Biological containment

The concept of biocontainment is

related to laboratory biosafety.
Pretains to microbiology laboratories in
which physical containment of highly
pathogenic organisms is required.

Containment types
Primary containment
It is the first container direct contact
with
bio hazardous material
as well as protection of personnel
immediate laboratory environment
from exposure to infectious agents

Secondary containment
It is the protection of environment
external to the laboratory from
exposure to infectious materials .

Microbial containment
Microbial containments include
viruses;fungi;parasites and bacterial
agents .
Following the examples are :
Viral examples

Conti.
Hepatitis B has been one of the most
frequently occurring laboratoryassociated infections, and laboratory
workers are recognized as a high-risk
group for acquiring such infections

Laboratory Safety and Containment

Recommendations

HBV may be present

in blood
blood products of human origin, in urine,
semen, CSF and saliva.
i. Parenteral inoculation
ii. droplet exposure of mucous membranes
iii. contact exposure of broken skin are the
primary laboratory hazards.
iv. virus may be stable in dried blood or blood
components for several days.

 BSL-2 practices, containment

equipment, and facilities are
recommended for all activities
utilizing known or potentially
infectious body fluids and tissues.
Additional primary containment and
personnel precautions, described for
BSL-3, may be indicated for activities

Hendra Virus (formerly known as Equine Morbillivirus)

and Nipah Virus

Hendra virus infection of humans may be

respiratory, including hemorrhage and the lungs
resulting in meningitis.
In horses, infection usually causes pulmonary
oedema
Transmission: The exact mode of transmission
of these viruses has not been established.
Most clinical cases to date have been
associated with close contact or contact with
body fluids or blood of horses or pigs.

Laboratory Safety and Containment

Recommendations

BSL-4 is required for all work with

these viruses.
Once a diagnosis of Nipah or Hendra
virus is suspected, all diagnostic
specimens also must be handled at
BSL-4.
ABSL-4 is required for any work with
infected animals.

Fungal examples
Occupational Infections:
Three groups are at greater risk of
laboratory acquired infections:
Microbiologists, Veterinarians and
Pathologists
Pulmonary infections have occurred
by the inhalation of conidia from
mold form cultures along with
pneumonia and osteolytic lesion
case.

 Mold from cultures, containing infectious conidia,

may become a hazard of aerosol exposure.
Laboratory safety and containment
recommendations:
BSL-2 and ABSL-2 practices, containment equipment
and facilities are recommended for activities with
clinical material, animal tissues, yeast-form cultures
and infected animals.
BSL-3 practices, containment equipment and
facilities are required for handling mold-form
cultures and soil or other environmental samples
known or likely to contain infectious conidia.

Histoplasma capsulatum
Occupational infections:
Pulmonary infections have resulted from
handling mold form cultures
Local infection has resulted from skin puncture
during autopsy of an infected human, from
accidental needle inoculation of a viable culture
and from spray from a needle into the eye
Collecting and processing soil samples from
endemic areas has caused pulmonary
infections in laboratory workers

Laboratory safety and containment

recommendations:
BSL-2 and ABSL-2 practices, containment equipment
and facilities are recommended for handling and
processing clinical specimens, identifying isolates,
animal tissues and mold cultures, identifying cultures in
routine diagnostic laboratories and for inoculating
experimental animals.
BSL-3 practices, containment equipment and facilities
are recommended for propagating cultures in the mold
form as well as processing soil or other environmental
materials known or likely to contain infectious conidia

Bacterial examples
Bacillus anthracis
LABORATORY SAFETY AND CONTAINMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The primary hazard to laboratory personnel are:
direct and indirect contact of broken skin with
cultures and contaminated laboratory surfaces,
accidental parenteral inoculation, and rarely
exposure to infectious aerosols.
Efforts should be made to avoid aerosols. In
addition all centrifugation should be done using
aerosols tight rotors.

 BSL-2 practices, containment equipment, and

facilities are recommended for activities using
clinical materials
diagnostic quantities of infectious cultures.
BSL-3 practices, containment equipment, and
facilities are recommended for working
involving production qualities or high
concentration of cultures, screening
environmental samples from anthrax
contaminated locations, and for activities with
the high potential for aerosol production.

Burcella species
LABORATORY SAFETY AND CONTAINMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The primary hazard to laboratory personnel
are: direct and indirect contact of broken skin
with cultures and contaminated laboratory
surfaces, accidental parenteral inoculation,
and rarely exposure to infectious aerosols.
Efforts should be made to avoid aerosols.
In addition all centrifugation should be done
using aerosols tight rotors.

 BSL-2 practices, containment equipment, and

facilities are recommended for activities using
clinical materials and diagnostic quantities of
infectious cultures.
BSL-3 practices, containment equipment, and
facilities are recommended for working
involving production qualities or high
concentration of cultures, screening
environmental samples from anthrax
contaminated locations, and for activities with
the high potential for aerosol production.