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DELEGITIMIZING AL-QAEDA:
A JIHAD-REALIST APPROACH
Paul Kamolnick
March 2012
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ISBN 1-58487-522-4
ii
FOREWORD
iii
that the key to dealing with al-Qaeda is a tractable
clash of interests and not an intractable clash of civili-
zations is, if true, a welcome message indeed.
iv
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
v
SUMMARY
vii
among adherents for whom sharia compliance is an
essential requirement.
Recent important jurisprudential debates among
jihad-realist Islamist militants have produced several
conclusions that may be used to delegitimize al-Qae-
das terror as both unlawful and imprudent. The ma-
jority of those conclusions arise from recent decades
of prison debates in Muslim-majority societies over
the legality, methods, means, and pragmatics of vio-
lent rebellion against their own governments.
These rulings are supplemented by others of vital
relevance for undermining al-Qaeda terrorism direct-
ed principally against noncombatant civilians living
in Muslim-minority societies. Among the latter, the
most decisive legal rulings include the following: (1)
murder is one of the gravest and forbidden of sins;
(2) the impermissibility of targeting Muslims, and
non-Muslim civilians, especially women, children, the
elderly, scholars, and students of knowledge; (3) the
impermissible extension of the principle of Tartarrus,
or human shields; (4) the impermissibility of treach-
ery, violation of oaths, and pacts of security granted
(implicitly, or explicitly) to Muslims in non-Muslim
majority societies; (5) jihad is impermissible unless
specific capacities, conditions, and circumstances are
present; (6) permissibility to wage offensive jihad
must be granted by parents and creditors; (7) imper-
missibility of violating a voluntary oath of uncondi-
tional allegiance and obedience (bayat) given to ones
recognized ruler; (8) the impermissibility of waging
offensive jihad under present conditions of Muslim
weakness vis--vis the infidel powers; (9) the permis-
sibility of jihad, emigration, or a truce when facing
infidel occupation; (10) the impermissibility of attack-
ing American civilians of an occupying country in the
viii
name of jihad or under its banner; and, (11) the impru-
dence of al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism.
It is suggested that relevant policymakers give due
regard to the key role that jihad-realist jurisprudential
debates hold for contributing to the tactical implosion
and marginalization of al-Qaedas terrorism. Those
charged with strategic communication, public diplo-
macy, and counterterrorist messaging should develop
the motivation, capacity, and sophistication to sys-
tematically analyze how jihad-realism and a jurispru-
dence of jihad, may be leveraged for, and not against,
vital U.S. national security interests.
Owing to present hostility directed in many quar-
ters against U.S. policies in the Middle East and Mus-
lim world generally, and the Israel-Palestine conflict
in particular, however, it is extremely inadvisable for
the United States to openly promote or publicize any
of these initiatives. A key, indeed essential, ingredi-
ent for the authority of these findings is that they are
viewed as absolutely untainted by any interest, factor,
force, or power; rather, these debates rest on the legiti-
macy of the sharia and involve credentialed actors of
immense stature and learning.
It is advisable that the United States do everything
within its power to make the case to the Muslim-ma-
jority countries, and the Muslim-minority populations
in the Muslim diaspora, that as a country we are on
the side of the lawful and the just, and we actively
seek and promote solutions to long-simmering policy
grievances. Our ability as a nation to openly associ-
ate with any efforts by internal Muslim actors must be
deferred until the perception of our motivations is al-
tered, and altered fundamentally. No amount of spin
or messaging matters when daily life and its common-
sense interpretation contradict official pretensions
and pronouncements.
ix
DELEGITIMIZING AL-QAEDA:
A JIHAD-REALIST APPROACH
1
homeland.8 Short of a complete revolutionary reorga-
nization of the global international order, al-Qaedas
maximalist global violent extremist ambitions cannot
succeed. Al-Qaedas global revolutionary terrorism
also rules out negotiations; although a deliberate and
sustained U.S. strategy of disaggregating al-Qaedas
terrorist network suggests targeting select regional
affiliates and associates for whom less ambitious po-
litical achievements (e.g., local, national, or specific
policy grievance-based) are original drivers.9 Selective
reorientation of al-Qaeda from disciplined global mass-
casualty violent extremist terrorism toward opportun-
ist criminality and less-ambitious Islamist militancy
has occurred, though on a relatively minor scale.10
Repression for our purposes is captured by the above
discussion of decapitating the terrorist organization
but is somewhat broader and encompasses attacking
the organizational capacities of al-Qaeda to persist as
an organized terrorist entity.11
While the above five correlates contribute in vary-
ing degrees to al-Qaedas dramatically-weakening
present capacities, it is the sixth predictori.e., fail-
urethat is the primary concern of this monograph.
This is so because it most directly touches on that
heretofore underaccomplished strategic objective
noted in the 9/11 Commission Report: preventing radi-
calization and recruitment to al-Qaedas transnational
terrorist campaign. Again, it is the intention of this
monograph to contribute to that strategic objective vi-
tal to declared national policy through the calculated
exploitation of failure as a known predictor of terror-
ist organizational decline and demise.
What is meant by terrorist failure as applied to al-
Qaeda? Failure here refers to a two-dimensional night-
mare scenario facing the al-Qaeda terrorist enterprise:
2
internal implosion and external marginalization. Indeed,
these combined dimensions account for a significant
swath of variance explained in terrorist failure: Most
terrorism ends, Audrey K. Cronin claims:
3
abandon terrorist means, reconnect to a broader mass,
and transform into a legitimate insurgent or political
entitysustenance must become ever more perilous
and fraught with all-too-human imperfections. As ex-
tremist outliers, they are isolated within, and there-
fore simultaneously inhabit the remotest outskirts and
fringes of an imagined ideal, cause, or community they
arrogantly presume to lead as vanguard. Further, they
are marginalized by moral revulsion owing to the kill-
ing of innocents and the cold logic of a ruthless killing
machine that lacks a pragmatic, hopeful, believable
Other realizable by real persons in real time.18
A JIHAD-REALIST JURISPRUDENTIAL
APPROACH
4
jihad, the legal case upholding an enduring obligation
to call others to Islam (dawa); to wage the military ji-
had until the entire world proclaims the word of Allah
supreme; and to enjoy the most privileged status and
fruits awaiting a true mujahid in paradise, is, in fact,
a compelling one.20 Neither popular piety, moderates,
liberals, or modernists have to date, in the opinion of
the present author, successfully refuted it.21
In this monograph, a jihad-realist jurisprudential
approach is operationalized as a tactical contribution
to the imploding of al-Qaeda.22 This approach is po-
tentially of greater yield, however, since unlike those
traditional categories of terrorist littering the political
violence landscape (e.g., separatist, ethno-nationalist,
communist, anarchist, or doomsday cults), al-Qaeda
legitimizes its self-proclaimed right to wage jihad
based on what it claims is a faithful adherence to Is-
lamic law.
Islam is a strictly-monotheistic, law-centered,
world religion. Its legal and moral principles are root-
ed in a revealed sacred scripture (Quran), traditional
accounts of Prophet Muhammads life (Ahadith), and
nearly 1,400 years of jurisprudential tradition. Aptly
described as aspiring toward a universal divine no-
mocracy,23 all persons regardless of social status, class,
race, sex, tribe, or family background are duty-bound
to strive for righteous intention and conduct in daily
life. In its orthodox Sunnite and Shiite forms, Islam
is quintessentially a religion commanding lawful and
forbidding lawless behavior.24 Islamic law also pre-
scribes a law of warfare, and for observant Muslims,
the military jihad is a binding religious prescription.25
There is no attempt in this monograph to deny,
minimize, or otherwise obfuscate this martial religious
prescription. In the opinion of this author, a genuinely
5
effective means for tactically imploding and marginal-
izing al-Qaedaparticularly in the eyes of those deep-
ly religiously-motivated potential recruits for whom
religious law is a sine qua non for participationmust
presume the validity of Islamically-prescribed mili-
tary jihad, and in those terms, objectively assess and de-
cisively refute the validity of al-Qaedas declaration of
war and subsequent global terrorist campaign.26 This
approach proposed by the present author is designed
to target exactly the type of person to which Noman
Benotman, former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group vio-
lent militant jihadist refers, when he states that for
genuine dialogue to even begin, The starting point
has to be that jihad is legitimate, otherwise no one will
listen.27 Three essential additional premises must also
be conceded if an Islamically-rooted legal case against
al-Qaedas reign of terror is to be valid, namely first,
that there is an absolute legal distinction between le-
gitimate jihad and terrorism;28 second, that terrorism
is haram (forbidden);29 and third, in addition to be-
ing forbidden, grave Sharia violations30 have ac-
companied terrorist methodologies.31
6
indeed impermissible, how then are Muslims to fight
back? Consider the following three online posts in
response to the republication of a letter34 by promi-
nent salafi Saudi Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, calling for
a categorical condemnation of terrorism, regardless
of motive or cause, without hesitation, ifs, ands,
or buts.35 These were just three of 185 posts over a
4-day period from al-Qaeda sympathizers (a distinct
minority) to modern, justice-seeking, young western-
ized Muslims (the vast majority)all convinced the
Muslim world requires definite action in its defense.
7
Mystrugglewithin: Naeems comment, and your
[Yaser] feedback summarize everything that most of
us here are concerned with.38
8
mad Salah, What advice would you give Muslim
youths regarding jihad? he replies:
9
cially because you deny being powerless. Otherwise,
your victims who are recruited on the internet will pur-
poselessly fill prisons, just because they believed you,
unaware of the rule: If you are my imam, you should
stand in front of me in battle (italics added).41
10
ing and jurisprudential proofs offered for each point
listed below. Genuine sharia scholars are required to
glean from every issue they consider some combina-
tion of reliance on the primary sourcesQuran, Ha-
dith, ijma, and qiyasto derive valid legal opinions.
The unrivaled source of authority in each dispute,
barring corruption or circumvention of this process,
is both the scholarly and jihadi reputation of the par-
ticipants to this debate, and their ultimate ability to
prevail in the ongoing worldwide conversation about
the jihad imperative in the 21st century. Especially
key is the fact that these disputant scholars are uncon-
ditionally associated with the religious duty to wage
jihad, and are untainted by any conflicts of interest,
for example, service on behalf of regimes perceived
to be self-serving who seek to undermine violent re-
bellion not on grounds of religion, but sheer regime
survival.43
These objections considered in their entirety
amount to violations of what is in essence an Islamic
law of armed conflict, including the right and duty to
violent rebellion against an unjust ruler. These objec-
tions overlap, but naturally fall into two distinct clus-
ters. The first concern predominantly Muslim societies
in which violent armed Islamist organizations wage
what they claim is jihad against what they assert are
apostate regimes (i.e., declarations of takfir of the
ruler or regime). The rules governing jihad, declar-
ing one an apostate, and the many issues arising from
targeting various kinds of person, are addressed here.
The second cluster comprises those objections of
greatest interest to those non-Muslim majority societ-
ies, including the United States, targeted by al-Qaedas
reign of terror. Though some overlap exists with the
first cluster, unique legal issues are raised, and sharia
11
violations identified. It is this second cluster that is of
greatest interest to citizens living in predominantly
non-Muslim societies presently targeted by al-Qaeda.
12
chaos, creating disorder, facilitating dissension (fit-
nah), and unleashing mayhem.48
5. The Impermissibility of Violating the Lives, Property,
and Honor of Non-Muslims Granted Promises of Security.
An extensive jurisprudential literature exists regulat-
ing the permissible security granted non-Muslims vis-
iting or residing in Muslim lands. It is impermissible
to target civilians involved in leisure, tourism, busi-
ness, or other affairs.49
6. The Religiously Ignorant, Impermissible, and Prag-
matically Disastrous Isolation of Jihad as a Means of Pro-
moting Allahs Word.50 This jihadism is characterized
by unlawful, inadvisable risk-taking in matters of mil-
itary action, eschewing for example, legal and custom-
ary requirements bearing on such factors as the rela-
tive strength of ones opponents; the relative capacity
to wage jihad; the relative availability of less-costly
options (i.e., dawa, enforcing the good and forbidding
evil, isolation, emigration, etc.),51 and the relative costs
to the Umma. This imprudence is likely owing to fa-
naticism, extremism, and the placing of means before
ends, each of which are rooted in religious ignorance
or worldly desires. The inflicting of overwhelmingly
burdensome costs has not only destroyed lives, prop-
erty, homes, and families in the short-run, but has also
come at the expense of the longer-term benefits, val-
ues and abiding interests of the Umma.52
7. Impermissibility of Rejecting the Modern States Pre-
rogative to Exercise Political Authority and Wage Jihad.
The medieval circumstances dividing the world into
Islamic (Dar al-Islam) and non-Islamic (Dar al-Harb;
literally Abode or House of War) spheres, and el-
evating the role of Caliph and Caliphate, no longer ex-
ists. Collective Muslim majorities are now territorially
organized into sovereign nation-states, and the state is
13
a political organ possessing a legitimate monopoly on
the means and use of violence. If today jihad is to be
declared and waged to discharge the lawful collective
duty (fard kifaya) to conduct offensive jihad to expand
the Umma, it can only be declared by a legitimate sov-
ereign on the basis of the sharia.53
8. Impermissible Extremism in the Exercise of the Right
to Retribution (the principle of justice). Recall that the
range of legal/moral permissibility for a given action
is five-fold: absolutely required or commanded (fard);
commendable or recommended, but not required
(mustahabb); indifferent, neutral, permissible (mubah);
discouraged or reprehensible, but not forbidden
(makruh); absolutely and explicitly forbidden because
both sinful and criminal (haram). Not only does Islam
maintain that charity, mercy, and forgiveness are even
greater virtues than mere retribution54though that
is certainly just and does restore a lawful reciproc-
itypermissible conduct (i.e., retribution) has been
replaced with terroristic conduct that is forbidden (ha-
ram).55
9. The General Impermissibility of Violent Rebellion
Against a Ruler, and its Necessary Conditions Specified.56
It is only under the most dire circumstances that the
Muslim community would not be threatened in their
lives, security, honor, and possessions by overthrow-
ing a ruler. Apostasy amounting to active disavowal
of the Islamic creed and assisting the enemies of the
Umma, are today the only sufficient grounds.
14
These rulings may be complemented with additional
ones of direct and vital relevance, undermining al-
Qaedas reign of terror principally directed against
noncombatant civilians living in Muslim-minority
societies. The force of these legal objections does not
lie in any kind of sentimentalism, but in a deeply-
embedded set of principles that legally regulate the
military jihad. It is worth restating at the outset, before
considering al-Qaedas chief violations, what a jihad-
realist jurisprudential approach is. Such an approach
is succinctly stated by Sayyid Imam himself:
15
3. The Impermissible Extension of the Principle of Tar-
tarrus (targeting human shields).62 The sanctity of life,
and specific conditions that must be met for jihad to
be waged, almost always render impermissible the
killing of a Muslim, even if unintentionally. The juris-
prudence of justification has, however, violated these
conditions in order to facilitate its unlawful terrorist
activities.
4. The Impermissibility of Treachery, Violation of Oaths
and Pacts of Security Granted (implicitly, or explicitly) to
Muslims in Non-Muslim Majority societies.63 The ques-
tion of safe passage for non-Muslims in Muslim-ma-
jority societies was examined above. This deals with
the security pact that governs the duty of Muslims
who are provided the opportunity to enter, be secure
in, and enjoy the liberties of life, property, possessions,
and honor, in a non-Muslim society.
5. The Impermissibility of Killing on the Basis of Nation-
ality. There is no precedent in Islam for killing persons
on the basis of national affiliation. Since in the modern
era Muslims may, and often likely will be, living in
non-Muslim societies, this invites the potential killing
of Muslims. However, its impermissibility rests on a
broader religious tradition that, while distinguishing
persons on the basis of faith, does not do so on the
basis of territorial residency or citizenship. Osama bin
Ladens and Ayman al-Zawahiris claim that they are
targeting Crusaders in the Crusader-Zionist alli-
ance is shown to be another instance of the jurispru-
dence of justification.64
6. Jihad is Impermissible Unless Specific Conditions and
Capacities are Present. Jihad is an enduring religious ob-
ligation. However, because of the seriousness of such
a declarationthe equivalent of a declaration of war,
in the Westwaging jihad is only permissible if one
16
has taken explicit and careful account of the abilities,
circumstances, conditions, and costs involved (rela-
tive to perceived benefits, and perceived alternative
courses of action) that this religious prescription de-
mands.65
7. Permissibility to Wage Offensive Jihad Must Be
Granted by Parents and Creditors. Individuals partici-
pating in an offensive jihad must have these permis-
sions. Persons participating in a defensive jihad, how-
ever, generally do not. The costs of abandoning ones
parents, families, properties, and possessions, how-
ever, must be factored in, and the ulema have issued
divided opinions. 66
8. Impermissibility of Violating a Voluntary Oath of
Unconditional Allegiance (bayat) Given to Ones Recog-
nized Ruler. Osama bin Laden knowingly and willfully
disobeyed then supreme leader of the Taliban regime,
Mullah Omar, by provoking in word and deed the
United States, and thus increasing the likelihood that
Afghanistan would be invaded and a Muslim govern-
ment overthrown. Osama bin Laden was an invited
guest enjoying complete security of person, property,
and liberty of action. His impermissible actions are
widely viewed as the proximate cause of the removal
of the Taliban from power, and the calamitous conse-
quences that have resulted from those events.67
9. The Impermissibility of Waging Offensive Jihad
Under Present Conditions of Muslim Weakness vis--vis
the Infidel Powers. Jihad-realism is not a suicide pact,
and the present power imbalance between Muslim
and non-Muslim parties recommends against violent
means. Other alternatives are available to Muslims
short of war for advancing the Muslim cause. Un-
til objective conditions favoring military action exist,
these alternatives are both permissible and desirable.68
17
10. The Permissibility of Jihad, Emigration, or a Truce,
When Facing Infidel Occupation. A defensive jihad is
understood to be an individual duty (fard ayn) that
devolves on every believer. However, it may be that
the costs of such a jihad outweigh the benefits, and
other courses of action are legally permissible.69
11. The Impermissibility of Attacking Civilians of an
Occupying Country in the Name of Jihad or Under Its Ban-
ner. This is the central legal question of greatest interest
to Americans and American policymakers. Regardless
of whether a country is presumed to be an occupying
country, in this case the presumption by al-Qaeda that
the United States is occupying Muslim lands, it is
impermissible to harm civilians or combatants in that
home country.70
12. The Imprudence of al-Qaeda Based and Inspired Ter-
rorism. Behind virtually every legal discussion above
is the implicit relation between law and life. Law that
does not support life does not last. Religious principles
that are radically at odds with the reality principle
the conditions of the world as they exist in reality, not
in fantasy or wish-projectioneither reinterpret these
principles, reform them, or become of mere antiquar-
ian interest. A pragmatic, prudential substrate exists
in Islam, as in every other great faith, that relates de-
sired ends to available means, and evaluates courses
of action in relation to the actual benefits that arise for
its intended beneficiaries. It is on these grounds that
the events occurring on September 11, 2001 (9/11)
are arguably the most calamitous, catastrophic blow
against Islam. A Muslim who is deeply observant, but
also wisely pragmatic may then ask: How has Osama
Bin Ladens so-called jihad benefitted Islam? What
has been the cost to Islam and Muslims worldwide
of al-Qaedas unilateral decision to declare, launch,
18
and wage a reign of terror whose principal victims are
noncombatant civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim?
The answer is not hard to find. The mind of the world
is not focused on Islam as a majestic, deeply law-
abiding, religion of peace, mercy, and justice; but on a
religion whose reputation has now been perverted by
its association with intolerance, fanaticism, and terror.
Bin Ladens gift has not been to expand the sphere of
those prepared to hear and respond to the Muslim call
but those preparedby the ignominy of 9/11, and re-
ligious ignorance in the West regarding Islams actual
moral soulto resist it, and indeed extinguish it.71
Conclusion.
19
to-be-Perfect belief system that demands the right
and duty to make Allahs word Supreme; they fail to
acknowledge and engage the breadth and depth of
nonreligiously motivated opposition to existing U.S.
foreign and military policy, especially in the Middle
East and the Israel-Palestine conflict; and most spe-
cifically, counternarrative approaches unnecessarily
burden this tactical objective by casting their net far
too wide and capturing a vast Islamic, Islamist, and
salafist universe whose adherents are overwhelmingly
morally repelled by al-Qaedas reign of terror.
4. Islam is a law-centered religious faith that pro-
scribes and prescribes human conduct. The jihadthe
religious prescription to struggle and strive in the
path/way of Allah until Allahs word reigns supreme
throughout the earthincluding its military sense is,
despite disavowal in popular piety and much modern
moderate Islamic discourse, a binding religious pre-
scription. This presumption is an essential starting-
point in potentially delegitimizing al-Qaedas reign of
terror among adherents for whom sharia compliance
is an essential requirement to wage lawful jihad.
5. Recent important jurisprudential debates among
jihad-realist Islamist militants have produced several
conclusions that may be used to delegitimize al-Qae-
das reign of terror as both unlawful, and imprudent.
The majority of those conclusions arise from recent
decades of prison debates in Muslim-majority societ-
ies over the legality, methods, means, and pragmatics
of violent rebellion against existing governments in
Muslim-majority societies. Among the most impor-
tant sharia violations are: (1) The impermissible re-
jection of scholarly authority; (2) The impermissibility
of extremism and fanaticism; (3) Murdering Muslims
is haram; (4) The impermissible declarations of takfir;
20
(5) The impermissibility of violating the lives, prop-
erty, and honor of non-Muslims granted promises of
security; (6) The religiously ignorant, impermissible,
and pragmatically disastrous isolation of jihad as a
means of promoting Allahs word; (7) Impermissibility
of rejecting the modern states prerogative to exercise
political authority and wage jihad; (8) Impermissible
extremism in the exercise of the right to retribution
(the principle of justice); and, (9) The general imper-
missibility of violent rebellion against a ruler, and its
necessary conditions specified.
6. These rulings may be complimented with addi-
tional ones of direct and vital relevance, undermining
al-Qaedas reign of terror directed principally against
noncombatant civilians living in Muslim-minority so-
cieties. Among the latter, the most decisive legal ob-
jections include: (1) The murder of persons is haram;
(2) The impermissibility of targeting Muslims, and
non-Muslim civilians, especially women, children,
the elderly, scholars, and students of knowledge; (3)
The impermissible extension of the principle of Tartar-
rus; (4) The impermissibility of treachery, violation of
oaths, and pacts of security granted (implicitly, or ex-
plicitly) to Muslims in non-Muslim majority societies;
(5) Jihad is impermissible unless specific capacities,
conditions, and circumstances, are present; (6) Per-
missibility to wage offensive jihad must be granted by
parents and creditors; (7) Impermissibility of violat-
ing a voluntary oath of unconditional allegiance and
obedience (bayat) given to ones recognized ruler; (8)
The impermissibility of waging offensive jihad under
present conditions of Muslim weakness vis--vis the
infidel powers; (9) The permissibility of jihad, emigra-
tion, or a truce, when facing infidel occupation; (10)
The impermissibility of attacking American civilians
21
of an occupying country in the name of jihad or un-
der its banner; and, (11) The imprudence of al-Qaeda
based and inspired terrorism.
Policy Suggestions.
22
ternarrative is not the one to defeat the religiously
learned for whom living and dying to promote the
word of Allah as supreme, is Islam. The debate is one
within militant Islamism over the lawfulness of al-Qa-
edas methods. It is about whether terrorism is haram,
and has done virtually incalculable damage to Islams
global image; or it is fard, and an essential condition
of being a True Mujahid and advancing the Muslim
Umma. In this battle it is, ironically, the learned, jihad-
realist jurisprudentslovers of religious truth, and re-
ligious lawwhose spirit most resembles that of our
own learned constitutional scholars. It is the law that
they love first, because law is a condition of life; of
security; of any reasonable attempt to fashion a last-
ing and just social order. Impatience and imprudence
have always been enemies of the law. It is in essence
the laws revenge that is finally wreaking havoc, along
with those several other causes, on al-Qaedas reign of
terror.
23
alternative one rooted in war-footing and a threatened
clash of civilizations was the work of terrorist entre-
preneurs whose primary goal was to cause as much
pain to the United States as possible, not because of its
lack of sharia compliance; or its infidelity; or its cra-
ven and immoral ways; or its freedoms. But quite the
opposite, for it was seencertainly through a mind-
set rooted in paranoia, scapegoating, and a reverse-
demonologyas being the singular superpower actor
whose support for its ally Israel was the essential con-
dition preventing a resolution of an enduring conflict
thousands of miles from its bordersnot sharia, but
retribution; not jihad, but terrorism; not Muslim holy
war, but terrorist moral rage.72
ENDNOTES
24
June 2011 National Strategy on Counterterrorism defines this war
in the following terms: The United States deliberately uses the
word war to describe our relentless campaign against [al-Qae-
da]. However, this administration has made it clear that we are
not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam.
We are at war with a specific organization[al-Qaeda], (p. 2).
The scope of this [al-Qaeda] threat is more expansive than its core
command and control, or al-Qaeda central, to include its affiliates
and adherents. As further stated: The preeminent security threat
to the United States continues to be from [al-Qaeda] and its af-
filiates and adherents, National Strategy on Counterterrorism, p. 3
(bold in original). This more expansive scope now includes what
might be termed al-Qaedist groups and individualsassociated,
affiliated, and inspiredwho use violence to target the United
States, its interests, allies, and other targets of opportunity (Ibid.,
p. 3). Key definitions (Ibid., p. 3) further clarify the scope of this
adversary and nature of this war. [1] Associated Forces is a le-
gal term of art that refers to cobelligerents of al Qaida and the
Taliban against whom the President is authorized to use force (in-
cluding the authority to detain) based on the Authorization to Use
Military Force, Pub.L.107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). [2] Affiliates
includes Associated Forces but also includes groups and indi-
viduals against whom the United States is not authorized to use
force based on the authorities granted by the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force, Pub.L.107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The
use of Affiliates in this strategy, the document continues, is in-
tended to reflect a broader category of entities against whom the
United States must bring various elements of national power, as
appropriate and consistent with the law, to counter the threat they
pose. Finally, [3] Adherents are defined as Individuals who
have formed collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or
are otherwise inspired to take action in furtherance of the goals of
al-Qaedathe organization and the ideologyincluding engag-
ing in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at
the United States, its citizens, or interests. A final official, illumi-
nating definition of the enemy is provided by former 9/11 Com-
mission co-chairs Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The [9/11]
commission embraced a definition of the enemy as two pronged:
al-Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11;
and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired
in part by [al-Qaeda], which has spawned terrorist groups and
violence across the globe. We made a conscious decision to refer
25
to the enemy as Islamist terrorismnot as terrorism the tactic,
or Islam the religion. (See Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamil-
ton Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p. 283.) For the likelihood that latent
conflicts are beginning to emerge between the Departments of
State and Defense as a result of this more expansive conception
of terrorist opponent and the jurisdictional, diplomatic, strategic,
and operational issues involved, see Charlie Savage, Obama Ad-
viser Discusses Using Military on Terrorists, The New York Times,
September 16, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/
us/john-o-brennan-on-use-of-military-force-against-al-qaeda.html.
26
curity Preparedness Group, September 2011, available from www.
bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/tenth-anniversary-report-card-sta-
tus-911-commission-recommendations; Cheryl Pellerin, Officials:
Defense-Intelligence Integration Strongest Since 9/11, Armed
Forces Press Service, September 8, 2011, available from www.de-
fense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65279.
27
8. Cronin, based on data trends ending c. 2008, severely un-
derestimates the strategic potential of relentless hunting and de-
capitation of high value terrorist targets, and significantly overes-
timates the costs that she believes it may entail, which include the
likely elevating of Osama bin Laden to the status of a martyred
Muslim icon and the relative ease of generating new high value
terrorist cadre. (see, e.g., pp. 177-179, 190, 194-195); This may be
due to her underestimation of al-Qaedas vanguardist ambitions
and organizational structure that, while not tied to a single indi-
vidual, presumes a battle-hardened, time-tested, absolutely loyal
secret cadre capable of monopolizing and carrying out a global
projection of strategic vision.
28
11. Ibid., pp. 190-191. Like decapitation, Cronin significantly
downplays the cumulative effects of repression for the viability
of al-Qaedas external operations capability. Again, in fairness to
her, at the time of publication (c. 2009) the relentless, systematic,
drone-based, high-value targeting campaign had barely just be-
gun.
29
Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 2009, pp. 6-8, available from
www.ctc.usma.edu.
16. Ibid., p. 95; See especially, Brian Fishman and Assaf Mogh-
adam, Do Jihadi and Islamist Divisions Matter? Implications for
Policy and Strategy, in Moghadam and Fishman, eds., Self-In-
flicted Wounds, pp. 224-240, for a deeply insightful description of
potential implosion tactics applicable to al-Qaeda.
30
tion (i.e., Right Guidance) for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World
(Wathiqat Tarshid Al-Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr wAl-Alam), November
2007, serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic and partially avail-
able on www.opensource.gov, Part 1. Crucial here is that (1) jihad
is regarded as including an armed, military dimension; and, (2)
its legal parameters precisely specified. The purpose of the pres-
ent monograph is to demonstrate that it is possible to disable al-
Qaedas reign of terror on these grounds, i.e., the jurisprudence of
lawful military jihad. This does not require a counternarrative,
which would in effect amount to an attempted demythologiza-
tion of a religious faith whose overwhelming majority of adher-
entsdespite maintaining faith in the first three elements of the
above narrative regard terrorism directed at innocent civilian
noncombatantsMuslim and non-Muslimas morally abhor-
rent, repulsive, murderous, and un-Islamic.
31
under the Shade of Swords); 2792-2798 (Martyrdom, and Para-
dise); 2833-2834 (Actual Fighters, and Rewards). See also Sahih
Al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, The Book of Belief (aman), chapter
26, #36, p. 73. In Sahih Muslim, Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans., Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore, Pakistan, 2004, Vol. 3, Book 10, Kitab
al-Jihad (4292-4472): 4292, 4294, 4297-4300, 4311, 4313-4315, 4319,
4321-4325, 4327-4330, 4332-4341, 4344-4349, 4353-4355, 4357-4358,
4360-4361, 4363-4366, 4368, 4370, 4372-4375, 4377, 4385, 4388-4390,
4392-4396, 4405-4406, 4413, 4429, 4437-4441, 4445-4447, 4452-4453,
4456-4457, 4462, 4464-4470, 4472; and, for the most militant of
the martial jihad traditions, see 4292, 4294, 4340-4341, 4344, 4347,
4363, 4366, 4370, 4372, 4375, 4385, 4388-4393, 4395-96, 4405, 4406,
4413, 4437-4447 , esp. 4462-4470, 4472. The religious prescription
to wage military jihad is also found outside the Book of Jihad in
the Book of Faith (aman), Sahih Muslim, Vol. 1, Chap. 9, Com-
mand for Fighting Against the People So Long as They Do Not
Profess That There is No God But Allah and Muhammad is His
Messenger, # 30-34 (pp. 16-17). The crux of the martyrological
covenant is crisply captured in this classical Quranic ayah, a kind
of jihadi covenant (Ali, pp. 470-471, 9:111): Allah hath pur-
chased of the Believers their persons and their goods; For theirs (in
return) is the Garden (of Paradise): They fight in His Cause, and
slay and are slain: A promise binding on Him In Truth, through
the Law, The Gospel, and the Quran. And who is more faithful
to His Covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain which ye
have concluded: That is the achievement supreme.
Despite the fact Islam is by wide consensus viewed to rest on
five pillarscreed, prayer, alms, fasting on Ramadan, and par-
ticipation in the Hajjthe classical sources are not in agreement.
For example, Sahih Muslim, Vol. 1, The Book of Faith, chap. 6,
pp. 10-11, #21, states: It is reported on the authority of Taus that
a man said to Abdullah son of Umar (may Allah be pleased with
him): Why dont you carry out a military expedition? Upon which
he replied: I heard the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon
him) say: Verily, al-Islam is founded on five (pillars): testifying
the fact that there is no god but Allah, establishment of prayer,
payment of Zakat, fast of Ramadan and Pilgrimage to the House.
In Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, The Book of Faith, chapter
18, #26, it reports the following tradition: Narrated Abu Jurairah:
Allahs Messenger [peace be upon him] was asked, What is the
best deed? He replied, To believe in Allah and His Messenger
(Muhammad)[peace be upon him]. The questioner then asked,
32
What is the next [in goodness]? He replied, To participate in
Jihad [holy fighting] in Allahs Cause.
33
Warfare Strategy, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 38, 2009, pp. 349-366)
that Islamic supremacism begins with medieval Hanbali Fiqh lu-
minary Ibn Taymiyyah, (see p. 350), and not al-Qaeda per se, but a
shifting mosaic of fundamentalist signifiers must be delegitimat-
edi.e., fundamentalist Islam (p. 357). Once the enemy has
been correctly, and publicly, identified as Islamic fundamentalists
(i.e., Wahhabists, Salafists, and others). . . a certain type of virulent
Islamic ideology derivative of Hanbali Fiqh, (p. 360); Salafist/
Wahhabi ideology, (p. 362)unnecessarily broadens the enemy
to include enormous chunks of fundamentalist adherents whose
propensity for terrorism, despite intolerance and supremacism, is
extremely questionable.
For scholarly analyses of Salafism and Wahhabism, see for ex-
ample Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islams New Religious Move-
ment, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009 generally, but
especially Thomas Hegghammer, Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionar-
ies? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,
Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, pp. 244-266; Quintan Wiktorowicz,
Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict and Ter-
rorism, Vol. 29, 2006, pp. 207-239; International Crisis Group,
Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly
Dont Mix, September 13, 2004, available from www.crisisgroup.
org; Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform
to Global Jihad, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; Chris-
tina Hellmich, Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypo-
crites to Salafi Jihadis, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31,
2008, esp. pp. 114-119, for a devastatingly-accurate critique of
what the author terms outside-in scholarship on al-Qaeda, and
key failures in conceptualizing Salafism, so-called Wahhabism,
and in consulting primary sources such as Ibn Taymiyyahs ac-
tual Fatawa or al-Wahhabs actual theological demands, instead
of exclusively consulting the group-think that mostly rests on
often-ignorant or biased commentary. For what the present au-
thor regards as the most sophisticated, persuasive, and nuanced
critique of the presumption of a fundamentalist-terrorist nexus
whether Salafi, Wahhabi, or otherwisesee Muhammad Haniff
Bin-Hassan, Key Considerations in Counterideological Work
against Terrorist Ideology, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.
29, 2006, esp. pp. 541-547.
34
22. Bin Hassan, Key Considerations in Counterideological
Work against Terrorist Ideology, pp. 537-538, advocates a theo-
logical and juristic approach virtually identical to that developed
by the present author. However, the explicit recognition of jihad
as a binding religious prescription (jihad realist) and Islamic ju-
risprudence (jurisprudential) or sacred law and sharia method-
ology concerning behavioral proscriptions, prescriptions, and a
continuum of lawful conductfrom obligatory (fard) to forbid-
den (haram) and stages in-betweenis the vital center-of-gravity
identified in the present authors approach. Theological too of-
ten connotes more abstract, scholarly investigations into the man-
ner in which the godhead exists, relates to the world and to man
in the world, as well as debates over the relative rights of human
reason versus faith in discerning those properties.
What is key in the above approach is clearly understood by
both bin Hassan, Key Considerations in Counterideological
Work against Terrorist Ideology, p. 531, and Wilner, Deterring
the Undeterrable, pp. 26-31, who both amply demonstrate the
vital importance of attacking terrorist beliefs about their own le-
gal and moral legitimacy. For bin Hassan, a successful terrorist act
rests on three factors: opportunity (i.e., available targets), capabil-
ity (i.e., money, training, weapons, recruits), and motivation (i.e.,
ideological and nonideological drivers), p. 531. Citing General
William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma dur-
ing World War II, bin Hassan identifies moralea crucial fac-
tor for the willful disposition of the fighteras presuming three
key dimensions: intellectual confidence that the goal can be at-
tained, material confidence that the means of attaining the goal
are available, and spiritual confidence that the cause is just,
p. 534. Translated in the vernacular of sharia-based criteria for
judging the legality of a jihad, the first two requirementsavail-
able means and probable successdeal with the pragmatics of ji-
had (i.e., Can it be done? Do the benefits outweigh the costs for
the Umma?). The third requirement, concerns the legality or Is-
lamic legitimacy of jihad (i.e., Is it just? Should it be done? Does the
sharia justify this jihad?). Wilner, extending deterrence theory to
counterterrorism also identifies three key bases underpinning the
terrorist cost/benefit calculus, two rooted in pragmatics, and the
thirdlegitimation (see esp. pp. 26-31)that demands that ter-
rorist actors root their actions in the moral and legal demands of
Islamic sharia.
35
23. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Balti-
more, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 14-18.
36
26. See also Alia Brahimi, Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al
Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas, Studies in Conflict and Terror-
ism, Vol. 33, 2010, p. 96, for insistence on placing al-Qaedas ter-
rorism within the legal framework of a legitimately declared and
fought defensive jihad. The connection between the imperative to
wage jihad, and the requirement that it be waged lawfully, is evi-
dent in the following quote from Sayyid Imam, whose works will
be discussed at length (see Sayyid Imam, Exposure of the Exonera-
tion Book Al-Tariya li Kitab Al-Tabriya, Twelfth Episode of Sayyid
Imam: Al-Zawahiri had no Prior Knowledge of 09/11, appear-
ing in Al Misri Al Yawm in Arabic December 1, 2008 by Ahmad
Al-Khatib, The Second man in Al-Qaiida Turned Osama Bin
Ladin from a Traitor to a Mujahid to Inherit the Allegiance of his
Followers, Part 12, p. 6: Jihad for Allahs sake is just, but do not
allow those people and their likes to auctioneer with this noble
cause. They push youths to extreme sacrifices and they bring ma-
jor catastrophes on the Muslims even though they most [sic] care-
ful about their personal safety and about reaping benefits without
realizing the least benefit for Islam and the Muslims.
29. Ibid.
37
p. 21. Quoting Kamal El Helbay, a Muslim Brotherhood leader
who helped wrest the Finsbury Park, London mosque from its
sharia violating former firebrand al-Qaedists: No government,
no police force, is achieving what these [religious] scholars are
achieving. To defeat terrorism, to convince the radicals . . . you
have to persuade them that theirs is not the path to paradise,
Ibid., p. 21. The difficulty of this task of differentiating lawful jihad
from unlawful murderous terrorism remains, however, for it is
not just a matter of convincing, but of first penetrating an extrem-
ist, arrogant, hostile, self-righteous mindset, often entirely igno-
rant of crucial Islamic tenets, and one that is self-insulating since
all scholars, clerics, and observant Muslims not engaged in the
terrorist project are viewed as internal enemies. For a real sense of
the difficulty facing these salafi sheiks, even highly-regarded ones,
on the front linesnot only among the youth, but from among
fellow sheikhs, see the article by Sheikh Salman al-Oadah, and
Comments by Shaykh Yaser Birjas in UPDATE: Standing United
Against Terrorism & Al-Qaeda Salman al-Oudah (with Yasir
Qadhi, Yaser Birjas, Tawfique Chowdhurry, and Waleed Basy-
ouni), http://muslimmatters.org/2009/10/12/standing-united-against-
terrorism-al-qaeda-salman-al-awdah-with-yasir-qadhi-and-yaser-
birjas/.
38
but not forbidden (makruh); [5] absolutely and explicitly forbid-
den because both sinful and criminal (haram). See especially John
Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007, chap. 2, Sharia Reasoning, pp. 43-96;
Sharia entry in Encylopedia of Islam, New Ed., C. Bosworth, E.
Donzel, W. Heirichs, and G. Leconte, eds., Vol. 9, Leiden, UK: E.
J. Brill, 1996, pp. 321-328. Because of the enormous stature of the
arch-traditionalist, originalist Hanbali Fiqh that is upheld in Saudi
Arabia, the more conservative Gulf countries, and among jihad-
realist scholars and militants, the most damning case against al-
Qaeda arises when this jurisprudential tradition, which uses the
two primary and most authoritative sources (Quran, Ahadith)
determines that absolutely forbidden sinful, criminal (haram) vio-
lations of the sharia have occurred. The three key luminaries of
the Hanbali school: its namesake Ibn Hanbal (d. 855); the great
medieval scholar and jihadist Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328);
and Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, namesake for the so-called
Hanbalite Wahhabi school (d. 1792); form a theologico-juridico
backbone against whom contemporary al-Qaedist terrorists run
afoul, because the teachings of these three key luminaries read-
ily condemn al Qaeda of abominable acts in the strictest Islamic
terms. For a survey of Hanbali scholars, see, H. Laoust, Hanabi-
la in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Ed., B. Lewis, V. L. Menage,
Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds., Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 1971, Vol. 3,
pp. 158-162.
39
Hakim al-Khwailidi Balhaj, aka: Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq; deputy
emir, Khalid Muhammad Al-Sharif; spiritual leader, Sami Mus-
tafa Al-Saadi, aka: Abu al-Munzir al Saaidi; its first emir, Miftah
al-Mbruk al-Thawadi, aka: Abdul Ghaffar; military commander,
Musafah Al-Said Qunayid, aka: Abu al-Zubair; and, Abdul Wah-
hab Muhammad Qayid, aka: Abu Idris (remarkably, also the
elder brother of senior al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi).
The original Arabic text is available online from www.akhbar-
libyaonline.com. For background, commentary, and additional
analysis, see The Daily Star: Deradicalizing Jihadists, the Lib-
yan Way, April 26, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov;
Noman Benotman, Al-Qaeda: Your Armed Struggle is Over,
September 10, 2010, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/
images/stories/pdfs/letter-to-bin-laden.pdf; Rania Karam, Former
LIFG leader: Bin Laden lacks Islamic authority to wage West-
ern Jihad, May 5, 2010, available from www.magharaebia.com;
Kamil al Tawil (Camille Tawil), Noman Benotman criticizes
al-Qaeda in bin Laden letter, September 23, 2010, available
from www.magharebia.com; Rania Karam, Former LIFG leader
questions bin Laden rationale, April 29, 2010, available from
al-shorfa.com; Kamil al Tawil (Camille Tawil), Al-Qaeda yet to
respond to corrective studies forbidding killing of civilians,
September 15, 2009, available from al-shorfa.com; Camille Tawil,
Libya closes the case of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,
March 30, 2010, available from al-shorfa.com; Nic Robertson
and Paul Cruickshank, In bid to thwart al Qaeda, Libya frees
three leaders of jihadist group, March 23, 2010, available from
edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/23/libya.jihadist.group; Va-
hid Brown, A First Look at the LIFG Revisions, September
14, 2009, available from www.jihadica.com/a-first-look-at-the-lifg-
revisions/; Camille Tawil, The Libyan Islamic Fighting
Groups revisions: one year later, July 23, 2010, available from
www.magharebia.com; Jarret Brachman, Why the LIFGs Revi-
sions are Falling on Our Deaf Ears, September 21, 2009, available
from jarretbrachman.net/?p=1036; Thomas Hegghammer, Libyan
Jihad Revisions, September 8, 2009, available from www.jihadica.
com/libyan-jihad-revisions/; Camille Tawil, Libyan Islamists Back
Away from al-Qaeda Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi Re-
gime, Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7, No. 17, June 18, 2009, available
from www.jamestown.org; Jarret Brachman, Abu Yahya al-Libis
Human Shields in Modern Jihad, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 6,
May 2008, pp. 1-4, available from www.ctc.usma.edu; Alison Par-
40
geter, LIFG Revisions Unlikely to Reduce Jihadist Violence,
CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2009, pp. 7-9, available from
www.ctc.usma.edu; Paul Cruickshank, LIFG Revisions Posing
Critical Challenge to al-Qaeda, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 12, De-
cember 2009, pp. 5-8, available from www.ctc.usma.edu; Ian Black,
Libyas jihadis reject violence as leader bids for acceptance,
September 4, 2009, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/
sep/04/libyan-islamist-fighters-reject-violence; Oea Online, Libyan Is-
lamists ideology revision serialization to start 6 Sep-paper, (Text
of report by Libyan pro-government newspaper Oea: Oea will,
as of tomorrow [Sunday 6 September 2009], begin a serialization
of the ideological revisions corrective studies prepared recent-
ly by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group [LIFG]),September 6,
2009, available from www.opensource.gov; Camille Tawil, Libyan
Islamist Criticizes Tripolis Refusal to Release the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group Prisoners, Al Hayah Online in Arabic, Report
by Kamil al-Tawil, Libyan Islamist Criticizes Tripolis Refusal to
Release the Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups Prisoners, Febru-
ary 22, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov; BBC Monitoring
in Arabic, BBC Monitoring: Review of al-Qaeda Activities in
North Africa 16 February-1 March [20]11, available from www.
opensource.gov; Paul Cruickshank, How Muslim Extremists are
turning on Osama Bin Laden, June 7, 2008, available from www.
nydailynews.com.
For the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, the following
sources by, or commentary on Sayyid al-Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-
Sharif's (aka Dr. Fadl, or, Shaykh Abd-al-Qadir Bin-Abd-al-Aziz)
key jihad-realist revisionist works are: Omar Ashour, The De-
Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Move-
ments, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Is-
lamist Movements, New York: Routledge, 2009, esp. Chaps. 3, 5. For
brief biographical details on Sayyid Imam, see Al-Sharq al-Awsat
Online in Arabic, Report Lists Stages in Life, Career of Egypts
Jihad Group Leader Dr. Fadl and Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in
Arabic, Report: Seven Places Which Made Up Dr. Fadls Life, the
First Amir of Egyptian Jihad Organization, November 19, 2009,
available from www.opensource.gov. For publicity for the revisions,
see Al-Misri al-Yawm, Detained Egyptian Islamist leader urges
rationalization of jihad activity, Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, text
of report by Ahmad al-Khatib: Faqih of [Egyptian] Jihad Orga-
nization to announce within days a document on rationalizing
jihadist actions, May 6, 2007, available from www.opensource.
41
gov; Al-Sharq al-Wasat, Egyptian Islamic Group Theoretician
Supports Call for Rationalized Jihad, Al-Sharq al-Wasat in Ara-
bic article by Abdu Zaynah: Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah Theoreti-
cian in Egypt Supports al-Qaeda Call for Ending Violence, May
13, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Al-Misri al-Yawm,
Egyptian Islamist lawyer says al-Qaedah to carry out religious
revisionspaper, and Al Misri al-Yawm in Arabic excerpt from
report by Ahmad al-Khatib: Jihad Organization leaders unani-
mously approve Fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] revisions, Novem-
ber 3, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov.
For the two key texts containing the legal requisites of law-
ful jihad: [1] Sayyid Imam, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e., Right
Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiqat Tarshid
Al-Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr wAl-Alam), November 2007, serialized in
Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic and partially available on www.open-
source.gov; [2] Sayyid Imam, Exposure of the Exoneration Book [Al-
Tariya li Kitab Al-Tabriya], completed by the author March 25,
2008, and published in 13-parts in Arabic by Al-Misri Al-Yawm,
between November 18-December 2, 2008, available from www.
opensource.gov. See Daniel Lav, An In-Depth Summary of Sayyid
Imams New Polemic Against Al-Qaeda, Exposing the Exonera-
tion, February 23, 2009, available from www.memri.org, for an ac-
curate summary of several key points made in the latter text.
Though Rationalization does indeed contain occasional
needless ad hominem attacks, three points are worth mention-
ing. First, a careful reading of both texts places these remarks in
proper context and though perhaps unwise and distracting, they
do not invalidate Sayyid Imams key legal criticisms. Second, the
vast majority of these ad hominem assaults are directed at Ayman
al-Zawahiris trustworthiness. To the extent that honesty, trust-
worthiness, and commitment to truthfulness are essential disposi-
tional qualities for a person claiming ultimate concern for sharia,
evidence to the contrary is potentially devastating. It suggests that
legal errors do not arise merely from inaccurate, ignorant, or in-
valid inference, but from intentional, willful deception. The origi-
nal Exposure book consists of four interlinked chapters, one of
which focuses virtually exclusively on what Sayyid Imam deems
theological inaccuracies, while the other three deal with ques-
tions bearing directly on motive and character. The linkage of the
first two chapters is represented thusly, You also ascertain the
veracity of what I stated at the start of this chapter [two] in citing
predecessor ulemas as saying that the statements of a liar and de-
42
bauchee are not accepted in religion. I have demonstrated in the
first chapter that Al-Zawahiri is a liar who invents and fabricates.
So what did that liar do when he issued fatwas about Allahs re-
ligion? You have seen in this chapter [two] how he perpetrated
monstrosities and heresies that contradict the Sharia of Islam. His
monstrosities followed one another until they formed a criminal
doctrine that allows wholesale killings under various pretexts
and justifications. . . . Al-Zawahiri ought to have called his book
The Justification rather than The Exoneration. The justification
they sought to make for their criminal behavior rightly sets the
foundation for the school of Ignorance and Crime in Jihad in our
times (Sayyid Imam, Exposure, Part 7, p. 2). And third, Sayyid
Imam constructs a coherent explanation that explains both legal
inaccuracies and intentional deception: that 9/11 and al-Qaeda
represent in their essential core the personal vendetta of Osama
bin Laden, and those whose agendas converged with his, e.g.,
Khalid Shaik Muhammad, to inflict the greatest loss of life possi-
ble on the United States. Ayman al-Zawahiris legal function then,
in Sayyid Imams opinion, is to produce jurisprudence of justifi-
cation legalizing what amounts to a corrupt doctrine about ex-
cessiveness in wholesale killing or a corrupt deviate doctrine
to entrench excessiveness in spilling of blood, . . . This corrupt
doctrine is what some call al-Qaeda ideology (Sayyid Imam,
Exposure, Part 2, pp. 1-2 , 2-7; Part 3, pp. 3-6; Part 4, entire; Part
7, p. 6; Part 11, p. 2; Part 13, p. 2-4).
Second, and in some sense more important, Sayyid Imam in-
dicates the circumstances under which these attacks became more
likely (see, Sayyid Imam, Exposure, Part 13, pp. 4-5), and they
are directly related to al-Zawahiris attempt to poison the recep-
tion of his Rationalization, and therefore prevent the kind of
genuine scholarly debate that Sayyid Imam believed was essen-
tial for restoring legality and pragmatics to the waging of jihad.
For the majority of a 10-hour, 2-day exclusive first-ever in-
terview conducted in Turrah Prison, n.d., conducted just after
release of Rationalization, see Al-Hayah,Egypts Dr. Fadl of Al-
Jihad Group Upbraids al-Qaedas Al-Zawahiri, Al-Hayah in Ara-
bic, Part One of a six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-
Aziz al-Sharif: Al-Hayah in Eguypts Turrah Prison Interviews
Author of the Document the Rationalization of Jihad in Egypt
and the World. Dr. Fadl: Al-Zawahiri Deceived me and was the
Reason I was Accused in the Al-Sadat Case. I Left Jamaat al Jihad
After it Insisted on Operations Inside Egypt and Distorted my
43
Book, A Compilation, December 8, 2007, available from www.
opensource.com; Al-Hayah, Egypt: Former Al-Jihad Ideologue Re-
bukes Leaders Abroad, Al-Zawahiri, Al-Hayah in Arabic, Part
Three of six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-
Sharif: Al-Hayah interviews the Author of the Document Ratio-
nalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World. Dr. Fadl: al-Qaeda Does
Not Have a Sharia Scholar and Al-Zawahiri Turned Al-Jihad
Members into Mercenaries, December 10, 2007, available from
www.opensource.com; Al-Hayah,Former Al-Jihad Theorist Says
Document on Rationalization of Jihad Unaswerable, Al-Hayah
in Arabic, Part Four of six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam
Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: Al-Hayah Interviews Author of the Docu-
ment Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World. Dr. Fadl: Bin
Ladin and Al-Zawahiri Are Creations of Intelligence Services and
Were Playthings in the Hands of the Sudanese and Pakistanis,
December 11, 2007, available from www.opensource.com; Al-Hayah,
Former Jihad Ideologue Attacks Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, 9/11
Atrocity, Al Hayah in Arabic, Part Six of six-part interview with
Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: Al-Hayah in the Egyp-
tian Turrah Prison interviews the author of The Rationalization
of Jihad in Egypt and the World document; Dr. Fadl: the victims
of al-Qaeda through recruitment on the internet fill prisons pur-
poselessly; my advice to Muslim youths: Learn your religion,
learn your religion; and seek the truth, December 13, 2007, avail-
able from www.opensource.com.
For select examples of post-Rationalization responses,
analyses, and commentary, see Al-Misri al-Yawm, Al-Jihad orga-
nization leaders in the world voice support to Imams revisions,
Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic text of report by Ahmad al-Khatib
headlined, Al-Jihad leaders are anticipating Dr. Fadils revisions,
[Al-Jihad] world leaders support him, November 15, 2007, avail-
able from www.opensource.gov; Nahdat Misr, Rationalization of
Jihad Paper Triggers Crisis Among Egyptian Fundamentalists,
Nahdat Misr in Arabic: Hani al-Sibai: Rationalization of Jihad
Document Product of Prisons, Lacks Credibility; Abu-Umar Al-
Masri Responds: The Document is a Product of Sympathy, Mercy
Not Coercion in Prison, November 20, 2007, available from www.
opensource.gov; Al-Misri Al-Yawm, Report on Reaction of Al-Jihad
Revisions by Islamists Residing in London, Report by Ahmad
Al-Khatib in Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic : Al-Misri al-Yawm
opens the door for debate on Al-Jihad revisions, November 23,
2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Jihadist Websites, Basir
44
al-Tartusi Questions Shaykh Sayyid Imams Words as Revisions,
Retractions, Syrian Salafi cleric Abu-Basir al-Tartusi post to jihad-
ist website, November 29, 2007, available from www.opensource.
gov; Al-Misri Al-Yawm, Egypt: Islamic Group Invites al-Qaeda
to Commit to Sayyid Imam Revisions, Pins hope on Bin Laden,
Report by Ahmad al-Khatib in Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic: The
Islamic Group Demands Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri to Consider
Sayyid Imams Revisions Seriously; In the first reaction, Karam
Zuhdi and Najih Ibrahim: The document which Al-Misri Al-
Yawm Published is unprecedented and its impact will reach al-
Qaeda members, November 19, 2007, available from www.open-
source.gov; MEMRI, Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al-Qaedas
Sharia Guide to Jihad: 9/11 Was a Sin; A Sharia Court Should Be
Set Up to Hold Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri Accountable; There
Are Only Two Kinds of People in Al QaedaThe Ignorant and
Those Who Seek Worldly Gain, MEMRI Special Dispatch Series
No. 1785, December 14, 2007, available from memri.org; MEMRI,
Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al-Qaedas Sharia Guide to
Jihad Sayyed Imam vs. Al Qaeda (2): Al-Zawahari Was Suda-
nese AgentSudans VP Ali Othman Taha Hired Him to Attack
Egypt; Ban on Jihad against Egyptian Regime in Egypt; Summary
of Imams New Right Guidance for Jihad Book, January 25, 2008,
available from memri.org. For select Western analyses and com-
mentary of this broader revisionist trend, see Jarret Brachman,
Al Qaedas Dissident: How the Prison Writings of Sayyid Imam
al-Sharif, One of al Qaedas Founders Now Labeled a Turn Coat,
are Doing More to Expose the Terrorist Groups Hypocrisy than
Anyone Else, December 2009, available from www.foreignpoli-
cy.com; Lawrence Wright, The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda
Mastermind Questions Terrorism, The New Yorker, June 2, 2008,
pp. 37-53; Daniel Lav, The Party of Jurisprudence vs. The Party
of Action: Sayyed Imam, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and the Split in
the Jihad Movement, MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No.
144, May 29, 2008, available from www.memri.org; Omar Ashour,
Post-Jihadism and the Inevitability of Democratization, Arab
Reform bulletin, November 10, 2009, available from carnegieen-
dowment.org/2009/11/10/post-jihadism-and-inevitability-of-democrati-
zation/kry; Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, The Unraveling:
Al Qaedas Revolt Against Bin Laden, The New Republic, June 11,
2008; Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN, New Jihad
Code Threatens Al Qaeda, November 10, 2009, available from
edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/Africa/11/09/Libya.jihadi.code/; Khalil
Al-Anani, Jihadi Revisionism: Will It Save The World?, Mid-
45
dle East Brief, No. 35, April 2009, pp. 1-7, available from www.
brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB35.pdf; IDC Herzliya, In-
ternational Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Retracting Using
Ideological Means for Purposes of De-Radicalization, January
2011, pp. 1-14, available from www.ict.org.il/Portals/O/Internet%20
Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Deradicalization.pdf.
The Egyptian Islamic Groups (Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya) 1997
cessation of violence, and 2002/2003 revisionist writings, were
unfortunately not available to this author in English translation.
For select commentary on Al-Gamaa, see Y. Carmon, Y. Feldner,
and D. Lav, The Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence:
An Ideological Reversal, MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No.
309, December 22, 2006, available from memri.org; Rudolph Peters,
The Notion of Jihad at the Turn of the 21st Century, in R. Peters,
ed., Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, 2nd Ed., Princ-
eton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, esp. Chap. 3., The Change
of Strategy of the Egyptian Jamaa Islamiyya, pp. 180-183, for
major revisions in jihad doctrine represented in the 2002/2003
books away from the notion of kufr al-nizam (the unbelief of the
regime), and other doctrines; Omar Ashour, Lions Tamed? An
Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist
Movements: the Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group, The Middle
East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4, Autumn 2007, pp. 596+, available from
Academic OneFile, go.galegroup.com.
46
dhi, Yaser Birjas, Tawfique Chowdhurry, and Waleed Basyouni,
March 10, 2009, available from muslimatters.org/2009/10/12/sand-
ing-united-against-terrorism-al-qaeda-salman-al-awdah-with-yasir-
qadhi-and-yaser-birjas.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
47
42. Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part Four; See also,
additional mentions of the overzealous attitudes and the phe-
nomenon of young men joining organizations that exploit reli-
gion but do not faithfully follow religious teachings in the same
Part Four, Al-Hayah Interview. Sayyid Imam continues later, in
his Exposure: I wanted to warn the people against them [al-
Qaeda], especially Muslim youths whom they entrap through
an array of deviate concepts and firebrand speeches in order to
throw them in perils [sic] without any benefit and without the
least achievement on the ground, except the media fanfare they
use to cover up their crimes and confuse matters in the minds of
people (Part 11, pp. 1-2); I am mentioning this so that the bud-
ding generations of youth will be aware of how they were sold
and gambled with, and so that no Muslim would venture to do
something except with a fatwa from established ulemas. . . . So
where is Al-Zawahiri from it [sic] as he incites with remote con-
trol? (Part 11, p. 5); I have written these words, as I have written
The Document on Rationalizing Jihadist Action [Rationaliza-
tion] to warn Muslims, especially the young, against those op-
portunistic adventurers and their likes (Part 12, p. 6).
48
44. Owing to the highly-esteemed role of martyrdom in the
process of killing and being killed in Islamic jurisprudence, his-
tory, and theology, and also its relative paucity as a tactic during
the 1970s-90s, there is bare mention of this phenomenon and cer-
tainly not an extended objection on par with others raised. For re-
cent scholarship examining the jurisprudential justifications and
legal debates involved, see David Jan Slavicek, Deconstructing
the Shariatic Justification of Suicide Bombings, Studies in Con-
flict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, 2008, pp. 553-571; Shireen Khan Burki,
Haram or Halal? Islamists Use of Suicide Attacks as Jihad,
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, pp. 582-601. See also
for a concise summary of a recently issued 600-page fatwa issued
by Shaykh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri: Fatwa on Suicide Bomb-
ings and Terrorism: Table of Contents, Summary & Bibliogra-
phy, Transl. Shaykh Abdul Aziz Dabbagh, Minhaj Publications,
February 2010, available from www.minhaj.org.
49
49. See LIFG 2009, ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, (see, Rationalization,
Part 6, p. 4), outlines and extensively treats the six proscriptions
each of which is sufficient on its own to spare the foreigners and
tourists and not confront them with harm or damage. Having
discussed them, he then asks rhetorically: So how can the situ-
ation be when all these proscriptions or some of them are com-
bined? According to "Rationalization," Part 3, pp. 4-5, these pro-
scriptions also apply to the financing of jihad:
50
to be wise because its deleterious effects (mafasid) outweigh its
presumed benefits (masalih).
51. For example, Sayyid Imam lists the following options ex-
ercised by Prophet Muhammad as examples for those committed
to upholding the sharia but unable by ability of circumstance, to
wage jihad: These options ranged from disguise, hiding faith,
going into seclusion, migration to Ethiopia and then Medina,
pardon, forgiveness, and shunning the mushrikin [polytheistic
idolaters], and the possibility of hurting the mushrikin by words,
deeds, and patience on this, to jihad against the kuffar [infidels]
including the mushrikin, apostates, and People of the Book [Chris-
tians and Jews] by sacrificing self and possessions by tongue, to
the conclusion of truce and treaties. And he concludes in refer-
ence to contemporary duties to jihad: There has been no change
in any of these options, for all of them are legitimate according to
the status of the establishment. Several additional examples of
the relation of the duty to jihad in relation to actual capacities, and
other options, are provided in this section.
51
God disqualifies one as a Muslim (Quran 4:116); jihad includes,
but significantly exceeds, martial fighting; put in its actual context,
the charge that not ruling based on what God sent down amounts
to unbelief, was actually addressed to the Jews, not the Muslims
(Quran 5:48); Egypt by any reasonable standard observes Islamic
dictates and where it does not, persons must remedy that to the
last detail; there is no support in the Traditions for sanctifying let
alone prescribing the violent removal of a leader who does per-
form the prayer ceremonies; the so-called sword verse (Quran
9:5) was directed at pagan polytheists, and is wholly inapplicable
to observant Muslims; it is erroneous to equate the ruling regime
in Egypt, whatever its faults, with the savage destruction meted
out to Muslims by the Mongols (Al-Tatar); erroneous and oppor-
tunistic use of Ibn Taymiyyahs fatwas; referring to the Faridah
as a political pamphlet, errors are made regarding a de-contex-
tualized and mythologized absolute oath of loyalty owed by an
adherent to a ruling Caliph, in fact, and the Quran is largely silent
on the precise means of selecting and holding accountable rul-
ers of a Muslim political entity. Moreover, modern circumstances
now empower the nation-state and its legitimate monopoly of
violence to act on behalf of the citizenry in matters of war, jus-
tice, and peace; in contrast to a mystical praxis jihad doctrine,
Islamic jurisprudence upholds the necessity of deep knowledge
in Islam, and of the world and its circumstances: this is also a
means of striving and struggling in the path of Allah or jihad;
there is great historical precedent for Muslim cooperation with
non-Muslims; the author of the Faridah is merely a contemporary
exponent of a specific deviant movement within Islamthe kha-
warij, or Kharijis, whose fanaticism, self-righteous arrogance,
and violent willingness to takfir virtually all who disagree; and
finally, in stark contrast to the claim that jihad is a nonfulfilled
duty, he states:
52
carries out the collective duty of jihad on behalf of all
citizens. To conquer oneself and Satan is equally part
of the Muslim duty of jihad, the Mufti adds, while call-
ing other Muslims apostates is not. Whatever the people
of the Faridah and their sympathizers might say, jihad is,
according to the Mufti, not a forgotten or absent duty at
all (p. 60).
53
59. Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, Doctrine of Rationaliza-
tion [i.e., Right Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World
(Wathiqat Tarshid Al-Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr wAl-Alam), Novem-
ber 2007, serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, available from
www.opensource.gov. Also, Ibid. In the domain of jihad for the
sake of Allah the Almighty, this is one of the branches of faith,
or the peak of Islams hump, as correctly cited from the beloved
chosen one [Muhammad], Allahs prayers and peace upon him.
54
praised, forbade you to act as advocate for such persons.
Anyone who admires their deeds is a partner in sin. They
are now counted as people of weak faith because they
have committed the major sins of lying and treachery.
Only a thin line separates them from being outright in-
fidels. The ancient Muslims said that major sins are the
path to disbelief. These sins are the introduction to dis-
belief. God Almighty said: In the long run evil in the
extreme will be the end of those who do evil because they
rejected the Signs of God, and held them up to ridicule
[Quran 30:10].
55
citizens without discrimination. This is what they did on
9/11. They killed on the basis of nationality. Groups that
sympathized with them carried out the Madrid bomb-
ings in 2004, killing Spaniards indiscriminately. In the
London Underground bombings in 2005, they killed Brit-
ish citizens on the basis of nationality. All this was killing
on the basis of nationality. Being a citizen of a particular
country is not proof of disbelief or faith. It is not evidence
of declaring the lives of certain persons forfeit or that
their property is forfeit.
56
66. See LIFG 2009, Revisions, ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, Ratio-
nalization, Part 4, p. pp. 1-2; Sayyid Imam, Exposure, Part 2,
pp. 3-4; Part 3, pp. 3-5; Part 10, p. 3.
68. Ibid., Part 6, p. 2. Since the law of jihad rules that a power-
less person in infidel countries is not required to conduct jihad
other options must be exercised, including: engage in a jihad that
propagates the Islamic call, and [i]f they are unable to do that,
they can repudiate abominable acts in their hearts, which is a duty
in any case, or he can conceal his faith and use what is allowed
in the shariah, like dissimulation. This key question faced by
Muslims living in non-Muslim majority societies led to virtually
an identical response from the salafi jihadist cleric Mohammad
Tahir al-Barqawi (aka Shaykh Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi), i.e.,
he encourages several nonviolent alternatives for promoting the
Islamic call in Belgium, empowering and protecting the Mus-
lim Umma, and also, interacting on the basis of reciprocity and
fairness with those who do the same. See Jihadist websites, Al-
Maqdisi Advises Muslims in Belgium on How to Deal with Non-
Muslim Society, April 23, 2010, available from www.opensource.
com.
57
The issue of killing civilians of the subjects of countries
occupying Muslim countries is explained in the docu-
ment [Rationalization]. The gist is that whoever enters
enemy countries on a visa, even if forged, must not act
treacherously against the people of that country, betray
their trust, kill them, or steal their money. It is not admis-
sible to kill civilians or combatants. Ulema do not dis-
agree over this issue.
See also, Sayyid Imam, Exposure, Part 6, pp. 3-4; Part 10, p. 5;
Part 13, p. 5.
[W]hat then would you say about Bin Laden and Al-Za-
wahiri and their followers who betrayed the Emir [vio-
lation of bayat], hit their enemy in the back [violation
of security pact, visa], and brought catastrophes to the
Muslims [pragmatics] destroying groups and States and
filling graveyards and prisons with Muslims, in addition
to founding a criminal doctrine to justify wholesale kill-
ing . . . So what do you say to these people? I leave it
to the Muslims to judge them. A debauched person who
drinks liquor hurts no one but himself. But the damage of
those [sic] we refer to is wholesale.
58
comed fugitive Muslims? Bin Ladin then fled and left the
Afghans to pay the price for his foolhardiness in death,
homelessness, and large-scale ruin. He sheds tears for the
children of Palestine and forgets the children of Afghani-
stan whose blood is spilled every day because of him. . . .
59
the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ing inspired KSM to become involved in planning attacks
against the United States. By his own account, KSMs
animus toward the United States stemmed not from his
experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent
disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.
(Source: The 9/11 Commission Report, New York: W.W.
Norton, 2004, p. 147.
Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center plot,
as well as others, including the initial planning of the Planes Op-
erationwho had earlier failed in an attempt to bomb the Israeli
embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and whose initial New York tar-
gets were not the World Trade Center but targeting Jewish neigh-
borhoods in Crown Heights and Williamsburghad this to say as
a final statement following his conviction for that crime:
Our demands:
Stop all military, economical, and political aids [sic] to
Israel.
All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.
Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries
[sic] interior affairs.
60
The American people are responsible for the actions
of their government and they must question all of the
crimes that their government is committing against other
people. Or they Americans will be the targets of our
operations that could diminish them.
61
thing he apparently did not know would happenis absolutely
unacceptable under Islamic law. The defendants Wadih El Hage,
Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali,
and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed all received life without parole:
Odehs views (see p. 112) are referred to by Judge Leonard B.
Sand when he states as motives, Mr. Odehs opposition to Unit-
ed States support of Israel, financially, politically and militarily,
[and] presence of the United States military in the holy lands of
Saudi Arabia, [and] the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. At
p. 113, Judge Sands states: The attack may have been intended
to attack American foreign policy, but the victims were innocent
people. . . . At pages 115-116, the distinction is made between
support of al-Qaedas military goals and deep regret at loss of in-
nocent civilian life. His attorney, Anthony L. Ricco, states:
62
open society here, (p. 139); also: Now, even though the Islamic
system and way of life is for the best of all humanity [sic], devout
Muslims, as I believe, are not asking to apply it here in the U.S.,
where Muslims are less than 7 million. They are a minority. The
fact is that they want to apply it in the Islamic countries where the
majority are Muslims. But in those countries, todays selfish, arro-
gant and self-deceited kings, presidents and rulers want to apply
their own self-invented rules . . . [T]o make the long story short
[sic], by the 20th century, the rulers started to neglect the Koranic
laws, substituting them with manmade [sic] laws. The result is
what we see today. Muslim nations are the weakest, poorest and
most miserable. That is why, in my opinion, we find devout, com-
mitted Muslims, individuals and groups, working actively to re-
implement Gods rules and guidance (pp. 137-138).
As for moral revulsion: [D]evout Muslims, . . . even in time
of conflict, they should not exceed certain limits, harming inno-
cent people or noncombatant ones. This is very stressed upon [sic]
in the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, peace
be upon him, who even prohibited destroying crops, animals or
property at time of war (p. 139); and again:
63
holiest sites, its negative impact on Muslim masses around the
world and specifically those on the Arabian Peninsula (p. 142).
He goes on to also say though: Such policies, in my opinion,
are wrong and end up breeding unjustified extremism. . . . Many
Muslims and non-Muslims have expressed the same views. That
includes the American Muslim community, which I am a member
of, which is free to voice its criticism to the American policy [sic]
but without committing or supporting any extreme acts (pp. 142-
143). And in his defense he also states: I am still the person who
avoids radical solutions and acts, as I did in the past (p. 145).
[El-Hage had at that time no prior record of any violent or illegal
activity.]
Bin Ladens butchery and contrast with El-Hage could not be
greater. He acknowledges El-Hage: [He] was one of our brothers
whom God was kind enough to steer to the path of relief work
for Afghan refugees. I still remember him, though I have not
seen him or heard from him for many years. He has nothing to
do with the U.S. allegations (FBIS Report, January 2004, Time
Magazine Interview with Bin Laden, January 11, 1999, pp. 83-
86). In stark contrast to El-Hages revulsion, Bin Laden answers
the TIME magazine correspondents question, [H]ow can you
justify the death of Africans? (p. 84), by invoking the jihad of
justification and extends the Tartarrus (human shield) doctrine
to justify the mass murder in Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1998,
of 213 persons, and injuring of 4500; and in Dar as Salam (liter-
ally, House of Peace), Tanzania, to 11 dead, and 85 injured.
(See United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr.
1023, United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
New York, N.Y., March 12, 2001, Superseding Indictment, pp. 43-
44, available from www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/US/US_v_
Osama_bin_Laden_et_al_Superseding Indictment-1.pdf ; 2.pdf; 3.pdf.)
See, finally, Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of
Cultures or Clash of Interests, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999, esp. pp. 238-242, for several prescient suggestions the
actual implementation of which may have substantially altered
the events defining the decade to come.
64
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
*****
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Author
Dr. Paul Kamolnick
Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil