Andrew Patterson November 7, 2011 History 180 Professor Cardwell Truman and the Recognition of Israel

At 4:00 P.M. on Wednesday, May 12, just two days before the British U.N. mandate in Palestine was set to expire Truman convened a meeting between his White House aides and the State Department to discuss the issue of Palestine. Present at the meeting were White House aides David Niles, Clark Clifford, and Matt Connelly along with Lovett, Fraser Wilkins, Robert McClintock, George Marshall from the State Department. It is worth noting that anti-partitionist Loy Henderson was specifically not invited in order to alleviate tension between the two sides. President Truman instructed Clark Clifford before the meeting to prepare statements as if he was going to make an argument before the Supreme Court. Truman wanted Clifford to lay out point by point the rationale for not only recognizing a Jewish state but also to do so before the state was created. Clifford was to speak for the President in the hopes of reconciling the ongoing feud between the State Department and the White House. Secretary of State Marshall was not informed before the meeting that Clifford was at the meeting representing the President. The Secretary of State reacted with hostility when he walked into to the conference room and saw the presidential aid. He wanted to know why Clifford was even present since the issue of Palestine fell within his sphere of responsibility as Secretary of State. Truman tried to placate Marshall by saying that Clifford had been invited because Palestine was such a serious policy dilemma that all points of view and recommendations should be considered. Marshall and Lovett stressed that recent military gains made by Jewish forces were fragile. The Secretary warned that recent progress might encourage Jewish leaders to establish a new state unilaterally without first securing military truces with its neighbors. On May 8 Marshall had warned the 1

Jews that in the event of a regional conflict that the U.S. was not going to provide aid and that they should proceed accordingly. Marshall advised Truman that the best option for the U.S. to pursue was Senator Austins Trusteeship plan in the U.N. and to wait for events to become clear in Palestine. Clifford then responded to Marshalls statements. The Presidential aide pointed out that the State Departments plan for the U.N. was unrealistic and nave. The British refused to extend their mandate in Palestine past May 14 making an agreement before the mandate expired highly unlikely. Even if the trusteeship plan was approved the military resources required to implement the plan were unrealistic. The United States would have to partially mobilize in order implement the unpopular State Department plan which hurt the Truman administration domestically and U.S. image abroad. With recent Jewish victories in Palestine the partition plan approved by the U.N. in November 1947 was already practically in place. The Jews had proven themselves as resourceful fighters and could be key allies within the region. To counter the State Departments agreement that U.S. support for a Jewish state would alienate the Arab-U.S. relations Clifford argued that the Arab states were too reliant on U.S. investment to push the countries into the Soviet camp. It was when Clifford stated mentioning the potential domestic benefits if Truman recognized the Jewish State did Marshall start to become visibly angry. Trumans decision to recognize Israel would motivate Jewish voters in swing states that were vital to both national and regional upcoming elections. It was not only vital for the President to recognize the Jewish state but for him to do so in a manner that was the most beneficial. Clifford wanted the President to announce U.S. support for a potential Jewish state immediately after the meeting or at the very least recognize the state immediately after it was declared by Jewish leaders. The rationale for recognizing the Jewish state before or right after its establishment was that it would benefit both the country and Truman in a variety of ways.

By following Cliffords advice the United States would beat the Soviets from recognizing the new state something that they intended to do. By having the United States be the first to recognize the Jewish state a public relations coup of sorts would be achieved for the country. The world would be shown another example of the U.S. promoting democracy around the world. Another reason was that mass rallies across the country were scheduled for May 16. These rallies were set up so Jews could show their support for their fellow brethren in Palestine. If Truman recognized Israel before these rallies were scheduled to take place he would be the central political figure to rally around which would hopefully translate into votes on Election Day. Another benefit by recognizing the Jewish state promptly would prevent the buildup of even more public pressure and scrutiny on the administration. Truman could claim that he did what was right for the nation both morally and strategically and preempt Republicans from claiming the issue as their own. Lovett countered Cliffords argument for preemptive recognition of a Jewish state on a variety points. If the U.S. was going to recognize Israel, an act still opposed by the State Department, the timing of the declaration was crucial. Lovett argued that it would be inappropriate for Truman to recognize the Jewish state before the British mandate expired because it appear as a transparent attempt to win the Jewish vote, would undermine the authority of the U.N., and probably had no precedent under international law. Secretary of State Marshall confronted with what he saw as domestic politics interfering with foreign policy stated that if Truman followed Cliffords advice that he would not vote for Truman in the upcoming presidential elections. The degree of seriousness that Marshall attached to this statement and Trumans reaction to it are a matter of continued historical debate but Marshalls reasoning for saying it wasnt without merit. To the State Department it appeared to the President was pursuing a course of action that directly threatened the countries national security and economic well-being. Truman was

taking a gamble pushing Arab states into the Soviet camp and threatening U.S. access to oil and trade routes. In the face of Marshalls comments about voting against him Truman decided to end the meeting before the conversation degenerated further. Clifford later recalled Truman as raising his hand and saying I think I understand the question involved and I think we need no further discussion of it. I think we must follow the position General Marshall has advocated. It is important to determine which position of Marshalls Truman was backing. Truman was not saying that he was going to follow his Secretary of States advice on not recognizing a Jewish state at all merely that he was not going to recognize the Jewish state before the British mandate expired and the state was proclaimed. Even though this meeting was convened in order to get both the State Department and the White House on the same page the degeneration of the conversation within the meeting caused Truman to end the meeting prematurely. With only two days before the mandate was set to expire and both sides not seeing eye to eye Trumans recognition of Israel was going to have several embarrassing and otherwise preventable side effects. With Truman accepting the State Departments advice that granting recognition to a state before it had even applied for it Clifford and the other White House aides sought to make sure that the United States was waiting to respond to a request when it was made. To accomplish this goal the aides had to try and accomplish several things at once. Frist is that it was absolutely vital to Truman that Marshall did not criticize Trumans Palestine policy publically. Second both the White House aides had to keep the media and other interest groups at bay all while making sure that Trumans intentions of extending imminent recognition were not made public. During his term in office Harry Truman was consistently unpopular. Facing turmoil from both within his own party and Republicans it was extremely important to the administration to have George Marshall as Secretary of State. Marshalls war record and reputation for being an effective and impartial

administrator were invaluable to the beleaguered president. Having Marshall come out openly against Trumans policy towards Palestine would prove likely fatal as Truman faced reelection in 1948. Truman was not the only politician to face pressure at this time over the Palestinian question. There was actually a movement within the Democratic Party to nominate General Eisenhower as their nominee for office instead of the incumbent president. This almost unprecedented action of going against the incumbent from their own party just shows how vital the Jewish vote and swing states like New York were considered in domestic politics. This political pressure had been growing for months. John A. Kennedy, a personal friend of Trumans, recalled that in either April or May of 1948 he paid a visit to the Oval Office. On his way in to meet Truman Kennedy passed a group of Jewish leaders waiting in the hall to meet with Truman after Kennedy. During his visit Kennedy jokingly asked whether Mr. President, are you going to recognize Israel? As of course that is what this group who are following me would like to know. Truman responded Well, how many Arabs are there registered voters in the United States? While Trumans comment was not supposed to be taken literally it does show that Truman understood the domestic pressure that surrounded the Palestine issue and how vital it was going to be for the upcoming presidential campaign. Truman could not afford to not capitalize on Palestinian issue or be undermined by public dissent from his Secretary of State two points that were understood by both Truman and his White House aides. Lovett and Clifford met over lunch on May 14 to review the events of the day. Clifford told Lovett that Truman had been persuaded to not recognize a Jewish state prematurely by the State Department but that tonight after the mandate had expired and a Jewish state was declared that the President intended on recognizing the state. Lovett stated that there was no legal bar to recognition but that he urged that the decision be delayed by a couple of days. The State Department was worried about notifying its Allies, especially the British and French, not permanently severing ties with Arab

countries, but also the potential embarrassment of having the decision break during the ongoing session of the United Nations that was working still working on the State Departments trusteeship proposal. Lovett and Clifford decided to split the responsibility of notifying the different parties of the news that the U.S. had recognized Israel. Lovett was able to persuade Marshall into a publically neutral stance on the Palestinian issue which was the final motivation for Truman. Marshall called the president on May 14th and said: Mr. President, I cannot support your action in recognition but I will not oppose it. To which Truman replied: Thank you, General Marshall. That is all that I need. Earlier that morning White House aide David Niles working closely with Clifford was instructed to notify the Jewish Agency representative in Washington to expect a call before noon. Clifford called and instructed the Jewish Agency that if they sent over a formal request to the White House and the State Department that the United States would recognize Israel. It is interesting to note that this phone conversation happened before Cliffords lunch with Lovett revealing that while Truman felt that having Marshall by his side on the matter was important he was willing to go ahead with his decision. At 5:45 P.M. Clifford notified the State Department that the president was going to recognize the State of Israel shortly after 6:00 P.M. or right after midnight in Palestine. State Department employee Dean Rusk voiced his opposition to the timing of the decision. The United Nations was in session and the American delegation was still promoting Senator Austins trusteeship proposal which now enjoyed majority support. At 6:11 P.M. eleven minutes after the British mandate had expired and the Jewish state was declared President Truman released his statement of recognition. The deep repercussions felt both domestically and abroad for the State Departments trusteeship proposal paled in comparison to Trumans public decision.

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been request by the provisional Government thereof. 6

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the State of Israel. Harry S. Truman May 14, 1948. 6:11 P.M. Just as Dean Rusk and Undersecretary of State Lovett had warned the last minute timing and secrecy of Trumans statement caught the United States metaphorically with its pants down. After getting off the phone with Clifford, Dean Rusk called and notified Warren Austin of the presidents decision. Instead of returning to the General Assembly that was currently in session Austin decided to instead to drive straight home as to show that that the decision had been Trumans and the American delegation had not been deceiving other delegations intentionally. A member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., Francis B. Sayre, was actually addressing on the issue of Palestine when the news broke of Trumans recognition of the Jewish state. The news was at first received with muffled laughter for surely that U.S. would have warned its delegates prior to a decision so monumental. Another delegate, Albert Fernandez of Colombia asked the United States delegation if they could give the General Assembly verification of the rumors that were circling the chamber. It was only after the American delegates telephoned the State Department that they received confirmation. It fell to Philip Jessup to stand up and read Trumans recognition to the rest of the assembly. Here the Americans had publically worked towards achieving a truce and the establishment of a trusteeship within Palestine to only go ahead and recognize a Jewish state unilateral. President Truman and his State Department left the delegations in the U.N. and it allies around the world feeling that at best they had been deceived and at worse intentionally double crossed. After learning of Warren Austins reaction Marshall instructed Rusk to head up to New York and prevent the U.S. Delegation from resigning en masse. Marshalls worst fears were not realized as cooler heads prevailed but the public spectacle of having U.S. representatives was repeated on smaller and

private scales around the world where U.S. foreign diplomats had been working to assure other countries that the U.S. was working for a peaceful and agreed upon solution.

(There is a copious amount of FRUS documents that show how U.S. ambassadors had been telling a foreign government one thing only to be surprised by Trumans decision. Correspondence between the U.S. and Britain, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan reflect that this trend. On the final draft I will expand on each country.)

The State Department had warned about the irrevocable damage that could potentially be done to American interests around the world but especially in the Middle East. Secretary of State Marshall accused Truman of following the advice from aides like Clifford and Niles who sought to sacrifice long term strategic interests of the country in exchange for short term political considerations. While it might have appeared to State Department officials and to some authors who enjoy the benefits of hindsight that Truman was acting solely on domestic considerations is not logical when examined closely. Trumans aides claimed that Truman recognizing a Jewish state was the most pragmatic course. For recognizing Israel was both domestically beneficial but resulted in the United States recognizing that the partition of Palestine was already in place. Not recognizing Israel would prove to be a missed opportunity. The Republicans were ready to make the issue a contentious political topic. The respected Republican Senator Vandenburg had a statement prepared on May 14 urging Truman in the strongest language to urge Truman to act for Israel. As a result of Trumans actions Vandenburg edited his statement and congratulated the president on his wise decision. The domestic reactions to Trumans recognition are easier to definitively gauge there are elections, newspapers, rallies while the foreign consequences are unclear. Instead of recognizing Israel Truman could have supported the official State Department proposal that Senator Austin introduced that sought to create a trusteeship for Palestine through the 8

U.N. This proposal ironically brought together all sides involved with the question of Palestine in opposition to the plan. The Jewish population wanted a Jewish state. The Arab league opposed the plan because it would mean that foreigners would continue to have a mandate that justified having troops within the region. The British refused to offer to stay even if they received an extended mandate. They simply did not want to commit troops and money to the complicated situation. France was busy trying to exert its control once again over Indochina. Like Britain France just didnt prioritize the Palestine situation high enough. If the United States had wanted to it could have enforced a trusteeship in Palestine unilaterally but this would require an estimated 100,000 troops. Any troop commitment that was more than a division or 20,000 troops would require partial mobilization. This made the prospect of enforcing a trusteeship practically impossible. The administration could not afford to partially mobilize the country. The Republicans would lambast the president for not supporting a fledgling democracy and the partial mobilization could potentially have adverse effects on the economy. Even if troops were deployed it would tie up resources in the Middle East that could potentially be needed in Europe. By May 14 when the British original mandate had expired and the General Assembly was still discussing trusteeship Jewish military units had already secured large parts of the country. Enforcing a trusteeship would inevitably cause both sides to come together. While some historians have agreed with the State Department sentiment that Trumans recognition of Palestine offers an extraordinary example of foreign policy conducted in line with shortrange political expediency rather than long-range national goals (Snetsinger, Truman). No president how dire his need for a short term boost to the polls would purposely undermine nations long term goals. Rather Truman decided to recognize the Jewish state because it offered the greatest reward with the least amount of risk for failure. Part of that reward was hopefully securing the Jewish vote in the upcoming election.

Truman gradually accepted refugee Zionism and understood that recognizing Israel was best option available to him he stuck by his decision. It is evident in Trumans correspondence to Jewish leaders shortly after his decision but also in his statements that stressed that he had made the right decision. There is a group of historians that have revisited Trumans presidency and his Palestine-Israel policy have stressed that it was Trumans character that allowed him to make to act against the advice of the pinstriped men at the State Department. By citing what has been called the Spongier Ground these authors

Trumans Morale Charter Truman didnt bind the U.S. to Israel for long terms Relate to Politics Pivotal Legacy

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