SPE 168428

Managing Health, Safety and Environment in a Complex Simultaneous

Operations (SIMOPS) within the Context of an Integrated Projects: A Case
Study
Presented by: Jacob OLOGE, Kayode AKIODE, Takeshi JINKOJI and Henry IKPA (Total E&P Nigeria Limited),
Emmanuel OSUGBA (Ponticelli Nigeria Limited)

Copyright 2014, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment held in Long Beach, California, USA, 17–19 March 2014.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper have not been
reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its
officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is prohibited. Permission to
reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of SPE copyright.

Abstract
The Total Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited has been operating its first discovered field in Nigeria for more than
40 years as an oil dominated field but the future potential of the field is gas. Hence, the decision to upgrade the field to
harness the gas potential as well as achieving the national priorities of flare down and gas supply to the domestic market.
After several studies and evaluation of various options, it was decided to carry out the upgrade in Simultaneous Operations
(SIMOPS) mode.

The upgrade involved triple SIMOPS of oil and gas production, drilling in a gas well cluster and heavy construction
(Upgrade Projects). This SIMOPS is uncharacteristically complex with the following elements; more than 3 years non-stop
activities, more than 6 million man-hours, more than 4,000 people working together out of which more than 80% are semi-
skilled and unskilled local community personnel; involvement of consortium of 3 contractors who have never worked
together in the past, more than 15 major subcontractors, unknown underground conditions of the installations, aging facility
with assets integrity challenges, over 2000 lifting of loads above high pressure live-lines, large number of thermal engines
(mobile and stationary) and other ignition sources in hazardous zones and so on.

The Company (Project management team and Production team) together with the contractors jointly put together some well
thought out Safety initiatives to contain the identified risks. Some of these initiative include; effective risk assessment
mechanism, strict control of ignition sources and looping the ignition engine Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) to the plant ESD,
drop object study and crash test of protective barrier built across high pressure live-lines, sectionalization of SIMOPS zones,
joint project and production emergency drills, technical and HSE competence development to mention but a few.

More than 24 million contractors’ man-hours achieved and about 6 million man-hours remaining with a lot of challenges that
the project has encountered. This paper will present in detail what the company implemented to achieve HSE results such as
Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR) of 0.37 and Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF) of 0.10.

Introduction
The OML58 Block, operated by Total Exploration and Production Nigeria Ltd (TEPNG), is located in the Niger Delta of
Nigeria approximately, 75 km north-west of Port Harcourt. Figure 1 shows the location of the block. The field which started
oil production since 1966 from Obagi and gas production from Obite in 1999 is a joint venture between TEPNG and the
Nigeria National Petroleum Company – NNPC. Figure 2 shows the satellite image of the two production hubs together with
the interconnecting lines.
2 SPE SPE-168428

OML 58
Ibewa
Obagi 100 km
Erema

Ubeta Olo

Port Harcourt

Bonny
Ikike Ofon
Odudu
Amenam

m Nkarika Ekanga Emem

Figure 1: Location of OML58 within the Political Map of Nigeria

The Obagi and Obite production centers are located within the same block (OML58) separated by a distance of 12km of
interconnecting lines. The OML58 Block comprises the following facilities:
 OGBOGU Cluster
 OGBOGU Flow Station
 OBITE Treatment Centre
 Various oil and gas well clusters
 Oil and gas gathering flowlines from wells to plants
 Various pipelines.
These facilities are currently in operation. As part of the OML58 Upgrade Phase 1 Project, various modifications were made
to OGBOGU Cluster, OGBOGU Flow Station and OBITE Treatment Centre in order to increase the gas export capacity.
The objectives of the project are as follow:
 Deliver Gas for Domestic Market.
 Reducing gas flaring.
 Increase gas treatment capacity.
 Provide new gas export route from OML58 to Nigeria Liquified Natural Gas (NLNG) via the Obite-Ubeta-Rumuji
(OUR) gas Pipeline
 Supply gas for OML58 IPP through a Gas Supply Unit (GSU)
 Reduce inherent safety risks related to older facilities.
 Improve safety and security standards for local population and site personnel and facilities by implementing
perimeter protection around restricted area.
 Increase oil recovery by increasing water injection pressure/capacity.
 Improve produced water treatment performance.
 Provide new accommodation and office facilities at SITE.
SPE SPE-168428 3

Figure 2: Satellite image of Obagi Flowstation and Obite gas Treatment Center

Integrated Projects Description.

The Onshore Projects consist of four important projects namely;
 OML58 Upgrade Project
 42”X45Km Obite-Ubeta-Rumuji gas Pipeline Project
 24”X50Km Northern Option Pipeline (NOPL) Project
 Field Logistics Base (FLB)
All these projects are being managed by one Project Management Team but different consortium of contractors.

This paper however, dwells on how the risks of the OML58 Upgrade Project were managed within the context of
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).

Context of the Work Environment.

Obagi Flowstation
The Obagi Flowstation is an old facility which started production in 1966. Due to the age of this facility, there were many
Health Safety and Environment challenges in carrying out extensive construction activities inside this location. Some of these
were:
Unknown underground facilities/obstacles: This is a serious challenge because, as-built drawings which should guide in
this situation, in an old facility like this, were not available; they were vandalized in 2006 during an attack on the flowstation
by unknown Niger Delta militants.
Process Safety System: Process Safety demand is increasing every day, so also the Process Safety System. This facility was
designed to the former Elf Petroleum specifications which do not meet today’s process safety requirements. In addition,
many of the equipment in operation were no longer being supported in term of spare parts due to obsolesnce or complete
disappearance of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).

Host Community Participation.

Many communities, villages and families play host to the Obagi Flowstation. For a successful and smooth execution of this
project, these important stakeholders must be carried along. These stakeholders werre involved in the execution of this
project in the following ways:
4 SPE SPE-168428

I. Labour Provision: The host communities contributed 100% of unskilled workers which is greater than 50% of the
staff strength; 60% of the semi skilled workers and 40% of the skilled workers. At the peak of the project, there were
more than 3000 community workers.

II. Sub-Contractors: They also played active roles in the construction activities. Some scope of the work were sub-
contracted to the host communities sub-contractors as part of community content development as stated in the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with the Company and the executing Contractor.

This extent of involvement posed a great HSE concern. Usually, the HSE competence and awareness level of community
workers are not always at the required level. Similarly, community contractors’ HSE performances are most of the time not at
par with the major contractors.

Contracting Strategy.
The contracting strategy adopted by the management resulted in three contractors namely; Saipem Contracting Nigeria
Limited (leader), Ponticelli Nigeria Limited and Desicon Nigeria Limited (SPD) being responsible for the EPC. Each of the
members of this consortium had different level of appreciation of HSE. Consequently, the challenge of bringing individuals
within this consortium to almost equal level of HSE appreciation had to be surmounted.

HSE Organization
The project HSE objectives were clearly set out ab initio, which are:
 To design safe and efficient facilities;
 To minimize disturbance to production and organize safely simultaneous operations;
 To avoid personnel injury on Site and within construction areas;
 To promote awareness of environmental matters during all project phases;
 To ensure host communities participate and benefit from the project.
To meet and surpass these objectives, the Project Management set up a robust HSE Organization. Two HSE organizations
were set up; the contractor’s HSE organization and the company’s HSE Organization. The organization was very dynamic
and regularly adapted in order to meet the challenging needs of the project. At a stage of the project, the two site HSE
organizations (company and contracted) were integrated into one organization. This change proved to be effective. The
advantages of this are; both teams were working hands in hands leading to improved collaboration, improved turn around
time for HSE documentation and reduced friction between the organizations. In all, there are more than thirty HSE positions
on site and ten HSE positions at the PMT level providing supports to site.

The Site HSE Head reports directly to the Site Project Manager who has the overall responsibility for managing HSE on site
(Project) also called the Responsible for Safety and Envrionment on Site Delegate (RSESD). The Project RSESD has a direct
link to the Production RSES, the OIM for all HSE matters.

Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) Organization

SIMOPS Philosophy
Prior to the commencement of the construction activities, a SIMOPS Philosophy was defined to set the ground rules for all
activities to be done in the SIMOPS area. The rules defined in this document covered important areas which include but not
limited to:
I. Battery limits definition
II. SIMOPS zones and sub-zones
III. Number of Permit to Work (PTW) per zone. Particularly the naked flame PTW and number of hot spot per naked
flame PTW.
IV. Number of contractor’s workers allowed in each SIMOPS area.
V. PTW authorization matrix
VI. Fire fighting arrangement
Figure 3 shows the SIMOPS Map.
SPE SPE-168428 5

Figure 3: SIMOPS Map

Site SIMOPS Organization

A suitable site organization to match the principle defined in the SIMOPS Philosophy was set up to meet the needs of Safety,
Work Preparation and Risk Analysis. A dedicated team of well experienced Production and HSE personnel from the
company and contractor was saddled with overall responsibilities of SIMOPS. Figure 4 shows the organization dedicated to
SIMOPS.

The SIMOPS areas were properly delineated with a leader assigned to each zone for effective coordination and management
of day to day production and construction activities.
6 SPE SPE-168428

Figure 4: Site SIMOPS Organization

Legend
RSESD: Responsible for Safety and Environment on Site – Deputy
HOP: Head of Production
OA: Operating Authority
UPG: Upgrade (OML58 Upgrade Project)

Control of Risks
PTW Organization and Management
The Permit to Work process was used as one of the veritable tools for controlling risks in the SIMOPS as well as in the non-
SIMOPS areas. With the PTW, all persons involved in the work execution contributed in defining the risk associated and
implement appropriate mitigation measures.

Number of Permit to Work

It is obvious that the number of PTW allowed per day determines the site activities level and hence the risk level. Two
approaches were taken to manage the number of PTW allowed on site.
I. Prescriptive Approach: This approach was implemented based on the recommendation coming from the SIMOPS
Philosophy. It prescribed the number of PTW allowed per SIMOPS Zone and Sub-zones. It worked well at the
beginning of the project however, as the project grew it was found to be too constraining as the contractor was
willing to do more work because of availability of resources.

II. Risk Based Approach: After a well debated and critically evaluated proposal, the Project Management with the
validation of the Production Management decided to adopt the risk based approach to PTW limitation. In this
approach, there is no specific number of PTW recommended. A daily risk analysis is done considering; the number
of supervisors, the criticality of production activities, the availability of Production personnel, the other co-activities,
etc. To ensure that this approach optimizes the PTW issued, some monitoring mechanisms were put in place such as
PTW Key Performance Indicator (KPI), analysis of PTW usage vis-a-vis number of PTW approved, number of
PTW opened versus actual number used, etc.

PTW Audit.
PTW implementation was considered to be vital. Several levels of PTW audit were put in place; site level and Project
Management Team (PMT) level. In order to address the blind spot syndrome, which people that are familiar with a particular
location or activity might have, cross-functional PTW audit was also implemented.

PTW Management KPI.

The KPI is defined to help top management to have clear visibility of PTW implementation on site. It helps to facilitate well
informed decisions relating to the control of site activity level and resources availability. The KPI was published weekly in a
dashboard as shown in figure 5.
SPE SPE-168428 7

Figure 5: PTW KPI Dashboard

PTW Preparation.
Proper PTW management starts with good work preparation. One of the things that worked well was a joint preparation of
PTW by both the Company and Contractor supervisors. This put all the parties on the same page. Some series of visits to the
work locations were also implemented. At a stage there was D-2 (two days before the work execution day) visit to the
location to properly understand, appreciate the work and propose changes or recommendations to be implemented, a D-1 (one
day before the work execution) visit to reconfirm the work preparation with supporting documents and verification of
implementation of D-2 recommendations before the job is approved on the D-0.

Each PTW application was accompanied by a number of supporting documentations such as the relevant drawing, Job Safety
Analysis, list of equipment, etc. Series of meetings were also held where PTW proposal for each day’s activities were
identified prior to approval. Figure 6 shows a typical representation of daily work locations and the type of PTW used in each
location.

UPG Sector Coord. : Vincent ELENDU / Romain INHAT SECTOR 2

SPD Sector Coord. : Maharai HOECKE / Romain CAPARROS
SPD HSE Coord. : CHIDI Hot Spot Location
Gritblasting
Structure 05/09/2012
Bassey
Welding of PW pipes 8”
GX968
Gritblasting 3” Okuna
ATM Piping 2” to 6”
Bassey PL29/30/31 Welding of OD pipes 10”
Carlos Between SM58/SM59
Okuna

Welding of handrails
Cristian Workshop

Welding of supports
Clearance of punchlist
PR1 – Level 4
Piping 6” to 12” + guides
Evans
PR1 + PL25
Aytac
Piping 2” + 6”
Welding of handrails Hot spot opened
PLT 37 Piping 4”
Manuel PL32 Piping 2”
PR1 – Level 4 Hot spot which can be opened
Cristian PR1 – Level 4
Manuel
Manuel

Figure 6: Daily activities location representation

8 SPE SPE-168428

Excavation Management.
Obagi Flowstation due to its old age presents the risk of unidentified underground installations and utilities; figure 6 shows
examples of such. As part of the OML58 Upgrade project, a lot of foundations needed to be made – CFA piling and micro
piling; for pipe racks, vessels installations, flare headers, pipe supports and so on. For these to be done without impacting or
damaging any of the underground installations requires carefulness. Hence, extensive underground surveys (probing) as
shown in figure 7 were carried out using metal and cable detectors followed by manual excavation. Where underground
installation or utility is discovered they are properly marked out and tagged. The discovery of underground obstacles in many
cases necessitated re-engineering of the foundations.

Figure 6: Example of complex Underground obstacles

Figure 7: Steps involved in underground obstacles identification

The table 1 presents the total number of foundations and the quantity of earth materials manually excavated.
SPE SPE-168428 9

Table 1: Volume of Manual Excavation in Obagi Flowstation

Nbr of
Area Vol. (m3)
foundation
Pipe Rack 1 39 257

Pipe Rack 2 6 138

Vessel Foundation (Drums, Tanks, Scrubbers etc) 34 1,927

Pipe supports (Miscellaneous supports) 1,040 1,137

Equipment Foundations (Pumps, Compressors, Packages, etc) 56 1,100

Flare header(81UB291/292) 3 136

Flare header(81UB293) 1 44

Drainage (Trenches, boxes, etc) 14,800

E&I building 28 1,762

Tank area (Tank-1) 2,291

Total 23,592

Some good initiatives developed to manage excavations include:

I. Excavation inspection: This was done weekly and after every heavy rainfall
II. Hard barriers: These were installed around each excavation to prevent unsuspecting persons from falling in
III. Shoring: This was done where there is high risk of cave-in.
IV. Sloping: Wherever possible, the excavation was sloped as a measure against collapsing of the deep vertical
excavated ground.

Lifting Planning & Management.

In this project, lifting near or above high pressure live lines was inevitable. In fact, a 250 ton crawler crane figure 8 was
installed at the middle of the process facility with several other mobile cranes in used within the same vicinity.

It was clearly specified in the contract that “CONTRACTOR shall not perform any lift near or over live facilities unless
such facilities are sufficiently protected and a specific lifting study based on a formal risk analysis conducted and the
result is approved by COMPANY. As a result all the lifting operations were carefully classified into two broad categories:
 Critical lift - lift near or above live facilities like:
o When a load is moved above or nearby facilities producing hydrocarbons or,
o When a load could fall on above ground facilities in production
 Non critical lift – any lift other than the two types above
Table 2 shows the list of lifting to be carried out above live lines.

Critical Lifts Dossier

For each lift classified as critical lift, a comprehensive “Lifting Dossier” was prepared covering:
I. General Requirements. These includes:
a. Up-to-date certificates for all lifting equipment and lifting accessories
b. Approved lifting study
c. Approved task specific Risk Analysis.
d. Approved Permit to Work
e. Approved Lifting plan
II. Lifting Studies. These include:
10 SPE SPE-168428

a. Plans and elevations with full details to show how lift shall be conducted
b. List and characteristics/details of all planned lifting equipment and lifting accessories
c. Total weight to be lifted including load blocks, temporary supports and accessories
d. Boom length, radius, and safe capacity of lifting equipment
e. Scaled elevation view, showing the locations and clearances between the lifting equipment, the load
and any adjacent equipment or structure
f. A detailed method statement
g. A set of crane charts and equipment specifications for rigging tackles being used
h. Load to be lifted with details including dimensions, configuration, weights, center of gravity and method of
attachment to lifting points provided on the load itself
i. Soil bearing capacity study and ground preparation description
j. Dropped object study with calculation note demonstrating the adequacy of mechanical protection
k. List of mitigation measures depending on the criticality of the risk
III. Identification of Lifting Above Live Lines. Each lift above live line was identified by:

a. Weight – minor, mean or heavy lift

b. Type – spools, structure or equipment
c. Area – position of the crane relative to live line, the path to be followed relative to final lay down
destination.
d. Identification of live lines and facilities potentially impacted
i. Type of line - Hydrocarbon line, Water Injection Line, Flare lines or Flow lines
ii. Diameter
iii. Pressure
iv. Inventory of liquid/gas between isolation

Figure 8: A 250 ton installed in the middle of the process area.

SPE SPE-168428 11

Table 2: List of lifts above live lines.

Facilities Weight Percentage
Designation Area Quantity
underneath category lifted (%)
Lifting of pipes and valves Zone 31 - Pipe rack 1 E/W main pipe rack Current and minor 2000

Lifting of structure Zone 31 - Pipe rack 1 E/W main pipe rack Current and minor 450 90

Lifting of structure Zone 31 - Pipe rack 1 E/W main pipe rack Mean size 1 100

Lifting of structure Zone 32 - Pipe rack 2 E/W main pipe rack Minor 10 70

Lifting of pipes and valves Zone 33 - Pipe rack 6 & 7 Pipe way Current and minor 600

Lifting of structure Zone 33 - Pipe rack 6 & 7 Pipe way Current and minor 120 80

Lifting of structure Platform 81DS363 Pipe way Mean size 10 100

Lifting of pipes and valves Bridges 1, 2, 3 Flow lines Mean size 25

Lifting of structure Bridges 1, 2, 3 Flow lines Current and minor 3 100

Lifting of 81DS302 A/B Zone 13 Pipe way Mean size 2 100

Lifting of 81DS292 Zone 23 E/W main pipe rack Mean size 1 100

Lifting of 81DS293 Zone 23 E/W main pipe rack Minor 1 100

Lifting of 81DS305 Zone 13 Pipe way Mean size 1 100

Lifting of 81DS363 Zone 13 Pipe way Mean size 1 100

Lifting of 81GX467 A/B/C Zone 12 Pipe way Mean size 3 66

Total 3228

The result of each risk analysis study was submitted with the dossier. This result was used to determine the level of
authorization required prior to the commencement of the lift. It is also very important to state that even when approval has
been given, the implementation of all the mitigations listed in the lifting studies were verified on site before the Permit to
Work (PTW) is validated.

Live Line Protection /Load bearing Capacity Verification.

Generally, it is required that all live lines should be protected using hard barriers (scaffold tubes). Figure 7 shows typical hard
barriers installed across live lines.
Some additional measures were also taken. These include:
 Loads lifted above protected live line did not exceed 2.6 tons
 The loads were not lifted higher than 2 meters above the protection
 Scaffolding protections were constructed after a detailed calculation has been done.
 The loads lifted did not exceed 80% of the crane Safe Working Load (SWL).
In order not to leave anything to chance, the result of a representative calculation was verified by conducting a crash test
using a representative and purpose built scaffold/protection. The test was satisfactory. This was extrapolated into other
scaffolding protection.
12 SPE SPE-168428

Figure 9: Typical hard barriers built over live lines

Control of Ignition Sources and Thermal Engines.

Adequate control measures were put in place to ensure that ignition sources were properly controlled. The control measures
put in place covered; the type of equipment, cables, sockets, control panel and segregation of activities was also used as a
control measure.

Requirements for Mobile Thermal engines.

The thermal engines considered include: mobile work equipment that were allowed into the flowstation like; vehicles,
dumpers, cranes and trucks. Four major requirements were imposed:
I. They must be diesel engines
II. They must have refinery kit (spark arrestors) fixed on them. “Do It Yourself” (DIY) types are not allowed
III. They must have an Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) button installed outside the operator’s cabin
IV. Exhaust (including turbo charger) temperature must be below the auto ignition temperature of condensate. From
time to time exhaust temperature measurement was done.

Requirements for Electrical Generators.

In addition to the four requirements above, the following requirements were further imposed:
I. The electrical generators must be segregated in one single location i.e. not located indiscriminately on site. The
location should be a non-hazardous area.
II. The ESDs of the generators were looped together and were connected to the plant ESD 1 for immediate shutdown
upon gas detection by the plant’s fire and gas detection system.
III. Presence of standby fire watchers.

Requirement for Air Compressors and Other Thermal Engines.

As much as possible, the use of stand alone air compressor was discouraged. Air supply from a central air compressor was
utilized. Whenever the need to use stand alone air compressor arose, such compressor was located within the work area
which was covered by fixed gas detectors that were having their sensors looped together and a permanent human fire watcher
available in the vicinity. In addition, the requirements of section 4.4.1 were made compulsory.

Requirement for Portable Electrical Equipment, Sockets, cables and Electrical Control Panels.
Strict requirements were also imposed on this category of work material. The requirements of IP15 for equipment to be used
in hazardous zones were imposed. Also IP45 and IP55 were imposed where necessary. Figure 10 below shows a team
carrying out temperature measurement on a hand drilling machine used within hazardous area.
SPE SPE-168428 13

Figure 10: Hand drilling machine temperature measurement

HSE Training, Competence Development and Communication

Given the context of the project environment already explained i.e. high involvement of community workers, community
contractors’ participation and the project HSE objectives, HSE training was given a high priority.
HSE training needs of all categories of workforce involved in the project were defined. Two layers of trainings were
administered; contractor’s provided trainings and company sponsored trainings. The Total Exploration and Production
Golden Rules training package was of immense assistance in rapidly cascading work related training to personnel.

Many approaches to HSE communication were developed in the course of the project. Notable among them include:
 Stop Work for Safety Day where all the personnel involved in the project brainstormed on how HSE could be
improved
 No Incident No Injury Club, aimed at incident prevention
 Safety stand down
 Weekly/Monthly HSE meeting at site and PMT
 Regular/Daily Toolbox talks

Medical Organization and Emergency Preparedness and Management

Because of the large number of the people that would be involved in the project construction phase and the location of the
project, it was decided to set up a site medical organization that would be able to adequately cater for the teaming population.
The site medical organization was headed by a doctor with training and experience in trauma and emergency medicine at the
contractor side.

The company also had a nurse with experience and training in trauma and emergency medicine. This nurse is involved in
training Site Emergency Response and Intervention Team (ERIT) in handling of victim and rescue, inspection of medical
equipment, site/accommodation hygiene inspection.

Much efforts and resources were committed into incident prevention from the beginning of the project. The project
management also paid a particular attention to Emergency Preparedness and Management. The contract specified the
minimum number of emergency drills which must be organized every week. Suffice to mention that emergency drills were
not merely conducted to meet the contractual requirements, but each drill was unique and aimed at achieving some specific
objectives and training purpose. Joint drills and exercises were conducted between the TEPNG production staff and the
project team (Company and Contactor). Figures 9, 10 and 11 show pictures of some major drills conducted.
14 SPE SPE-168428

Figure 11: Rescue from confined space - tank

Figure 12: Rescue from a deep Evacuation – 5.85m deep closed drain

In addition, the Project Management Team in collaboration with the TEPNG management at the main office jointly organized
exercises to test Major Emergency Scenarios involving multiple casualties.
SPE SPE-168428 15

Figure 13: Rescue from height

Results & Conclusion

The integrated projects have recorded about fifty million man-hours since it started site construction activities more than four
years ago. Out of these man-hours simultaneous construction and production activities account for more than six million
man-hours. No major accident has been recorded in the most dreaded SIMOPS areas.

Overall, other Key Performance Indicators monitored by the projects are below the 2012 OGP figures. Table 3 shows the
lagging Key Performance Indicators (KPI).

Table 3: Key Performance Indicators.

Parameter OGP 2012 PTD 12 mths sliding

TRIR 1.74 0.37 0.27

LTIF 0.48 0.10 0.00

HIPF 0.40 0.09

PTD: Projects till Date

In conclusion, the Project Management Team and the entire project personnel worked together to achieve these results in a
very difficult terrain. The collective resolve of all the people involved in this project to support every incident prevention
initiative launched goes a long way to show that even in a complex terrain like old installation with safety and integrity
challenges, construction and production activities could still be safely managed.
16 SPE SPE-168428

Acknowledgement
We sincerely acknowledge the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), the OML58 Joint Venture partner for its
commitment to this project. We are very grateful to SPD for for their cooperation to be able to achieve the record presented in
this paper. Finally, we appreciate the management and staff of the Field Operation team, the OML58 Site Project
Management and the entire staff of the OML58 Upgrade Project for their HSE commitment throughout the project.