Hillier and Lieberman Problem

14.4-2 Page 746

Consider the game having the following
pay-off (to A) table:
Player B
Strategy
Player A

-2

2 -1

Use the graphical procedure to determine

the value of the game and the optimal
strategy for each player according to the
minimax criterion.
When B plays strategy

As Expected pay-off

3 x1-1(1-x1) = -1 + 4x1

-2 x1+2(1-x1) = 2 4x1

B2
(3/8, 1/2)
0
B1

x1

Thus A should play his strategies 1, 2

with probabilities 3/8, 5/8. And the value
of the game = 1/2.
Now if Bs optimal strategies are y1* and
(1-y1*), then
3 y1* - 2(1- y1* ) = 1/2
Or 5 y1* = 5/2 , i.e., y1* = 1/2 = y2*
Thus B should play his strategies 1, 2
with probabilities 1/2, 1/2.

Hillier and Lieberman Problem

14.4-3(a) Page 746
Consider the game having the following
pay-off (to A) table:
Player B
Strategy
Player A

Use the graphical procedure to determine

the value of the game and the optimal
strategy for each player according to the
minimax criterion

Hillier and Lieberman Problem

14.4-3(b) Page 746
Consider the game having the following
pay-off (to A) table:
Strategy
Player A

1
2
3
4

Player B
1
2

1
0
3
-3

3
1
5
-2

-1
4
-2
6

Use the graphical procedure to determine

the value of the game and the optimal
strategy for each player according to the
minimax criterion.
It is clear that the strategy 3 of player B is
dominated by the strategy 1 of player B, in
the sense that Bs pay-off to A is less
whatever strategy A plays. (Note 1 < 3, 0 < 1,
3 < 5, -3 < -2). Thus B should never play the
strategy 3 and the pay-off matrix becomes

Player B
Strategy

Player A

1
2
3
4

1
0
3
-3

-1
4
-2
6

Thus we first solve Bs problem graphically.

Let B play the strategies 1, 2 with

probabilities y1 and (1-y1). Thus
When A plays strategy

Bs expected pay-off (to A)

y1 (1-y1) = -1 + 2y1

4(1-y 1) = 4 - 4y1

3y1 2(1-y1) = -2 + 5y1

-3y1 +6 (1-y1) = 6 - 9y1

A4
A2

(2/3, 4/3)
A1
A3

Thus B should play strategy 1 with prob 2/3

and strategy 2 with prob 1/3 and the value of
the game = 4/3.

y1

Now we find As prob distribution. From the

graph we see that A should never play the
strategy 1. Thus x1 = 0. If x2*, x3*, x4* are
the optimal prob with which he plays the
strategies 2, 3, 4, then we find
x2*(4 4y1) + x3*(-2+5y1)+ x4*(6-9y1) 4/3
for all y1: 0 y1 1.
This becomes an equality when y1 = 2/3.
Hence (4/3)x2*+ (4/3) x3*+ (0)x4* = 4/3
Hence x2*+ x3* = 1 which implies x4* = 0

Now 3 x3* = 4/3 or x3* = 4/9 and so x2* = 5/9

Hillier and Lieberman problem

14.5-3 Page 747
Consider the game having the following payoff matrix. Solve it by LPP method
Player B
Strategy

Player A

1 4

-3

2 -1

3 2

-2

We now add 3 to each entry so that we get

the new pay-off matrix with all entries nonnegative.
Player B
Strategy

Player A

1 7

2 2

3 5

Putting u1 = x1/, u2 = x2/, u3 = x3/ , As

problem is
Minimize z = u1 + u2 + u3
Subject to 7u1 + 2u2 + 5u3 1
5u1 + 3u2 + 6u3 1
6u2 + u3 1
u 1 , u 2 , u3 0

Putting t1 = y1/, t2 = y2/, t3 = y3/ , Bs

problem is
Maximize w = t1 + t2 + t3
Subject to 7t1 + 5t2

2t1 + 3t2 + 6t3 1

5t1 + 6t2 + t3 1
t 1 , t 2 , t3 0
Solving we get: t1 = 8/91, t2 = 1/13, t3 = 9/91
+ t2 + t3 =1/ = 24/91.

t1

8 91 1
Thus y1 = t1 =

91 24 3
1 91 7

y2 = t2 =
13 24 24
9 91 3
y3 = t3 =

91 24 8

And the value of the game

91
19
= - 3 = 24 3 24

Also from the optimal tableau of Bs LPP, we

read out optimal values of u1, u2, u3 as
8
u1 =
91

15
u2`=
91

1
u3 =
91

8 91 1

Hence x1 = u1 =
91 24 3
15 91 5

x2 = u2 =
91 24 8
1 91 1

x3 = u3 =
91 24 24

Basic w

t1

t2

t3

s1

s2

s3

Sol

-1

-1

-1

s1

s2

s3

-2/7 -1

1/7

1/7

t1

5/7

1/7

1/7

s2

11/7 6

-2/7 1

5/7

s3

17/7 1

-5/7 0

2/7

Basic w

t1

t2

t3

s1

s2

s3

Sol

-1/42

4/42

1/6

11/42

t1

5/7

1/7

1/7

t3

11/42

-2/42 1/6

5/42

s3

91/42

-28/42 -1/6

7/42

8/91

1/91

24/91

t1

33/91 5/91

-30/91 8/91

t3

3/91

-11/91 9/91

t2

-4/13 -1/13

15/91

17/91

6/13

7/91

Problem 1 Set 14.4C Page 541

On a picnic outing, 2 two-person teams are
playing hide-and-seek. There are four hiding
locations (A, B, C, and D), and the two
members of the hiding team can hide
separately in any two of the four locations.
The other team will then have the chance to
search any two locations. The searching team
gets a bonus point if they find both members
of the hiding team.If they miss both, they lose
a point. Otherwise, the game is a draw.

(a) Set up the problem as a two-person zerosum game.

(b) Determine the optimal strategy and the
value of the game.
Thus each team has 6 strategies, namely,
AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD
The pay-off matrix (to the searching team) is
given below:

Hiding team
StraAB
tegy

AC

AD

BC

BD

CD

AB

-1

-1

AD

-1

BC

-1

BD

-1

CD

-1

Searching
AC
Team

Since max (Row minima) = -1 and

min (Col maxima) = 1,
the game has no saddle point. We go in for
mixed strategies. Adding 1 to each entry, the
new pay-off matrix is:
AB
AC
AD
BC
BD
CD

AB
2
1
1
1
1
0

AC
1
2
1
1
0
1

AD
1
1
2
0
1
1

BC
1
1
0
2
1
1

BD
1
0
1
1
2
1

CD
0
1
1
1
1
2

The hiding teams problem is:

Maximize w = t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6
1

Subject to 2t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5
+

t6 1

+ t5 +

t6 1

t1 +2t2 + t3 + t4
t1 + t2 + 2t3

t1 + t 2 +
2t4 + t5 + t6 1
t1 +
t3 + t4 + 2t5 + t6 1
t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + 2t6 1
t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6 0

Solving, using TORA, we get

t1= 0.5, t2= 0.0, t3= 0.0, t4= 0.0, t5= 0.0, t6= 0.5
The optimal tableau also gives
u1= 0.0, u2= 0.0, u3= 0.5, u4= 0.5, u5= 0.0, u6= 0.0
Also tj = ui = 1. Hence
x1= 0.0, x2= 0.0, x3= 0.5, x4= 0.5, x5= 0.0, x6= 0.0
y1= 0.5, y2= 0.0, y3= 0.0, y4= 0.0, y5= 0.0, y6= 0.5
And the value of the game is 1-1 = 0.