Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated
Pilots with Natural Gas Fuel in Process Heater Burners
Louis Pasnik
Becht Engineering
lpasnik@[Link]
Ty Keeth
Zeeco
Ty_Keeth@[Link]
American Flame Research Committee - 2025 Industrial Combustion Symposium
San Antonio, Tx
Abstract:
For many end users, unsupervised and manually lit pilots utilizing natural gas are
essential to achieving reliable light-off in process heater burners. Serving as the ignition
source, pilots create the necessary conditions to ignite the main burner. However, pilots
are susceptible to failure due to various factors such as overheating, improper positioning,
airborne fouling (most common failure), and others. These failures, if not properly
recognized and addressed, can lead to unsafe conditions during light-off.
.
This paper delves into the most common challenges associated with the reliability of
unsupervised, naturally air-aspirated pilots in process heater burners, particularly under
normal natural gas operating pressures. The primary causes of pilot failure are explored,
and effective mitigation strategies are identified.
Drawing from real-world case studies and experiences, this paper aims to provide
valuable insights into understanding and improving the reliability of unsupervised,
naturally air-aspirated pilots, contributing to safer lighting of process heaters burners.
1
Table of Contents
1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 3
2. Anatomy of a naturally air aspirated, unsupervised, manually lit pilot ........................ 4
3. What a Healthy Pilot Looks Like ................................................................................. 6
4. Causes of Poor Pilot Reliability .................................................................................. 8
4.1 Natural gas pressure outside of design range ..................................................... 9
4.2 Inadequate Air...................................................................................................... 9
4.3 Natural Gas Fouling ............................................................................................. 9
4.4 Improper Installation, alignment, or height ......................................................... 10
4.5 Mechanical and overheating damage ................................................................ 11
4.6 Obstruction due to refractory debris ................................................................... 12
4.7 Airborne fouling .................................................................................................. 13
5. Pilot Reliability Case Studies .................................................................................... 16
5.1 Louisiana based refinery/petrochemical plant .................................................... 16
5.2 Texas based refinery/petrochemical plant ......................................................... 17
6. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 19
Appendix A – Cold Pilot Light Off ................................................................................. 21
2 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
1. Introduction
Burners are the heart of process heaters in refineries and petrochemical plants. Most
process heater burners are initially ignited from pilot flames. The purpose of the pilot is
to provide reliable and stable ignition of the burner’s primary flame (see Figure 1) at the
time when the burner fuel is first introduced. If the pilot becomes unreliable, the primary
fuel (and thus the stage fuel if designed with such) may not ignite. A cold process burner
pilot light off is a critical time in which most catastrophic combustion incidents occurred in
the past. Today, many pilots used in process burners are still unsupervised and manually
lit, relying heavily on strict procedures and human verification to ensure a safe burner
light off.
Figure 1: Diagram of a staged fuel burner with pilot used in process heaters.
If the burner management system (BMS) does not include flame supervision and
associated trip logic, as is the case in many applications, it is incumbent upon the human
operator to visually confirm the unsupervised pilot is lit and robust before opening the
burner fuel valve. Similarly, the human operator would also need to visually confirm that
burner primary fuel light off occurred and that the burner flame is stable while the burner
fuel valve is opening, else act (i.e., close the burner fuel valve) to prevent unsafe
conditions from developing inside the combustion enclosure.
This paper documents the author’s most common reliability problems experienced with
unsupervised, naturally air-aspirated pilots in process heater burners across multiple US
Gulf Coast plants within the past two decades, particularly while operating under normal
natural gas operating pressures. Several case studies are presented and solutions to
improve pilot reliability are discussed.
3 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
2. Anatomy of a naturally air aspirated, unsupervised, manually lit
pilot
The experiences and descriptions of the pilots presented here are the most common style
provided by three major burner manufacturers for the past three decades, with tens-of-
thousands estimated to be in service. The components of these process burner pilots
are depicted in Figure 2 through Figure 4.
Natural gas at ~10 to 15psig is introduced at the natural gas connection and passes
through an orifice spud (see Figure 3) with orifice size of approximately 1/16” diameter.
The natural gas jet flowing out of the orifice inducts air into the fuel/air mixer venturi
assembly. The natural gas and air mixture flows through the riser pipe and into the pilot
tip. A typical procedure for a cold pilot light-off of unsupervised pilots can be found in
Appendix A.
Pilot tip
Riser
pipe
Mounting plate
Fuel/air mixer
venturi assembly
Natural gas connection
Figure 2: Typical naturally air aspirated, unsupervised manually lit pilot assemblies
4 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 3: Three different fuel/air mixture venturi assemblies commonly used, and typical
component descriptions.
As the natural gas and air mixture flow into the pilot tip, the internal design of the pilot tip
creates low-pressure zones for the pilot flame to stabilize. These internal details are often
difficult to visually observe with a completed pilot assembly but are depicted in Figure 4.
5 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 4: Two different process burner pilot tips commonly used with views showing
flame stabilization internals
3. What a Healthy Pilot Looks Like
After lighting, the flame should anchor near the pilot internals. The tip’s outer cylinder
glows just beyond the internals, and the resulting flame coming out of the tip is crisp and
stiff. The holes on the side of the pilot tip will have small flames radiating out, as shown
in Figure 5.
When viewed from a combustion zone peep door, healthy pilot tips should glow and emit
a crisp, stiff flame as depicted in the example photos of Figure 6. If the pilot tip cannot be
observed from the combustion zone peep door, observation should be made from the
burner sight port near the burner light off port. Figure 7 includes examples of healthy and
unhealthy pilots as viewed from the burner sight port or light off ports.
6 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 5 – Elevation view photos of a single healthy pilot tip and a spare pilot tip
Figure 6: Various photos of healthy and glowing process burner pilot tips as viewed
from a side peep door.
7 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 7: Healthy glowing pilot tips (left) and unhealthy non-glowing pilot tips (right) as
viewed from burner light-off port.
In the author’s experience, those tips which are not glowing are either not lit or have the
potential of being extinguished during nominal plant excursions.
4. Causes of Poor Pilot Reliability
The following are possible causes of unhealthy, unsupervised, naturally air-aspirated
pilots using natural gas:
• Natural gas pressure out of design range
• Inadequate or too much air
• Pilot natural gas fouling
• Mechanical or overheating damage
• Improper installation / alignment / height
• Airborne fouling
In the authors’ experience, airborne fouling is by far the most frequent cause, as will be
further discussed in Section 4.7 and Section 5.
Although this paper focuses mostly on unsupervised naturally air-aspirated pilots, the
above causes can also apply to supervised pilots.
Each of these possible causes listed above are further described below.
8 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
4.1 Natural gas pressure outside of design range
The pilots described in this document are typically lit with natural gas pressures in the
range of 7psig to 15psig. After a flame was established, pilots have been tested with
natural gas pressures ranging from 7psig to >35psig and were found to be stable and
very robust. In applications where low/high pilot fuel pressure trips are in-place and
natural gas regulators used, the authors of this paper cannot remember a single time
when a pilot was unhealthy or flamed out due to a natural gas pressure excursion. Thus,
low or high natural gas pressure is normally not the cause of an unhealthy pilot in most
situations unless there is a gross and obvious problem with the natural gas regulator or
other BMS equipment.
4.2 Inadequate Air
As the naturally air-aspirated pilot draws air into the fuel/air mixture venturi assembly, the
only practical way to cause an air reduction is via closure of the air door described in
Figure 3.
Some burner OEMs suggest that too little or too much air can cause pilot reliability
problems. The author’s experience is as follows:
- For pilots operating with natural gas fuel, complete removal of the air adjustment
door for the pilots described in this paper has NO negative influence on pilot light
off or reliability over a wide range of ambient conditions and draft conditions inside
the firebox. In fact, one supplier’s fuel/air mixture venturi assembly shown in
Figure 3 is designed without an air door.
- Complete closure of this door causes a long/lazy pilot flame and a non-glowing tip
(unhealthy) condition. Some operators do not understand that this is an unhealthy
condition, but to the contrary perceive (incorrectly) this to be a benefit as the flame
appears longer.
Because of a lack of operator knowledge, the air adjustment door (if present) is usually
found in varying positions amongst pilots with no rhyme or reason. Some plants have
since removed all air doors on pilots to prevent operators from adjusting and potentially
closing off as to cause a weak pilot.
4.3 Natural Gas Fouling
The fuel orifice on a natural gas pilot is on the order of 1/16” in diameter and could plug
with just one piece of foulant of similar size. However, natural gas is believed to be clean
and non-fouling, thus likely not the cause of poor pilot health in most cases.
Potential sources of foulant found in natural gas piping:
- In some older plants, pilots were originally operated on blended refinery fuel gas
and then changed to natural gas over time. In some of these cases, the “dirty”
refinery fuel gas piping was repurposed for natural gas operation without cleaning.
- In some cases, pilot natural gas piping is field routed, welded, and hydrotested. In
one case, the ID of the pipe was inspected by the author two days after the
hydrotest. Residual water was observed remaining with significant active
corrosion / rust occurring on the inside of the carbon steel pipe. As such,
9 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
hydrotesting of carbon steel pilot gas piping is not recommended unless measures
are taken to mitigate any rust or corrosion products from forming.
Despite the presence of piping foulant in some of these applications, the blockage of the
fuel orifice occurs relatively infrequently in the author's experience.
Figure 8: Foulant found in a natural gas connection to a pilot (line was previously
repurposed from blended refinery fuel gas)
4.4 Improper Installation, alignment, or height
As depicted in Figure 1, the primary flame is reliant on the pilot flame to initially ignite. If
the pilot flame does not reach the area of the primary fuel low-pressure zone, the main
burner fuel may not ignite. Figure 9 shows examples of properly positioned pilots adjacent
to the primary fuel low pressure zones.
Top of pilot tip adjacent to the
primary gas low pressure zone
Figure 9: Correctly installed pilots in two different burner styles
10 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
4.5 Mechanical and overheating damage
In the author’s experience, mechanical and/or overheat damage is not frequent, but not
uncommon. Typical causes of mechanical damage are poorly supported or poorly routed
pilot gas piping causing the fuel/air mixer venturi assembly orifice spud to break as shown
in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Broken orifice spud caused by poorly supported natural gas piping.
Overheat damage can occur to the pilot tip when it is either installed at too high elevation
(and the primary burner flame impinges upon the pilot tip – see Figure 11), or when the
tip design is against an obstruction in which the pilot tip flames impinge back upon the
pilot tip as shown in Figure 12.
Figure 11: Overheat damage of pilot tip caused by flame impingement of primary flame
(installed length too long).
11 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 12: Overheat damage of a process heater pilot tip with angle heat shield and
associated remedy
4.6 Obstruction due to refractory debris
Occasionally, refractory debris can fall into the pilot tip of floor mounted burners. Operator
surveillance should be able to identify changes to the glow of the tip or pilot flame when
this occurs.
During refractory maintenance inside of the heater, refractory debris often finds its way
into pilot tips unless the pilot/burners are well protected. Inspection of the pilot tips (and
burners) should always be made AFTER conclusion of all internal maintenance work and
scaffolding removal to ensure absence of debris in the pilot tips.
12 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 13: Refractory debris found inside pilot tip
4.7 Airborne fouling
In the authors’ experience, airborne foulant is the primary cause of pilot reliability
problems. When a pilot tip is pulled for maintenance, most visual inspections do not go
further than a visual inspection of the top side of the tip, in which airborne foulant is not
readily obvious. Airborne foulant can manifest in the pilot tip portions not readily visible
from the top side of the tip, as described in Figure 14 to Figure 16. Because of the effort
it takes to remove the tip from the riser pipe and concerns with galling, the pilot tip may
not be removed at all, thus not allowing for inspection of the backside (see bottom view
of Figure 14).
The fouled pilot tips shown in Figure 14 through Figure 16 would either NOT light off, not
stay lit, or had a weak flame and non-glowing tip.
13 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 14: Clean (left) and fouled (right) photos of pilot tip internals
Figure 15: Pilot tip with outer shield cut away, showing extreme fouling. Compare with
Figure 4.
14 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
top view top view – tip with flame supervision
bottom view
Figure 16: Airborne foulant examples found in high H2 pilot tip design (burning natural
gas)
Figure 17: Caution tape being sucked into a fuel/air mixture venturi assembly
15 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
5. Pilot Reliability Case Studies
5.1 Louisiana based refinery/petrochemical plant
In 2016 a Gulf coast refinery commissioned a new process heater. This heater had
significant modernizations, including supervised pilots with flame rod detection and HEI
ignition. A local panel was installed at each burner with ignitor and flame indication light.
The new heater was installed within 50 yards of a cooling tower and 25 yards of a
limestone road on the exterior fence line of the facility.
Soon after commissioning, the DCS began receiving intermittent flame signals. Because
the operating unit had reduced throughput due to the lack supervised pilots/burners
online, the supervised pilot permissive was removed to allow furnace operation with
additional burners. The intermittent flame signal was assumed to be an electrical or
instrumentation issue. Plant personnel began troubleshooting. The pilots were removed,
subsequently cleaned, and electrically tested. No evidence of the problem was found.
However, all pilots were functioning as expected immediately after this activity.
Several weeks later, the pilots again began losing flame indication, both at the local panel
and at the DCS. Signals would drop in and out with increasing frequency over time.
Several relays and wiring sections were replaced as it was believed to be an electrical
issue. This time the pilots were not pulled to be cleaned. There was no improvement in
flame indication after relays and wiring were replaced. The burner supplier was called out
to service and inspect the pilots, and after servicing they functioned correctly for
approximately 3 to 5 months.
When the intermittent pilot flame indication occurred again yet again, the site heat transfer
specialist (with vendor support) removed several pilots and found a fibrous greyish foulant
packed behind the internal flame rod. The foulant was removed and the pilots again
functioned correctly for a few weeks until the flame rods began giving intermittent signals
again. As the cause of the foulant was not fully understood, pilot natural gas samples
were analyzed, and nearby equipment was inspected with no obvious origin of the foulant.
Despite the intermittent flame signal, the operators believed there was no real issue as
the pilots had visible flames. However, the burner OEM confirmed the pilot tips were cold,
not glowing, and the pilot supervision system was correctly indicating unhealthy pilots.
The site personnel proceeded to remove every pilot for thorough inspection and cleaning.
A pressure washer was used in both ends of the pilot tip. After this final cleaning, black
nylon fabric was wrapped around four of the twelve pilot fuel/air mixer venturi assemblies
to serve as an airside filter in a side-by-side test – see Figure 18. Pilots that had the filter
continued to operate for an extended period, while the pilots without the filter degraded
over time. The test was concluded after 3 cleaning intervals of the “nonfiltered” pilot
compared to no required maintenance of the filtered pilots.
16 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Figure 18: Stretchable nylon fabric used as an air filter on the fuel/air mixture venturi
assembly of a supervised pilot – photo taken less than 1 week after installing fabric.
It was concluded that the surrounding environment caused accumulation of the foulant in
the pilot tip leading to unhealthy pilot conditions. During these occurrences, the flame rod
was indeed correctly alerting an unhealthy pilot condition.
The plant personnel worked with the burner supplier to design a commercial solution, and
the learnings were applied to other pilots in the facility.
5.2 Texas based refinery/petrochemical plant
In the year 2018, a flooding event caused a complete refinery/petrochemical plant
shutdown for a several week period. This unusual occurrence allowed for a thorough
visual inspection of pilot flames. A complete survey was conducted on 100% of all pilots
at that plant with the following findings:
Table 1: Pilot health survey from a plant in year 2018
Flamed Not Healthy, Found
out but lit OK Total
Total 142 492 287 921
Percent of Total 15% 53% 31% 100%
The pilot’s natural gas operating pressure was reviewed, and no evidence was found of
historic unexpected pressure swings.
Two decades prior to this event, the same company had undertaken rigorous pilot stability
testing, which proved the pilot style described in this document could withstand a wide
17 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
range of natural gas pressures (from 7psig to 35psig) as well as a wide range of firebox
pressures (from negative 6” wg all the way to positive 1” wg in the firebox) without flaming
out. Upon these favorable test results, some credit was given to pilots serving as a
safeguard to the main burner flame while operating within the above fuel and draft ranges.
The condition of the pilots tested were likely new and clean.
The unexpected number of flamed out and unhealthy pilots found during the 2018 flooding
event triggered an investigation as to what caused most of the pilots to become unhealthy,
and a major effort was undertaken to rectify the 634 unhealthy pilots in short order. The
following observations were made:
- About half of the flamed-out pilots were able to be re-lit, but they did not exhibit a
glowing tip upon relighting.
- The first pilots to be addressed had the fuel/air mixer venturi assembly pulled,
inspected to have a clear fuel orifice, and venturi and riser pipe internally brushed.
Upon relighting, the pilots did not exhibit a glowing tip.
- The next step to address the non-glowing pilot tip was to replace the fuel/air mixer
venturi assembly with new. Upon relighting, the pilots did not exhibit a glowing tip.
- In the next step, the pilot tip was pulled and visual inspected. No obvious debris
could be seen from above the tip. However, the pilot tip was replaced regardless.
Upon relighting, the pilot tip immediately began to glow.
Following this, many pilot tips were purchased for replacement. Some of the non-glowing
tips were studied further, resulting in the information presented in Section 4.7 of this
paper.
Over the next two years, significant effort was invested in operator training, operator
surveillance rounds, and auditing by the site heat transfer specialist. Audits would
routinely reveal non-healthy pilots, despite having spent much effort on operator training.
In 2020, the main burner fuel of a natural draft process heater tripped due to a unit upset
and the pilots remained operational as intended. During the main burner relight,
operators proceeded to open two main burner fuel valves and reported “hearing” the main
fuel light-off. Three minutes later, a deflagration occurred, flashing back flame outside of
the burner air registers. An investigation revealed that the main burner fuel was flowing
inside of the firebox for 3 minutes without igniting. Post incident, all pilots on this eight-
burner heater were observed “unhealthy” and were considered causal to the incident. It
became clear that maintaining healthy unsupervised, naturally air-aspirated pilots always
was unrealistic. The plant no longer took credit for pilots acting as a safeguard to the
burners.
In early 2021, a set of pilot assemblies which were only a few months old would not lite
during a cold process heater start-up. The site heat transfer specialist pulled the pilot and
observed an airborne foulant on the backside of the pilot tip, which was not obvious to
the untrained eye. The pilot tip was replaced, and the pilots immediately lit with no issues.
This prompted purchasing of ~10 air filter assemblies for testing purposes. A side-by-
side test was conducted of 10 new pilots incorporating air filters covering the fuel/air mixer
venturi assembly, and 10 new pilot assemblies without air filters (see Figure 19). All pilot
tips were confirmed glowing at the beginning of the test. Observations were made one
year later and are described in Table 2.
18 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Table 2: Number of pilots glowing after 1 year
Percentage of glowing
Description pilot tips after 1 year
10 pilots with air filters 100%
10 pilots with OUT air filters 40%
Figure 19: Left – new air filter assembly for the fuel/air mixer venturi. Right – air filter
condition after 1 year in operation.
In 2022, one of the plant’s process heaters were retrofitted with eight new burners. The
pilot assemblies for the new burners incorporated the same air filter design as shown in
Figure 19. After being in service for two years (without pilot maintenance), the pilot tips
were audited and confirmed to be glowing and healthy.
In the year 2024, a different process heater at the plant was configured with a methane
permissive incorporating a signal from a TDL (Tuned Diode Laser) flue gas analyzer. This
permissive would require methane values to be below a set threshold prior to allowing
energizing of the main fuel after pilots were lit. After lighting the natural gas pilots, the
methane was above the set threshold and the permissive was not satisfied, thus
preventing the main burner fuel from being introduced. Due to concerns with delaying
startup and because most pilot flames were visible, operations proceeded to bypass the
methane permissive. Post start-up, the pilots were audited by a heat transfer specialist,
and 50% of the thirty pilots were found to be unhealthy and the likely cause of increased
methane content in the flue gas.
6. Conclusions
A healthy, stable pilot is one which has a glowing tip and a crisp stiff flame. Several issues
can cause pilots to become unhealthy. In the authors’ experience, airborne foulant is the
most common cause of poor pilot reliability. The most effective mitigation for airborne
fouling is using air filters on naturally air-aspirated pilots.
19 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
The difference between a healthy and unhealthy lit pilot is neither well understood nor
obvious to most operators. Therefore, it is not appropriate to consider unsupervised pilots
a safeguard to the main burner flame.
20 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
Appendix A – Cold Pilot Light Off
Detailed procedures for safe cold furnace light off are outside the scope of this document.
Because light off is the crucial time during which most catastrophic combustion incidents
occurred in the past, the authors’ experience of minimum procedural requirements for
pilot light off is presented here, assuming a robust SIS system is already in place:
Minimum Requirements for Cold Pilot Light-off:
1. Verification that all maintenance work and pre-startup inspections are complete, all
instrumentation/controls (including valves, dampers, analyzers, etc.) are working as
intended, and no alarms and no SIS are bypassed.
2. Visual inspection of the process heater and fuel system.
3. Clear unnecessary personnel from the area.
4. Verification of closure and leak tightness of all fuel source block valves (main burner
fuel, pilot block valves, and any waste gas valves) to each individual burner.
5. Verification of closure and leak tightness of the fuel Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
valves. Some plants have a procedure in place to keep all other fuel sources blinded
until after the pilots are lit.
6. Verification of natural gas pressure upstream of the closed pilot gas SIS valves.
7. Initiate and complete the firebox purge and sample the firebox environment to verify
absence of fuel. Some plants have also configured a methane permissive into the
BMS, which will not allow the SIS fuel valves to open if a methane threshold has been
exceeded. The time limit between the purge completion and successful pilot light off
should be established.
8. Position dampers to their light-off position.
9. Don proper light-off personal protective equipment, and test ignition torch.
10. Position one operator with the ignition torch at the burner light off port, and a second
operator at the furnace wall peep door for double verification of stable light off.
11. After permissives have been satisfied, the pilot natural gas SIS valve is reset/open,
the ignition torch is lit and inserted to touch the pilot tip, and the individual pilot natural
gas block valve is slowly opened. After the immediate successful ignition of a healthy
pilot, the outside operators proceed to light the remaining pilots within the prescribed
time. The outside operator gives verbal confirmation to the board operator that safe
light off has occurred. The pilots should be monitored for a period of ~5 minutes as
conditions may change while adjusting the natural gas pressure (if required), and to
confirm the pilot tip is glowing with a stiff crisp flame. If pilots did NOT light off within
the prescribed time, the process is aborted, the pilot natural gas SIS valves are
immediately closed, and the issue is escalated before restarting the procedure.
Even in applications that appeared to have a well thought out BMS design incorporating
supervised pilots and burners, catastrophic explosions can and have occurred in the past
due to unrealized hazards which were not accounted for in the development of the
procedure or the BMS.
For each process heater application, light off procedures and SIS logic configuration
should be developed by competent experts who:
• have a complete understanding of combustion hazards
• specialize in BMS design
21 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
• have personally experienced burner light offs on multiple occasions and understand
process heater operation and alarm management
• can understand the uniqueness of every different application and can scrutinize
unforeseen scenarios
• understand the local jurisdictional requirements of BMS design
22 Reliability Experiences with Unsupervised, Naturally Air-Aspirated Pilots with Natural Gas in Proces Heater Burners
