Value theory, also called axiology, studies the nature, sources, and types of

values. It is a branch of philosophy and an interdisciplinary field closely

associated with social sciences such as economics, sociology, anthropology and
psychology.

Value is the worth of something, usually understood as covering both positive and
negative degrees corresponding to the terms good and bad. Values influence many
human endeavors related to emotion, decision-making, and action. Value theorists
distinguish various types of values, like the contrast between intrinsic and
instrumental value. An entity has intrinsic value if it is good in itself,
independent of external factors. An entity has instrumental value if it is useful
as a means leading to other good things. Other classifications focus on the type of
benefit, including economic, moral, political, aesthetic, and religious values.
Further categorizations distinguish absolute values from values that are relative
to something else.

Diverse schools of thought debate the nature and origins of values. Value realists
state that values exist as objective features of reality. Anti-realists reject
this, with some seeing values as subjective human creations and others viewing
value statements as meaningless. Regarding the sources of value, hedonists argue
that only pleasure has intrinsic value, whereas desire theorists discuss desires as
the ultimate source of value. Perfectionism, another approach, emphasizes the
cultivation of characteristic human abilities. Value pluralism identifies diverse
sources of intrinsic value, raising the issue of whether values belonging to
different types are comparable. Value theorists employ various methods of inquiry,
ranging from reliance on intuitions and thought experiments to the analysis of
language, description of first-person experience, observation of behavior, and
surveys.

Value theory is related to various fields. Ethics focuses primarily on normative

concepts of right behavior, whereas value theory explores evaluative concepts about
what is good. In economics, theories of value are frameworks to assess and explain
the economic value of commodities. Sociology and anthropology examine values as
aspects of societies and cultures, reflecting dominant preferences and beliefs. In
psychology, values are typically understood as abstract motivational goals that
shape an individual's personality. The roots of value theory lie in antiquity as
reflections on the highest good that humans should pursue. Diverse traditions
contributed to this area of thought during the medieval and early modern periods,
but it was only established as a distinct discipline in the late 19th and early
20th centuries.
Definition
Photo of a marble bust of a bearded man
Even though early contributions to value theory were made in antiquity by
philosophers such as Socrates, this area of thought was only conceived as a
distinct discipline in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[1]

Value theory, also known as axiology and theory of values, is the systematic study
of values. As a branch of philosophy, it examines which things are good and what it
means for something to be good. It distinguishes different types of values and
explores how they can be measured and compared. This field also studies whether
values are a fundamental aspect of reality and how they influence phenomena such as
emotion, desire, decision, and action.[2] Value theory is relevant to many human
endeavors because values are guiding principles that underlie the political,
economic, scientific, and personal spheres.[3] It analyzes and evaluates phenomena
such as well-being, utility, beauty, human life, knowledge, wisdom, freedom, love,
and justice.[4]

The precise definition of value theory is debated and some theorists rely on
alternative characterizations. In a broad sense, value theory is a catch-all label
that encompasses all philosophical disciplines studying evaluative and normative
topics. According to this view, value theory is one of the main branches of
philosophy and includes ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political
philosophy, and philosophy of religion.[5] A similar broad characterization sees
value theory as a multidisciplinary area of inquiry that integrates research from
fields like sociology, anthropology, psychology, and economics alongside
philosophy.[6] In a narrow sense, value theory is a subdiscipline of ethics that is
particularly relevant to the school of consequentialism since it determines how to
assess the value of consequences.[7]

The word axiology has its origin in the ancient Greek terms ἄξιος (axios, meaning
'worthy' or 'of value') and λόγος (logos, meaning 'study' or 'theory of').[8] Even
though the roots of value theory reach back to the ancient period, this area of
thought was only conceived as a distinct discipline in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, when the term axiology was coined.[9] The terms value theory and
axiology are usually used as synonyms, but some philosophers distinguish between
them. According to one characterization, axiology is a subfield of value theory
that limits itself to theories about which things are valuable and how valuable
they are.[10][a] The term timology is an older and less common synonym.[12]
Value
Main article: Value (ethics)

Value is the worth, usefulness, or merit of something.[b] Value theorists examine

the expressions used to describe and compare values, called evaluative terms.[15]
They are further interested in the types or categories of values. The proposed
classifications overlap and are based on factors like the source, beneficiary, and
function of the value.[16]
Evaluative terms

Values are expressed through evaluative terms. For example, the words good, best,
great, and excellent convey positive values, whereas words like bad and terrible
indicate negative values.[15] Value theorists distinguish between thin and thick
evaluative terms. Thin evaluative terms, like good and bad, express pure
evaluations without any additional descriptive content.[c] They contrast with thick
evaluative terms, like courageous and cruel, which provide more information by
expressing other qualities, such as character traits, in addition to the
evaluation.[18] Values are often understood as degrees that cover positive and
negative magnitudes corresponding to good and bad. The term value is sometimes
restricted to positive degrees to contrast with the term disvalue for negative
degrees. The words better and worse are used to compare degrees, but it is
controversial whether a quantitative comparison is always possible.[19] Evaluation
is the assessment or measurement of value, often employed to compare the benefits
of different options to find the most advantageous choice.[20]

Evaluative terms are sometimes distinguished from normative or deontic terms.

Normative or deontic terms, like right, wrong, and obligation, prescribe actions or
other states by expressing what ought to be done or what is required.[21]
Evaluative terms have a wider scope because they are not limited to what people can
control or are responsible for. For instance, involuntary events like digestion and
earthquakes can have a positive or negative value even if they are not right or
wrong in a strict sense.[22] Despite the distinction, evaluative and normative
concepts are closely related. For example, the value of the consequences of an
action may influence its normative status—whether the action is right or wrong.[23]
Types
Intrinsic and instrumental
Main article: Instrumental and intrinsic value
Diagram with a box labelled "instrumental value" and an arrow pointing to a circle
labelled "intrinsic value"
An entity has intrinsic value if it is good in itself. An entity has instrumental
value if it leads to other good things.[24]
Diagram with several boxes and arrows labelled "chain of instrumental values", and
a circle labelled "intrinsic value"
Instrumental values can form chains with intrinsic values as their endpoints.[25]

A thing has intrinsic or final value if it is good in itself or good for its own
sake, independent of external factors or outcomes. A thing has extrinsic or
instrumental value if it is useful or leads to other good things, serving as a
means to bring about a desirable end. For example, tools like microwaves or money
have instrumental value due to the useful functions they perform.[24] In some
cases, the thing produced this way has itself instrumental value, like when using
money to buy a microwave. This can result in a chain of instrumentally valuable
things in which each link gets its value by causing the following link.
Intrinsically valuable things stand at the endpoint of these chains and ground the
value of all the preceding links.[25]

One suggestion to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental value, proposed by

G. E. Moore, relies on a thought experiment that imagines the valuable thing in
isolation from everything else. In such a situation, purely instrumentally valuable
things lose their value since they serve no purpose while purely intrinsically
valuable things remain valuable.[26][d] According to a common view, pleasure is one
of the sources of intrinsic value. Other suggested sources include desire
satisfaction, virtue, life, health, beauty, freedom, and knowledge.[28]
Diagram with a circle inside a box labelled "intrinsic and instrumental value", an
arrow, and another circle labelled "intrinsic value"
A thing can have both intrinsic and instrumental value if it is good in itself and
leads to other good things.[29]
Diagram with a box labelled "instrumental value", two arrows, and two circles
labelled "positive intrinsic value" and "negative intrinsic value"
A thing can have both positive and negative consequences. Its total instrumental
value is the value balance of all its consequences.[30]

Intrinsic and instrumental value are not exclusive categories. As a result, a thing
can have both intrinsic and instrumental value if it is both good in itself while
also leading to other good things.[29] In a similar sense, a thing can have
different instrumental values at the same time, both positive and negative ones.
This is the case if some of its consequences are good while others are bad. The
total instrumental value of a thing is the value balance of all its consequences.
[30]

Because instrumental value depends on other values, it is an open question whether

it should be understood as a value in a strict sense. For example, the overall
value of a chain of causes leading to an intrinsically valuable thing remains the
same if instrumentally valuable links are added or removed without affecting the
intrinsically valuable thing. The observation that the overall value does not
change is sometimes used as an argument that the things added or removed do not
have value.[31]

Traditionally, value theorists have used the terms intrinsic value and final value
interchangeably, just like the terms extrinsic value and instrumental value. This
practice has been questioned in the 20th century based on the idea that they are
similar but not identical concepts. According to this view, a thing has intrinsic
value if the source of its value is an intrinsic property, meaning that the value
does not depend on how the thing is related to other objects. Extrinsic value, by
contrast, depends on external relations. This view sees instrumental value as one
type of extrinsic value based on external causal relations. At the same time, it
allows that there are other types of non-instrumental extrinsic value that result
from external non-causal relations. Final value is understood as what is valued for
its own sake, independent of whether intrinsic or extrinsic properties are
responsible.[32][e]
Absolute and relative

Another distinction relies on the contrast between absolute and relative value.
Absolute value, also called value simpliciter, is a form of unconditional value. A
thing has relative value if its value is relative to other things or limited to
certain considerations or viewpoints.[34]

One form of relative value is restricted to the type of an entity, expressed in

sentences like "That is a good knife" or "Jack is a good thief". This form is known
as attributive goodness since the word "good" modifies the meaning of another term.
To be attributively good as a certain type means to possess qualities
characteristic of that type. For instance, a good knife is sharp and a good thief
has the skill of stealing without getting caught. Attributive goodness contrasts
with predicative goodness. The sentence "Pleasure is good" is an example since the
word good is used as a predicate to talk about the unqualified value of pleasure.
[35] Attributive and predicative goodness can accompany each other, but this is not
always the case. For instance, being a good thief is not necessarily a good thing.
[36]

Another type of relative value restricts goodness to a specific person. Known as

personal value,[f] it expresses what benefits a particular person, promotes their
welfare, or is in their interest. For example, a poem written by a child may have
personal value for the parents even if the poem lacks value for others. Impersonal
value, by contrast, is good in general without restriction to any specific person
or viewpoint.[38] Some philosophers, like Moore, reject the existence of personal
values, holding that all values are impersonal. Others have proposed theories about
the relation between personal and impersonal value. The agglomerative theory says
that impersonal value is nothing but the sum of all personal values. Another view
understands impersonal value as a specific type of personal value taken from the
perspective of the universe as a whole.[39]

Agent-relative value is sometimes contrasted with personal value as another person-

specific limitation of the evaluative outlook. Agent-relative values affect moral
considerations about what a person is responsible for or guilty of. For example, if
Mei promises to pick Pedro up from the airport then an agent-relative value
obligates Mei to drive to the airport. This obligation is in place even if it does
not benefit Mei, in which case there is an agent-relative value without a personal
value. In consequentialism,[g] agent-relative values are often discussed in
relation to ethical dilemmas. One dilemma revolves around the question of whether
an individual should murder an innocent person if this prevents the murder of two
innocent people by a different perpetrator. The agent-neutral perspective tends to
affirm this idea since one murder is preferable to two. The agent-relative
perspective tends to reject this conclusion, arguing that the initial murder should
be avoided since it negatively impacts the agent-relative value of the individual
committing it.[41]

Traditionally, most value theorists see absolute value as the main topic of value
theory and focus their attention on this type. Nonetheless, some philosophers, like
Peter Geach and Philippa Foot, have argued that the concept of absolute value by
itself is meaningless and should be understood as one form of relative value.[42]
Other distinctions

Other categorizations of values have been proposed following diverse classification

principles without a single approach widely accepted by all theorists.[43] Some
focus on the types of entities that have value. They include distinct categories
for entities like individuals, groups, society, the environment, and inert things.
Another subdivision pays attention to the type of benefit involved and encompasses
material, economic, moral, social, political, aesthetic, and religious values.
Classifications by the beneficiary of the value distinguish between self- and
other-oriented values.[44]

A historically influential approach identifies three spheres of value: truth,

goodness, and beauty.[h] For example, the neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm
Windelband characterizes them as the highest goals of consciousness, with thought
aiming at truth, will aiming at goodness, and emotion aiming at beauty. A similar
view, proposed by the Chinese philosopher Zhang Dainian, says that the value of
truth belongs to knowledge, the value of goodness belongs to behavior, and the
value of beauty belongs to art.[46] This three-fold distinction also plays a
central role in the philosophies of Franz Brentano and Jürgen Habermas.[47] Other
suggested types of values include objective, subjective, potential, actual,
contingent, necessary, inherent, and constitutive values.[48]
Schools of thought
Realism and anti-realism

Value realism is the view that values have mind-independent existence.[49][i] This
means that objective facts determine what has value, irrespective of subjective
beliefs and preferences.[50] According to this view, the evaluative statement "That
act is bad" is as objectively true or false as the empirical statement "That act
causes distress".[51]

Realists often analyze values as properties of valuable things.[52] For example,

stating that kindness is good asserts that kindness possesses the property of
goodness. Value realists disagree about what type of property is involved.
Naturalists say that value is a natural property. Natural properties, like size and
shape, can be known through empirical observation and are studied by the natural
sciences. Non-naturalists reject this view but agree that values are real. They say
that values differ significantly from empirical properties and belong to another
domain of reality. According to one view, they are known through rational or
emotional intuition rather than empirical observation.[53]

Another disagreement among realists is about whether the entity carrying the value
is a concrete individual or a state of affairs.[54] For instance, the name "Bill"
refers to an individual while the sentence "Bill is pleased" refers to a state of
affairs, which combines the individual "Bill" with the property "pleased". Some
value theorists hold that the value is a property directly of Bill while others
contend that it is a property of the state of affairs that Bill is pleased.[55]
This distinction affects various disputes in value theory. In some cases, a value
is intrinsic according to one view and extrinsic according to the other.[56]

Value realism contrasts with anti-realism, which comes in various forms. In its
strongest version, anti-realism rejects the existence of values in any form,
claiming that value statements are meaningless.[57][j] There are various
intermediate views between this position and realism. Some anti-realists accept
that value claims have meaning but deny that they have a truth value,[k] a position
known as non-cognitivism. For example, emotivists say that value claims express
emotional attitudes, similar to how exclamations like "Yay!" or "Boo!" express
emotions rather than stating facts.[60][l]

Cognitivists contend that value statements have a truth value, meaning that
sentences like "knowledge is intrinsically good" are either true or false.
Following this view, error theorists defend anti-realism by stating that all value
statements are false because there are no values.[62] Another view accepts the
existence of values but denies that they are mind-independent. According to this
view, the mental states of individuals determine whether an object has value, for
instance, because individuals desire it.[63] A similar view is defended by
existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued that values are human creations
that endow the world with meaning.[64] Subjectivist theories say that values are
relative to each subject, whereas more objectivist outlooks hold that values depend
on mind in general rather than on the individual mind.[65]

A different position accepts that values are mind-independent but holds that they
are reducible to other facts, meaning that they are not a fundamental part of
reality. One form of reductionism maintains that a thing is good if it is fitting
to favor this thing, regardless of whether people actually favor it, a position
known as the fitting-attitude theory of value. The buck-passing account, a closely
related reductive view, argues that a thing is valuable if people have reasons to
treat the thing in certain ways. These reasons come from other features of the
valuable thing. According to some views, reductionism is a form of realism, but the
strongest form of realism says that value is a fundamental part of reality and
cannot be reduced to other aspects.[66]
Sources of value

Various theories about the sources of value have been proposed. They aim to clarify
what kinds of things are intrinsically good.[67] The historically influential
theory of hedonism[m] states that how people feel is the only source of value. More
specifically, it says that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain is the only
intrinsic evil.[69] According to this view, everything else only has instrumental
value to the extent that it leads to pleasure or pain, including knowledge, health,
and justice. Hedonists usually understand the term pleasure in a broad sense that
covers all kinds of enjoyable experiences, including bodily pleasures of food and
sex as well as more intellectual or abstract pleasures, like the joy of reading a
book or happiness about a friend's promotion. Pleasurable experiences come in
degrees, and hedonists usually associate their intensity and duration with the
magnitude of value they have.[70][n]

Many hedonists identify pleasure and pain as symmetric opposites, meaning that the
value of pleasure balances out the disvalue of pain if they have the same
intensity. However, some hedonists reject this symmetry and give more weight to
avoiding pain than to experiencing pleasure.[72] Although it is widely accepted
that pleasure is valuable, the hedonist claim that it is the only source of value
is controversial.[73] Welfarism, a closely related theory, understands well-being
as the only source of value. Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person,
which can include other aspects besides pleasure, such as health, personal growth,
meaningful relationships, and a sense of purpose in life.[74]

Desire theories offer a slightly different account, stating that desire

satisfaction[o] is the only source of value.[p] This theory overlaps with hedonism
because many people desire pleasure and because desire satisfaction is often
accompanied by pleasure. Nonetheless, there are important differences: people
desire a variety of other things as well, like knowledge, achievement, and respect;
additionally, desire satisfaction may not always result in pleasure.[77] Some
desire theorists hold that value is a property of desire satisfaction itself, while
others say that it is a property of the objects that satisfy a desire.[78] One
debate in desire theory concerns whether every desire is a source of value. For
example, if a person has a false belief that money makes them happy, it is
questionable whether the satisfaction of their desire for money is a source of
value. To address this consideration, some desire theorists say that a desire can
only provide value if a fully informed and rational person would have it, thereby
excluding misguided desires from being a source of value.[79]

Perfectionism identifies the realization of human nature and the cultivation of

characteristic human abilities as the source of intrinsic goodness. It covers
capacities and character traits belonging to the bodily, emotional, volitional,
cognitive, social, artistic, and religious fields. Perfectionists disagree about
which human excellences are the most important. Many are pluralistic in recognizing
a diverse array of human excellences, such as knowledge, creativity, health,
beauty, free agency, and moral virtues like benevolence and courage.[80] According
to one suggestion, there are two main fields of human goods: theoretical abilities
responsible for understanding the world and practical abilities responsible for
interacting with it.[81] Some perfectionists provide an ideal characterization of
human nature as the goal of human flourishing, holding that human excellences are
those aspects that promote the realization of this goal. This view is exemplified
in Aristotle's focus on rationality as the nature and ideal state of human beings.
[82] Non-humanistic versions extend perfectionism to the natural world in general,
arguing that excellence as a source of intrinsic value is not limited to the human
realm.[83]
Monism and pluralism

Monist theories of value assert that there is only a single source of intrinsic
value. They agree that various things have value but maintain that all
fundamentally good things belong to the same type. For example, hedonists hold that
nothing but pleasure has intrinsic value, while desire theorists argue that desire
satisfaction is the only source of fundamental goodness. Pluralists reject this
view, contending that a simple single-value system is too crude to capture the
complexity of the sphere of values. They say that diverse sources of value exist
independently of one another, each contributing to the overall value of the world.
[84]

One motivation for value pluralism is the observation that people value diverse
types of things, including happiness, friendship, success, and knowledge.[85] This
diversity becomes particularly prominent when people face difficult decisions
between competing values, such as choosing between friendship and career success.
[86] In such cases, value pluralists can argue that the different items have
different types of values. Since monists accept only one source of intrinsic value,
they may provide a different explanation by proposing that some of the valuable
items only have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.[87]
Black-and-white photo of a man with glasses wearing a suit and a bow tie
Isaiah Berlin argued that conflicts between different types of values, like liberty
and equality, cannot always be resolved.[88]

Pluralists have proposed various accounts of how their view affects practical
decisions. Rational decisions often rely on value comparisons to determine which
course of action should be pursued.[89] Some pluralists discuss a hierarchy of
values reflecting the relative importance and weight of different value types to
help people promote higher values when faced with difficult choices.[90] For
example, philosopher Max Scheler ranks values based on how enduring and fulfilling
they are into the levels of pleasure, utility, vitality, culture, and holiness. He
asserts that people should not promote lower values, like pleasure, if this comes
at the expense of higher values.[91][q]

Radical pluralists reject this approach, putting more emphasis on diversity by

holding that different types of values are not comparable with each other. This
means that each value type is unique, making it impossible to determine which one
is superior.[93][r] Some value theorists use radical pluralism to argue that value
conflicts are inevitable, that the gain of one value cannot always compensate for
the loss of another, and that some ethical dilemmas are irresolvable.[95] For
example, philosopher Isaiah Berlin applied this idea to the values of liberty and
equality, arguing that a gain in one cannot make up for a loss in the other.
Similarly, philosopher Joseph Raz said that it is often impossible to compare the
values of career paths, like when choosing between becoming a lawyer or a
clarinetist.[96] The terms incomparability and incommensurability are often used as
synonyms in this context. However, philosophers like Ruth Chang distinguish them.
According to this view, incommensurability means that there is no common measure to
quantify values of different types. Incommensurable values may or may not be
comparable. If they are, it is possible to say that one value is better than
another, but it is not possible to quantify how much better it is.[97]
Others

Several controversies surround the question of how the intrinsic value of a whole
is determined by the intrinsic values of its parts. According to the additivity
principle, the intrinsic value of a whole is simply the sum of the intrinsic values
of its parts. For example, if a virtuous person becomes happy then the intrinsic
value of the happiness is simply added to the intrinsic value of the virtue,
thereby increasing the overall value.[98]
Black-and-white photo of man wearing a suit with a pipe in his mouth
G. E. Moore introduced the idea of organic unities to describe entities whose total
intrinsic value is not the sum of the intrinsic values of their parts.[99]

Various counterexamples to the additivity principle have been proposed, suggesting

that the relation between parts and wholes is more complex. For instance, Immanuel
Kant argued that if a vicious person becomes happy, this happiness, though good in
itself, does not increase the overall value. On the contrary, it makes things
worse, according to Kant, since viciousness should not be rewarded with happiness.
This situation is known as an organic unity—a whole whose intrinsic value differs
from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts.[100] Another perspective, called
holism about value, asserts that the intrinsic value of a thing depends on its
context. Holists can argue that happiness has positive intrinsic value in the
context of virtue and negative intrinsic value in the context of vice. Atomists
reject this view, saying that intrinsic value is context-independent.[101]

Theories of value aggregation provide concrete principles for calculating the

overall value of an outcome based on how positively or negatively each individual
is affected by it. For example, if a government implements a new policy that
affects some people positively and others negatively, theories of value aggregation
can be used to determine whether the overall value of the policy is positive or
negative. Axiological utilitarianism accepts the additivity principle, saying that
the total value is simply the sum of all individual values.[102] Axiological
egalitarians are not only interested in the sum total of value but also in how the
values are distributed. They argue that an outcome with a balanced advantage
distribution is better than an outcome where some benefit a lot while others
benefit little, even if the two outcomes have the same sum total.[103] Axiological
prioritarians are particularly concerned with the benefits of individuals who are
worse off. They say that providing advantages to people in need has more value than
providing the same advantages to others.[103]

Another debate addresses the meaning of life, investigating whether life or

existence as a whole has a higher meaning or purpose.[104] Naturalist views argue
that the meaning of life is found within the physical world, either as objective
values that are true for everyone or as subjective values that vary according to
individual preferences. Suggested fields where humans find meaning include
exercising freedom, committing oneself to a cause, practicing altruism, engaging in
positive social relationships, or pursuing personal happiness.[105]
Supernaturalists, by contrast, propose that meaning lies beyond the natural world.
For example, various religions teach that God created the world for a higher
purpose, imbuing existence with meaning. A related outlook argues that immortal
souls serve as sources of meaning by being connected to a transcendent reality and
evolving spiritually.[106] Existential nihilists reject both naturalist and
supernaturalist explanations by asserting that there is no higher purpose. They
suggest that life is meaningless, with the consequence that there is no higher
reason to continue living and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and
suffering are ultimately pointless.[107]

Formal axiology is a theory of value initially developed by philosopher Robert S.

Hartman. This approach treats axiology as a formal science, akin to logic and
mathematics. It uses axioms to give an abstract definition of value, understanding
it not as a property of things but as a property of concepts. Value measures the
extent to which an entity fulfills its concept. For example, a good car has all the
desirable qualities of cars, like a reliable engine and effective brakes, whereas a
bad car lacks many. Formal axiology distinguishes between three fundamental value
types: intrinsic values apply to people; extrinsic values apply to things, actions,
and social roles; systemic values apply to conceptual constructs. Formal axiology
examines how these value types form a hierarchy and how they can be measured.[108]
Methods

Value theorists employ various methods to conduct their inquiries, justify

theories, and measure values. Intuitionists rely on intuitions to assess evaluative
claims. In this context, an intuition is an immediate apprehension or understanding
of a self-evident claim, meaning that its truth can be assessed without inferring
it from another observation.[109] Value theorists often rely on thought experiments
to gain this type of understanding. Thought experiments are imagined scenarios that
exemplify philosophical problems. Philosophers use counterfactual reasoning to
evaluate possible consequences and gain insight into underlying problems.[110] For
example, philosopher Robert Nozick imagines an experience machine that can
virtually simulate an ideal life. Based on his contention that people would not
want to spend the rest of their lives in this pleasurable simulation, Nozick argues
against the hedonist claim that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value.
According to him, the thought experiment shows that the value of an authentic
connection to reality is not reducible to pleasure.[111][s]

Phenomenologists provide a detailed first-person description of the experience of

values. They closely examine emotional experiences, ranging from desire, interest,
and preference to feelings in the form of love and hate. However, they do not limit
their inquiry to these phenomena, asserting that values permeate experience at
large.[112] A key aspect of the phenomenological method is to suspend preconceived
ideas and judgments to understand the essence of experiences as they present
themselves to consciousness.[113]

The analysis of concepts and ordinary language is another method of inquiry. By

examining terms and sentences used to talk about values, value theorists aim to
clarify their meanings, uncover crucial distinctions, and formulate arguments for
and against axiological theories.[114] For instance, a prominent dispute between
naturalists and non-naturalists hinges on the conceptual analysis of the term good,
in particular, whether its meaning can be analyzed through natural terms, like
pleasure.[115][t]
Circular diagram showing the relations between different types of values,
represented by segments
The Schwartz theory of basic human values is an instrument to measure value
priorities. It arranges different values in a circle, using angular distance
between values to indicate how compatible they are.[116]

In the social sciences, value theorists face the challenge of measuring the
evaluative outlook of individuals and groups. Specifically, they aim to determine
personal value hierarchies, for example, whether a person gives more weight to
truth than to moral goodness or beauty.[117] They distinguish between direct and
indirect measurement methods. Direct methods involve asking people straightforward
questions about what things they value and which value priorities they have. This
approach assumes that people are aware of their evaluative outlook and able to
articulate it accurately. Indirect methods do not share this assumption, asserting
instead that values guide behavior and choices on an unconscious level.
Consequently, they observe how people decide and act, seeking to infer the
underlying value attitudes responsible for picking one course of action rather than
another.[118]
Various catalogs or scales of values have been proposed in psychology and related
social sciences to measure value priorities. The Rokeach Value Survey considers a
total of 36 values divided into two groups: instrumental values, like honesty and
capability, which serve as means to promote terminal values, such as freedom and
family security. It asks participants to rank the values based on their impact on
the participants' lives, aiming to understand the relative importance assigned to
each of them. The Schwartz theory of basic human values is a modification of the
Rokeach Value Survey that seeks to provide a more cross-cultural and universal
assessment. It arranges the values in a circular manner to reflect that neighboring
values are compatible with each other, such as openness to change and self-
enhancement, while values on opposing sides may conflict with each other, such as
openness to change and conservation.[119]
In various fields
Ethics
Main article: Ethics

Ethics and value theory are overlapping fields of inquiry. Ethics studies moral
phenomena, focusing on how people should act or which behaviors are morally right.
[120] Value theory investigates the nature, sources, and types of values in
general.[2] Some philosophers understand value theory as a subdiscipline of ethics.
This is based on the idea that what people should do is affected by value
considerations but not necessarily limited to them.[7] Another view sees ethics as
a subdiscipline of value theory. This outlook follows the idea that ethics is
concerned with moral values affecting what people can control, whereas value theory
examines a broader range of values, including those beyond anyone's control.[121]
Some perspectives contrast ethics and value theory, asserting that the normative
concepts examined by ethics are distinct from the evaluative concepts examined by
value theory.[23] Axiological ethics is a subfield of ethics examining the nature
and role of values from a moral perspective, with particular interest in
determining which ends are worth pursuing.[122]

The ethical theory of consequentialism combines the perspectives of ethics and

value theory, asserting that the rightness of an action depends on the value of its
consequences. Consequentialists compare possible courses of action, saying that
people should follow the one leading to the best overall consequences.[123] The
overall consequences of an action are the totality of its effects, or how it
impacts the world by starting a causal chain of events that would not have occurred
otherwise.[124] Distinct versions of consequentialism rely on different theories of
the sources of value. Classical utilitarianism, a prominent form of
consequentialism, says that moral actions produce the greatest amount of pleasure
for the greatest number of people. It combines a consequentialist outlook on right
action with a hedonist outlook on pleasure as the only source of intrinsic value.
[125]
Economics
Main article: Economics

Economics is a social science studying how goods and services are produced,
distributed, and consumed, both from the perspective of individual agents and
societal systems.[126] Economists view evaluations as a driving force underlying
economic activity. They use the notion of economic value and related evaluative
concepts to understand decision-making processes, resource allocation, and the
impact of policies. The economic value or benefit of a commodity is the advantage
it provides to an economic agent, often measured in terms of what people are
willing to pay for it.[127]

Economic theories of value are frameworks to explain how economic value arises and
which factors influence it. Prominent frameworks include the classical labor theory
of value and the neo-classical marginal theory of value.[128] The labor theory,
initially developed by the economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, distinguishes
between use value—the utility or satisfaction a commodity provides—and exchange
value—the proportion at which one commodity can be exchanged with another.[129] It
focuses on exchange value, which it says is determined by the amount of labor
required to produce the commodity. In its simplest form, it directly correlates
exchange value to labor time. For example, if the time needed to hunt a deer is
twice the time needed to hunt a beaver then one deer is worth two beavers.[130] The
philosopher Karl Marx extended the labor theory of value in various ways. He
introduced the concept of surplus value, which goes beyond the time and resources
invested to explain how capitalists can profit from the labor of their employees.
[131]

The marginal theory of value focuses on consumption rather than production. It says
that the utility of a commodity is the source of its value. Specifically, it is
interested in marginal utility, the additional satisfaction gained from consuming
one more unit of the commodity. Marginal utility often diminishes if many units
have already been consumed, leading to a decrease in the exchange value of
commodities that are abundantly available.[132] Both the labor theory and the
marginal theory were later challenged by the Sraffian theory of value, which
considers diverse forms of production costs, including but not limited to the
quantity of labor.[133]
Sociology
Main article: Sociology

Sociology studies social behavior, relationships, institutions, and society at

large.[134] In their analyses and explanations of these phenomena, some
sociologists use the concept of values to understand issues like social cohesion
and conflict, the norms and practices people follow, and collective action. They
usually understand values as subjective attitudes possessed by individuals and
shared in social groups. According to this view, values are beliefs or priorities
about goals worth pursuing that guide people to act in certain ways. For example,
societies that value education may invest substantial resources to ensure high-
quality schooling. This subjective conception of values as aspects of individuals
and social groups contrasts with the objective conceptions of values more prominent
in economics, which understand values as aspects of commodities.[135]

Shared values can help unite people in the pursuit of a common cause, fostering
social cohesion. Value differences, by contrast, may divide people into
antagonistic groups that promote conflicting projects. Some sociologists employ
value research to predict how people will behave. Given the observation that
someone values the environment, they may conclude that this person is more likely
to recycle or support pro-environmental legislation.[136] One approach to this type
of research uses value scales, such as the Rokeach Value Survey and the Schwartz
theory of basic human values, to measure the value outlook of individuals and
groups.[137]
Anthropology
Main article: Anthropology

Anthropology also studies human behavior and societies but does not limit itself to
contemporary social structures, extending its focus to humanity both past and
present.[138] Similar to sociologists, many anthropologists understand values as
social representations of goals worth pursuing. For them, values are embedded in
mental structures associated with culture and ideology about what is desirable. A
slightly different approach in anthropology focuses on the practical side of
values, holding that values are constantly created through human activity.[139]

Anthropological value theorists use values to compare cultures.[140] They can be

employed to examine similarities as universal concerns present in every society.
For example, anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn and sociologist Fred Strodtbeck
proposed a set of value orientations found in every culture. These orientations are
centered on the topics of human nature, human activity, social organization,
relation to nature, and a focus on past, present, or future.[141] Values can also
be used to analyze differences between cultures and value changes within a culture.
Anthropologist Louis Dumont followed this idea, suggesting that the cultural
meaning systems in distinct societies differ in their value priorities. He argued
that values are ordered hierarchically around a set of paramount values that trump
all other values. For example, Dumont analyzed the traditional Indian caste system
as a cultural hierarchy based on the value of purity, extending from the pure
Brahmins to the "untouchable" Dalits.[142]

The contrast between individualism and collectivism is an influential topic in

cross-cultural value research. Individualism promotes values associated with the
autonomy of individuals, such as self-directedness, independence, and the
fulfillment of personal goals. Collectivism gives priority to group-related values,
like cooperation, conformity, and foregoing personal advantages for the sake of
collective benefits. As a rough simplification, it is often suggested that
individualism is more prominent in Western cultures, whereas collectivism is more
commonly observed in Eastern cultures.[143]
Psychology
Main article: Psychology

As the study of mental phenomena and behavior, psychology contrasts with sociology
and anthropology by focusing more on the perspective of individuals than the
broader social and cultural contexts.[144] Psychologists tend to understand values
as abstract motivational goals or general principles about what matters.[145] From
this perspective, values differ from specific plans and intentions since they are
stable evaluative tendencies not bound to concrete situations.[146]

Various psychological theories of values establish a close link between an

individual's evaluative outlook and their personality.[147] An early theory,
formulated by psychologists Philip E. Vernon and Gordon Allport, understands
personality as a collection of aspects unified by a coherent value system. It
distinguishes between six personality types corresponding to the value spheres of
theory, economy, aesthetics, society, politics, and religion. For example, people
with theoretical personalities place special importance on the value of knowledge
and the discovery of truth.[148] Influenced by Vernon and Allport, psychologist
Milton Rokeach conceptualized values as enduring beliefs about what goals and
conduct are preferable. He divided values into the categories of instrumental and
terminal values. He thought that a central aspect of personality lies in how people
prioritize the values within each category.[149] Psychologist Shalom Schwartz
refined this approach by linking values to emotion and motivation. He explored how
value rankings affect decisions in which the values of different options conflict.
[150]
History

The origin of value theory lies in the ancient period, with early reflections on
the good life and the ends worth pursuing.[151] Socrates (c. 469–399 BCE)[152]
identified the highest good as the right combination of knowledge, pleasure, and
virtue, holding that active inquiry is associated with pleasure while knowledge of
the Good leads to virtuous action.[153] Plato (c. 428–347 BCE)[154] conceived the
Good as a universal and changeless idea. It is the highest form in his theory of
forms, acting as the source of all other forms and the foundation of reality and
knowledge.[155] Aristotle (384–322 BCE)[156] saw eudaimonia as the highest good and
ultimate goal of human life. He understood eudaimonia as a form of happiness or
flourishing achieved through the exercise of virtues in accordance with reason,
leading to the full realization of human potential.[157] Epicurus (c. 341–271 BCE)
proposed a nuanced egoistic hedonism, stating that personal pleasure is the
greatest good while recommending moderation to avoid the negative effects of
excessive desires and anxiety about the future.[158] According to the Stoics, a
virtuous life following nature and reason is the highest good. They thought that
self-mastery and rationality lead to a pleasant equanimity independent of external
circumstances.[159] Influenced by Plato, Plotinus (c. 204/5–270 CE) held that the
Good is the ultimate principle of reality from which everything emanates. For him,
evil is not a distinct opposing principle but merely a deficiency or absence of
being resulting from a missing connection to the Good.[160]
Painting of a man with a long beard and mustache wearing traditional Chinese
scholarly robes
Confucius viewed general benevolence towards humanity as the supreme virtue.[161]

In ancient Indian philosophy, the idea that people are trapped in a cycle of
rebirths arose around 600 BCE.[162] Many traditions adopted it, arguing that
liberation from this cycle is the highest good.[163] Hindu philosophy distinguishes
the four fundamental values of duty, economic wealth, sensory pleasure, and
liberation.[164] Many Hindu schools of thought prioritize the value of liberation.
[165] A similar outlook is found in ancient Buddhist philosophy, starting between
the sixth and the fifth centuries BCE, where the cessation of suffering through the
attainment of Nirvana is considered the ultimate goal.[166] In ancient China,
Confucius (c. 551–479 BCE)[167] explored the role of self-cultivation in leading a
virtuous life, viewing general benevolence towards humanity as the supreme virtue.
[161] In comparing the highest virtue to water, Laozi (6th century BCE)[u]
emphasized the importance of living in harmony with the natural order of the
universe.[169]

Religious teachings influenced value theory in the medieval period. Early Christian
thinkers, such as Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE),[170] adapted the theories of
Plato and Plotinus into a religious framework. They identified God as the ultimate
source of existence and goodness, seeing evil as a mere lack or privation of good.
[171] Drawing on Aristotelianism, Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274
CE)[172] said that communion with the divine, achieved through a beatific vision of
God, is the highest end of humans.[173] In Arabic–Persian philosophy, Avicenna
(980–1037 CE)[174] regarded the intellect as the highest human faculty. He thought
that a contemplative life prepares humans for the greatest good, which is only
attained in the afterlife when humans are free from bodily distractions.[175] In
Chinese thought, the early neo-Confucian philosopher Han Yu (768–824 CE) identified
the sage as an ideal role model who, through self-cultivation, achieves personal
integrity expressed in harmony between theory and action in daily life.[176]

In the early modern period, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)[177] understood values as

subjective phenomena that depend on a person's interests and examined mutual
interests and benefits as a key principle of political decisions.[178] David Hume
(1711–1776)[179] agreed with Hobbes's subjectivism, exploring how values differ
from objective facts.[180] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)[181] asserted that the highest
good is happiness in proportion to moral virtue. He emphasized the primacy of
virtue by respecting the moral law and the inherent value of people, adding that
moral virtue is ideally, but not always, accompanied by personal happiness.[182]
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)[183] and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)[184] formulated
classical utilitarianism, combining a hedonist theory about value with a
consequentialist theory about right action.[185] Hermann Lotze (1817–1881)[186]
developed a philosophy of values, holding that values make the world meaningful as
an ordered whole centered around goodness.[187] Influenced by Lotze, the neo-
Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915)[188] understood philosophy as a
theory of values, claiming that universal values determine the principles that all
subjects should follow, including the norms of knowledge and action.[189] Friedrich
Nietzsche (1844–1900)[190] held that values are human creations. He criticized
traditional values in general and Christian values in particular, calling for a
revaluation of all values centered on life-affirmation, power, and excellence.[191]
Black-and-white photo of a man with combed hair wearing a knit sweater over a dark
shirt
G. H. von Wright analyzed and compared diverse types of goodness.[192]

In the early 20th century, Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952)[193]

defended axiological naturalism. He distinguished values from value judgments,
adding that the skill of correct value assessment must be learned through
experience.[194][v] G. E. Moore (1873–1958)[196] developed and refined various
axiological concepts, such as organic unity and the contrast between intrinsic and
extrinsic value. He defended non-naturalism about the nature of values and
intuitionism about the knowledge of values.[197] W. D. Ross (1877–1971)[198]
accepted and further elaborated on Moore's intuitionism, using it to formulate an
axiological pluralism.[199][w] R. B. Perry (1876–1957)[201] and D. W. Prall (1886–
1940)[202] articulated systematic theories of value based on the idea that values
originate in affective states such as interest and liking.[203] Robert S. Hartman
(1910–1973)[204] developed formal axiology, saying that values measure the level to
which a thing embodies its ideal concept.[205] A. J. Ayer (1910–1989)[206] proposed
anti-realism about values, arguing that value statements merely express the
speaker's approval or disapproval.[207] A different type of anti-realism,
introduced by J. L. Mackie (1917–1981),[208] suggests that all value assertions are
false since no values exist.[209] G. H. von Wright (1916–2003)[210] provided a
conceptual analysis of the term good by distinguishing different meanings or
varieties of goodness, such as the technical goodness of a good driver and the
hedonic goodness of a good meal.[211]

In continental philosophy, Franz Brentano (1838–1917)[212] formulated an early

version of the fitting-attitude theory of value, saying that a thing is good if it
is fitting to have a positive attitude towards it, such as love.[213] In the 1890s,
his students Alexius Meinong (1853–1920)[214] and Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–
1932)[215] conceived the idea of a general theory of values.[216] Edmund Husserl
(1859–1938),[214] another of Brentano's students, developed phenomenology and
applied this approach to the study of values.[217] Following Husserl's approach,
Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) each proposed a
comprehensive system of axiological ethics.[218] Asserting that values have
objective reality, they explored how different value types form a hierarchy and
examined the problems of value conflicts and right decisions from this hierarchical
perspective.[219] Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)[220] criticized value theory,
claiming that it rests on a mistaken metaphysical perspective by understanding
values as aspects of things.[221] Existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre
(1905–1980)[222] suggested that values do not exist by themselves but are actively
created, emphasizing the role of human freedom, responsibility, and authenticity in
the process.[223]
References
Notes

Another view sees axiology as the wider field and restricts value theory to
questions concerning the nature of value.[11]
The term value has other meanings as well, such as the value of a mathematical
variable expressing the information or quantity that this variable carries.[13]
Value theory is only interested in the evaluative sense of the term about being
good or bad in a certain respect.[14]
Some philosophers, such as G. E. M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch, have
argued that there are no pure thin evaluative terms.[17]
Critics of this thought experiment argue that it depends on controversial
assumptions about the nature of intrinsic value and is not applicable to all cases.
[27]
In the social sciences, some works rely on the concept of relational value to
understand the value of the relationship between humans and nature. According to
this view, relational value is a unique type of value that is neither intrinsic nor
instrumental.[33]
Prudential value is a closely related concept signifying what is good for a person.
[37]
Consequentialism is a theory in normative ethics. It says that whether an act is
right depends on its consequences.[40]
In scholastic philosophy, they are known as transcendentals and considered
fundamental aspects of being.[45]
If this position limits itself to the moral realm, it is known as moral realism, an
influential position in ethics.[49]
This view is sometimes called radical nihilism.[58]
This means that value statements are neither true nor false.[59]
Projectivism is a closely related view holding that values are projections of
emotions onto the world.[61]
This view is sometimes called axiological hedonism to distinguish it from related
theories under this label.[68]
Qualitative hedonists argue that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor
influencing its value besides intensity and duration. Some distinguish higher
pleasures of the mind, like enjoying fine art and philosophy, from lower pleasures
of the body, like enjoying food and drink.[71]
Some theorists use the terms desire satisfaction and desire fulfillment as synonyms
while others distinguish between them. According to the latter view, desire
satisfaction is a subjective state involving a possibly false belief that a desire
is satisfied. Desire fulfillment is an objective state present if the desired
outcome actually exists, even if the person does not know about it.[75]
Some desire theories aim to explain goodness in general while others restrict
themselves to goodness for a person.[76]
In some places, Scheler talks about four levels instead of five: sensory, vital,
spiritual, and holy.[92]
More specifically, this implies that one value is not better than the other, not
worse than the other, and not as good as the other.[94]
Moore's isolation test is another influential thought experiment about intrinsic
value.[26]
This problem is the main topic of Moore's controversial open-question argument.
[115]
This period is given in traditional sources. Some contemporary scholars have
suggested later dates or questioned whether there was a single person by that name.
[168]
Clarence Irving Lewis (1883–1964) accepted and further elaborated many of Dewey's
insights.[195]

Ross is primarily known for his deontological pluralism about different types
of prima facie duties, which is related but not identical to his axiological
pluralism about different types of values.[200]

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Oddie 2001, pp. 313, 318

Dancy 2004, pp. 176–177

Orsi 2015, pp. 98–100

Schroeder 2021a
Dancy 2004, pp. 176–177

Holtug 2015, pp. 267–268

Peterson 2013, p. 147
Hirose 2015, pp. 25–27

Holtug 2015, p. 273

Peterson 2013, p. 147
Hirose 2015, pp. 25–27

Metz 2023, Lead section

Cowan 2020, pp. 25–26
Groothuis 2020, pp. 160–162

Metz 2023, § 3. Naturalism

Cowan 2020, pp. 25–26
Yalom 2020, pp. 431–435

Metz 2023, § 2. Supernaturalism

Groothuis 2020, pp. 162–164
Seachris, § 3. Theories of Meaning in Life

Metz 2023, 4. Nihilism

Pratt, § 3. Existential Nihilism
Crosby 1998, § Existential Nihilism
Groothuis 2020, pp. 165–169
Crosby 1988, pp. 30–32

Edwards 2021, pp. 2–4

Hartman 2011, pp. 104–105, 305–306

Stratton-Lake 2020, § 1.1 Intuition

Audi 2004, pp. 2, 5
Martin 2002, p. 166
Li 2014, pp. 4–5
Dabbagh 2022, p. 53
 Martin 2002, p. 166
Zaibert 2018, pp. 37–38
Brown & Fehige 2019, Lead Section
Goffi & Roux 2011, pp. 165, 168–169

Heathwood 2015, pp. 146–147

Tiberius 2015, pp. 163–164

Davis & Steinbock 2024, § 3. Value Personalism

Direk 2014, pp. 371–372
Grünberg 1990, pp. 199–201
Hart 1997, pp. 1–2, 6–7

Smith, § b. Phenomenological Reduction

Staiti 2020, pp. 368–369

Moritz 1972, pp. 33–46

Schroeder 2021, § Basic Questions

Laskowski & Finlay 2017, pp. 537–539

Chrisman 2016, p. 79

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 109–113

Schwartz et al. 2012, p. 669

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106, 108

Hiles 2008, p. 53
Karp 2000, Lead section

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106–107

Powe 2007, p. 123

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 109–113

Karp 2000, § The Rokeach tradition, § The Schwartz Scale of Values

Norman 2005, p. 622

Nagel 2006, Lead section
Crisp 2011, § 1. Ethics and Metaethics

Schroeder 2021, Lead section

Orsi 2015, pp. 6–7
Bahm 1993, p. 4
Cowan 2020, p. 4
Hurka 2006, pp. 357–358

Findlay 1970, pp. 1–2, 4

Kupperman 2005, pp. 73–74

Sinnott-Armstrong 2023, Lead section

Crisp 2005, pp. 200–201
Alexander & Moore 2021, § 1. Deontology's Foil: Consequentialism

Dorsey 2020, pp. 97–98

Sinnott-Armstrong 2023, § 1. Classic Utilitarianism

Chenneville 2017, p. 5
Hearn 1971, p. 2

Pape 2000, p. 7
 Welch & Welch 2009, p. 4
Mukherjee, Mukherjee & Ghose 2013, p. 17

Pirgmaier 2021, p. 1
Young & Loomis 2014, p. 289
Turner et al. 2004, p. 50

Pirgmaier 2021, pp. 1, 8–9

Ayres 2023, p. 104

Pirgmaier 2021, p. 2
Fraser 2009
Rogers, Castree & Kitchin 2013

Pirgmaier 2021, pp. 2–3

Ayres 2023, p. 104

Moseley 2023, p. 48
Pirgmaier 2021, pp. 7–8

Pirgmaier 2021, p. 3
Black, Hashimzade & Myles 2009

Ayres 2023, p. 104

Oka 2017, pp. 77–78

Bhushan & Sachdeva 2012, p. 4

Sharma 1996, p. 10

Karp 2000, Lead section

Steinert 2023, pp. 33–34, 37, 39–40
Tormos 2019, p. 11

Karp 2000, Lead section, § Social Values

Steinert 2023, pp. 39–40, 47

Karp 2000, Lead section, § The Rokeach Tradition, § The Schwartz Scale of
Values
Tormos 2019, pp. 13–15

Sutton 2021, p. 5
Fluehr-Lobban 2013, p. 158

Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value Theory, § A Third Approach to Value

Steinert 2023, pp. 53–54, 56, 58

Steinert 2023, pp. 3, 55

Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value Theory
Sykes 2016, § Introduction

Steinert 2023, p. 54
Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value Theory

Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value Theory

Sykes 2016, § Introduction, § General Overviews
Steinert 2023, pp. 3, 61–62

Karp 2000, § Individualism and Collectivism

Fatehi, Priestley & Taasoobshirazi 2020, pp. 7–9
 Kim 2002, p. 22
Serna & Martínez 2022, p. 423

Steinert 2023, p. 4
Woodworth & Marquis 2014, p. 5

Steinert 2023, pp. 7–8

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106–107

Steinert 2023, pp. 14, 19–20

Steinert 2023, pp. 4, 11–12

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, p. 106

Steinert 2023, pp. 11–12

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, p. 106

Steinert 2023, pp. 12–13

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106–107

Steinert 2023, pp. 13–15

Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 107–108

Frankena 2006, pp. 636–637

Li 2014, p. 3
Chang 2001, pp. 68–69

Dehsen 2013, p. 178

Sharma 1991, pp. 27–28

Devettere 2002, pp. 33–34
Heinaman 2016, pp. 123–124
Heathwood 2015, p. 153

Dehsen 2013, p. 156

Honderich 2005, p. 349

Bahm 1993, p. 112

Dehsen 2013, p. 13

Hiles 2008, pp. 52–53

Frankena 2006, p. 639
Crisp 2005a, p. 349

O'Keefe, § 5. Ethics
Gaskin 2005, p. 258
Frankena 2006, p. 639

Durand, Shogry & Baltzly 2023, § 4. Ethics

Pigliucci, § 3. The Third Topos: Ethics, § 4. Apatheia and the Stoic Treatment
of Emotions
McDonald 2021, p. 38

Bahm 1993, p. 103

Darr 2023, p. 108
Emilsson 1998, Lead section

Ebrey 2010, p. 43
 Sim 2015, pp. 64, 74
Richey, § 6. Self-cultivation
Littlejohn, § 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects

Borgolte 2019, p. 97

Sharma 1999, p. 230

Bartley 2020, pp. 37–38, 136

Ranganathan, § 1a.iii. Puruṣārthas : dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa

Sharma 1999, pp. 223–225, 230
Bailey 2011

Sharma 1999, p. 230

Wilson 2010
Lougheed 2020, pp. 243–244
Prasad 2007, pp. xiii–xiv, 21, 23

Littlejohn, § 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects

Chan 2018, Lead section, § 2. Date and Authorship of the Laozi

Assandri 2021, pp. 70–71

Slingerland 2007, p. 77
Chan 2018, Lead section
Lobel 2017, p. 297

Dehsen 2013, p. 16

Bahm 1993, p. 112

Frankena 2006, p. 639
Darr 2023, p. 108

Dehsen 2013, p. 185

Wieland 2002, p. 59
Zagzebski 2004a, p. 350
Peterson 2008, p. 235

Dehsen 2013, p. 19
McGinnis 2010, pp. 209–210

Berthrong, § 3. The Emergence of Neo-Confucianism

Hartman 1998

Dehsen 2013, p. 88

Hardin 2009, pp. 6–7, 12, 16, 173, 177–179

Abelson & Nielsen 2006, § Hobbes
Cowan 2020, pp. 197, 210–211, 220

Dehsen 2013, p. 91

Hardin 2009, pp. 29, 51, 173, 177

Li 2014, p. 3

Dehsen 2013, p. 105

Engstrom 1992, p. 747

 Johnson & Cureton 2024, § 1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy, § 2. Good
Will, Moral Worth and Duty
Direk 2014, pp. 373–374

Dehsen 2013, p. 25
Dehsen 2013, p. 132

Frankena 2006, p. 639

Sinnott-Armstrong 2023, § 1. Classic Utilitarianism
Chenneville 2017, p. 5
Hearn 1971, p. 2

Woodward 2015, p. i

Sullivan 2023, § 5.3 Value Theory

Li 2014, p. 3
Sullivan 1998, § 4. Metaphysics
Milkov, § 3a. Ethics
Frankena 2006, p. 636

Dafermos 2018, p. 20

Heis 2018, § 3.1 Conception of Philosophy: Philosophy as Theory of Value

Kinzel 2024, § 2. From Kant to the Philosophy of Values
Hiles 2008, p. 52

Dehsen 2013, p. 144

Frankena 2006, pp. 636, 639

Li 2014, p. 4
Anderson 2024, § 3. Value Creation
Hiles 2008, p. 52
Direk 2014, pp. 374, 378

Frankena 2006, pp. 637–638

Ylirisku & Arvola 2018, p. 53

Dehsen 2013, p. 52

Hart 1971, pp. 36–38

Marcum 2008, p. 192

Hart 1971, pp. 37–38

Bunnin & Yu 2009, p. 443

Findlay 1970, pp. 2, 37–38, 41

Dancy 2004, p. 165
Hart 1971, p. 33

Kunnan 2020, p. 86

Mason 2023, § 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

Simpson, Lead section, § 6. Ross's Ethical Theory: Main Components and
Principles
Findlay 1970, p. 2

Mason 2023, § 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

Anderson 2013, p. 222
Townsend 2006, p. xvi
 Hart 1971, p. 31
Frankena 2006, p. 637

Edwards & Hartman 2023, p. 173

Edwards 2021, pp. 3–4

Hartman 2011, pp. 105–106

Tuboly 2021, p. 2
Hart 1971, pp. 34–35
Bunnin & Yu 2009, p. 406
Sayre-McCord 1988, pp. 11–12
Rosenkrantz & Hoffman 2011, p. 332

Frankena 2006, pp. 637–638

Ylirisku & Arvola 2018, p. 53

Kriegel 2018, p. 2

Kriegel 2018, pp. 10–11, 218, 221–222

Kriegel 2017, p. 12

Kuijper 2022, p. 298

Zimmer 2017, p. 135

Frankena 2006, p. 637

Hart 1971, pp. 30–31

Frankena 2006, p. 637

Direk 2014, pp. 371–372

Frankena 2006, p. 637

Findlay 1970, p. 2
Hart 1971, p. 32
Direk 2014, pp. 371–372
Løgstrup 2020, p. 105

Frankena 2006, pp. 637–639

Findlay 1970, p. 2
Hart 1971, p. 32

Dehsen 2013, p. 83

Direk 2014, pp. 372–373, 384–386

Findlay 1970, pp. 2–3
Sullivan 2023, § 5.3 Value Theory

Dehsen 2013, p. 168

Abelson & Nielsen 2006, pp. 426–428

Direk 2014, pp. 384–385

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vte

Philosophy
 vte

Good and evil

Category:

Axiology

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