Camille Carpio SPECTOC C31 April 8, 2011 Final Paper Ive Never Camille and Maricon decide to have

e a drinking game called Ive Never wherein, for this paper, let us assume that there is a set of cards with different possible truths on it. Examples will be, I have never French kissed a boy or I have never eaten a burger or I have never fallen on my bum while ice skating or I have never failed a class before. When the game is actually being played, players will have to take a shot if what is written on the card is true for themselves and will not take a shot if it is false for themselves. There is a 50-50 chance that the card that is picked may be true or false. I will try to incorporate this game into the extensive form of the bluff game example given discussed in class. However, instead of nature revealing red or black cards, it will reveal a card that has a 50-50 chance to be true or false to player 1, Camille. Rules: - Each player will each add a shot glass in a pot, instead of putting P1 in a pot - Camille draws a card which is either true or false with equal probability - She will then observe what is written in the card and will choose whether to raise, in this case add another shot, or fold - If she folds, she will win the card is false for her and Maricon will have to take all 2 shots, and will lose if the card is true for her and so she will have to take all 2 shots - If she raises, which make the pot a total of 3 shots, it will be Maricons turn move - Maricon can either meet, or pass - If she passes, she has to take all 3 shots - If she meets, each of them will add another shot to the pot, making it 5 shots in the pot - Maricon wins if the card is true for Camille and Camille will have to take all the shots, and will lose if the card is false for Camille and so she will have to take all the shots The payoffs in this game will be different form the payoffs from the bluff game learnt in class because this game is not about losing the money you put in the pot but about the shots you did not have to take based on the circumstances. The losers payoff will be negative because of the simple fact that she has to be the one to gulp down all the shots and will be calculated by the number of shots her friend added to the pot and the shots she herself added. The winners payoff will be positive because not only did she win and does not have to be the one to gulp down all the shots, she gets to see her friend gulp down the shots she added to the pot, and so the payoff will be calculated by the number she gained from not having to drink the her own shots plus the shots her friend added and had to gulp down herself.

I = {C, M} Hc = {hc hc} Hm = {hm}

For Player i: A (hc) = {F,R} A (hc) = {f,r} A (hm) = {M,P}

Sc = {Ff, Fr, Rf, Rr} Sm = {M, P}

# of shots each person has added: N 1st Step: C-1, M-1 2nd Step: C-2, M-1 3rd Step: Meets: C-3, M-2 Pass: C-2, M-1 -2 Fold C T (1/2) 2 hc Raise M M -5 5 F (1/2) C fold hc raise hm P M 3 5 -3 -5 M P 3 -3 2 -2

M Ff Fr Rf Rr M 0, 0 1.5, -1.5 -1.5, 1.5 0, 0 P 0, 0 0.5, -0.5 2.5, -2.5 3, -3

Calculations: For Camille: (Ff, M) = -2 (0.5) + 2 (0.5) = 0 (Fr, M) = -2 (0.5) + 5 (0.5) = 1.5 (Rf, M) = -5 (0.5) + 2 (0.5) = -1.5 (Rr, M) = -5 (0.5) + 5 (0.5) = 0 (Ff, P) = -2 (0.5) + 2 (0.5) = 0 (Fr, P) = -2 (0.5) + 3 (0.5) = 0.5 (Rf, P) = 3 (0.5) + 2 (0.5) = 2.5 (Rr, P) = 3 (0.5) + 3 (0.5) = 3 For Maricon: (Ff, M) = 2 (0.5) - 2 (0.5) = 0 (Fr, M) = 2 (0.5) - 5 (0.5) = -1.5 (Rf, M) = 5 (0.5) - 2 (0.5) = 1.5 (Rr, M) = 5 (0.5) - 5 (0.5) = 0 (Ff, P) = 2 (0.5) - 2 (0.5) = 0 (Fr, P) = 2 (0.5) - 3 (0.5) = - 0.5 (Rf, P) = 2 (0.5) - 3 (0.5) = -2.5 (Rr, P) = -3 (0.5) - 3 (0.5) = -3

There is no pure Nash Equilibrium. Ff is a strictly dominated strategy, and any combination of Rr and Rf is better than playing Fr. Next step is to find the mixed strategy equilibrium.
M M C Rf Rr P

-1.5, 1.5 0, 0

2.5, -2.5 3, -3

Camille: Plays Rf: 1.5dM (M) + 2.5(1- dM (M)) = - 1.5dM (M) + 2.5 - 2.5dM (M) = 4dM (M) + 2.5 Plays Rr: 0 + 3(1- dM (M)) = 3 - 3dM (M) So, she will only play Rf as long as: 4dM (M) + 2.5 3 - 3dM (M) = dM (M) 0.5 And will play Rr as long as: M (M) < 0.5 Maricon: Plays M: 1.5dC (Rf ) - 2.5(1- dC (Rf )) = 1.5dC (Rf ) - 2.5 + 2.5dC (Rf ) 4dC (Rf ) - 2.5 Plays P: 0 - 3(1- dC (Rf )) = 3dC (Rf ) - 3 So, she will play M as long as: 3dC (Rf ) - 3 4dC (Rf ) - 2.5 dC (Rf ) 0.5 And will only play P when: C (Rf ) < 0.5 So the mixed strategy equilibrium is: NE((0.5Rf + 0.5Rr),(0.5M + 0.5P))

* C = 0.5Rf + 0.5Rr * dM = 0.5M + 0.5P

To write this in behavioral strategy when they are mixing:

* C (R | hC ) = 1 * 1. dC (r | hC ) = 0.5 * dM (M | hM ) = 0.5 * C (R | hC ) = 1 * 3. dC (r | hC ) = 0.5 * dM (P | hM ) = 0.5 * C (R | hC ) = 1 * 2. dC ( f | hC ) = 0.5 * dM (M | hM ) = 0.5 * C (R | hC ) = 1 * 4. dC ( f | hC ) = 0.5 * dM (P | hM ) = 0.5

Anyway, let us think logically for a moment, and notice that if Rf and Rr are better combinations, Maricon will never choose P but instead choose to meet more often than not for the 50-50 chance that Camilles card can be the truth or not and may have the 50-50 chance to see Camille gulp down all 5 shots if she was indeed bluffing. In Camilles case it would be better for her to fold her card if its true and gulp down only 2 shots instead of trying to bluff and drink 5 shots when Maricon chooses meet. But then where is the fun in that? This paper only discusses one round of Ive Never when in fact it is simultaneously and ends when either parties cannot drink anymore.