THINKING

SOCRATICALLY













Bust of Socrates, Roman marble, Louvre museum
Socrates & Euthyphro















Riddle me this, Euthyphro!

The dialogue between Socrates & Euthyphro

Scene: The Hall of the King.
Characters: Socrates, Euthyphro.

The Background

The dialogue is set near the king-archon's court, where the
two men encounter each other. They are both there for
preliminary hearings before possible trials.

Euthyphro has come to lay manslaughter charges against his
father, as his father had allowed one of his workers to die
exposed to the elements without proper care and attention.
This worker had killed a slave belonging to the family estate
on the island of Naxos; while Euthyphro's father waited to
hear from the expounders of religious law (exegetes cf. Laws
759d) about how to proceed, the worker died bound and
gagged in a ditch.


Socrates expresses his astonishment at the
confidence of a man able to take his own father to
court on such a serious charge, even when Athenian
Law allows only relatives of the deceased to sue for
murder.

Euthyphro misses the astonishment, and merely
confirms his overconfidence in his own judgment of
religious/ethical matters.

In an example of "Socratic irony," Socrates states that
Euthyphro obviously has a clear understanding of
what is pious and impious. Since Socrates himself is
facing a charge of impiety, he expresses the hope to
learn from Euthyphro, all the better to defend himself
in his own trial.


The argument

The argument of this dialogue is based largely on "definition
by division". Socrates goads Euthyphro to offer one definition
after another for the word 'piety'. The hope is to use a clear
definition as the basis for Euthyphro to teach Socrates the
answer to the question, "What is piety?", ostensibly so that
Socrates can use this to defend himself against the charge of
impiety.

It is clear that Socrates wants a definition of piety that will be
universally true (i.e., a universal), against which all actions
can be measured to determine whether or not they are pious.

It is equally clear that to be universal, the definition must
express what is essential about the thing defined, and be in
terms of genus, species, and its differentiae (this
terminology is somewhat later than Socrates, made more
famous with Aristotle).

Socrates to Euthyphro

And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you
understand divine things and piety and impiety so
accurately that, in such a case as you have stated, you can
bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself
may be doing something impious?

Tell me what are righteousness and sacrilege with respect
to murder and everything else. I suppose that piety is the
same in all actions, and that impiety is always the opposite
of piety, and retains its identity, and that, as impiety, it
always has the same character, which will be found in
whatever is impious.

Tell me, then, what is piety and what is impiety?


First definition by Euthyphro

Well, then, I say that piety means prosecuting the
unjust individual who has committed murder or
sacrilege, or any other such crime, as I am doing now,
whether he is your father or your mother or whoever he
is; and I say that impiety means not prosecuting him.
And observe, Socrates, I will give you a clear proof,
which I have already given to others, that it is so, and
that doing right means not letting off unpunished the
sacrilegious man, whosoever he may be. Certainly I
do.


Euthyphro: Well, then, what is pleasing to the gods is pious, and
what is not pleasing to them is impious.

Socrates: Come, then, let us examine our statement. The things
and the men that are pleasing to the gods are pious, and the things
and the men that are displeasing to the gods are impious. But piety
and impiety are not the same; they are as opposite as possible
was not that what we said?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: And it seems the appropriate statement?

Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, certainly.

Socrates. Have we not also said, Euthyphro, that there are
quarrels and disagreements and hatreds among the gods?

Euthyphro. We have.

Contd..
Socrates: But what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes
hatred and anger? Let us look at the matter thus. If you and I
were to disagree as to whether one number were more than
another, would that make us angry and enemies? Should we
not settle such a dispute at once by counting?

Euthyphro: Of course.

Socrates: And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of
two things, we should measure them and put an end to the
disagreement at once, should we not?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: And should we not settle a question about the
relative weight of two things by weighing them?

Euthyphro: Of course.
Contd..
Socrates: Then what is the question which would make us
angry and enemies if we disagreed about it, and could not
come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not an answer
ready; but listen to mine. Is it not the question of the just and
unjust, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of the good
and the bad? Is it not questions about these matters which
make you and me and everyone else quarrel, when we do
quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory
agreement?

Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates, it is disagreements about these
matters.

Socrates: Well, Euthyphro, the gods will quarrel over these
things if they quarrel at all, will they not?

Euthyphro: Necessarily.


Contd

Socrates: Then, my good Euthyphro, you say that some of the gods
think one thing just, the others another; and that what some of them
hold to be honorable or good, others hold to be dishonorable or evil.
For there would not have been quarrels among them if they had not
disagreed on these points, would there?

Euthyphro: You are right.

Socrates: And each of them loves what he thinks honorable, and
good, and
just; and hates the opposite, does he not?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: But you say that the same action is held by some of them
to be just, and by others to be unjust; and that then they dispute about
it, and so quarrel and fight among themselves. Is it not so?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: Then the same thing is hated by the gods and
loved by them; and the same thing will be displeasing and
pleasing to them.

Euthyphro: Apparently.

Socrates: Then, according to your account, the same thing
will be pious and impious.

Euthyphro: So it seems.

Euthyphro: But on this point, Socrates, I think that there is
no difference of opinion among the gods: they all hold that if
one man kills another unjustly, he must be punished.

Socrates: What, Euthyphro? Among mankind, have you
never heard disputes whether a man ought to be punished
for killing another man unjustly, or for doing some other
unjust deed?





Euthyphro: Indeed, they never cease from these disputes,
especially in courts of justice. They do all manner of unjust things;
and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid
punishment.

Socrates: Do they admit that they have done something unjust,
and at the same time deny that they ought to be punished,
Euthyphro?

Euthyphro: No, indeed, that they do not.

Socrates:. Then it is not the case that there is nothing which they
will not do and say. I take it, they do not dare to say or argue that
they must not be punished if they have done something unjust.
What they say is that they have not done anything unjust, is it not
so?

Euthyphro:. That is true.



Socrates: We shall know that better in a little while, my good friend.
Now consider this question. Do the gods love piety because it is
pious, or is it pious because they love it? loved by all the gods,
according to your definition?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: Because it is pious, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro: No, because it is pious.

Socrates: Then it is loved by the gods because it is pious; it is not
pious because it is loved by them?

Euthyphro: It seems so.

Socrates: But, then, what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them,
and is in a state of being loved by them, because they love it?

Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Then piety is not what is pleasing to the gods,
and what is pleasing to the gods is not pious, as you say,
Euthyphro. They are different things.

Euthyphro: And why, Socrates?

Socrates Because we are agreed that the gods love piety
because it is pious, and that it is not pious because they love
it. Is not this so?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: And that what is pleasing to the gods because
they love it, is pleasing to them by reason of this same love,
and that they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: Then, my dear Euthyphro, piety and what is
pleasing to the gods are different things. If the gods had
loved piety because it is pious, they would also have loved
what is pleasing to them because it is pleasing to them; but if
what is pleasing to them had been pleasing to them because
they loved it, then piety, too, would have been piety because
they loved it. But now you see that they are opposite things,
and wholly different from each other. For the one is of a sort
to be loved because it is loved, while the other is loved
because it is of a sort to be loved. My question, Euthyphro,
was, What is piety? your wisdom. But, as I say, the wealth of
your wisdom makes you complacent. Exert yourself, my good
friend: I am not asking you a difficult question. I mean the
opposite of what the poet 3 said, when he wrote: You shall
not name Zeus the creator, who made all things: for where
there is fear there also is reverence. Now I disagree with the
poet. Shall I tell you why?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: I do not think it true to say that where there is fear, there also is
reverence. Many people who fear sickness and poverty and other such evils
seem to me to have fear, but no reverence for what they fear. Do you not think
so?

Euthyphro: I do.

Socrates: Now observe the next point. If piety is a part of justice, we must find
out, I suppose, what part of justice it is? Now, if you had asked me just now,
for instance, what part of number is the odd, and what number is an odd
number, I should have said that whatever number is not even is an odd
number. Is it not so?

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: Then see if you can explain to me what part of justice is piety, that I
may tell Meletus that now that I have been adequately instructed by you as to
what actions are righteous and pious, and what are not, he must give up
prosecuting me unjustly for impiety.

Euthyphro: Well, then, Socrates, I should say that righteousness and piety
are that part of justice which has to do with the careful attention which ought to
be paid to the gods; and that what has to do with the careful attention which
ought to be paid to men is the remaining part of justice.
Socrates: And I think that your answer is a good one, Euthyphro.
But there is one little point about which I still want to hear more. I do
not yet understand what the careful attention is to which you refer. I
suppose you do not mean that the attention which we pay to the
gods is like the attention which we pay to other things. We say, for
instance, do we not, that not everyone knows how to take care of
horses, but only the trainer of horses?

Euthyphro: Certainly.

Socrates: For I suppose that the skill that is concerned with horses
is the art of taking care of horses.

Euthyphro: Yes.

Socrates: And not everyone understands the care of dogs, but only
the huntsman.

Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: For I suppose that the huntsmans skill is in the art of taking
care of dogs.
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And the herdsmans skill is the art of taking care of cattle.
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: And you say that piety and righteousness are taking care of
the gods, Euthyphro?
Euthyphro: I do.
Socrates: Well, then, has not all care the same object? Is it not for the
good and benefit of that on which it is bestowed? For instance, you
see that horses are benefited and improved when they are cared for
by the art which is concerned with them. Is it not so?
Euthyphro: Yes, I think so.
Socrates: And dogs are benefited and improved by the huntsmans
art, and cattle by the herdsmans, are they not? And the same is
always true. Or do you think care is ever meant to harm that which is
cared for?
Euthyphro: No, indeed; certainly not.
Socrates: But to benefit it?
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates. Then is piety, which is our care for the gods, intended to
benefit the gods, or to improve them? Should you allow that you
make any of the gods better when you do a pious action?
Euthyphro. No indeed; certainly not.
Socrates. No, I am quite sure that this is not your meaning,
Euthyphro. It was for that reason that I asked you what you meant
by the careful attention which ought to be paid to the gods. I
thought that you did not mean that.
Euthyphro. You were right, Socrates. I do not mean that.
Socrates: Good. Then what sort of attention to the gods will piety
be?
Euthyphro. The sort of attention, Socrates, slaves pay to their
masters.
Socrates. I understand; then it is a kind of service to the gods?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. Can you tell me what result the art which serves a
doctor serves to produce? Is it not health?
Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. And what result does the art which serves a
shipwright serve to produce?
Euthyphro. A ship, of course, Socrates.
Socrates. The result of the art which serves a builder is
a house, is it not?
Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. Then tell me, my good friend: What result will
the art which serves the gods serve to produce? You
must know, seeing that you say that you know more
about divine things than any other man.
Euthyphro. Well, that is true, Socrates.
Socrates. Then piety, Euthyphro, will be the art of
carrying on business between gods and men?
Euthyphro. Yes, if you like to call it so.

Socrates. But I like nothing except what is true. But tell me,
how are the gods benefited by the gifts which they receive
from us? What they give is plain enough. Every good thing
that we have is their gift. But how are they benefited by what
we give them? Have we the advantage over them in these
business transactions to such an extent that we receive from
them all the good things we possess, and give them nothing
in return?
Euthyphro. But do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are
benefited by the gifts which they receive from us?
Socrates. But what are these gifts, Euthyphro, that we give
the gods?
Euthyphro. What do you think but honor and praise, and, as
I have said, what is acceptable to them.
Socrates. Then piety, Euthyphro, is acceptable to the gods,
but it is not profitable to them nor loved by them?
Euthyphro. I think that nothing is more loved by them.
Socrates. Then I see that piety means that which is loved by
the gods.
Euthyphro. Most certainly.

Socrates. Then either our former conclusion was wrong
or, if it was right, we are wrong now.
Euthyphro. So it seems.
Socrates. Then we must begin again and inquire what
piety is. I do not mean to give in until I have found out.
Do not regard me as unworthy; give your whole mind to
the question, and this time tell me the truth. For if
anyone knows it, it is you; and you are a Proteus whom I
must not let go until you have told me. It cannot be that
you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your aged
father for the murder of a laboring man unless you had
known exactly what piety and impiety are. You would
have feared to risk the anger of the gods, in case you
should be doing wrong, and you would have been afraid
of what men would say. But now I am sure that you think
that you know exactly what is pious and what is not; so
tell me, my good
Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think.
Euthyphro. Another time, then, Socratesa. I am in a
hurry now, and it is time for me to be off.

Summing up

Euthyphro offers as his first definition of piety what
he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for
manslaughter. Socrates rejects this because it is
not a definition; it is only an example or instance of
piety. It does not provide the fundamental
characteristic which makes pious things pious.












A great statue of Athena Parthenos, Athena "the
Virgin," was contained in the Parthenon.

Second definition
Euthyphro's second definition: piety is what is pleasing to
the gods.
Socrates applauds this definition because it is expressed in a
general form, but criticizes it on the grounds that the gods
disagree among themselves as to what is 'pleasing'.
This would mean that a particular action, disputed by the
gods, would be both pious and impious at the same time a
logically impossible situation.
Euthyphro tries to argue against Socrates' criticism by
pointing out that not even the gods would disagree amongst
themselves that someone who kills without justification should
be punished but Socrates argues that disputes would still
arise over just how much justification there actually was,
and hence the same action could still be both pious and
impious. So yet again, Euthyphro's 'definition' cannot possibly
be a definition.


Third definition

Euthyphro attempts to overcome Socrates' objection by
slightly amending his second definition. Thus the third
definition reads: What all the gods love is pious, and what
they all hate is impious.
At this point Socrates introduces the "Euthyphro dilemma" by
asking the crucial question: "Is the pious loved by the gods
because it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved by the
gods?"
This is where he sets up his typical dialectic. This Socratic
technique, essentially an analogy or comparison in this
instance, is used to make his question clearer.
He gets Euthyphro to agree that we call a carried thing
"carried" simply because it is carried, not because it
possesses some inherent characteristic or property that we
could call "carried". That is, being carried is not an essential
characteristic of the thing carried; being carried is a state.

Likewise with piety, if defined as "what is liked by the gods"; it
is liked for some reason, not just because it is liked, so that
one likes it, by itself, does not make an action pious. The
liking must follow from recognition that an action is pious, not
the other way around. Thus the piety comes before the liking
both temporally and logically, yet in Euthyphro's definition it is
exactly the other way around. Therefore Euthyphro's third
definition is severely flawed.
To the modern reader, this part of the argument sounds
painfully convoluted. But it had to be written this way,
because there was no standard term at that time for such
grammatical entities as "passive voice". Socrates cannot
simplify his explanation by using the term "passive voice".
Nor can he refer to Aristotle's Categories, which also goes
into great detail on this distinction (treating it as between
simple expressions of state and secondary substances). So
he explains with detailed examples ('carried', 'loved', 'seen')
instead.



Without yet realizing that it makes his definition circular,
Euthyphro at this point agrees that the gods like an action
because it is pious. Socrates argues that the unanimous
approval of the gods is merely an attribute of piety; it is
not part of its defining characteristics. It does not define
the essence of piety, what piety is in itself; it does not
give the idea of piety, so it cannot be a universal
definition of 'piety.'

Fourth definition

In the second half of the discussion Socrates himself
suggests a definition of piety, namely that "piety is a species
of the genus justice'. But he leads up to this with both
observations and questions concerning the difference
between species and genus, starting with:
...are you not compelled to think that all that is
pious is just?

However, as he then points out a little later, this is still not
enough for a definition, since piety belongs to those actions
we call just or morally good. However, there are more than
simply pious actions that we call just or morally good; for
example, bravery, concern for others and so on. What is it,
asks Socrates, that makes piety different from all those other
actions that we call just? We cannot say something is simply
because we believe it to be so. We must find proof.

Euthyphro's response

Euthyphro then suggests that piety is concerned with
looking after the gods, but Socrates immediately raises
the objection that "looking after", if used in its ordinary
sense, which Euthyphro agrees that it is, would imply
that when you perform an act of piety you make one of
the gods better a dangerous example of hubris, which
gods frowned upon. Euthyphro claims that "caring for"
involves service. When questioned by Socrates as to
exactly what is the end product of piety, Euthyphro can
only fall back on his earlier claim: piety is what is loved
by all the gods.

Final definition

Euthyphro then proposes yet again another definition: Piety,
he says, is an art of sacrifice and prayer. He puts forward the
notion of piety as a form of knowledge of how to do exchange:
giving the gods gifts, and asking favours of them in turn .
Socrates presses Euthyphro to state what benefit the gods
get from the gifts humans give to them, warning that this
"knowledge of exchange" is a species of commerce.
Euthyphro objects that the gifts are not that sort of gift at all,
but rather "honour, esteem and favor". In other words, as he
admits, piety is intimately bound up with what the gods like.
The discussion has come full circle. Euthyphro rushes off to
another engagement, and Socrates faces a preliminary
hearing on the charge of impiety.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A REASONABLE DIALOGUE

The openness of the dialogue is the critical factor here.
Because the dialogue is continuous and never closed, it
is always open to revision. If we do not get the results
we anticipate, then we revise our reasoning or our
expectations. We continue our dialogue with each other
and with the world until our results match up with our
expectations and we are able to fulfill our purposes. As
human beings we are continuously revising our
expectations on the basis of the evidence we gather.

The believer in mystery is generally not open to revising
her beliefs. Since the result is a product of mystery,
there are no guidelines for revision.


Obviously we are not going to be able to anticipate
everything that is going to happen. Sometimes, in fact,
we would rather not know.
Life would be deadly dull if we knew exactly what was
about to happen to us. We like the idea of some mystery
in the world.
On the other hand, we like to avoid pain and suffering
when we can. Some people have the attitude that
reason can resolve every problem. This is not the case.
Sometimes there is no right answer, and we must make
a forced choice between unattractive alternatives.
Examples like this are common, for instance, in the
practice of medicine. But the mode of rational inquiry
and of open dialogue has a very good track record in
helping humans fulfill their plans and goals.

To begin our open rational dialogue, we must begin
somewhere. The alternative would be to reason backward
forever and never come to an end/beginning.
We must choose between reasoning on and on, never
coming to a conclusion or we must begin to reason from
some claim for which we give no reasons. Neither alternative
is very satisfactory. One is endless and the other is arbitrary.
The Big Bang theory about the origins of the universe
discussed by Lewis Thomas, exemplifies this age-old
problem.
If you want to know what there was in the universe before the
big bang, physicists cannot tell you. The laws of physics as
we know them began with the big bang. One is left to
wonder:
If reason is so limited, then why try so hard to be
rational?
This philosophical puzzle led the nineteenth-century Danish
philosopher Kierkegaard to claim that all choices rest
ultimately on a leap of faith.
What Kierkegaard meant by this is that if all reasoning begins
from some initial claim, then it would seem that no choice is
wholly rational for each choice rests on an initial assumption
that is not itself justified. Each choice is, therefore, taken on
faith.
Kierkegaard concluded from this that people should choose a
life of faith, not reason. We disagree. While Kierkegaards
point about the limits of reason is well taken, it does not
follow from these limitations that people should choose a life
of faith and mystery, not reason.
People are still usually better off trying to be reasonable.
Open rational dialogue and critical thinking lead to more
successful anticipation of future events and happier
outcomes than does assuming that the world is a mystery
and unknowable.
The rational open dialogue also has the advantage of
being a good way of persuading others to join us in our
plans. It is less likely to have the unpleasant
consequences attendant on the use of force, or threats
of force, which historically have often been used to
persuade others to accept or believe mystery. These
uses of force include excommunication from the tribe,
burning at the stake, threats of death by lightning, etc.
and so on.

The rational dialogue invites, but does not force,
agreement. It relies solely on the power of evidence. It
allowsand even encouragesthe other party to think
critically and to respond critically to that evidence.


To put the matter another way, the way Socrates would
put it: Rational dialogue is the essence of friendship .
The people we talk to and who talk with us are our
friends. When we are friends, we are willing to listen; we
are willing to change our minds when persuaded; we are
willing to go an extra mile to find a common ground.

Most people would agree that being a friend means
sharing. And what could be more important to share than
our thoughts and beliefs? To do this we must talk
together.

There is more than irony in Socrates words when he
refers to Euthyphro as his friend each time Euthyphro
wants to go away and end the dialogue.
Exercises
1-I
1. What is the hallmark of the rational person?
2. What are the five limitations of human reason?
3. Give three reasons why rational approaches generally work better than non-
rational
approaches.
4. How would your explanation differ if:
a) you were explaining to your best friend why your computer was not
performing as you expected?
b) you were explaining to your best friend why you just bought a new
Corvette?
1II
1. Find an example in a recent newspaper of an event attributed to mystery, that
is, something that cannot be known. Give an explanation of why it is considered
a mystery.
2. Bring in two different accounts of the same event, which are told from very
different cultural perspectives. You could use the Internet for this.
3. Why do you love your girlfriend/boyfriend? Is this an example of reasonable
behavior or an affair of the heart? Explain.
4. Mr. Ruschi died soon after his session with the shamans. Does that
information change your earlier interpretation of that event? If so, how?
5. Do you think there are events for which there are no rational explanations?
Why or why not?