just the day beIore, Director oI National Intelligence Mike McConnell testiIied that the intelligence community
has "moderate conIidence"--intelligence speak Ior "we have evidence"--that North Korea has an ongoing
uranium enrichment program. McConnell Iurther assessed that Pyongyang has produced enough plutonium Ior
up to halI a dozen nuclear weapons, and has the ballistic missile capability to hit the continental United States
with those weapons. In short, notwithstanding State Department spin, North Korea has nuclear weapons and the
ability to use them against the United States and her allies. There is little prospect that current U.S. policy will
change North Korea's nuclear status.
Then there is the subject oI proliIeration. U.N. Security Council resolutions, Six Party Talk agreements, and U.S.
warnings are supposed to prevent Pyongyang Irom proliIerating any weapons oI mass destruction or ballistic
missile technology. But it seems pretty clear that when Israel struck a site in Syria in September 2007, it was
because North Korea was helping ramp up a Syrian WMD program oI some sort. All Hill had to say to Congress
on this matter was that the State Department takes the issue oI North Korean proliIeration seriously--diplomatic
talk meaning we're not planning to do anything about it.
The real state oI play, then, is that North Korea will not Iully declare, much less disable or dismantle, its nuclear
weapons programs, and it has continued to proliIerate. To mask this noncompliance, the State Department will
talk optimistically oI the next phases oI diplomacy, continuing to provide North Korea with heavy Iuel oil,
removing it Irom the list oI state sponsors oI terror, even negotiating a peace treaty and Iull normalization. In
short, no amount oI evidence oI North Korea's bad intentions will deter the Bush administration Irom declaring
diplomatic victory.
This policy collapse on North Korea has happened at a rapid clip. It was just a year and a halI ago that Bush told
an audience in Singapore that we would "hold North Korea Iully accountable Ior the consequences oI such
actions" iI it shared WMD technology. II Pyongyang was not helping Syria with a WMD program, then the
administration should say so Iorthrightly to help save its Ialtering policy.
AIter North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear tests in 2006, the administration got tough, with two strong
U.N. resolutions and Iinancial sanctions that hurt Kim and his cronies directly. President Bush then decided to
give the regime he loathes one last chance to come clean, aIter decades oI lying and cheating. Assistant Secretary
Hill got it exactly backwards when he told senators on February 6 that "we" have much work to do in getting
Pyongyang to rid itselI oI its nuclear programs. The burden is on Pyongyang to come clean. "We," meaning
Washington (plus Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow), must veriIy that they have done so and punish them iI
they have not.
Besides creating a more dangerous Korean peninsula, the Six Party process has caused a breach with our most
important ally, Japan, which wanted to take a tougher line. What's more, China is making its own plans and
arrangements to deal with an unstable and nuclear North Korea. Beijing, too, has little Iaith in the talks and has
drawn up military plans to intervene in North Korea to protect its own interests. All parties are concerned about
China's intentions, which they are keeping to themselves. II North Korea does collapse, American, Japanese, and
South Korean war planners will have to consider the possibility oI dealing with a unilateral Chinese intervention.
China's trade with the North tripled between 2000 and 2005--with an eye toward gaining more inIluence over the
Iuture disposition oI the peninsula.
The Six Party Talks, supposedly a model oI multilateral diplomacy, have thus caused each party to act more
unilaterally. Washington is essentially conducting its own negotiations with Pyongyang. Japan, a little less
conIident oI U.S. protection, is showing a keener interest in having its own military capabilities to deIend against
North Korean missiles. And China is taking military and economic measures oI its own to live with or perhaps
even control an unstable, nuclear regime on its borders. The situation is, in short, more precarious than when this
new round oI diplomacy began.
President Bush, who has shown a remarkable steadIastness on Iraq, keen not to bequeath a Middle East disaster
to his successor, still has an opportunity to change course in Korea. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung-
bak, seems willing to be less conciliatory to Kim Jong Il and repair relations with Japan and Washington. South
Korea has little interest in seeing a Chinese satellite state to its north. But Lee is getting mixed messages Irom
Washington. He can't take a tougher line iI Washington sticks to its "agreement at any price" course.
Rather than tying the hands oI the next president, President Bush could start taking a more realistic approach to
North Korea. First, Washington can halt its economic largesse until North Korea makes a Iull, and veriIiable,
declaration oI its nuclear programs. Any talk oI de-listing North Korea as a terrorist state or oI normalizing
relations is inappropriate given North Korea's continued bad behavior. Second, the Bush administration should
tell the truth about North Korea's proliIeration. II Pyongyang proliIerated, it is time to once again sanction,
squeeze, isolate, and perhaps even quarantine it. Third, the administration should Iocus its time and energy on
building a common approach with South Korea and Japan. Washington shares with its democratic allies an
interest in a democratic, uniIied peninsula. All three parties should ramp up eIIorts to take in the reIugees still
pouring out oI North Korea.
The prospect oI real change in North Korea under Kim is next to zero. All three countries should thus reestablish
a strong deterrent posture that will be necessary as they work toward the only real, albeit long term, solution: a
uniIied Korea Iree oI Kim Jong Il and his ilk.
Dan Blumenthal is a resident Iellow at AEI.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/opinion/28thu1.html?reIopinion
Editorial
A Little Nuke Music
February 28, 2008
The New York Philharmonics concert in Pyongyang was a tantalizing taste oI what might be in
Americas relationship with North Korea. It was also a reminder oI the missteps and dangerously
wrongheaded judgments that have kept the two countries apart and at saber-point Ior more than a halI
century.
The Philharmonic drew sustained applause and even some tears, playing Gershwin, a beloved Korean
Iolk song and the two countries national anthems. The concert would have had even more signiIicance
iI it could have celebrated continuing progress toward shuttering North Koreas nuclear weapons
program.
That eIIort unIortunately has stalled, and the Iault at least this time is undeniably Pyongyangs. It
would take a serious diplomatic push by the Bush administration and the leaders oI China, Russia,
Japan and South Korea to ensure that it does not Iall apart.
North Korea agreed last year to disable its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and produce a complete and
correct accounting oI all its nuclear activities, Iacilities and weapons-usable material by the end oI last
year. In exchange, it was to get 950,000 tons oI heavy Iuel oil and start down the road toward
normalizing diplomatic and economic relations with the United States and others.
While North Korea is disabling the reactor, it has not turned over the promised list. That has revived
serious doubts about whether it would ever abandon a program that has already tested a nuclear device
and produced Iuel Ior 10 or more weapons. Russias delay in delivering some oI the promised Iuel oil
may be a Iactor, but there are more serious disputes as well.
North Korea has said it would produce the accounting, but Iirst it wants Washington to remove it Irom
the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and liIt certain sanctions. Washington says the sequencing can be
worked out iI Pyongyang is prepared Ior Iull disclosure.
The Bush administration has a long history oI using any excuse to scuttle any diplomatic deal, but in
this case it is right. Pyongyang clearly agreed to Iull disclosure and the deadline. Since then serious
questions have also arisen about Pyongyangs nuclear cooperation with Syria. That must also be
disclosed.
President Bush wasted years reIusing to deal with North Korea, and that expanded stockpile oI
weapons-grade plutonium is the result. Having belatedly embraced diplomacy, the president deserves
credit Ior not overreacting Ior continuing negotiations and Iuel deliveries despite Iierce criticism
Irom members oI his party, including Iormer members oI his administration.
The United States and its partners should continue to explore creative solutions to the impasse and
stand ready to liIt sanctions and quickly take North Korea oII the terrorism list iI it IulIills its
obligations. China, North Koreas chieI beneIactor (and Irequent enabler), must press Pyongyang to
keep its commitments. Plans by South Koreas new president to link economic integration to nuclear
progress could be important leverage.
II the stalemate drags on, the United States and its partners may have to get tougher and implement
United Nations sanctions that they are now choosing to ignore. North Korea needs to know that the
international community has patience but that such patience has limits.
http://media.www.jhunewsletter.com/media/storage/paper932/news/2008/02/28/NewsFeatures/Bolton.
Condemns.Handling.OI.Nuclear.ProliIeration.Issue-3243071.shtml
Bolton condemns handling of nuclear proliferation issue
By: Kate Kelberg
Posted: 2/28/08
John Bolton, Iormer United States ambassador to the United Nations, addressed a very small audience
in Shriver Hall yesterday.
Bolton, a Baltimore native, spoke on the eIIects oI nuclear proliIeration on national security and saIety
around the world. His speech was part oI this spring's Foreign AIIairs Symposium.
Bolton began his speech immediately condemning the Bush administration's handling oI the
proliIeration issue. North Korea, which he called "a Iundamentally criminal regime" is particularly
dangerous as a nuclear regime because it "would sell anything to anyone I believe iI Al-Qaeda came
up with the money to pay Ior |a nuclear ballistic weapon| they would sell it to them."
North Korea, aware oI the Iear this possibility inspires in western powers, has exploited their position
oI power since the late '90s, continually promising to cease nuclear programs in exchange Ior economic
and political gains, and then never Iollowing through on their commitments.
This has set up a pattern in which "Iirst |North Korea| negotiates, then it renegotiates to get what it
wants. The trouble is that North Korea is lying about its programming |and getting away with it|
because its negotiating partners are so eager to keep negotiations alive," Bolton said.
"Any other country in the world would have long ago been shut down" Ior the threat North Korea poses
to international saIety, Bolton said.
Bolton blamed the problem on "lazy journalists" who reported that North Korea is conceding when all
evidence suggests otherwise.
Bolton discussed the recent Israeli discovery oI a North Korean nuclear Iacility in the Syrian desert.
Although little has been released publicly about the discovery, Bolton Iound reason to believe Syria
and North Korea were working together to build this Iactory.
Syria has remained silent on the issue.
"Syria knows how to Iill a security council chamber with agitated people," Bolton said, adding that Ior
some reason they didn't.
Bolton suggested the only explanation Ior their silence is that they were working with the North.
That silence oI other countries in the region also suggests that the Sunni-Arab region is becoming a
satellite oI an Iranian nuclear revolution, Bolton warned.
Yet world powers continue to disregard the threat, Bolton believes this Iranian nuclear revolution
deserves. He angrily reIerred to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimates, the United States'
authoritative assessments oI national security. The 2007 NIE misrepresented the inIormation American
Intelligence had gathered.
"It was written in a very politicized way and had an intended policy outcome," he said.
In terms oI substance the report was not very diIIerent Irom previous NIEs. There was one key
diIIerence however - the Iirst sentence oI the document stated, "In 2003, Iran halted its nuclear
weapons program."
This sentence, Bolton argued, was the only thing that got any attention Irom the press, however the Ioot
note explaining the incredibly narrow deIinition oI "nuclear weapons program" did not.
Bolton Iound it irrational to disbelieve that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear proliIeration. In the past,
the Iranian government has claimed they are only experimenting with nuclear materials Ior benign
purposes.
Iranian leaders said they wanted nuclear power as an alternative energy source Ior the Iear that they
were running out oI oil and natural gases.
Bolton cited a recent study that concluded iI Iran continued to both consume and export oil and natural
gases at its current rate, they would run out oI these energy sources in the next 300 to 400 years -
making their Iear unbelievable.
"I could go on and on with examples like this. There's very little doubt Iran is producing nuclear
weapons and there's very little doubt that Syria would have engaged in North Korea's |program|
without Iranian support," Bolton said.
And Iran and North Korea working in tandem would be a very dangerous combination. Two things are
required to build weapons oI mass destruction: the technical capabilities, which North Korea possesses,
and the Iinancial resources Iran has Irom its oil reserves.
The two countries share "the same interest in hiding nuclear activity Irom international inspectors."
Bolton reiterated his desperate claim that this was a dire situation that our administration and
administrations across the world were Iailing to address properly.
We either must immediately put a stop to this activity or, "get used to the idea oI an Iran and North
Korea with nuclear weapons," he said.
Bolton also warned oI a "chain reaction" in the middle east should the western powers let Iran get away
with building nuclear weapons.
"Each country |that develops nuclear weapons| inspires more than one country to do the same," he said.
It is a very scary situation that can only be prevented by "a more robust program against proliIeration."
U.S. Hard-line Policy toward DPRK Slammed
Pyongyang, March 5 [2008](KCNA) -- These days the U.S. conservative hardliners are talking
nonsense that the points agreed at the six-party talks have not been properly implemented due to the
"delaying tactics" oI the DPRK and, accordingly, the Bush administration should stick to its hard-line
policy toward the DPRK, not appeasing it. They are even blustering that it is seriously "mistaken" iI it
calculates it can produce a better agreement with the next U.S. Administration.
Commenting on this, Rodong Sinmun today terms this a provocative move to scuttle the six-party
talks and lay an obstacle in the way oI settling the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula in a bid to
deteriorate the existing hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S. and bring the situation on the
peninsula to an extreme pitch oI tension.
The U.S. conservative hardliners are not seeking the negotiated settlement oI the nuclear issue on the
peninsula but working hard to attain their sinister aim with a strong-arm policy by shiIting onto the
DPRK all the responsibilities Ior the delayed implementation oI the points agreed at the six-party talks,
the commentary says, and goes on:
They are blustering that the new U.S. regime would never pardon the DPRK while talking nonsense
that it is delaying the implementation oI the above-said points. This is a short-sighted and Ioolish ruse
to Irighten and stiIle it with pressure and blackmail.
It is preposterous and ridiculous Ior them to Iloat rumor that the DPRK pins any hope on the next
U.S. president. It is a very wrong way oI thinking Ior them to regard their one-sided hard-line policy
toward the DPRK as a cure-all.
They had better clearly understand that iI the U.S. opts Ior the one-sided hard-line policy toward the
DPRK, the bilateral relations will reach an extreme phase and everything go up in smoke.
The DPRK does what it should do and reIrains Irom what it should not do no matter what others may
say. The U.S. conservative hardliners are sadly mistaken iI they calculate they can wrest any
concession Irom the DPRK with a strong-arm policy.
They would be well advised to discard a Ioolish delusion and behave with reason in the realistic way
oI thinking.
U.S. Rivals Overseas Now Bide Their Time
Thorniest Issues Will Face A New Administration; Seeking Better Deals?
By JAY SOLOMON
March 13, 2008; Page A8
WASHINGTON -- As Iall elections grow closer, many oI President Bush's Iiercest overseas Ioes
appear to be adjusting their Ioreign-policy strategies Ior the next administration.
The dynamic could undercut some oI the White House's most pressing Ioreign-policy initiatives,
including campaigns to disarm North Korea and to stabilize Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
Even American eIIorts to reach deals with Iriendly nations -- such as an agreement to share nuclear
technologies with India -- risk running out oI time. The Iallout could leave the next president with
immediate Ioreign-policy dilemmas, in addition to the war in Iraq.
The Republicans' presumptive candidate, Sen. John McCain, has pledged to maintain a hard line on
regimes such as those in Iran and North Korea, but there is a perception internationally that his Ioreign-
policy agenda will be much more nuanced than Mr. Bush's. Both Democratic candidates still seeking
their party's nomination, Sens. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, have campaigned on the platIorm oI
aggressively engaging some oI the world's most hostile regimes, such as Iran and Syria, in order to
stabilize the Middle East.
OIIicials in Tehran and Damascus already have made public statements saying they are going to wait
Ior new U.S. leadership beIore deciding whether to try to improve ties with Washington. "The
conditions oI the U.S. government are such now that it is harmIul Ior us to resume relations," Iran
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told Iranian students in a speech earlier this year. "We have never said
that they will be cut Iorever."
Last month, the Bush administration successIully lobbied the United Nations Security Council to pass a
new round oI economic sanctions aimed at pressuring Tehran into negotiations over the Iuture oI its
nuclear program. Many diplomats, say the sanctions are likely to be too weak to Iorce Iran to the
negotiating table, and Iew expect the White House to be able to pass a Iourth round oI sanctions against
Iran in its remaining 10 months in oIIice.
In Geneva today, Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher Hill is scheduled to meet with North Korean
negotiators to push Iorward a tentative denuclearization pact agreed to by Washington and Pyongyang
more than a year ago. Mr. Hill's mission Iollows a successIul trip by the New York Philharmonic to
North Korea last month, which has Iueled hopes oI a greater willingness by the communist state to
open to the West. Pyongyang has largely dismantled its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which has been
used to produce bomb-making Iuel.
There remains mounting concern inside the Bush administration that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il
may seek to draw out the current negotiations in a bid to extract more concessions Irom a Iuture U.S.
administration. These diplomats note that Pyongyang has already missed by 10 weeks its initial
deadline Ior declaring all its current and past nuclear activities, as called Ior by the agreement. And
North Korea's lead negotiator, Kim Kye Gwan, didn't show up Ior a scheduled meeting with Mr. Hill in
Beijing last month.
State Department oIIicials express optimism that Mr. Hill can successIully press Pyongyang this week
to clariIy two key parts oI its nuclear program: its alleged assistance to Syria and its attempts to
develop highly enriched uranium. These oIIicials say the U.S. is seeking to oIIer Pyongyang a Iace-
saving alternative through which to declare its programs. But should Mr. Hill Iail, they acknowledge
the next administration could immediately be Iaced with the challenge oI a North Korean leadership
possibly unwilling to give up its nuclear arsenal Ior any price. "My Iear is that the North Koreans are
trying to get what they can and then delay things," said a U.S. oIIicial working on counter-proliIeration
issues. "They may think they can get a better deal" down the line.
In the Middle East, the Bush administration's eIIorts to pressure and woo Syria into helping stabilize
the region also risk Ioundering. In November, the White House invited Damascus to a peace summit in
Annapolis, Md., calculating that Syrian President Bashar Assad may assist Washington's eIIorts to
promote deals in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories in return Ior U.S. support oI direct dialogue
between Syria and Israel over the disputed Golan Heights region. But increased instability inside
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories in recent months has led many Western diplomats to conclude
the overture Iailed.
The Bush administration has responded in recent weeks by placing sanctions on some oI President
Assad's closest conIidants while working with Arab states to try to curtail investment into Syria. But
Damascus is still expected to weather the storm while seeking direct dialogue with whichever candidate
replaces Mr. Bush. "There's likely to be another year in Lebanon without a president as the Syrians
continue to block a political settlement," says an Arab diplomat involved in the Syrian diplomacy.
Even Washington's much touted eIIorts to promote nuclear cooperation with India seem to be running
out oI time. More than two years ago, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
agreed to a tentative deal in which the U.S. would supply nuclear Iuels and technologies to New Delhi
in return Ior greater international oversight oI India's nuclear programs. Indian communist parties,
however, have subsequently sought to block ratiIication in India's parliament.
U.S. congressional leaders say they must begin debate on the deal's Iinal authorization by June in order
to complete the process in Washington's political calendar. But U.S. oIIicials say there remains
opposition in India and New Delhi needs to conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency on saIeguards.
OPINION
Salvaging Our North Korea Policy
By JOHN R. BOLTON
March 17, 2008
There are signs, albeit small ones, that the Bush administration may be reaching the end oI its patience
with the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. These signs could prove illusory.
But as it nears its end, the administration has a serious responsibility: It must not leave its successor
with an ongoing, Iailed policy. At a minimum, President Bush should not bequeath to the next
president only the burned-out hulk oI the Six-Party Talks, and countless Iailed and violated North
Korean commitments.
Since they were conceived in spring 2003, the Six-Party Talks have stumbled around inconclusively.
And Ior the last 13 months, Pyongyang has ignored, stalled, renegotiated and violated the Feb. 13, 2007
agreement.
Throughout all this "negotiation," which has mostly consisted oI our government negotiating with
itselI, North Korea has beneIited enormously. It's been spared the truly punishing sanctions that
concerted international eIIort might have produced. In large part because oI the appeasement policies
oI the two previous South Korean governments, Pyongyang has not Ielt the Iull impact oI the
ProliIeration Security Initiative (PSI) on its outward proliIeration eIIorts. The U.S. has muzzled its
criticism oI North Korea's atrocious oppression oI its own citizens. And, perhaps most humiliatingly oI
all, the U.S., in a vain eIIort at chasing the mirage, gave up its most eIIective pressure point -- the
Iinancial squeeze -- allowing Pyongyang renewed access to international markets through institutions
like Banco Delta Asia.
In Iact, the protracted Six-Party Talks have provided Kim Jong-il with the most precious resource oI
all: the time to enhance, conceal and even disperse his nuclear weapons programs. Time is nearly
always on the side oI the would-be proliIerator, and so it has proven here. In exchange Ior Iive years oI
grace to North Korea, the U.S. has received precious little in return.
Pyongyang is now stonewalling yet again on its promise to disclose Iully the details oI its nuclear
programs, including its uranium enrichment eIIorts and its outward proliIeration. The successIul Israeli
military strike against a Syrian-North Korean Iacility on the Euphrates River last September
highlighted the gravity oI the regime's unwillingness to do anything serious that might restrict its
nuclear option.
President Bush should spend the next 10 months rectiIying the Six-Party concessions and put North
Korea back under international pressure -- eIIorts that would be welcomed by Japan, and South Korea's
new, Iar more realistic President Lee Myung-bak. Here are the steps to take:
- Declare North Korea's repeated reIusal to honor its commitments, especially but not exclusively
concerning Iull disclosure oI its nuclear programs, unacceptable. This is the easiest step, and the most
obvious. It can happen immediately. Accept no Iurther partial "compliance," as the State Department
continuously tries to do. Make public what we know about the North's Syria project, and its uranium
enrichment and missile programs, so our 2008 presidential candidates can have a Iully-inIormed
debate.
- Suspend the Six-Party Talks, and reconvene talks without North Korea. Although the talks could be
jettisoned altogether, continuing them without the North allows Japan, South Korea and the U.S. to
begin applying real pressure to China, the one nation with the capacity to bring Pyongyang's nuclear
program to a halt. China has Ieared to apply such pressure, worried that it could collapse Kim Jong-il's
regime altogether -- an accurate assessment oI the regime's limited staying power. Nonetheless, the
eIIect oI Chinese reticence has been to preserve Kim and his nuclear program. It is vital that China
know this policy is no longer viable.
- Strengthen international pressure on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Ramp up PSI
cooperation with South Korea. Remind Russia oI its own voluntarily-assumed obligations as a PSI core
member. Remind China as well to comply with the sanctions imposed on North Korea by U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 (which Iollowed the North's 2006 ballistic missile and
nuclear tests), and honor its other counterproliIeration obligations. Tell them we will be watching with
particular care, and that Chinese Iailure to increase pressure on North Korea will have implications in
Sino-American bilateral relations. We can make this point privately to China rather that trumpet it
publicly, but it should be made without ambiguity.
- Squeeze North Korea economically. Return the regime to limbo outside the international Iinancial
system, and step up action against its other illicit activities, such as traIIicking in illicit narcotics and
counterIeiting U.S. money. These and other "deIensive measures" are nothing more than what any selI-
respecting nation does to protect itselI, and the U.S. should never have eased up on them. Even now
they can have a measurable impact on Kim Jong-il's weak and unsteady regime.
- Prepare contingency plans Ior humanitarian relieI in the event oI increased North Korean reIugee
Ilows or a regime collapse. Both China and South Korea have legitimate concerns about the burdens
they would Iace iI the North collapsed, or iI increased internal economic deprivation spread instability.
America and Japan should make it plain that they will Iully shoulder their share oI providing
humanitarian supplies and assistance iI either happened. Moreover, President Lee should increase
pressure on Pyongyang -- by reiterating that South Korea will Iully comply with its own constitution
and grant Iull citizenship to any reIugees Irom the North, however they make their way to the South.
Doubtless there are other steps. President Bush will not likely be able to solve the threat posed by
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless, he still has time to implement policies that will
allow him to leave oIIice with the nation back on oIIense -- thereby aIIording his successor the chance
to vindicate a return to the original Bush administration national security strategy.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?editionid1&categid5&articleid90123
North Korea and Syria: The US wants to know more
By David Ignatius
Daily Star staII
Saturday, March 22, 2008
For many months, Bush administration oIIicials have been imagining a valedictory conclusion to their
long-running negotiations with North Korea: Pyongyang would make a "complete and correct
declaration" about its nuclear program, and Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice would travel to North
Korea to celebrate normalization oI relations with a Iormer member oI the "axis oI evil."
But the North Korea breakthrough isn't happening, and administration oIIicials know they are running
out oI time beIore Bush leaves oIIice. The New York Philharmonic has come and gone Irom its
February 26 concert in Pyongyang - without Rice there to add a nimble-Iingered piano accompaniment,
as some US oIIicials had hoped.
An agreement remains tantalizingly close: The North Koreans are currently disabling their reactor at
Yongbyon, which was a key part oI the denuclearization agreement announced last October. And there
are hopes that iI Pyongyang will Iinally deliver the promised nuclear declaration, then negotiations can
move to a Iinal (and even more diIIicult) phase oI bargaining over destruction oI North Korea's handIul
oI nuclear weapons and an estimated 30 to 40 kilograms oI plutonium.
What is blocking this breakthrough is North Korea's reIusal to explain its nuclear relationship with
Syria. This remains one oI the murkiest Ioreign-policy issues oI the past year, but administration
policymakers, intelligence oIIicials and other analysts recently shed some new light on what happened.
The mystery centers on Israel's bombing on September 6, 2007, oI a Iacility in Syria. This was to be the
site oI a nuclear reactor, US oIIicials believe. North Korea had made a secret agreement to provide
technical knowhow and some materials Ior the reactor, although not Iissile material. The Israelis
destroyed the reactor site - but neither they nor the US made any public statement about the attack.
The silence in the United States and Israel led some analysts to think that the Bush administration was
aIraid oI blowing up the six-party talks with North Korea - by disclosing the evidence oI Pyongyang's
role as a proliIerator. That may have been a small Iactor, but I'm told that the larger issue was a Iear in
Israel - especially, it is said, with DeIense Minister Ehud Barak - that disclosure would wreck the
chances Ior serious peace negotiations with Syria, which the Israelis were exploring through back
channels.
For Israel and Syria, it appears, last September was a classic Middle East moment oI talking and
Iighting simultaneously. Since then, hopes in Israel Ior a breakthrough with Syria appear to have Iaded.
Back to the North Korea negotiations: Christopher Hill, the US assistant secretary oI state Ior East Asia
who has deItly managed the six-party talks, began demanding an accounting oI the Syria connection
last Iall. The North Korean response, as recently as Hill's March 13 meeting in Geneva with North
Korean negotiator Kim Gye Gwan, has essentially been: "We never did it, and we won't do it again."
That is, the North Koreans have promised that they have no current nuclear cooperation with Damascus
and won't have any in the Iuture, but they won't discuss what may have happened in the past. That's not
enough, Hill has insisted.
American oIIicials have begun to conIirm publicly that they have hard intelligence about North Korean
proliIeration. Mike McConnell, the director oI national intelligence, said in February 7 testimony to the
House Intelligence Committee: "While Pyongyang denies a program Ior uranium enrichment and also
denies its proliIeration activities, we know North Korea continues to engage in both." In a telephone
interview this week, a senior intelligence oIIicial conIirmed the Syria nuclear connection, saying: "Our
suspicions are justiIied and valid. A lot oI due diligence was done on this. People are conIident."
Hill expressed the administration's Irustration over North Korea's Ioot- dragging in comments to
reporters last week. "We are at a point where we really do need to make progress soon to wrap up" the
current phase oI negotiations, he said. He complained that the North Koreans "seem to think I have
nothing better to do in my time or in my liIe than to keep asking them questions." Hill has privately
rebuIIed Pyongyang's request Ior another round aIter the Geneva session, saying that there's no point in
meeting iI the stalemate continues.
A Iull peace agreement with North Korea remains a worthy prize. It would stabilize a dangerous region
and cement the cooperation between China and the US that made the six-party talks possible. But as
with so many oI its Ioreign-policy goals, the Bush administration is nearly out oI time. It doesn't make
sense to break oII the talks when they are so close to success, but then, it doesn't make sense to
continue with a charade, either.
http://www.themedialine.org/news/newsdetail.asp?NewsID21141
Israel Fears New Korean Nuclear Factor But Remains Silent
Written by David Harris
Published Monday, April 07, 2008
|Analysis| It is no secret that Israel believes North Korean scientists were working in Syria to help
develop a nuclear program a project Israel destroyed when it launched an aerial attack on an
installation in northern Syria on September 6 last year.

Right now, there is a debate in Israel as to whether to go public concerning that airstrike. So Iar no
oIIicial inIormation has been published by Jerusalem, with Ioreign media coverage being the main
vehicle Ior knowing what happened. For the record, Syria vehemently denies the Iactory in question
was a Iledgling nuclear Iacility.

II one believes the latest reports in the Hebrew media, Israeli Intelligence believes the North Koreans
have now turned their attention to Iran, with the level oI aid, iI anything, considerably greater than that
given to Damascus. Washington is pressuring Pyongyang behind the scenes to end its association with
Tehran.

However, in public, neither the Bush administration nor the Olmert government is openly criticizing
North Korea. And that has absolutely nothing to do with United States Mideast policy or with Israels
relations with its Arab and Muslim neighbors.

The lack oI Irankness about the Korean involvement in Syria and Iran is all about the Bush legacy and
the U.S. approach to Southeast Asia. The deal brokered by Washington with North Korea is arguably
the key success story oI the Bush administration (some would say its only success). President George
W. Bush, his team oI negotiators led by Christopher Hill and the State Department do not want to see
that deal collapse. Any public attack on Pyongyang could lead to a u-turn by the Koreans and a return
to a potential arms race involving China, Japan and South Korea.

So, while some in Israel, led by the DeIense Ministry, are pushing Ior more openness about Israels
recent operation in Syria, the diplomatic wonks in Washington are urging Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
to ensure the gag order on his cabinet members remains in place.
A Mystery in the Middle East
April 8, 2008
By George Friedman
The Arab-Israeli region oI the Middle East is Iilled with rumors oI war. That is about as unusual as the
rising oI the sun, so normally it would not be worth mentioning. But like the proverbial broken clock
that is right twice a day, such rumors occasionally will be true. In this case, we dont know that they are
true, and certainly its not the rumors that are driving us. But other things minor and readily
explicable individually have drawn our attention to the possibility that something is happening.
The Iirst thing that drew our attention was a minor, routine matter. Back in February, the United States
started purchasing oil Ior its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The SPR is a reserve oI crude oil
stored in underground salt domes. Back in February, it stood at 96.2 percent oI capacity, which is pretty
Iull as Iar as we are concerned. But the U.S. Department oI Energy decided to increase its capacity.
This move came in spite oI record-high oil prices and the Iact that the purchase would not help matters.
It also came despite potential political Iallout, since during times like these there is generally pressure
to release reserves. Part oI the step could have been the bureaucracy cranking away, and part oI it could
have been the Ieeling that the step didnt make much diIIerence. But part oI it could have been based
on real Iears oI a disruption in oil supplies. By itselI, the move meant nothing. But it did cause us to
become thoughtIul.
Also in February, someone assassinated Imad Mughniyah, a leader oI Hezbollah, in a car bomb
explosion in Syria. It was assumed the Israelis had killed him, although there were some suspicions the
Syrians might have had him killed Ior their own arcane reasons. In any case, Hezbollah publicly
claimed the Israelis killed Mughniyah, and thereIore it was expected the militant Shiite group would
take revenge. In the past, Hezbollah responded not by attacking Israel but by attacking Jewish targets
elsewhere, as in the Buenos Aires attacks oI 1992 and 1994.
In March, the United States decided to dispatch the USS Cole, then under Sixth Fleet command, to
Lebanese coastal waters. Washington later replaced it with two escorts Irom the Nassau (LHA-4)
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), reportedly maintaining a minor naval presence in the area. (Most oI
the ESG, on a regularly scheduled deployment, is no more than a Iew days sail Irom the coast, as it
remains in the Mediterranean Sea.) The reason given Ior the American naval presence was to serve as a
warning to the Syrians not to involve themselves in Lebanese aIIairs. The exact mission oI the naval
presence oII the Levantine coast and the exact deterrent Iunction it served was not clear, but
there they were. The Sixth Fleet has gone out oI its way to park and maintain U.S. warships oII the
Lebanese coast.
Hezbollah leaders being killed by the Israelis and the presence oI American ships oII the shores oI
Mediterranean countries are not news in and oI themselves. These things happen. The killing oI
Mughniyah is notable only to point out that as much as Israel might have wanted him dead, the Israelis
knew this Iight would escalate. But anyone would have known this. So all we know is that whoever
killed Mughniyah wanted to trigger a conIlict. The U.S. naval presence oII the Levantine coast is
notable in that Washington, rather busy with matters elsewhere, Iound the bandwidth to get involved
here as well.
With the situation becoming tense, the Israelis announced in March that they would carry out an
exercise in April called Turning Point 2. Once again, an Israeli military exercise is hardly interesting
news. But the Syrians apparently got quite interested. AIter the announcement, the Syrians deployed
three divisions two armored, one mechanized to the Lebanese-Syrian border in the Bekaa Valley,
the western part oI which is Hezbollahs stronghold. The Syrians didnt appear to be aggressive.
Rather, they deployed these Iorces in a deIensive posture, in a way walling oII their part oI the valley.
The Syrians are well aware that in the event oI a conventional war with Israel, they would experience a
short but exciting liIe, as they say. They thus are hardly going to attack Israel. The deployment
thereIore seemed intended to keep the Israelis on the Lebanese side oI the border on the apparent
assumption the Israelis were going into the Bekaa Valley. Despite Israeli and Syrian denials oI the
Syrian troop buildup along the border, StratIor sources maintain that the buildup in Iact happened.
Normally, Israel would be jumping at the chance to trumpet Syrian aggression in response to these
troop movements, but, instead, the Israelis downplayed the buildup.
When the Israelis kicked oII Turning Point 2, which we regard as a pretty interesting name, it turned
out to be the largest exercise in Israeli history. It involved the entire country, and was designed to test
civil deIenses and the ability oI the national command authority to continue to Iunction in the event oI
an attack with unconventional weapons chemical and nuclear, we would assume. This was a costly
exercise. It also involved calling up reserves, some oI them Ior the exercise, and, by some reports,
others Ior deployment to the north against Syria. Israel does not call up reserves casually. Reserve call-
ups are expensive and disrupt the civilian economy. These appear small, but in the environment oI
Turning Point 2, it would not be diIIicult to mobilize larger Iorces without being noticed.
The Syrians already were deeply concerned by the Israeli exercise. Eventually, the Lebanese
government got worried, too, and started to evacuate some civilians Irom the South. Hezbollah, which
still hadnt retaliated Ior the Mughniyah assassination, also claimed the Israelis were about to attack it,
and reportedly went on alert and mobilized its Iorces. The Americans, who normally issue warnings
and cautions to everyone, said nothing to try to calm the situation. They just sat oIIshore on their ships.
It is noteworthy that Israeli DeIense Minister Ehud Barak canceled a scheduled visit to Germany this
week. The cancellation came immediately aIter the reports oI the Syrian military redeployment were
released. Obviously, Barak needed to be in Israel Ior Turning Point 2, but then he had known about the
exercise Ior at least a month. Why cancel at the last minute? While we are discussing diplomacy, we
note that U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visited Oman a country with close relations with Iran
and then was Iollowed by U.S. Secretary oI DeIense Robert Gates. By itselI not interesting, but why
the high-level interest in Oman at this point?
Now lets swing back to September 2007, when the Israelis bombed something in Syria near the
Turkish border. As we discussed at the time, Ior some reason the Israelis reIused to say what they had
attacked. It made no sense Ior them not to trumpet what they careIully leaked namely, that they had
attacked a nuclear Iacility. Proving that Syria had a secret nuclear program would have been a public
relations coup Ior Israel. Nevertheless, no public charges were leveled. And the Syrians remained
awIully calm about the bombing.
Rumors now are swirling that the Israelis are about to reveal publicly that they in Iact bombed a nuclear
reactor provided to Syria by North Korea. But this news isnt all that big. Also rumored is that the
Israelis will claim Iranian complicity in building the reactor. And one Israeli TV station reported April
8 that Israel really had discovered Saddam Husseins weapons oI mass destruction, which it said had
been smuggled to Syria.
Now why the Bush administration wouldnt have trumpeted news oI the Syrian reactor worldwide in
September 2007 is beyond us, but there obviously were some reasons assuming the TV report is
true, which we have no way oI establishing. In Iact, we have no idea why the Israelis are choosing this
moment to rehash the bombing oI this site. But whatever their reason, it certainly raises a critical
question. II the Syrians are developing a nuclear capability, what are the Israelis planning to do about
it?
No one oI these things, by itselI, is oI very great interest. And taken together they do not provide the
means Ior a clear Iorecast. Nevertheless, a series oI rather ordinary events, taken together, can
constitute something signiIicant. Tensions in the Middle East are moving well beyond the normal point,
and given everything that is happening, events are moving to a point where someone is likely to take
military action. Whether Hezbollah will carry out a retaliatory strike or Israel a pre-emptive strike in
Lebanon, or whether the Israelis real target is Iran, tensions systematically have been ratcheted up to
the point where we, in our simple way, are beginning to wonder whether something has to give.
All together, these events are Iairly extraordinary. Ignoring all rhetoric and the Israelis have gone
out oI their way to say that they are not looking Ior a Iight it would seem that each side, but
particularly the Americans and Israelis, have gone out oI their way to signal that they are expecting
conIlict. The Syrians have also signaled that they expect conIlict, and Hezbollah always claims there is
about to be conIlict.
What is missing is this: who will Iight whom, and why, and why now. The simple explanation is that
Israel wants a second round with Hezbollah. But while that might be true, it doesnt explain everything
else that has happened. Most important, it doesnt explain the simultaneous revelations about the
bombing oI Syria. It also doesnt explain the U.S. naval deployment. Is the United States about to get
involved in a war with Hezbollah, a war that the Israelis should handle themselves? Are the Israelis
going to topple Syrian President Bashar al Assad and then wind up with a Sunni government, or
worse, an Israeli occupation oI Syria? None oI that makes a lot oI sense.
In truth, all oI this may dissolve into nothing much. In intelligence analysis, however, sometimes a set
oI not-Iully-coherent Iacts must be reported, and that is what we are doing now. There is no clear
pattern; there is no obvious direction this is taking. Nevertheless, when we string together events Irom
February until now, we see a persistently escalating pattern oI behavior. In Iact, what we can say most
clearly is that there is escalation, without being able to say what is the clear direction oI the escalation
or the purpose.
We would like to wrap this up with a crystal clear explanation and Iorecast. But we cant. The motives
oI the various actors are opaque; and taken separately, the individual events all have quite innocent
explanations. We are not prepared to say war is imminent, nor even what sort oI war there would be.
We are simply prepared to say that the course oI events since February and really since the
September 2007 attack on Syria have been startling, and they appear to be reaching some sort oI
hard-to-understand crescendo.
The bombing oI Syria symbolizes our conIusion. Why would Syria want a nuclear reactor and why put
it on the border oI Turkey, a country the Syrians arent particularly Iriendly with? II the Syrians had a
nuclear reactor, why would the Israelis be coy about it? Why would the Americans? Having said
nothing Ior months apart Irom careIul leaks, why are the Israelis going to speak publicly now? And iI
what they are going to say is simply that the North Koreans provided the equipment, whats the big
deal? That was leaked months ago.
The events oI September 2007 make no sense and have never made any sense. The events we have
seen since February make no sense either. That is noteworthy, and we bring it to your attention. We are
not saying that the events are meaningless. We are saying that we do not know their meaning. But we
cant help but regard them as ominous.

OPINION
Bush's North Korea Capitulation
By JOHN R. BOLTON
President George W. Bush is Iond oI comparing himselI to Ronald Reagan. But as he meets with South
Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Washington this week, his policy regarding North Korea's nuclear
weapons program looks more like something out oI Bill Clinton's or Jimmy Carter's playbook.
In dealing with the Soviet Union on arms control, Reagan was Iamous Ior repeating the Russian phrase,
"Doveryai, no proveryai" (trust, but veriIy). Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reportedly once
complained to Reagan, "You use that phrase every time we meet." To which Reagan smilingly replied,
"That's because I like it so much."
This administration appears to have Iorgotten that concept altogether. Although the Six-Party Talks
have been sliding into dangerous territory Ior some time, the Bush administration has repeatedly said
that North Korea's complete, veriIiable disclosure oI its nuclear program was a sine qua non oI any
deal. No longer.
Last week in Singapore, U.S. chieI negotiator Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim
Kye Gwan reached a deal that rests on trust and not veriIication. According to numerous press reports
and Mr. Hill's April 10 congressional brieIing, the U.S. will be expected to accept on Iaith, literally,
North Korean assertions that it has not engaged in signiIicant uranium enrichment, and that it has not
proliIerated nuclear technology or materials to countries like Syria and Iran.
Indeed, the North will not even make the declaration it earlier agreed to, but merely "acknowledge" that
we are concerned about reports oI such activities which the United States itselI will actually list. By
some accounts, the North Korean statement will not even be public. In exchange Ior this utter
nonperIormance, the North will be rewarded with political "compensation" (its word): Concurrent with
its "declaration," it will be removed Irom the U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and Ireed Irom the
Trading With the Enemy Act.
President Bush has repeatedly told Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser
Stephen Hadley not to make him look weak on North Korea. II the president accepts the deal now on
the table, things will be Iar worse than that.
Although the U.S. public is not yet Iully aware oI every detail oI this agreement, the administration's
public and private comments eIIectively admit the substance. While brieIing Congress, Mr. Hill said he
expects the North's release Irom the long-standing U.S. constraints to be "simultaneous" with its
"acknowledgment," which he described as a "win-win" concept.
The generals in Pyongyang must love that assessment. They can also relax, since they won't have to
worry about concealing their ongoing nuclear work Irom any veriIication Iollow-up.
Our chieI negotiator conceded, without blushing, that North Korea "won't allow snap inspections,"
which apparently justiIies the Bush administration's immediate surrender. Indeed, Mr. Hill derided
concerns about the North's enrichment eIIort by saying, according to an attendee, "Some people
imagine there is a building somewhere with a secret door they can open and Iind a group oI scantily
clad women enriching uranium."
So much Ior legitimate concerns about U.S. security and the equally legitimate concerns oI our allies.
Despite cryptic comments by Secretary oI State Rice to the contrary, there is no veriIication mechanism
whatever to explore and monitor the truth oI what North Korea will say. We will be taking their word.
Ironically, the only hang-up is that North Korea is still lying about how much plutonium it has
accumulated, proIIering an amount well below what U.S. intelligence believes to be the case. In short,
the Bush administration is Iocusing on what it thinks it knows (plutonium), ignoring what could be the
Iar more dangerous activities (uranium enrichment) it has reason to suspect.
This is the same mistake as the drunk searching Ior his car keys near a lamppost, even though he admits
to a passerby they are not there. Why keep looking near the lamp post? "Because the light is better," the
drunk replies.
One can only imagine what Ronald Reagan would have said in his 1980 campaign, iI Jimmy Carter had
Iallen so low. Similarly, in 1999, Iormer Secretary oI State James Baker called Clinton administration
policy on North Korea "appeasement," writing in the New York Times: "Once again, we have been
played Ior Iools. . . . |I|t is hard to Iathom how anyone could put credence in any agreement by North
Korea."
Perhaps President Bush could at least read Secretary Baker's Times's op-ed beIore he signs oII on this
deal. Even Jack Pritchard, the Bush administration's Iormer chieI North Korea negotiator who
resigned Iive years ago because he believed our policy was too harsh is critical oI the current
approach.
Our allies South Korea and Japan will long remember this impending act oI American Iecklessness.
South Korea's President Lee, who was voted into oIIice last December, campaigned extensively on
requiring the North to meet its commitments. As he meets with President Bush this week, his
countrymen must be wondering why the North's commitments mean something in Seoul but not in
Washington.
Japan emphatically wants Pyongyang to account Ior the Japanese citizens kidnapped over the decades.
On April 12, Japan extended its own economic sanctions against the North. Nonetheless, despite the
absence oI any resolution oI these repeated acts oI North Korean terrorism, the U.S., until now Japan's
closest ally, is poised to remove the North Irom the terrorism list.
Pyongyang's escape Irom accountability could break down international counter-proliIeration eIIorts.
What possible reason will Iran now have to be transparent about its nuclear activities? II North Korea
can get away with deception and be rewarded, why should Iran not do the same? In Libya, Moammar
GadhaIi will kick himselI Ior giving up his nuclear weapons program in 2003. This deal with North
Korea is troubling enough, but the worst news is still to come.
Last Iall, President Bush rejected the idea oI giving North Korea a pass on uranium enrichment and
proliIeration. Now, in the waning days oI his term, he seems poised to accept it. II he does, and iI this
deal proceeds, we can well and truly say: "President Bush, you are no Ronald Reagan."
Mr. Bolton, a senior Iellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author oI "Surrender Is Not an
Option: DeIending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions, 2007).
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Six-Party Giveaway
Kim Jong Il has done it again. The North Korean dictator rarely makes a promise he doesn't break, and
sure enough, that includes his latest nuclear disarmament pledge. He can thank his enablers in
Washington Ior letting him get away with it.
Kim's strategy was entirely predictable on February 13, 2007, when North Korea pledged to give up its
nuclear ambitions in exchange Ior diplomatic recognition and Ioreign aid. AIter years oI broken
promises, missile launches and nuclear tests, there was little reason to think Kim would treat this
promise any diIIerently than he had previous ones. At the time, we called it Iaith-based
nonproliIeration, and now that's turning out literally to be the case.
AIter months oI demanding that the North live up to its promise to provide a "complete declaration oI
its nuclear programs" as speciIied in the document Pyongyang signed the U.S. is now backtracking.
Last week in Singapore, U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart reached a
compromise that media reports say will take the North's assurances on Iaith.
Washington appears ready to accept a declaration that reIers only to the North's plutonium program. It
would exclude any mention oI its clandestine uranium enrichment program which it bragged about in
2002 but now claims never existed. Nor would it explain the North's proliIeration oI nuclear
technology or materials to Syria, Iran or elsewhere.
A Financial Times report quotes an anonymous U.S. oIIicial, almost certainly Mr. Hill, as saying a "Iull
admission" isn't necessary. "This is a regime that is incapable oI certain things, and it is incapable oI
doing that." This is diplomacy as psychotherapy. In other words, the U.S. will give a pass to
Pyongyang Ior lying about Syria and uranium while assuming that the North is now telling us the truth
about its plutonium stockpile. This turns Ronald Reagan's slogan on its head: Trust but don't veriIy.
The revised nuclear deal hasn't been Iormally announced, and President Bush could still nix it. South
Korea's new President, Lee Myung-bak, who will be in Washington later this week, has the moral
standing to persuade Mr. Bush oI the dangers here. Since taking oIIice at the end oI February, Mr. Lee
has talked tough on the subject oI North Korean accountability. Pyongyang has responded by testing
short-range missiles that could reach the South and threatening to reduce Seoul to "ashes."
Allowing the North to renege on its pledge to account Iully Ior its nuclear programs is also a slap at
Japan, another U.S. ally in range oI Pyongyang's missiles. Tokyo has been pushing North Korea Ior
inIormation about the Japanese citizens it abducted in the 1970s and '80s. II Pyongyang doesn't have to
account Ior its nuclear weapons or its uranium program, why would it Ieel inclined to account Ior a Iew
Japanese nationals?
In the waning days oI the Bush Administration, there seems to be an attitude that any deal with
Pyongyang is better than no deal. But a "disarmament" accord that gives the North a pass on
proliIeration and uranium is more than worthless. In addition to propping up Kim's regime, the
Administration is setting a standard Ior nonproliIeration that is so low that it may well allow rogue
regimes to keep their weapons while getting credit Ior giving them up. This is dangerous.
A Deal With Pyongyang?
Once again, North Korea may gain concessions Irom the Bush administration while evading its own
commitments.
FOR MONTHS, the Bush administration has insisted that North Korea would have to IulIill its year-old
commitment to disclose all oI its nuclear programs in order to receive Iurther economic and political concessions
Irom the United States. The disclosure is important because Pyongyang has until now denied that it pursued
uranium enrichment or helped Syria with a nuclear reactor, even though there is strong evidence that it did both.
A truthIul statement would indicate that the regime oI Kim Jong Il was serious about giving up its weapons and
not just trying to extort aid Irom the West as it has in the past.
Yet the Bush administration appears to be close to a deal under which North Korea would be excused Irom
disclosing its work with uranium and proliIeration activity. Instead, The Post's Glenn Kessler reported, it would
merely "acknowledge" -- possibly in private -- a U.S. statement oI concern about those activities. According to a
package craIted by Assistant Secretary oI State Christopher R. Hill, the North would disclose only its plutonium
stockpile, by Iar the most dangerous part oI its nuclear program. In return the United States would make two
major concessions: North Korea would be removed Irom the State Department's list oI state sponsors oI
terrorism and be exempted Irom the Trading With the Enemy Act.
Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice was still saying yesterday that "the outcome we and our partners require is a
Iull account Irom North Korea oI all its nuclear programs, including any uranium and nuclear proliIeration
activities." But the reality is that the Bush administration is letting an intransigent regime oII the hook.
Administration oIIicials explain Ms. Rice's statement by saying that the North Koreans would eventually
"account" Ior their uranium and proliIeration by accepting a process oI veriIication. But that process will be
prolonged, iI it succeeds at all. In the meantime Mr. Kim will pocket the latest U.S. concessions without making
the "Iull and complete declaration" oI nuclear programs that Ms. Rice previously said would be required.
In a meeting with members oI Congress and in statements to reporters, Mr. Hill has argued that the Iirst priority
must be the plutonium stockpile, since it can be used to make weapons. In contrast, U.S. oIIicials believe that
while North Korea obtained equipment Ior uranium enrichment, it does not now have such a program. Yet there
are also problems with North Korea's preliminary declaration on plutonium, which is well below U.S.
intelligence estimates. Ms. Rice suggested that the amount oI plutonium, too, will have to be conIirmed by the
veriIication process.
II the United States were able to reach its goal oI having North Korea surrender its plutonium, substantial
concessions would be justiIied. But senior administration oIIicials say they don't expect that the Kim regime will
turn over its plutonium in the coming nine months. That raises the question oI why President Bush would allow
North Korea to evade Iull disclosure. Mr. Hill's deal would preserve the negotiating process -- but what does the
Bush administration stand to gain Irom it? All along the risk has been that North Korea would repeatedly extract
economic and political Iavors Irom the United States without giving up its nuclear arsenal. The latest deal would
seem to greatly increase the chance that that will be the legacy oI Mr. Bush's diplomacy.
Deterring the Undeterrable
By Charles Krauthammer
The era oI nonproliIeration is over. During the Iirst halI-century oI the nuclear age, saIety lay in
restricting the weaponry to major powers and keeping it out oI the hands oI rogue states. This strategy
was inevitably going to break down. The inevitable has arrived.
The six-party talks on North Korea have Iailed miserably. They did not prevent Pyongyang Irom
testing a nuclear weapon and entering the club. Now North Korea has broken yet again its agreement to
reveal all its nuclear Iacilities.
The other test case was Iran. The EU-3 negotiations (Britain, France and Germany) went nowhere.
Each U.N. Security Council resolution enacting what passed Ior sanctions was more useless than the
last. Uranium enrichment continues.
When Iran's latest announcement that it was tripling its number oI centriIuges to 9,000 elicited no
discernible response Irom the Bush administration, the game was over. Everyone says Iran must be
prevented Irom going nuclear. No one will bell the cat.
The "international community" is prepared to do nothing oI consequence to halt nuclear proliIeration.
No one wants to admit that. Nor does anyone want to contemplate the prospect oI nuclear weapons in
the hands oI one, two, many rogue states.
We must. The day is coming, and quickly. We must Iace reality and begin thinking how we live with
the unthinkable.
There are Iour ways to deal with rogue states going nuclear: preemption, deterrence, missile deIense
and regime change.
Preemption works but, as a remedy, it is spent. Iraq was deIanged by the 1981 Israeli airstrike, by the
1991 Persian GulI War (which uncovered Saddam Hussein's clandestine nuclear programs) and Iinally
by the 2003 invasion, which ended the Hussein dynasty, pere et deux Iils.
A collateral eIIect oI the Iraq war was Libya's nuclear disarmament. Seeing Hussein's Iate, Moammar
GaddaIi declared and dismantled his nuclear program. And iI November's National Intelligence
Estimate is to be believed, the Iraq invasion even induced Iran to temporarily suspend weaponization
and enrichment.
But the cost oI preemption is simply too high. No one is going to renew the Korean War with an attack
on Pyongyang. And the prospects oI an attack on Iran's Iacilities are now vanishingly small. What to
do?
Deterrence. It worked in the two-player Cold War. Will it work against multiple rogues? It seems quite
suitable Ior North Korea, whose regime, Iar Irom being suicidal, is obsessed with survival.
Iran is a diIIerent proposition. With its current millenarian leadership, deterrence is indeed a Ieeble
gamble, as I wrote in 2006 in making the case Ior considering preemption. But iI preemption is oII the
table, deterrence is all you've got. Our task is to make deterrence in this context less Ieeble.
Two ways: Begin by making the retaliatory threat in response to Iranian nuclear aggression so
unmistakable and so overwhelming that the non-millenarians in leadership would stay the hand or even
remove those taking their country to the point oI extinction.
But there is an adjunct to deterrence: missile deIense. Against a huge Soviet arsenal, this was useless.
Against small powers with small arsenals, i.e., North Korea and Iran, it becomes extremely eIIective in
conjunction with deterrence.
For the sake oI argument, imagine a two-layered anti-missile system in which each layer is imperIect,
with, say, a 90 percent shoot-down accuracy. That means one in 100 missiles gets through both layers.
That inIinitely strengthens deterrence by radically degrading the possibility oI a successIul Iirst strike.
Even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad might reIrain Irom launching an arsenal oI, say, 20 nukes iI his scientiIic
advisers showed him that there was only an 18.2 percent chance oI any getting through-- and a 100
percent chance that a retaliatory counterattack oI hundreds oI Israeli (and/or American) nukes would
reduce the world's Iirst Islamic republic to a cinder.
OI course, one can get around missile deIense by using terrorists. But anything short oI a hermetically
secret, perIectly executed, multiple-site attack would cause terrible, but not existential, destruction. The
retaliatory destruction, on the other hand, would be existential.
We are, oI course, dealing here with probabilities. Total saIety comes only Irom regime change. During
the Cold War, we worried about Soviet nukes, but never French or British nukes. Weapons don't kill
people; people kill people. Regime change will surely come to both North Korea and Iran. That is the
ultimate salvation.
But between now and then lies danger. How to saIely navigate the interval? Deterrence plus missile
deIense renders a Iirst strike so unlikely to succeed and yet so certain to bring on selI-destruction that it
might -- just might -- get us through Irom the day the rogues go nuclear to the day they are deposed.
We have entered the post-nonproliIeration age. It's time to take our heads out oI the sand and deal with
it.
letterscharleskrauthammer.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/opinion/19sat1.html
Editorial
Now Hes Ready to Deal
April 19, 2008
President Bushs latest compromise Ior ending North Koreas nuclear program is agitating critics
outside his administration and in. It is an imperIect solution. But imperIect may be all one can expect
aIter Mr. Bush wasted so much time reIusing to consider any compromise at all.
For six years, Mr. Bush rejected any meaningIul negotiations. The result? Pyongyang kept adding to its
plutonium stockpile it now has enough Ior eight or more bombs and tested a nuclear device.
When Mr. Bush Iinally agreed to try diplomacy and gave a serious diplomat, Christopher Hill, the
room to negotiate Washington correctly insisted on a complete and correct accounting oI all North
Koreas nuclear activities as an important step toward dismantling the program. Now Mr. Bush is
willing to accept less.
The North Koreans wont have to come clean at least Ior now on their Iledgling uranium-based
weapons program, which American oIIicials believe has been shut down. Nor will they be required to
publicly admit to selling Syria the technology and know-how to build a nuclear reactor. Israel
destroyed that project last September. Instead, oIIicials say, the United States will stipulate what it
knows about these programs, and Pyongyang only has to acknowledge these concerns.
OI course, iI a Democratic president had made similar compromises, hard-line Republicans probably
would have called Ior impeachment. That said, Mr. Hill may be right that this is the only chance to
push the process to the next step: getting North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-based reactor at
Yongbyon and eventually surrender all its nuclear Iuel and weapons.
That is the clear and present danger. The North Koreans have already shut down Yongbyon an
important but insuIIicient accomplishment.
Presuming the current compromise comes together the two sides remain divided over the size oI
North Koreas plutonium Iuel stocks North Korea would be removed Irom Americas list oI terrorist
states and Irom sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act and receive a large shipment oI heavy
Iuel oil.
All oI this is especially Irustrating when one considers how much saIer the world would be iI Mr. Bush
had picked up where President Bill Clinton leIt oII in 2001. In those days, the North Koreans only had
enough plutonium Ior one or two bombs. Activities at Yongbyon were Irozen under a 1994 agreement.
Mr. Bush and his aides detested that agreement, and as soon as they discovered Pyongyang was trying
to build a uranium-based weapons program, they declared that diplomacy pointless.
The hard-liners are right on one thing: No commitment Irom North Korea should ever be taken at Iace
value. Were not convinced it will ever trade its nuclear capability, even Ior vastly better diplomatic
and economic ties with the world.
That is why the emerging deal will require the most transparency and veriIication possible, including
Iull access to its plutonium production records. The Bush administration must push harder on this. And
iI North Korea is Iound cheating, the world will have to impose even tougher sanctions.
As we said, it is an imperIect solution. But, presuming the deal isnt weakened even more, it may be
the only choice.
http://www.cIr.org/publication/16075/
Samore: More Fluid U.S. Stance on N. Korea Nuclear Weapons
Interviewee:
Gary Samore, Vice President, Director oI Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair
Interviewer:
Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor
April 23, 2008
Gary Samore Gary Samore, vice president oI the Council on Foreign Relations, says the Bush
administration has agreed to a compromise on demands Ior North Korea to conIess the extent oI its
uranium-enrichment activities. Samore, a senior arms control negotiator in the Clinton administration,
says the compromise is to allow the United States to get into what it considers to be the most
important element oI the deal, the negotiation over the actual elimination oI North Koreas nuclear
weapons.
Whats the status of negotiations with North Korea? A year ago, it looked like we had an
agreement. Now critics are saying the Bush administration is giving away the store and selling
out.
For over a year the talks have been stuck over the issue oI North Korea making a declaration oI all oI
its nuclear activities. The main question there is North Koreas reIusal to acknowledge a secret
uranium-enrichment program and then more recently, its nuclear assistance to Syria. So the
administration has made a compromise with North Korea. In the compromise the North Koreans will
declare how much plutonium theyve produced over the years and instead oI North Korea having to
directly acknowledge the uranium-enrichment program and their assistance to Syria, the United States
will make a statement expressing its belieI that these activities have taken place and the North Koreans
will not reIute or challenge that U.S. statement.
In exchange Ior that, the United States will take North Korea oII the list oI state sponsors oI terrorism
and remove some oI the Trading with the Enemy Act sanctions. Most importantly, once the declaration
issue has been resolved, the two sides will begin the serious negotiations over the so-called third phase,
which is the plan to dismantle North Koreas nuclear Iacilities and eventually eliminate its nuclear
weapons. Basically the Bush administration has made a concession or compromise on the North
Korean declaration in order to get into what it considers to be the most important element oI the deal,
the negotiation over the actual elimination oI North Koreas nuclear weapons.
Now, there is a State Department delegation on its way to Pyongyang as we talk. What is it
supposed to accomplish?
My understanding is that they are talking about the veriIication provisions, especially Ior North
Koreas plutonium declaration. North Korea, as I understand it, has declared or will declare that its
produced about thirty kilograms oI plutonium. Thats at the low end oI U.S. estimates Ior how much
plutonium they have produced over the last twenty years. It will be absolutely essential to have some
conIidence thats an accurate number, because the natural suspicion is that North Korea will under
declare what they have so that can keep some in secret Ior possible nuclear weapons. The team that is
going to Pyongyang, headed by Sung Kim, who is the director oI the Korea oIIice at the State
Department, will be to talk about what kinds oI measures the North Koreans will allow to veriIy that
their statement oI thirty kilograms is accurate. Thats going to be very tricky.
In the past North Korea has rejected intrusive inspection methods designed to try to determine how
much plutonium it had actually produced. In Iact that was the cause oI the original nuclear crisis in
1992. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wanted to visit some suspected nuclear waste
sites, which would have shown evidence oI North Korean reprocessing, and the North Koreans reIused
to let the IAEA go to those sites. Then they leIt the NonproliIeration Treaty |NPT| and thats what led
to the whole crisis during the Clinton administration |which led to the signing oI the Agreed
Framework in 1994|.
Now Ive read that the United States has estimated North Korea has produced as much as fifty
kilograms.
We dont know. These are estimates based on how long the reactor is operated. You have to take into
consideration that when you reprocess you dont get all the plutonium out oI the spent Iuel. Some oI it
is lost. II the reprocessing Iacility is sloppy, which I wouldnt be at all surprised in this case, you could
lose 20 or 25 percent oI the plutonium in the waste stream. Nobody really knows how much plutonium
the North Koreans actually produced.
To get some sense of plutonium, it takes about eight kilograms to make a bomb?
It really depends on the design. Again, we dont know how eIIicient the North Korean design is, but
something on the order oI six to eight kilograms per bomb is probably a pretty conservative estimate
Ior the kind oI design we think North Korea is most likely to utilize.
So were talking about the possibility that they might be secretly keeping enough plutonium to
make a couple of bombs.
Thats the natural suspicionthat the North Koreans have lied about their nuclear program over the
decade. The natural suspicion is that they would underreport the amount oI plutonium; they would
IalsiIy records; they would coax their scientists to give us a Ialse story. So unless we have an
independent means oI veriIying, which means sampling Irom the reactor the waste that was produced
in the reprocessing plant. Unless you get those kinds oI physical samples to carry out a real Iorensic
investigation, the veriIication is not going to be very strong.
What do you think is going on in North Korea? You would think they would have a lot to gain
from joining the world of nations, by getting trade and everything else that would help their
economy.
Especially now. Theyve had a very bad harvest so they are looking at the likelihood oI serious Iood
shortages, maybe as bad as they experienced in the mid-1990s. At the same time the North Korean
regime wants to hang on to their nuclear weapons, so they are playing the same game they have always
been playing, which is to make concessions to limit their nuclear capabilities in exchange Ior political
and economic compensation, while at the same time hold oII and resist pressure to actually give up
their nuclear weapons.
I expect that iI these third-phase negotiations begin you will see a similar kind oI process, where the
North Koreans agree in principle to give up their nuclear weapons once peace and prosperity has been
established on the Korean peninsula and U.S-North Korea relations are Iully normalized. So in other
words, they will set conditions which are not likely to be met anytime in the near Iuture.
Lets come back to this compromise that U.S. negotiator Chris Hill reached with the North
Koreans. This is one that is getting criticized by former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton and other
conservatives. Did the Bush administration cause its own problem by taking such a tough line
back in 2002 and 2003?
The Bush administration was correct when it reached the conclusion that North Korea was cheating on
the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret uranium-enrichment program, but the way it handled the
conIrontation with North Korea was very clumsy. North Korea took advantage on our Iocus on Iraq to
leave the NPT and to produce more plutonium and to basically walk away Irom the Agreed
Framework. Then the Bush administration realized that it needed to negotiate but unIortunately it was
too late to roll back what the North Koreans had already done.
Now the Bush administration has Irozen any Iurther North Korean plutonium production and it has
created a good diplomatic Iramework Ior the next U.S. administration to pick up the talks. Its unlikely
that youll see a deal reached on the third phase during the rest oI this administration because North
Korea is likely to demand things, like the light-water nuclear-reactor project, that so Iar the Bush
administration has not been willing to give. But at least the talks will get started and will put the next
administration in a better position to pick them up and hopeIully bring them to a conclusion.
I havent seen much said by any of the candidates about North Korea in particular; am I missing
something?
No, thats right. As long as the situation seems to be under control, as long as the negotiations are
proceeding, its really not a major Ioreign-policy challenge, especially given all the big problems in the
Middle East, Iraq being the Iirst.
If you were in the new administration would you recommend that they do anything different?
The Bush administration has provided a good diplomatic Iramework Ior trying to work out an
agreement with the North Koreans to eventually give up their nuclear weapons, even though I am
skeptical that the North Koreans will actually carry out that commitment. The next administration just
has to pick up where this administration leaves oII. The big issue, which is sort oI out there Ior these
third-phase negotiations, is whether we agree to resume the light-water reactor project. You will
remember that in the original Agreed Framework, the North Koreans were to get nuclear power in
exchange Ior giving up nuclear weapons.
We were supposed to supply a light-water reactor?
It was mainly Iunded by the South Koreans and Japanese but the United States also had to support it
because the design was a U.S. design. That project oI course was suspended when we Iound out that
North Korea was cheating. The North Koreans are saying they still want that light-water reactor
because they need the electrical power.
But for them to get a light water reactor we have to be absolutely certain about what their
nuclear situation is?
Thats why the veriIication is so important. The declaration that the North Koreans have made was
always intended to be an initial declaration and the understanding was that unless you veriIied it, the
initial declaration wouldnt be worth very much. So these talks that are going on in Pyongyang are
critically important Ior the plutonium question; even more diIIicult will be how to veriIy eventually the
status oI the uranium-enrichment program because we know so little about that. At least in the case oI
the plutonium program we know where the Iacilities are, so we can go visit the Iacilities and take
physical measurements. In the case oI the enrichment program, we dont even know where it is.
And theyve denied it all?
Well, yes, theyve sort oI denied it. Apparently they acknowledged it during the 2002 meetings with
|James| Kelly |assistant secretary oI state Ior Asian aIIairs|, or at least thats what our side claims. But
the oIIicial position oI the North Koreans is that they deny it. The evidence that they had or still have a
secret enrichment program is very strong. We just dont know how advanced it is.
Are we worse off now regarding North Korea? Theyve had a nuclear test and built a couple of
bombs. Whos at fault here? The Bush administration, or the North Koreans?
The Iundamental Iault rests with Pyongyang. They are the ones that decided to renege on the Agreed
Framework, although the way the Bush administration handled the discovery oI their cheating was not
the most eIIective way to go about it. Taking on Iraq and North Korea at the same time created an
opening Ior the North Koreans to walk away Irom the Agreed Framework with impunity.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20080424/EDITORIAL/102159602
Caving in to Pyongyang
April 24, 2008
THE WASHINGTON TIMES EDITORIAL - The more details that come out about the Bush
administration's approach to negotiations with North Korea, the more disturbing the deal looks. Last
week, administration oIIicials indicated that they were backing away Irom their insistence that North
Korea Iully admit its nuclear activities. The White House said that its requirements Ior a Iull
declaration Irom North Korea about its past actions would no longer include proliIeration matters.
Since North Korea signed an agreement last year agreeing to come clean about its nuclear activities, the
White House had been saying that these would include proliIeration or the transIer oI knowledge
about uranium enrichment or nuclear materials to other countries. North Korea is suspected oI helping
Syria build a plutonium-processing Iacility Ior nuclear weapons which was destroyed by Israel in a
Sept. 6 airstrike.
Dennis Wilder, the senior White House oIIicial on East Asia, said April 17 that Washington is handling
the North Korea proliIeration issue in a "diIIerent" (i.e., more conciliatory) way Irom other
requirements that North Korea declare its past nuclear activities. The Bush administration's latest
approach to Pyongyang, supported by Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary oI
State Christopher Hill, would enable North Korea to avoid coming clean about its earlier nuclear
activities. North Korea will make a Iormal declaration about its plutonium-based weapons program and
then "acknowledge" in a conIidential side agreement U.S. statements regarding the communist's regime
program to build nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium and its proliIeration activities with
Syria.
The Bush administration yesterday said publicly that North Korea was helping Syria build a plutonium-
based nuclear reactor, but that Pyongyang has ceased all assistance and promised not to resume
providing it. How the United States veriIies this in dealing with a totalitarian police state like North
Korea is anyone's guess.
But State Department spokesman Sean McCormack claims that the emerging agreement with North
Korea does not represent a U.S. concession. For example, he maintains that even iI North Korea did not
Iully account Ior its uranium enrichment eIIorts, the agreement would still permit inspectors access to
all oI Pyongyang's nuclear Iacilities in order to veriIy that it had stopped its weapons programs. "We
don't know where the Iacilities are. That's totally untrue," Iormer Undersecretary oI State Ior Arms
Control John Bolton told us yesterday when we read him Mr. McCormack's statement. "All it gives us
is |access to| Yongbyon," he said, reIerring to North Korea's main plutonium processing Iacility.
But North Korea's decision to jettison Yongbyon is not much oI a concession because that Iacility is
probably at the end oI useIul liIe anyway, Mr. Bolton said. One major Ilaw oI the agreement is that it
lacks a mechanism permitting snap inspections oI suspected covert Iacilities. In essence, Washington
will be reduced to taking North Korea's word, Mr. Bolton added, likening the Bush administration's
North Korean deal to something Jimmy Carter would put together.
Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Republican, has sent a detailed letter to
congressional appropriators challenging a panoply oI U.S. concessions to North Korea, among them
steps to relax economic sanctions against Pyongyang despite the Iact that it continues to threaten South
Korea and apparently remains engaged in counterIeiting U.S. currency. It's time Ior more members oI
Congress to join Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen in doing some serious oversight work regarding the concessions
being made to North Korea.
http://www.It.com/cms/s/0/731b1I0e-1307-11dd-8d91-0000779Id2ac.html
The curious Syrian nuclear affair
Published: April 25 2008 21:50 , Last updated: April 25 2008 21:50
Just over Iive years ago, a US secretary oI state, Colin Powell, made more than two dozen claims to the
United Nations Security Council about Iraqs alleged possession oI weapons oI mass destruction. In the
build-up to war, many Iound it a compelling perIormance. But all Mr Powells assertions were
subsequently shown to be without Ioundation. He might as well have shown the world a video game.
Not long aIter that, Israel started hawking evidence uncovered by its spies that Saddam Hussein had
moved his WMD to Syria. It got some takers but nothing more has been heard oI this chimera.
Thursdays Central Intelligence Agency presentation to the US Congress making the case that North
Korea supplied Syria with a nuclear reactor able to produce plutonium Ior nuclear weapons was also
compelling. It would also appear to justiIy retroactively the Israeli air strike on the site in Syrias
eastern desert last September. But given the US and Israels recent record in these matters, it could also
be just another dog and pony show.
Taken purely on its own terms, the US claim raises many questions. Where was Damascus going to get
the Iissile Iuel Ior this alleged reactor? Where was the plutonium separator, or reprocessing Iacility Ior
spent Iuel? Where is the evidence Ior a weaponisation programme? Why, moreover, did the US (and
Israeli air Iorce) bypass the IAEA, the UNs nuclear watchdog?
None oI this means we should believe the Syrians. They have said little more than Israel which
reIuses to comment beyond claiming the site was a military depot. Bashar al-Assads regime is not
trustworthy. Damascus has a long history oI pursuing its aims through violent surrogates such as
Hizbollah and Hamas, and oI murdering its opponents, especially in Lebanon.
Its usual deIence do you think we would be that stupid? can only be answered in the aIIirmative
aIter the government sanctioned a recruiting station Ior volunteer Iighters in Iraq just yards away Irom
the US embassy in Damascus in 2003. But that does not mean these speciIic allegations are true.
This aIIair is very odd. The CIAs decision to go public now backs Pyongyang into a corner at a critical
moment in the six-power talks on North Koreas nuclear disarmament leading some to detect the
hand oI Bush administration hawks such as Dick Cheney.
But it also Iollows the assassination in Damascus oI top Hizbollah (and Iranian) operative Imad
Mugnhiyeh. The air strike and the hit could also be interpreted as warnings to Iran to cease its regional
meddling and nuclear ambitions and maybe scare Damascus oII its alliance with Tehran. One video
show in Washington does not shine a light through the regional murk. But it should remind us there is
too much dry tinder out there Ior anyone to be careless with matches.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/25/opinion/25Iri2.html
Editorial
North Korea Redux
April 25, 2008
It is more than a little suspicious that the ever-secretive Bush administration has suddenly decided to go
public with what it knows about North Koreas nuclear connection with Syria. AIter seven months oI
reIusing to acknowledge Israels air strike last Sept. 6 on a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor, the
intelligence community has now provided Congress with video images showing North Koreans inside
the secret Iacility.
It is another example oI this administration insisting that inIormation be withheld Ior national security
reasons until there is a political reason to release it.
So why now? It is no secret that Republican hard-liners are outraged over a State Department-
negotiated deal intended to eventually shut down North Koreas nuclear weapons program. They are
desperate to stop it, either by getting President Bush to pull back or provoking the easily provoked
North Koreans into doing something stupid, like walking out oI the talks.
Thursdays presentation to certain Congressional committees will also make it harder to win approval
Ior aid to dismantle North Korean nuclear Iacilities an essential part oI the agreement.
As we said recently on this page, the deal is imperIect, not least because it does not require Pyongyang
to come clean on the Syria deal. But at this point it is probably the best chance oI moving North Korea
toward a much more important goal: Iully accounting Ior and eventually giving up its plutonium stocks
and weapons. The North Koreans have already shut down their reactor at Yongbyon the source oI
their plutonium but there is a lot more work to be done.
North Koreas willingness to sell nuclear technology and know-how to Syria is extremely worrisome.
Israels attack has at least ensured that the Syrian reactor will not be a threat. As Ior Pyongyangs
promises to Iorsake any Iuture sales, that must be vigilantly monitored and veriIied along with all oI its
nuclear activities. Scuttling the agreement now will guarantee less transparency, not more, and will
only increase Pyongyangs nuclear appetites and its incentive to sell more oI its wares.
For six years, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney reIused to seriously negotiate with
North Korea. The result? North Korea tested a nuclear device and went Irom having enough plutonium
Ior one or two weapons to eight or more. Weve seen that movie. The world cant aIIord a sequel.
http://www.stratIor.com/geopoliticaldiary/geopoliticaldiarybushadministrationbrieIingleavesmorequestionsanswers
Geopolitical Diary: The Syrian Nuclear Mystery Evolves
April 25, 2008 , 0223 GMT
The Bush administration brieIed the U.S. Congress on Thursday about the reasons behind the Sept. 6,
2007, Israeli raid on Syria. According to the secret brieIing the content oI which, oI course, not only
was leaked immediately (as was intended) but was essentially conIirmed by a White House
spokeswoman the target was a nuclear reactor, able to produce plutonium, that had been built with
the assistance oI North Korea. The administration showed a videotape, apparently produced by Israeli
intelligence, showing Iaces that were said to be in the Iacility and to be clearly Korean.
What is important to note is this inIormation is not new. It is a conIirmation oI the story leaked by the
administration shortly aIter the attack and also leaked by the Israelis a bit later. The explanation Ior the
attack was that it was designed to take out a reactor in Syria that had been built with North Korean
help. There are thereIore three questions. First, why did the United States go to such lengths to reveal
what it has been saying privately Ior months? Second, why did the administration do it now? Third,
why is the United States explaining an Israeli raid using, at least in part, material provided by Israel?
Why isnt Israel making the revelation?
It has never been clear to us why the Israelis and Americans didnt immediately announce that the
Syrians were building a nuclear reactor. Given American hostility toward Syria over support Ior
jihadists in Iraq, we would have thought that they would have announced it instantly. The explanation
we thought most plausible at the time was that the intelligence came Irom the North Koreans in the
course oI discussions oI their nuclear technology, and since the North Koreans were cooperating, the
United States didnt want to publicly embarrass them. It was the best we could come up with.
The announcement on Thursday seems to debunk that theory, at least to the extent that the primary
material displayed was U.S. satellite inIormation and the Israeli video, which was said to have been
used to convince the United States oI the existence oI the reactor and oI North Korean involvement. So
why didnt the administration condemn Syria and North Korea on Sept. 7? It still seems to us that part
oI the explanation is in the state oI talks with North Korea over its own program. The North Koreans
had said that they would provide technical inIormation on their program which they havent done.
Either the United States lost its motivation to protect North Korean Ieelings because oI this or the Bush
administration Ielt that Thursdays brieIings would somehow bring pressure to bear on North Korea.
Unless the United States is planning to use these revelations as justiIication Ior attacks on the North
Koreans, we Iind it diIIicult to see how this increases pressure on them.
More interesting is the question oI why the United States and not Israel is brieIing on an Israeli
raid. Israeli media reported April 23 that the Israelis had asked the Americans not to brieI Congress.
The reason given was that the Israelis did not want the United States to embarrass Syria at this point.
As we noted on April 23, there appeared to have been some interesting diplomatic moves between
Syria and Israel, and it made sense that revealing this inIormation now might increase Iriction.
II this read is true, then it would appear that the United States brieIed deliberately against Israeli
wishes. Certainly, the Israelis didnt participate in the process. One answer could be that the United
States is unhappy about Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmerts moves on Syria and wants to derail them.
The United States wanted Syria out oI Lebanon. The Israelis have a more complex view oI their
presence. In some ways, they see the Syrians as a stabilizing Iorce. And they certainly arent eager to
see Bashar al Assads government Iall, since whatever might replace the al Assad government would
probably be worse Irom the Israeli point oI view. That would mean that the Israelis would want to take
out the reactor, but not necessarily rub the Syrians nose in it.
So there are two plausible answers to Thursdays show. One is to increase pressure on North Korea.
The second is to derail any Israeli-Syrian peace process. The problem is that its hard to see why North
Korea is going to be moved by the oIIicial declaration oI what Washington has been saying Irom the
beginning. The second would assume that U.S.-Israeli relations had deteriorated to the point that the
United States had to use this as a lever. Thats tough to believe.
The senior Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, Peter Hoekstra, said aIter the brieIing,
This administration has no credibility on North Korea. A lot oI us are beginning to become concerned
that the administration is moving away Irom getting a solid policy solution to lets make a deal.
So that seems to undermine the prep Ior strike theory. That leaves tension between the United States
and Israel as the last standing theory. Not a good theory, but the last standing one.
Yielding To N. Korea Too Often
By Winston Lord and Leslie H. Gelb
Saturday, April 26, 2008; A17
The Bush administration gives plausible reasons Ior a bad nuclear deal with North Korea.
The proposed deal would liIt key U.S. legal sanctions against the North while Pyongyang shelves many
oI the commitments it made in a prior agreement.
The United States would stomach North Korea's latest evasions because, Ior all oI its risks, the deal at
hand oIIers some movement on the most immediate problem, reducing North Korea's plutonium
capabilities, and it keeps the door open to diplomatic solutions to eliminate Pyongyang's nuclear
weapons.
But these reasons are not enough. II the administration accepts North Korea's hedging and reneging
once again, it will increase, not decrease, the likelihood oI conIrontation down the line.
Yes, sometimes Washington must hold its nose, make concessions and tolerate ambiguity. But not now.
Not when it waters down compliance with a painIully reached prior agreement. II President Bush
allows Pyongyang to brush away its pledges, he will reinIorce its instinct Ior bluster and blackmail.
This latest tug oI war began promisingly, with a joint statement agreed on in six-party talks in
September 2005. In essence, it stipulated easing some American economic sanctions in return Ior
Pyongyang's disabling its nuclear Iacilities and accounting Ior past activities.
The most recent U.S. statement oI the North's primary obligations, made last Oct. 3, gave this update
on Pyongyang's perIormance: North Korea was committed to "a complete and correct declaration oI all
its nuclear programs -- including clariIication regarding the uranium issue -- by the end oI the year."
On plutonium, North Korea reportedly has stated levels at the low end oI U.S. intelligence estimates.
On uranium, Pyongyang has provided nothing. It merely "acknowledges" American assertions.
In diplomatic parlance, "acknowledge" rarely means "accept"; usually, it means "we hear what you
say."
North Korea pledged to disable all its existing nuclear Iacilities. By most reports, progress did occur
but is slowing. The Dec. 31 deadline Ior disabling the Iacilities at the Yongbyon plutonium plant was
missed.
North Korea had committed "not to transIer nuclear materials, technology or know-how." The issue
today is Pyongyang's evident role in a Syrian nuclear reactor that was bombed by Israel last September.
Washington has until now correctly demanded a Iull explanation oI this and other nuclear activities.
Once again, Pyongyang has provided no inIormation and merely proposes to "acknowledge" American
assertions.
Despite these Iailures, the Bush administration seems ready to make a bilateral deal by which it would
accept these "acknowledgments" and IulIill the U.S. commitments to cease applying the Trading With
the Enemy Act and -- over the vociIerous objections oI our closest Asian ally, Japan -- remove North
Korea Irom our list oI state sponsors oI terrorism. (While this would make Pyongyang eligible Ior
economic beneIits, the practical eIIects remain unclear.)
American oIIicials rationalize this cave-in by asserting that the plutonium issue, which remains
unresolved, is paramount. They count on correcting deIiciencies on all issues in the next phase oI
negotiations and through veriIication. The latter, by the administration's own admission, will be
extraordinarily diIIicult. Such an approach is slippery with any negotiating partner; with North Korea,
it is perilous.
It is one thing to compromise in order to craIt an agreement, keep diIIicult negotiations going and not
let the best be the enemy oI the good. It is another thing to let the other side breach compromises
already reached.
President Bush's remarks at his meeting with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak last weekend
suggest that he still may stiIIen his stance. We hope so. Our Iear, however, is that Bush, Ieeling the
glow oI a rare Ioreign policy accomplishment, may proceed to cement a legacy. He should consider the
criticism he would heap upon his successor iI he or she were to ink such a deal.
The two oI us can hardly be counted as conservative die-hards opposing deals with Pyongyang. We
believe that Washington and its allies are rightly committed to exploring even the remotest chance that
Pyongyang might give up its nuclear weapons. While reaching Ior that larger goal, our negotiators can
seek to cap North Korea's nuclear inventory and head oII proliIeration.
We oppose both abandoning the September 2005 agreement and allowing Pyongyang to eviscerate it.
Better to let the talks continue than to make one-sided concessions. Better to sharpen North Korean
compliance or -- Iailing that -- to string out our own.
Bush can sustain international unity by making clear that his goal is to hold Pyongyang to its 2005
commitments. This is the only way to preserve American credibility and bargaining leverage. It is also
the only way to maintain political support in Washington Ior these diIIicult negotiations.
This is the legacy Bush should bequeath to his successor.
Winston Lord was ambassador to China under President Ronald Reagan and assistant secretary oI state
Ior East Asia and the PaciIic under President Bill Clinton. Leslie H. Gelb was assistant secretary oI
state Ior politico-military aIIairs under President Jimmy Carter and is a board senior Iellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Belated Disclosure
The Bush administration releases evidence regarding Syria's nuclear reactor, eight months aIter it was
destroyed.
Sunday, April 27, 2008; B06
THE FACT that Israel bombed a secret Syrian nuclear reactor built with the help oI North Korea was
widely iI unoIIicially reported within days oI the strike last September. But the Bush administration's
decision to go public with the considerable evidence it had about the reactor has placed that
extraordinary event in a new political context. The disclosure, which administration oIIicials said they
initially withheld because oI Iears oI triggering hostilities between Israel and Syria, was nevertheless
overdue. As a member oI the U.N. Security Council, the United States is obligated to report evidence
that other states are violating international law against nuclear proliIeration.
Experts pointed out that the U.S. disclosures, including pictures Irom inside the reactor, did not include
evidence that Syria had obtained Iuel or built the reprocessing Iacility that would be needed to convert
plutonium Irom the reactor into bomb material. But Syria's Iailure to report the reactor's existence to
the International Atomic Energy Agency, as required by the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty, and its
quick demolition and burial oI the reactor's remains aIter the attack require explanation -- and in its
absence, sanction. IAEA chieI Mohamed ElBaradei will be tested by the investigation he announced on
Friday. Already he has politicized his position by trying to thwart Western pressure on Iran about its
illegal nuclear program. Will Mr. ElBaradei hold Damascus accountable Ior its blatant violation oI
international law, or will he simply blame Israel and the United States? So Iar he has chosen the latter
course -- and thereby given cover to the many governments who will want to do the same.
That answers are needed, too, Irom North Korea is an immense understatement. The regime oI Kim
Jong Il pledged to disclose all oI its nuclear programs as one oI the opening steps oI a disarmament
process. Now we know that North Korean technicians were continuing to work on the Syrian reactor
aIter Pyongyang made its commitment in February 2007. Yet the Kim regime still reIuses to report on
its help to Syria. According to a deal under discussion with the Bush administration, it would merely
"acknowledge" -- and then only in private -- U.S. "concerns" about proliIeration.
Bush administration oIIicials say they hope the disclosure oI evidence about the reactor will prompt
North Korea to be more Iorthcoming. They also acknowledge that they were under pressure Irom
Congress to act beIore removing sanctions on Pyongyang as part oI the new agreement. The question
Ior the administration remains why it would grant Iurther concessions to North Korea beIore
Pyongyang comes clean about its proliIeration to Syria as well as any other deals it may have made.
The State Department argues that such an "accounting" will come through a veriIication process.
OIIicials also say that by sustaining the "six-party" diplomacy, they are gradually opening a totalitarian
state to change. Still, the process won't work unless North Korea truly intends to disarm, rather than
merely extort aid and political Iavors Irom the West. What's needed is a diplomatic strategy that Iorces
Mr. Kim to choose between his weapons and engagement with the outside world. That's why dropping
the requirement Ior a Iull disclosure by Pyongyang is risky -- it encourages the regime to believe it can
avoid that decision.
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Plutonium on the Euphrates -- II
We Iinally know what Israel bombed in the Syrian desert on September 6 last year, and it isn't pretty.
AIter seven months oI silence, the Bush Administration conIirmed last week that the target was a
nuclear reactor being built with the aid oI North Korea.
The prospect oI nuclear technology in the hands oI another terrorism-sponsoring state is scary enough.
Worse is the notion that Syria's reactor is no big deal. That's the interpretation being shopped in
Washington by anonymous Administration oIIicials, presumably at State, who have been quoted as
saying the CIA has "little conIidence" that the goal was to build a bomb.
The no-big-deal thesis expounded by the President's men directly contradicts their boss. AIter brieIing
Congress behind closed doors, the White House put out a statement expressing "conIidence" that "this
reactor was not intended Ior peaceIul activities." CIA Director Michael Hayden said yesterday an
operational reactor could have produced enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear bombs.
No one disputes that the Syrians were cooperating with the North Koreans on a nuclear Iacility like the
one currently being shut down at Yongbyon as part oI the six-party denuclearization process. The
previously classiIied intelligence shows striking similarities between the Syrian Iacility, going up at a
desert site called Al Kibar, and Yongbyon. Other evidence includes photos oI a man identiIied as a
North Korean nuclear expert in Syria.
Nor does anyone other than the Syrians deny that Damascus was disguising Al Kibar Irom the
world. The secret reactor is also a violation oI Syria's obligation as a signatory oI the Nuclear Non-
ProliIeration Treaty. Given this background, it would be Iolly Ior anyone concerned about the national
security oI the U.S. to conclude that Syria's intention wasn't some sort oI nuclear program, or capacity.
It is also disturbing that the Administration Iirst tried to persuade the Israelis that Syria's outlaw actions
could be settled with diplomacy, and then sat on its conclusions Ior seven months aIter Israel bombed
the site.
This kind oI behavior is typical oI the "arms control process" that Mr. Bush has embarked on with
North Korea, where violations get explained away or ignored iI the violator merely promises not to do
it again. Pyongyang's nuclear aid to Syria was still going on aIter its February 2007 pledge to give up
all its nuclear programs and stop proliIerating.
Meanwhile in Tehran, it's easy to imagine what the mullahs are making oI all this. Washington may be
talking tough again about Iran, but its leadership can see what North Korea is getting away with. II
Pyongyang can pursue a nuclear program with impunity and in violation oI its promises why not
Tehran?
The same goes Ior Iran's support oI the insurgencies in Iraq and AIghanistan. The Chairman oI the
Joint ChieIs oI StaII, Admiral Mike Mullen, accused Iran on Friday oI stepping up arms transIers and
training support to insurgents Iighting American troops in both countries. But Iran has been killing
American soldiers, directly or indirectly, Ior years and suIIered no consequences. Why should it
believe it's any diIIerent now?
As the news oI North Korea's violations in Syria became public, Chris Hill, chieI U.S. negotiator with
Pyongyang, kept up his happy talk about the nuclear deal, calling the latest talks "productive." The
Administration has already agreed to let North Korea renege on its promise to provide a Iull accounting
oI its nuclear program. It is widely expected soon to start the process oI removing the North Irom the
U.S. list oI state sponsors oI terrorism and the Trading With the Enemy Act.
By insisting that the nuclear accord proceed even as the latest inIormation oI Pyongyang's proliIeration
becomes public, Mr. Hill and his boss, Condoleezza Rice, are making the President look Ioolish. The
intelligence about the Syrian reactor came out largely because oI pressure Irom Congress, which
demanded to know what happened on September 6 beIore it would consider whether to allow the
sanctions on North Korea to be liIted.
This aIIair was not well handled Irom day one. Now Mr. Bush is allowing his diplomats to put about
the belieI that he values any deal over no deal. That leaves it to Congress to blow the whistle.
http://www.cIr.org/publication/16155/syriannuclearpuzzle.html?
The Syrian Nuclear Puzzle
May 1, 2008
Author:
Greg Bruno
On matters oI nonproliIeration, policymakers and weapons inspectors share a disdain Ior secrets. So
perhaps it was inevitable that a seven-month delay (NYT) in disclosing details oI an Israeli air raid on a
Syrian nuclear reactorbuilt, allegedly, with North Korean assistancewould spark outrage Irom
Capitol Hill and the UNs nuclear agency. Members oI the House and Senate intelligence committees
scolded (AFP) the Bush administration Ior its delay in brieIing Congress on the September 2007 strike.
Mohamed ElBaradei, chieI oI the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, said he
deplores the Iact inIormation was not provided to his agency in a timely Iashion, as required under
the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty. President Bush, meanwhile, deIended the late disclosure as
necessary to avoid sparking a larger regional conIlict.
Beyond the dispute over timing is the broader question oI motivation. At a news conIerence on April
29, Bush said the release was aimed as a warning to nations pondering the spread oI nuclear weapons;
he singled out Syria, North Korea, and Iran. A senior administration oIIicial, detailing the sequence oI
events in a background brieIing Ior reporters on April 24, went Iurther. The oIIicial said the disclosure
was intended to advance a number oI policy objectives, Irom serving as a potential trump card in
negotiations with Pyongyang over its own nuclear program (AP), to compelling the international
community to take action against Iran Ior its suspected nuclear-weapons development.
But some observers see other motives in pulling back Syrias nuclear curtain. Andrew Semmel, the
Iormer top State Department oIIicial Ior nonproliIeration, tells Voice oI America the release may have
been aimed at putting a positive spin on intelligence that was bound to leak. Dar Al-Hayat columnist
Elias HarIoush sees the disclosure as an attempt by Washington to interrupt talks between Syria and
Israel over the disputed Golan Heights. The intelligence brieIing came amid reports oI a potential
breakthrough (Reuters) between the two sides. Still others question the veracity oI the nuclear plant
claim. The allegations were equated in some quarters (al-Jazeera) to intelligence presented to the UN
Security Council by then Secretary oI State Colin Powell in the run-up to the Iraq war. Nuclear
weapons experts David Albright and Paul Brannan dont doubt the photos veracity but question
whether the plant was part oI an active nuclear weapons program (PDF).
The situation puts a new spotlight on the troubled U.S.-Syria relationship. In recent years Damascus
and Washington have sparred over the Arab-Israeli conIlict; Syrias support Ior Hezbollah in Lebanon;
and claims that Ioreign Iighters in Iraq have entered the war zone via Syria. The Bush administration
has raised concern about Syrian weapons development in the recent past. Damascus has rejected such
charges beIore and denies (AFP) the targeted complex in the most recent case was nuclear in nature.
But U.S. claims oI Syrian support Ior terrorists are decades old; the U.S. government Iirst listed Syria
as a state sponsor oI terrorism in 1979. The State Departments most recent annual report on global
terrorism accuses Syria oI providing material and political support to Palestinian terrorist groups, and
suggests oIIicial involvement in the February 2005 assassination oI Iormer Lebanese Prime Minister
RaIik Hariri. Secretary oI State Condoleezza Rice recalled the U.S. ambassador to Syria Iollowing the
murder, although Syria maintains a diplomatic mission in Washington. The United States has also
sought to use economic leverage to compel Syria to cut ties with terrorist groups.
It is uncertain how stepped up U.S. pressure will inIluence Syrian behavior. The American Enterprise
Institutes David Frum says reckless regimes cant always be reasoned with (National Post). Jeremy M.
Sharp, a Middle East analyst Ior the Congressional Research Service, estimates economic sanctions
would be Iutile. Trade with Syria is already minimal, Sharp writes (PDF). And the United States
Institute oI Peace (USIP), which has published a series oI reports on Syrian politics and regional
relations, has Iound that sanctions could embolden the ruling party. The most direct route to change,
two USIP scholars say, lies with Syrias oppositionists.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op-cohen4-2008may04,0,4335891.story
Cloak and stagger
AIter overestimating the Iraq threat, U.S. intelligence agencies are now dangerously underestimating
Syria and Iran.
By Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen
May 4, 2008
Last month's unclassiIied congressional brieIing on Syria's clandestine nuclear reactor, which was
destroyed by Israel on Sept. 6, 2007, was yet another reminder oI the challenges conIronting the U.S.
intelligence community. Still smarting Irom its gross overestimation oI Iraq's weapons oI mass
destruction, the community bent over backward to avoid overstating its case against Syria -- and in
doing so, it stumbled badly.
In the Syrian case (as with the release last year oI part oI the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's
nuclear program) the intelligence community was unnecessarily cautious, and thereby underestimated
the threats posed by Syria and Iran. Its eIIorts to improve precision have only created new conIusion
and uncertainty.
The key problem has been the intelligence community's astonishing awkwardness in making clear
what's a Iact and what's an inIerence. In the case oI Iraq, there were Iew Iacts on which to build a
convincing case that Saddam Hussein was arming himselI with weapons oI mass destruction. But
Hussein's past pursuit oI them, coupled with the anxieties unleashed by 9/11, led U.S. intelligence
analysts and many policymakers to inIer the worst and leap to conclusions unsupported by the Iacts.
The intelligence community has now jumped to the opposite extreme with respect to Iran's and Syria's
nuclear ambitions, where there are more than a Iew Iacts. Yet it has virtually reIused to draw any
conclusions, no matter how obvious, about the two countries' nuclear programs. The eIIect has been to
seriously understate the dangers Iran and Syria pose and to distort the policy options available to the
U.S. to manage them.
When the unclassiIied summary oI the NIE on Iran's nuclear program was released Dec. 3, many
observers were shocked by its most prominent "key Iinding" -- that the intelligence community
believed with "high conIidence" that Iran had halted its "nuclear weapon program" in late 2003. A
Iootnote deIined "nuclear weapon program" as Iran's eIIorts to design a nuclear weapon and to enrich
uranium in secret. That deIinition is extremely narrow because most proliIeration experts view
designing the bomb as relatively easy compared with producing the necessary Iissile materials Ior its
core and developing a delivery system.
As a result, the summary paid scant attention to those two nuclear-weapon-related -- and extremely
dangerous -- activities in Iran. In Iact, the summary doesn't even mention the missiles, and Iran's
uranium enrichment activities, the Iocal point oI U.S. and U.N. Security Council diplomacy and
pressure, are described in the blandest oI terms.
Why? Based on comments at a recent roundtable oI U.S. oIIicials and outside proliIeration expertsthat
we co-chaired, those responsible Ior the NIE on Iran knew that the heads oI the 16 U.S. intelligence
agencies had agreed that its key Iindings would not be declassiIied. But the White House, IearIul that
the Iindings might leak to the media without any oIIicial explanation oI their signiIicance, overruled the
agencies.
By the time the White House decided to release an unclassiIied summary, the classiIied version had
been produced and was about to be handed over to the congressional intelligence committees. That
created a problem. Even though the estimate's "key Iindings" were originally intended to be understood
in the context oI the whole classiIied report, the intelligence community and the White House Ielt that
they needed to repeat them almost verbatim in the unclassiIied summary. They worried that any
rephrasing oI the Iindings would open them up to accusations oI playing politics with the estimate.
That still leaves the question oI why the intelligence community spotlighted the Iinding on Iran's
nuclear weapons program. We know that important new evidence on Iran's nuclear activities in 2003
had been obtained and that it had required changing a 2005 estimate that the country was pursuing a
nuclear weapon. In highlighting the new data, the authors oI the 2007 unclassiIied summary
unIortunately leIt out the context oI the previous estimate -- that a rogue Iran remained well on course
to developing a nuclear capability.
Ever since Dec. 3, the intelligence community has been trying to restore context to its key Iinding. On
Feb. 27, Director oI National Intelligence Michael McConnell said the release oI the unclassiIied
version was rushed and that it was "an error oI judgment on my part." Days later, DeIense Intelligence
Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples said that "although Iran claims its program is Iocused on
producing commercial electric power, |we assess| with high conIidence Iran remains determined to
develop nuclear weapons." Then in March, CIA chieI Michael Hayden, asked on NBC's "Meet the
Press" whether he thought Iran was trying to develop a nuclear weapon, replied "Yes," adding this was
not based on "court-oI-law stuII. ... This is Mike Hayden looking at the body oI evidence."
These statements were a move in the right direction, but the CIA's linguistic Iumbling during last
month's congressional brieIing on Syria's reactor indicates that the snaIu over the Iran estimate is not a
one-time blunder.
AIter going to considerable lengths to show that Syria's reactor was built with North Korea's help, that
it was modeled on the reactor that the North Koreans used to produce plutonium Ior their nuclear
weapons and that it had been careIully disguised by the Syrians to avoid detection, senior intelligence
oIIicials declared they had only "low conIidence" that Syria has a nuclear weapons program.
The justiIication Ior this bizarre conclusion? Although it has "a rich level oI inIormation" about the
destroyed reactor and North Korea's involvement in building it, the intelligence community said it has
no speciIic inIormation on Syrian Iacilities Ior the manuIacture oI Iuel Ior the reactor or Ior processing
the Iuel aIter it is irradiated to extract plutonium. Nor has it any inIormation showing that Syria is
working on a design Ior a nuclear warhead.
While well-intentioned, the intelligence community's eIIorts at clarity have now twice gone astray. II it
wants to right the balance between Iacts and inIerence, a starting point might be to stop redeIining
commonly used phrases -- such as "nuclear weapon program" -- in order to give them new,
counterintuitive meanings that obscure a more simple and dangerous reality.
When the intelligence community has real evidence, it should not be aIraid to draw the obvious
inIerence and call a spade a spade.
Leonard S. Spector directs the Washington oIIice oI the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center Ior
NonproliIeration Studies. Avner Cohen is a senior Iellow at the United States Institute oI Peace in
Washington and the author oI "Israel and the Bomb."
http://canadaIreepress.com/index.php/article/2910
The Elusive Smoking Gun
Assessing Nuclear Activity in Syria and Iran
By INSS: Emily Landau
Sunday, May 4, 2008
Posted 05/4 at 09:54 AM
On April 24, US oIIicials brieIed lawmakers on Syrias covert nuclear reactor. They explained their
high conIidence that what was destroyed last September in Syria was in Iact a nuclear reactor Ior the
production oI plutonium, and that it was built with the long-term and sustained assistance oI North
Korea. In contrast to this certainty, a central aspect oI their estimate regarding Syrias nuclear plans
adopted a vaguer tone: when asked whether the material to be produced by the reactor would be used in
a nuclear weapons program, the Intelligence oIIicials accorded this only a low conIidence level.
Interestingly and rather surprisingly, the oIIicials acknowledged that a low conIidence estimate did not
concur with what they actually believed to be the case. In Iact, on the basis oI their overall analysis oI
the situation, it was their belieI that the reactor was intended to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, they
Iound no other reasonable explanation Ior the reactor: it was clearly not Ior producing electricity, and it
was ill-suited to be a research reactor. Moreover, Syria had acted suspiciously in other regards, such as
rushing to destroy the remains oI the reactor aIter the attack. But due to the lack oI additional clinical
evidence oI other activities most importantly, the absence oI a reprocessing Iacility they could not
accord this assessment the level oI conIidence that they actually believed to be the case. As one oI the
Intelligence oIIicials at the brieIing tried to explain: theres a diIIerence between evidence and an
assessment.
This episode underscores the problematics involved when decisions regarding nuclear proliIeration
activities are expected to be grounded in clear-cut evidence oI a smoking gun namely, in some
physical or clinical evidence that proves beyond a doubt the illegal and dangerous nature oI the nuclear
activity in question.
Generally speaking, smoking guns although packaged by those who seek them as the epitome oI
prooI based on hard evidence are actually subject to interpretation, and can prove to be quite elusive.
In realty, there are no clear-cut criteria Ior smoking guns. Short oI producing evidence oI a nuclear
bomb, is any piece oI evidence truly iron-clad? II someone is not interested in Iinding a state guilty oI
illegal nuclear activity, then with regard to most evidence again, short oI a nuclear bomb a more
benign interpretation can generally be manuIactured. In the Iinal analysis, much depends on the ability
oI the presenter to convince others that the Iacts exposed do or do not constitute incriminating
evidence.
Moreover, the history oI the past Iive and a halI years oI dealing with Irans nuclear activities
demonstrates that the ongoing search Ior a smoking gun can result in the loss oI valuable time in
conIronting a determined proliIerator. Throughout 2003 the search was on Ior a smoking gun in Iran,
which was never Iound. But in late 2007, the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that
Ior most oI that same year as well as Ior close to 20 years beIore that time Iran had actually been
engaged in an active nuclear weapons program. II in 2003 states had acted upon what they sensed and
believed to be the case in light oI Irans long history oI deception in the nuclear realm rather than
Iocusing on Iinding a smoking gun things might have evolved diIIerently.
This leads to another problem with smoking guns: determined proliIerators are well aware oI the Iact
that states are looking Ior this kind oI evidence, and they put tremendous eIIorts into hiding it.
ThereIore, the diIIiculties that are encountered in Iinding a smoking gun should come as no surprise,
and the inability to Iind one due to states concealment eIIorts should be Iactored into assessments.
According to the NIE, Iran stopped one aspect oI its nuclear program in the Iall oI 2003:
weaponization. It continued with the other two activities that are essential Ior nuclear weapons:
production oI Iissile material (uranium enrichment), and development oI long-range ballistic missiles.
The decision to stop the weaponization program had a double logic Ior Iran: Iirst, this was the part oI
its program that could be achieved in the least amount oI time, and thus it was the easiest to suspend
temporarily while Iran continued to work on the other two prongs. Second, this was the only part oI the
program that Iran believed it would be hard pressed to account Ior, iI discovered. Uranium enrichment
in Iran has been conducted openly Ior the past several years and Iran steadIastly continues to insist that
it is Ior civilian purposes, and long-range missiles can be explained as intended Ior conventional
warheads. But designs Ior a nuclear warhead suggest a diIIerent narrative that would be more diIIicult
to explain.
All oI this leads to the conclusion that connecting the dots oI weapons-related nuclear activity should
be carried out in the realm oI strategic analysis, where hard evidence oI so-called smoking guns is but
one important component (but not a sine qua non) in an overall, intricate picture. Something is amiss
when Intelligence oIIicials have to bend over backwards to explain an estimate that doesnt concur with
what they believe to be the actual nature oI a states nuclear activity based on their overall analysis and
powers oI deduction. Moreover, there is the real risk that media articles will pick up the line that there
is low conIidence that nuclear activity is intended Ior weapons, and Iorget the broader, more complex
message that was presented. The sound bytes that appeared in the media Iollowing publication oI the
NIE and the damage that they caused to eIIorts to conIront Iran are a case in point.
Comprehensive and logical assessments with regard to nuclear proliIeration obviously need to include
as much hard evidence as possible, but in the interest oI non-proliIeration, they should not be held
hostage to the absence oI a smoking gun.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/060508News/06May2008news23.php
EDITORIAL
N Korea's long nuclear reach
Tuesday May 06, 2008
The disclosure that Syria has been caught in the secret construction oI a high-class nuclear Iacility
bears special attention Ior our part oI the world.
That is because the Iingerprints oI North Korea appear at each stage oI the largely mysterious Syrian
Iacility destroyed last year by Israel. The Iacts oI the Syrian Iacility are murky at best. Damascus
appears determined to try to deny the whole problem away by claiming there was nothing there.
The United Nations nuclear watchdog has spent Iar more energy and urgency denouncing the Israeli
airstrike and withholding oI evidence by the United States, than in investigating the secret Syrian
project and most ominous oI all actors in the story the Pyongyang link.
The Iirst time most oI the world heard oI the possible Syrian nuclear project was last September, when
the Israeli air Iorce and commandos destroyed the Iacility. Damascus, in a most unusual reaction to the
act oI war, waIIled over what had been hit and what reaction it planned. AIter months oI pressure and
vacillation, the United States Iinally coughed up the inIormation it had gathered on the site in northern
Syria.
The evidence appears overwhelming that Syria had secretly and thus illegally almost Iinished
constructing a nuclear Iacility, virtually identical to that oI the North Korean nuclear programme
headquartered at Yongbyon, which has made nuclear bombs. It credibly indicates a continuing, strong
eIIort by North Korea to proliIerate nuclear sites, quite possibly Ior its own purposes.
And that is the rub. Recent photographs show the head oI the North Korean nuclear project in Syria.
Pyongyang is known to have peddled missiles and weapons technology to Syria. The evidence is
almost entirely circumstantial but thus Iar it points to a single conclusion: North Korea has tried to
build a nuclear plant in Syria capable oI supplying plutonium and related material which would Iit
perIectly in the North Korean weapons programme.
There may be another explanation, but the initial claim by Syria that Israel had bombed an abandoned
building was clearly a lie, since dated satellite photos Irom several sources prove the site was active.
Shortly aIter Israel destroyed the Syrian Iacility, North Korea renewed diplomatic relations with
Burma. The Burmese junta kicked out the North Koreans in 1983, aIter Pyongyang staged a terrorist
attack in Rangoon which killed many South Koreans and almost assassinated then-president Chun
Doo-Hwan during a state visit.
The timing oI the renewal oI diplomatic relations between the two Asian hermits raised eyebrows
because they have so little in common. Their biggest common interest is that Rangoon wants a nuclear
Iacility and Pyongyang has the technology and, perhaps, a burning ambition to help the generals get
one.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has already proved too lackadaisical in taking up evidence in
the Syrian case. Indeed, it appears Syria is in serious violation oI its responsibility under the Nuclear
Non-ProliIeration Treaty to report all nuclear construction. Not only is the IAEA qualiIied to
investigate, it must do so. More troubling is the North Korean link. II Pyongyang really was attempting
to set up a back-up source oI plutonium in Syria, it probably is doing the same elsewhere.
The IAEA also must delve urgently into all aspects oI the inscrutable nuclear projects by Burma. II
Rangoon is trying to construct a medical-type nuclear reactor, Iine. But the world, and more
importantly this region, deserves to know iI North Korea is playing any role.
Review & Outlook
Vetoing the Verifiers
May 8, 2008; Page A14
The State Department is justiIying its decision to let North Korea renege on its pledge to give a
"complete declaration oI its nuclear programs" by promising a strict veriIication regime. So why is
Foggy Bottom cutting its own veriIication experts out oI the loop?
The State Department's systematic exclusion oI its own Bureau oI VeriIication, Compliance and
Implementation has gone unreported as the North Korean diplomacy proceeds. But it is causing
concern on Capitol Hill and has already led to a proposal to require State to submit a report to Congress
describing how the U.S. will veriIy any nuclear deal. Sponsored by Florida Republican Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, the legislation passed the House Foreign AIIairs Committee last week with the support oI
Democratic Chairman Howard Berman.
The mandate oI the veriIication bureau, as described on the State Department's Web site, is to provide
oversight "on all matters relating to veriIication or compliance with international arms control,
nonproliIeration and disarmament agreements and commitments." It "supports the Secretary" in
"developing and implementing robust and rigorous veriIication and compliance policies."
The veriIication bureau was created by a Republican Congress in 1999 over the objections oI the
Clinton Administration and State Department careerists who didn't want agreements subject to
additional oversight. The bureau's biggest success to date is Libya, where it played a central role in
dismantling the country's WMD programs in 2003. There the bureau worked closely with experts Irom
the Departments oI DeIense and Energy as well as with Britain and the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
North Korea is a diIIerent story. The veriIiers "have no voice so Iar," one person close to the process
told us. They aren't part oI the negotiating teams talking to the North Koreans and they've been
excluded Irom key internal meetings. No one Irom the veriIication bureau participated in a recent State
Department trip to Pyonygang intended to work out veriIication issues.
Nor is the veriIication bureau in charge oI monitoring the disabling oI the North's nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon. One bureau proIessional took part, but he was invited Ior his technical expertise; he was not
there as a veriIier. Paula DeSutter, the assistant secretary who heads the bureau, declined to comment.
Incredibly, the Bureau oI East Asian and PaciIic AIIairs is calling the shots talking to the North
Koreans, hand picking experts to work at Yongbyon, and overseeing disablement. Call it the Chris Hill
Show. Mr. Hill the assistant secretary Ior East Asia has also made a mockery oI the interagency
process. The veriIication bureau's Pentagon counterparts, who were closely involved in the six-party
Korean diplomacy until mid-2005, have also been kept in exile.
Now there's talk that the East Asia bureau not the veriIication bureau will also end up monitoring
any Iinal six-party agreement. Not only does East Asia lack the technical expertise to veriIy a nuclear
agreement, its staIIers would hardly be eager to Iind violations in an accord negotiated by their
superiors. There's even talk State may outsource some oI the inspection work to China, which will be
chairing a veriIication group within the six-party group. But China would have no incentive to blow the
whistle on its client state.
The Iact that Mr. Hill and his boss, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, are marginalizing their own veriIiers
is Iurther reason to doubt their North Korea deal. The diplomats want to deliver a "success" and are
aIraid that iI the veriIiers get a close look, they will expose it as a Iraud. Among the uncomIortable
questions: Where is all oI the plutonium North Korea has produced over the years? What happened to
the uranium program that Pyongyang once boasted about but now says does not exist? What exactly
did the North proliIerate to Syria?
No veriIication can deliver 100 certainty, and North Korea, with its history oI cheating and lying,
would be a diIIicult case under even the most stringent inspection regimes. The disarmament oI Libya
succeeded because Moammar GadhaIi decided to cooperate. There's zero indication that Kim Jong Il
shares that Irame oI mind.
North Korea's geography oIIers special challenges too. It's a mountainous country, with caves hiding
mobile missile launchers aimed at Seoul. The military has vast underground Iacilities built with the
help oI its Iormer Soviet patrons. Will these be open to inspectors? Even assuming that Kim will allow
unimpeded and unannounced access a leap oI diplomatic Iaith special expertise is needed to decide
where to inspect and what to look Ior.
The State Department's veriIication bureau was created in the spirit oI Ronald Reagan's slogan, "trust
but veriIy." The Gipper was reIerring to the disarmament oI the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but his
principle applies equally to North Korea today. II Foggy Bottom won't trust its own veriIiers enough to
make them part oI any disarmament deal, then the rest oI us shouldn't trust any deal struck by the Bush
State Department.
OPINION
Bush's North Korea Nuclear Abdication
By JOHN R. BOLTON
May 8, 2008; Page A15
Despite rising Capitol Hill opposition to its North Korea policy, the Bush administration continues to
Iind new and imaginative ways to accommodate Pyongyang's sensitivities. Meanwhile, the
administration's Democratic congressional allies are urgently pushing to waive the Glenn Amendment,
which bars essentially all U.S. economic and militay aid to the North.
The strategic Iolly here is rooted in the administration's decision to Iocus on North Korea's plutonium
supplies and stop caring what Pyongyang once did or is doing on the enriched-uranium route to nuclear
weapons. That could be a Iatal mistake.
In 2002, our intelligence community deIinitively judged that the regime was working on an industrial-
scale enrichment program. Since then we have little new inIormation, reducing the conIidence level,
but not changing the substantive conclusion, that the North Koreans "have and continue to operate a
uranium enrichment program" as Director oI National Intelligence Mike McConnell testiIied in
February.
For the Bush administration, however, the lack oI new data is an excuse to ignore the entire issue oI
uranium.
On plutonium, the administration seems content to seek vague statements Irom the North that
"account" Ior the amount oI this Iissile material we think it has extracted Irom its Yongbyon reactor's
spent Iuel rods over the years. Administration brieIings reveal little or no interest in how many
plutonium weapons exist; whether there are other plutonium-related Iacilities hidden in North Korea's
vast complex oI underground Iacilities; and what the North's weapons-manuIacturing capabilities are.
ProliIeration? Perhaps the Bush administration's most wondrous act oI magic is to make that problem
disappear. The State Department argues that North Korea may have proliIerated in the past, but that's
all behind us. How do we know? The North Koreans have told us.
Since the reactor it helped Syria build on the Euphrates River was pulverized by the Israeli Air Force
last September 6, Pyongyang's eIIorts at and interest in nuclear proliIeration may have ceased. Even iI
true, that should not give us comIort: It took an act oI brute military Iorce to bring this about. One need
hardly point out that this tactic is not congruent with the administration's current approach to North
Korea's nuclear behavior.
More troubling is the administration's apparent treatment oI the Syrian reactor as iI it were the only
proliIeration threat in the Middle East. It is not. Iran should be top oI mind as well.
It is inconceivable that Syria could work Ior Iive years or more building the clone oI North Korea's
Yongbyon reactor on the Euphrates without, at a minimum, Iranian acquiescence. Quite likely, Iran
was involved. Tehran could well be Iinancing Syria's purchase oI reactor technology Irom North
Korea. It could also have expected to beneIit Irom the reactor's production oI plutonium.
Indeed, Iran had much the same incentive as North Korea to hide its nuclear activities Irom
international scrutiny. What better way to conceal proscribed work Irom inspectors in North Korea or
Iran than to build Iacilities in Syria?
Iran and North Korea already have a history oI cooperation in ballistic missiles the delivery system
which, iI perIected, could give their weapons global reach. AIter the North declared a moratorium on
launch testing Irom the Korean Peninsula in 1999, it simply ramped up cooperation with Iran's
aggressive missile research and development program.
The North thus continued to beneIit Irom launch-testing data, prior to breaking its moratorium on July
4, 2006, while also scoring a propaganda victory among the clueless Ior its apparent renunciation oI
provocative behavior in Northeast Asia. Outsourcing weapons programs is nothing new Ior Pyongyang.
Although our intelligence community stated publicly that the Syrian reactor was a cash transaction, its
congressional brieIings contained little or no supporting evidence that this was so. This is unsurprising.
The Israeli raid was based on the hard physical evidence seen on the banks oI the Euphrates River, not
on scrutiny oI documents embodying the deal.
Some Iriendly advice to our intelligence services: Think joint venture. Think asset diversiIication.
Hypothetically, what iI the deal had North Korea getting a third oI the plutonium produced by the
Euphrates reactor, Iran a third, and Syria a third? The North beneIits by maintaining open access to a
plutonium supply even iI Yongbyon remains Irozen. Iran gets experience in reactor technologies
immune Irom IAEA scrutiny. And Syria takes a major step toward undisclosed nuclear capabilities.
Win-win-win, as that entrepreneurial proliIerator A.Q. Khan might have said.
Here is the real problem. North Korean nuclear proliIeration is quite likely more than a series oI one-
time transactions that create problems elsewhere in the world. It may very well be integral to its own
nuclear weapons program.
The Bush administration can wish away these possibilities and still achieve its deal. But it cannot wish
away the underlying reality, the Iull scope oI which we simply do not know. That reality, whatever its
reach, will still be there to haunt President Bush's successor and threaten international peace.
http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID/20080508/OPINION03/805080310/1039/OPINION03
Commentary
CIA credibility suffers
By HAVILAND SMITH
May 8, 2008
Credibility is the liIeblood oI any intelligence organization serving a democracy. II the public, or any
given administration, doesn't believe it is getting told the truth, then the organization has lost its
purpose and eIIectiveness. It is the public perception oI credibility that matters most, and thanks to
current White House tasking oI the agency, the CIA appears to be losing that battle today.
The role oI any intelligence organization is to provide intelligence inIormation and estimates to
policymakers in support oI security and Ioreign policy issues, based on known Iacts.
During the Cold War, the CIA did its best to do just that. It was not always as eIIective as it might have
been, but it was a principled organization staIIed by motivated, reputable people who did their best to
do their job and do it right. The Cold War CIA did not lie or Iabricate intelligence Ior policymakers or
Ior public consumption.
CIA management occasionally suIIered Irom poor judgment and did some really stupid things, like
providing disguises to a Iormer employee who was a member oI the Watergate break-in team.
However, with the possible exception oI Iran/Contra who knows iI Reagan knew and approved?
the CIA never undertook covert activities without White House direction. It was never the "rogue
elephant" that its Iiercest critics persistently alleged it to have been.
UnIortunately, concerns about CIA credibility have grown since 9/11. The role oI the CIA in enabling
the Iraq invasion is probably still not Iully understood, muddled as it is by the machinations oI the Bush
administration. The persistent, unprecedented visits by Vice President Cheney to CIA headquarters
during the run-up to the invasion, reportedly to seek changes in CIA estimates on Iraq that would
support such an invasion, have never been Iully explained.
The "slam dunk" moment on Iraqi WMD; allegations oI CIA waterboarding, renditions, a gulag oI
prisons around the world and, most recently, the question oI why the waterboarding tapes were
destroyed have all added Iuel to the credibility Iire.
Structural changes have weakened CIA credibility, as well. The post-9/11 creation oI a new OIIice oI
the Director oI National Intelligence at the expense oI the CIA was senseless and bureaucratic. The
persistent eIIorts oI the Pentagon under Secretary oI DeIense Donald RumsIeld to usurp CIA Iunctions
and to denigrate the CIA, its processes and its products have added Iurther to an atmosphere in which
CIA credibility is routinely publicly questioned.
In early September 2007, Israeli jets Ilattened a structure in the Syrian desert. Israel, Syria and America
all acknowledged the act, but none gave any explanation Ior it, that is, until recently. Now we see pre-
raid photos oI the inside oI the Syrian structure with virtually identical companion pictures oI North
Korean nuclear sites. The Syria photos presumably were obtained Irom the Israelis.
In the meantime, the Syrian ambassador in Washington, who can hardly be viewed as impartial, claims
the photos are CIA Iabrications. This claim has then become the object oI speculation in the American
media.
What's going on here? Why was this inIormation held so tightly and only released now, seven months
later? Is the CIA lying about this issue? Has the CIA Iabricated these photos? Have the Israelis done
the Iabrications and passed them on to us? All oI these questions and more are now under examination.
Ultimately what is true and what is Ialse about this Syria incident is oI secondary importance to what
the eIIect oI a media examination oI the subject has already brought and will continue to bring. What
will matter is that Iurther doubt will arise in Americans' minds about CIA credibility.
The U.S. involvement in the "war on terror" and in Iraq has put tremendous pressure Irom the White
House on the CIA to undertake activities which, even iI not illegal, create in the public mind an aura oI
mistrust. In today's world, no one is quite sure iI the CIA is on the "right" side oI anything.
That may suit the needs oI today's White House, but it creates a legacy oI mistrust in and lack oI
credibility Ior the CIA that will continue Ior years aIter they are gone. This legacy may serve this
White House well, but it will disastrously serve its successors. The U.S. can ill aIIord to have an
intelligence service whose credibility is publicly questioned.
Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chieI who served abroad in Europe and the Middle East, as
executive assistant in the director's oIIice and as chieI oI the counterterrorism staII. He lives in
Williston.
The Right Path With N. Korea
By SiegIried S. Hecker and William J. Perry
Tuesday, May 13, 2008; A15
The Bush administration's North Korea strategy is being criticized Irom the right and the leIt Ior letting
Pyongyang oII the hook. Some advocate scuttling the six-party talks. Others suggest slowing our own
compliance with the agreement to get North Korea to make a Iull declaration oI its nuclear program
Iirst. We disagree with both positions. Our mantra should be: It's the plutonium, stupid.
North Korea does have the bomb -- but a limited nuclear arsenal and supply oI plutonium to Iuel its
weapons. The Yongbyon plutonium production Iacilities are closed and partially disabled.
In separate visits to North Korea in February, we concluded that the disablement was extensive and
thorough. We also learned that Pyongyang is prepared to move to the next crucial step oI dismantling
Yongbyon, eliminating plutonium production. This would mean no more bombs, no better bombs and
less likelihood oI export. AIter this success, we can concentrate on getting Iull declarations and on
rolling back Pyongyang's supply oI weapons and plutonium.
We must not miss this opportunity, because we have the chance to contain the risk posed by North
Korea's arsenal while we work to eliminate it. As dismantlement proceeds, negotiations should Iocus
concurrently on the plutonium declaration, the extent oI the uranium enrichment eIIort and
Pyongyang's nuclear exports.
Pyongyang's declaration oI 30 kilograms oI plutonium (suIIicient Ior roughly Iour to Iive bombs) Ialls
short oI the estimate oI 40 to 50 kilograms, based on our past visits. We believe that North Korea is
prepared to produce operating records and permit access to Iacilities, equipment and waste sites Ior
veriIication. Obtaining and veriIying its declaration oI plutonium production and inventories is
imperative. Let's proceed.
Pyongyang continues to claim that it has made no eIIorts to enrich uranium, despite strong evidence to
the contrary. Although it appears unlikely that these eIIorts reached a scale that constitutes a weapons
threat, a complete accounting is required. Dismantlement oI the Yongbyon Iacilities should not,
however, be postponed to resolve this issue. In October 2002, the Bush administration accused North
Korea oI covert uranium enrichment, only to have Pyongyang withdraw Irom the nuclear Non-
ProliIeration Treaty and produce plutonium to Iuel the arsenal that we are now attempting to eliminate.
Nuclear exports are oI greater concern. As recently revealed evidence demonstrates, North Korea sold
nuclear technology to Syria, much as it sold missile technology. North Korea must cooperate iI we are
to get to the bottom oI the Syrian incident and ensure that it is not repeated elsewhere. Israel eliminated
the Syrian threat, Ior now, by bombing the reactor at Al Kibar. But it is imperative that Pyongyang
reveal the nature and extent oI its export operations and, most important, whether it has similar deals
underway with Iran.
We do not advocate letting Pyongyang oII the hook, but a "conIession" regarding Syria is not the
critical issue. We have good knowledge oI what the North Koreans supplied to Syria. What we really
need is inIormation Irom North Korea that will help us deal with potential threats. For example, was
North Korea acting alone, or was it part oI a more sophisticated proliIeration ring involving
Pyongyang's trading partners and suppliers? North Korea's leadership must resolve all three declaration
issues Iully, and these will take time to veriIy.
To ultimately succeed in the peaceIul elimination oI nuclear weapons, we must understand why North
Korea devoted its limited resources to going nuclear. The September 2005 six-party joint statement
addresses many oI these concerns, promising mutual respect Ior national sovereignty, peaceIul
coexistence, and a commitment to stability and lasting peace in Northeast Asia, as well as
normalization oI relations. Given the acrimonious history oI our relations, such steps require a
transIormation in the relationship between North Korea and the United States, a change that will Iirst
require building trust -- step by step.
The six-party negotiations have put us on that path, and there is much evidence oI winds oI change
blowing in North Korea that will make navigating that path easier (the recent New York Philharmonic
concert in Pyongyang is one such symbol oI change; the joint industrial Iacility at Kaesong is another).
But North Korea's reluctance to provide Iull declarations and the Syria revelations have moved us in
the wrong direction.
Nevertheless, walking away Irom the talks or slowing them at this point would be counterproductive.
Instead, in its remaining months, the Bush administration should Iocus on limiting North Korea's
nuclear capabilities by concluding the elimination oI plutonium production. II it can also get answers
on the Syrian operation and resolve the question oI uranium enrichment, it will put the next
administration in a stronger position to Iinally end the nuclear threat Irom North Korea.
SiegIried S. Hecker and William J. Perry are with the Center Ior International Security and Cooperation
at StanIord University. Hecker was director oI the Los Alamos National Laboratory Irom 1986 through
1997. Perry was secretary oI deIense Irom 1994 through 1997.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-oe-schoenIeld24-2008may24,0,5061314.story
The failed theology of arms control
So-called experts are frequently certain about what they know about nuclear material --
and they're frequently wrong.
By Gabriel SchoenIeld
May 24, 2008
ONE OF THE least noticed and most peculiar campaign promises made by Barack Obama is his
pledge, iI elected president, to "secure all loose nuclear materials in the world within Iour years."
Without doubt that is a laudable goal, but one is leIt wondering how exactly he expects to accomplish it
in Iour years, or even, Ior that matter, in 40.
One oI many obstacles is that our intelligence agencies seldom know where loose nuclear materials are,
especially when they are hidden on the territory oI hostile states. An even bigger problem is that when
we they do locate them, there always will be some expert or another telling us that, despite all the
evidence, they are not really there. Obama, oI all people, should know this.
He has one such expert advising his campaign.
On Sept. 6, 2007, Israeli jets destroyed a large box-shaped structure built in Syria at Al Kibar, not Iar
Irom the Euphrates River. Although Israel maintained a discreet silence about the raid, and Syria
conIined itselI to denouncing Israel Ior violating its airspace, suspicion immediately began to mount
that the target was a nuclear reactor. In the weeks that Iollowed, satellite photos and other data
buttressing that suspicion rapidly began to emerge.
But not everyone was convinced. Among the skeptics was Joseph Cirincione, Iormerly a staII member
Ior Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) on the House Armed Services Committee and more recently a
denizen oI the Washington think-tank world, who has been an inIormal advisor on nuclear aIIairs Ior
Obama and has written a series oI memos Ior the campaign.
Interviewed by Seymour Hersh oI the New Yorker aIter the Israeli raid, Cirincione was emphatic:
"Syria does not have the technical, industrial or Iinancial ability to support a nuclear weapons program.
I've been Iollowing this issue Ior 15 years, and every once in awhile a suspicion arises and we
investigate and there's nothing. There was and is no nuclear weapons threat Irom Syria."
Thanks to materials made public by the U.S. on April 24, we now know that the Iacility at Al Kibar
was a nuclear reactor and that it had been built with North Korean assistance. Indeed, it was a close
copy oI the North Korean plutonium producing reactor at Yongbyon that the U.S. has been trying, via
negotiations, to shut down. Cirincione has admitted that he got it wrong, explaining that the evidence
"seems strong" that Syria was building a reactor and that no one can bat 1,000.
Cirincione is correct about the diIIiculty oI attaining a perIect batting average. But still, why did he
miss this particular ball?
One obvious explanation is that he Iell victim to Syrian deception. As a report by the Institute Ior
Science and International Security makes plain, Syrian engineers and architects went to "astonishing
lengths" to erase the "signature" oI the reactor at Al Kibar and to camouIlage and/or bury "commonly
expected attributes and conceal the building's true purpose." So successIul was the Syrian concealment
eIIort that even aIter 2005, when U.S. intelligence oIIicials Iirst became aware oI the structure and a
North Korean presence at it, they labeled it an "enigma Iacility."
Yet secrecy and camouIlage are par Ior the course. No country with a covert nuclear program has Iailed
to use such means to keep its eIIort hidden Irom the world. And no nuclear nonproliIeration expert
worth his boron would be unaware oI this. What else must have been at work here?
Experts, like generals, have a tendency to Iight the last war. In this instance, the last war was the Iraq
war, in which the U.S. invaded in no small part to dismantle a nuclear weapons program that turned out
not to exist. A good many nuclear specialists within and outside the intelligence world appear to have
become so IearIul oI repeating that sorry experience that they are aIraid even to acknowledge things
that do exist. Last year's National Intelligence Estimate on Iran that declared, misleadingly, that Iran's
nuclear weapons program ended in 2003 is a prominent case in point.
Cirincione seems to have been snared by precisely the same trap. Reports oI a Syrian nuclear reactor,
he wrote a week aIter the Israeli strike, were "nonsense," the handiwork "oI a small group oI oIIicials
leaking cherry-picked, unvetted 'intelligence' to key reporters in order to promote a preexisting political
agenda. II this sounds like the run-up to the war in Iraq, it should."
It "is all political," he insisted to Hersh. Those peddling the story oI the nonexistent reactor appear to
have been aiming "at derailing the U.S.-North Korean agreement that administration hard-liners think
is appeasement."
In his solicitude Ior the U.S.-North Korean agreement -- itselI a deeply Ilawed document and one
repeatedly violated by Pyongyang -- the solution to the riddle becomes clear. Cirincione is now the
president oI an outIit called the Ploughshares Fund, a Ioundation dedicated to Iunding advocates oI
arms control negotiations around the world. To him and his Iellow members oI the arms control creed,
the admission that North Korea was illicitly shipping nuclear technology abroad -- and that a country
such as Syria, a signatory to the Nuclear NonproliIeration Treaty, had been caught in a brazen violation
oI its commitments -- might be taken as an acknowledgment that the arms control regime on which
they have staked their reputations and dedicated their lives has Iailed utterly.
But it is as irrational to suggest that weapons never exist as it would be to suggest that they always
exist. As the Syrian episode demonstrates, there may not be weapons oI mass destruction under every
dictator's bed, but sometimes there will be, and it is not something about which we -- or, in this
instance, the Israelis -- can aIIord to be wrong.
In short, when the Israelis obliterated the reactor at Al Kibar, the reverberations oI the blast also
shattered a theology. II Obama is to make any headway at all on his quixotic pledge to secure all loose
nuclear materials in the world in Iour years, he might begin by securing some more realistic nuclear
advisors.
Gabriel SchoenIeld is senior editor oI Commentary magazine.
Appendix B
Imagery and Related Materials
Probable SPOT image.
Note that there is no riverside building.
Image Credit: ISIS & DigitalGlobe
2007-08-10 DigitalGlobe Image.
Note the presence of a riverside building and what may be a trench
on the south side of the wadi leading to the large building
DigitalGlobe imagery of the pump house on the Euphrates retrieved from
GoogleEarth 2008-04-27. Estimated date of imagery is August, 2007.
DigitalGlobe imagery of the facility retrieved from
GoogleEarth 2008-04-27. Estimated date of imagery is August, 2007.
Rotated view of DigitalGlobe image as displayed in Google Earth, 2008-04-27. This represents the
view of the wadi containing the facility as seen from a point on the west bank of the Euphrates some 25
meters above river level. Note that the curves in the lower course of the wadi block a direct view of the
facility. The pump house is the thin white rhombus to right center on the opposite shore.
Rotated view of DigitalGlobe image as displayed in Google Earth on 2008-04-29 showing the facility
and surrounding terrain in perspective. According to the Google Earth display, the elevation of the
river surface is 216 meters, the plateau nearest the river 277 meters, the plateau adjacent to the facility
316 meters and the floor of the wadi adjacent to the large building 285 meters.
Caution: the heights of the buildings at the facility are not represented in the Google Earth image:
i.e., they appear flat.
Image provided by the U.S. Government, April 2008
Image Credit: DigitalGlobe
2007-08-05
2007-08-05 2007-10-24
[DigitalGlobe imagery of the presumed pump house near the Euphrates. Note that there appears to be
a modest outflow of turbid water through the flume connecting the building and the river in the August
image. In addition, the shoreline appears to have altered between the two images.]
2007-08-10
2007-10-24
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/worldnews.html?inarticleid489863&inpageid1811
2007-08-24
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1689/syrian-and-nuclear-weapons-again#comment
JeIIrey,
Actually the large square-top building which has apparently now been removed Irom the site has been
on the site Ior over FIVE years. Shown below is a piece oI an astronaut photo I cropped Irom an online
collection accessible at a NASA website
This photo was taken in September oI 2002.
[Segment of image dated 2002-09-05T08:51:57Z; 2002248.369410Z]
The technical inIormation about the photo I cropped this piece Irom is shown in the image below.
I am currently looking Ior older photos online to see iI I can Iind one where the building is not yet
present so we can bracket the time Irame over which the structure was built. Will keep everyone
inIormed iI I Iind one.
John Oct 29, 06:36 PM
1 25544U 98067A 02248.15325231 .00043399 00000-0 54223-3 0 1188
2 25544 51.6391 11.6363 0015293 222.4936 139.9474 15.59260317216505
ISS orbital elements for day of photograph from http://celestrak.com/NORAD/archives/zarya.zip
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/SuspectSite24October2007.pdI
[EXCERPT OF COMMENT]
I played around with some shadow geometry and got some interesting tentative results.
II we assume that the truck trailer stands 4 meters tall:
then the Secondary Structure stands a reasonable 8 meters (about 26 Ieet):
But theBig Box stands over 24 meters (78 Ieet) high:
Above is a side view oI the Big Box. The red arrow points at a person-sized line Ior comparison
II these calculations are even roughly correct, and the building is, as Syria claims, just a warehouse,
what are they storing?? Dinosaurs?
Yale Simkin
yale Oct 30, 10:14 PM
I was just looking at the 24 October post-strike picture and noticed that the line representing the
putative water pipe Irom/to the Euphrates leads not to the Iormer big building, but to the smaller one
just south oI it.
And indeed, a key ABC News story oI Oct 19 (http://abcnews.go.com/WN/story?
id3752687&page1) says, The oIIicial said there was a larger structure just north oI a small pump
station; a nuclear reactor would need a constant source oI water to keep it cool.
So I wonder iI the building on the Euphrates identiIied as a pump station in
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/SuspectSite24October2007.pdI might not be just one oI two.
Putative is a lovely word to have available in such circumstances as these.
Allen Thomson Nov 1, 02:09 PM
Stranger and stranger. A couple oI comments.
First oI all, look at the location oI this Iacility Irom the big picture:
Notice anything odd about the location? II you zoom in, the river in this section bisects two bluIIs. As a
consequence, the adjacent land is not subject to Ilooding and the river likely Ilows Iaster and deeper
than in the green low-lying agricultural areas that predominate to both the north and south all along
the Euphrates. II one desired to build a reactor, would this particular section oI river not be well suited?
A reactor could be placed in close proximity to the river and a deep and narrow channel would provide
easy pumping oI cooling water.
However, as Yale noted above, pumps require electricity. Im still trying to obtain hi resolution
imagery that will not cost me $400, but the reported pump station would require electrical power
Irom somewhere. Perhaps someone with the requisite imagery could see iI there are electrical lines and
where they lead.
Finally, at this point Im relatively convinced this is not a SCUD Iacility Ior a Iew reasons. First oI all,
Syria already has developed Iacilities Ior such missiles Iacilities with underground bunkers, wide
paved roads, etc. II the shipment were Scuds, particularly a new variant, why not send them to an
established, existing and more secure Iacility?
Secondly, the razed Iacility lacks the kind oI wide, paved roads and large, paved parking areas that one
commonly associates with missile-related Iacilities.
Additionally, the Iacility is , well, isolated. What purpose would an isolated scud Iacility serve that
could not be served by Syrias existing and more well developed Iacilities?
Finally, the indications are that the US and Israel have been watching this Iacility Ior some time. One
might postulate that in all that time the intelligence community might have imaged or otherwise noticed
something scud-related, such as a MAZ parked outside or other Scud-related equipment. No indication
oI that so Iar.
Finally, what is this: [continued on next page]
Ill put Iorth some additional conjecture and suggest it might be a concrete mixing plant. Compare to
this and this and this.
Andy Nov 1, 01:22 AM
[Pictures of concrete plants in above links]
Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2007 07:43:03 -0700
Local: Sat, Nov 3 2007 9:43 am
Subject: DigitalGlobe coverage oI Syrian site
According to DigitalGlobe's somewhat quirky ordering tool, the only
images they have Ior the Big Box site are the ones listed below.
Apparently somebody put in an order Ior coverage late-July/early
August.
Whether the Iact that coverage stopped a week beIore the strike and
didn't resume until the ISIS work became public is interesting, but
may or may not be signiIicant.
Date Cloud OII-nadir Catalog #
2007-08-05 0 29 10100100070A0D01
2007-08-05 0 40 10100100070A0E01
2007-08-10 0 40 10100100070E7C01
2007-08-15 0 37 1010010007125B01
2007-08-18 0 2 101001000714C801
2007-08-28 0 38 10100100071CCB01
2007-10-24 11 11 10100100074B1001
DigitalGlobe coverage of Syria during 2007 as shown in Google Earth on 2007-11-04.
Note the region of special coverage at the suspect site.
Detail of DigitalGlobe region of coverage.
Google Earth depiction of centerpoint of images obtained 2007-12-20. Note that the image of 16
November 2007 is at the site of the former building, but the centers of earlier images are displaced by
several kilometers. The significance of this displacement, if any, is unknown.
DigitalGlobe coverage of Syria 2002-2006 (2007 excluded)
as shown in Google Earth on 2007-11-04
[Note that this image includes the town of At Tibnah but not the suspected strike site.]
SPOT/IMAGE Coverage
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2007 10:27:30 -0800 (PST)
Local: Tues, Nov 27 2007 12:27 pm
Subject: Re: Israeli Strike on Syria sourcebook update
~ one thing that came out is that there is a considerable amount oI
~ SPOT-5 2.5 meter imagery oI the site extending Irom March 2004 through
~ March 2007.
"A considerable amount" being enumerated below. They all appear to be
near-nadir shots with 10 cloud cover. I'm slightly tempted to read
something into the June 2006 coverage, but it's probably best not to.
18-03-2007
18-03-2007
25-01-2007
25-01-2007
08-11-2006
17-08-2006
17-08-2006
11-08-2006
21-06-2006
21-06-2006
20-06-2006
20-06-2006
11-06-2006
11-06-2006
28-07-2005
02-07-2005
01-06-2005
01-06-2005
22-05-2005
22-05-2005
16-05-2005
26-04-2005
26-04-2005
25-03-2005
20-03-2005
22-02-2005
31-03-2004
31-03-2004
GeoEye Ikonos and IRS-1C Imagery
Ikonos Browse Image
2003-09-16
Ikonos Browse Image
2003-09-16
Ikonos Browse Image
2007-06-25
Ikonos Browse Image
2007-06-25
Ikonos Browse Image
2007-11-23
IRS-IC 5-meter Imagery
IRS-1C Browse Image
2001-11-07
IRS-1C Browse Image
2000-09-25
Syria Rebuilds on Site Destroyed by Israeli Bombs
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
The puzzling site in Syria that Israeli jets bombed in September grew more curious on Friday with the
release oI a satellite photograph showing new construction there that resembles the site's Iormer main
building.

DigitalGlobe
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/01/11/world/12syria-450.jpg
New construction at a disputed Syrian site that Israeli and American analysts
judged to be a partially built nuclear reactor.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/Syria11January2008.pdI
THE INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
JANUARY 11, 2008
Satellite imagery taken January 9, 2008 obtained Irom DigitalGlobe shows new construction at the site
in Syria bombed by Israel in early September 2007. The destroyed building was widely reported to be a
nuclear reactor under construction. The new building has dimensions oI approximately 60 meters by 60
meters, larger than the destroyed building, which had dimensions oI about 47 meters by 47 meters. In
addition, the rooI on the new building is vaulted at the top instead oI Ilat. The height oI the new
building was not determined.
The building's purpose cannot be discerned Irom the satellite imagery. There are trenches and what
appear to be pipe sections, east oI the building (away Irom the river). The trenches and pipes can be
seen in the imagery Ior several kilometers. The trenches end at a site that may be a water treatment
Iacility.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has sought permission Irom Syria to inspect the site, but
so Iar Syria has denied the IAEA access to the site. II Syria allows the IAEA to inspect the site, the
inspectors will have a more diIIicult time looking Ior evidence oI reactor construction, because the new
building covers whatever was leIt oI the original building.
http://browse.digitalglobe.com/imageIinder/showBrowseImage?
catalogId10100100071CCB00&imageHeightnatres&imageWidthnatres
DigitalGlobe
Segment of Quick Bird browse image, 2007-08-28
catalogId10100100074B1000&imageHeightnatres&imageWidthnatres
DigitalGlobe
Segment of QuickBird browse image, 2007-10-24
http://archive.spaceimaging.com/ikonos/2/kpms/2007/11/browse.23487.crsssat.0.0.jpg
GeoEye
Segment of IKONOS image, 2007-11-23
catalogId10100100078DE200&imageHeightnatres&imageWidthnatres
DigitalGlobe
Segment of Quick Bird browse image, 2008-01-09
catalogId1020010001143100&imageHeightnatres&imageWidthnatres
Digital Globe
Segment of WorldView-1 browse image, 2008-01-12
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/syria/SyriaReactorReport12May2008.pdI
[EXCERPTS]

This report Iocuses on the astonishing lengths to which Syrian engineers and architects went to hide
the[...] commonly expected attributes [of a nuclar reactor] and conceal the buildings true purpose.
This case serves as a sobering reminder oI the diIIiculty oI identiIying secret nuclear activities and how
too oIten debate about the veracity oI technical assessments is subordinated to political or ideological
goals on both the right and leIt. It should also serve as a call to bolster national and international
methods to better detect these Iacilities. The current domestic and international capabilities to detect
nuclear Iacilities and activities are inadequate to prevent more surprises in the Iuture.

Creating a Boxy Non-Descript Building

By Iar the most dramatic Ieat oI concealment oI the buildings purpose was the eIIort to mask the
design oI the building using Iake upper walls and rooI. Figure 4 shows the original design oI the
reactor building, with columns used to suspend what appear to be Ilimsy camouIlaging rooIs. These
columns were likely later used as the Iramework Ior the Iinal Iake outer walls and rooI. This ground
photo dates to beIore 2003, when GeoEye satellite imagery shows only the boxy structure. The U.S.
intelligence community does not have satellite images prior to the completion oI the construction oI
these Iake walls and rooI, according to US Government experts.
Figures 5 and 6 show how the rooI oI the shorter sides (highlighted in green) was artiIicially
raised up in order to bring these sides level with the top oI the reactor building. Doing so alters
the original design oI the building, which is similar to that oI Yongbyon, and transIorms it into
the box-like structure.
Building Extends Underground

A signiIicant percentage oI the Al Kibar reactor building was underground. AIter demolition oI the
reactor building on October 10, 2007 and removal oI the heavy reactor structures, Syria Iilled in the
resulting hole. Figure 11 shows that this hole was quite deep. According to U.S. government experts,
the depth oI the hole was several tens oI meters. In contrast, the Yonybyon Iive megawatt-electric
reactor was built essentially Irom the ground upwards.

Isolated Site and Lack of Physical Protection

Isolated Site

The Al Kibar reactor was located in an isolated desert region oI eastern Syria. The Euphrates River
cuts through this desert, and in many places, villages and industries line the river banks. Syria
however, situated the reactor at a point near the river that is likely about as sparse as could be Iound on
the banks oI the Euphrates in Eastern Syria. This unlikely location Ior a reactor helped ensure that
Western intelligence agencies would pay little attention to the site, particularly iI Syria minimized
visible signatures that would attract outside scrutiny. A key signature to minimize was physical
protection and the presence oI the military. According to U.S. government experts, the Al Kibar
reactor site had minimal visible physical protection.
Earthen Walls

Syria built the reactor at the bottom oI a canyon, aIIording the site a considerable degree oI natural
isolation. To Iurther increase the sites privacy, Syria created a series oI earthen walls at key points
around the reactor that would block the view oI anyone traveling nearby (see Iigure 16). These walls
were constructed by repeatedly dumping large mounds oI dirt in a line and then pushing them Irom
either side with a bulldozer to create a ridge. Some oI these walls were created near ridgelines, a
diIIicult Ieat to accomplish (see Iigure 17).
The construction oI a special transport system is not necessary Ior this type oI reactor. Large internal
components do not need to be assembled elsewhere and shipped to the site. In about 2002, Syria
assembled the steel reactor liner or vessel at or near the site under a tarp to hide it Irom overhead
surveillance, according to U.S. government experts (see Iigure 22). It was placed inside the building
beIore installing the rooI, perhaps at night. The thin sheets oI steel and water piping used in the vessel
could have easily been transported to the site in trucks. Other components were probably likewise
assembled at the site Irom easily transportable.
Air Ventilation System

A nuclear reactor requires an air ventilation system to carry away radioactive gases emitted Irom
the reactor core. A gas-graphite reactor, which uses carbon dioxide gas Ior cooling, has an even
greater need Ior a robust ventilation system. It must carry away any leaking radioactive carbon
dioxide gas. Using a system oI air intakes and Iilters, radioactive gaseous eIIluents are Iiltered
and then dispersed into the atmosphere through the stack.

Typically, a stack, which is distinctive, is located near or at the reactor building. A ventilation
stack is plainly visible towering over North Koreas Iive megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon.

According to U.S. government experts, the reactors ventilation system was careIully hidden.
The air intakes oI the ventilation system are assessed to be along one wall oI the building,
according to these experts (see Iigure 23). They noted that two rectangular structures located
against the wall have louvers at the top through which air can enter.

The building in August 2007 did not have a stack visible (see Iigure 24). U.S. government
experts said that the stack may have been located near the spent Iuel pond. Syrian demolition oI
the building on October 10, 2007 leIt visible heavy concrete structures. The explosion blew
debris and other structures Irom these hard to destroy parts. One structure visible is what the
intelligence community assessed could be the Ioundation and remaining part oI the stack (see
Iigure 25). According to U.S. government experts, a pipe or small stack could have been
extended through the Iake rooI aIter the reactor started operating. Until that time, the top oI the
stack may not have been more than a hole or cover in the Iake rooI, according to U.S.
government experts (see Iigure 24).
Electrical System for the Reactor

The Syrian reactor would have needed a supply oI electricity. No obvious high power lines are
visible in August 2007 commercial satellite imagery oI the site and surrounding area, leading
many to discount that the site could be a reactor site.

According to U.S. government experts, the reactor did not have a turbine to make electricity.
Thus, electrical power must come Irom outside the site. According to these same experts, the
power lines were hidden underground. Such a strategy was also used by Iraq in the 1980s to
disguise electrical inputs into its secret uranium enrichment sites using electro-magnetic isotope
separation (EMIS) technology.

In the case oI this reactor, the U.S intelligence community assessed that the power lines
originated at a water treatment plant that is connected to the local electrical grid (see Iigure 26).
The power lines were likely placed in conduits running underground Irom the treatment plant to
the reactor building (see Iigures 27 and 28).
[Sourcebook note: The water treatment plant is the facility discussed in Appendix C. It is not
obvious where the water to be treated was to come from or go to.]
Water Intake and Discharge
Summary and Lessons

In building the Al Kibar reactor, Syria used three basic methods to avoid detection: locating the reactor
in a remote area, building portions oI it underground, and camouIlaging the design oI the reactor
building along with its ventilation, cooling, and electrical supply.
The Syrian strategy worked Ior years. According to U.S. government experts, U.S. intelligence had
determined in 2005 that Syria and North Korea were involved in a project in the province Dayr az
Zawr. However, the nature oI the cooperation and the location oI the site remained unknown.
However, suspicions based on earlier obtained inIormation, pointed to some type oI nuclear activity
taking place in this province.

The 2005 assessment led to an intensiIied imagery search, which resulted in the discovery oI a large
unidentiIied building near the town oI Al Kibar. According to a U.S. government expert, it was odd
and in the middle oI nowhere, but analysts could not ascribe the building with a nuclear character, and
U.S. intelligence labeled it an enigma Iacility. In the spring oI 2007, the building was determined to
be the covert nuclear reactor based on photos acquired by U.S. intelligence, reportedly Irom Israel, that
showed the inside and outside oI the building.
... U.S. government experts acknowledge that the IC lacks high-quality overhead imagery oI the
construction site beIore the building was turned into a non-descript boxy shape. II the United States or
other countries had acquired pre-2003 satellite imagery oI the site, particularly imagery showing the
creation oI a Ialse rooI, the Syrian construction site would have looked more suspicious and more like a
North Korean reactor.
Appendix C
A Possibly Associated Facility
at
35.7006 N, 39.8998 E
Five kilometers to the east of the former large building is another facility next to a road. In
prestrike Google Earth photography available as of 2007-12-30, there are traces of another
road, largely sand-covered, leading from the building site to the facility.
Image Credit: GeoEye
Post-strike Ikonos browse image of 2007-11-23 showing a distinct road connecting the building site to the
road-side facility. This road appears to follow the general path of the one in the above image, but not to be
completely coincident with it. Note that there is a suggestion of an object at the location of the former
building.
Connecting
Road
Image Credit: GeoEye
Detail of road between strike site and second facility. The 2007-11-23 IKONOS browse image has
been magnified, converted to grey scale, sharpened and cropped.
Ikonos browse image, 2003-09-16. Both facilities are present, but no obvious road connects them.
Prestrike DigitalGlobe browse image, 2007-08-18. No obvious road connects the facilities.
Post-strike DigitalGlobe browse image, 2007-10-24. No obvious road connects the facilities.
Comparison of the facility and the building site at the same scale from Google Earth.
Google Earth measurement of largest bulding(?) at facility showing it to be about 48 meters on a
side. The blue square at the bottom appears to be a square pond about 30 meters on a side
divided into six sections. Note that, unlike the site of the former building, the facility appears to
have a security perimeter.
Google Earth measurement of former building showing it to be about 47-48 meters on a side.
Retrieved 2008-03-08
Scene ID:2000000961702R08 Source ID:2008022708131000000011102134
DigitalGlobe image taken from Google Earth on 2008-04-27. The resolution is higher than images
previously shown on Google Earth. Date is uncertain but is probably in August of 2007.
Appendix D
Frames from 2008-04-24 Intelligence
Briefing Video
Pumphouse and pipeline externally complete, early August 2007
Reactor building after 6 September bombing and before 10 October demolition
Reactor building beIore completion oI curtain wall, perhaps mid-2002
View of Syrian building after roof and curtain walls were added.
Before (top) and after (bottom) 2007-10-10 explosive demolition of the building
Late October 2007. Comparison with DigitalGlobe imagery of 24 October
suggests this image was taken between 10 October and 24 October.
New building under construction, perhaps November 2007
New building externally complete

The Israeli Strike in Syria

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Israeli Strike in Syria

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Sourcebook on the Israeli Strike in Syria,

'Aluminum pipes not Ior N-use'

You might also like