Wireless Public Key Infrastructure Security

and
Mobile Voting

Aamir Hirani
Mustafa Zaidi
Wajeeh ul Hassan
Paper’s Highlights

• This paper highlights various risks and

implications of Wireless PKI security
using ID Card Based PKI as benchmark for
Mobile voting.
Overview - Wireless PKI
• Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (WPKI) is a two-factor
authentication scheme using mainly the mobile phone and a laptop. It
is mainly promoted by banks, mobile operators, and mobile network
manufacturers.

• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) enables users to authenticate

themselves to web services, sign documents electronically and
encrypt text.

• PKI binds user identities to their public keys by means of certificate

authorities (CA).
• PKI Support security critical functionality such as
– Bank Transactions
– Digital Signing and
– E-voting.
CASE – Mobile Voting
• Estonia, country of 1.4 million people has
more than 1 million ID –PKI cards issued.
• Electronic signatures are used for contracts
and other legal documents. Banks recognize
the security of ID Card based PKI.
• Nation’s local elections, Parliament elections
used Electronic voting over Internet voting
based on ID-PKI.
• Problem – ID Card Reader NA, convenient to rely on portable
devices: MOBILE PHONES
Mobile Phones – “Handy” Solution
• Security critical applications utilize
– Computer and
– Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) for
authentication and electronic signatures.
• Ideally a mobile phone has 3 main components
integrated
– The Card – comprising the user’s certificate
– The Card Reader &
– Computer
Mobile Phones – “Handy” Solution (Contd..)

• Mobiil-ID is a technology that enables

personal identification and authentication
with a mobile phone.
• Mobiil –ID USIM card provides the usual SIM
card functionality and also incorporates the
private keys for authentication obviating the
need of physical ID card reader.
Stakeholders and Components
• USIM cards can be personalized allowing the
following to be loaded onto the card
– Public and private keys for authentication and
digital signatures
– 2 PINs and 1 PUK for authentication and digital
signatures and
– PIN and PUK codes for protecting and unblocking
the USIM card.
Stakeholders and Components
USIM card USIM card
USIM card USIM Card Personalized
personalization logistics service
Developer for USIM card
provider provider
Personalization
Procure Store & Distribute
card in RA offices

Mobile Operator
Registration
Authority (RA)
User

Card Bound to
user’s identities

Application Trust Service Certificate

Provider Provider Authority
Stakeholders and Components
USIM card Procure Store & Distribute card in RA Registration
logistics service offices Authority (RA)
provider

WPKI In charge of User Registration, Certificate

Management Handling and the main services

Registers users, issues USIM cards &

Registration
provide Customer Care on behalf of
Authority
Certificate Authority (CA)
Stakeholders and Components
Certificate CA Manages certificate activation,
Authority (CA) suspension, revocation, and storage.

Handles authentication and signing

Trust Service requests from Application Providers,
Provider (TSP) communicating with Mobile Operators
(MO), the CA for certificate and Validity
Checks

Communicates with users and the TSP by

Mobile
means of Subsystems such as over-the air
Operators
(OTA) server and SMS center
WPKI Security Study
• In Estonia Mobiil-ID technology is new and people
are concerned about its security.
• The security study began with High Level Risk
Assessment examining WPKI stakeholders,
processes, systems, major assets, threats and risks.
• Main types of threats focused on
– General Threats related to Legal issues
– Cryptography
– Software Development, technical threats and
– M-Voting Threats
WPKI Security Study (Contd..)
• Risks with WPKI
– Risks associated with WPKI are of
• Information security
• Integrity
• Confidentiality
• Authenticity
• Non repudiation &
• Availability
WPKI Security Study (Contd..)
• As many as 50 risks were identified which were
compared to similar risks in ID-PKI.
• E.g. The study ignored risks such as, insufficiency of
124bit RSA Keys that are of the same magnitude for
WPKI and ID-PKI (this does not specify WPKI
Specific Problem)
• Risk related to WPKI – The risk resulting from users
technical equipment being out of application
provider’s control is more probable in case of WPKI
Manageable WPKI Specific Risks
• The Risk within the Mobile Operator’s
Subsystem i.e. the Over the Air (OTA) Server
and SMS Center can be subject to Man in the
Middle Attack
• Mobile Operator must impose security
measures including the encryption
communication over VPN and securing LAN
with firewalls.
WPKI Specific Risks Requiring Attention

• WPKI is sensitive to attacks on mobile phones

in the case of ID-PKI.
• Mobile Operators are stakeholders for WPKI
their infrastructure, operational procedures
and organization must be compatible with
WPKI applications security requirements.
• Also Man in the middle attack between APs
and users are easier in WPKI than in ID-PKI.
WPKI Specific Risks Requiring Attention

• Compared with other authentication methods

one time passwords – WPKI enabled measures
help prevent many kind of attacks.
• ID-PKI authenticates the user based on both
her certificate and the server public key
certificate during the SSL session handshake.
This makes an MITM attack unrealistic.
Implications for M-Voting
• Electronic voting asks for additional
demanding security.
– Satisfy conflicting requirements of confidentiality.
– Auditability, preserving integrity of voting results.
Implications for M-Voting (Contd..)
• Electronic Voting Systems differ from one
another.
– Swiss E-voting systems lets voters use the internet
or mobile phones to cast votes . This system
applies two step encryption and citizens use
special password mailed to them.
– The I-Voting used in Estonia and several other
settings utilizes the “digital envelope”.
• Inner envelope has the encrypted vote.
• Outer envelope has digital signature.
Implications for M-Voting (Contd..)
• Various factors have to be considered to
determine if a particular voting system is
suitable. For e.g.
– 1. The type and criticality of election
– 2. Information and Communication technology
infrastructure etc…
• This should precede the political decision to
accept I-voting. There is no universal solution
but I-Voting and M-Voting can be considered
practicable.
WPKI Requirements and
Recommendations