1. Life Marcus Aurelius was born in AD 121.

His early education was overseen by the Empe ror Hadrian, and he was later adopted by the Emperor Antoninus Pius in AD 138. A fter an initial education in rhetoric undertaken by Fronto, Marcus later abandon ed it in favor of philosophy. Marcus became Emperor himself in AD 161, initially alongside Lucius Verus, becoming sole Emperor in AD 169. Continual attacks mean t that much of his reign was spent on campaign, especially in central Europe. Ho wever, he did find time to establish four Chairs of Philosophy in Athens, one fo r each of the principal philosophical traditions (Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean). He died in AD 180. 2. The Meditations Marcus reputation as a philosopher rests upon one work, the Meditations. The Medi tations take the form of a personal notebook and were probably written while Mar cus was on campaign in central Europe, c. AD 171-175. The entries appear to be i n no particular order and may simply be in the original order of composition. Th e repetition of themes and the occasional groups of quotations from other author s (see e.g. Med. 4.46, 11.33-39) add to this impression. Book One, however, is s omewhat different from the rest of the text and may well have been written separ ately (a plan for it may be discerned in Med. 6.48). The first recorded mention of the Meditations is by Themistius in AD 364. The cu rrent Greek title ta eis heauton (to himself) derives from a manuscript now lost a nd may be a later addition (it is first recorded c. AD 900 by Arethas). The mode rn text derives primarily from two sources: a manuscript now in the Vatican and a lost manuscript (mentioned above), upon which the first printed edition (1558) was based. Beyond the Meditations there also survives part of a correspondence between Marc us and his rhetoric teacher Fronto, probably dating from earlier in Marcus life ( c. AD 138-166), discovered as a palimpsest in 1815. However, although this inter esting discovery sheds some light on Marcus as an individual, it adds little to our understanding of his philosophy. 3. Philosophy a. Stoicism According to tradition, Marcus was a Stoic. His ancient biographer, Julius Capit olinus, describes him as such. Marcus also makes reference to a number of Stoics by whom he was taught and, in particular, mentions Rusticus from whom he borrow ed a copy of the works of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (Med. 1.7). However, n owhere in the Meditations does Marcus explicitly call himself a Stoic. This may simply reflect the likelihood that Marcus was writing only for himself rather th an attempting to define himself to an audience. Yet it is probably fair to admit that Marcus was at least open to ideas from other philosophical traditions, bei ng impressed by Stoic philosophy, but not merely an unthinking disciple of Stoic ism. b. The Influence of Epictetus As has been noted, Marcus was clearly familiar with the Discourses of Epictetus, quoting them a number of times (see Med. 11.33-38). Epictetus fame in the second century is noted by a number of ancient sources, being hailed as the greatest o f the Stoics (Aulus Gellius 1.2.6) and more popular than Plato (Origen Contra Ce lsus 6.2). If Marcus felt drawn towards Stoicism, then Epictetus would surely ha ve stood out as the most important Stoic of the time. It is perhaps reasonable, then, to turn to Epictetus in order to explore the philosophical background to t he Meditations. c. The Three topoi Central to Epictetus philosophy is his account of three topoi, or areas of study. He suggests that the apprentice philosopher should be trained in three distinct

areas or topoi (see Epictetus Discourses 3.2.1-2): Desires (orexeis) and aversions (ekkliseis); Impulse to act (hormas) and not to act (aphormas); Freedom from deception, hasty judgement, and anything else related to assents (s unkatatheseis). These three areas of training correspond to the three types of philosophical dis course referred to by earlier Stoics; the physical, the ethical, and the logical (see Diogenes Laertius 7.39). For Epictetus, it is not enough merely to discour se about philosophy. The student of philosophy should also engage in practical t raining designed to digest philosophical principals, transforming them into acti ons. Only this will enable the apprentice philosopher to transform himself into the Stoic ideal of a wise person or sage (sophos). It is to this end that the th ree topoi are directed. The first topos, concerning desire (orexis), is devoted to physics. It is not en ough for the philosopher to know how Nature works; he must train his desires in the light of that knowledge so that he only desires what is in harmony with Natu re. For the Stoic, Nature is a complex inter-connected physical system, identifi ed with God, of which the individual is but one part. What might be called the p ractical implication of this conception of Nature is that an individual will ine vitably become frustrated and unhappy if they desire things without taking into account the operations of this larger physical system. Thus, in order to become a Stoic sage happy and in harmony with Nature one must train ones desires in the light of a study of Stoic physical theory. The second topos, concerning impulse (horm), is devoted to ethics. The study of e thical theory is of course valuable in its own right but, for the Stoic training to be a sage, these theories must be translated into ethical actions. In order to transform the way in which one behaves, it is necessary to train the impulses that shape ones behavior. By so doing the apprentice philosopher will be able no t merely to say how a sage should act but also to act as a sage should act. The third topos, concerning assent (sunkatathesis), is devoted to logic. It is i mportant to remember here that for the Stoics the term logic included not only dia lectic but also much of what one would today call epistemology. According to Epi ctetus every impression (phantasia) that an individual receives often includes a value-judgement (hupolpsis) made by the individual. When an individual accepts o r gives assent (sunkatathesis) to an impression, assent is often given to the va lue-judgement as well. For instance, when one sees someone drink a lot of wine, one often judges that they are drinking too much wine (see e.g. Epictetus Handbo ok 45). Epictetus suggests that, in the light of Stoic epistemological theory, t he apprentice philosopher should train himself to analyze his impressions carefu lly and be on guard not to give assent to unwarranted value-judgements. For Epictetus, then, the student of philosophy must not only study the three typ es of philosophical discourse but also engage in these three types of philosophi cal training or exercise in order to translate that theory into actions. Marcus may himself be seen as a student of Epictetus, and so some scholars have suggest ed that the three topoi form a key to understanding the Meditations. Indeed, the Meditations may be approached as an example of a form of personal writing in wh ich the very act of writing constituted a philosophical exercise designed to dig est the three types of philosophical theory. In other words, the Meditations are a text produced by someone engaged in the three topoi outlined by Epictetus. Th is is hinted at in Med. 9.7 where Marcus exhorts himself to wipe out impression ( phantasia), check impulse (horm), and quench desire (orexis). d. Philosophical Exercises The Meditations certainly do not present philosophical theories similar to those that one can find in, say, the surviving works of Aristotle. Nor are they compa

rable to a theoretical treatise like the Elements of Ethics by the Stoic Hierocl es, possibly a contemporary of Marcus. Nevertheless, the Meditations remain esse ntially a philosophical text. As has already been noted, the Meditations are a p ersonal notebook, written by Marcus to himself and for his own use. They do not form a theoretical treatise designed to argue for a particular doctrine or concl usion; their function is different. In order to understand this function it is n ecessary to introduce the idea of a philosophical exercise (asksis). In the Meditations Marcus engages in a series of philosophical exercises designe d to digest philosophical theories, to transform his character or dye his soul in the light of those theories (see e.g. Med. 5.16), and so to transform his behavi or and his entire way of life. By reflecting upon philosophical ideas and, perha ps more importantly, writing them down, Marcus engages in a repetitive process d esigned to habituate his mind into a new way of thinking. This procedure is quit e distinct from the construction of philosophical arguments and has a quite diff erent function. Whereas the former is concerned with creating a particular philo sophical doctrine, the latter is a practical exercise or training designed to as similate that doctrine into ones habitual modes of behavior. Following the accoun t of three types of philosophical training outlined by Epictetus, Marcus reflect s in the Meditations upon a medley of physical, ethical, and logical ideas. Thes e written reflections constitute a second stage of philosophical education neces sary after one has studied the philosophical theories (see e.g. Epictetus Discou rses 1.26.3). By engaging in such written philosophical exercises Marcus attempt s to transform his soul or inner disposition that will, in turn, alter his behav ior. Thus, this second stage of philosophical education is the process by which a philosophical apprentice trains himself to put theories into practice, and so make progress towards wisdom. e. The Point of View of the Cosmos Of all the philosophical exercises in the Meditations the most prominent centers around what might be called the point of view of the cosmos. In a number of passa ges Marcus exhorts himself to overcome the limited perspective of the individual and experience the world from a cosmic perspective. For example: You have the power to strip away many superfluous troubles located wholly in you r judgement, and to possess a large room for yourself embracing in thought the w hole cosmos, to consider everlasting time, to think of the rapid change in the p arts of each thing, of how short it is from birth until dissolution, and how the void before birth and that after dissolution are equally infinite. (Med. 9.32; see also 2.17, 5.23, 7.47, 12.32) In passages such as this Marcus makes implicit reference to a number of Stoic th eories. Here, for instance, the Stoic physics of flux inherited from Heraclitus is evoked. Perhaps more important though is the reference to ones judgement and t he claim that this is the source of human unhappiness. Following Epictetus, Marc us claims that all attributions of good or evil are the product of human judgeme nts. As Epictetus put it, what upsets people are not things themselves but rathe r their judgements about things (see Handbook 5). According to Epictetus epistemo logical theory (to the extent that it can be reconstructed) the impressions that an individual receives and that appear to reflect the nature of things are in f act already composite. They involve not only a perception of some external objec t but also an almost involuntary and unconscious judgement about that perception . This judgement will be a product of ones preconceptions and mental habits. It i s this composite impression to which an individual grants or denies assent, crea ting a belief. The task for the philosopher is to subject ones impressions to rig orous examination, making sure that one does not give assent to (i.e. accept as true) impressions that include any unwarranted value judgements. Marcus personal reflections in the Meditations may be read as a series of written exercises aimed at analyzing his own impressions and rejecting his own unwarran

ted value judgements. For instance, he reminds himself: Do not say more to yourself than the first impressions report. [] Abide always by the first impressions and add nothing of your own from within. (Med. 8.49) These first impressions are impressions before a value judgement has been made. Fo r Marcus, human well-being or happiness (eudaimonia) is entirely dependent upon correctly examining ones impressions and judgements. For once one has overcome fa lse value-judgements that wealth and social standing are valuable and that one s hould compete for them against others, for instance one will experience the cosm os as a single living being (identified with God) rather than a site of conflict and destruction. As Cicero put it in his summary of Stoic physics: The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hind er their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate Nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being. (On the Nature of the Gods 2.35) It is to this end cultivating an experience of the cosmos as a unified living be ing identified with God that the philosophical exercises in the Meditations are directed. 4. Concluding Remarks From a modern perspective Marcus Aurelius is certainly not in the first rank of ancient philosophers. He is no Plato or Aristotle, nor even a Sextus Empiricus o r Alexander of Aphrodisias. To a certain extent this judgement is perfectly fair and reasonable. However, in order to assess the philosophical qualities that Ma rcus does have and that are displayed in the Meditations it is necessary to emph asize that in antiquity philosophy was not conceived merely as a matter of theor etical arguments. Such arguments existed and were important, but they were frame d within a broader conception of philosophy as a way of life. The aim was not me rely to gain a rational understanding of the world but to allow that rational un derstanding to inform the way in which one lived. If one keeps this understandin g of philosophy in mind, then one becomes able to appreciate the function and the philosophical value of Marcus Meditations.