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Go To Market

Strategy
Go To Market Strategy

How a Firm Serves its Customers with a


Combination of
Sales
Financing
Logistics
Service
Evolution of the Sales
Function

Talking Providing Adding Value


Brochure Technical To The
Plus And Service Customers
Delivery Van Support Operations
Connecting with Customers
Engineering Company
Lead Technical
Industries Post Sales
Generation Solutions

Chemical Industry Specialists

Power
Industry Specialists
Generation

Dairy Equipment Industry Specialists

Engineering Industry Specialists

Fertiliser Industry Specialists


Connecting with Customers
Office Automation Company
Lead Technical
Products Post Sales
Generation Solutions

Desktop Systems

Activity Specialists

Activity Specialists

Activity Specialists
Servers

Switches

Printers

Scanners
Connecting with Customers
Power Products Company
Lead
Technical Post
Products Generatio Sales
Solutions Sales
n

Alternators

Product Specialists

Product Specialists
Activity Specialists

Activity Specialists
Turbines

Transformers

Switchgear

Control
Systems
Go To Market Activities

Sales and Marketing Channels


Agents/
Direct Value
Represent Tele Independe
Sales Added Retailers
atives Channels nt Partners
Force Partners
Go To Market Activities

Sales and Marketing Channels

Agents/
Direct Value
Represent Tele Independe
Sales Added Retailers
atives Channels nt Partners
Force Partners

Geo-
graphicall Large, Mid
Retail
Large New Geo- y Small Size, Small
Customer
Accounts graphies Dispersed Accounts and Retail
s
Mid Size Customers
Accounts
Channels by Association Levels

Company
Company Owned
Connected

Permanent Representatives
Direct Sales Force
Authorised Agents
Company Tele Sales
Exclusive Distributors
Web Site
Franchisees
Company Retail Outlets
Dealerships
Company Catalog
Joint Ventures
Channels by Association Levels

Independent
Independent
Partners
Whole Salers
Distributors
Dealers
Co-Sellers Independent Agents
Collaborators Value Added Partners
System Integrators Independent Retailers
Direct Mail Companies
Catalog Based Retailers
Internet Intermediaries
Customer Needs and Preferences

Value Complex
Convenience Products, Occasional,
Business Facility
of Ordering High Low Value
Customer Manager
at Own Time Support Purchases
and Pace Needs

Company
Sales Force Few Retailers
Web
Represen Distributor Distributor
Channel Company
tative s, Wide s
Incoming Sales Force
Agent Range of Web
Tele Sales
Distribut Products Channel
or
Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Need Assessment
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Complex Communication
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Total Soultions
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Self Service
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
On Site Support
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
24*7 Availability
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Fast Local Support
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Relationship
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Effectiveness in
Performing Functions
Economy
E-Channels

Direct Mail

Tele Sales

Retail

Resellers

Value Added Resellers

Direct Sales Force

Strategic Account Team

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5


Efficiency Effectiveness
Continuum
Lead
Generation
Efficiency
Prospecting
Qualifying
Prospective Customer
Pool

Value
Effectivenes Addition
s Closure
Post Sales
Average Cost Per Contact for Lead Generation (Rs.)

Company Sales Force

Representative

Trade Fair

Direct Mail

Advertising

Telemarketing

Digital Marketing

Web Site

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500


High Touch and Low Touch
Channels
Mass
Advertisi
ng
Direct
Mail

Internet
Efficiency

Telesales

Sales
Force
Specialis
edSales
Force

Effectiveness
Combining High Touch and Low Touch
Channels- Ancillary Products

Lead Qualificatio Fulfilment/


Pre Sales Closure
Generation n Support

OEM Sales Force Specialised Sales Force


Internet
and
Telesales
Dealershi Channel
Authorised Resellers
ps

Independe
nt Repair Industrial Distributors
Shop
Value Networks

Level I Level II
Level II Level I
Intermediar Intermediar
Suppliers Suppliers
y y
Level I Level II
Level II Level I
Company Intermediar Intermediar
Suppliers Suppliers
y y
Level I Level II
Level II Level I
Intermediar Intermediar
Suppliers Suppliers
y y

Facilitators Facilitators Facilitators Facilitators Facilitators


Supply Chain
vs
Demand
Chain
Supply Chain Management
Push Strategy
Supplier Level Warehouse Supplier Level Producer
II I

Producer Warehouse Wholesaler Retailer


Demand Chain Management
Pull Strategy

Supplier Level Warehouse Supplier Level Producer


II I

Producer Warehouse Wholesaler Retailer


Cross Docks

Retailer Retailer Retailer III Retailer IV


I II

Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier


I II III IV
Cross Docks

Retailer Retailer Retailer III Retailer IV


I II

CROSSDOCK

Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier


I II III IV
Vendor Managed Inventories

Vendor

Vendor

Retailer

Vendor

Vendor
Develop Channel Value Creation
Potential Add or Shift to
A Better
Channel
Option

Supplier Channel Customer

Improve Improve Improve


Channel Channel Customer
Interface Operation Interface

Add Value To
End Customer
Directly
CISCO Systems
Cisco Systems
Leonard LenBosack and
Sandra SandyLerner
CISCO Financials 2001
2003
2001 $ Bn Loss on $ 20 Bn Sales
2003 : $ 3.6 Bn Profit on $ 18 Bn Sales
The Turnaround Story
The Turnaround

Halted Acquisitions
Reduced models from 33,000 to 24,000
Cut 8,500 jobs
Reduced vendors from 1400 to 400
Reduced VARs from 6000 to 3000 worldwide
and 2200 to 1000 in USA
Go To Market Strategy

Previously focus on R & D, Engineering and


Product Development
Renewed Focus on Sales and Go To Market
Strategy
The New
Channel
Strategy
Coverage and Routes to
Market
Tier A: Top 1 100 enterprise accounts and 25
service providers Intense Interface
Tier B: The next 125-10,000 customers with a
collaborative channel partnership High Degree of
Interface
Tier C: The next 10,000 to 100,000 customers with
significant channel activity and marketing support
Medium Degree of Interface
Tier D: Nearly 1 mn small business customers Low
level and Cisco Interface, high level of marketing
Tier E: Nearly 10 mn consumer accounts served
through retail and or web, with heavy marketing and
promotional support
Tier A: The Top 1-100 Enterprise
Accounts and about 25 Service
Providers. Intense Interface

Tier B: The next 125-10,000 customers, with


a collaborative channel partnership

Tier C: The next 10,000- 100,000 customers with


significant channel activity and marketing support.
Medium Degree Interface
Tier D: The Nearly 1 Mn Small Business Customers. Leads
sourced by Channel Partners. High level of Marketing by
CISCO

Tier E: The Nearly 10 Mn Consumer Accounts served through Retail


and/or Web. Heavy marketing and promotional support.

Coverage and Routes to


Market
Challenges

Each market segment has unique requirements


One size fits all strategy will not work
New Products being introduced to capture
adjacent markets
Evolution of Markets

Customer needs become more sophisticated


Standardised Products evolve into customised products
Customised Products come together to term unique
solutions
The Value Added Reseller

Develop close understanding of customer needs


Integrate hardware, software and Third Party Products
Customised Solutions
Pre Sales Services: Planning, Design
Post Sales Services: Installation, Support, Remote
Monitoring
CISCO Product Range

Routers: Route Traffic through Network


Switches: Establish and Terminate Connections through Network
Voice over Internet Protocol: Voice transmitted as Data
Security : Protection from unauthorised access
Unified Communications: Technology that integrates Voice,
Video, data, Mobility in the network
New Product Push

Home Networking
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Telephony
Storage Networking
Wireless
Optical
Security
Unified Communications
CISCOs Explosive
Growth
Ciscos explosive growth was powered by the
growth of the internet
Dot Coms spurred brick and Mortar companies
to go online
A flood of ISPs came into existence
Heightened demand of technology companies
took the NASDAQ Index from 1835 in March 98
to 5132 in March 2000
When the Dot Com crash happened the
NASDAQ Index plummeted to 1619 in April 2001
ISPs that hosted the dotcoms went out of
business
Routes to Market

In the early 1990s CISCO sold directly to


customers who asked for their products
As the market exploded in the 1990s CISCO
started relying on channel partners
Partners added Unique Value
CISCO could not grow its Salesforce fast enough
to cope with the flood of requirements
CISCO followed a Divide and Grow Policy
As sales in a territory grow, they divided the
territory in half and maintained the target per
territory
Routes to Market

1.Direct

2.System
Houses:
IBM,HP
CISCO 3.Telecom Business
Services: SBC Customers

4.Value Added
Resellers
5.Direct
2 Tier Resellers:
Distributo CDW
rs
Linksys 6.Retailers: Retail
CompUSA Customers
Routes to Market

Growth Path Channel 1 and 2


In North America CISCO started with Channel 1
Quickly added 2,3 and 4 during growth years
Channel 2 included IT Consultants and System
Houses like IBM, HP and Accenture
These executed turnkey solutions
Growth Path Channel 4

Traditional Value Added Resellers


Focused on Networking Products and Services
Customers were enterprise accounts with 1000
employees to mid level and small business
Growth Path Channel 5

Channel 5 served many dispersed small


customers requiring standardised products from
CISCO
Low cost was key
CISCO used centralised distributors like Tech
Data, and Ingram Micro which provided efficient
stocking, logistics and fulfilment
Growth Path Channel 6

Acquisition of LinkSys, a home Networking


supplier
Channels 5 and 6 accounted for less than 10%
of CISCOs Sales
The Wholesale Channel made 5-7% Gross
Margins
The retail channel made 20% gross margin
CISCO Sales Force
Composition
Total Strength 10,000 salespeople worldwide
4500 Customer Account Managers
4500 Sales Engineers
1000 Channel account Manager
Sales force and Channel
Responsibility
For Direct Customers the Sales team generated
and fulfilled orders
For Channels 2 to 6, the sales team facilitated
sales but fulfilment was through channel
partners
Demand Generation

78% of Sales generated by prospects generated by the


company sales team
Prospects generated by account managers and system
engineers using high touch approach
Direct Sales force targeted
1000 employment customers from HQ
500 to 1000 employee organisations from Territories
22% of Sales generated by Channels prospecting on
their own
Fulfilment

CISCO Manufactured products through contract


manufacturers in multiple plant locations
worldwide
The Channel partners helped in Integration of
units coming from different locations and
served as a staging point
Markets and Competitors

Three major markets


One: Core Corporate Networking Gear Market
Sold to Enterprise and SMB accounts
Two: Telecommunication Service Providers
Three: Consumer Markets
Corporate Networking
Gear Market
Enterprise Accounts : 70%
SMB Segment : 40%
SMB Segment Size : $ 20 Bn
In the Enterprise segment CISCO was the
undisputed leader
In the SMB Segment CISCO competed with HP,
Nortel, 3 Com and Huawei
Telecom Service Provider
Market
TSP Market Size $ 50 Bn
Fragmented Market CISCO share 5%
In top end Market of $ 3 Bn, the CISCO share
25%
Competitors were Nortel, Juniper, Siemens,
Alcatel and Lucent
If the Top End, Juniper was the market leader
with 30% share
CISCO was working on products like Carrier
Routing System (CRS-1), considered the fastest
in the world
Consumer Market

Post the Linksys acquisition CISCO sales


doubled to $ 800 mn
CISCO Market share was 40%
Aggressive competition from Netgear and D-link
High pressure on Margins, 50% of Corporate
Networking Gear business
CISCO Partner Program
Pyramid
Gold: 42% Discount

Silver: 40% Discount

Premier: 38% Discount

Authorised Reseller
The VAR Channel

VARs given Gold, Silver and Premier Status


based on based on Sales Volume criteria
Higher status translated into higher margins
Crash of 2001

Post Dot Com crash of 2001 Management revamped


the Go-To-Market Strategy
CISCO changed channel partner requirements from
Volume to Value
From 6000 gold , silver and premier partners to 3000
In the US market it came down from 2200 to 1000
Commercial terms linked to Certification and
Specialisation requirements and not linked to Sales
Volumes
Value Engagement model would bring resellers early
into the selling cycle
Effects of Slowdown

Before slowdown the price distribution between


Hardware and Services was 2/3 to 1/3
Post slowdown it was 1/3 to 2/3
The Channel split into two classes
One: Large solution Houses like IBM and HP
Two: Small niche players specialising in regions,
technologies and vertical markets
The Mid tier resellers disappeared
VARs which did not significant services were in
the Valley of Death
Fierce Channel Conflict erupted
Post Crash of 2001

Juggernauts
Big Solution Juggernauts
Houses like Big Solution
IBM, HP Houses like
IBM, HP
Large Resellers
who Pushed
Death Valley
Boxes with
little Value
Addition Specialised
Specialised Resellers
Resellers Delivering High
Delivering High Value Addition
Value Addition
Problem with Volume
Based System
Business concentrated among large Partners
10 Partners out of 6000 accounted for 30% of Partner Sales
Higher discounts to big Partners helped big Partners grow bigger
Small VARs capable of adding more Value could not compete on
Price
Small VARs started exciting ever when they had higher solutions
capabilities
Need for Value Based
System

Introduction of new technologies


Large Partners had no incentive to adapt
Pre 2001 Volume Based
Model
Percentage of
Partners

Value Add
Sales Force Coordination
Focus on better coordination between Sales Force and
Direct Sales Force
CISCO moved from Neutral Engagement to Value
Engagement
Bringing in Partners at an early stage of the Sales Cycle
Earlier the Partner came in post price negotiation only
at the fulfilment stage
After price negotiation there was little scope for value
addition
CISCO partner support took the initiative to understand
Partner Objectives, Business Models and Strengths
Sales Force Coordination
Created Playbooks, a ready reckoner which
defined staffing requirements for various CISCO
offerings
CISCO developed a Channel MBA Course for its
enterprise sales teams
We need to help partners build their service
practice not just say You need a service practice
VAR Response: We understand the intent But if all
depends on how well they drive this program down
to the feet on the street.
Service Provider
Initiatives
Post the 2001 meltdown CISCO insisted on
Hardware and Service Bundling by Solution
Providers
Solution Providers now had to combine Carrier
Contract, Network Management, e-commerce
storefront, Solutions Design Services and Hardware
into one point of contact for SMB and Enterprise
customers
Customer could now outsource responsibility for
Internet Services and communication to a single
solution provider.
Wall Street Intervention

Wall Street Traditionally oriented towards


Sales Revenue Growth started watching Profits,
discouraging price competition
Territory Allotment

Value Added Resellers not allotted territories


Nature and capability to add value varies widely
Hence customers free to choose VARs irrespective of
Geographic location
CISCOs Limitations

No formal training and Certification System for CISCO


Partners
Understanding of Partner business models inadequate
Understanding of Partner financials inadequate
Weakening Customer
Experience

Customer experience was weakening


CISCO had no measurement system to track customer
satisfaction
Volume to Value Based
Partnerships
As complexity grew, emphasis was on the ability to add
value
Partner Program Linked rewards with Value instead of
Volume
Value Add Framework

Extent of Partner involvement in CISCO technologies


Sales of Key CISCO advanced technologies
End customer satisfaction with the Partner in CISCO
Transactions
Partner Profitability
Improving Reseller
Service Levels
CISCO rigorously measured customer satisfaction
for direct and reseller customers
Independent Third Party research houses conducted
survey
Minimum 30 customers surveyed for each reseller
Survey covered Pre-sales and Post-Sales support
Evaluating Reseller
Service Levels
Responsiveness
Communications
System Engineer Availability
Skill Levels
Ability to diagnose problems
Improving Reseller
Service Levels
Resellers could access results online
Diagnostics on how to improve provided
Underperformers received a 6 Month Get Well
period and support
Tier Reorganisation
Volume Vs. Value
Tiers were reorganised by capability and not by
volume of sales
The more specialisations a reseller had, the more
points it was awarded
The CISCO Channel structure become unique in the
industry
Small but highly skilled solutions houses could
compete with larger ones
CISCOs ability to measure customer satisfaction
allowed smaller partners to outshine and prove
themselves
Key Activities and Outcomes in Value Based Framework

Key Channel Performance Outcomes


Customer
Sales of Advanced
Partner Profitability Satisfaction with
Technologies
Partners

Identify Partner Tie Incentives to


Enable Partner
Value Add Value Add
Value Add
Opportunities Outcomes

Key Management Actions


Volume Vs Value Based Channel Management
Volume Based Value Based
Channel Channel
Management Management
Exclusive Geographic Territories No No
Partner Quotas No No
Requirement to be trained through technology
No Yes
specialisations to gain access to subject products
Measurement of End Customer Satisfaction with
No Yes
partners
Identification of Key Customer Facing Value Add
No Yes
Behaviours to be Rewarded
Reward Structure Discount for Discount for
Volume Value Addition
Performance Performance
Holdbacks, Technology Rebates tied to Customer
Satisfaction Targets paid outside the transaction No Yes
cycle
CISCO Partner Program
Pyramid
Gold: 42% Gold: 42%
Discount Discount
5% of Sales 15% of Sales

Silver: 40% Discount Silver: 40% Discount


5% of Sales 10% of Sales

Premier: 38% Discount Premier: 38% Discount


90% of Sales 75% of Sales

Volume Based Tiers Value Based Tiers


Resulting Program
Partners increasing and maintaining upfront and
ongoing investments in training and certification
Selling advanced technologies
Customers satisfaction increasing
Over $30 Bn sales in 2009
Driver by 280,000 individuals in 55000 VARs, System
Integrators, Services Providers, Network Consultants
CISCO Partner Certification Framework Enables Partners
to Benefit from Both Breadth and Depth of Expertise

Master
Depth of Technology Expertise

Any 2 Adv. Adv. R&S Adv. UC


Spezns. Spezn Spezn
Advance
Any Adv. Adv. Sec Adv. WLAN
d
Spezn. + UC Spezn Spezn

Express
Express 2 CCIEs 4 CCIEs
Foundation
SMB Spezn. Spezn.

Select Premier Silver Gold

Breadth of Technology Expertise


Structure of CISCOs Channel incentive Program

Solution
Incentive Business Solutions
Program
Opportunity
Identification
Program
Partner Profitability

Technology
Migration
Integrated Technologies
Program

Value
Incentive Technology Specialised
Program

Individual Products

Partner Value Add


Fall out of Channel
Restructuring
The lowest range of partners Premier Partners severely
affected
Partner strength came down from 6000 to 3000
Competition among Resellers and Channel Conflict reduced
Distribution of Partners which was 5% Gold, 5% silver and
90% Premier changed to 15% Gold, 10% Silver and 75%
Premier
CISCO Products formed a high share of the Resellers total
revenues (30% to 70%)
With higher focus on solutions and loss emphasis on price
competition there were now fewer ankle biters in the
competition
A Solution Provider Commented : The future is in Value
added services
New
Competitors
Telecom Service
Providers
Compared to Resellers, TSPs were large companies
like AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, Worldcom and SBC
Telecom Cos threw in a router or two free just to
sweeten the deal
New Competitors- TSPs

End User
Telecom Service Providers Networking Service
Behemoths who Owned the Wires Providers-
Value Added
Resellers

End User
Networking
Telecom Service Providers
Service
Behemoths who Owned the Wires
Providers-
Letting the Wolves into the Hen House
Value Added
Resellers
Channel Discounts

Gold Partners could offer 42% Discounts TSPs


offered 45% and more
CISCO has created a partner that is running
amok
How will they reel it in now?
Letting the Wolves into
the Henhouse
In December 2003, CISCO announced a
marketing agreement with a large Telecom
Service Provider SBC communications and
select solution providers
The Solution Provider got the commission for
Hardware sales and the monthly commission on
carrier services
The lucrative network management service
commission went to SBC
Letting the Wolves into
the Henhouse
The solution providers had spent millions of
dollars to develop capabilities which were now
unutilised due to the TSPs involvement
If the TSPs chose to integrate downstream the
solution providers would face serious
competition
This was like letting the wolves into the hen
house
CISCOs Intervention

CISCO intervened with Telecom Service


Providers to enable Solution Providers offer
bundled services including Telecom services
without having to deal with Telecom Service
Providers
New Competitors- TSP

End User
Telecom Service Providers Networking Service
Behemoths who Owned the Wires Providers-
Value Added
Resellers

End User
Networking
Telecom Service Providers CISCO Service
Behemoths who Owned the Wires Interface Providers-
Value Added
Resellers
New Competitors:
Large Systems Houses
CISCO got products specified by Network
Storage Makers IBM, HP, Hitachi and EMC
This created another channel for CISCO
Products in competition with VARs
Online Sales A new
threat
CISCO was a Pioneer in web enabled support
tools
Resellers could access the CISCO website,
configure products based on requirements and
obtain prices online
As this tool become well developed, CISCO
opened up a direct online sales channel
Online Retailers

CISCO contracted with online Retailers, CDW,


Insight, PC Connection, Micro Warehouse in
order to expand direct sell options
Online customers had the option of buying
through a Systems Integrator or an Online
Retailer
The thrust was directed at recovery through
Retail Customer Sales
Network in a Box

Simplified toolkit of Pre Configured Routers,


switches and Accompanying Gear
No Networking skills needed to Install
With Configuring and pricing tools available bigger
customers expected to buy from Online retailers
Blueprint for a Future Route-
To-Market Strategy
In 2000 CISCO acquired Linksys
Linksys made home networking equipment and had 39%
share
The SOHO market was growing by 35% annually
Crisco's growth strategy was two fold
Low end SOHO products growing at 35%
High Tech new technology products growing at 40-45%
against 15% in the core technologies
The new technology markets were expected to grow to $
1 Bn businesses
The new technologies had potential to generate derived
demand for the core products
VOIP Telephony

CISCOs IP Telephony targeted the $ 750 Bn


Telecom equipment market
Internet phone system market was expected to
grow from $ 3.5 Bn to $ 8 Bn in 2008
CISCO offered a suite of products for Internet
Telephony
Voice VARs
Traditionally CISCO VARs were geared to offer data
centric solutions
Voice solutions were sold by VARs who sold
conventional telephone systems
VOIP systems were lower priced and had lower
margins
Existing Voice VARs loyal to telephone companies
were reluctant to sell CISCO products
Telephony companies Nortel, Siemens and a
Lucent spinoff) quickly entered the VOIP market
and outperformed CISCO
Voice VARs

CISCO could woo Voice VARs


CISCO could get Data VARs to diversify into
Voice
CISCO could create new Voice VARs
If integration was a trend, asking Data VARs to
diversify into Voice made sense
Routes to Market
1.Direct

2.System
Houses:
IBM,HP
CISCO 3.Telecom Business
Services: SBC Customers

4.Value Added
Resellers
5.Direct
2 Tier Resellers:
Distributo CDW
rs
Linksys 6.Retailers: Retail
CompUSA Customers
What Should
be CISCOs
Next Move?