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 Outline Contents

List of Abbreviations xiii

List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes xv
How to use this book xvii
How to use the Online Resources xviii

1 Introduction 1

Part I Defining Democracy and Dictatorship 11

2 Defining Democracy 15

3 Defining Autocracy 36

4 Dysfunctional Democracies and Hybrid Systems 52

5 The Consequences of Democracy and Authoritarian Regimes 70

Part II Political Dynamics of Autocracies 97

6 The Durability of Autocracy 101

7 Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown 122

8 Autocratic Transitions 142

Part III Drivers of Democracy 163

9 Cultural, Social, and Historical Drivers of Democracy 167

10 Economic Drivers of Democracy 188

11 Institutional Drivers of Democracy 210

12 International Drivers of Democracy 229

Part IV Contemporary Challenges to Democracy 253

13 The Rise of Populism and Its Impact on Democracy 255

14 Changing Patterns of Democratic Backsliding and Breakdown 273

15 Conclusion: The Future of Democracy 291

Glossary 303
References 313
Subject Index 353
Author Index 357
 Detailed Contents

List of Abbreviations xiii

List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes xv
How to use this book xvii
How to use the Online Resources xviii

1 Introduction 1
Threats to democracy 2
The bright spots 6
Overview of the book 7
Key definitions and caveats 9

Part I Defining Democracy and Dictatorship 11

2 Defining Democracy 15
Why define democracy 16
Conceptualizing democracy 17
Models of democracy 29
Conclusion 34
Key Questions 35
Further Reading 35

3 Defining Autocracy 36
Totalitarian regimes 37
Contemporary approaches to disaggregating autocracy 40
Blended regimes and changes over time 48
Conclusion 49
Key Questions 50
Further Reading 50

4 Dysfunctional Democracies and Hybrid Systems 52

Mapping the terrain 53
Defective democracies 55
Diminished dictatorship 57
The spread of hybrid regimes 62
Conclusion 67
Key Questions 68
Further Reading 69

5 The Consequences of Democracy and Authoritarian Regimes 70

Key themes 72
Regime type and conflict 74
x DE TAILED CONTENTS

Regime type and terrorism 78

Regime type and economic performance 81
Regime type and quality of life 86
Regime type and corruption 89
Regime type and repression 92
Conclusion 94
Key Questions 94
Further Reading 95

Part II Political Dynamics of Autocracies 97

6 The Durability of Autocracy 101

Authoritarian constituents and their role in stability 102
Authoritarian survival strategies 107
Other sources of authoritarian durability 114
Conclusion 120
Key Questions 121
Further Reading 121

7 Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown 122

What factors increase the risk of autocratic breakdown? 124
Elite divisions and defections 124
Youth bulge 129
Electoral fraud 132
Natural disasters 134
External factors 135
Conclusion 140
Key Questions 141
Further Reading 141

8 Autocratic Transitions 142

Pathways of authoritarian regime transitions 143
Top-down paths to regime breakdown 143
Bottom-up paths to regime breakdown 149
Trajectories of authoritarian regime change 155
Pathways of authoritarian leader transitions 156
Conclusion 159
Key Questions 160
Further Reading 160

Part III Drivers of Democracy 163

9 Cultural, Social, and Historical Drivers of Democracy 167

Cultural drivers of democracy 168
Social and historical drivers of democracy 177
Conclusion 185
 DE TAILED CONTENTS xi

Key Questions 186

Further Reading 187

10 Economic Drivers of Democracy 188

Economic development 189
Role of a middle class 193
Role of organized labour 195
Changes in beliefs and values 198
Economic inequality 199
Economic growth 203
Clientelism 204
Conclusion 207
Key Questions 208
Further Reading 209

11 Institutional Drivers of Democracy 210

Political parties 212
Electoral systems 217
System of government 220
Federal versus unitary states 222
Consociationalism 223
Political institutions and democratization: A double-edged sword 226
Conclusion 227
Key Questions 228
Further Reading 228

12 International Drivers of Democracy 229

Geopolitics and the international order 231
Diffusion, diffusion-proofing, and autocracy promotion 232
External imposition 240
Linkage and leverage 243
Foreign aid 245
International organizations 249
Conclusion 251
Key Questions 252
Further Reading 252

Part IV Contemporary Challenges to Democracy 253

13 The Rise of Populism and Its Impact on Democracy 255

What is populism? 256
Populist ideology 257
Populist leaders 261
Populist supporters 263
Populism and democracy 265
The drivers of populism 267
xii DE TAILED CONTENTS

Conclusion 271
Key Questions 271
Further Reading 272

14 Changing Patterns of Democratic Backsliding and Breakdown 273

Democratic backsliding and breakdown 274
The rise of authoritarianization 275
Signposts of the slow dismantling of democracy 277
Case studies on authoritarianization 281
Russia 282
Turkey 285
Implications of authoritarianization 288
Conclusion 289
Key Questions 290
Further Reading 290

15 Conclusion: The Future of Democracy 291

The future of democracy 292
Implications of an authoritarian resurgence for the global order 297
Key themes of the book 300

Glossary 303
References 313
Subject Index 353
Author Index 357
 List of Abbreviations
AD Acción Democrática (Venezuela)
AI Artificial intelligence
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Turkey)
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
Brexit British exit (from the EU)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
COPEI Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Venezuela)
DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU European Union
FSB Federal Security Service (Russia)
FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua)
GDP Gross domestic product
ICT Information communication technology
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPA-CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States
KANU Kenya African National Union
KMT Koumintang of China (Taiwan)
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MB Muslim Brotherhood
NCA National Constituent Assembly (Tunisia)
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NPC National People’s Congress (China)
OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAN Partido Acción Nacional (Mexico)
PAP People’s Action Party (Singapore)
PARM Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana
PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba (Cuba)
PDP People’s Democratic Party (Nigeria)
xiv LIS T OF ABBRE VIATIONS

PFCRN Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional (Mexico)

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PoR Party of Regions (Ukraine)
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
PR Proportional representation
PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Mexico)
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico)
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UAE United Arab Emirates
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UMNO United Malays National Organisation (Malaysia)
UN United Nations
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UR United Russia
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
 List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes
Figure 4.1: Classifying regimes 54
Figure 7.1: Autocracies with highest percentage of population under 18 129
Figure 7.2: Autocracies with the highest youth unemployment in the
world (15–24) 131
Figure 7.3: Examples of cases of electoral fraud that have led to authoritarian
breakdown 133
Figure 10.1: Per capita income levels (PPP) and political system type, as of 2017 190
Figure 10.2: Middle class in the world 194
Figure 10.3: Most democratic countries in the world, GINI index and per
capita incomes (nominal) 202
Figure 10.4: Economic inequality and political system type 202
Table 8.1: Regime trajectories following selected forms of authoritarian
leader transitions: 1946–2012 157
Table 9.1: Women in national parliaments 175
Table 9.2: 25 best countries for women in national parliaments 176
Table 9.3: 25 worst countries for women in national parliaments 176
Table 14.1: How democracies fail 275
Box 2.1: Dahl’s polyarchies 018
Box 2.2: Liberalism and its relationship to democracy 021
Box 2.3: Authoritarian regimes seek to mimic democratic attributes 028
Box 3.1: Personality cults 039
Box 3.2: Indicators of personalist dictatorship 043
Box 4.1: Pseudo-opposition 059
Box 4.2: Hybrid systems in Singapore and Malaysia 061
Box 5.1: Shining light on kleptocracy 090
Box 6.1: The security services and authoritarian durability 103
Box 6.2: Authoritarian tactics 105
Box 7.1: Autocratic breakdown in Mexico: The fall of the PRI 128
Box 8.1: Coup proofing 146
Box 8.2: Pacted transitions 149
xvi LIS T OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND BOXES

Box 8.3: Case study: Burkina Faso 151

Box 8.4: State failure 153
Box 8.5: Risk factors for civil war 154
Box 8.6: Death of a dictator in office 158
Box 9.1: Religious organizations and democratization 170
Box 9.2: Women and democracy 174
Box 9.3: Civic versus exclusionary nationalism 179
Box 10.1: Case studies: South Korea and Taiwan 196
Box 10.2: Case study: Clientelism and corruption in Nigeria 205
Box 11.1: ‘Great man’ theory and democracy 212
Box 11.2: Realignment versus de-alignment 216
Box 11.3: Federalism in Iraq 223
Box 11.4: Constitutional design: The case of Tunisia 225
Box 12.1: The rise of election monitoring and authoritarian efforts to mimic it 235
Box 12.2: Changing international norms and the spread of autocracy 238
Box 12.3: The sequencing debate 248
Box 13.1: Populism as a ‘thin ideology’ 257
Box 13.2: Populism in Latin America 259
Box 13.3: Who are the right-wing populist parties in Europe? 260
Box 14.1: Term limit extensions 280
Box 15.1: Does social media facilitate or undermine democracy? 296
 How to use this book

Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes is the only introduction to cover the full
spectrum of political systems, from democracy to dictatorship and the growing
­number of systems that fall between, equipping readers to think critically about
democracy’s future trajectory.

This book features a number of engaging learning features to help you navigate the
text and contextualize and reinforce your understanding:

THE DUR ABILIT y OF AUTOCR AC y 105

Boxes
Box 6.2: Authoritarian tactics

The absence of a viable alternative to the incumbent regime is a key source of authoritarian In-chapter boxes feature a diverse range of case studies,
durability. If elites and citizens cannot envision a future under different leadership, they have little
choice but to acquiesce to the current regime. Autocrats frequently use the following tactics to
pre-emptively weaken challengers from the elite, opposition, and public to prevent the emer-
helping you to apply key concepts in the context of
gence of an alternative and maintain their control:
contemporary cases, including hybrid regimes such as
Divide and rule
252 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Authoritarian regimes seek to use fissures within society—including inter-ethnic or geographic
Malaysia, the impact of corruption in Nigeria, and the
divisions—to create opposing factions they play off one another. Such ‘divide and rule’ strate-
gies make it difficult for opponents to coordinate, which prevents the emergence of a unified or personalization of power in the Chinese Communist
in the West
cohesive are altering
challenge the international
to the regime. Many leaders, suchscene. In today’s
as Libya’ s Muammar geopolitical
Qaddafi andenvironment,
Kenya’s the
toolsKenyatta
Jomo and mechanisms
and Daniel Arapthat
Moilong favoured
pitted democracy
tribal groups against oneare nowtofunctioning
another Party. They also highlight key terms to ensure relevant
maintain theirin reverse:
diffusion
power (Black,is2000;
working in ways
Fox, 1996). that reinforce
In addition autocracy,
to exacerbating China
existing and
fissures, Putin’s model
authoritarian lead- of autoc-
ers alsoare
racy seekinspiring
to manufacture them. Asnew
emulation, we discuss
norms later
arein creating
this chapter, autocrats enable
conditions moresomeconducive toterminology and research is translated in a clear,
opposition groups to participate in elections while banning others from participation. Because
authoritarianism, and autocracies are establishing linkages that dilute Western leverage.
members of the opposition cannot be certain who receives support from the regime, this divide
andAsrulewe discussed
strategy createsin this chapter,
suspicion authoritarians
and distrust have adapted
among the opposition to changes
and prevents
engaging format.
in their external
their forma-
environment.
tion Democracies, therefore, cannot afford to be complacent. To remain dominant,
of a unified front.
they must engage in the same process of learning and adaptation as their autocratic peers.
Elite rotation AuthoritAriAn ins tAbilit y And bre Akdown 141
Authoritarian leaders may also regularly shuffle high-level government officials to ensure that
no one individual is able to establish a personal following or base of support (Migdal, 1988).
Key Questions Key Questions
Key Questions
This practice also enables leaders to breed loyalty among their inner circle. By creating a system
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability, public officials come to realize they depend on
1. are
How do autocracies collaborate? Provide andexamples from ofcurrent events.
and indebted to the leader for their selection maintenance power. This
1. Why is the difference between ‘authoritarian breakdown’ and ‘democratization’ significant?
was a favoured
tactic of Zaire’s Mobutu. A New york Times correspondent wrote in 1988, ‘Every six months or so,
Each chapter features a set of carefully devised questions
2. Levitsky and Way argued that Western efforts to establish linkages with other countries could
[Link]
Mobutudoesshuffles
economic crisis affect
the Cabinet, an authoritarian
with some regime’s
ministers moving risk of
up, others putbreakdown?
on the street and a
encourage and sustain democracy. Why do such linkages work? What is the potential for this
few put in jail on graft or nepotism charges . . . the shuffling makes it hard for anyone to become to help you assess your comprehension of core concepts
dynamic
3.a recognized
What are thetoprimary
rival work
to theinPresident.’
reverse—for
external greater
3factors that
Similarly, authoritarian
affect
Acemoglu linkages
authoritarian
et al. wrote to promote
regime
that autocracy?
stability?
Zairian In your opin-
government
ion, should
officials
3. Should were theoutside actors
‘constantly
United
ever seek
reminded
States of andtheto destabilize authoritarian
precariousness
other Westernofdemocratic
regimes?
tenure by the What
frequency
countries of factors
office did
intervene
you
in non- and facilitate critical reflection on key arguments.
consider
rotation, in developing
which simultaneously your response?
fuels the hopes of those Zairians anxiously waiting just outside
democracies to support human rights and democracy?
the portals of power’ (2004, p. 168).
4. What were the most significant causes of the Arab Spring? Which other regimes or regions
4. How might Russia and China undermine democracy? Even if they do not intend to export
are most based
Promoting vulnerableloyalty,
to a wave of protests? Why?
their models on weeding
of authoritarianism, out
whatcompetence
are the different pathways that their actions could
[Link] leaders
affectfactors
What levels often promote
of democracy
or conditions regimethe
globally?
increase officials based on
likelihood thatloyalty
elite rather thanwill
divisions competence
occur? When are
andelite divisions likely to lead to regime change? the emergence of skilful and/or ambi-
may sideline their most capable advisors to prevent
tious challengers. Georgy Egorov and Constantin Soninefforts
5. How can we distinguish between Russian to interferethat,
(2011) underscore in ‘while
democratic
incompe- societies and
[Link] Western
Pick
ministers efforts
a current
are not to supportunusual
autocracy—such
completely democracy
as in
Russia,abroad?
China,
democratic Zimbabwe,
countries, most or North and
historians Korea—and
political discuss
how the
scientists regime
would agreecould break down.
that dictatorships arePosit a scenario,
especially marredor byaincompetence’
series of events, that could result in
(p. 904).
Such
political
preferencebreakdown
authoritarian
parties
cate that
for loyalty is in
theorcountry
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thatselected
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can incorporate
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selected. What
and harness
was becoming
dictatorships,
lessskilled
stable?
whichyou
signs would lacklook
strong
bureaucrats in a manner less Further Reading
for to indi-
Further Reading
threatening to the regime. In the personalist dictatorship under Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican

Diamond, L. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the Reading lists support you to broaden your understanding
Further ReadingSteven Greenhouse, New York Times, 24 May 1988.
World. Macmillan. 3

The Sprit of Democracy explains why democracy advances and how this process takes place. The of key academic literature and pursue areas of further
book argues
Huntington, that
S.P., many
2006. authoritarian
Political Order inregimes like Iran
Changing or China
Societies. Yalecould democratize
University Press. eventually but
the book
Political also central
Order’s highlights some
thesis of the
is that challenges
contrary to building
to previous democracy
works, economicin growth
the world andtoday, and
devel- research interest.
why there
opment doeshas
notbeen a democratic
always recession
lead to stability, butin some
may previously
actually have democratic
the oppositestates likeStates
effect. Venezuela.
that
are seeing
Knack, their ‘Does
S., 2004. institutions decaying
Foreign may face
Aid Promote growing instability
Democracy?’ during
International periods
Studies of change
Quarterly, 48(1),
and
[Link].
251–66.
As the article
Magaloni, indicates,
B., 2006. theAutocracy:
Voting for question of whether or
Hegemonic notSurvival
Party foreign aid
andpromotes
Its Demisedemocracy
in Mexico. is
explored. University
Cambridge The articlePress.
argues that there is no evidence that foreign aid does contribute to
democracy.
Voting for Autocracy explains how the PRI regime in Mexico was able to hold elections con-
tinuously B.,
Wejnert, during
[Link] eight decades
Diffusion in power
of Democracy: Theand still
Past and maintain
Future ofitself in power.
Global The book
Democracy. also
Cambridge
explains the factors
University Press. that impacted the PRI’s eventually fall in 2000.
Diffusion G.,
O’Donnell, of Democracy
Schmitter, explores theWhitehead,
P.C., and causes of democratic
L., [Link]
Transitionsand from
argues that networks
Authoritarian
between
Rule: democratic
Southern states1).
Europe (Vol. and authoritarian
JHU Press. regimes are more important to democratization
than
This foreign
edited aid. offers interesting case studies on how authoritarian regimes in Italy,
volume
Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Portugal transitioned from authoritarian rule. The book also offers
what prospects each case had to democratize.
Tucker, J. A. (2007). ‘Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-communist
Colored Revolutions’. Perspectives on Politics, 5(03), 535–51.
This article focuses on the post-communist Colour Revolutions and demonstrates how elec-
toral fraud can serve as a trigger to mobilize opponents of authoritarian regimes to action.
 How to use the Online Resources

[Link]/he/kendall-taylor

This text is supported by a range of online resources to encourage deeper

­engagement with the most current developments in the subject matter. These
resources are free of charge and provide opportunities to consolidate understanding
and further develop skills of critical analysis.

For students
Updates to supplement the text ensuring you are fully informed of the latest developments in
the field.

For lecturers
Assignments to use in class help to reinforce key concepts and facilitate the development of
key skills of critical analysis and argumentation.
 1
Introduction

Threats to democracy 2 Overview of the book 7

The bright spots 6 Key definitions and caveats 9

Democracy is in crisis. By most accounts, this is the most trying period democracy has
faced since the 1930s when fascism spread over much of Europe. Even the most opti-
mistic observers posit that democracy will decline unless rich countries address vexing
challenges such as inequality, cultural and demographic shifts, and technological change.
Pessimists fear we have already crossed a critical threshold and that the democratic
dominance we have grown accustomed to has ended (Rose, 2018). A 2019 report by
Freedom House underscored the gravity of the crisis. The democracy watchdog docu-
mented that global political rights and civil liberties have declined for thirteen consecu-
tive years—the longest downward slide since the organization began measuring these
trends over forty years ago.
Some of the decline in political and civil liberties has occurred in the usual authori-
tarian suspects such as China and Russia. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Russian President Vladimir Putin have increased repression to retain control. Their
efforts to export their authoritarian tactics and models to sympathetic leaders have
also contributed to a broader ‘authoritarian hardening’ as several autocrats have tight-
ened control. But perhaps more importantly, the observed erosion in political and civil
liberties has increasingly taken place outside of the usual suspects, including in many
long-established democracies. In the last five years there has been a remarkable decline
in respect for democratic norms and practices in Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines.
The backsliding has been so severe in Turkey—a long-time model of a successful secu-
lar democracy in the Middle East—that we can no longer call it a democracy. In short,
there is a real risk that the democratic gains that have occurred since the end of the
Cold War will be rolled back, paving the way for a widespread resurgence of autocracy
across the globe.
How did we get here? After all, for the last twenty-five years, momentum had been
squarely on democracy’s side. In 1991, there were sixty-five democracies in power
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018). By 2014, this number climbed to ninety-four, such
that democracies governed a majority of the world’s countries. The end of the Cold War
and the triumph of democracy set in motion a number of changes to the international
2 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

environment that allowed democracy to spread and put authoritarian governments

on the defensive. Authoritarian regimes were caught off-guard and their numbers rap-
idly declined. With communism discredited, a broad swath of countries scrambled to
adopt—at least cosmetically—the trappings of democratic rule. Democracy, it seemed,
had secured its status as the world’s preferred form of governance.

Threats to democracy

Today, we face a different reality. Although the number of democracies in the world
remains at or near historic highs, there are a number of important trends accelerat-
ing beneath the surface that threaten to reverse democracy’s progress. In particular,
democracies are facing mounting challenges from within; autocracies are evolving and
adapting their survival strategies in ways that make them a more formidable challenge
to democracy; and international developments, including the growing assertiveness of
influential countries such as China and Russia, are creating conditions conducive to the
spread of autocracy.
These dynamics provide the backdrop, or the broader context in which this book
is situated. We will delve more deeply into many of these issues throughout this text-
book, including through discussions of the contemporary challenges facing d ­ emocracy
(Part IV) and changes in the survival strategies of today’s authoritarian regimes
(Part III). More generally, however, we intend our discussion of the challenges facing
democracy in the next section to set the stage for the chapters that follow. Each of the
following chapters will go on to provide a different lens through which to examine these
challenges. The goal of this book is to provide readers with the foundational research
and cutting-edge insights that deepen their understanding of the challenges facing
democracy and what we can do to respond.

Democracy’s internal challenges

The first of these trends—the growing threat to democracy from within—significantly
raises the risk of a global democratic retreat. Until recently, we could safely assume that
Western societies would be governed by moderate political parties and remain commit-
ted to liberal democratic values, open economies, and multilateral cooperation (Norris,
2017). We also assumed that respect for the core principles of free and fair elections,
rule of law, human rights, and civil liberties were secure in a large and growing number
of countries. And yet events such as Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the rise
of right-wing populist parties across Europe signal that these assumptions are no longer
valid. Instead, factors such globalization, migration, rising inequality, and stagnating
living standards for broad swaths of citizens in Western democracies have led many to
believe that the political establishment no longer works. These factors have also con-
tributed to a loss in citizens’ perceived security (Hacker, 2006; Beck, 1999; Giddens,
1990). Research suggests that when individuals feel threatened or insecure, they are
 Introduction 3

more likely to support strong, decisive leaders they perceive as able to hold back the
forces of change and protect them from what they see as dangerous outsiders that jeop-
ardize their jobs and benefits (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).
The rise in the number of citizens that are discontent with inequality, stagnating liv-
ing standards, and changing values is fuelling the political polarization so apparent in
Western democracies today. Information technologies and social media amplify these
divisions. While many authoritarian regimes are harnessing social media to tighten their
control, these same technologies are fraying the social bonds of democratic soci­eties.
The digital technologies that promise to connect people and enable a free exchange of
ideas are increasingly being used by populists and other extreme voices to amplify their
messages. These dynamics have contributed to a decline in popular support for the
political centre and fragmented politics across Europe. Such political polarization and
fragmentation is contributing to gridlock that threatens to undermine people’s support
for democratic rule. The dysfunction that polarization and fragmentation breed also
invigorate Russian and Chinese narratives that democracy does not deliver.
These trends in Western democracies are creating fertile ground for the rise of
­ opulism. Once in power, many populist parties pursue policies that slowly erode
p
democracy from within. Today’s populist leaders have learned from earlier strongmen
such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, who incrementally undermined democracy. Such leaders assume power
through relatively free and fair elections and subsequently leverage societal dissatisfac-
tion to gradually undercut institutional constraints on their rule, sideline opponents,
and weaken civil society. Despite coming to power in different historical and cultural
contexts, their approach is the same: they stack key political institutions with loyal-
ists and allies (particularly in the judicial and security sectors) and muzzle the media
through legislation and censorship. Their slow and piecemeal approach makes it dif-
ficult to pinpoint when the collapse of democracy actually happens (Bermeo, 2016;
Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2016).
The gradual erosion of democratic rules and norms at the hands of democratically-
elected incumbents, what scholars refer to as ‘authoritarianization’ (Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz, 2018), constitutes a major change in the ways that democratic governments
have traditionally collapsed. Until recently, coups have been the biggest threat to democ-
racy (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2016). From 1946 to 1999, 64 per cent of democracies
collapsed via coups. In the last decade, however, authoritarianizations have been on
the rise. They now comprise 40 per cent of all democratic failures and equal coups in
frequency. If current trends persist, authoritarianizations will soon become the most
common route to autocracy.

The evolution of autocracy

The change in the way that today’s aspiring autocrats are dismantling democracy is a
poignant example of the way that authoritarianism is evolving. Instead of seizing power
overtly and via force, which risks inciting domestic and international condemnation,
4 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

today’s aspiring autocrats have learned that incremental power grabs are far more dif-
ficult to oppose. Because they are slow and subtle, there is no single action that generates
a massive backlash. And in those instances where opponents do sound the alarm bell
that democracy is under threat, populist leaders can easily frame them as unpatriotic
provocateurs who solely seek to stir trouble.
But it is not just the tactics that autocrats use to seize power that have evolved.
Autocracies are also adapting their survival strategies in ways that make them a more
formidable challenge to democracy. In the face of what seemed to be an inevitable
extinction in the 1990s and early 2000s, dictators changed their strategies and grew
more resilient. As an indicator of this, research shows that today’s authoritarian
regimes are more long-lasting than their predecessors. From 1946 to 1989, the typical
autocracy lasted fourteen years in power. This number has nearly doubled since the
end of the Cold War to an average of twenty years. As authoritarian regimes become
more durable and savvier, global democracy is likely to suffer (Kendall-Taylor and
Frantz, 2015).
One of the most notable changes in contemporary authoritarian regimes is the extent
to which they have learned to mimic democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, there
has been a substantial rise in the number of countries that combine democratic charac-
teristics with authoritarian tendencies. These ‘hybrid’ regimes—the broad label used to
describe countries that mix democratic and authoritarian elements—have proliferated
to such an extent that scholars contend they are now ‘the modal type of political regime
in the developing world’ (Schedler, 2006, p. 3; Brownlee, 2007). Hybrid systems adjust
their survival tactics and pursue a softer, subtler form of authoritarian rule. Whereas
autocracies of the past relied heavily on overtly repressive methods of control and were
more likely to ban political activities, censor opponents, and limit public demonstra-
tions of dissent to maintain power, today’s autocrats often embrace seemingly demo-
cratic institutions and rule of law, but manipulate these institutions to serve their own
self-interests.
Authoritarian regimes have similarly adapted to manage the threats initially
posed by social media. In the early 2000s, there was widespread optimism that
social media would serve as a great democratizing force. Such optimism was most
pronounced in the early days of the Arab Spring, as political activists harnessed
social media in their efforts to topple four long-lasting dictators in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Yemen. Over time, however, authoritarian regimes have co-opted these
technologies to deepen their grip internally, curb basic human rights, spread illib-
eral practices beyond their borders, and undermine public trust in open societies.
New advances in facial recognition and artificial intelligence will only intensify
and accelerate these practices. China, for example, is developing new methods of
political control, including mass surveillance and a data-driven ‘social credit’ sys-
tem. These dystopian approaches raise serious concerns, including their potential
to spread to other parts of the developing world. In sum, since the end of the Cold
War, dictators have evolved to withstand and even flourish amid a changing global
landscape.
 Introduction 5

International developments
In addition to changes taking place within democracies and authoritarian regimes, there
have also been changes in the international environment that are conducive to the spread
of autocracy. As Western democracies are increasingly distracted with their own domestic
challenges, authoritarian regimes—especially Russia and China—have grown more asser-
tive on the global stage. Russia and China are convinced of the threat of Western-backed
revolutions and have responded by adapting their survival tactics and exporting their
best practices for guarding against the ‘threat’ of engagement with the democratic West.
Russian and Chinese efforts to counter democracy promotion are not new. But they have
changed in scope and intensity. Since 2014, Russia in particular has gone on the offensive
with its efforts to undermine Western democracies. Because Moscow and Beijing gauge
their power in relation to the United States, they view weakening Western democracy as a
means of enhancing their own standing (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2018).
Shifts in geopolitical power are increasing the potency of Russian and Chinese actions.
China’s rise and Russia’s assertiveness provide other leaders with examples of viable alter-
natives to the West and alter perceptions about what constitutes a legitimate regime. For
the past few decades, China in particular has sought to portray itself as a compelling
alternative to democracy. According to the World Bank, China’s GDP growth has aver-
aged nearly 10 per cent a year—the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in
history—and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty. Many now view
China as demonstrating that the road to prosperity no longer needs to run through liberal
democracy. Even without a deliberate strategy to export his model of governance, Putin
has also offered one that others seek to emulate. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for example, seem to admire Putin’s strong-
man tactics and have adopted elements of his repertoire to enhance their control.
Beyond demonstration effects, a shift in the balance of economic and military power
away from the democratic West is increasing the potency of the threat that countries
such as Russia and China pose to democracy. For decades, established democracies
such as the United Kingdom and the United States made up the bulk of global GDP. But
now, for the first time in over a hundred years, democracies’ share of global GDP has
fallen below half (Mounk and Foa, 2018). According to forecasts by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), it will slump to a third within the next decade. Moreover, U.S.
President Trump is scaling back U.S. global leadership and disrupting the cohesion of
the democratic alliance system.
These geopolitical changes amplify the effects of long-standing Russian and Chinese
actions by enabling these countries to engage with a broader spectrum of states. China’s
rising power and Russia’s assertiveness allow them to increase political, economic, and
military ties with many states at once—as the United States did in the aftermath of
the Cold War—creating greater opportunities to encourage authoritarian tendencies.
But even beyond buttressing like-minded autocrats, Russia’s and China’s international
activism may also work to weaken democracies. Research shows that extensive linkages
with the West (through aid, trade, and social networks) encouraged democracy and its
6 DEMOCR ACIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

consolidation after the Cold War (Levitsky and Way, 2005). Although neither Russia nor
China seek to export their authoritarian models, their growing ties now raise the risk of
a growing global tide of authoritarianism.
These trends highlight some of the critical challenges we face today in preserving the
democratic gains that have accrued since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, democra-
cies are facing internal threats that are shaking the very foundations of these systems.
Autocracies are adapting and evolving their tactics in ways that make them a more for-
midable threat to democracy. And international developments, including the growing
assertiveness of influential countries like China and Russia, are trending in ways that
are increasingly conducive to the spread of autocracy.

The bright spots

Although these developments make it easy to grow pessimistic about democracy’s

future, it is important not to lose sight of the relative bright spots.1 In Southeast Asia,
for example, Timor Leste held free and fair elections in 2017 that saw a clean transfer of
power, helping strengthen democracy in one of the world’s newest countries. Likewise,
the election of Lenín Moreno in Ecuador in 2017 moved that country away from the
brink of authoritarianism following the democratic backsliding that occurred during
Rafael Correa’s decade in power. In Africa, as well, we have seen democratic openings
in a number of places, such as Burkina Faso following the ouster of long-time leader
Blaise Compaoré in 2014 and the Gambia, where strongman Yahya Jammeh was forced
to resign in 2016 after more than two decades in power.
Just as important, we cannot lose sight of the fact that democratic decline is not inevi-
table. Western democracies have proved remarkably resilient over time. They have faced
challenges before, and they have found ways to renew themselves to surmount them. That
is the task before us. We are living in time of rapid change and change can be uncom-
fortable. We are learning that the ideologies, policies, and even the institutions that fit
Western democratic societies a generation ago are steadily becoming less applicable to the
problems they face today. History suggests that it will be the democracies—and not the
far more rigid authoritarian structures—that will be able to harness change into advance-
ment and achievement. Yes, authoritarian regimes are evolving and adapting. But it is
unlikely in the long term that these political systems will have the flexibility to change to
the extent that today’s challenges will require. Because they are flexible and more capable
of learning, democracies will always have the upper hand in the long term. Walter Russell
Mead (2018) wrote that, ‘there is resiliency and flexibility in the creative disorder of a free
society’.2 Democracies now need to develop new ideas, new paradigms, new approaches—
and the leadership to execute them—to maintain their competitive edge.
With these points and backdrop in mind, we know provide an overview of the book
and how it will unfold.
1
For more information on these cases, see ‘Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis’, Freedom House,
2018, [Link] (accessed 13 February 2019).
2
[Link] (accessed 29 May 2019).
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