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The Experiencing Self and the Remembering Self: Implications for Leisure
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The Experiencing Self and the Remembering Self:

Implications for Leisure Science

Chris A. B. Zajchowski, Keri A. Schwab & Daniel L. Dustin

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Experiencing Self and the Remembering Self: Implications for Leisure Science, Leisure Sciences,
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 LEISURE SCIENCES
, VOL. , NO. , –
[Link]

RESEARCH REFLECTION

The Experiencing Self and the Remembering Self: Implications

for Leisure Science
Chris A. B. Zajchowskia , Keri A. Schwabb , and Daniel L. Dustina
a
Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA; b Recreation, Parks, &
Tourism Administration Department, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, San Luis Obispo,
CA, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

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In this research reflection we question the way leisure experience is com- Received  November 
monly understood and how leisure science is commonly conducted. Accepted  June 
Specifically, we focus on advances in multiple self-theory popularized
KEYWORDS
by Daniel Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and Slow, an in-depth examina- ambulatory assessment;
tion of human thought processes. After establishing Kahneman’s foun- experiencing self;
dational perspective, we apply his thinking to leisure experience and remembering self;
leisure science by reviewing recent scholarship focused on the “expe- self-reports
riencing” and “remembering” selves (2000). We conclude the reflec-
tion by discussing the implications of Kahneman’s thinking for the use
of self-reports by leisure scientists, as well as call for greater congru-
ence between the selves we seek to research and our selected research
methods.

“I am my remembering self, and the experiencing self, who does my living, is like a stranger to me.”
— Daniel Kahneman

In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman popularizes
the idea of two selves: the experiencing self and the remembering self (Kahneman, 2011).
The experiencing self is that part of us that lives in the moment, cognitively, affectively, and
behaviorally responding to life as it comes, for better or worse. The remembering self is that
part of us that looks back and reflects on what we have experienced (Kahneman & Riis, 2005).
“How are you?” is a question for the experiencing self. “How have you been?” is a question
for the remembering self. What makes the two selves so interesting is how radically different
they are in their interpretations of the same event.
While other scholars have developed the concept of multiple or “dynamic” selves
(Conner & Barrett, 2012; Marcus & Wulf, 1987; Singer & Salovey, 1993), Kahneman advances
our understanding of how the experiencing and remembering selves construct notions of
utility (2011). Unlike the modern interpretation of utility—the perceived benefit or useful-
ness of an action attributed through a probabilistic weighing of observed choices—Kahneman
shows that moment-based and remembered pain and pleasure also influence how we make
evaluations. In doing so, he references philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s hedonic definition of

CONTACT Chris A. B. Zajchowski [Link]@[Link] Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, College of
Health, University of Utah,  South  East Room , Salt Lake City, UT -.
©  Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 562 C. A. B. ZAJCHOWSKI ET AL.

utility, outlined in his 1789 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “Nature
has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is
for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (as
quoted in Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997, p. 375). As Kahneman reasons, how accurately
the pain and pleasure we experience informs our assessment of utility depends on whether
our assessments are made in the moment or retrospectively (Kahneman, 2011, 2000). Put
differently, experienced utility is either a function of the aggregation of moment-based expe-
riences of pain/pleasure or the post-facto, memory-based recollections of those experiences
constructed by the remembering self. As Kahneman and others have shown, the experienc-
ing and remembering selves each calculate utility quite differently (Conner & Barrett, 2012;
Kahneman, 2011, 2000; Schwarz, 2007).

Experience and memory

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Kahneman’s classic experiment illuminating the differences between the experiencing and
remembering selves focused on the pain endured during a colonoscopy (Kahneman &
Redelmeier, 1996). As illustrated in Figure 1, Patient A endured a shorter procedure
(8 minutes) while Patient B endured a longer procedure (24 minutes). When asked which
of the two patients endured the most pain, most people will agree it was Patient B. Indeed,
as the graphs show, Patient B’s experiencing self endured both a longer period of pain and
a much greater sum total of pain than Patient A. However, much to Kahneman’s surprise,
when he asked the patients’ remembering selves to rate the pain they had endured during the
colonoscopy, Patient A retained a much worse memory of the procedure than Patient B. Kah-
neman drew two important conclusions from his findings: first, what he calls the “peak-end
rule,” the overall retrospective rating could be predicted by the average level of pain reported
at the worst moment of the experience and at its end; and second, what he calls “duration
neglect,” the length of the procedure had no effect whatsoever on the ratings of total pain
(Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman, 2011).
The implications of Kahneman’s findings are far-reaching. As his research suggests, what
something feels like when we are experiencing it—the experiencing self—can differ dramat-
ically from our memory of it—the remembering self. Moreover, what we remember of an
experience can be influenced heavily by its peaks or valleys with little regard for its duration

Figure . Patients’assessments of pain experienced during colonoscopies (Adapted from Kahneman’s Think-
ing, Fast and Slow, p. ).
 LEISURE SCIENCES 563

(Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005). Finally, our memory of an experience is strongly influ-
enced by its ending. Recent research on this ‘end’ component of the peak-end rule presumes
that for experiences with long-lasting durations the most recent experience may even inter-
fere with memory recall of positive events early in the experience (Garbinsky, Morewedge, &
Shiv, 2014; Kemp, Burt, & Furneaux, 2008).
In the context of the colonoscopy study, the resulting question becomes: “What should the
physician do?” According to Kahneman, it depends:
If the objective is to reduce patients’ memory of pain, lowering the peak intensity of pain could be
more important than minimizing the duration of the procedure. By the same reasoning, gradual
relief may be preferable to abrupt relief if patients retain a better memory when the pain at the end
of the procedure is relatively mild. If [on the other hand] the objective is to reduce the amount of
pain actually experienced, conducting the procedure swiftly may be appropriate even if doing so
increases the peak pain intensity and leaves patients with an awful memory. (Kahneman, 2011,
pp. 380–381)
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Kahneman presents this dilemma as a conflict of interests between the two selves.
The experiencing self is the one that answers the question: “Does it hurt now?” The remembering
self is the one that answers the question: “How was it, on the whole?” Memories are all we get to
keep from our experience of living, and the only perspective that we can adopt as we think about
our lives is therefore that of the remembering self. (Kahneman, 2011, p. 381)

In sum, Kahneman’s research not only illustrates two divergent ways of calculating experi-
enced utility (moment-based and memory-based), but it also provides much food for thought
regarding the dominance of the remembering self over the experiencing self. “The experienc-
ing self does not have a voice,” Kahneman says, while the remembering self “keeps score and
governs what we learn from living, and it is the one that makes decisions” (2011, p. 381). He
concludes that it is the experiencing self that actually does our living for us, but the experi-
encing self is largely lost to the remembering self. The question we are left to ponder is: “Does
this matter?”

Implications for leisure experience

What does Kahneman’s work have to do with leisure experience? Let us begin by revisiting
Bentham’s quote: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign mas-
ters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do” (as quoted in Kahneman et al., 1997, p. 375). Unlike Kahneman
and his colonoscopy study, however, let us now substitute pleasure for pain as the focus of our
inquiry, and let us begin thinking about the idea of a “leisure experiencing self ” and a “leisure
remembering self.”
Consider, for example, a recently completed study of British tourists on the coastal steamer
Hurtigruten, who purchased a four-day winter cruise along the shore of Norway to view the
northern lights (Ekeland & Dahl, in press). The researchers conducted a triangulated assess-
ment of various dimensions of the excursion, including the tourists’ interest in and satisfaction
with their leisure experience. As it turned out, the tourists were able to see the northern lights
on the second evening of their cruise and, based on questionnaires administered and obser-
vations made at that time, their leisure experience was extraordinary. However, two days later,
at the end of their excursion, a cross-section of passengers was interviewed about their over-
all satisfaction with the cruise and not one mentioned seeing the northern lights. What they
focused on instead was the boring nature of the final two days at sea. It appears as though
 564 C. A. B. ZAJCHOWSKI ET AL.

the passengers’ leisure experiencing selves were quite happy when the researchers questioned
and observed them in-the-moment of seeing the northern lights, but a mere two days later
their leisure remembering selves had all but forgotten what drew them to the cruise in the
first place. All their leisure remembering selves could talk about was the anticlimactic nature
of the trip’s end.
Other recent leisure research has shown similar results. In a study of college students’ expe-
rienced and remembered satisfaction while on vacation, Kemp et al. (2008) found that neither
vacation duration nor peak experiences featured as salient in vacationers’ evaluations of over-
all satisfaction. Rather, the most memorable 24-hour period of the vacation, as opposed to the
most enjoyable, and the reported satisfaction at the end of the trip were most highly corre-
lated with overall recollections of satisfaction. This emphasis on the “recency” or end effect is
supported by the work of Nawijn, Mitas, Lin, and Kerstetter (2013) and Fredrickson (2000),
whose studies show satisfaction at the end of the trip as a relatively good predictor of over-
all satisfaction. In sum, while Kahneman’s peak-end rule may not accurately describe all of
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the recent findings regarding the role of affect and emotion in leisure experience, it is clear
that subjective recollections of overall happiness are dependent on discrete snapshots from
leisure experience as opposed to the aggregation of moment-based satisfactions throughout
(Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Kemp et al., 2008). In other words, leisure experiencing
and remembering selves appear to hold vastly different interpretations of the same leisure
experience.
In the same way the colonoscopy study resulted in the question “What should the physi-
cian do?” these recent studies result in the question: “What should leisure service providers
do?” And, just like Kahneman, their answer might well be that it depends. In the case of the
northern lights example, if the objective is to increase a tourist’s memory of pleasure, then
ensuring that the peak intensity of pleasure—seeing the northern lights—occurs at the end
of the excursion is more important than the duration of the cruise or peak experiences dur-
ing the middle of the cruise. On the other hand, if the objective is to increase the amount of
pleasure actually experienced on the cruise, then lengthening the duration of the cruise and
intentional programming for more pleasurable on and off-board experiences throughout the
cruise might be preferable, even though the memory of the cruise itself might be less positive.
Finally, astute observers will readily point out that this question is further complicated by
the fact that considerable chance is involved when embarking on any leisure experience, such
as an excursion to see the northern lights. Hurtigruten’s operators, for example, understand
the conditions under which the likelihood of seeing the northern lights are most favorable,
but they cannot guarantee when or even if they will see them. This uncontrollable aspect
of the excursion can result in early peaks, which can lead to intense feelings of boredom
by the cruise’s end, which in turn may ruin the overall story for the remembering self (Eke-
land & Dahl, in press). And, as we have learned from Kahneman, it is the remembering self
that will make decisions about whether to repeat the experience or recommend it to others.
Hurtigruten’s operators are thus left with a choice between catering to the remembering self,
whose recollections could affect the operator’s bottom line, and catering to the experiencing
self, who may later undervalue the peak experiences, such as seeing the northern lights.

Which self should count?

In the Hurtigruten study, the leisure experiencing self is the one that answers the question:
“Are you enjoying the cruise now?” while the leisure remembering self is the one that answers
the question: “Did you enjoy the cruise on the whole?” As noted previously, the leisure
 LEISURE SCIENCES 565

experiencing self is largely lost to the leisure remembering self, and it is the leisure remem-
bering self that does the decision-making with regard to creating future memories through
future leisure experiences. Why might this uneven distribution of power over our memories
matter?
Consider another example. A sporting event that is hard fought until the very end is chock
full of pleasurable moments for the home team, but an unfortunate error costs the home team
the game at the very end. One might say that the error ‘ruined’ the whole game. Kahneman
would quickly point out, however, that for most of the game the experiencing selves root-
ing for the home team were having a really good time. But because of the tyranny of their
remembering selves (Kahneman, 2011), they ignore that large part of the game and focus
instead on the small part at the very end when things went wrong. Their leisure experiencing
selves were lost to their leisure remembering selves. There are countless other leisure-related
examples that illustrate the same phenomenon: a wonderful picnic “ruined” by a sudden rain-
storm, a memorable road trip “ruined” by mechanical failure, a wonderful concert “ruined”
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by a sour note; or, conversely, a miserable camping trip “saved” by a rare songbird sighting or
a harrowing rafting trip “saved” by the successful negotiation of a challenging rapid. How the
remembering self-catalogues these experiences becomes critically important when planning
future outings.
The possibility, then, that our remembering selves can misrepresent the totality of our expe-
rience should give us pause about the way we think about leisure experience and the way
we understand leisure experience. One might say, for example, that because the remember-
ing self is the dominant self, the one that makes judgements and decisions about things, we
should cater to it in both our planning and programming as well as in our assessment of the
meaning and impact of leisure opportunities we provide our constituencies. At the same time,
there seems to be something inherently wrong with the idea that we should base our planning
and programming on an aspect of ourselves that denies the significance of another aspect of
ourselves—the aspect that actually does our living for us.

Implications for leisure science

The idea of multiple selves raises several challenges for both leisure service providers and for
leisure scientists. For scholars seeking to understand satisfaction in diverse settings such as
tourism, community recreation, or resource management, an understanding of the difference
between the experiencing and remembering selves is crucial when deciding which self-report
metric of satisfaction is most germane to any given study. For example, a scholar interested
in the “objective happiness” (Kahneman, 2000) of the experiencing self should employ a
markedly different instrument than one interested in the more subjective impressions of
the remembering self or how best to encourage brand loyalty for leisure service providers
(Zaltman, Olson, & Forr, 2015).
Recent work within the field of psychosomatic medicine by Connor and Barrett (2012)
provides a helpful schematic for leisure researchers navigating these multiple selves. As
Connor and Barrett profess: “Understanding the distinctions among experiences, memo-
ries, and beliefs can help researchers choose which ‘self ’ they want to cultivate for a given
hypothesis, and which corresponding self-report measure to use” (2012, p. 331). For assess-
ing moment-based satisfaction, the authors recommend the use of “ambulatory assessment”
(Faherenberg & Myrtek, 1996) techniques to ascertain real-time information regarding “emo-
tions, pain, fatigue, coping, and daily stress” (Connor & Barrett). Particularly germane for
real-time, health-related research, ambulatory assessment can be facilitated by use of readily
 566 C. A. B. ZAJCHOWSKI ET AL.

available personal digital assistants (PDAs), such as smartphones, tablets, and Internet dairies
(Connor & Barrett; Kubiak, & Krog, 2012). Conversely, for retrospective evaluations of how
individuals construct memories of specific leisure experiences or assign the level of reported
satisfaction—as opposed to “objective” or in-the-moment satisfaction—postevent/experience
surveys and cross-sectional designs are fitting. Additionally, as Connor and Barrett point out,
there is a third self to whom we must attend in our research designs: “the believing self.” In
contrast to the experiencing or remembering self, the believing self forms trait-based assess-
ments over the course of an individual’s life. Widely used instruments such as the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) are emblematic of these trait-based assessments of
the believing self (Conner & Barrett; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Finally, researchers
interested in discrepancies or discontinuities between these multiple selves are encouraged to
employ a battery of methods that help distill the moment-based effects of various experiences
and stimuli from the remembered and constructed effects (Connor & Barrett).
Current work in leisure science is beginning to acknowledge and design for these multiple
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selves. Like the scholarship of Kemp et al. (2008), Nawijn et al. (2012), and Fredrickson (2000),
the triangulated methodology employed in the northern lights study tapped into both the
experiencing self—administering questionnaires and making observations immediately after
seeing the northern lights—and the remembering self—end of trip interviews (Ekeland &
Dahl, in press). These authors’ findings illustrate the subtle situational and temporal elements
that shape our recollections from any touristic experience. Similarly, a recent winter study
conducted by Brownlee and Bricker (2014) in Yellowstone National Park exemplifies the use
of visitor employed photography to capture in-the-moment experiences (Dorwart, Moore, &
Leung, 2009; MacKay & Cloudwell, 2004). By including end-of-day interviews, when visitors
were asked to interpret the meaning of their photographs in relation to their feelings about
sense of place, this type of research design (see Samdahl, 2016) made it possible for Brownlee
and Bricker to better understand the relationship between the leisure experiencing and leisure
remembering selves in the same study.
While these recent advances in leisure scholarship are promising, we believe they are out-
liers in our field’s measurement of satisfaction. As noted previously, the experiencing self is
largely lost to the remembering self, and so too is the leisure experiencing self largely lost to
the leisure remembering self. The resulting question is whether the leisure experiencing self,
in turn, is largely lost to leisure science? Studies that capture the recollections of the remem-
bering self through postevent, cross-sectional surveys, while claiming an objective portrayal
of overall satisfaction derived from leisure experiences, may actually distance leisure scien-
tists from in-the-moment satisfaction. Put differently, while these studies may be useful for
demonstrating how those reflecting upon leisure experiences construct their memories of
specific events, they are likely to be woefully inadequate as in-the-moment-based or overall
‘objective’ metrics. In short, the advances in ambulatory assessment techniques outlined by
Connor and Barrett (2012), as well as our knowledge of these multiple selves at play, charge
us to more consistently align our metrics with our intended ‘self ’ of study.

Concluding thoughts
The possibility that the way we have come to understand leisure experience and the way
we have typically studied leisure experience may be incomplete, that there may be more to
the story than meets the eye, should fuel increased interest in exploring new ways to know
our subject matter (Stewart, 1998). Kahneman’s conclusion that the remembering self is the
 LEISURE SCIENCES 567

dominant self, and that humans have a predilection for creating coherent stories about them-
selves that give meaning and purpose to their lives (Kahneman, 2011), however inaccurate the
stories may be (Diener, Scollon, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Suh, 2000), is reminiscent of Patterson,
Watson, Williams, and Roggenbuck’s (1998) conclusion about the significance of stories in
wilderness meaning making. To what stories do leisure scientists owe their allegiance? To
what self should leisure scientists direct their attention: to the remembering self that governs
our recollection of things, to the experiencing self that does our living for us, or to both selves
in some combination thereof? The answer, we believe, is “It depends.”

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