TF Iron

Operation Iraqi Freedom

07-09

28 October 2007 – 9 December 2008

The overall classification of this briefing is
as of 28 Jan 09 UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
V2.3
 MND-N Provincial Orientation
•7 Provinces, 4 w/ CF presence TURKEY
•3 International Borders
–180 mi border w/ Turkey
–175 mi border w/ Syria SYRIA
–300 mi border w/ Iran IRAN
•Population: ~10,200,000 (6.3 in MND-N)
•48 Districts (23 in MND-N)

MD

CT
Ninewa (~2.6 mil)
Kirkuk (~1.1 mil)

VT
475 km

NJ
Salah ad Din (~1.1 mil)
JRTC/NTC
Comparison

Diyala (~1.5 mil) 450 km

 Sunni/Shia Insurgency in MND-N
Categorization of Groups

Sunni Extremists
• Driven by Salafist ideology
• Anti-Everybody
• Non-reconcilable
• Indiscriminate targeting of local nationals

Shi’a Extremists
• Anti-Coalition
• Non-reconcilable
• Pursuit of military means to drive
Sunni Rejectionists
• Desires return of Sunni/Ba’ath government out occupation forces, counter /
• Rejects current GoI, Coalition “occupation” eliminate Sunni influence
• Non-reconcilable
• Focused targeting of Coalition /Shi’a security
forces

Sunni Nationalists
• Open to participation in current GoI if conditions are “right”
• Willing to reintegrate into GoI security apparatus
• Some cells focused targeting of Coalition Forces
 MND-N Terrain & Weather
•4 River Systems TURKEY
–Tigris River Valley
–Diyala River Valley
–Uzaym River Valley
SYRIA
–Zaab Rivers 475 km

•Lake Thar Thar (Man-made) KRG

MOSUL IRAN
TAL AFAR
Sinjar Ridge
IRBIL
•2 Mountain Ranges
–Hamrins
–Sinjar Ridge

•Barren Deserts KIRKUK

–Jazirah HAWIJAH
–Jalam
Ha
mr
BAYJI in
•10 Major Cities Mo TUZ
un
tai
ns
TIKRIT
•Weather
QARA TAPA
–Temps (35oF – 115oF)
KANAQIN
–Dust (Shamal/Haboob) SAMARRA JALULA

MUQDADIYAH
BALAD

BAQUBAH

450 km
 MND-N
Demographics
Dahuk
• 3 Major religious /
ethnic groups
Mosul
Rabiah Irbil
1,750,000
• Turkoman and Yizidi Sinjar
ethnic minorities Tal Afar Mosul Irbil
900,000
Tal Afar
• Small minority of 130,000
Christians Makhmur
Ninewa Hawijah
• KRG boundary v 80,000
Kirkuk
Kirkuk850,000
Kurdish region Hawijah Sulaymaniyah
900,000
Bayji
• Most diverse Bayji Sulaymaniah
Kirkuk
population in Iraq 145,000
Tuz Khurmatu
Salah ad Din

Ethnicities Tikrit Kifri

147,000 Samarra
Kurds 189,000 Khanaqin
Sunni Arab
Muqdadiyah
Mixed Kurd/Sunni Arab Balad 84,000
Iraq 122,000
Shia Arab Demographics
Demographics Diyala
Mandali
Baqubah
Mixed Shia/Sunni Arab
350,000
Turkoman/Yizidi/other
 MND-N Tribal Overview
Kurdish Tribes
•7 confederations, but
Barzani Tribe constitutes the majority of KDP
over a hundreds sub- leadership.
tribes Talabani Tribe constitutes the majority of the PUK
•Tribal identity vs leadership
– National identity
– Religious identity
– Ethnic identity Shammar The Obeidi Tribe:
Confederation: • Obeidi Tribe does
•Tribal law vs GoI • Shia/Sunni
authority not currently
recognize a single
•Cross boundary tribes supreme Sheikh
– Smuggling
– FF&E Facilitation Tikriti tribes: Janabi
• Sunni Confederation:
•Tribal feuds • Shia/Sunni
– Resources • Nearly 1 million
Al-Jaburi
– Honor members total
Confederation:
• Confederation claims • 8 tribes
•Tribal control of
economic centers over two million Sunni
and Shia confederates Dulaym
Confederation:
• Shia/Sunni
 The Kurdish “Factor”
Current Status:
• Delayed UNAMI Assessment

..
- “Strategic Ambiguity”
• Khanaqin Standoff
TAL AFAR

Concerns: SINJAR
• Continued GoI/KRG tension
• Peshmerga/IA coordination

.
• Elections law passed – status
of Kirkuk still not resolved
• UNAMI DIBs proposal KIRKUK

Expected Flashpoints (IA-

.
Pesh Confrontation):
• Khanaqin District
• Kirkuk District
• Sinjar District
KHANAQIN
• Tal Afar District

LEGEND
LEGEND
Kurdish Influence
Kurdish Influence
Current Green Line
Current Green Line
(GoI Recognized/TAL)
(GoI Recognized/TAL)
Kurdish Claims
Kurdish Claims
 Energy Infrastructure
• Both hydroelectric and oil-fired Habur Gate POE
plants produce the region’s power Dahuk

• Lack of electricity is often the Irbil

limiting factor in other Rabiyah POE
MND-NEMullah Abdullah Northern
infrastructure performance
Power Plant Gas Company
•Kirkuk Oil Fields and the Bayji Oil Ninewa Kirkuk Oil Fields
Refinery are the principle means
of production in MND-N
IZ-TU Pipeline Sulaymaniyah
• Each piece of the oil
Kirkuk
infrastructure is critical to the Bayji Power
operation of the overall network Plant Stabilization
Plants
#1 & #2

Oil Pipelines Muntheria POE

Salah ad Din
Pumping Stations
Diyala
Processing Treatment
Naft Khana
Power Plant Bayji Oil GOSP
Refinery
Dams

Oil & Gas Fields

Powerlines
 Lines of Communication
Key Bridges in MND-N
Operational
1 1 Shillal Bridge
2 Mosul Dam Bridge
2 15 Samarra Dam Bridge
3
12 Sarha Bridge
5 4 Quwair Bridge
6
Rail line through Mosul Repairs Underway
6 3
Aski-Mawsil Bridge (ongoing, ECD FEB 09)
7 Quayarah Bridge (ongoing, ECD MAR 09)
7
8 Ash Sharqat Bridge (ongoing, ECD MAR 09)
8 11 Zekhaiton Bridge (ongoing, ECD FEB 09)
13 Baqubah Bridge (contracted, ECD TBD)
16 Samarra Float Bridge (ongoing, ECD DEC 08)
9
10 5 Badush-Siboni Bridge (ongoing, ECD JAN 09)
11
9 Fathah Bridge (ongoing, ECDMAR 10)
12 Unrepaired
4
Darnajukh Bridge
10
Fathah Railroad Bridge
14
Buhriz Bridge
15
16 15 Sindiyah Bridge
15
Heavy Railroad Track status: 13
Obstructions
Operational 14
Needs to be tested
Non-operational (blocked or needs repairs)
No GoI plan to open
Rail is on or next to MND-N base
The Threat in MND-
N
 TF Iron’s 1st Month
400 Week Ending Week Ending
Region # Change
16-Nov-07 23-Nov-07
MND-BAGHDAD 60 64 4
350 TF Iron
MND-C 66 51 -15
TOA MND-CS 1 3 2
MND-N 232 270 38
300 MND-NE 0 0 0
MNF-W 23 29 6
MND-SE 11 16 5

250

200

150

100

50

MND-B MND-C MND-CS MND-N MND-NE MNF-W MND-SE

12-Week Attack Trends by MND/F (Sep – Nov 2007)

 Insurgency in Iraq
EFFECTIVE ENEMY ATTACKS /
TURKEY
TOTAL ENEMY ATTACKS 0 Attack on CF
Habur Gate
MND-NE 0 / 0 Rabyah 0 Attack on ISF
Dahuk
MND-N 12 / 31 Tall Afar 1
MND-B 4 / 9 1 Mosul Irbil 0 Attack on Civilians
MNF-W 0 / 0 0 Attack on Infrastr.
MND-C 1 / 13 Kirkuk Sulaymaniya
Hawijah
MND-CS 0 / 1 Bayji
MND-SE 0 / 2 Tikrit
SYRIA Al Qaim
IRAN
TOTAL 17 / 56 Rawah
Samarra
Husaybah Hadithah
1 1
1 Baqubah
Balad
1 Muqdadiyah
Al Asad
Hit 2 2 2 2 0 0
Fallujah 1 1
Diyala

Ramadi Baghdad
Baghdad Baghdad
Al Walid
Ar Rutbah
Hindiyah
1
N. Babil
Iskandariyah
Karbala Al Kut
Al Hillah
An Nukhayb Najaf / Kufah Diwaniyah Al Amarah

Samawah

Nasiriyah Qurnah

Basrah
SafwanMNC-I C2Basrah
INTSUM
31 OCT 2007
Umm Qasr
KUWAIT 
1 TF Iron KIA
st
st
Kuwait City
SAUDI ARABIA CPT Timothy McGovern
 MND-N Threat
Key Conditions in Oct ‘07
Security Ex AQI Presence

Inf tern AQI Support Zone

• Surge in Baghdad and Anbar driving fight lue al JAM Presence

to MND-N nc
e JAM SG Sanctuary

• AQI dominant threat; organized, lethal,

capable Mosul Attacks
• Foreign Fighter and external support
networks a significant influence in MND-N
• Enemy finance, media capable & effective UBE

• Vast ungoverned areas, limited CF/ISF

RPG’s Propa ne Tanks
SVEST
Weapons Cache of Various Ordnance Material

RKG-3M

8 ft

4ft
presence
Projectiles encased in
E FP’s BBIED
BBIE D (Talon
(Talon view)
view) Deep Buried IED Crate r IRL’s MAIED concrete to look like curb

Threat Capabilities
Zaab

Provincial Governance Triangle

Attack Trends
• PGov/GoI disconnect; strong perception
of Shi’a bias and neglect
• Lack of PGov capacity in Ninewa, Diyala,
SaD; public confidence in PGov low
• IP capacity and capability low; IA bar g
capabilities improving l An nin
A ake External
• Kurd concerns over Article 140 deadline
(DEC 07) Aw Influence
d
Economic Stability hda
g
• Lack of budget execution and release of Ba urge
funds across all provinces S
Reconciliation
• High unemployment, lack of capital • Population begins turning away from AQI/violence
generation and opportunities • CLC (SoIZ) well established in Diyala; indication of tribal/local CLC
interest in Za’ab region, southern Salah ad Din
• BOR corruption and poor oil distribution • Indications of insurgent group (JARF-1920s, JM) fledgling interest in
linked to AQI extortion, funding activities cease-fire, political participation
• No DDR or reconciliation measures in place
TF Iron Operations
 XX XX XX XX DOC XX
TF Iron MND-N 1 2 3 4 5
IGFC IGFC IGFC IGFC

X X X (-) X X (-) X X X
MP
1 101 3 1 4 ooo 2 1 10 4 1 1 142 111 728OPCON
(-) A HHB
1-327 4-9 ooo
1-1 H /142
5-73 1-87 1-9 1 CE
431 CA
FSE OPCON
2-1 ooo
25ID
2-327 6-9 2-22 2-7 4-6 19 CH
(-) HQ/
2-12 C/1-14 TAB EOD
(-)
1-32 1-12 1-71 5-82 3-1 ASLT
II
184
DS
BTB
1-6/ 5 5
2-23 3-6 4 STB
STB C/1-14 TAB
TAB II
2-320
ooo
2-1 GS TAB
TAB
TAB
II
(-) TAB 25 STB
1AD STB
BTB 27 BSB
202 BSB
426 BSB
1-38 ooo
3 1-3/ ADCON
1-6 H-26 TAB
(-) (-) TAB
TAB
BTB 1051
325 BSB
BSTB 3 II EASOS
601 ASB
101 1001 1000 25
(-) 1-4/ 431 CA DS
215 BSB CA
A/431 EOD A/1-14 TAB
OPCON CA 115 MPAD B/425 18
DS
TAB TAB
TAB
ADCON FOR UCMJ II
(-)
5 5
C/431 CA B/431 CA
(-) 717th EOD
1040 ODIN
1050 OPCON DS
OPCON
I ATTACHED TENANT UNIT
7-9
EOD
1060 B/401 CA 506
EOD
237 FSB
DS
DS DS
557 USAF
332
EOD 725
EOD
5-25 EASOS 25-25
EASOS
SPECTRE 5 x US BCTs
DS DS Attached to:
EASOS
EASOS
X x
(-)
TACON
21 x US BNs MND-B
14-25 BLUE 4 9 2 4 9-25 EASOS
DS X X
(-)
TACON X (-) xx
DS (-)
II II
AA NP
NP
x 3 2 3 3/2 3 1/3
9-25
EASOS 2 9 3 III
X X xx
DS
II
3 4 xx 2 MTR II II II
NP
NP
2 NP 4
(-) 3 2/5 x 2 TACON 3 2/4 4 2/4 3 2/2
6 4 xxx
5 Partnered 1
x x (-) II SIB
SIB
SIB
I
SIB
SIB 1BDE
1 4 2 1,2,3,4,5, BN ALB
2 2/1 6, 7, 13 SIB
9,10 BN 8, 12, 18, 20 BN Partnered Partnered Partnered
TACON Effective 28 OCTOBER 07
 TF Iron Stance
October 2007
TURKEY Dahuk

SYRIA PRT Irbil

XX
3
RRT IRAN
XX
4
2

PRT
Ninewa
Sulaymaniyah
Salah ad Din Kirkuk

PRT
XX
4

XX
3
5
PRT ePRT

Diyala
 MND-North Mission
Transitions

Operation Northern Law (October 2007):

TF Lightning conducts counter-insurgency
operations to enhance population security and
governance throughout MND-N IOT: develop
credible and capable ISF; defeat terrorists and
insurgents and neutralize extremists; legitimize
provincial and local governments; and contain
political and sectarian violence.

Operation Iron Resolve (January 2008):

TF Iron in partnership with Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF), Northern Provincial Leaders, and the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), conducts
counterinsurgency operations by supporting the
security of the population and by assisting in the
development of a legitimate GOI throughout MND-N
OLD IRO
in order to transition to a N SIDESand self-reliant Iraq.
stable
 Hajj Voter Ramadan Hajj
Iron Hammer Iron Reaper Iron Harvest Registration Iron Pursuit
2007
2007 2008
2008
October November December January February March April May June July August September October November December
28 Oct 0311Dec
15 Dec
Dec 0515 Jan 01 Feb
Jan 15 Mar 01 Apr 29 01
May Jun 15 Aug 15 Oct 2707 Oct
05 Nov22 01Nov
28 Dec
Nov
09 Dec
4-9 IN TOA with 1/2 SCR to •• •
1-67
TAO 2 SCR
AR to
Tripoli
1/101/25
1/101ID
Active
MTN 1MND-NE
ID
ABN
(MNF-
CABto to
MND-N 3/1CD(-)
4/1 CD toto 4/2
3/2 1-8 IN to 1-71 CAV(+)
ID
3 SCR
ACR(-) 142 FiB to 75TAO
FiB Mameluke 111
4/2EN
ID to
to 18
2 SCR(-)
EN MND-N
2/25 IDOPCON to 26 Aug TOA
TOA TOA to Diyala
TOA Mosul TOA Active (MNF-W) TOATOA Mosul Arrive FOB Depart
W) 3/25
10 MTN
EOM
ID TOA
CAB
Battlespace 4-6 CAV to 6-17 CAV •2/3
• ACR to Mosul
TF 714 TAO McHenry
AO Ligtning
(No Backfill)
and
TOA TAO
TOA
TOA
MND-N Stance 06 Dec Realignment with
MND-B
01 Apr 15 Jul Striker •18 EN
Kirkuk
Mameluke
to
(KLE)
Inactive
2/3 ACR
AO Lightning TAO Ends
to Diyala A
Active (TF 525)
XX Striker
1-9 4-6 L
2-7
(+) 1 25

1-5
OPCON
OPCON to
to TF714
TF714
3 25
5-82 1-24
2-27
AO Lightning
A

1-6 L 3-21
(-) 2-35

TAO Tripoli 1-87 2-22

3-6
5-1
3-4

TAO Mameluke 3-7

2-8
1-67
A
1-327
6-17 L
728 MP
448 CA 1-71
75 142

2
18 X 111 II
1-8 2-327
10 X 2 ooo
2
II
A
1 6-9 4 ooo
2
3-3 H 3-8 1-38 II
3 A

2-320 1-12 5 2
1-1 H
2-23 (-)
2-10 ASLT From
1 3 2-1
1
25 2-82 1-32 MND-B
2-1 GS
4-9
2 3 3-10 GS
2-12
TAO Striker 14xBN
15xBN
16xBN
17xBN
18xBN
20xBN
A 3-1 ASLT
II II 2/1 AD(-)
3 3 6-6 L
3 ooo
21 ooo
2 OIF 07-09
 OIF 07-09
Assessments
TF Iron Remembers Enabling TF Iron
Iron Observations
OCT 07 NOV 07 DEC 07 JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08 MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08 SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08
HAJJ ASHURA GEN Petraeus Testimony RAMADAN HAJJ
MI-17 Water Tanker Khanaqin Standoff
Qayarrah Bridge Crash Rabiyah POE SVEST Attack PGOV’s Son
Archbishop Kidnapped PB Bushmaster VBIED OH-58D MND-NE
Hood Harvest Crash
MND-N Fratricide Zanjili Explosion Shi’a Pilgrimage (Samarra)
STANCE COP Inman SVBIED Kirkuk Demonstration/IED

HAMMER HYDRA
Secure REAPER ROUNDUP IRON RHYTHM
Environment TF Iron
HARVEST PHASE II PURSUIT PH II PH III
TAO TAO BDA
CLC Contracts AO Lightning DoI Graduation Tripoli
Mameluke
Enduring Effects

Capable IRON PARTNERSHIP

Regional Tng Ctr 3IA Air Assault Kirkuk IP Graduation ISF/CF
NiOC United & Just I U&J II U&J III MPSA OPs
ISF
LION’S ROAR MoTS IA/IP Soccer GToB MoTS II
IRON MUSALAHA
Economic IRON MAMMOTH
Energy Conferences United & Prosperous Salah ad Din Visit
Stability
#1 #2 #3 Energy Conf #4 Energy Conf #5 Drought Relief

Functioning Rule of Law IRAQI VOICE PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III

Provincial United & Healthy Women’s Conference MROC
Government U&S II U&S III
United &Strong I
8k 8.5k 15.5k 15k 16.5k 20k 24.5k 32k 31.5k 30.5k 30k 29.5k 27.5k 27.5k 27.5k
SoIZ
508 518 565 1k 1.5k 2.5k 2.5k 3k 3k 3k
DDR
Attack Trends
 OIF 07-09
Operational Assessment
 Operational Assessments
October 2007 December 2008

Challenges to “Hold” and “Build” What Changed

• Effects of surge in Baghdad/southern Iraq and + 80% decline in attacks
+ 79% reduction in improvised explosives
awakening movement in Al Anbar pushed AQI east
+ 43,000 increase in Iraqi Security forces
and north into MND-N. + Sons of Iraq growth 26,415
• MND-N remained an economy of force during surge in + DDR - CF cease fire ~3000
Baghdad. Challenges transitioning to “Build”
• Many key population centers were “unsecure” in - Only 73% 07 budget received; only 19% 08 budget received
northern Iraq. - Slow economic expansion
- Police primacy (hiring/training) 16,000 IPs still untrained
• AQI retained freedom of maneuver in northern - Sons of Iraq transfer to GoI progressing slowly
provinces. - Border focus
• CLC (Sons of Iraq) recruiting still immature in MND-N. - Elections issues
• Weak government institutions – provincial and GoI. - Kurd influences
 Changes in Public Perception
Change
Public Perceptions % October 07 % December 08 (Oct-Dec)

Confidence in Prov Gov’t to provide security? 5.3% 64.3% 59.0%

Public Confidence in IP in MND-N ? Positive Response Positive Response

49.1% 84.5% 35.4%

Public Confidence in IA in MND-N? Positive Response Positive Response

51.3% 81.7% 30.4%

Current Household financial status (have enough)? 51.2% 73.4% 22.2%

Is the Govt making efforts to improve job 3% 25.7% 22.7%

opportunities?

Is the sewage disposal system working? 14.9% Yes 26.4% Yes 11.5%

Is there trash collection in your neighborhood? 10.5% Yes 36.6% Yes 26.1%

Does your family get the electricity you need? 15.4% Yes 32.6% Yes 17.2%

Likelihood to Vote? 39.3% 71.0% 31.7%

Source: MNC-I National Public Opinion Poll

 Security
• 80% reduction in total attacks
– 79% reduction in IEDs; 76% reduction in Direct Fire attacks; 86% reduction in
IDF attacks
– 89% reduction in CF KIA; 74% reduction in ISF KIA; 42% reduction in Civ KIA
• (S/MCFI) The enemy isolated and off balance
– Driven from population centers / support zones
– Finance and recruiting efforts disrupted
• (S/MCFI) Enemy no longer a threat to legitimacy and survival of GoI
– High-level captures has left AQI fractured and decentralized
– Targeting of Shi’a extremists has degraded their operational capability
– While disrupted, Sunni rejectionists continue attempts to infiltrate GOI, ISF
and other Iraqi institutions

Operation
Operation
Iron Hammer MND-N Attacks: Oct 07 - Oct 08
2000
Operations
Operations Iron
Iron
Harvest II, Lion’s
1651
1548 1555 Roar, MoTS I Operation
1500 1488
1376 1412 Iron
1301
Operation Pursuit
Iron
Iron Reaper
Reaper Mother of
1000 909 908 Two Springs II
882 864 857 879 854
806 812 814
739 753
580 607 635
562
500 484 518 470
382
Operation Iron Operation
Operation 273 326
Harvest I Iron
Iron Musalaha
Musalaha 179
0
Oct NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Total Attacks IED Events

 MND-N EOF Trends
MND-N Total and Serious Injury, Death, or Damage (SIDD) EOFs

100 • 8 EOFs for OCT 08 is a decrease of 2 from

90 Total EOF
80
Incidents SEP 08; the lowest month of incidents; and a
with
70 Weapons 86% decrease since TOA.
60 Discharged

50
65 56 • Two SIDD incidents resulted in two LNs
32 Total EOF
40
25
resulting in wounded and one killed.
43 SIDD
30 20 13 19
20 29 10
7 8 24 8 8
10 7 5 5 5 1 3 2
1 1 3 2
0
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV Graduated Measures
Employed in October

Number of LNs Injured or Killed in MND-N EOFs

15 14%
Overall
WND/KLD
10 10
LN WND
10 9
86%

6 LN KLD
6 5 5
5 64 4 5 4
3 3
4 Property
2 23 2 2 Damage Shot to Kill First Step
3 23 1 1 11 1 1 12 Shot to Disable/Warn as First Step
2 0 1 11
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 One Non-Lethal
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV Two or More Non-Lethal Graduated Steps
 MND-N EOF Trends
EOF Incidents by Weapon Type (%)

• Nearly half of all EOF incidents in October

80 INDIVIDUAL
involved the use of individual weapons.
75 70
65 63 62 • No crew-served weapons incidents in
59
61 55 67 60
CREW October resulted in a SIDD.
47 49 SERVED
38 53 • Bastogne had a slight increase in EOF
27 29 32 38 37 31 incidents. Brave Rifles had a significant
28 37 UNKNOWN
20 20 decrease.
1020
8 7
7 0 14
5 12 0 0
7 4MAR 3
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV

Trends by BCT AO
40 38 35 Salah ad Din
35
30
25 Kirkuk
21
20 18
15 17 16 Diyala
16 11
10 10 14
5 7 9 5 10 7 7 6
63 3 7 6 7 10 5
5
2 3 3 7 2 1 1 24 1 6 13
1 2
4 11 Ninewa
0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV
 MND-N Detainee Trends
• Captured: 5,370 detainees
• BCT Releases: 1,541 detainees
• Transfer to ISF: 894 detainees
• Sent to Theater Internment Facility: 2,920 detainees
• Released from Theater Internment Facility: 5,711 detainees
1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Jan-
Oct Nov Dec Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
08
Captures 453 439 532 408 383 353 403 367 396 294 436 392 329 185
BCT Release 151 173 127 109 115 56 92 137 117 79 110 83 112 80
Transfer to ISF 95 53 125 136 63 69 66 51 43 31 50 45 41 26
Sent to TIF 312 178 214 215 216 183 206 248 177 210 238 222 224 77
Release from TIF 328 485 258 289 95 315 255 504 441 450 460 884 510 437
CCCI Referals 129 95 144 101 94 100 70 97 121 90 62 132 113 0
 MND-N Iraqi Security Forces
October 2007 – December 2008

ISF Service October ’07 December ‘08 Change

Iraqi Army 43,000 63,800 +20,500
(IA)

Iraqi Police 56,000 76,000 +19,200

Service (IPS)

NP National 3,500 5,500 +2,000

Police (NP)
Dept of Border
Enforcement
5,600 5,500 -100
(DBE)
Strat.
Infrastructure
9,300 10,750 +1,450
BNs (SIBs)
 ISF Logistics

• Fielding's:
• M16’s – 19,150 fielded
• M1114s (UAH) – over 900 fielded
• Badgers W/ILAV – 16 fielded
• Symphony (IA CREW System) – 12 systems fielded
• Radios’ – 55 SINCGARS/ 45 ASIPS fielded

• Capabilities: :
• Minimized CF support /expenditures to the ISF by 85% saving
roughly $385,000
• Improved Class IX parts distribution (PLL established at unit level)
• Enhanced Code-Out procedures; over 400 packets pending
approval with MoD
• Class III (B) self sustain without any CF support
 Provincial Government
Capacity
• Significant progress, but a long way to go:
– Provincial governments and GoI improving ties and
cooperation
– Reconstruction efforts critical to stability
– Delivery of essential services remains inadequate
• Sewage, trash collection, and electricity viewed as
unavailable
– Budgeting and cash flow challenges remain
– Improved perceptions of provincial governments:
• OCT 07 – 5.3% favorable; Oct 08 – 61.3% favorable

U&J I United &

U&S III Healthy PM to Mosul U&P II U & S IV
Energy Energy
U&S II U&P I Mosul Security Conf. Women’s Conf.
U&S I Conf. Rule of Law
Conf. U&J II

JAN 08 FEB 08 MAR 08 APR 08 MAY 08 JUN 08 JUL 08 AUG 08 SEP 08 OCT 08 NOV 08 DEC 08
 Economics Environment
• Unemployment remains high – 68.7%
• Lack of investment capitol
• Drought
– MND-N coordinated for $8.5 M in drought relief
efforts to purchase modern irrigation systems,
seed, and “hoop houses”
• Some Successes
– Coordinate for $28.7 Million in small business
grants and loans (MoIM/MoLSA)
– Civil Service Corps – produced 50,000 jobs
• Banking system improving with new branches
opening, some with ATM and Electronic Funds
Transfer capabilities
• More people have positive perception of
individual financial status
– OCT 07 – 51.2% (had enough); DEC 08 – 61.1%
Enabling & Sustaining
TF Iron
 TF Iron ISR Support
MISSION. Provide multi-discipline Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to TF
IRON and partnered Iraqi Security Forces to enable support to ground operations and to
enable the Government of Iraq, Provincial and Local Leaders to provide essential services,
improved governance, and economic revitalization.
Full Motion Video (hours) DOMEX Reporting
•Ground Operations – 14,159.5
•CIED/CIDF – 14,567.25 Documents – 2744
•Target Development – 14,226.5 Media – 2562 items
•Total hours – 42,953 CELLEX – 1022 items

Still Imagery (images)

•U2 – 21,068
•Global Hawk – 20,495 Collection Priorities
•TACRECCE – 1,069 1. Ground Operation
2. CIED/CIDF/Cache
3. Target Development
4. Sectarian Activity
HUMINT Reporting 5. Infiltration Routes

SPOT Reports:  316

DIIR: 10500
SIR:  6711 AIR ASSETS
SIGINT Reporting
KB:  1190 TACREPS – 6,762
Sources evaluated:  80 KL – 7558
SYNC MATRIX Tippers – 186
 MND-N Aviation Support
OCT 07 – DEC 08
MOSUL - MAREZ  
1-1 (AH-64D) 7
6-17 (OH-58D) 10
Operations
KIRKUK   TST 613
2-1 (UH-60L) 3
1-6 (OH-58D) 20 Air Assaults 199
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 3
6-17 (UH-60L) 5 BFC 4,248
TAL AFAR - SYKES  
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 3 Personnel moved 127,012
6-17 (OH-58D) 10
Cargo Moved (TONS) 5,875
6-17 (UH-60L) 6
Total Missions 27,153
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 2
AMRs Supported 40,389
TIKRIT- SPEICHER  
MEDEVAC Missions 1,288
1-1 (AH-64D) 17
Patients EVACd 2194
1-6 /6-17(OH-58D) 20
3-1/2-1 (UH-60L) 34
2-1 (CH-47D) 12
2-1 (HH-60A MED) 4
SAFIRES
Unit SAFIRES Effective
4-6 CAV 73 14
Hours Flown TF 1-6 11 1
Type Hours Total Hours by MND TF 1-1 24 1
AH-64D 27,287 Division Hours
OH-58D 64,922 MND-N 144,362 2-1 GSAB 14 2
UH-60 42,146 MND-B 61,314 TF 3-1 35 4
CH-47 7,849 MND-C 91,127 TF 6-17 9 1
HH-60 2,158 CORPS 53,584 TF ODIN 4 0
 MND-N MRAP Fielding
MND-N MRAP O/H MND-N MRAP
Units Type Issued
O/H
Units Type Issued
1/101 AH I
372 372 1/101 RG-33L 12
(IBCT) Caiman 26
(IBCT) MP+ 14
1/10 AH I 357 357
(IBCT) Caiman 18 EN RG-33L 1 1
1-67 AR Caiman + 87 87
1-67 AR RG-33L 3 3
1/25
BAE II 50 50
(SBCT)
1/25 RG-33L 4
3 ACR 25
IMG I 305 305 (SBCT) MP+ 21
(HBCT+)
115
3 ACR RG-33L 12
Div Trps/ BAE II 30
2 117 (HBCT+) MP+ 18
18 EN Cougar II
MND-N
MND-N
Mixed 1288 1288 Mixed 85 85
Total Total
HAGA – Heavy Armored Ground Ambulance
MRAP fielding began 5 Nov 07 for MND-N
(RG-33L & Maxx Pro + Amb)
 Good Stewardship
Only the tip of ACCOMPLISHMENTS
IMPLEMENTATION OF
the iceberg! Over 220,000 excess CL II,
Command emphasis on command
III(P), IV, V, VI, VII, and IX
supply discipline in combat
Quarterly FRAGOs directing returned to the DoD system
inventories/excess scrubs of CL VII
DEC 08 Dollar value returned =
over $88 million
(major end items)
Implementation of Mobile
Redistribution Teams (MRTs) for
CL II, III(P), IV, VI, and IX items

RECOMMENDED WAY AHEAD

As troop reductions occur, requirements to
determine disposition of commercial off the
shelf (COTS) and government purchased
Items (i.e. ICOMs, computers, UGSs)

 How do we draw down equipment in theater

OCT 07 ICW troop drawdowns?
•Drawdown troops or contractors first?
-Drives equipment pushes out of theater
DIRECTIVE
-Drives CONUS-based RESET programs
Reduce and clean up •The “pipe” out of theater is only so big!
the MND-N
footprint
Programs to ease complexity to retrograde
LOG Metrics equipment in theater, such as mobile one-stop
Teams for CDRs/supply SGTs to turn-in equipment
 MND-N Fire Support
OCT 07 – DEC 08
Multiple Launch Rocket System
Excalibur
MND-N Fire Missions = 4372 GMLRS
- HE = over 17,200 rds
- GMLRS = 66
- Excalibur = 7

Kinetic Strike Packages = 47

- Executed 30 (22 x CAS, 8 x
GMLRS, 3 x both)

ASRs = 7200 were supported

Fire Missions by Province

4372

3096

M109A6 Paladin
155mm Howitzer (SP)

671 581

24
 Close Air Support Roll-up
OCT 07 – DEC 08
MND-N Sorties ISO TICs:
676
TICs w/ Drops: 145
TIC’s w/ SOF: 68

BDA
CACHE: 14
EKIA: 156
EWIA: 9
VBIED: 18
HBIED: 74
IED: 11

Munitions Dropped
GBU-38: 284
GBU-31: 68
GBU-12: 74
 MND-N Base Camps
MND-N Engineers constructed 22 Coalition
bases across northern Iraq since OCT 07.

MND-N Bases
135 Total
COB
COS
COL
Corps
IA w/MiTT
** IA & ISF bases not
HESCOs of Freedom shown
 Engineer Mobility Reserve
TF Iron Engineers established an Engineer Mobility Reserve (EMR) for MND-N. The EMR consists of 2 x
AVLBs, 1 x MV-4, 2 x Panthers, 2 x MICLICs, 4 Wolverines, 4 x REBs, and 1 HET. The reserve is
maintained by the Division Engineer Brigade (111th and 18th) and is used as the Division Reserve Mobility
package. BCTs can request the reserve equipment and personnel ISO breaching and clearing operations
where BCTs have limited internal capabilities. The reserve has been used for Operation Iron Harvest,
Operation Iron Pursuit, and clearing operations along ASR Golden and the Siniyah Berms.

AVLB - Mosul Panther in use - Diyala

WOLVERINE Employment - Diyala

MICLIC employment - Diyala
 Culvert Denial & Crater
Repair
• MND-N Construction Engineers since TOA:
– repaired 2820 craters on MSRs, ASRs, and BCT and BN routes
– Denied 365 culverts on MSRs, ASRs, and BCT and BN routes
Crater repair – 326thEN BN, 18th EN BDE

Culvert Denial Mission – 94th EN BN, 18th EN BDE

 Route
Clearance
Route Clearance Patrols across MND-N from Oct 07 – Dec 08:
– Found and Cleared 1,300 IEDs
– Cleared over 1 million kilometers of ASRs, MSRs and BCT and BN routes
– EOCA qualified SAPPERs reduced over 1,000 UXOs and IEDs

Buffalo Interrogating suspected IED

Husky

AN/PSS 14
 Sustain Soldier QOL
sustaining, maintaining and optimizing a viable quality of life for MND-N Soldiers

• 41 Division QOL team site assessments

• Weekly QOL Assessments by BDE and
BN Teams at 67 + Contingency Operating
Locations across MND-N

7 Focus Areas
• Living Conditions
• Shower and Latrine
• Food Service
• Commo (Spaware)
• MWR (Gym, AFN)
• Health (Medical Care, Field Sanitation)
• Other (REL SPT, Force Protection, Safety)
 Casualties Trends
OCT 07 – NOV 08

ec
D

• RTD for WIA: 68%

• RTD for DNBI: 74%
• 4,720 hours of rotary wing MEDEVAC flown in MND-N carrying 2011 patients
 MND-N Casualties
DECEASED WIA CASUALTY
MONTH KIA DOW DNBD VSI SI NSI TOTAL
OCT 07 1 2 0 0 1 12 16
NOV 07 14 3 0 2 18 37 74
DEC 07 7 2 0 4 13 93 119
JAN 08 19 2 1 2 12 70 106
FEB 08 5 1 1 2 8 64 81
MAR 08 5 0 1 2 5 53 66
APR 08 5 4 2 1 10 60 82
MAY 08 0 3 0 1 2 63 69
JUN 08 7 1 1 1 9 64 83
JUL 08 0 3 1 1 6 80 91
AUG 08 0 0 2 1 7 55 65
SEP 08 0 1 1 2 2 49 55
OCT 08 0 3 1 0 1 36 41
NOV 08 2 1 5 3 7 24 42
DEC 08 2 0 0 0 2 3 7
CATEGORY TOTAL 67 26 16 22 103 763 997
TOTAL 109 888
 Distinguished Service Cross – 1
Silver Star – 8
Distinguished Flying Cross – 5
Soldier’s Medal – 3
Bronze Star for Valor – 54
Bronze Star – 4,210
Purple Heart – 702
Air Medal for Valor – 37
Air Medal – 813
Army Commendation Medal for Valor – 13
Army Commendation Medal – 1,131
Combat Infantry Badge (2nd Award) – 12
Combat Infantry Badge – 2,035
Combat Medic Badge – 229
Combat Action Badge – 3,628
 TF Iron
Observations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
 Division Observations from
the 07-09 Fight (1 of 4)
•Role of the DIV HQ
–In operations, MND-N, Task Force Iron served as an operational level
HQ.
–In line with FM 3.0/FM 3.07, DIVs promote economics, governance, and
rule of law, but do so without having subject matter expertise in key areas.
–There is a requirement for the integration of all non-DoD actors within the
DIV HQ staff through an MOU with the particular agency.

•Organization of the DIV HQ

–There is a distinction between the DIV & BCT “fight” in lethal versus non-
lethal operations.
–Must integrate PRT at DIV (as well as BCT) levels.
–Division/Task Force requires augmentation of G8, EWO, SJA, Medical,
CA, and Engineers, based on mission load beyond unit support.
 Division Observations from
the 07-09 Fight (2 of 4)
•MND in a “steady-state” environment
–Consider a rotational construct to maintain continuity, relationships, memory
(section, individual)
–Embed a staff team early (90-150 days) to gain better situational
understanding

•Training
–Redesign the BCTP training model.
–Integrate PRT/SOF/CIA/OCFI (interagency) into DIV train-up…NOT
replication, but duplicate.
–Critical requirement to gain understanding of HN governance, economics,
infrastructure, and rule of law systems beyond what is presented at the BCTP
seminars. (“REACH FORWARD” with SVTC and current TF)
–Incorporate “value chain analysis for dummies” for economic advancement.
–IO/PA training to shape conditions in the environment (must change the way
we prepare for this critical task).
–EWO requirement as an Army-specific task (no longer AF/USN).
–MRAP training for both home station and CTCs.
 Division Observations from
the 07-09 Fight (3 of 4)
•ISF Development
–Senior ISF leader development and enabler process development will be
driving the ISF focus of the future (potential for mini Marshall Center?).
–DIV/BCT staffs are not designed to “mentor” provincial Operations
Commands (rank structure).
–Attending Phoenix/COIN Academy in theater is too late. Need to understand
ISF organization, personalities, and processes prior to deployment. (“REACH
FORWARD”)

•Modular DIV/BCT Structure

–LNOs and Rear Detachment not part of the MTOE; must establish beyond
MSE.
–UAS company at AVN BDE (CAB) unsupported. Recommend build within
CAB due to safety and standardization issues.
–Requirements for enhanced logistics, engineers, fires, and intel for surge at
Division level.
–Policy on females below the BCT level must change.
–Dissimilar Intel capabilities at different types of BCTs defeats modular
capability (different MICOs in HBCT, IBCT, CAV REGT, and STRYKER).
 Division Observations from
the 07-09 Fight (4 of 4)
•Training Core/Directed Mission Tasks
–Must train with other non-DoD government agencies.
–Directed tasks will focus on Baghdad scenario while core tasks are oriented
on traditional Division C2 roles. Must do both.
–Plug into MND-B Battle Rhythm early. Regularly schedule events/SVTCs with
MND-B staff (real world vignette).
–Gain directed METL from higher HQ (I and/or III Corps) beginning in AUG 09.
–DIV Annual Training Guidance directed at Division staff and sent to BCTs
joining us in the fight.
 1 AD FRG Observations

The FRSA program is excellent but could be improved:

Allocation should be based on number of soldiers in a unit, not task organization.

There should be two FRSAs at the BCT level.

The hiring process needs simplification.

Modularization of the Army Structure has significantly hampered effective FRG

and Rear Detachment operations and in particular the Chain of Command
responsibilities and Chain of Concern effectiveness.

Currently there is no consistent standard from post to post.

Recommend DA must create a rear detachment / FRG certification process.

Recommend regional FRG leaders develop programs for coaching and mentoring
BCT senior FRG leaders. The traditional structure of the chain of concern no longer
exists.
 USAREUR FRG / Rear Detachment
Observations
Sustain current certifications and directives for rear detachments and family

readiness groups.

USAREUR has provided detailed instructions on the training and tasks

of rear detachment and family readiness groups. This is not the same
across the entire Army.

Due to legal and medical issues with stay behind Soldiers, the cadre of rear
detachments must be enhanced or chapter and medical boards must be
Expedited prior to deployment.
 USAREUR / CONUS FRG
Observations
There are some unique differences between a OCONUS and CONUS FRG:

Geographically disbursement of family support services – in CONUS almost

all family support services can be found at one convenient location. In
USAREUR this support may be dispersed over multiple locations and hours
Apart.

Civilian Support Agencies - In USAREUR the support services offered by

the Army are all that exist. In CONUS there are other available civilian
support agencies by city, county and state.

Direct family support for critical issues – in USAREUR, child care provided
by direct family members is not readily available in most cases because of the
great distances, money involved for travel, and housing limitations.

Family Support Agencies supporting each other - In USAREUR, family

support services can easily cover down on alternate locations, while in
CONUS the installations are too far apart to provide assistance support for
surge periods.
Summary