Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Legal-Separatin Edited As of 3 20 2018
Legal-Separatin Edited As of 3 20 2018
When to file?
Facts: On March 21, 1996, Lucita Ong filed a Complaint for Legal
Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the RTC of
Dagupan City. She alleged the following:
1. That after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
2. That William would shout invectives at her like putang ina mo, gago,
tanga, and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against
concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand;
3. That William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of
their bodies using the buckle of his belt and that whenever she tried to stop
William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her;
4. And that On December 14, 1995, a violent quarrel ensued and William hit
her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her
on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the
head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house.
William for his part denied the charges and asserted
that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of
legal separation should not be granted, following the Family
Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied
when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Decree of Legal Separation should be
granted?
Held:
Yes. As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the
general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those
of the former.
• (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
2. Homosexuality
MANUEL ALMELOR VS RTC AND LEONIDA ALMELOR
G.R. NO. 179620, AUGUST 26, 2008
Facts: After 11 years of marriage, Leonida Almelor filed a petition to
annul their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity alleging
that, Manuel, her husband, concealed to her that he was a homosexual.
Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar
closeness to his male companions. She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession.Her worse fears were confirmed
when she saw Manuel kiss another man on the lips. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode.
Manuel, for his part, denied his wife's allegations and asserted that his
wife's action is based on an ongoing family rivalry as between Leonida's
family-owned hospital and his.
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but
Article 45 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage should be annulled based on
petitioner’s alleged homosexuality?
HELD:
No. The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no
basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally
make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." If so, the lower court
should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the
guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were
Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally
predominant among homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that
the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the
essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud.
In 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated the proceedings at bar and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce
from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo
Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.
ISSUE:
W/N a decree of legal separation should be granted?
HELD:
YES. In the Philippine jurisdiction, Vicenta Escaño's divorce and
second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid for her
previous union to Tenchavez must be declared to be existent
and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform
her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated
charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery."
4. Sexual Infidelity
FROILAN GANDIONCO VS HON. PENARANDA
G.R NO. 79284, NOVEMBER 27, 1987
Facts: Private Respondent, Teresita, the legal wife of the
petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for legal separation
on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and
payment for damages. She also filed a criminal case against
petitioner for concubinage. Subsequently, an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendente lite was filed by Teresita
and which was granted by the lower court.
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and
the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private
respondent.
It is petitioner's position that such civil action arises from, or
is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so
that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to
be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for
concubinage in the criminal case.
Issue:
W/N conviction for concubinage will have to be first
secured before the action for legal separation can prosper?
HELD:
No. A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage,
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action
for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others.
Jose and Serafina were married in 1938. In 1951, Jose discovered that
Serafina maintained illicit relations with a certain Arcalas. In 1955,
plaintiff again surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man.
When Serafina was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court,
she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation. Interpreting these
facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the lower court's ruling to deny the petition for being
based on a confession of judgement is proper?
2. W/N there is collusion in the present case?
1. NO. Article 100 of the Civil Code does not exclude, as
evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation
upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually
happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the
right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
Mandatory.
NOTE!
Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent
even if he fails to file an answer. In case of
summons by publication and the respondent failed
to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to
respondent at his last known address.
PRE-TRIAL
What are the contents of Pre-Trial Brief?
The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(1) A statement of the willingness of the parties to
enter into agreements as may be allowed by law,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(2) Their respective claims together with the
applicable laws and authorities;
(3) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of
facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal
issues;
(4) All the evidence to be presented, including
expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing
the nature and purpose thereof;
PRE-TRIAL
What are the contents of Pre-Trial Brief?
NOTE!
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its
required contents shall have the same effect as failure
to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding
section.
PRE-TRIAL
What is the effect of failure to appear at the
Pre-Trial?
If the petitioner fails to appear personally:
Dismissed, UNLESS his counsel or a duly authorized
representative appears in court and proves a valid
excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
When is it made?
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez
on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the
marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went
back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his
sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of
the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a
local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-
law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing,
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife
informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked
him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked
for his wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s
godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin
of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as
husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in
their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on
the information he received but instead of answering, she
merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation
of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal
separation.
ISSUE:
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and
Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the
action.
HELD:
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage.
b. Consent
People vs Sensano and Ramos
58 PHIL 73
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married and had a child whom the latter
allegedly abandoned when he went and stayed in Cagayan for three years without
letters or financial support to the former who worked hard for herself and her son
until she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who later took care of them.Ventura
charged Sensano and Ramos for adultery, found by the court guilty of the crime
charged and served their sentence.
Sensano after serving her sentence and leaving her paramour made steps to
reconcile with and go back to her husband but to no avail - She and her child were
abandoned for the second time. Thus, they went back to her co-accused Ramos.
Despite the knowledge that she resumed living with her co-defendant, her husband
did nothing to assert his right as her spouse. Instead, he went abroad for seven
years and presumably had completely abandoned them..
When Ventura returned home, he charged Sensano of adultery for the second time
in order to obtain divorce under Act No. 2710.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos can file adultery against his spouse
for the second time being the offended party.
HELD:
No. The Court concluded that the evidence in this case as well
as the conduct of Ramos showed that he consented to the
adulterous relations existing between the accused and former
co-defendant. He is therefore under the law not authorized to
institute the criminal proceeding.
William H. Brown filed a petition for legal separation from his wife, Juanita
Yambao, before the Court of First Instance of Manila on the ground of
adultery.
Brown is now praying for the confirmation of their liquidation agreement; for
custody of the children issued of the marriage; and that the defendant be
declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff and for other remedy as might
be just and equitable.
Now, because Juanita Yambao failed to file her answer to the
petition in due time, the trial court declared her in default and
ordered the City Fiscal to represent the state and investigate, in
accordance with Article 101 of the New Civil Code, if collusion
exists between the parties.
In the case at bar, the SC said that the petition for legal
separation should not be granted it being evident that Brown is
also guilty of co-habiting with a woman other than his wife. This
misconduct bars him from claiming legal separation in
accordance with the express provision of Article 100 of the new
Civil Code.
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting
and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to
Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that
she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within
which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an
answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare
the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received
plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a
defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance
thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal
separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public
interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree
be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their
answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering
its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal
separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or
not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take
care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
NOTE!
The appellant shall serve a copy of the Notice upon the
adverse parties.
LIQUIDATION, PARTITION AND
DISTRIBUTION, CUSTODY, AND
SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN
Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or,
in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of
judgment of the appellate court granting the petition,
the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, including custody
and support of common children, under the Family
Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
ISSUANCE OF DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION
When shall the court issue the Decree of Legal
Separation?
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation,
the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
FAMILY CODE
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the
following effects: